DECISION-MAKING IN DAM ENGINEERING

William R. Fiedler, PE 1
Daniel W. Osmun, PE 2

ABSTRACT

Dam engineering requires countless decisions at each stage of a dam’s lifecycle to ensure
its safe operation. For a new dam under design, some of the key decisions include the
alignment, type, geometry, design loads, foundation treatment, as well as spillway and/or
outer works type and location. For an existing dam, decisions determine how frequently
to inspect and monitor the dam, how to respond to changing conditions, when and to
what extent the dam should be reanalyzed, and whether conditions at the dam have
reached the point where dam modifications are necessary. Reviews of dam failure case
histories have often concluded that key information was overlooked, misinterpreted, or
missing during decision-making processes. These misinformed decisions were sometimes
made by a single individual, with little input from multiple perspectives, and sometimes
reflected the lack of experience or expertise of key decision-makers and influencers.
Making the right decisions about dam safety requires input from a group of
knowledgeable individuals, both in-house and independent, with different perspectives; a
clear understanding and portrayal of uncertainties and unknowns related to information
leading to the decision; knowledge of case histories and precedents that can inform
decisions; and a clear and complete basis for the decision that establishes what was
decided and the underlying rationale for the decision. Good decisions do not necessarily
require exhaustive investigations and studies, but they do require judgment as to whether
adequate information is available to make the decision.

INTRODUCTION

There are many decisions involved in the analysis and design of dams and their
associated structures that ultimately affect the dam’s stability and safety. Prior to the
initiation of an analysis or design, there may be an exploration program that requires
several decisions on the scope of the program and requirements for the investigations.
Once information is obtained, a decision is made as to whether the site is adequately
characterized. During analysis/design there are decisions about which numerical
programs to use and what the key inputs are for the analysis. If key information is
overlooked or not obtained, the analysis may provide inaccurate results that are
unrealistic for the actual conditions and that could provide a false sense of security that
decisions are well-informed. For a new dam, the key decisions are the location and
alignment of the dam; the dam type; design loads; design criteria; and foundation limits
and treatment. A design can be based on deterministic criteria, be risk-informed, or can
incorporate both approaches.

1
HDR, Senior Technical Advisor, Dam Safety/Risk, Denver, CO, Bill.Fiedler@hdrinc.com.
2
HDR, Senior Technical Advisor, Dam Safety/Risk, Denver, CO, Daniel.Osmun@hdrinc.com.

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 1

For existing high and significant hazard dams, decisions are routinely made regarding the
safety of the dam. These decisions are made by a range of stakeholders, from owners to
consulting engineers to regulators, and they can be made knowingly and unknowingly.
Typically, inspections are performed on a regular basis, and periodic reevaluations of the
dam are conducted to determine if the dam can continue to be safely operated. Engineers
and owners are more frequently using risk analysis/risk assessment as a tool to identify
potential issues with a dam and to estimate the probability that unfavorable performance
will occur. Two keys to an effective risk analysis are: 1) a thorough review of the design,
construction, performance and condition of the dam and associated structures, and 2) the
identification of the critical potential failure modes (PFM). If critical PFMs are not
identified or if data and information are misinterpreted or ignored, erroneous conclusions
can be reached on the safety of the dam. Further, when dam safety issues are identified,
decisions must be made about how to proceed—conduct additional studies; increase
monitoring; proceed to studying corrective actions; or do nothing.

The decision-making processes and technical capabilities vary across dam owner
organizations. Owners with a large portfolio of dams often have dedicated technical staff
to perform technical studies and designs and have well-defined dam safety decision-
making processes and designated decision-makers. Dam owners with a single dam or a
small portfolio of dams often rely on consultants to perform technical studies and designs
and to provide input and advice on dam safety decisions. Owners of dams that are
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or state dam safety
organizations are required to comply with the criteria and guidelines imposed by the
regulator when making dam safety decisions. Regardless of the approach, the dam owner
is ultimately responsible for making good decisions regarding dam safety.

INFLUENCES ON DAM ENGINEERING DECISIONS

A number of factors have historically contributed to flawed decisions that resulted in dam
failures or incidents. These factors include:

a. Dominance of a key individual in the decision-making without independent input

or review. This was a factor in the failure of St. Francis Dam, as discussed later in
this paper.
b. Lack of recognition of key mechanisms that contribute to instability or
overstressing of dam structures or components. This was a factor in the failures of
St. Francis Dam, Teton Dam, and Delhi Dam, as discussed later in this paper.
c. Not connecting information that provides evidence of a developing failure mode.
This was the case in the spillway incident at Oroville Dam, as discussed in the
Independent Panel Forensic Report (2018).
d. Not responding to dam safety issues in a timely manner. This was a factor in the
failure of Delhi Dam, as discussed later in this paper.
e. Not accounting for the appropriate loading conditions at a dam. This was a factor
in the failure of Delhi Dam, as discussed later in this paper.

