But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways.
He continued living with
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct
for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without
pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court
on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent. [4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic
Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven
children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos
City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment
as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their
first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against
respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six
months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of
immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly
immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal
and separation from the service.[6]
Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea
Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along
Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a
ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was
done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution
thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from
the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the
misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against
them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was
forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and
protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed
upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him,
respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a
mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later
administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute
triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on
May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by
the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein
considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the
Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to
the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-
toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of
public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and
private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that
aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a
judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety. [11] For a judge is the visible
representation of the law, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of
strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the
law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. [13] Surely, respondent could not
have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. [14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is
also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as
officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered
with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he
resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. [16]Exacted from him, as a
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is
right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and
maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of
and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full
opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that
those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and
women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of
the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had
adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the
evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer
was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him
a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court,
respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife.The report of the
Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the
contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP
Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of
the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct
abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage
while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children,
show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral
indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could
not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril,
hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.
Purisima, J., no part.
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006 (P25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to the above-named accused at a designated place at the Coffee
Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said complainants in the
aforesaid amount of P25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government service." 5
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision disposed as
follows:
x--------------------------------x
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito S.
Perlas and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006
Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor,
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S. Hernandez
vs. and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. Costs against the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. accused.

DECISION "On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold Departure Order against him
embodied in this Court’s Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled."6
PANGANIBAN, CJ:

