Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs

ISSN: 2373-9770 (Print) 2373-9789 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rifa20

Understanding the War in Yemen

Marcel Serr

To cite this article: Marcel Serr (2018): Understanding the War in Yemen, Israel Journal of Foreign
Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405

Published online: 04 Jan 2018.

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 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405

Understanding the War in Yemen

Marcel Serr

Marcel Serr is a political scientist and until recently served as assistant director of the
German Protestant Institute of Archaeology (GPIA) in Jerusalem. Mr. Serr is an
independent researcher and specializes in Israel’s defense and security policy and the
military history of the Middle East. Currently, he serves as editor at the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin.
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A few years ago, Yemen looked as if it might be one of the few “success stories” of
the so-called Arab Spring. Since 2014, however, the country has descended into a
chaotic civil war; today, it is one of the poorest in the world. According to the 2016
UN Human Development Index, Yemen ranks 168 out of 188 countries, and the
population faces severe water and food shortages.1

Whoever thinks that the violence in Yemen is just the result of another fierce con-
flict, far away in an unimportant place on the global periphery, should think again.
Yemen is strategically located next to Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s major oil
producers, and the Ban-el-Mandeb strait, a vital waterway linking the Indian
Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. In addition,
Yemen could become a major battleground in the fight for regional supremacy
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus, there are plenty of reasons to monitor
the developments there very carefully.

Background

The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, divided between Shi’a Zaydis,
who mostly live in the north, and Sunnis. A series of Zaydi dynasties ruled parts of
Yemen from the ninth century until 1962. However, in the 1960s, a civil war in the
north and an uprising in the south against the British—who had ruled the port city
of Aden and its surroundings since the nineteenth century—changed the political
landscape. The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was established, and in the south,
the socialist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was born.

In 1990, North and South Yemen merged to form the Republic of Yemen. Ali
Abdullah Saleh, the former ruler of the YAR, became president of the newly
© Israel Council on Foreign Relations under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress (2018) 1
 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs

unified country. His rule was characterized by nepotism and corruption, and
unsurprisingly, Yemen remained among the poorest nations in the Arab world.2

The “Arab Spring” in Yemen

As unrest spread across the Arab world in 2011, youth–led demonstrations chal-
lenged Saleh’s rule in Yemen and attracted broad popular support. Soon, the pro-
testers were joined by key players of the regime who understood that the “writing
was on the wall.” In mid–2011, the confrontation became increasingly violent, with
street battles erupting in the capital city of Sana’a and elsewhere. In November
2011, Saleh agreed to a transition plan that granted him immunity in return for
his resignation.
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In February 2012, Yemen held presidential elections with only one candidate—
former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. As a result, a National
Dialogue Conference (NDC) was convened to design and implement constitutional
reforms before new elections were held. The NDC ended inconclusively in
January 2014. Eventually, the participants extended President Hadi’s term by
another year.

Hadi was plagued by a number of problems, including attacks by al-Qa‘ida; a

separatist movement in the south; the continuing loyalty of many military officers
to Saleh; as well as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity. The Houthis, a
Zaydi movement in the north, took advantage of the government’s weakness.
Within weeks of the NDC’s conclusion, they launched a military offensive
against Hadi, taking control of Sana’a and other parts of the country’s north
and west until the summer of 2014. Some members of the security services, who
were pro–Saleh, supported the Houthis, thus bringing the tacit Houthi–Saleh alli-
ance to light.

In January 2015, the Houthis seized the presidential palace, setting up a shadow
government and reinforcing their control over Sana’a by placing Hadi and his gov-
ernment under house arrest. A few weeks later, they completed their coup d’état by
establishing a “revolutionary council” and other associated governmental bodies.
Hadi eventually escaped to Aden in the south of Yemen, accusing the Houthis
of perpetrating a coup and stressing his own legitimacy as the internationally
recognized head of state. Hadi was quick to form an anti–Houthi/Saleh alliance
that included elements of the southern separatist movement, Islamists, and tribes-
men mostly from the south and from Sunni areas of the north.

Yemen rapidly descended into chaos. The Houthis attempted to take control of the
entire country with the help of security forces loyal to Saleh, but their expansion
alienated significant segments of Yemen’s population. Making matters worse,

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 Marcel Serr

al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a branch of the nascent Islamic
State (IS) exploited the state’s weakness, asserting territorial control in Yemen’s
southeast.

Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia in March 2015 as the Houthis prepared to capture Aden.
This was the tipping point for Saudi King Salman and his favorite son and newly
appointed successor, thirty-two-year-old Defense Minister Muhammad bin
Salman. Alarmed by the rise of the Houthis, whom they rightly believed to be
backed by their nemesis, Iran, Riyadh formed an alliance of mostly Sunni Arab
states, which launched a military campaign at the end of March 2015. The declared
objective of that operation was to defeat the Houthis and restore Hadi’s
government.3
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Who Is Fighting Whom?

There are two oppositional factions, the first being the bloc of Houthi forces allied
with ex–President Saleh, who receive Iranian support; the second is a messy anti–
Houthi/Saleh alliance, which supports the Hadi government and is backed by a
Saudi–led coalition. It is supported by the United States and other Western
states. These factions are internally diverse, with each of the actors having compet-
ing interests and priorities.

The Houthi/Saleh Bloc

The Houthis are a prominent Zaydi–Shi’a4 clan who claim descent from the
prophet Muhammad. Their roots are in a Zaydi revivalist movement and they
see their actions as a response to Wahhabi proselytizing in Shi’a areas, and
Saudi influence in Yemen in general. Their base is in the northern governorate
Saada, and they operate a trained militia of 20,000–30,000 fighters.

Having ruled for more than thirty years, ex–President Saleh commands an exten-
sive tribal, military, and political network throughout the country. He cooperates
with the Houthis to ensure his political survival—the alliance is one of necessity.
Despite a fraught history, Saleh and the Houthis are bound together by
common enemies. But like many political marriages of convenience, their relation-
ship lacks a solid foundation. Many of Saleh’s supporters are proud of belonging to
a secular party and view the Houthis as religious zealots. The Houthis, in turn,
despise Saleh and his close circle because of their corrupt past.5

Saudi Arabia and the Hadi government accuse the Houthis of being Iran’s proxy.
They claim that Iran provides them with significant amounts of military equip-
ment, and training. While the exact amount of assistance is unclear, there is no

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doubt that the Houthis do receive military support from Iran, albeit to a limited
degree. Intercepted weapons shipments are proof of the fact that Iran provides
light and medium weaponry to the Houthis.6

Over the course of the past year Iran has ramped up its military support, supplying
advanced munitions that enable the Houthi–Saleh faction to counter certain capa-
bilities of the Arab coalition and threaten freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
The Houthis have been flying Iranian drones right into the radar sets of the
Saudi Patriot missile systems. With the radar disabled, rebels can fire missiles at
coalition forces. As US Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan told Reuters: “These
weapons didn’t exist … before the war.”7 They must have come from somewhere
and Iran is the most likely source.

Until Tehran exerts control over Houthi decision making, the Houthis cannot truly
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be considered a direct Iranian proxy. This, however, may change with a further
escalation of the war in Yemen.8

The Anti–Houthi/Saleh Bloc

The opposing bloc has even more unlikely partners, whose alliance is founded solely
upon their shared opposition to the Houthis. It includes the internationally recognized
government and combines three main domestic actors: southern separatists, Sunni
Islamists, and other tribal actors. The coalition is strongest in the south and east.
However, it depends fundamentally on external political and military backing.

The Hadi government is, paradoxically, both the strongest and weakest asset for
the anti–Houthi/Saleh bloc. As the internationally recognized government of
Yemen, Hadi provides the Saudis with justification for their involvement in the
war. However, having no popular base whatsoever, Hadi is completely dependent
upon the support of various Gulf States for his political survival.

Most anti–Houthi fighters in the south are separatists. For years, southern Yeme-
nites have been frustrated because of their perceived second–class status in the
unified state. The war has only increased their hatred for the north and their
desire to break away. The separatist movement (known as the al–Hirak) calls
for the resurrection of the state of South Yemen. Though it has gained broad popu-
larity, it remains divided and therefore less effective. Although aligned with Hadi,
due to his outright rejection of the south’s secession from Yemen, most southern
groups are openly hostile to the government.

In addition, the anti–Houthi bloc includes a broad range of Sunni Islamist groups
that are united in ideological opposition to the Shi’a Houthis. Their rank-and-file is
driven by religious zeal to fight the Shi’a. The most important group is al-Islah—a

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political party that combines the Yemenite branch of the Muslim Brotherhood
with Salafi and tribal components. Al-Islah, however, lacks a standing militia.
Instead, it relies on affiliated tribal fighters and regular soldiers. Like the separa-
tists, it is far more anti–Houthi than pro–Hadi.