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 2

 DAM FAILURE CASE HISTORIES

Case histories on dam failures and incidents shed insight into the causes of dam failures.
Forensic studies can identify key decisions that, if made differently, would likely have
prevented the failure. Three case histories – those of St. Francis Dam, Teton Dam, and
Delhi Dam – are presented below with the decisions that contributed to the failures.

St. Francis Dam

Background and Failure. St. Francis Dam was a gravity arch concrete dam completed in
May 1926 (see Figure 1). The selection of the dam site and the design of the dam was
overseen by William Mulholland, head of City of Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works
and Supply (BWWS). The dam was originally designed to a height of 175 ft above
streambed, but was raised twice during construction to an ultimate height of 195 ft. The
base width of the dam was not increased as the dam height was increased. Contraction
joints were not provided in the dam, and the only drainage provided was in the existing
channel portion of the dam. During initial filling in 1926 and 1927, two sets of cracks
appeared on the dam’s downstream face. These were dismissed by Mulholland as a
natural result of the concrete curing.

Figure 1. St. Francis Dam Prior to Failure (Photo from Huber Collection, University of
California Water Resources Center Archives, Berkeley).

Prior to failure, the reservoir had been held 3 inches below the spillway crest for five
days. On the morning of the St. Francis Dam failure, the dam tender called Mulholland to
alert him about muddy seepage that was exiting from the right abutment. Mulholland and
his assistant Harvey Van Norman travelled to the damsite on the morning of March 12,
1928. They observed the seepage to be clear. They observed additional seepage on the
left abutment and declared the dam to be safe before leaving the damsite.

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 3

Later that night, a powerhouse employee reported an offset in the road upstream of the
dam’s left abutment. The offset was later attrributed to a landslide scarp. St. Francis Dam
failed that same night around midnight. The dam breach released an estimated 38,000
acre-ft of water, killing at least 450 people. There were no eyewitness accounts. Forensic
work was required to develop theories on how the dam failed.

Factors Influencing the Failure. St. Francis Dam was located in the San Franisquito
Canyon, where the canyon suddenly narrowed, just downstream of a broad, wooded flat
area. The narrowing of the canyon at the damsite was the result of large prehistoric
landslides in the Pelona Schist.

Ten years before the St. Francis Dam failure, two dams in San Diego failed during large
floods – Sweetwater Dam and Lower Otay Dam. The failures resulted in the California
Dam Safety Act of 1917, which granted the State Engineer authority over dams that were
greater than 10 ft high or those impounding more than 9 acre-ft of water. The State
Engineer also had the authority to review plans for dams prepared by irrigation districts,
private companies, and individuals. By the 1920s it was also common practice for dam
engineering projects to have independent design reviews by consulting engineers. The
Reclamation Service, renamed the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923, had been requiring
this practice before construction could begin. Because of Mullholland’s reputation and
prior engineering accomplishments, he was given the latitude to pursue the St. Francis
Dam designs as he saw fit and received an exemption under the 1917 law from the State
Engineer. Early in his career, he had studied books and articles to improve his technical
understanding. Later, this diligence seemed to wane, especially in regard to concrete dam
design.

There was no evidence that Mullholland conducted an evaluation of the site geology as
part of the design. Mullholland did not significantly address the potential for uplift in the
designs, and this was criticized at the time by a number of prominent dam engineers. This
had been issue at Austin Dam, a concrete gravity dam that failed in Pennsylvania on
September 30, 1911. John Freeman, a prominent New England-based engineer, visited
the Austin Dam site and said, “Uplift presssures may possibly occur under or within any
masonry dam and should always be accounted for” (Jackson, 2003). Prior to the failure of
St. Francis Dam, the Bureau of Reclamation had added features at Elephant Butte Dam
(1911) and Arrowrock Dam (1913) to reduce uplift pressures (Jackson, 2003).

Geological engineering professor Dr. J. David Rogers recently performed a thorough

evaluation of the St. Francis Dam failure and developed a detailed sequence of events
that explained his theory of how the dam failed (Rogers, 2013). He concluded that the
dam failure sequence was likely brought about by a combination of factors. He believed
that the dam experienced excessive tilting when fully loaded, which increased the uplift
loads on the dam. He noted the lack of drainage in the dam abutments that contributed to
dam instability and believed that underlying paleo mega-slides within the Pelona Schist
were reactivated prior to the dam failure (Figure 2).