The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused. The second
This Court defers to the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard any cogent Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas’ Motion for New Trial.
reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft court’s findings. In any event,
after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court. 7
The Case
The Facts
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review1 assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,2 and the January
33 and 14, 20034 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194. Francisco SB. Acejas III The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery penalized under
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
"At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao Aoyagi and
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III and Jose P. Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila. His
Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads thus: purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 dated December 13, 1993, issued by BID
Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi,
through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he was
"That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and
VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking advantage of their official positions and "To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez who issued
committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police Officer 3 an undertaking (Exh. ‘B’) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi promised to
EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty. appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a guarantee for his appearance,
FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the passport.
OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the
"On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito ‘Dick’ Perlas 9 and informed him
spouses BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR.,
about the taking of her husband’s passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would refer their problem to
in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-
his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law
accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and out of said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao
Aoyagi and Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand
Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They discussed
the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December 20, 1993.
"As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M.
Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh. ‘6’ – Acejas). Atty.
Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what the ground
was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagi’s passport.
"Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. ‘5’ – Hernandez) which was submitted to Ponciano M.
Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao Aoyagi,
who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial investigation.
"In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco
Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who would
handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. ‘D’) dated December 22, 1993 was entered into by
Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the Lucenario Law Firm.
"In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the Domestic
Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas P40,000.00,
P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket fee (Exh. ‘O’). The
Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning flight was postponed.
"On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her
brother, Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr., about her husband’s passport.
"On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and told the
latter of Takao Aoyagi’s problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told Pelingon to
call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs. Aoyagi flew back to Manila.
"On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic Conanan and Akira
Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.
"Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun Pelingon,
Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.
"On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao Aoyagi’s
passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica Somera,
an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and Atty. Somera who
arranged the entrapment operation.
"On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee Shop of
the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested Dick Perlas, Atty.
Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked money
representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and Victoriano were brought to
the NBI Headquarters."10
Version of the Prosecution
Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno "Jun" Basaca Pelingon, Jr.,
and Carlos Romero Saunar.11
The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1 million as
consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a drug trafficker and
Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged "problem" and to facilitate the processing
of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the amount demanded, Conanan stated that
there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). 12
During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and government
enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of P300,000, but Pelingon said that
the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid another meeting.13
After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,14 Pelingon called up Dick Perlas to schedule
the exchange.
Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adds the
following facts:
"1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat Restaurant. [Acejas]
informed Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who confiscated
the passport of Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which allegedly were in
connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and Conanan arrived at the
Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas] never mentioned to the BID agents the P1 million lawsuit.
[Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his [Acejas’] bag.
"1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the amount of P1
million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent visa in
the Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagi’s lawyer, did nothing.
"1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko.
Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials and even the press
were after Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of
P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the
amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the
negotiations.
xxx xxx xxx
"1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel.
Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to
Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed to
Hernandez the envelope15 containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and motioned
 that [Acejas] be the one to receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed it beside him
and Perlas.
x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagi’s pass- port, he reminded the group of their earlier agreement
of ‘kaliwaan’, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1 million."16
Version of the Defense
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and Ponciano M.
Ortiz testified for the defense.17
To the Sandiganbayan’s narration, Hernandez adds:
"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), went to
the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and serve a Mission Order
issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on December 13, 1993, for the arrest of
Takao Aoyagi.
"7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husband’s passport, [Hernandez] found out that the
latter’s [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private respondents to go with him to
the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the BID office for investigation
on December 20, 1993. As security for said undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi entrusted to [Hernandez]
her husband’s passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in return, acknowledge[d] in the same instrument.
"8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared and that he can
pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was invited by Perlas to make
the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel Coffee Shop. Upon arrival thereat,
[Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas, Aoyagi’s counsel, and within less than ten minutes, he left
the coffee shop."18
In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:
"1. 18th December 1993 – The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco & Acejas was
engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"3. 22nd December 1993 –
"a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas] about the
facts regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the passport belonging to a
Japanese client. x x x.
"b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to ‘meet his brother-in-law Mr.
Expedito Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr. Takao Aoyagi.’
Thus, [Acejas] ‘met Mr. Perlas for the first time in the afternoon’ of this date.
"c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the Diamond
Hotel, where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the law firm decided
that the clients ‘can file an action for Replevin plus Damages for the recovery of the
Japanese passport.’
"d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client and the
law firm, thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way of ‘Case Retainer’s/Acceptance Fees’,
which was supposed to be payable ‘upon (the) signing (t)hereof’, and the sum of
Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee. However, the client proposed to pay half only
of the acceptance fee (Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for the
filing or docket fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the ‘balance
of Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery of the
Japanese passport’.
"e) The clients informed [Acejas] that ‘they are supposed to leave for Davao the
following day on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in Davao City; but
they promised that they will be back on the 26th, which is a Sunday, so that on the
27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the BID officers will have to be filed in
Court’.
xxx xxx xxx
"6. 27th December 1993 – ‘(T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the Japanese did
not come back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot be filed on the 27th
instead (it has) to wait for client’s instruction.’
"7. 4th January 1994 – ‘In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call from Mr.
Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was requesting for an
appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5, 1994’.
"8. 5th January 1994 – [Acejas] ‘met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr.’ including a
certain Nimoto Akira.
x x x.
"b) [Acejas] ‘told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but, of
course, the Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint and sign if
they want to pursue the filing of the complaint against the BID agents’.
 "c) For the first time, ‘Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the case’. x x "a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was already
x He ‘instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the BID agents.’ in Manila and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at lunchtime of
January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where he was billeted.
"d) Thereafter, ‘Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID agent who
confiscated the Japanese passport.’ ‘Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon were able to contact xxx xxx xxx
the BID agent’.
"c) x x x x x x x x x
"e) For the ‘first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez’, when the latter arrived and also
accused Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation ensued
"At this meeting, ‘the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and he was
between [Acejas] and [Hernandez] concerning the legal basis for the confiscation of
wondering why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when according to him he
the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of the Japanese passport x x x. Mr.
has already paid for the attorney fees. And so, [Acejas] explained to him that the case
Hernandez ‘said that if there are no further derogatory report concerning the Japanese
has to be filed and they still have to sign the complaint, the Special Power of Attorney
client, then in a matter of week (from January 5 to 12), he will return the passport’.
and the affidavit relative to the filing of replevin case. But the Japanese would not fully
understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised against the filing of the case saying that
"f) [Acejas] ‘gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese passport will not since there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the BID office, then the BID
be returned in one (1) week’s time, then (the law firm) will pursue the filing of the agents should return the Japanese passport.’
replevin case plus the damage suit against him including the other BID agents’.
xxx xxx xxx
"g) ‘x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing thereof saying
that his Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in his own words
"e) Thereafter, ‘Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr. Hernandez.’
‘magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money anyway].’
Since, they were able to contact the latter, ‘we waited until around 2:00 p.m.’. ‘When
Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the Japanese client is cleared at the BID office and
"9. 8th January 1994 – so, he can return the Japanese passport and he gave it to [Acejas]. x x x ‘When
[Acejas] received the Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the
documents and finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the
"a) Again, ‘Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the Japanese client
Japanese client.’
is now in Manila.’ Petitioner attended the meeting they arranged in ‘(Makati) and meet
Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez and Pelingon Jr. x x x.
"‘Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese across the table,
the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the table. x x x [Acejas] found it
"b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with anybody
strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things like that under the table. But
because anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.
nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was
seated at (his) right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from [Acejas] and finally handed
"c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] ‘met him for the second it over to Mr. Aoyagi.’ x x x. ‘After that, there was a little chat between Mr. Hernandez and the client, and
time. x x x [Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return the passport on or Mr. Hernandez did not stay for so long and left.’
before January 12, 1994, then the law firm will have no choice but to file the case
against him x x x. Again, for the third time Mr. Pelingon warned against the filing of the
"Still, thereafter, ‘(w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas] were
case because he said that he would directly negotiate with the BID agents.’
talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing to pay the
Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.’
"d) The Makati meeting ended up ‘with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez will
have to undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on or before January 12,
"‘Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to receive it while Mr.
1994.’
Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it.

