Begun and Held in Metro Manila, On Monday, The Twenty-Fifth Day of July, Two Thousand Eleven

Republic of the Philippines
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two
thousand eleven.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175
AN ACT DEFINING CYBERCRIME, PROVIDING FOR THE

PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION, SUPPRESSION AND THE
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012″.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the vital role of

information and communications industries such as content production,
telecommunications, broadcasting electronic commerce, and data processing, in
the nation’s overall social and economic development. The State also recognizes
the importance of providing an environment conducive to the development,
acceleration, and rational application and exploitation of information and
communications technology (ICT) to attain free, easy, and intelligible access to
exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protect and safeguard
the integrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and
databases, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and
data stored therein, from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making
punishable under the law such conduct or conducts. In this light, the State shall
adopt sufficient powers to effectively prevent and combat such offenses by
facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and
international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable
international cooperation.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms
are hereby defined as follows:
(a) Access refers to the instruction, communication with, storing data in,
retrieving data from, or otherwise making use of any resources of a computer
system or communication network.
(b) Alteration refers to the modification or change, in form or substance, of an

existing computer data or program.
(c) Communication refers to the transmission of information through ICT media,

including voice, video and other forms of data.
(d) Computer refers to an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other
data processing or communications device, or grouping of such devices, capable
of performing logical, arithmetic, routing, or storage functions and which includes
any storage facility or equipment or communications facility or equipment
directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device. It covers any type
of computer device including devices with data processing capabilities like
mobile phones, smart phones, computer networks and other devices connected to
the internet.
(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts

in a form suitable for processing in a computer system including a program
suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function and includes electronic
documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local computer
systems or online.
(f) Computer program refers to a set of instructions executed by the computer to

achieve intended results.
(g) Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related

devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automated
processing of data. It covers any type of device with data processing capabilities
including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device consisting
of hardware and software may include input, output and storage components
which may stand alone or be connected in a network or other similar devices. It
also includes computer data storage devices or media.
(h) Without right refers to either: (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of
authority; or (ii) conduct not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court
orders, justifications, or relevant principles under the law.
(i) Cyber refers to a computer or a computer network, the electronic medium in

which online communication takes place.
(j) Critical infrastructure refers to the computer systems, and/or networks,

whether physical or virtual, and/or the computer programs, computer data and/or
traffic data so vital to this country that the incapacity or destruction of or
interference with such system and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national or economic security, national public health and safety, or any
combination of those matters.
(k) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management

approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can
be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets.
(l) Database refers to a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts,

or instructions which are being prepared, processed or stored or have been
prepared, processed or stored in a formalized manner and which are intended for
use in a computer system.
(m) Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the

content of communications, including procuring of the content of data, either
directly, through access and use of a computer system or indirectly, through the
use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the same time that the
communication is occurring.
(n) Service provider refers to:

(1) Any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to
communicate by means of a computer system; and
(2) Any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such
communication service or users of such service.
(o) Subscriber’s information refers to any information contained in the form of

computer data or any other form that is held by a service provider, relating to
subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data and by which identity
can be established:
(1) The type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken
thereto and the period of service;
(2) The subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other
access numbers, any assigned network address, billing and payment information,
available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement; and
(3) Any other available information on the site of the installation of

communication equipment, available on the basis of the service agreement or
arrangement.
(p) Traffic data or non-content data refers to any computer data other than the
content of the communication including, but not limited to, the communication’s
origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.
CHAPTER II
PUNISHABLE ACTS
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of

cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system
without right.
(2) Illegal Interception. – The interception made by technical means without right
of any non-public transmission of computer data to, from, or within a computer
system including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying
such computer data.
(3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion

or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
(4) System Interference. — The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or

interference with the functioning of a computer or computer network by inputting,
transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer
data or program, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right or
authority, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
(5) Misuse of Devices.
(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation, distribution, or otherwise

making available, without right, of:
(aa) A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for
the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act; or
(bb) A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any
part of a computer system is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used
for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act.
(ii) The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs 5(i)(aa) or (bb) above with
intent to use said devices for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under
this section.
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the
same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered

with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name
registration:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
(b) Computer-related Offenses:
(1) Computer-related Forgery. —
(i) The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer data without right resulting
in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal
purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly
readable and intelligible; or
(ii) The act of knowingly using computer data which is the product of computer-
related forgery as defined herein, for the purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent or
dishonest design.
(2) Computer-related Fraud. — The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of

computer data or program or interference in the functioning of a computer
system, causing damage thereby with fraudulent intent: Provided, That if no
damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,

transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to
another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided, That if no damage
has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation,

directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable
by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed
through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.1âwphi1
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The transmission of commercial

electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and

reliable way for the recipient to reject. receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the
recipients to read the message.
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or
any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Section 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who

willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this
Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully

attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Section 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, as the case may be.
Section 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
CHAPTER III
PENALTIES
Section 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred
or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the
penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred
or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)
(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of
at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One
million pesos (PhPl,000,000.00) or both.
(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act
No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009″: Provided,That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least
Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5
shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the
prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(PhPl00,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00)
or both.
Section 9. Corporate Liability. — When any of the punishable acts herein defined
are knowingly committed on behalf of or for the benefit of a juridical person, by a
natural person acting either individually or as part of an organ of the juridical
person, who has a leading position within, based on: (a) a power of representation
of the juridical person provided the act committed falls within the scope of such
authority; (b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the juridical
person: Provided, That the act committed falls within the scope of such authority;
or (c) an authority to exercise control within the juridical person, the juridical
person shall be held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines
imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of Ten million pesos
(PhP10,000,000.00).
If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined was made possible
due to the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to and
described in the preceding paragraph, for the benefit of that juridical person by a
natural person acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be held liable
for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a
maximum of Five million pesos (PhP5,000,000.00).
The liability imposed on the juridical person shall be without prejudice to the
criminal liability of the natural person who has committed the offense.
CHAPTER IV
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
Section 10. Law Enforcement Authorities. — The National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall be responsible
for the efficient and effective law enforcement of the provisions of this Act. The
NBI and the PNP shall organize a cybercrime unit or center manned by special
investigators to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.
Section 11. Duties of Law Enforcement Authorities. — To ensure that the

technical nature of cybercrime and its prevention is given focus and considering
the procedures involved for international cooperation, law enforcement
authorities specifically the computer or technology crime divisions or units
responsible for the investigation of cybercrimes are required to submit timely and
regular reports including pre-operation, post-operation and investigation results
and such other documents as may be required to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for review and monitoring.
Section 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement

authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or
electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time,
date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities
in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed: (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to
the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any
such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining
such evidence.
Section 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and
subscriber information relating to communication services provided by a service
provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date
of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months
from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring
its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a
service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service
provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be
deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the
case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential
the order and its compliance.
Section 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon

securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service
provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant
data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for
investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of
investigation.
Section 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a

search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities
shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as

defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage

medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed

computer or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to
protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the
necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon
but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by
the court.
Section 16. Custody of Computer Data. — All computer data, including content
and traffic data, examined under a proper warrant shall, within forty-eight (48)
hours after the expiration of the period fixed therein, be deposited with the court
in a sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the law
enforcement authority executing it stating the dates and times covered by the
examination, and the law enforcement authority who may access the deposit,
among other relevant data. The law enforcement authority shall also certify that
no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if
made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the package deposited
with the court. The package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings
replayed, or used in evidence, or then contents revealed, except upon order of the
court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or
communications have been recorded.
Section 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as

provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement
authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the
computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 18. Exclusionary Rule. — Any evidence procured without a valid warrant
or beyond the authority of the same shall be inadmissible for any proceeding
before any court or tribunal.
Section 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When a

computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act,
the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Section 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter

IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be
punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of
prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand
pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order
issued by law enforcement authorities.
CHAPTER V
JURISDICTION
Section 21. Jurisdiction. — The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over
any violation of the provisions of this Act. including any violation committed by a
Filipino national regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if
any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or committed with the
use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by
such commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the
time the offense was committed, was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained

judges to handle cybercrime cases.
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Section 22. General Principles Relating to International Cooperation. — All

relevant international instruments on international cooperation in criminal
matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation,
and domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations
or proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to computer systems and
data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal, offense
shall be given full force and effect.
CHAPTER VII
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
Section 23. Department of Justice (DOJ). — There is hereby created an Office of

Cybercrime within the DOJ designated as the central authority in all matters
related to international mutual assistance and extradition.
Section 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. — There is

hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-
agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the
President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the
formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Section 25. Composition. — The CICC shall be headed by the Executive Director
of the Information and Communications Technology Office under the Department
of Science and Technology (ICTO-DOST) as Chairperson with the Director of the
NBI as Vice Chairperson; the Chief of the PNP; Head of the DOJ Office of
Cybercrime; and one (1) representative from the private sector and academe, as
members. The CICC shall be manned by a secretariat of selected existing
personnel and representatives from the different participating agencies.1âwphi1
Section 26. Powers and Functions. — The CICC shall have the following powers
and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance

for the suppression of real-time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT);
(b) To coordinate the preparation of appropriate and effective measures to prevent

and suppress cybercrime activities as provided for in this Act;
(c) To monitor cybercrime cases being bandied by participating law enforcement

and prosecution agencies;
(d) To facilitate international cooperation on intelligence, investigations, training

and capacity building related to cybercrime prevention, suppression and
prosecution;
(e) To coordinate the support and participation of the business sector, local
government units and nongovernment organizations in cybercrime prevention
programs and other related projects;
(f) To recommend the enactment of appropriate laws, issuances, measures and

policies;
(g) To call upon any government agency to render assistance in the

accomplishment of the CICC’s mandated tasks and functions; and
(h) To perform all other matters related to cybercrime prevention and suppression,
including capacity building and such other functions and duties as may be
necessary for the proper implementation of this Act.
CHAPTER VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 27. Appropriations. — The amount of Fifty million pesos

(PhP50,000,000_00) shall be appropriated annually for the implementation of this
Act.
Section 28. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The ICTO-DOST, the DOJ
and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall jointly
formulate the necessary rules and regulations within ninety (90) days from
approval of this Act, for its effective implementation.
Section 29. Separability Clause — If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the
other provisions not affected shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 30. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees or rules inconsistent with this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 33(a) of Republic Act
No. 8792 or the "Electronic Commerce Act" is hereby modified accordingly.
Section 31. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Speaker of the House of Representatives President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2796 and House Bill No.
5808 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on June
5, 2012 and June 4, 2012, respectively.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA- (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

YAP Secretary of Senate
Secretary General
House of Representatives
Approved: SEP 12 2012
(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines
LIBEL, ART. 355 (RPC)
Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to
the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE

AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE
JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations,
as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where
the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer
does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel
cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible
venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v.

Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it
appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to
whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public
officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that
time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua
non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is
used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The
Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest

jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale
for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of
Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions

for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised
Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil
actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published,
displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written,
printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and
the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may
be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or
circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43
Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party
has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the
Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were
charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended
party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882,
May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the
indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or
far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute
where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence,
and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used
by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information
must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their
editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial
publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory

material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of
determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s
premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’
website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills
that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations
where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages
therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all
other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of
being accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as
amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez37 are
instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the

Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel
either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place
of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate
this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no
convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on
libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still
allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places
of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine
with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008
and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH
the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
***Following the principles laid down in the case of Bonifacio, the rules on
venue of criminal actions for Internet libel are as follows: (I) If the offended party
is a private individual, the criminal case can only be filed in either of two places,
namely: (a) where the complainant or offended party actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense; or (b) where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published. (II) If the offended party is a public official, the
criminal case can only be filed in either of two places, namely: (a) in the place
(whether in or outside Manila) where he holds office at the time of the
commission of the crime; or (b) where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
DISINI vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Xxx
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but
creates an altogether new defamatory story against Armand like "He beats his
wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting published
on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors
of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that
society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships
and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social
or economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their
relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures,
stores, and indexes child pornography and facilitates the completion of
transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make
Google and its users aiders and abettors in the commission of child pornography
crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the American law on child pornography
that the Cybercrimes law lacks—the exemption of a provider or notably a plain
user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child pornography as
follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the

publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively

republishes it whether wittingly or unwittingly. Does this make him a willing
accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user downloads the
Facebook mobile application, the user may give consent to Facebook to access his
contact details. In this way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and
unsolicited commercial communication could be disseminated on the basis of this
information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution
of this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve
users of annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises

apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on
the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting
ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the
petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens
and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section
5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)
(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4)
on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on
Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of
the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same
reason not objectionable. A hacker may for instance have done all that is
necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system but the security
employed by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker
may have gained access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use
these because the system supervisor is alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any
person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the
owner of the username and password could not file a complaint against him for
attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from
liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the
innocent.73 While this may be true with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak
past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified in
Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5),
Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)
(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be
identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works.
Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this
Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than
that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the
case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a

qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a
substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information
and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means.
In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is
able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore,
creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled
doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously
under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different
laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the
other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other. 74 With the
exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court
would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to
actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material
on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical
material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a
violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in
fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article
353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of
publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2)
merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in
cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in
fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or
any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and
ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred
or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the
penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred
or both, shall be imposed.
(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of
at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) but not exceeding One
million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both.
(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act
No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least
Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5
shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the
prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on
Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data
and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices;
when the crime punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure;
4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt
in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a

legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe
penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties
for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior
time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have
been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret
and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.78
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities,

with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time,
date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities
in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to
the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any
such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining
such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be
incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected.
Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected
from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose
since a law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but
then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the
purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and
that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. 80 In assessing regulations affecting
privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against
constitutional guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law
for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for
public good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government
should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of
cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic

data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities with the power they
need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace.
Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt
legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or record "traffic data,
in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And this is precisely
what Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to
collect or record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it
has been committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time
data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the
crimes of accessing a computer system without right, 84 transmitting
viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could easily evade detection
and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or
laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes
from virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places that provide
free internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors.
Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered
SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified.
There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those
who peddle child pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law
enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only
real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-
issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and
do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading
the people’s right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court
recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work
together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not
intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such
right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe, 90 the United States Supreme
Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational
privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain
important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to informational
privacy—that those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic
data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. 91 In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court
has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the
right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain
matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy
must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its
application to a particular person or group, petitioners’ challenge to Section 12
applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning
the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general public’s point of view. Without reasonable expectation
of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his
communication through a service provider, must of necessity disclose to the latter,
a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user.
For example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for another ICT
user must furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the
cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is this
information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to
putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it
through the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no
one will read the information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and

in a way that may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through
the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into
packets and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header
contains the traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet
originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat
messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how
the packet fits together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent
through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and
addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded
internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to
another where their contents are pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents
of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the
service provider’s communication’s system will put his voice message into
packets and send them to the other person’s cellphone where they are refitted
together and heard. The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way.
To be connected by the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number
to the service provider when he puts his call through. He also reveals the
cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating
electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme
Court reasoned that telephone users in the ‘70s must realize that they necessarily
convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call. That
Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials
should remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or
exchange data with one another over cyberspace except through some service
providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for a
successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them
out of the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them an
expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly
random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed,
they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the
persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to
determine a person’s close associations, religious views, political affiliations,
even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may
expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to
privacy. But has the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn
narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or

record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point
out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that
whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to
this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the
meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory
construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint
at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General
suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to
a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12
does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of
a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general
gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the
Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be
used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the traffic data to identify the
perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an
identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and
lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose
identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can
prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking
into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will
unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion
from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with
specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all
since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to
privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of
traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get a court warrant that
would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless
search is associated with a police officer’s determination of probable cause that a
crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and
that unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands
to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal
protection to internet users and that the procedure envisioned by the law could be
better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that
law enforcement authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of
course not enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in
real time and determine their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines
however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech
cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor punishes any type of
speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and
kindred institutions to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in
ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of
a technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage
of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and
subscriber information relating to communication services provided by a service
provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date
of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months
from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring
its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a
service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service
provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be
deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the
case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential
the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue
deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order that
law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from
accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to
their authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it
is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of
the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and
subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six months
from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six
months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his
computer if he was so minded. The service provider has never assumed
responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the
same.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon

securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service
provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant
data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for
investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of
investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a

subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial
function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively
a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an
adjunct of their investigatory powers.98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued

court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable
them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for
disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate
the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only
after judicial intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search
and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall
likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as
defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage

medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed

computer or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to
protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the
necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon
but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by
the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant

established search and seizure procedures. On its face, however, Section 15
merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure
the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have
been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose
any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15
does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely
supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as

provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement
authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the
computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or

examination, destroyed or deleted upon the lapse of the prescribed period. The
Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service provider’s
storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are
quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous

preservation or examination violates the user’s right against deprivation of
property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the
user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of
the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them
preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data
or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is
deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to

computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer

data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ
shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates

the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General
concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19
indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware,
as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without
having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is
indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors
may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal
computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure
in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the
computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case,
Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace.
Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within
constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an
executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial
warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates
some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into
one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. 101 Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can
actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into
consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of
the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV

hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished
as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision
correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued
by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The

argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of
guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or
valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense
which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute
an offense in and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other
statue or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine

ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person
who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases
by committing any of the following acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done

"knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt,
during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for
non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to
the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby

created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency
body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for
policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and
enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of

real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency
response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it
gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the

Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the
position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management

approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can
be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. 104 This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of
the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international
levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order,
which has been considered as sufficient standard. 106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a)
are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of

unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic

data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of

Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system

without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including

transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring

domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of
others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse
of identifying information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious

exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child

pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes

defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use
of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require

service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber
information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under

a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination

of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously

preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed
holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to

cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and

Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions;

and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL

with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and
react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of

cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)
(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on
Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-

squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct

application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under

both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same
proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial

question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
ELEMENTS:
1. The civil action must be instituted PRIOR to the criminal action;

2. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action;
3. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
VIOLATION OF BP 22 OR BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario
P. Campos (Campos) to assail the Decision 1 dated July 21, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction of Campos for fourteen (14) counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as The
Bouncing Checks Law.
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from

respondent First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of
₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the
agreed installment payments.3 Fourteen of these checks drawn against her Current
Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were
dishonored when presented for payment, particularly:
Check No. Date Amount

138609 August 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138610 August 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138611 September 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138612 September 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138613 October 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138614 October 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138615 November15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138616 November30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138617 December15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138618 December31, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138619 January 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138620 January 31, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138621 February 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138622 February28, 1996 ₱3,333.33
₱46,666.62
The checks were declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed

account."4
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite
demand, she was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she
failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned.5
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion
that reads: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby
CONVICTED of fourteen (14) counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment for each violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of
₱46,666.62 representing the total value of the checks, plus legal interest from date
of default until full payment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July
30, 2007, the RTC of Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding
Campos’ conviction. A motion for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied
for lack of merit.7
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on
July 21, 2008 its decision8 affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to
reconsider, but her motion was denied via a Resolution9 dated February 16, 2009.
Hence,this petition for review on certiorari which cites the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH

REGISTERED MAILIS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS
OF [B.P. 22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF
THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS’] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE

FACT OF THE CHECKS’ DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR PAYMENT [ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO
GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS AND TO LEND SUCCOR TO
[CAMPOS’] CASE.10
Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of
the check’s issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon presentment was not established by the
prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor from FWCC.
Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a supposed
notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She
also invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the
payment of her obligation after the subject checks were dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.11
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being
advanced by Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to
receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the
dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, 12 although not as an
element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was
aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored
it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22.
Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds,13 as it reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days
fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the
required notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos,
nonetheless, still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not
sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and the
registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. The Court
has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts
that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of
dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks.1âwphi1 The
authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor
and to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers
Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her
creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank,
BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "[she] has in
her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made
arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor
of the checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually
received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in
her statement were receipts16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22,
1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various
amounts ranging from ₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00. Campos would not have entered
into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had.
not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks
or making arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving
notice. Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the
instant case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged
arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied
with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks.
Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the
MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived
her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her former counsel for
alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial, 17 it is
settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the
circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA
which affirmed the conviction of Campos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and
Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31468 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177438 September 24, 2012
AMADA RESTERIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the

drawer, maker or issuer of a check should be written. If the service of the written
notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer of the dishonored check is by
registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as
evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together with
the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without
the authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of dishonor is
insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending by
registered mail.
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Mandaue City through the information
that alleged as follows:
That on May, 2002, or thereabouts, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent of gain, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make, draw and issue ChinaBank Check bearing No. AO141332, dated June 3,
2002, in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 payable to the order of Bernardo T. Villadolid
to apply on account or for value, the accused fully knowing well that at the time
of the issuance of said check that she does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
or the accused having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when she
make/s or draw/s and issue/s a check but she failed to keep sufficient funds or
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check, which check when
presented for encashment was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"ACCT. CLOSED" or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, and
despite notice of dishonor and demands for payment, said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to redeem the check or to make arrangement for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving the notice of dishonor, to the damage and prejudice of the aforenamed
private complainant, in the aforestated amount and other claims and charges
allowed by civil law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After trial, the MTCC found the petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered finding the accused, AMADA Y.

RESTERIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and sentences her to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱
50,000.00) and to pay her civil liabilities to the private complainant in the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 50,000.00), TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱
10,000.00) as attorney’s fees and FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS (₱
575.00) as eimbursement of the filing fees.
SO ORDERED.2
The petitioner appealed, but the RTC affirmed the conviction.3
By petition for review, the petitioner appealed to the CA, stating that: (a) the RTC
erred in affirming the conviction and in not finding instead that the Prosecution
did not establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (b) the conviction was
contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence, particularly Yu Oh v. Court of
Appeals.4
On December 4, 2006, the CA found the petition to be without merit, and denied
the petition for review.5
Issues
The petitioner assails the affirmance of her conviction by the CA based on the
following grounds, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
IGNORING THE APPLICABILITY IN THE PRESENT CASE THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ELVIRA YU OH VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125297, JUNE 26, 2003.

NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE ALL THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22.

NOT FINDING THAT NO NOTICE OF DISHONOR WAS ACTUALLY SENT
TO THE PETITIONER.

NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 6
The appeal hinges on whether or not all the elements of a violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 were established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Prosecution must prove the
following essential elements, namely:
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there
were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.7
The existence of the first element of the violation is not disputed. According to
the petitioner, she was "required to issue a check as a collateral for the
obligation," and that "she was left with no alternative but to borrow the check of
her friend xxx and used the said check as a collateral of her loan." 8 During her
cross-examination, she stated that she did not own the check that she drew and
issued to complainant Bernardo Villadolid.9
Yet, to avoid criminal liability, the petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 was applicable only if the dishonored check was actually owned by her; and
that she could not be held liable because the check was issued as a mere collateral
of the loan and not intended to be deposited.
The petitioner’s contentions do not persuade.
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless
check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the
account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the
drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited
was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People,10 the Court debunked her contentions and
cogently observed:
In Lozano v. Martinez, this Court ruled that the gravamen of the offense is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes all
checks drawn against banks. The law was designed to prohibit and altogether
eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check, either as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a
pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. 22. It is a crime
classified as malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include, within its
coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a
bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented
for payment. As the Court in Lozano explained:
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated –
The "check flasher" does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the
pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place
him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and
for whom the constitutional inhibition against "imprisonment for debt, except in
cases of fraud" was intended as a shield and not a sword.
Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction on one who draws and issues a
worthless check against insufficient funds or a closed account in the drawee bank,
there is, likewise, every reason to penalize a person who indulges in the making
and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the latter’s
consent, which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee
bank.11 (Bold emphases supplied)
The State likewise proved the existence of the third element. On direct
examination, Villadolid declared that the check had been dishonored upon its
presentment to the drawee bank through the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
as the collecting bank. The return check memorandum issued by BPI indicated
that the account had already been closed. 12 The petitioner did not deny or
contradict the fact of dishonor.
The remaining issue is whether or not the second element, that is, the knowledge
of the petitioner as the issuer of the check that at the time of issue there were no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, was existent.
To establish the existence of the second element, the State should present the
giving of a written notice of the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the
dishonored check. The rationale for this requirement is rendered in Dico v. Court
of Appeals,13 to wit:
To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish
that a check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it must
further be shown that accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check that
he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment.
This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of

the check is the second element of the offense. Inasmuch as this element involves
a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the check which is
difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of
such knowledge. Said section reads:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the
check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the
drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the
check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it
is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five
days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee
bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such
notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus

indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent
by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere
oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice
is fatal for the prosecution.14 (Bold emphases supplied)
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the
second element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but
also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the offender to
avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within
five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been
paid.15 The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory
right by not giving the proper notice of dishonor. The nature of this opportunity
for the accused to avoid criminal prosecution has been expounded in Lao v. Court
of Appeals:16
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator
‘a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt
the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated’ xxx In this
light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking
days from notice of dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and
the basic postulate of fairness require – that the notice of dishonor be actually sent
to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under
B.P. 22."17 (Bold emphases supplied)
To prove that he had sent the written notice of dishonor to the petitioner by
registered mail, Villadolid presented the registry return receipt for the first notice
of dishonor dated June 17, 2002 and the registry return receipt for the second
notice of dishonor dated July 16, 2002. However, the petitioner denied receiving
the written notices of dishonor.
The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to
establish the fact that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on the
petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the written
notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return receipts
by themselves were not proof of the service on the petitioner without being
accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person or persons who had
actually mailed the written notices of dishonor, or without the testimony in court
of the mailer or mailers on the fact of mailing. The authentication by affidavit of
the mailer or mailers was necessary in order for the giving of the notices of
dishonor by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of the
notices of dishonor to predicate the existence of the second element of the
offense. No less would fulfill the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, for,
as the Court said in Ting v. Court of Appeals:18
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand
letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed from the above exchange, the
prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove
mailing, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return
receipt. However, no attempt was made to show that the demand letter was indeed
sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry return receipt
authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of
private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when the same was sent.
In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry return receipt
was proof enough that the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that
the same was actually received by petitioners or their agents.
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person
alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d,
Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its
existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove
notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear
proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is
sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the
validity of such service depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is
insufficient to establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In the instant
case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through
registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases,
service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by
the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases
that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more
reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient
as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the
testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand
letter was sent. xxx
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand
letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners’ denial of receipt of the demand letter, it
behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent
through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the
prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely presented the demand letter
and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was equivalent to
proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. Receipts for
registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be
properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Central
Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the
addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return
receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone
but the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in which case the
authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on the proper space and then
affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort was made to
show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we
have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that
someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the
petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry
receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive
the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable
doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their
checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the insufficiency
of the funds therefor cannot arise.
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000, 311 SCRA
397), "penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an
offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense, petitioners may not
thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. (Bold emphases
supplied)1âwphi1
Also, that the wife of Villadolid verbally informed the petitioner that the check
had bounced did not satisfy the requirement of showing that written notices of
dishonor had been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of
dishonor were not effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor
must be in writing.19 The Court definitively ruled on the specific form of the
notice of dishonor in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals:20
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court
agrees.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor
be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that
where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact
shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral
notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the
law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks
Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused
issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been
notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes
have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. (Bold emphases supplied; italics in the original text)
In light of the foregoing, the proof of the guilt of the petitioner for a violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing to Villadolid the unfunded Chinabank Check
No. LPU-A0141332 in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 did not satisfy the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. According to Section 2 of Rule 133, Rules of
Court, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, which does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; only a moral certainty is required,
or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This is
the required quantum, firstly, because the accused is presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved, and, secondly, because of the inequality of the
position in which the accused finds herself, with the State being arrayed against
her with its unlimited command of means, with counsel usually of authority and
capacity, who are regarded as public officers, "and with an attitude of tranquil
majesty often in striking contrast to that of (the accused) engaged in a perturbed
and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life."21
Nonetheless, the civil liability of the petitioner in the principal sum of ₱

50,000.00, being admitted, was established. She was further liable for legal
interest of 6% per annum on that principal sum, reckoned from the filing of the
information in the trial court. That rate of interest will increase to 12% per annum
upon the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on December 4, 2006, and ACQUITS petitioner
AMADA RESTERIO of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as charged for
failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BERNARDO VILLADOLID the
amount of ₱ 50,000.00, representing the face value of Chinabank Check No.
LPU-A0141332, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the filing of the
information until the finality of this decision, and thereafter 12% per annum until
the principal amount of₱ 50,000.00 is paid.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
August 3, 2016
G.R. No. 163494
JESUSA T. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Jesusa T. Dela Cruz
(petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision2 dated November 13, 2003 and Resolution3 dated May 4, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26337. The CA affirmed the
Decision4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, on
August 31, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 89-72064-86, convicting the petitioner for
twenty-three (23) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22),
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The Antecedents
The case stems from a complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed by Tan Tiac
Chiong, also known as Ernesto Tan (Tan), against the petitioner.5 Tan entered into
several business transactions with the petitioner sometime in 1984 to 1985,
whereby Tan supplied and delivered to the petitioner rolls of textile materials
worth ₱27,090,641.25. For every delivery made by Tan, the petitioner issued
post-dated checks made payable to "Cash". When presented for payment,
however, some of the checks issued by the petitioner to Tan were dishonored by
the drawee-bank for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" or "Account
Closed". The replacement checks later issued by the petitioner were still
dishonored upon presentment for payment. 6
The fourth batch of twenty-three (23) replacement checks issued by the petitioner
to Tan became the subject of his complaint.1âwphi1 All checks were dated March
30, 1987 and drawn against Family Bank & Trust Co. (FBTC), but were issued
for different amounts totaling ₱6,226,390.29,7 to wit:
Check No. Amount

078790 P 145,905.57
078791 145,905.57
078789 145,905.57
078788 145,905.58
078787 145,905.59
078786 145,905.59
078785 1,354,854.50
078784 337,380.50
078783 309,580.17
078782 411,800.15
078804 874,643.86
078803 129,448.30
078796 282,763.60
078802 129,448.36
078801 129,448.36
078800 129,448.38
078799 129,448.36
078798 129,448.36
078797 282,763.60
078795 282,763.61
078794 145,905.57
078793 145,905.57
078792 145,905.57
P 6,226,390.29
The 23 checks were still later dishonored by the drawee-bank FBTC for the
reason "Account Closed". Tan informed the petitioner of the checks' dishonor
through a demand letter,8 but the amounts thereof remained unsatisfied. 9
In March 1989, 23 informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed in court
against the petitioner. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges. The cases were consolidated and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 10
The prosecution was able to present its evidence during the trial; it rested its case
on June 5, 1995.1âwphi1 The defense, however, failed to present its evidence
after it had sought several hearing postponements and resettings. In view of the
petitioner's failure to appear or present evidence on scheduled dates, the RTC
issued on July 27, 2000 an Order11 that deemed the petitioner to have waived her
right to present evidence. A copy of the order was received by the petitioner's
counsel of record. 12
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC then decided the case based on available records. On August 31, 2001,
the RTC rendered its Decision13finding the petitioner guilty of the charges. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds [the
petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation[s] of [B.P.]
Blg. 22 on twenty-three (23) counts, and hereby sentences her to
suffer imprisonment of one (1) year in every case, and to
indemnify [Tan] the amount equal to the collective face value of all
the subject checks, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing, among other grounds,
that she was not accorded an ample opportunity to dispute the charges against her.
Contrary to the RTC's declaration, the petitioner denied any intention to waive her
right to present evidence. 15 In fact, she intended to present a certified public
accountant to prove that she had overpayments with Tan, which then extinguished
the obligations attached to the checks subject of the criminal cases.16
Ruling of the CA
The appeal was dismissed by the CA via the Decision 17 dated November 13,
2003, with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal in the above-entitled case is

DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated August 31, 2001 in
Criminal Case Nos. U-89-72064-86, of the [RTC], Branch 2 of
Manila, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 18
The Present Petition
Hence, this petition for review founded on the following grounds:
I.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

PETITIONER HAD BEEN ACCORDED AMPLE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE.
II.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO

CONSIDERATION A PREVIOUS DECISION ISSUED BY ONE
OF ITS DIVISIONS.
III.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

PETITIONER RECEIVED A NOTICE OF DISHONOR OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
IV.
EVEN ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT THE

PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22,
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPL YING TO THE
PETITIONER THE PROVISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NUMBERS 12-2000 AND 13-2001. 19
The petitioner prays for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a remand of the case to
the R TC so that she may be allowed to present evidence for her defense. She also
asks the Court to take into consideration the fact that she was acquitted by the CA
in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground that she has overpaid
Tan. 20 Granting that the Court still declares her guilty of the offense, she asks for
an imposition of fine in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment. 21
In its Comment, 22 respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), signifies that it was interposing no objection to the
petitioner's alternative prayer of a case remand.23 The OSG agrees that the
petitioner was not duly notified of the hearing scheduled on July 27, 2000, to wit:
Petitioner was not duly notified of the July 27, 2000 hearing
because, one, the notice of said hearing was sent to her former
address, and, two, the notice was sent on August 3, 2000, that is,
one week after the scheduled date of hearing. Thus, petitioner's
failure to appear at the July 27, 2000 hearing is justified by the
absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to her.
Petitioner, who is out on bail on a personal undertaking, having

posted a cash bond in lieu of a bail bond, is entitled to personal
notice of every scheduled hearing, especially the hearing for her
presentation of evidence. There must be clear and convincing
proof that she, in fact, received the notice of hearing set on July 27,
2000 in order that the questioned Order of the trial court dated July
27, 2000 may be considered without constitutional infirmity. x x
x.24
The OSG, nonetheless, argues that the petitioner's acquittal in

another CA case failed to render applicable the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment because there was no identity of
subject matter and cause of action between the two sets of
cases. 25 As regards the petitioner's alleged failure to receive a
notice of dishonor, the OSG maintains that the defense should have
been raised at the first instance before the R TC. 26
Tan filed his own Comment/Opposition, 27 refuting the arguments

raised in the petition for review.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the petitioner entitled to an acquittal.

Questions of fact under Rule 45
The petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is
that petitions for review on certiorarifiled under this rule shall raise only
questions of law that must be distinctly set forth. Questions of fact, which exist
when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, are not
reviewable. 28
Pertinent to this limitation are the petitioner's arguments that delve on first, the
claim that she was not properly notified of the proceedings before the RTC
and, second, her alleged non-receipt of a notice of dishonor from Tan. Being
questions of fact, the Court, as a rule, finds those unsuitable to review the issues,
and instead adheres to the findings already made by the R TC and affirmed by the
CA. This is consistent with jurisprudence providing that a trial court's factual
findings that are affirmed by the appellate court are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze and weigh the parties'
evidence all over again except when there is a serious ground to believe a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result.29
By jurisprudence, the following instances may however be considered exceptions

to the application of the general rule that bar a review of factual findings: (1)
when the factual findings of the CA and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the CA from the findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the CA is
premised on misapprehension of facts; (7) when the CA failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence
of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.30
Taking into consideration the petitioner's allegations that hinge on the RTC's and
CA' s alleged errors in their factual findings that could fall under exceptions (2),
(3), (6) and (7), and which if considered could materially alter the manner by
which the petitioner's guilt was determined, the Court finds it vital to look into
these matters.
The petitioner was notified of scheduled hearings
The Court rejects the petitioner's claim that she was not duly notified of scheduled
hearing dates by the RTC. It is material that the petitioner was represented by
counsel during the proceedings with the trial court. Fundamental is the rule that
notice to counsel is notice to the client. When a party is represented by a counsel
in an action in court, notices of all kinds, including motions and pleadings of all
parties and all orders of the court must be served on his counsel. 31
Particularly challenged in the instant case was the RTC's service of the notice for
the July 27, 2000 hearing, when the petitioner's and her counsel's absence
prompted the trial court to deem a waiver of the presentation of evidence for the
defense. While the petitioner, and the OSG in its Comment, referred to a belated
sending of notice of hearing to the petitioner's supposedly old address, it appears
that her counsel, Atty. Lorenzo B. Leynes, Jr. (Atty. Leynes), was sufficiently
notified prior to July 27, 2000. 32
Cited in the RTC decision was a timely receipt by Atty. Leynes of the notice, a
matter which the petitioner failed to sufficiently refute. Even after several
postponements and case resettings had been previously sought by the defense,
counsel and the petitioner still failed to appear or come prepared during the
hearing. 33 The RTC decision narrates the antecedents, to wit:
On August 24, 1998, the cases were set for reception of defense
evidence, but counsel arrived late causing the resetting to
September 24, 1998.
On November 5, 1998, on motion of the defense, on the ground

[that] its witness was not available, the hearing was transferred to
November 19, 1998. Due to the unavailability of the public
prosecutor, hearing was reset to January 12, 1 999.
On January 12, 1999, upon urgent motion filed by the defense on

the alleged ground [that] defense counsel was suffering from
emotional and psychological trauma, hearing was reset to February
9, 1999. Thereafter, hearing was postponed to February 23, 1999.
With the commitment of defense counsel, Atty. Jerry D. Bafiares,
that he will rest his case at the next setting, hearing was reset to
March 9, 1999.
On March 9, 1999, Atty. Bafiares[,] instead of complying with his

commitment, withdrew as counsel. Thereafter, a new counsel,
[Atty. Leynes], entered his appearance, and filed an urgent motion
for postponement.
On March 15, 1999, [Atty. Leynes,] instead of continuing with the

presentation of defense evidence[,] opted to file a motion for
voluntary inhibition and postponement. The motion was granted
and the cases were re-raffled to Branch 2 on April 26, 1999.
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1999, [Tan] filed a motion for issuance

of a writ of preliminary attachment.1âwphi1
On April 20, 1999, [Atty. Leynes] filed a Motion to Declare the

Entire Proceedings Null and Void.
On June 9, 1999, the Court, thru Judge Florante A. Cipres, jointly

resolved the motions by granting the issuance of a writ of
attachment and denying the motion to declare null and void the
entire proceedings.
On July 24, 1999, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez entered his

appearance as co-counsel, asking that he be served with copies of
all the pleadings and other court processes.
After entering his appearance, Atty. Fernandez, on August 4, 1999,

filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the
Motion to Declare Null and Void the Entire Proceedings with
[Atty. Leynes] as movant. The motion was denied for lack if merit,
with a copy thereof furnished [Atty. Leynes].
On January 25, 2000, reception of defense evidence was set.

