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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Flight Centre Travel Group Limited
FLT: AU/ FLT.AX Recommendation
Industry: Consumer Discretionary
Current $36.85
At 31/8/2016
è Market Cap è Avg Daily Volume è Free Float Target $31.93
AU$3.6B 820,640M 50.49%
100.93M Shares Potential Downside 13%
Executive Summary
Key Stock Data Sep16
As per our valuation, we issue a sell recommendation for Flight Centre (herein ‘FLT’ or the
52 Week Range 45.37 - 29.38 ‘Company’). Our 12-month target price is $31.93AUD, with a projected downside of 13%. This
Institutional Ownership 62.45% has been calculated using a combination of (1) The Dividend Discount Model, (2) Discounted
Free Cash Flows to the Firm, and (3) several Relative Valuation techniques.
ROE 18.67
Current P/E 12.93
Investment Thesis and Outline
Est. International P/E 10.21 Industry volatility, lowered necessity for travel agency intermediation and little international room
Est. Domestic P/E 14.08 for expansion all collectively suggest that FLT will face future struggle. Declines in financial
performance of the Company in 2016 have resulted in weaker competitive positioning. We
EPS 2.42
believe this is paving the way to eventual stagnation of income, and hence loss of investor returns.
Est. EPS 2.69 A summary of our fundamental top-down analysis is as follows:
Price/Book 2.37 • High International Competition: Many key international players already dominate worldwide
1
Price/Sales 1.21 market share. We forecast eventual online market saturation, leaving little room for global
development unless FLT can steal revenue from its existing competitors.
Dividend
• Lowered Industry Commission Potential: Increased sales demand from price wars between
Div. Yield 4.30% domestic budget airlines cannot offset lowered commission revenues. Further, demand for
DPS 1.52 agency intermediation is decreasing as online platforms are making it easier for consumers to
5 year Dividend bypass the middleman, and compare the competition.
12.59%
Growth
• Shifts in consumer preferences: Consumer preferences have shifted and now favour
localised travel due to the weak AUD/USD primary pairing. This form of travel is simple and
Relative Performance does not usually require agency intermediation. Further, corresponding growth in inbound
S&P/ASX200 travel does not form revenue for FLT.
Ticker: AS51 • Expensive Capital Structure: FLT currently has the most expensive WACC of all peers as
2
1m 3.73 CAPEX is funded entirely through equity. As the Company is focusing on future expansion,
6m -25.46 this will reduce the profitability of such ventures.
12m -19.81
• High Expenses and Low Net Profit Margins: For the previous 3 financial years, operating
expenses have grown at a higher rate than revenues, leaving low and unimproved net profit
S&PASX 200 Consumer Discretionary margins. This has led to a ROA below peer average, and an ROE at a second all time low,
Ticker: S5COND causing concerns for shareholders.
1m 5.76 • Low Potential for International Profits: As FLT have shifted their focus onto claiming
6m -16.68 international market share, expenses incurred do not benefit from FLT’s economies of scale
within Australia. Consequently the bottom line for these segments is not as profitable as it could
12m -13.58
be if revenues were incurred domestically.
• Many investment risks are faced and inherently volatile: Operation within 14 countries
Source: Bloomberg & Team Estimates naturally causes high amounts of foreign exchange and economic risk. Further, FLT’s large
fixed expenses combined with commissions fluctuating due to price wars cause high operating
risk.
Income Statement
2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
($'000,000)
TTV 19305 20608 21879 23095 24234
Revenue 2640 2878 3058 3222 3372
EBITDA 409 456 459 473 482
EBITDA Margin 15.49% 15.86% 15.01% 14.67% 14.29%
Net Income 245 272 265 265 265
Net profit Margin 9.264% 9.466% 8.683% 8.240% 7.868%
Balance Sheet ($'000,000)
Total Assets 3001 3285 3596 3936 4308
Total Liabilities 1655 1812 1983 2171 2376
Total Equity 1346 1473 1612 1765 1932
Ratios
FCFF/Share 2.80 2.77 2.72 2.65 2.56
EPS 2.42 2.70 2.63 2.63 2.63
DPS 1.52 1.61 1.55 1.54 1.53
ROE 18.70% 19.33% 17.21% 15.72% 14.35%
ROIC 18.18% 18.30% 16.36% 15.03% 13.61%
1
Priceline (PCLN:US) $1,418.59, Expedia (EXPE:US) $113.13, CTrip.com (CTRP:US) $48.96
2
Above, also including Webjet (WEB:AU) $9.64, HelloWorld (HLO:AU) $4.30, Corporate Travel Management (CTD:AU) $18.14
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Business Structure
Source: Flight Centre Travel Group Previously known as Flight Centre Limited, FLT changed their name to Flight Centre Travel Group
Annual Report Limited in 2013. Majority of the Company’s revenues are derived from the travel industry, where
they operate within leisure, corporate and wholesale sectors. Of the 40 brands under FLT, leisure
Figure 3: Recent Acquisitions has consistently remained the strongest sector, while the corporate division has grown to 33% of
revenues for FY16 under 6 dedicated brands. The Company are targeting consumers at many
different stages of travel: expanding their products to include tourist activity packages (Cruise About)
and currency exchange services (Travel Money).
Excluding the travel industry, in 2016 only 9.92% of total revenue was attributed to FLT’s other
companies. Evidently, FLT’s business structure is hardly diversified. This is due to the fact that
management are aiming to use such expansion into other areas to support FLT travel segment
growth simultaneously. For example, products from Buffalo Tours are sold within FLT’s travel
package bundles, and courses offered First Class Education Group include travel agency training
for employees.
Though originally a brick and mortar store based company, new technology developments are
forcing FLT to expand online to continue sustainable growth. The Company has shifted its business
structure by investing in online booking platforms, either by developing its own websites and online
brands such as Aunt Betty, or acquiring businesses who already have a foot in the door such as
BYOjet and Student Universe (Figure 3).
The Company is undertaking large geographical expansion, and does so primarily through
acquisitions. Within the last two financial years FLT have acquired several profitable companies,
such as StudentUniverse.com. It is expected that they will continue to capture market share through
this method.
FLT’s success however, is not consistent across the board. The INDUASIA segment contains India,
Singapore & Malaysia, Greater China and United Arab Emirates. FLT have had increasing issues
within this area and closed losses in FY16. However in order to compensate, management have
Source: Austrade made acquisitions within the area to capture increased market share. In particular, the Company
may expand into mainland China to add to their geographical diversity.
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Increasing aeroplane capacity also has a similar effect. The enhanced supply of tickets is
expected to act as an incentive for airlines to offer overrides within their contracts. Yet inherently
with such over-supply, prices must be decreased to also increase demand. Combined with the
slow down of international travel, these increased capacities are eroding commission potential. It
is expected that this will adversely affect FLT, and that their profit margins will lower
correspondingly.