"10. 12th January 1994 –

"Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope.

xxx xxx xxx

"Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was ‘signaling something’ as if "III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when it relied
there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When [Acejas] approached solely on the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr. in
Mr. Victoriano, he ‘said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front of the Diamond Hotel gate, somebody order to declare the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt of the
took the car’. [Acejas] ‘went out and checked and realized that it was valet parking so it was the parking accused.
attendant who took the car and transferred the car to the parking area’. [Acejas] requested ‘Mr. Victoriano
to get (the) envelope and the coat’, at the table.
"IV. Whether or not [respondent] court’s acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and its
conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the existence of a
"g) ‘When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car. When the car conspiracy.
arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr. Dick Perlas
coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents." They then ‘were taken to the NBI’,
"V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
except the accused Vladimir Hernandez."19
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery."30
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,20 as well as conspiracy in the commission of
the crime,21 had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;22 Perlas negotiated and dealt
"1. The Conspiracy Theory
with the complainants;23 and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it to Perlas.24

2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to client’s cause; lawful performance of duties
Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked up the envelope containing the
payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other accused. 26
3. ‘Instigation’ not ‘entrapment’
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the balance
of the law firm’s legal fees.27 If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to him, he should have 4. Credibility of witness and testimony
kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been pretending to protect his client’s
rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.28
5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the accused

The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of
Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be present 6. Elements of ‘bad faith’
during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994.29 His presence during one of those meetings, on January
5, 1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator. 7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)

The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas’ Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a new trial. 8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence"31

The Issues In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they raised are
therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:
The Court’s Ruling
"I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the conspiracy to
extort money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and convincing evidence. The Petitions have no merit.

"II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it Main Issue:
overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present as to warrant
[Hernandez’] complicity in the crime charged.
Finding of Guilt
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) "A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.

agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present; 2) xxxxxxxxx
accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains
from the performance of official duties.32
"Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport?

Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following elements:
"A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so when Mr. Perlas
1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another, 3)
handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my husband and he passed it
in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official
to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same.
duties.33

Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he was
merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate Takao Aoyagi.34 The
passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID office,
but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.35
"ATTY. ACEJAS:
"Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the money it pertains
to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x .

The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had taken "AJ ESCAREAL:
the passport of Takao Aoyagi.36 On various dates,37 he met with Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also
Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the
"Noted.
payoff,38 during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.39

Bethel Grace Aoyagi’s testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as follows: "PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR: "Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?

"A: No, sir.

"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?

"A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir. "Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?

"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas? "A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.

"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.

"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?

"Q: After that, what happened?

"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

"A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.

"INTERPRETER:

"Q: The passport?

"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.

"A: Yes, sir.

"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

"Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do?
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir. "ATTY. VALMONTE:

"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas? "Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir. "A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir.

"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom? xxxxxxxxx

"A: Expedito Perlas, sir. "Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing you documents
that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?
"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?
"A: Yes, sir.
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each other, Atty.
Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1 million damage suit
"Q: After that, what happened?
should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport?

"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore] mentioned, sir." 45

"Q: And then, what happened?

"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.] Mr.
Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the
envelope, sir."40
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his client’s behalf, he still failed to
justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he had received the
purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel Grace Aoyagi:
"Prosecutor Montemayor:

Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his
xxxxxxxxx
representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside the BID.
Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a
standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations. 41 It can readily be "Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time despite the
absence of any legal purpose.
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanan’s acquittal. 42 While the testimony of Pelingon
was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,43 there was an abundance of evidence showing
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
Hernandez’s involvement.

"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecution’s version
that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport. 44 According to him, he kept giving
Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court case. "Interpreter:

Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by Spouses "Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just been a charade and
was in fact belied by Pelingon’s testimony regarding the January 5, 1994 meeting:
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas? the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it. Moreover, the three
prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to Hernandez who refused to
accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for the balance of the acceptance
"A: Yes, sir.
fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez.

"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

xxxxxxxxx

"A: Yes, sir.