However, the [petitioner] and her counsel failed to appear
compelling Judge Cipres to reset the hearing to March 24, 2000
and to April 6 and 13, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. and to issue a warrant of
arrest for the apprehension of [the petitioner].
Unfortunately, Judge Cipres became indisposed and eventually

retired. Thus, Judge Rebecca G. Salvador as Pairing Judge of
Branch 2, took over.
Accordingly, the hearing for reception of evidence was again reset

to July 27, August 17 and 24, 2000.
The Office of [Atty. Leynes] was notified of the hearing dates.

Notices were received by one Edwin Gamba and Atty. Virgilio
Leynes.
On July 27, 2000, defense counsel and the [petitioner] again failed
to appear. Hence, Judge Salvador decreed that "the [petitioner] is
considered to have waived presentation of evidence in her
defense". A copy of the Order was furnished the Office of [Atty.
Leynes]. Same was received by Atty. Virgilio Leynes.
On September 5, 2000, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez[,] who claimed

he did not receive any court [ o ]rder or process, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration setting [the] same to September 8, 2000.
On September 8, 2000, Atty. Fernandez did not appear. Instead, it

was Atty. Virgilio Leynes who showed up.
On March 5, 2001, this Court, thru Judge Leonardo P. Reyes,

Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. 34 (Emphasis ours)
These were reiterated in the CA decision, to wit:
After the prosecution rested its case on June 5, 1995, the

presentation of the defense's evidence was set but was postponed
and reset several times. Notably, the postponements were mostly at
the instance of the defense. However, despite due notice and
warrant of arrest, the [petitioner] and her counsel failed to appear
on the scheduled dates for presentation of the defense's evidence.
This prompted the court a quo to issue an order dated July 27,
2000, considering the [petitioner] to have waived her right to
present evidence. Copy of the said order was sent to the Office of
[Atty. Leynes] and the same was received by Atty. Virgilio Leynes,
Jr., the [petitioner's] counsel ofrecord.35 (Citations omitted)
The records support the finding that the petitioner was duly notified of the
scheduled hearings. Specifically for the July 27, 2000 hearing, notice was
received by Atty. Leynes. Minutes of the hearing scheduled on May 23, 2000,
indicating that the next hearing was reset to July 27, 2000, bore the signature of
Atty. Leynes. 36 A notice of hearing dated July 20, 2000 for the July 27, 2000
schedule also indicated receipt for Atty. Leynes by one Edwin Gamba on July 25,
2000. 37 It was not the service to the petitioner that should determine the
sufficiency of the notice because she was then represented by counsel, upon
whom all court notices should be addressed and served.
The petitioner was deemed to have waived right to present evidence

The petitioner claims that she had sufficient evidence to support her plea for
acquittal, but was unduly deprived the right to present such evidence.
The Court has explained the reasons in sustaining the RTC's and CA's
declarations that the petitioner was sufficiently apprised of the schedule of
hearing dates for the defense's presentation of evidence. Notwithstanding the
opportunity given to the defense, hearings were repeatedly postponed at the
instance of the petitioner and her counsels.
The question now is whether the trial court committed a reversible error in issuing
the Order dated July 27, 2000, by which the petitioner was considered to have
waived her right to present evidence in her defense.
The Court answers in the negative.
In People v. Subida,38 the Court reminded judges to be on guard against motions

for postponements by the accused which are designed to derail and frustrate the
criminal proceedings. Just as the accused is entitled to a speedy disposition of the
case against him or her, the State should not be deprived of its inherent
prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases and in seeing to it that justice is
served.39 Thus, parties cannot expect, much less insist, that their pleas for
postponement or cancellation of scheduled hearings will be favored by the courts.
In the event that their motions are denied, they need to bear the consequences of
the denial. "The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force
and greater reason to prosecutions involving violations of [B.P. Blg.] 22, whose
prompt resolution has been ensured by their being now covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure."40
Thus, in the instant case, the RTC judge could not have allowed the case to
continually drag upon the defense's requests. In Paz T. Bernardo, substituted by
Heirs, Mapalad G. Bernardo, Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T.
Bernardo and Gervy B. Santos v. People of the Philippines,41 the Court
emphasized that the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation
of evidence is a matter that lies with the discretion of the trial court; but it is a
discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances
of each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.42
Corollary to this rule on the disposition of motions for postponement during trial
is a rule that addresses an accused's waiver of the right to present evidence. By
jurisprudence, the Court has affirmed a trial court's ruling that the accused was
deemed to have waived her right to present defense evidence following her and
counsel's repeated absences. Such waiver was deemed made after it was
determined that the accused was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence
in her defense but failed to give the case the serious attention it deserved. 43 The
Court has after all consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.44
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22
The Court now explains why the petitioner's acquittal is warranted.
The petitioner's acquittal in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases fails to exonerate her
from the indictment for the 23 subject checks. While the petitioner claims that
another division of the CA, specifically the Special Former Fifth Division,
acquitted her in CA-G.R. CR No. 13844 for four counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 following a finding that the petitioner had overpayments with Tan, it is not
established that the overpayments similarly apply to the obligations that are
covered by the subject checks. In light of applicable law and prevailing
jurisprudence, the conviction of the petitioner is nevertheless reversed.
"To be liable for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22, the following essential elements must
be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment." 45
As between the parties to this case, the dispute only pertains to the presence or
absence of the second element. In order to support her plea for an acquittal, the
petitioner particularly insists that she failed to receive any notice of dishonor on
the subject checks, which rendered absent the element of knowledge of
insufficient funds.
Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a

prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as it is not an element of the offense,
evidence that a notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the accused is
actually sought as a means to prove the second element. Jurisprudence is replete
with cases that underscore the value of a notice of dishonor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases,
and how the absence of sufficient proof of receipt thereof can be fatal in the
prosecution's case.
In Yu Oh v. CA,46 the Court explained that since the second element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient

funds.-The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such
bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from
the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence
of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.
Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had

knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence
only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its
payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in
this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the
drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no
proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since
there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day
period.47 (Citations omitted)
Further, the Court held:
Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of

dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides
for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the
amount appearing on the check, within five banking days from
notice of dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore
deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal
prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands
that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the
case at bar, appellant has a right to demand and the basic postulate
of fairness requires - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to
and received by her to afford her the opportunity to aver
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.48 (Citation omitted and emphasis
ours)
To support its finding that the petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds
with the drawee bank, the RTC merely relied on the fact that replacement checks
had been issued, in lieu of those that were originally issued to pay for the
petitioner's obligation with Tan.49 The Court finds the conclusion misplaced,
considering that the last batch of replacement checks, which eventually became
the subject of these cases, were precisely intended to address and preclude any
dishonor. Thus, the replacement checks dated March 30, 1987 were purposely
drawn against a different checking account with FBTC, different from the old
checks that were drawn against another drawee bank.
The prosecution also attempted to prove the petitioner's receipt of a notice of

dishonor by referring to a demand letter 50 dated August 8, 1987, along with a
registry receipt51 showing that the letter was sent by registered mail, and the
registry return card52 showing its receipt by a certain Rolando Villanueva on
August 25, 1987. Given the circumstances and the manner by which the
documents were presented during the trial, the presumption that could lead to
evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds failed to arise. The Court emphasized
in Alferez v. People, et al. 53 the manner by which receipt of a notice of dishonor
should be established, to wit:
In Suarez v. People, x x x [w]e explained that:
The presumption arises when it is proved that the

issuer had received this notice, and that within five
banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. The full payment of the amount appearing
in the check within five banking days from notice
of dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly,
procedural due process requires that a notice of
dishonor be sent to and received by the petitioner to
afford the opportunity to aver prosecution under
B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x. [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove

that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner.
It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to show
"that the drawer of the check received the said
notice because the fact of service provided for in
the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the drawee of the check.["]
A review of the records shows that the prosecution
did not prove that the petitioner received the notice
of dishonor. Registry return cards must be
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters
sent through registered mail.
In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the

demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return
card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt
to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return
card. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by
themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to
serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with
an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner reveived such
notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution
must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice.
In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there
should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, for notice by mail, it
must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly
authorized agent of the addressee. From the registry receipt
alone, it is possible that petitioner or his authorized agent did
receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The consistent rule is that penal
statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused. The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient proof that petitioner
received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had
knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.54 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, in the instant case, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the actual
receipt by the petitioner of the demand letter sent by Tan. No witness testified to
authenticate the registry return card and the signature appearing thereon. The
return card provides that the letter was received by one Rolando Villanueva,
without even further proof that the said person was the petitioner's duly
authorized agent for the purpose of receiving the correspondence. The OSG
contends that the argument on the petitioner's failure to receive a notice of
dishonor could not be raised at this stage. The Court disagrees. While the question
may seemingly present a factual issue that is beyond the scope of a petition for
review on certiorari, it is in essence a question of law as it concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts. It addresses the
question of whether or not the service and alleged receipt by the petitioner of the
notice of dishonor, as claimed by the prosecution, already satisfies the
requirements of the law.
Clearly, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The petitioner is acquitted from the 23 counts of the
offense charged. The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by the
petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that she was given at
least five banking days within which to settle her account constitutes sufficient
ground for her acquittal. 55
Even the petitioner's waiver of her right to present evidence is immaterial to this
ground cited by the Court for her acquittal. The basis relates to the prosecution's
own failure to prove all the elements of the offense that could warrant the
petitioner's conviction, rather than on an action or argument that should have
emanated from the defense. The burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each
element of the crime is upon the prosecution, as its case will rise or fall on the
strength of its own evidence. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the
accused.56
Civil liability of the petitioner
Notwithstanding the petitioner's acquittal, she remains liable for the payment of
civil damages equivalent to the face value of the 23 subject checks, totaling
₱6,226,390.29. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized that acquittal from a
crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability. 57
It was not established that the petitioner had paid the amounts covered by the
checks. The Court has explained that the overpayments that were determined by
the CA in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases against the petitioner could not be
applied to this case. The petitioner failed to present any evidence that would
prove the extinguishment of her obligations. Thus, the petitioner should pay Tan
the amount of ₱6,226,390.29, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum to be computed from the date of finality of this Decision until
full satisfaction thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 13, 2003 and Resolution dated
May 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26337
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jesusa T. Dela Cruz
is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on
twenty-three (23) counts on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. She is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Tan Tiac
Chiong, also known as Ernesto Tan, the face value of the subject checks totaling
Six Million Two Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Pesos and
29/100 (?6,226,390.29), with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.

Begun and Held in Metro Manila, On Monday, The Twenty-Fifth Day of July, Two Thousand Eleven

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Begun and Held in Metro Manila, On Monday, The Twenty-Fifth Day of July, Two Thousand Eleven

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Republic of the Philippines

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175

AN ACT DEFINING CYBERCRIME, PROVIDING FOR THE

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the vital role of

(b) Alteration refers to the modification or change, in form or substance, of an

(c) Communication refers to the transmission of information through ICT media,

(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts

(f) Computer program refers to a set of instructions executed by the computer to

(g) Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related

(i) Cyber refers to a computer or a computer network, the electronic medium in

(j) Critical infrastructure refers to the computer systems, and/or networks,

(k) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management

(l) Database refers to a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts,

(m) Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the

(n) Service provider refers to:

(o) Subscriber’s information refers to any information contained in the form of

(3) Any other available information on the site of the installation of

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of

(3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion

(4) System Interference. — The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or

(5) Misuse of Devices.

(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation, distribution, or otherwise

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

(b) Computer-related Offenses:

(1) Computer-related Forgery. —

(2) Computer-related Fraud. — The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation,

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The transmission of commercial

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully

Section 11. Duties of Law Enforcement Authorities. — To ensure that the

Section 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement

Section 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon

Section 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed

Section 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as

Section 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When a

Section 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter

There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained

Section 22. General Principles Relating to International Cooperation. — All

Section 23. Department of Justice (DOJ). — There is hereby created an Office of

Section 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. — There is

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance

(b) To coordinate the preparation of appropriate and effective measures to prevent

(c) To monitor cybercrime cases being bandied by participating law enforcement

(d) To facilitate international cooperation on intelligence, investigations, training

(f) To recommend the enactment of appropriate laws, issuances, measures and

(g) To call upon any government agency to render assistance in the