The anti–Houthi/Saleh front receives significant external support—primarily from

Saudi Arabia, which is leading a multinational military campaign in close
cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and a coalition of mainly
Sunni states. Saudi Arabia perceives the war in Yemen as being fought between
the legitimate government and an Iranian-backed militia. Riyadh feels that it
cannot tolerate the Houthi/Iranian presence at its southern border and justifies
its intervention in Yemen as “self-defense against an external aggressor.”9

The US, Great Britain, and France assist the Saudi–led coalition by providing
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critical military support and political cover. Saudi Arabia’s Western allies are in
a predicament, as withdrawing military support would only reinforce the Saudis’
fear of being abandoned in favor of Iran. However, the West’s continued involve-
ment contributes to a humanitarian disaster, heightens Saudi–Iranian tensions, and
possibly renders the West complicit in Saudi Arabia’s war crimes.10

Struggle for Regional Supremacy: Iran vs Saudi Arabia

Recently, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, the Saudi defense minister,
stressed in a widely cited TV interview that a dialogue between Riyadh and
Tehran was impossible, due to the latter’s ambitions “to control the Islamic
world.” Prince Muhammad is the face of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. Ger-
many’s foreign intelligence agency (Bundesnachrichtendienst) has suggested that
his personal ambitions have also played a role in the Saudi intervention.11

Although the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is often referred to as a
struggle between Sunnis and Shi’a, it is their regional rather than religious
aspirations that drives their rivalry. Both countries vie to maximize their
spheres of influence in the Middle East, making an already volatile region
even more unstable. Tehran tries to export its ideas to states with a significant
Shi’a population, such as Iraq, Lebanon, and the oil–rich eastern provinces of
Saudi Arabia. For its part, Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Arab mon-
archies perceive the promotion of Iran’s revolutionary agenda in the Middle East
as particularly threatening, as they fear it may incite unrest among their respect-
ive populations.

Until now, Riyadh and Tehran have avoided direct military confrontation. Instead,
both regimes struggle for supremacy through proxy wars in which they try to
manipulate existing conflicts in the region in their favor. Yemen is not the only

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battlefield of the Saudi–Iranian competition; both are backing opposing groups in

Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Iraq. The conflict in Yemen, however, is central to
the Iranian–Saudi power struggle. It is geographically close to Saudi Arabia and
bears strategic value to Riyadh; however, with little effort, Tehran is managing
to keep the Saudis occupied and to lay a heavy financial, political, and military
burden on them.12

Yemen at War: The Current Situation

In spring 2017, the war in Yemen entered its third year of fighting with no clear
victor. Pro-government forces consisting of soldiers loyal to Hadi, and predomi-
nantly Sunni southern tribesmen and separatists, were successful in preventing
the rebels from taking Aden in the summer of 2015, but only after a bloody,
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four-month battle. Having established a beachhead, Arab coalition troops

landed in Aden and helped drive the Houthis out of much of the south. Mean-
while, Hadi returned from exile and established his government in the southern
port city, but his area of control is contained within Aden and its immediate
surroundings.

In 2017, the coalition forces have concentrated on Yemen’s Red Sea Coast. The
operation was intended to isolate the Houthi–Saleh faction in central Yemen.
The Saudi-led air campaign as well as the naval and air blockade have slowed
advances and strained Houthi supply lines. This has had a devastating effect
on the civilian population: By March 2017, almost 10,000 civilians had been
killed.13

Despite military setbacks, the Houthi militias, together with the portion of the
army loyal to Saleh, still present a formidable force that is far from defeated.
Sana’a is still under Houthi–Saleh control and pro-Houthi forces are still able to
launch cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia.14

On November 4, 2017, the Saudi–Iranian crisis over Yemen escalated when

Houthi/Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile at the King Khalid airport near the
Saudi capital. Although it was intercepted by a US Patriot air defense system,
the political effects were significant. Apparently, this attack was a response to
Saudi airstrikes in the Houthis’ home region of Saada. Riyadh linked the attack
to Tehran and called it “an act of war by Iran.”15 US President Trump agreed:
“A shot was taken by Iran, in my opinion, at Saudi Arabia.”16 Two days later,
Riyadh tightened the naval and air blockade of Yemen. However, this only dee-
pened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. According to the World Health Organiz-
ation, seven million Yemenites are on the brink of famine, including 2 million
children. There are 900,000 people infected with cholera, and more than 2,000
have already died.17 Further fuel shortages will diminish the food market even

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more. Thus, Riyadh’s military options are limited. Any legitimate targets for the air
force have already been destroyed.