2. Online Platforms Create Higher Competition and Increase Direct Online Supplier Sales:
The online industry is highly concentrated by direct suppliers and major online agents, who
collectively hold 72% of revenues (Figure 12). Many of these well established travel companies,
such as airlines, hotels and other direct service providers face little difficulty in expanding online.
Due to the cost-effective nature of such a platform, these businesses are rapidly increasing their
direct online sales by directly marketing to consumers, cutting out the middleman (Appendix 4).
Source: QAN Annual Report Consequently there is a lowered necessity for travel agency intermediation.
Figure 10: CPI Adjusted Best Such a conclusion is supported by a study conducted by the European Journal of Tourism
Discount Rate Airfare ($AUD) Research in 2015 (Appendix 4). Particularly for frequent traveller, consumers prefer booking
directly online. This is due to the quick and easy nature of the platform, user desire to save
intermediation costs and the ability to effortlessly compare competitors at the click of a button:
increasing the risk of stolen market share.
Further, the study also concludes that online travel research has transformed into an
entertainment platform for consumers, who can come home after a long day at the office and plan
their dream holiday. While these persons are typically low-frequency travellers, and the study
suggests that they are more likely to require intermediation, they are inherently less profitable
than those who travel regularly. Hence the increased presence of direct online booking systems
pose a great threat to travel agency revenues.
Source: bitre.gov.au
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
3. Airlines Directly Winning Corporate Contracts Cut Out the Middle Man: Another factor
responsible for agency disintermediation is an increased amount of exclusive contracts won by
airlines directly. Loss of large contracts with these corporate clients is resulting in further agency
struggles. Further, those clients that have been maintained are no longer as profitable, and likely
not to be renewed. This is because enhanced connection speeds have increased teleconferencing
capabilities, hence reducing demand for business travel (Figure 13).
All of these factors are expected to cause future revenue struggles for FLT as a travel intermediary.
Consumer preferences clearly favour online direct bookings without agency involvement. As agency
online sales are expected to continue stagnating, FLT cannot expect any further growth within the
industry from their online platform. Additionally, struggles to maintain corporate contracts, a segment
that accounts for 33% of FLT’s total revenues, are expected to be detrimental to sales.
Figure 14: Market Share of Total Admittedly, the Company has taken a dynamic approach to obtain market share by undertaking a
Rides (US) large amount of acquisitions and divestitures, particularly within demographic specific service
companies. An example is their acquirement of StudentUniverse (a total overview of all acquisition
activities can be found in Appendix 20. However the Company is struggling to transfer its domestic
success and economies of scale onto an international platform. Global competitors already hold a
large market share that FLT is struggling to steal (Figure 20). As a result the company’s continued
acquisitions are expected to be stagnant to revenues and are in fact distracting management from
further domestic profits. This is magnified as FLTs decreasing market share in Australia is corroding
their economies of scale advantage (Figure 17).
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
result, it is expected that FLT will struggle to retain their in-store customer base through this
Figure 15: Airbnb Number of transition, and so sales will suffer accordingly.
Nights Booked
The Industry Life Cycle Favours High Growth for Competitors
FLT currently resides within the mature stage of the industry life cycle. This is resultant from
management's strategy to protect its currently dominating market share and secure stable revenues.
The company’s competitors however, are all estimated to have a strong growth outlook, and hence
in a position to retain market share and greater benefit from industry success. Online competitors
Webjet and Helloworld have strong forecasted growth for FY17, largely due to strategic M&A
Activity. Although the online market is reaching saturation, these competitors are all stealing
proportions of FLTs market share, and so are within the shakeout stage of the industry life cycle
(Figure 18).
Low Potential for Profitable International Expansion: The online travel industry is highly
competitive as it combines direct suppliers and other agency competitors onto one easily
comparable platform. Many existing competitors, particularly the dominating international duopoly
of Expedia.US and Priceline.US, broke into online platforms earlier than FLT, hence securing a
competitive advantage (Figure 20). Consequently, the Company will need to steal existing market
share in order to break through within these markets. This is supported by our prediction that the
Source: Bloomberg market will reach saturation. The result is an increased price competition placing further downwards
pressure on revenue forecasts.
Figure 18: Stages in the Industry
Life Cycle FLT’s management is currently undertaking expansions through the costly acquisitions of
businesses within niche markets. However, this strategy is not permanently sustainable, and does
not improve the Company’s organic growth nor steal market share from other existing competitors.
Profit margins of international segments are also significantly lower than those within Australia, as
overseas expense structures do not benefit from FLT’s domestic economies of scale (Figure 23;
Figure 24). Consequently, management’s focus on international expansion will not result in
corresponding shareholder gains.
Lowered Necessity for Travel Agency Intermediation: Four key industry factors are adversely
affecting demand for FLT services. Firstly, consumer preferences have shifted to favour local travel:
Source: Team Estimates
an inherently simpler task generally not requiring intermediation. The industry’s expansion online,
Figure 19: FLT SWOT- Analysis secondly, has resulted in higher competition and increased sales between suppliers and consumers
directly. FLT is consequently cut out. Airlines are now also targeting large corporate clients,
contracts that FLT used to win. These corporate sales account for 33% of FLT revenues. Finally,
sales are being challenged at all platforms due to the rise of peer-to-peer travel services. This
include companies such as AirBnB and Uber, who are capturing market share from FLT’s car hiring
and hotel packages (Appendix 3).
Expensive and Below Average Capital Structure: FLT has the lowest amount of debt financing
among key industry players. While this might give reason for upside potential, FLT have confirmed
they will not take on any debt capital. Consequently they will continue undertaking much more
expensive investments than necessary, falling further behind competitors.
Source: Team Estimates
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Figure 20: Revenue Comparison High Operating Expenses Drive Down Profits and Shareholder Returns: While FLT’s TTV
(US$ Million) (International) grew consistently over the last five years, this does not translate to their bottom line. This is
because expenses are growing at a higher rate than revenue streams, jeopardising profits.
Correspondingly, net profit margins have remained consistently low. Majority of the Company’s
high operating expenses are derived from rent and salaries, as they heavily rely on their bricks
and mortar stores for revenue. Consequently, these low profits are forecasted to continue, and
as revenue streams will be declining while expenses maintain steady growth, profit margins will
be squeezed (Figure 27).
Dividend Policy
FLT's payout ratios over the last five years have been in line with their dividend policy of returning
50-60% of NPAT to shareholders, with the only exception being FY14 when a fully franked
Source: Bloomberg dividend of $1.52 led to a payout ratio of 74%. This particular outlier was due to the directors
desire to share their strong cash reserves despite a low NPAT for the year. FLT’s current payout
Figure 21: Dividends & Payout ratio of 61% also sits slightly higher than usual, with the ten-year average being 55%. Our
(%) forecasts expect the Company to pay flat dividends of $1.61 per annum until FY20, as we believe
they will maintain a payout ratio of 60% while NPAT stagnates (Figure 21).