"Acejas’ defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left immediately after
the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have presented accused Victoriano
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom? to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him and caused him to leave their
table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots with his co-
accused."47
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

Lawyer’s Duty
"x x x x x x x x x

"Q: After that, what happened?
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"WITNESS:
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.] Mr.
Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the
envelope, sir.
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
"Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope?
xxxxxxxxx
"A: Victoriano, sir."46
Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his contention that
the envelope represented the balance of his firm’s legal fees. That it was given to Hernandez immediately
after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the money was a consideration for
the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if he believed it to be his. The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement on this point:
Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with the
complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest 48 and had the right to be present when
the passport was to be returned.49
True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His presence at
Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact, however, does not support
his innocence
Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the payoff, but did
nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he was to get a share. Thus, he
received the money purporting to be the payoff,
even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a conspirator.
The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics50 when confronted by public officers who extort money.
Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities.51 If the extortion is directed at the client, they
must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover, they must report it to the authorities, without
having to violate the attorney-client privilege.52 Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal act.53
Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.
Instigation
Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them into accepting
the payoff.54 Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons into the commission of an
offense in order to prosecute them.55 As opposed to entrapment, criminal intent originates in the mind of
the instigator.56

"x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how come he
passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not contain
There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an extortion
attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had arranged for the payoff.
During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice Escareal clarifying
question as follows:
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband?
"A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement that upon
handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately (‘magkaliwaan’)." 57
Alleged Discrepancies
According to Acejas, Pelingon’s testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-Affidavit,
inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were contradictory. 58 He cites these
particular portions of Pelingon’s Affidavit:
"5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting innocent men, I
have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the accused in the
Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action.
"6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no reward,
promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this affidavit." 59
Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his life.60 He did
not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true testimony was in the first
Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.61
By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of Desistance. An
affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence given on the witness stand. 62
Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The Court therefore
adopts the Sandiganbayan’s finding that these were minor details that were not indicative of the lack of
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.63 People v. Eligino64 is in point:
"x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from
their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimony completely discarded
as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements
neither dilute the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Thus, inconsistencies and
contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy the credibility of witnesses, for indeed,
such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the
responses are honest and unrehearsed."65
Suppression of Evidence
Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money was supposedly
demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness. 66
The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People.67 The freedom to devise
a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution. 68 Necessarily, its decision on which
evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by the trial
court.69 If petitioners believed that Takao Aoyagi’s testimony was important to their case, they should have
presented him as their witness.70
Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence was not
resolved by the Sandiganbayan.71 In that Comment/Objection, he had noted the lateness in the filing of the
Formal Offer of Evidence.
It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence
upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas’ Comment/Objection was deemed immaterial. It
could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that the Sandiganbayan needed to act
upon.72
Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this
Court.73 We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced in this case.
In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question that
the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi
spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas
was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the
group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport,
an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were
made in the exercise of official duties.
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as principals.74 The
evidence shows that the
parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not
commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
accomplishing a criminal design.75 The act of one is the act of all.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A.
Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
5 modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me
under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at
No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified
to own real property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the
name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several
documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge
that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for
advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner
San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years
and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he
was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He
also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had
no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his
act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a
contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to
contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines Paralegal
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Tel: 362-7820
FIRST DIVISION 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-
Fax: (632) 362-
01
7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009 Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City
2701719

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. Back

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
SERVICES OFFERED:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law
Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
services. TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and expeditious AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them ABROAD.
text messages.
1avvphi1
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondent’s" calling card:6
(emphasis supplied)
Front
Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO said calling card.7

LAW OFFFICE The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other
canons11of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
Fe Marie L. Labiano soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule
13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended
penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional
practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the
said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business;
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of
the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited
legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable
result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not
steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or
reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule
16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of
his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the
Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and
to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The
proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement
is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and
conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable
law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their
legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage
of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of
the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to
prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from
receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court
of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ,
DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and
JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,[1] an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment
of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while
she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-
in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the
amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation
of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of
the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to
be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by
Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name. [3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11)
baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which
were subsequently dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36[5] of
Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas
Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, [6] the complaint sheet, and the
subpoena issued to respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son,
Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats
against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a
libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11)
CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view
of securing an appointment for herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges.[10] A
copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision,
Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation Unclaimed. [11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the
Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon,
an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission
on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to
submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case
heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed
her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission
ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was
mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated
as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a
government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort
money from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her
promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public from Canon 6[17] of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to
office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations,
Higher Education. as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will
be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of
which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office
in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position,
at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development
Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [14]However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment
on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to
affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was
patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office are violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members
of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting
their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all
lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1[20] and Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as
gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of
three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon
finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty
in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., andAzcuna,
JJ., concur.

