BERNARDINA BARTOLOME vs. SSS & SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES 1.

1. When the law does not make a distinction, we should not make a distinction. Ubi lex non
Limits on Rule-Making Power | November 12, 2014 | Velasco, Jr., J.
Nature of Case: Review of a Decision of Employees’ Compensation Commission via Rule 43
SUMMARY: At issue is the validity of Rule XV Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation implementing Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code, which interpreted the phrase “dependent
parents” to refer to “legitimate parents” and using it as a justification to deny the death benefit claims
of the biological mother of an employee covered by the ECP on the ground that the adoption decree
severed their parental relation and divested her of the status of a legitimate parent and, consequently,
that of being a secondary beneficiary under the ECP. In striking down the said phrase, SC ruled that it is
not only contrary to law because the Commission read into Art. 167 of the Labor Code an interpretation
not contemplated by the provision, but also contrary to the Constitution itself for being violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
DOCTRINE:
 Rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
 Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
FACTS:
 Scanmar Maritime electrician John Colcol died in 2008 on board the vessel Maersk Danville when steel
plates fell on him.
 At the time of his death, he was enrolled under the Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP),
unmarried, and childless.
 Petitioner, John’s biological mother and allegedly the sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits with SSS, but was denied on the ground that she was no longer considered as legitimate
parent of John, having given up the latter for adoption in 1985 to Cornelio Colcol, petitioner’s
grandfather.
o Consequently, the rights which previously belonged to the biological parent of the adopted child
shall now be upon the adopting parent.
o It was also not proven that Cornelio was no longer alive.
distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemos.
2. That general terms (“dependent parents”) should be understood in their general sense.
Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligenda.
ii. Par. 3 of Art. 7 NCC which provides administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
iii. The Equal Protection Clause under the Constitution which mandates similar treatment of
individuals who are similarly situated.
1. The rule failed to surpass the test of reasonableness1 since the classification (biological and
adoptive parents) is not germane to the policy of the law being implemented – i.e., that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in case of work-
connected disability or death.
c) OTHER POINTS:
i. The law also does not equate legitimacy to parental authority but assuming that it does, petitioner
would still be qualified, considering that when the adoptive parent died in 1987, the adopted was
only 4 years old. Thus, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents, otherwise no one would be left to care for the minor, contrary to the state
policy behind adoption (best interest of the child).
ii. The confluence of circumstances — from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration
of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear
intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary — effectively made petitioner entitled to death
benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary as a dependent parent.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED.

ISSUE & RATIO: W/N Rule XV Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation implementing
Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code is a valid exercise of ECC’s rule-making power – NO.
a) Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is a patently wayward
restriction of and substantial deviation from Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code:
i. Art. 167(j) LC provides that, in the absence of primary beneficiaries (dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children), the dependent parents, illegitimate children, and legitimate
descendants are the secondary beneficiaries.
ii. But when the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) promulgated the rules and
regulations governing the processing of claims and settlement of disputes as prescribed by SSS,
it interpreted the secondary beneficiaries under Art. 167(j) to refer to legitimate parents wholly
dependent upon the employee for regular support under Sec. 1(c)(1) of Rule XV.
iii. Therefore, ECC indulged in administrative legislation when it read into Art. 167 LC an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. See Doctrine.
b) Aside from deviating from the Code it’s supposed to implement (the Labor Code), said Rule is also void
for being violative of:
i. The rules on statutory construction that:

1Four requisites of the test of reasonableness: The classification: 3) Is not limited to existing conditions only; and
1) Rests on substantial distinctions; 4) Applies equally to all members of the same class.
2) Is germane to the purpose of the law;