Investment Risks
The key risks that pertain to FLT include foreign exchange risk, economic risk, operational risk
and credit risk. The former risk includes translation and exchange risk due to their multicurrency
debt facility. Economic risk includes the high sensitivity global shocks may have on travel
behaviours and discretionary spending. The Company faces operational risk through decreasing
airfare prices, which lower commission streams, as well as the increasing threat of online
competitors.
Financial Analysis
Expensive Capital Structure with No Plans of Changing
Comparative to the chosen peer group, FLT now remains the only major company within the travel
Source: Team Estimates industry that is not taking advantage of debt financing. (Figure 26). While this may immediately
seem like a good reason for upside potential, FLT have never once taken on long-term debt nor
Figure 23: International have any plans to. Although in FY16 both ROE and ROIC (18.7% and 18.17% respectively)
Segments remain higher than 5 year historical WACC (12%), ROE sits at a second all time low for the
company, suggesting future shareholder returns are limited (Figure 25).
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Figure 25: ROE and ROA International Expansion Will Jeopardize Net Income Due To Higher
Expenses and No Economies of Scale
FLT are quick to boast their international income diversity, with Australia comprising 55.4% of total
FY16 revenues (Figure 23). However differences in geographical expenses result in drastically
different statutory EBIT values, as Australia rose to 74% due to the clear presence of economies of
scale within domestic expense structure. Further, the segment’s profit margin stood at an astounding
21.15%, with the Rest of the World and US regions causing concern at 8.32% and
2.7% respectively (Figure 24). As discussed above, management is targeting strong international
expansion. In doing so however, the larger expenses faced in non-domestic regions will result in
lower profits than if such revenues were made locally. Also, the required capital expenditure to then
set up such income streams in these new segments will then further decrease profitability and
Source: Bloomberg & Team Estimates
efficiency, drastically affecting shareholder value.
Figure 26: WACC Peer Revenues Internationally Are Not Justifying Costs
Comparison The company is adamant regarding their strong TTV growth as a major driver of their success,
however increased sales volume does not result in corresponding revenue growth. (Appendix 8).
When the margin between TTV and revenue is broken down per segment, they severely differentiate,
likely due to differentiating commission laws and standards.
Though overall revenue grew 11.2% in FY16, expenses grew 14.61% (13.4% excluding the one off
impairment charge), resulting in a 5.8% decrease in EBIT. When broken down into segments, all
regions had decreased profit margins in comparison to FY15 (Appendix 6).
As discussed above, FLT is losing market share due to its main competitors deriving online revenue.
While this area is one that FLT are looking to explore further, these trends will continue as younger
Source: Bloomberg & Team Estimates generations favor a technological approach. Despite the Company addressing this, they are still
undertaking large investments into physical assets and employees. This alone increased their wages,
Figure 27: Profitability Analysis rental and depreciation expenses by 11.91% in FY16.
The current management plan clearly favours long-term growth however financially this will not result
in increased shareholder value in the forecasted period. Instead it is expected that expense growth
will continue to surpass sales growth within the next four years, and so any eventual benefits to net
income will not fall within the forecasting period. Consequently, as the dividend policy sits at 50-60%
of NPAT, these growing expenses will be detrimental to shareholder profit.
Valuation
We have used a combination of three valuation approaches: the Dividend Discount Model (DDM),
Source: Bloomberg & Team Estimates the Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) and Relative Valuation techniques (RV). These have led us
to our weighted average target price of $31.93AUD indicating 13% downside potential. Each of
Figure 28: Peer ROA these methods have weightings of 20%, 40% and 40% respectively. These were chosen to reflect
Comparison that free cash flows are a better indicator of FLT’s future cash flows opposed to dividends, and also
to reflect our opinion that multiples are the key driver behind making a stock converge to it’s intrinsic
value.
DDM
$27.33
Source: Bloomberg
CAPM: The capital asset pricing model was used to determine
FLT's required rate of return at 8.51%.(Figure 31)
Figure 29: Operating Margin
Dividend Forecasts: We have assumed the Company will maintain a consistent 60% payout ratio
Analysis
of NPAT, and hence calculated future dividend payments based on our bearish net income forecasts.
Terminal Growth Rate: The Company’s terminal growth rate was estimated at 3% (Figure 35).
Notably, nearly half of FLT’s total revenues are generated from international markets. Therefore we
have incorporated the GDP growth rate of domestic and international markets to reach a suitable
terminal growth rate. We assigned a weighting of 75% to the average GDP growth rate of the three
most dominant markets (Australia, UK and US), consistent with revenue breakdown per segment.
The remainder is attributed to an average of Asia and South Africa (Appendix 11).
Two Stage Model: Currently our projected dividends indicate a decreasing trend due to our
Source: Bloomberg prediction that net income growth stagnate. However in times of struggling profits, FLT have
historically raised the payout ratio to avoid negative dividend signals. As the last three years’ d
ividends were paid at flat level, we assume that FLT will undertake a similar strategy on the basis of
our forecasted 2017 dividend ($1.61AUD) until 2020. After this, we assume the dividend growth rate
will be constant.
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Figure 30:
Based on the above information and Appendix 12, we have reached an intrinsic value of $27.33AUD.
Additional sensitivity analysis has been conducted with two pairs of variables: payout ratio versus
cost of equity and terminal growth rate versus cost of equity.
Source: Bloomberg. & Team Estimates WACC: We have considered two major uncertainties to estimate the cost of capital:
1. Historically low interest rates could entice FLT to take on more debt; and
Figure 31: 2. High volatilities in stock price and pressures upon future earnings create higher risk.
Consequently, we used a combination of current WACC (8.3%) and the 10-year historical average
WACC (12%) to reach our long-term estimated cost of capital at 10.15% (Appendix 11).
FCFF: We have computed FCFF from Cash Flows from Operations (CFO), which has been
projected by directly forecasting its components. Two essential components are receipts from
customers and payments to suppliers and employees.
1. We have set the growth rate of receipts at 6.3%, equal to forecasted compounded revenue
Source: Bloomberg. & Team Estimates growth from 2017-2020. Historically, these two factors have shown high correlation with minimal
spread.
Figure 32: 2. Similarly, we set the growth rate of payments equal to the compounded operating cost growth
rate for the forecasted period, at 6.7%.
CapEx Growth Rate: FLT has undertaken aggressive expansion in the past five years, and so we
assume they will continue to invest in fixed assets in accordance with the historic five-year average
CapEx growth rate of 11.5% (Appendix 11).
By applying the same LGR as above, we reached an intrinsic of $33.10AUD. The three key
variables used in sensitivity analysis are WACC, CapEx growth rate and LGR (Appendix 13 & 15).
Relative Valuation
Source: Bloomberg & Team Through our relative valuation model, we derived a target price of $33.07AUD using three key
Estimates multipliers: Price/Earnings (P/E), Enterprise Value/Earnings before Interest Tax, Depreciation and
Figure 33: Amortisation (EV/EBITDA), and Price/Sales (P/S).