The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed
in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[16]Respondents demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs
afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE
YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding
the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of
reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead
for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the
Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded
any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as
operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and
dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of
the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third
persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to
him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house
there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to
work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep
sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio
Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from
December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses
and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation
for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and
legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84,
against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private
respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said
termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this
petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally
dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay
and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the
corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to
function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private
respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there
was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the
decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter
in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the
petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on
February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor
Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the
special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could
very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind.
For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child
and therefore the only heir against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
 . . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be
may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article 282 of the
complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were personal Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10 representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c)
fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave
analogous to the foregoing.
abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did
not conduct the hearings thereof.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent
administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda
provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's
failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing
health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to the
employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of
the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable
illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or
a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:
heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that
they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to
evidence submitted in the case.12 December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a
justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986
the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor
at 20-44).
Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially
considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted. This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical
rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon
precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not
The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
 After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved
and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon
de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December
1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as
follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie
(Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation,
1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest
to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25),
for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must
be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda
Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a
letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital
for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that private
respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the
medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again.
The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate
hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on
account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and
as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable
cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to
resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground
for termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as
a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties.
This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being
candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to
specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the
farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model
employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased
production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is
because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision
and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying
that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and
could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator, petitioner
would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was
no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his
employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-
employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of
returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an
employee of the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the
mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private
respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son,
and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984
that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by
what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding
petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my
bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to
insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning
the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the
initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's
illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of
work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's
accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April,
1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is
immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance,
with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm
administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there
must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to
work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not
without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to
believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January,
1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the
farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These
are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from
G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said
firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances
for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private
respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities and
operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run
errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the
property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter
to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at
least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to
have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige
petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be
his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have
over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM
Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-
member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name,
place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being
herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead,
the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the
same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of
abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of
his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting
his full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We
perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and
the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of
said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the
taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a
witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he
continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to
be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were
ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case,
the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services
rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify
them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part
of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a
ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does not square with the elements
constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due
process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in
opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case
where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the
grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at
the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such
notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in
writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by
him during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the
reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be
required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his
right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the
mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no
notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September
5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of
the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice
still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of
the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address,
by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly
taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the
effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as
follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision
Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
 This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just
cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do
even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the
present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because
he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article
279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages
and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the
due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the
fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees
to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing
rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to
security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out
the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just
cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of
said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as
would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where
there are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and
severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate
that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from
the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales
vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173
SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences
should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court
concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely
in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate
or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs.
NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private
respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust
dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse
injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided
that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not
recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral
damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of
exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do
not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if,
seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where
moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and
were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning
the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a
peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual
antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in
good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we
hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor
General:
 The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years,
his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of
dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay
SO ORDERED.
equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence
(Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
for both parties are equally at fault.54

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the
Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called
upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct
of litigation.56

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts
towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least
entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task of
resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an
aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations.
While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about
the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here
to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds.
In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore,
that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the
parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms.
A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004
JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,
vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed
with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the
Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or
neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
1 of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the
Before us is a verified Complaint filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It
charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of
Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons
12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in
notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of
the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client.
Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several
persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of
his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, 7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer.8He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the
verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the
Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary
public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries
public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants’ residence
certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 9 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or
not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said
noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf
of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice."
Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they
were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice."
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing
Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to
avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he
submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit11 of the two police
officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he
was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the
ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case
for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the
parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared.
Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8,
2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o’clock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The
latter’s Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. 15 It also received complainant’s Letter-
Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24,
2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted
for resolution.
The CBD received complainant’s Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBP’s Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving
and adopting the Investigating Commissioner’s Report that respondent had violated specific requirements
of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register,
and the indication of the affiant’s residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for
the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner
by increasing the fine to "₱3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a
heavier penalty."
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03,
12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that
the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such
certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all
instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages
of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22 Failure to perform these duties would result in the
revocation of their commission as notaries public.23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions
are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and
are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry
number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits
relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of
older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law
makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of
notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is
not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondent’s clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses’ Affidavits relative to
Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant’s brother against the
aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent
failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel
for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. 27 It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they
may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn
oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their
failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his
clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a
notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.30Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient
disciplinary measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of
the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
"Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument
and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, 31 except only in certain
cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to
their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall
them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of
others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their
clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the
lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are
against the lawyer’s client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a
witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked
upon as partial and untruthful."33
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a
cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to;
and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case. 34
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his
clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter’s life and
liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to
rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that
may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such
conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the
law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except
by due process of law.36
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and
could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant
does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as
such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has
the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as
expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment
in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the
prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the
"ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these
cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not
supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with
liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible,
considering that the latter’s allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED ₱3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called
up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo,
who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half
of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been
rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that
similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and
August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-
old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against
him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified. 4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law
for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The
IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C.
No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation
on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting
the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without
authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.16
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence,
his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded
for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s
authority.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
SO ORDERED.
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. 20 Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names
of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;