The situation in Yemen, three years since the beginning of the Saudi-led interven-
tion, remains bleak. The military campaign had not generated enough momentum
for the Arab coalition to compel the Houthi–Saleh faction to come to the negotiat-
ing table. It further entangled Yemen in the Iranian–Saudi conflict and worsened
an already severe humanitarian crisis. AQAP has exploited this situation, expand-
ing its support base within Yemen’s Sunni population.18

What Will US President Trump Do?

Washington has provided essential military support to the Saudi-led coalition.

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American assistance to Saudi Arabia appears to be part of the price for Riyadh’s
reluctant acceptance of the nuclear deal with Iran. In addition, the White House
wants to prevent Yemen from becoming a sanctuary for terrorist groups. Recent
developments have also led to great concern in the US regarding the freedom of
navigation along the Yemenite coast.19

US President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 strengthened

Riyadh’s position. The weapons deal worth $110 billion that was the subject of
the meeting can be interpreted as being indicative of Washington’s approval for
the Saudi campaign in Yemen. It is a major policy shift away from the Obama
administration, which suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia in October 2016.
Recently, Washington has also expanded counterterrorism operations in Yemen.20

An intensification of US involvement is likely to result in a further escalation of the

conflict. Iran has already increased its military support for the Houthis, further
heightening the danger. For example, in January 2017, the Houthis used an
unmanned remote-controlled boat to bomb the Saudi frigate Al Madinah off the
coast of Hodeidah in the Red Sea. Such operations will become more frequent if
Iran steps up support for the Houthis.21 Washington has made clear that it will
not tolerate a restriction of navigation in the Red Sea, and has bolstered the US
Navy’s presence by deploying the USS Cole in the area. It is very likely that
another incident such as the one that occurred in October 2016, when the USS
Mason, an Arleigh–Burke–Class destroyer, was attacked with anti-ship missiles
several times, will easily draw the US further into the conflict.22

AQAP and the Islamic State

AQAP and the Islamic State are arguably the war’s principal beneficiaries:
They are both the Houthis’ sworn ideological enemies and view the Shi’a as

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heretics. The two groups fight together with the other actors of the anti-Houthi/
Saleh bloc. Although it is difficult to quantify their effectiveness compared to
the other forces in the coalition, it is safe to say that they are key players in
the struggle against the Shi’a rebels on several fronts. However, like most
actors in the anti–Houthi/Saleh bloc, they also reject the Hadi government
and are attempting to prevent it from consolidating control over southern
Yemen.

The US considers AQAP al-Qa‘ida’s most dangerous branch, because it has

proven its ability to strike outside Yemen, particularly against the US, on
several occasions. AQAP attempted to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight
(December 2009) and sent parcel bombs on a flight to the US (October 2010).
It also claimed responsibility for the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in
Paris (January 2015). In Yemen, however, AQAP is focusing on seizing territory,
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particularly in the country’s remote southern provinces.

Unlike AQAP, IS is comparatively new in Yemen. The Islamic State’s branch

“Province of Yemen” claimed responsibility for its first attack in March 2015
against Zaydi mosques in Sana’a, killing over 140 people. IS is even more
prone to brutality than AQAP and has no regard for local norms, customs,
or traditions. Both AQAP and IS benefit not only from the collapse of local
government authority, but also from the Houthis’ expansion into Sunni areas,
as it presents new opportunities for recruitment. Tensions run high between
AQAP and IS as they compete for the same recruits. Nevertheless, AQAP
and IS have made substantial political and territorial gains in the war and
will continue to do so as long as there is no government capable of confronting
them.23

The Saudi Coalition’s Military Performance

The war in Yemen provides an opportunity to assess the military performance and
capabilities of Saudi Arabia and its allies—most notably the UAE. Since 2000, the
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have spent more than $1 trillion on
Western military equipment. Yet the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen came as a
surprise to many observers, as neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE were believed
to be capable of launching an operation as large and offensive as that in Yemen.
Nevertheless, the number of forces from neighboring states that Riyadh
managed to muster is impressive. The coalition commands approximately 170
aircraft.