This model is then further split into domestic and international to provide insight into differentiating
Company expectations within different playing fields. (Appendix:14).
Within the domestic comparable pool we have included HLO:AU, CTD:AU, WEB:AU and also the
S&P/ASX Consumer Discretionary Index. International peers consist CTRIP:US, PCLN:US,
Source: Bloomberg & Team EXPE:US and the MSCI World Consumer Discretionary Index. All chosen comparables are subject
Estimates to similar risks and growth potential. To derive our final intrinsic value, we have combined both
Figure 34: target prices, weighting domestic and international target prices based on their forecasted
proportions of total revenue as illustrated in Figure 34.
P/E and EV/EBITDA: These multiplies provide an insight into FLT financial health by taking into
account both the Company’s capital structure and earnings. Historically, both international and
domestic multiples have sat above FLT by the same margin.
Price/Sales: This multiple however, serves as an alternative and is useful for identifying how much
revenue the company generates in isolation, with less chance of accounting manipulation. However
as the multiple shows a limited picture by only capturing sales, we have assigned a weighting of
20%. P/S has also traded as a discount, with the international pool sitting significantly higher than
domestic (Appendix 14).
FLT has maintained a dominant presence in the Australian travel industry, hence explaining the
higher target prices in comparison to international for P/E and P/Sales. This further illustrates the
risk FLT will face as they expand internationally and compete with the international comparable.
Residual Income: One of the key advantages to RI model is the reduced reliance on terminal value
Source: Bloomberg & Team Estimates
for the determination of intrinsic value. Applying the same variables as the DDM, and taking current
book value into consideration, we obtained an intrinsic value of $32.25AUD. This is consistent with
the DCF results. Consequently while residual income was not taken into the final weighting
arrangement, the RI results confirm the results of our DCF model (Appendix 16).
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
Figure 35: Terminal Growth Monte Carlo: In addition to the sensitivity analyses conducted for each method, we have also
completed a Monte Carlo simulation on the basis of the DCF. In the simulation, we defined
assumptions for five major variables (receipts, payments, CapEx growth, WACC and LGR) and
applied reasonable standard deviations. After running 20,000 trials, the simulation results suggest
that more than 60% of total possibilities estimate a target price below FLT’s current market price
(Appendix 17).
Source: IMF & Team Estimates Scenario: To gain further robustness, a scenario analysis was also conducted based on all three-
valuation models, and has been explained with Monte Carlo distribution. The following table
Figure 36: Scenario Prices illustrates our forecasts for the decisive variables within the three valuation models for each case:
bearish, base, and bullish.
Bearish Assumptions: We assume that FLT’s revenue growth will be below the Australian
outbound travel growth rate of 5.5% (Appendix 19). This is then expected to lead to even worse net
income growth, and a lowered dividend payout ratio. In this situation, the Company will strive for
survival by maintaining a relatively high CapEx growth rate. Further, cost of equity and hence WACC
could rise due to higher risk.
Bullish Assumption: Here, we have assumed FLT’s revenue growth rate will outperform their 5Y
Source: Bloomberg & Team Estimates
average, and stay in line with their historical 10Y long-term growth average by increasing
investments. Net profit margin will be improved, which will boost investor confidence and hence
decrease WACC.
Figure 37: Monte Carlo
Scenario Analysis
Key Variables Bearish Base Bullish
Receipts 5.00% 6.30% 9.00%
Payment 6.00% 6.70% 9.00%
CapEx 11.15% 11.50% 15.00%
Source: Team Estimates
WACC 10.89% 10.15% 9.40%
Cost of Equity 9.13% 8.51% 7.89%
Payout Ratio 50.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Figure 38: Risk Matrix Net profit 1.50% 2.00% 12.50%
Target Price $23.45 $31.61 $40.71
Up/Downside Potential -36.36% -14.21% 10.46%
Probability 0.2455 0.4551 0.2994
Probability Weighted Target Price $32.33
Potential Downside -12.26%
Investment Risks
Source: Team Estimates
By regressing FLTs monthly returns against the S&P/ASX200 and observing the coefficient of
determination, it is evident that FLT’s risk profile is relatively independent from the market.
Figure 39: Trade & Other Consequently, approximately 71% of total risk faced by FLT is unsystematic (See Appendix 19 for
Payables ($'000) time-varying volatility modelling) This can be attributed to the outlined risks below.
FX1 - Translation Risk: For functional and presentation purposes, FLT’s financial statements are
recorded in AUD. Transactions occurring overseas are transformed to Australian currency at the
time of the transaction. Conversely, Asset and liability translations occur on the date of the statement
using the closing rate. Any spreads arising from the translations are then reclassified to profit and
loss, which have a history of being highly volatile (Figure 40).
Source: FLT Annual Report
FX2 - Cash Flow: While forecasted cash flows are highly probable, they can be subject to
Figure 40: Net exchange forecasting error as the contracts are re-priced every 12 months. Over the previous 5 years,
differences on translation of variations in gains and losses from cash flow hedges have remained relatively low (Figure 41).
foreign operations ($'000) Mitigation: FLT is risk adverse in their hedging strategy. The Company aims to minimize exposure
and achieve a 1:1 hedging ratio. FLT treasury only enter into forward foreign exchange when
exchange forecasts become highly probable. Thus, speculation is not FLT’s hedging strategy.
Economic Risks
ER1– Consumer Confidence and travel patterns: Global shocks such as terrorism, political unrest,
natural disasters and social pandemics can have an adverse effect on consumer travel confidence,
potentially decreasing TTV. Furthermore, changes in discretionary income and exchanges rates can
alter consumer travel patterns.
Source: FLT Annual Report Mitigation: FLT’s strategy involves increasing their brand and geographic diversification to avoid
relying on a single segment.
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2016 | CFA Institute Research Challenge
OR2 - Technology Disruptions: Rapid and continuous technology expansion of online booking
platforms is likely to constrain industry growth and impact FLT market share. Online industry players
Source: FLT Annual Report such as Webjet are able to enter the market with little capital and provide heightened price
competition. Consumers will then be able to bypass travel agencies and book directly with the travel
Figure: 42: FLT Australian provider.
Revenue Proportion Mitigation: FLT has acquired a number of brands such as StudentUniverse and BYOjet.com to
ensure they maintain significant market share.
Credit Risk
CR1 – Credit ratings: FLT is exposed to credit risk through their forward foreign exchange contracts,
their cash equivalent and available for sale assets.
Mitigation: All FFX contracts and 87% of liquid assets are equivalent to S&P rating AA to A-
(Appendix 21).
Board of Directors
Source: FLT Annual Report FLT’s independent directors only hold small amounts of shares, which could lead to a moral hazard,
as they may not act in the shareholder’s best interest but rather in their own (Figure 43). Further,
Figure 44: Board Members FLT has the smallest board of directors’ comparative to all peers worldwide, with only four members
opposed to the international average of eight (Figure 44). Consequently, the Company does not
have a separate audit and remuneration committee. Also, FLT does not have a female director. This
has been historically proven as suboptimal, as females improve company performance, risk
management and the quality of the decision making process. The absence of such diversification
and gender equality can lead to one-sided decisions (Appendix 26).
