ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, vs VILLARAMA, JR.

G.R. No. 187320

FACTS:

Complainants filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of
wages and other money claims against the petitioners Atlanta Inc. and its officers. The complainants
alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6)
months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They
claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired. Petitioners
contended that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were
engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to
hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant
where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master
List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.

ISSUE:

1. WON workers were employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as apprentices;
2. WON apprenticeship agreements is invalid;

HELD:
(1) Yes, they were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship.
a) Based on company operations four workers were already rendering service to the company as
employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the
respondents status through relevant operational records. The said documents are sufficient to
establish the employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.
b) The Master List of employees is unreliable and does not inspire belief. The list, consisting of
several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to sort out the names of the employees
listed, as well as the other data contained in the list. For this reason alone, the list deserves little or
no consideration. Atlantawould have been better served, in terms of reliable evidence, if true
copies of the payroll (on which the list was based, among others, as Bernardo claimed in her
affidavit) were presented instead.
(2) Yes, apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
a) The fact that the workers were already rendering service to the company when they were made to
undergo apprenticeship renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are
concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions
such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and
desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These
tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor
Code.Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without
the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.
 b) Even if we recognize the companys need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we can
only consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first
agreement and the retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and purposes, recognized
the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon
them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the
agreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules and is an act manifestly
unfair to the employees, to say the least. This we cannot allow.

BERNARDO et al vs NLRC
G.R. No. 122917

FACTS:

Complainants numbering 43 are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Disclaiming that complainants were
regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a
special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under a special
employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to
the respondent Bank; that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always
logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have
been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that through the pakiusap
of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes
without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the
Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations. Petitioners maintain
that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was
necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served
merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the petitioners no
longer exists in private respondent bank, after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special
employment contracts.

ISSUE:

1. WON petitioners were regular employees

2. WON employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of
six (6) months - were valid.

HELD:

Petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the
contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer,
the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term. The stipulations in the employment
contracts indubitably conform with Article 80 of the Labor Code. Succeeding events and the
enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), however, justify the
application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion
that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that
they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability
did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as aqualified able-bodied
person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:

Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the
same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified
able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code.

As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice
of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them
probationary appointments, ad infinitum. The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a
probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees fitness for the
job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the
employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely
the fitness of its employees. As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to
security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause.
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and
hence not entitled to the same benefits
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the
same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have
attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law,
notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on
charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.
ROWENA DE LEON CRUZ v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 173357, February 13, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner was the Assistant Branch Manager of the BPI Ayala Avenue Branch in Makati City, and
she was in charge of the Trading Section. After 13 years of continuous service, respondent
terminated petitioner on grounds of gross negligence and breach of trust. Petitioner’s dismissal
was brought about by the fraud perpetrated against three depositors in respondent’s Ayala Avenue
Branch. She asserted that she followed the bank procedure/policy on pre-termination of accounts,
opening of transitoryaccountsand reactivation of dormant accounts.
She explained that upon verifying the authenticity of the signatures of the depositors involved,
shevapproved the withdrawals from certain accounts of these clients. Moreover, petitioner stated
that at the time the alleged fraudulent transactions took place she was not yet an Assistant
Manager, but only a Cash II Officer and charged of responsibilities requiring her only to bring out
signature card files from the vault to the Trading Section and to ensure that these files were
returned to the vault at the close of banking hours.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner cannot be considered a managerial employee, and that her di
smissal on grounds of gross negligence and breach of trust was unjustified. But this was reversed
by the NLRC. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but it was dismissed. It stressed
that petitioner was holding a highly confidential position, as Assistant Branch Manager, in the
banking industry, which required extraordinary diligence among its employees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not dismissal of petitioner is illegal.

HELD:
No. Respondent dismissed petitioner from her employment on grounds of gross negligence and br
each of trust reposed on her by respondent under Article 282 (b) and (c) of the Labor Code.
Petitioner was remiss in the performance of her duty to approve the pre-
termination of certificates of deposits by legitimate depositors or their duly-
authorized representatives, resulting in prejudice to the bank, which reimbursed the monetary loss
suffered by the affected clients. Hence, respondent was justified in dismissing petitioner on the gro
und of breach of trust. As long as there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when th
e employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the p
urported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust a
nd confidence demanded of his position, a managerial employee may be dismissed.

Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them. On the other hand, the basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of
confidence is that the employees concerned hold a position of trust and confidence. It is the breach
of this trust that results in the employer's loss of confidence in the employee. The test of
“supervisory” or “managerial status” depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the
interest of his employer and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
Petitioner holds a managerial status since she is tasked to act in the interest of her
employer as she exercises independent judgment when she approves pre-
termination of USD CDs or the withdrawal of deposits.

Only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari;
Exception. As the decision of the Labor Arbiter has been appealed to the NLRC, the NLRC has the
power to review the factual finding and resolution of the Labor Arbiter. It is a settled rule that only
errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari of the
decisions of the Court of Appeals. However, an exception to this rule is when the findings of the
NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contradict those of the Labor Arbiter. In this case, the
Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was illegally dismissed, while the NLRC reversed the finding of
the Labor Arbiter, which reversal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In view of the discordance
between the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,
on the other, there is a need for the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review the
factual findings and the conclusions based on the said findings.