For years, the UAE has been preparing its forces for an operation such as this.
Several training missions have been conducted abroad, starting with small
contributions to peacekeeping expeditions in the 1990s in East Africa and

8
 Marcel Serr

Kosovo, and continuing in 2008 with the NATO-led International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. The UAE demonstrated
its mature military capability during the 2011 NATO–led operation in
Libya, as well as through its involvement in airstrikes against IS targets in
Iraq and Syria since 2014. No wonder, then, that US Defense Secretary
James Mattis called the UAE “little Sparta.”24 In comparison, Saudi military
forces had considerably less experience, although Saudi Arabia invested sig-
nificantly in military procurement and training throughout the 1990s and
2000s.

The coordination of airpower is a challenging task for the Saudis, as they need to
manage the operation of eight different classes of fighter jets from nine countries.
As if this were not complicated enough, the US Air Force flew hundreds of air-to-
air refueling missions, providing a crucial capability the Arab states lacked.
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Riyadh’s coordination of this multinational operation has been technically out-

standing to date. However the aerial campaign has been responsible for horrible
collateral damage in Yemen with thousands of civilian casualties and massive
destruction to vital infrastructure.

Meanwhile, on the Saudi home front, rockets and artillery attacks by the Houthis
have continued to disrupt life in the border region. Huthi/Salah forces have fired
hundreds of projectiles into Saudi Arabia since 2015, including at least thirty bal-
listic missiles.

The initial goals of the Arab coalition’s mission appear to remain unattainable.
Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been able to achieve significant tactical
and operational success, the shortage of capable infantry has proven to be proble-
matic. The deployment of special forces and mercenaries has been too infrequent to
reinforce the coalition, as they are not part of a coherent ground offensive. Instead,
the coalition relies on local partners who are diverse and often hostile toward one
another. Consequently, competition among these local Yemenite factions escalates,
which, in turn, creates a vacuum that AQAP and IS are eager to fill. The large
number of civilian deaths and the havoc wrought to Yemen’s infrastructure has
rendered the goal of a functioning state after the war unattainable for the foresee-
able future.25

Implications for Israel

The Houthis are openly hostile to Israel. Their slogan “Death to Israel, A Curse on
the Jews” resembles the motto of the Iranian Revolution. Houthi rule has
undoubtedly worsened the situation for the fifty or so remaining Jews in Yemen
(some 49,000 Yemenite Jews were airlifted to Israel in Operation Magic Carpet
in 1949–50).26

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 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs

There was a brief episode of military cooperation between Israel and Yemen’s Shi’a.
During the civil war in North Yemen (1962–70), Jerusalem supported the Zaydi
royalists against the revolutionaries backed by Egypt. When Israel learned that
the Egyptians had used chemical weapons in North Yemen, it was concerned that
this might pose a future threat to the Jewish State. To gain intelligence, Israel
cooperated with the British to airlift weapons and supplies to the royalists.27

The conflict in Yemen has three major implications for Israel. First, assisting the
Houthis provides Iran with the opportunity to test new weapons and tactics that
may well end up in the hands of Hizbullah or Hamas, and could pose a real
threat to Israel. Particularly worth mentioning are the use of aerial and maritime
drones as “kill vehicles,” which could endanger Israel’s gas rigs in the
Mediterranean.28
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Second, Israeli politicians are concerned that the US–Saudi arms deal could
weaken Israel’s military edge. Some fear that US weapons in Saudi Arabia
could end up in the hands of Sunni terrorist groups. The weapons deal is,
however, far from finalized; it is still “a bunch of letters of interest or
intent.”29

Third, the balancing of Sunni states under the leadership of Saudi Arabia against
the Iranian bid for regional supremacy seems to establish a tacit alliance between
the Gulf States and Israel. There may even be concrete steps of rapprochement
encouraged by the White House. In May and June 2017, media reports indicated
that a partial normalization of relations between the Gulf States and Israel was
being discussed behind closed doors. Although it is unclear how serious these
developments are, this may pose a rare opportunity for Israel to exploit the unify-
ing moment that Iran, as a common threat, presents, and to further cooperate with
the Gulf States.30

Conclusion

The prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough in Yemen remains remote, and it is

likely to be the site of a long, drawn-out conflict. The military situation is dead-
locked, as the various factions are motivated by hatred, mistrust, and sectarian-
ism. An intensification of the Saudi–Iranian struggle for regional dominance
might lead to a further escalation of the conflict. But even if the Saudi-led
coalition forces manage to conquer Sana’a (which presently appears unlikely),
this would not end the fighting. The Houthis will not simply lay down their
arms. Unfortunately, the most probable outcome of Saudi Arabia’s intervention
will be the emergence of a failed state in its direct neighborhood, where the
Houthis remain a hostile key player, and which provides an ideal breeding
ground for jihadism to thrive.