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Appendix: 1
Force 1: Threat of New Entrants
1) Strict Regulatory and financial monitoring pressures on new
agents Supplier Power
2) Existence of Economies of Scale and incumbent exclusive
partnerships makes entry difficult and/or unprofitable
3) Rise of technology based travel advice allows low cost and Threat of Threat of New
innovative myriad micro-entrepreneurs to quickly gain market Substitution Entry
share. However online market heavily dominated.
4) Higher comparable Profit Margins for Online Travel Booking
services
5) Large Network effect of current market leader (FLT) provides Buyer Power
Competitive
more tailored and cost effective service to clients. Rivalry
Force 2: Threat of Substitute Products
1) Holds largest market share, however there are highly
substitutable branch and online travel booking services.
2) Other Flight Planning Services, particularly low-cost online travel booking services. However, buyers are still
dependent on a quality face-to-face tailored servicing.
3) Brandjacking: illegal use of popular brands by brandjackers to drive traffic to their sites without the permission of
brand owners. Potentially drawing away revenue and reputation of FLT.
4) Disintermediation: Especially on a domestic level, as Australian’s typically avoid travel agents when travelling
domestically. Additionally airlines are now directly approaching customers reducing potential commissions for FLT.
Force 3: Bargaining Power of Buyers
1) Easily substitutable for other agents, and thus can negotiate price wars between agents.
2) Information Asymmetry: Lack of pricing information, especially on grounded services (hotels) between customers
and suppliers creates dependency of buyers. This due to the complexities of travel.
Force 4: Bargaining Power of Suppliers/Sellers
1) High Threat of backward integration from Airline suppliers due to online pricing
2) Grounded travel Services (hotels) have little influence of FLT, as their revenues are highly dependent on the agency
relationship.
3) High Competition between suppliers, creates higher commission potential, and low bargaining power.
4) Enhanced Capacity and supply of available airline seats has enhanced the negotiating power for agents to receive
more commissions in order to fill the excess supply.
New Zealand
Indonesia
USA
UK
Thailand
China
Singapore
Fiji
Japan
India
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Zika Virus
The top 10 international destinations for Australian Travellers are shown in the above table. The transmission of the
deadly Zika virus has been reported in 50% of the most popular travel destinations. Thus, it is expected that international
travel demand will decrease through fear of contraction when travelling. Although it could be argued that the Zika virus
would simply cause travellers to change their travel destination, this is not so easy. A key reason for these travel locations
is their low-cost, and short distance from Australian Airports. The majority of south-east Asia has been infected by the
Zika Virus, and thus the closest alternative is the European region or the northern parts of Asia. However, these are
generally more expensive alternatives and thus may not be of adequate substitution for Australian Travellers. There is
also the alternative for the Middle East, but travel to these countries has decreased by the effect of terrorist associations
which are discussed next.
Terrorism
Since 2000, there has been a nine-fold increase in the
number of deaths from terrorism. More recently the events in Global Terrorism Threat
France, Bangladesh, turkey, United States as well as
Australia highlight the increased threat at high-target areas. 50,000
The Australian Government has listed mass gathering places Number of
such as hotels, markets, public transport, airports and tourist 40,000 Incidents
sites are a common target for terrorism activities. Australian’s Deaths
are viewed by the levant (ISIL) as a key target for terrorist 30,000
attacks. Even in cases where Australian’s weren’t Injuries
necessarily the target, Australian citizens are still harmed by 20,000
indiscriminate attacks. The immense fear from Australian
Travellers particularly after events in 2016 has created a 10,000
culture that hesitates to travel. A common trait is to cancel
flights and travel after a major terrorism event, even if it is in 0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
another country. A survey in 2015 compiled by YouGov has
shown that 10% of American travellers have cancelled their
trip in response to terror, and 18% have delayed their travels.
The world is now on red alert (figure 3), and we expect this Source: Global Terrorism Database
adjustment to consumer preferences will cost the travel
industry, and thus the travel agent industry.
Brexit
The effect on the UK leaving the European Union caused an immediate downturn on the world travel market. However
the effects on airline share price, exchange rates and consumer confidence have already started to adjust from June.
However the long-term effects are not fully realised yet. We expect the travel industry in Australia to have limited effect
from the Brexit other than a decrease of UK tourists in Australia, which would be offset by an increase of Australian
passengers to the UK. Although, once the Brexit is fully undertaken there may be a change in visa protocol which overrides
the current no-visa policy for Australians holidaying in the UK and EU.
Ultimately the Brexit has the biggest effect on the UK and European travel market. Thus with FLT deriving 13% of their
profits and revenues from this continent, they are at risk of long-term revenue slowdowns. The International Air Transport
Association has predicted
by 2020 UK air passengers could be 3-5% lower due to a downturn in economic activity and fall in sterling.
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Holiday rental sites like Airbnb, are currently the main driver of growth in peer-to-peer travel services. HVS a global
hospitality service has estimated that hotels are losing approximately $450 million in direct revenues per year due to the
peer-to-peer economy. Additionally amongst a survey of 300 hotel groups, 70% predict Airbnb will pose a significant
threat over the next 3 years. These effects have large impacts on the revenue of Flight Centre hotel commissions.
Uber and other ride-share tech companies have now surpassed the total transactions for car rental companies, which
were once a typically stable revenue stream for travel agencies. This has been caused by a fundamental change of
business and leisure consumer preferences. The increased convenience of hailing and payment efficiencies is
encouraging the switch to Uber. On a corporate level, ride-sharing is becoming the industry normality for business travel.
Especially as Uber has released a business platform which allows employees to charge their rides directly to the
corporation's expense account. This poses a large threat to the car-rental industry, and this is evident from large car rental
companies like Hertz and Avis experiencing depreciating share value.
However, there is positives for the industry. Rental car companies like Hertz have partnered with Uber to rent older cars
to Uber drivers unable to afford a car. Thus Hertz can secure rentals on older cars they would typically sell. Although the
additional revenues may offset some lost revenues caused by Uber, the same cannot be said for travel intermediaries.
Flight Centre only receives commissions from their travel clients renting cars, thus the substitution for the more cost-
effective Uber, will decrease the commission potential from the car rental revenue stream of FLT.
500 Leisure
400 7%
Airbnb less satisfactory
10% Corporate
300
200
30%
100 Airbnb about the same
39%
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Est. Est. Est. Est. Est. 63%
Airbnb more satisfactory
Source: Cowen &Company ; Team Estimates 51%
Market Share of Total Rides Market Share of Total Rides (Q2 2016)
60.00% 54.70%
(US)
50.00% 48.70%
14% Ride Hailing
37.20%
40.00%
30.00% 37.30% Car Rental
20.00% 14% 48.70% Taxi
10.00% 8.10%
37.30%
0.00%
Q1 2014 Q3 2014 Q1 2015 Q3 2015 Q1 2016
60 Hertz (HTZ.US)
40
20
Jul-15 Sep-15 Nov-15 Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16
Source: Bloomberg
Sources: Certify. (2016). Certify SpendSmart Reports. The Changing State of Business Travel. Retrieved from https://www.certify.com/Infograph-SpendSmart-
Full-Year-2015.aspx
Goldman Sachs. (2016). 2,000 US Consumers – Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Retrieved from http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-
do/research/
Kurtz. M. (2014). HVS Reports. In Focus: Airbnb’s Inroads into the Hotel Industry. Retrieved from http://www.hvs.com/article/6952/in-focus-airbnbs-inroads-into-
the-hotel-industry/.
Wu. T. (2016). IBISWorld Industry Report OD4216. Travel Insurance in Australia. Retrieved from http://www.ibisworld.com.au
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Facebook is the largest Social media platform, and Facebook Advertising Revenue
is important for the travel industry in marketing to 80.0
Billions of $USD
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increased revenues of Trip Advisor is indicating these travel services are advertising more directly to their consumers
online through a review-based large-data platform rather than using a travel agent.
EBIT values are non-statutory and unreconciled. All figures are displayed in AUD
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Margin 12.4% 12.5% 11.8% 11.9% 11.6% 12.0% 12.0% 11.9% 11.9%
US & Mexico 204 208 247 287 333 406 460 517 577
Margin 12.1% 12.1% 11.8% 11.7% 11.1% 11.8% 11.7% 11.6% 11.6%
United Kingdom & Europe 157 174 224 268 314 341 372 393 407
Margin 13.6% 14.7% 14.6% 14.2% 14.5% 14.3% 14.5% 14.4% 14.4%
Other Segment 144 159 184 201 262 288 314 339 363
Margin 99.8% 99.9% 94.3% 72.7% 72.9% 73.0% 73.0% 73.0% 73.0%
Operating Expenses 1,460 1,565 1,820 1,955 2,231 2,421 2,599 2,749 2,890
Growth 7.2% 16.3% 7.4% 14.2% 11.26% 12.28% 11.27% 12.24%
Salaries Wages and Employee
952 1,038 1,152 1,284 1,433 1,590 1,718 1,821 1,912
Benefits
Growth 9.1% 11.0% 11.4% 11.6% 11.00% 8.00% 6.00% 5.00%
Rental Expense 114 116 129 143 159 172 183 188 194
Growth 2.4% 10.6% 11.2% 10.7% 8.7% 6.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Other 396 418 483 529 621 659 698 740 784
Growth 5.6% 15.8% 9.4% 17.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
EBITDA 327 386 392 413 409 456 459 473 482
EBITDA Margin 18.2% 19.8% 17.7% 17.4% 15.5% 15.9% 15.0% 14.7% 14.3%
Capital Expenditure 45 41 46 73 94 105 117 130 145
Growth 12.1% -8.5% 13.2% 56.9% 29.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5%
Dep & Amort 49 49 54 54 66 76 87 98 111
EBIT 277.8 336.4 338.2 358.8 343.0 380.2 372.2 374.2 371.0
Total Non-Operating Loss -13 -13 15 -7 -2 -4 -2 0 -3
Pretax Income 289.4 349.3 323.7 366.3 345.0 384.3 374.6 374.5 374.3
Income Tax Expense 90 103 117 110 100 112 109 109 109
Tax rate 31.21% 30.19% 30.76% 30.06% 29.13% 29.12% 29.12% 29.12% 29.12%
Net Income 200 246 207 257 245 272 265 265 265
Net profit Margin 11.20% 12.62% 9.35% 10.84% 9.26% 9.47% 8.68% 8.24% 7.87%
Growth 23.0% -16.0% 24.0% -4.7% 11.4% -2.5% 0.0% -0.1%
Balance sheet
FY FY FY FY FY
($'000,000) 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total Current Assets 1,554 1,785 1,888 2,153 2,263 2,477 2,711 2,968 3,249
Total Noncurrent Assets 561 588 523 635 738 808 884 968 1,059
Total Assets 2,115 2,373 2,410 2,788 3,001 3,001 3,001 3,001 3,001
Total Current Liabilities 1,149 1,288 1,261 1,453 1,567 1,715 1,877 2,055 2,249
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 108 59 51 65 89
Total Liabilities 1,258 1,346 1,313 1,518 1,655 1,812 1,983 2,171 2,376
Total Equity 857 1,026 1,098 1,270 1,346 1,473 1,612 1,765 1,932
Total Liabilities & Equity 2,115 2,373 2,410 2,788 3,001 3,285 3,596 3,936 4,308
Converting Lease agreements into Debt Present Value of Future Lease Commitments
Commitment Present Value
Assumptions and Notes Year
($'000,000) ($'000,000)
1. Commitments between 1 to 5 and 6 to 7 years are
1 139.167 131.29
averged in order to compute present value
2 84.261 74.99
2. Pre-tax cost of debt is used as discount rate to
3 84.261 70.75
compute PV = 6%
4 84.261 66.74
3. Lease commitments are from end of 2016 Financial
5 84.261 62.96
Year
6 89.0415 62.77
Commitment ($'000,000)
7 89.0415 59.22
<1 139.17
Total 654.294 528.72
1 to 5 337.04
Stated Operating income 241.2
6 to 7 178.08 + PV of Lease commitments 528.72
Total Commitments 654.29 * Pretax cost of debt 6%
PV of Commitments 528.72 = 272.92
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CAPM Explanation
a) Beta. Regression of FLT’s weekly returns against ASX200 using 2- Beta 0.928 (a)
year data. Adjusting the raw beta (0.892) to reflect future beta under Risk-Free Rate 2.95% (b)
assumption that security’s true beta will move towards to market Market Premium 6.00% (c)
average of 1 over time. Formula used in adjustment: 0.67 x Raw Beta Cost of Equity 8.51%
+ 0.33 x 1 = 0.928
b) Risk-Free Rate. 10-year Australia government bond yield was chosen as reference rate. Given that 10Y government
bond yield has been decreasing dramatically and there are still more uncertainties on future cash rate, we decide to
combine the average of past two-year and five-year average yield to represent future risk free rate.
c) Market Premium. The market Premium was extracted from ‘KPMG Valuation Practices Survey 2015’ and ‘Social
Science Research Network’, all of which indicate a 6% premium of Australia equity market. Furthermore, potential
volatility of market premium has been incorporated into sensitivity analysis.
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In this report, we use GDP growth rate as the indicator of future terminal growth rate. However, FLT’s revenue from
domestic operations has shrunk considerably, hence Australia GDP growth rate no longer has the full representativeness.
Following tables demonstrate the process of estimating terminal growth rate.