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 Marcel Serr

Notes

1
Human Development Reports, Yemen, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/YEM.
2
Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research
Service, February 11, 2015, pp. 30f, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.
3
Sharp, op. cit., pp. 2f., 31f. International Crisis Group, “Yemen at War,” March 27,
2015, pp. 1–5, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b45-yemen-at-war.pdf; Bruce
Riedel, “Yemen war turns two,” Al-Monitor, March 12, 2017, www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2017/03/yemen-war-saudi-arabia-two-years-houthi-iran.html.
4
Zaydism is a branch of Shi’a Islam; it is, however, distinct from the so-called Twelver
Shi’ism, found in contemporary Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Today, Zaydis account for
approximately one third of Yemen’s citizens; the rest are Sunnis.
5
International Crisis Group, “The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa,” June 10, 2014, https://
d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-huthis-from-saada-to-sanaa.pdf.
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6
International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Is Peace Possible?” February 9, 2016, pp. 5–11,
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/167-yemen-is-peace-possible.pdf.
7
Phil Stewart and Yara Bayoumy, “In Yemen Conflict, a Window into Deepening US–
Gulf Ties,” Reuters, April 27, 2017.
8
Maher Farrukh, Tyler Nocita, and Emily Estelle, “Warning Update: Iran’s Hybrid
Warfare in Yemen,” Critical Threats, March 26, 2017, www.criticalthreats.org/
analysis/warning-update-irans-hybrid-warfare-in-yemen; Christopher Diamond,
“Houthi rebels flying Iranian-made Kamikaze drones into surveillance radars,”
Defense News, March 28, 2017, www.defensenews.com/articles/report-houthi-rebels-
flying-iranian-made-kamikaze-drones-into-surveillance-radars.
9
Sebastian Sons and Toby Matthiesen, “The Yemen War in Saudi Media,” Muftah, July
20, 2016, http://muftah.org/yemen-war-saudi-media/#.WQpCfeXyiUk.
10
International Crisis Group (2016), op. cit., pp. 13–25.
11
“BND warnt vor Saudi-Arabien,” Zeit Online, December 2, 2015, www.zeit.de/politik/
ausland/2015-12/saudi-arabien-bnd-aussenpolitik.
12
Gidon Windecker and Peter Sendrowicz, “Cold War in the Gulf,” International Reports,
XXXII:4 (2016), 81, 83–87; Riedel, op. cit.
13
World Food Program, “Yemen: Situation Report No. 27,” March 15, 2017, http://
documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp290997.pdf?_ga=2.
76386325.1638939424.1493816925-1230277463.1493816925.
14
Andrew Engel: “Reassessing the Civil War in Yemen,” Washington Institute, March 8,
2017, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/reassessing-the-civil-war-in-
yemen.
15
Siraj Wahab: Missile attack on Riyadh ‘an act of war’ by Iran, Arab News, November 7,
2017, www.arabnews.com/node/1189476/saudi-arabia.
16
Michael Knights: Countering Iran’s Missile Proliferation in Yemen, The Washington
Institute, Policy Watch 2889, November 8, 2017, www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/countering-irans-missile-proliferation-in-yemen.