2006 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
Australia 3.1% 3.8% 2.7% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.3% 2.8% 3.3% 3.00% 3.03% 2.94% 2.78%
US 2.67% 1.78% 2.53% 1.60% 2.22% 1.49% 2.43% 2.43% 2.40% 2.50% 2.38% 2.13% 1.96%
UK 2.7% 2.6% 1.5% 2.0% 1.2% 2.2% 2.9% 2.2% 1.89% 2.22% 2.21% 2.14% 2.11%
Asia 10.11% 11.20% 9.64% 7.83% 6.92% 6.91% 6.76% 6.59% 6.40% 6.32% 6.26% 6.32% 6.34%
South Africa 5.60% 5.36% 3.04% 3.21% 2.22% 2.21% 1.55% 1.28% 0.61% 1.21% 2.06% 2.40% 2.40%
Source: IMF
Historical Average Forecasted Average Weighted Average Final Weighting G x W
AU 2.9% 3.0% 2.93%
US 2.1% 2.3% 2.21%
UK 2.2% 2.1% 2.13%
Average of developed market 2.42% 75% 1.8%
Asia 8.24% 6.33% 7.29%
South Africa 3.06% 1.74% 2.40%
Average of emerging market 4.84% 25% 1.2%
Terminal Growth Rate 3.0%
Source: Team Estimates
3. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
FLT’s WACC has been swing since global financial crisis. We weighted its 10-year historical average WACC and current
WACC to arrive at 10.15%, which is also consistent with 10-year average WACC excluding GFC outliers. In the scenario
analysis, we use this two reference WACC with different weightings to determine WACCs for bearish and bullish cases.
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
WACC 7.50% 7.29% 16.23% 16.37% 14.85% 12.62% 11.25% 12.02% 11.58% 8.83%
Current WACC 8.30%
10Y Average 12.00%
Equal weighting 10.15%
Source: Bloomberg, Team Estimates
Bearish Case WACC Bullish Case WACC
WACC weighting WxW WACC weighting WxW
Current WACC 8.30% 30% 2.49% Current WACC 8.30% 70% 5.81%
10Y Average 12.00% 70% 8.40% 10Y Average 12.00% 30% 3.60%
Weighted Average 10.89% Weighted Average 9.41%
Source: Team Estimates
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Intrinsic Value
Sum of PV 3380.78
Debt 76.80
Value of Equity 3303.98
WAOS 101.00
Intrinsic Value(2016/06/30) 32.71
Target Price (2016/08/31) 33.10
Current Price 36.85
Upside potential -10%
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Scenario 2: Cost of Equity & Terminal Growth Rate Scenario 2: WACC & Long Term Growth
Rationals:
1. Terminal growth rate could be in line with historical sustainable
growth rate
2. Cost of equity could rise when company increase leverage
Cost of Equity Long Term Growth
27.33 7.50% 8.00% 8.51% 9.00% 9.50% 33.10 2.5% 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5%
2.5% 30.5 27.7 25.4 23.5 21.9 11.0% 28.19 28.73 29.58 30.50 31.15
Growth 2.7% 31.6 28.63 26.15 24.15 22.4 WACC 10.5% 29.96 30.57 31.56 32.62 33.38
3.0% 33.4 30.09 27.35 25.15 23.3 10.2% 31.34 32.02 33.10 34.29 35.14
3.3% 35.5 31.74 28.68 26.26 24.2 9.5% 34.26 35.08 36.42 37.89 38.95
3.5% 37.0 33.0 29.7 27.1 24.8 9.0% 36.90 37.88 39.46 41.21 42.48
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International International
Discount Debt
27.21 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.47 28.04 1631 1721 1812 1902 1993
2.43 26.30 25.39 24.48 23.58 22.67 411 26.82 25.92 25.03 24.13 23.23
2.56 27.76 26.80 25.85 24.89 23.93 434 28.32 27.43 26.53 25.64 24.74
EPS 2.69 29.23 28.22 27.21 26.20 25.19 EBITDA 456 29.83 28.93 28.04 27.14 26.25
2.83 30.69 29.63 28.57 27.51 26.44 479 31.34 30.44 29.55 28.65 27.75
2.96 32.15 31.04 29.93 28.81 27.70 502 32.84 31.95 31.05 30.16 29.26
P/Sales
Scenario 3: Discount & Sales
Rationals:
1.FLT can increase or decrease their debt levels
2.FLT's earnings can increase or decrease
Domestic
Discount
64.11 27.73% 29.27% 30.81% 32.35% 33.89%
2590 $60.27 $58.99 $57.70 $56.42 $55.13
2734 $63.62 $62.26 $60.91 $59.55 $58.19
Sales 2878 $66.97 $65.54 $64.11 $62.68 $61.26
3022 $70.32 $68.82 $67.32 $65.82 $64.32
3166 $73.66 $72.09 $70.52 $68.95 $67.38
International
Discount
35.92 59.35% 62.64% 65.94% 69.24% 72.54%
2590 38.59 35.46 32.33 29.20 26.07
2734 40.73 37.43 34.13 30.82 27.52
Sales 2878 42.88 39.40 35.92 32.45 28.97
3022 45.02 41.37 37.72 34.07 30.42
3166 47.17 43.34 39.51 35.69 31.86
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Bearish case has a value of AUD23.45, while bullish case has a price
at AUD40.71. This represents 25% probability downside and 30%
probability upside potential in accordance with Monte Carlo simulation
distribution. However, overall, there would be more than 60%
probability that the stock price will below current price.
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Appendix 19: Australia Short-term Outbound Travel Modelling & Stock Return
Volatility Modelling
1. Multiplicative SARIMA (Seasonal Autoregressive
Moving Average Model)
FLT generates half of its annual revenue within Australia, on
which outbound travel has a significant impact. Therefore we
forecast the next 5-year outbound travel movement by using
a multiplicative SARIMA to model this essential growth driver.
The graph on the right demonstrates the trend of movements,
and the table below illustrates the forecasted future outbound
travel growth.
Student Universe
Overview
Student Universe is currently the world’s leading travel booking service for students and youth. They offer special student
online rate on flights, hotels and tours. The company is in association with dozens of World-class partners and over 70
Airlines. Student Universe launched in 2000 and has branches in Boston, London, Toronto, New
York and the Philippines.
Details of the Acquisition
st
The Acquisition was made on the 21 December 2015 for $US 28 million after 18 months of
negotiations. The agreement states that student universe will operate under the management of
Flight Centres Americas President.
Acquisition SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
• Enhanced economies of scale power • Intense online competition
• Strong Online Platform • Concentrated international competition
• Leading youth travel booking service • Heavily US Based
• Overvalued acquisition
Opportunities Threats
• Expand Online Presence • Alternative Management leading to inefficiencies
• Access Niche Market (Key Demographic in • Online Market Saturation
Travel) • Unrecognized revenue expectations
• Student and Youth Market is one of Travel’s
fastest growing sectors.
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BYOJET
Overview
BYO Jet is an Australian family owned and operated travel agency that operates in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore
and South Africa. Launch in 2010, the company is an online booking service which offers the lowest price guarantee on
over 300 worldwide airlines.
Details of the Acquisition
st
Flight Centre Acquired a 70% stake of BYOjet on the 21 of December, after 3 months of
negotiation. Flight Centre will pay BYOjet's parent company Professional Performance
Systems $2.52 million upfront, plus a second payment for 70 per cent of 6 times the online
business' 2016 financial year EBIT, less the original amount. There has also been placed
call and put options, so that Flight Centre may control 100% of the company in 2018.
Acquisition SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
• Enhanced economies of scale power • Undefined cost of Acquisition creates additional risk
• Decreased competition • Intense online competition
• Expanded employee base • Concentrated international competition
Opportunities Threats
• Financial options to acquire remaining 30% in • Alternative Management leading to inefficiencies
2018. • Enhanced EBIT of BYOjet may lead to expensive
• Expand Online Presence acquisition
• Better exposure to Asia Markets • Online Market Saturation
• Exposure into low-cost market • Low-cost sales can cannibalise full service revenues.
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Professional Performance US$1.81 million Owners and operators of BYOjet Group which is an AUS
Systems Pty Ltd online travel agent specialized in ultra low cost
airfares
2016 Professional Performance US$0.5 million AUS
Systems Pty Ltd
AVMIN Pty Ltd A$1.224 million Aircraft charter and logistics specialist AUS
Worldwide Aviation Services A$297,000 Small corporate travel business MY
(WAS)
Maya Events A$361,000 Event management and production company HK
Business Travel Development A$2.649 million Corporate Travel Agency based in the Netherlands NL
Source: Bloomberg and Company Information
The Cambodian Children’s Trust works to empower vulnerable children to escape the cycle of poverty
through family preservation, education and deinstitutionalisation. It is a local NGO with more than 90%
of the staff are from Cambodia.
Foodbank is the largest non-profit organisation in Australia which distributed food to those who have
difficulty purchasing enough food to avoid hunger. In 2015 they provided enough food for 40 million
meals.
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The Kokoda Track Foundation is an aid organisation with the objective to improve the education, health
and community services in Papa New Guinea. FLT supports the Education Bilong Olgeta Program
contributing to teacher training and development, salaries and school resources for the Elementary
School in Kokoda and the Kou Kou Pre-school.
Redkite is an Australian cancer charity which provides support to children and young people with cancer.
Furthermore, it supports their families and support networks. FLT assists Redkite’s Diagnosis Support
Pack program which includes vital care and comfort as well as critical information to help along their
journey. Furthermore, it provides information and age-appropriate items for teenagers and young adults
up to the age of 24.
Youngcare assists people between the ages of 18 to 65 with high care needs. Their programs focus on
supporting young people with a disability by providing greater choice in housing and care options. FLT
supports Youngcare Connect which is a free national information and support line which helps families
navigate through the often confusing healthcare system.
Total Strengths
30
25
20
15
Total
Total Threats 10
Weaknesses
Total
Opportunities
The SWOT analysis was created to establish a better understanding of FLT's position within the travel industry. The
analysis is built around a series of categories within each of the four SWOT sections and ranked on a scale to three
according to their likely impact on FLT. Furthermore, this point system was used to determine the overall performance of
FLT in the respective category which can be seen in the chart above.
Strengths Weaknesses
• Diversification of services: complete and tailored experience • Dependency on Australian Market: 74% of EBIT
across different sectors like flights, hotels, cruises, currency, car derived in AU
rental, visa assistance • Inefficient capital structure
• Multiple segments: leisure, online, wholesale and corporate. • Cost structure: High operating expenses
• Expansive Growth Strategy • Insufficient online presence
• Large Market Share domestically
• Existing distribution and sales networks
Opportunities Threats
• Strategic Acquisitions • Diseases, Terrorism, Economic downturns
• Brand Strength: Allows for easier integration into the • Brandjacking: online diversion of search traffic
online/physical business dynamic • Increasing online travel service competition
• Disintermediation: especially domestically
• Backward integration from Airline suppliers due to
online pricing
• Small board and missing diversity
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Social Score
60
Flight Centre
50 Travel Group
Axis Title
Ltd. 60
40
30
Local Peers 50
20 40
10 30
0
International
Peers 20
2013 2014 2015
10
Axis Title 0
2013 2014 2015
30 Environmental Score
25
20
15
10
5
0
2013 2014 2015
of Michael Hill International Limited (MHI). He has an active role in the tourism
and travel industry Australia’s for 20 years.
John Eales Mr. Eales has been appointed to the board of Flight Centre in 2012. Yes
Non- Furthermore, he currently sits on the board of GRM International, International
Executive Quarterback, Fuji Xerox – DMS and the Australian Rugby Union. He was the
Director Co-founder of the Mettle Group in 2003, which was acquired by Chandler
MacLeod in 2007.
Robert Baker Robert Baker has been a non-executive Director of Flight Centre since 2013. Yes
Non-Executive He has had a successful career at PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in leading
Director their Office in Brisbane, providing professional services to clients and in being
a member of PwC’s Board from 2008 to 2013. Mr. Baker is also in the function
of the chairman in four other companies (John Goodman & Co Ltd since 2014,
International Justice Fund Limited since 2015, Employment Office Australia Pty
Ltd since 2015, Audit and Risk Committee of the Australian Catholic University
Limited since 2015). Furthermore, Robert is an advisory board member and
Audit and Risk Committee member for the Catholic Development Fund,
Archdiocese of Sydney since 2011.
Cassandra Kelly* Cassandra Kelly has been appointed to the board of Flight Centre in 2014. She Yes
Non-Executive is the Co-founder and chair of corporate advisory Pottinger, deputy
Director chairwoman of Treasury Corporation of Victoria, chairwoman of Allpress
nd
*resigned on the 2 of International and director of UNSW Foundation Limited. However, she
August 2016
resigned her role on the board of FLT effective with the 2 August 2016 due to
her current living situation in the USA and because she wants to spend more
time with her family.
30
Disclosures:
Ownership and material conflicts of interest:
The author(s), or a member of their household, of this report does not hold a financial interest in the securities of this company.
The author(s), or a member of their household, of this report does not know of the existence of any conflicts of interest that might bias
the content or publication of this report.
Receipt of compensation:
Compensation of the author(s) of this report is not based on investment banking revenue.
Position as a officer or director:
The author(s), or a member of their household, does not serve as an officer, director or advisory board member of the subject
company.
Market making:
The author(s) does not act as a market maker in the subject company’s securities.
Disclaimer:
The information set forth herein has been obtained or derived from sources generally available to the public and believed by the
author(s) to be reliable, but the author(s) does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to its accuracy or
completeness. The information is not intended to be used as the basis of any investment decisions by any person or entity. This
information does not constitute investment advice, nor is it an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security. This report
should not be considered to be a recommendation by any individual affiliated with CFA Society Sydney, CFA Institute or the CFA
Institute Research Challenge with regard to this company’s stock.