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17
WHO warns that more people will die if ports in Yemen do not reopen to humanitarian
aid, WHO, November 9, 2017, www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2017/
yemen-ports-aid/en/.
18
International Crisis Group (2016), op. cit., pp. 1–4; Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen
Frontlines: October 2016,” Critical Threats, October 6, 2016, www.criticalthreats.org/
analysis/yemen-frontlines-october-2016; Maher Farruk and Tyler Nocita, “Yemen Situ-
ation Report,” Critical Threats, March 23, 2017, www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/yemen-
situation-report/2017-yemen-crisis-situation-report-march-23; Riedel, op. cit.
19
Joe Gould, “CENTCOM chief: ‘Vital US interests at stake’ in Yemen,” Defense News,
March 29, 2017, www.defensenews.com/articles/centcom-chief-vital-us-interests-at-
stake-in-yemen.
20
Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, “Why the Saudi weapons deal may not live up the hype,”
Defense News, May 28, 2017: 1, 24. www.defensenews.com/articles/why-the-saudi-
weapons-deal-may-not-live-up-to-hype; Warren Strobel and Arshad Mohammed
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“Weighing Arms Sale, US Seeks Saudi Pledge on Yemen Civilian Casualties,”

Reuters, April 20, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-yemen-
idUSKBN17M2ZK; Aaron Mehta and Shawn Snow, “New Strikes in Yemen,” Defense
News, March 3, 2017, www.defensenews.com/articles/new-strikes-in-yemen-but-no-us-
troops-in-firefight; Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper, “Navy SEALs Kill 7 Militants in
Yemen Raid but Suffer Injuries,” The New York Times, May 23, 2017, www.nytimes.
com/2017/05/23/world/middleeast/navy-seals-yemen-raid.html?_r=0.
21
Christopher P. Cavas, “New Houthi weapon emerges: a drone boat,” Defense News, Feb-
ruary 19, 2017, www.defensenews.com/articles/new-houthi-weapon-emerges-a-drone-
boat.
22
Ibid; Phil Stewart, “US Navy ship targeted in failed missile attack from Yemen,” Reuters,
October 10, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-ship-idUSKCN12
A082.
23
International Crisis Group (2016), op. cit., pp. 17–19; Katherine Zimmerman and Jon
Diamond, “Challenging the Yemeni State: ISIS in Aden and al Mukalla,” Critical
Threats, June 9, 2016, www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/challenging-the-yemeni-state-
isis-in-aden-and-al-mukalla; International Crisis Group, Yemen’s al–Qaeda: Expanding
the Base, February 2, 2017, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/174-yemen-s-al-
qaeda-expanding-the-base.pdf.
24
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nick-
named ‘Little Sparta,’” The Washington Post, November 9, 2014, www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-
potent-ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c-
83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_term=.af7eb4a728bc; “UAE’s Battle-Hardened Mili-
tary Expands Into Africa,” Mideast, US News, April 29, 2017, www.usnews.com/
news/world/articles/2017-04-29/uaes-battle-hardened-military-expands-into-africa-
mideastl.
25
Emile Hokayem and David Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” Survival, LVIII:6 (2016),
157–86.

12
 Marcel Serr
26
Maayan Groisman, “Houthi leader: Israel participating in the aggression in Yemen,”
The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2016, www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Houthi-leader-
Israel-participating-in-the-aggression-against-Yemen-452963; “Yemen Minister says
fate of country’s last 50 Jews unknown,” The Times of Israel, April 16, 2017, www.
timesofisrael.com/yemeni-minister-says-fate-of-countrys-remaining-jews-unknown/.
27
Oren Kessler, “When Israel Helped Yemen’s Shiites,” Politico Magazine, April 21, 2015,
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/israel-yemen-shiites-117208; Asher Orkaby,
“Syria’s Chemical Weapons Might Start a New Six Day War,” The Wall Street Journal,
June 4, 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-chemical-weapons-might-start-a-new-six-
day-war-1496605055.
28
Michael Segall, “Yemen has become Iran’s Testing Ground for New Weapons,” Jeru-
salem Center for Public Affairs, March 2, 2017, http://jcpa.org/article/yemen-has-
become-irans-testing-ground-for-new-weapons/.
29
Raoul Wootliff and Raphael Ahren, “Lapid: Entire Israel security establishment is
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worried by Trump’s Saudi arms deal,” The Times of Israel, May 29, 2017, www.timeso-
fisrael.com/lapid-entire-israeli-security-establishment-is-worried-by-trumps-saudi-
arms-deal/; Bruce Riedel, “The $110 billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia is fake news,”
Brookings, June 5, 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-
arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake-news/.
30
“Israel, Saudi Arabia are reportedly negotiating economic ties,” Haaretz, June 17, 2017,
www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.796215; Zvi Barel, “Saudi Proposal to Israel
could be the stuff of Trump’s Dream Deal,” Haaretz, May 2, 2017, www.haaretz.
com/middle-east-news/1.789953.

13