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 4

Figure 2. Remnants of St. Francis Dam and the Slide on the Left Abutment (from UCLA
Spence Collection).

After the failure of St. Francis Dam, the Dam Act of 1929 closed many of the exceptions
in the 1917 law, including the one that Mullholland had used. The act mandated
regulation by a single agency in the State Engineer’s Office that had comprehensive
oversight of non-federal dams in California..

The failure of St. Francis Dam ended William Mulholland’s career. He was not the
engineer of record for St. Francis Dam; this position was instead held by BWWS
engineer Edgar A. Bayley. At the Los Angeles County Coroner’s Inquest, Mullholland
was quoted as saying “Don’t blame anybody else, you fasten it on me. If there is an error
in human judgement, I was the human” (Coroner’s Inquest, 1928). John R. Freeman
privately criticized Mullholland for not consulting independent experts, for not
recognizing major vulnerabilities at the site, and for trusting too much in his own
knowledge.

Flaws in Decision-Making. There were a number of flawed decisions made in the design
of St. Francis Dam, many of them the result of Mullholland being the sole decision-
maker who did not recognize issues that were already understood in the dam engineering
community at the time. Mullholland didn’t recognize the impact of uplift pressures on
dam and dam foundation stability and the corresponding need for drainage, and he didn’t
appreciate the significance of the previous landslides in the left abutment. The dam height
was also raised twice during construction without a making a corresponding change in
the cross-section. These oversights were compounded by the fact that there was no
independent review on the designs that may have identified the decisions that
compromised the safety of the dam

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 5

Delhi Dam

Background and Failure. Delhi Dam is located on the Maquoketa River about 1.4 miles
south of the town of Delhi, Iowa. The Maquoketa River, located in northeastern Iowa, is
a tributary of the Mississippi River. The dam was constructed between 1922 and 1929 by
the Interstate Power Company for hydroelectric power generation. Generation of power
was eventually terminated at the dam in 1968. The embankment portion of Delhi Dam
breached on July 24, 2010, after several days of intense rain in the watershed above the
dam (see Figure 3). The dam was owned and operated by the Lake Delhi Recreation
Association (LDRA) at the time of dam failure.

Figure 3. Photo Looking From Right Abutment of Dam across Breached Embankment
Dam, With Right Spillway Wall in Background (Fiedler et al., 2010).

Delhi Dam was designed as a concrete dam and earthen embankment. A layout of the site
is shown on Figure 4. The 704-ft-long structure consisted of (from left to right looking
downstream): a 60-ft-long concrete reinforced earthfill section abutting the left limestone
abutment; a 61-ft-long reinforced concrete powerhouse; an 86-ft-long gated concrete
ogee spillway, with three 25- by 17-ft vertical lift gates; and, a 495-ft-long embankment
section that was originally constructed with 1V:3H upstream slopes and 1V:2H
downstream slopes that extend to the right abutment of the dam. The crest of the right
embankment section of the dam was 25 ft wide and was at El. 904.8. A concrete corewall
(Figure 5) served as the impervious barrier for the embankment, but the corewall was
located upstream of the dam crest and only extended to El. 898.8.

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 6

 Figure 4. Overhead Photo Showing Layout of Dam (Fiedler et al., 2010).

Figure 5. Delhi Dam Cross-Section (Note Core Wall Upstream of Dam Crest and Below
Dam Crest Elevation).

The maximum section of the embankment section had an estimated height of 43 ft. Lake
Delhi, the reservoir behind Delhi Dam had a storage volume of 3790 acre-ft at normal
pool (El. 896) and a reservoir volume of about 9920 acre-ft at the crest of the dam (El.
904.8). The spillway crest was at El. 879.8.

Factors Influencing the Failure. The spillway gates at Delhi Dam were difficult to open
and close. A small crane had been used to sometimes initiate opening of the gates. A
jacking device was installed on the top of the gates to force the gates down to their fully

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 7

closed position. During the 2010 flood event, Gate 3 was stuck at a 4.25-ft opening
(compared to the full opening of 18 ft). Damaged concrete behind the left gate guide for
Gate 3 is the likely cause of Gate 3 not operating to full opening. This area was identified
in a 2009 inspection of the dam and was not repaired (Figure 6). The inability to fully
open one of the spillway gates caused the dam to be overtopped. Flood routings indicated
that the dam would not have overtopped if all three spillway gates had been opened fully,
but that the reservoir would have exceeded the top of the core wall for over a day with a
maximum water surface elevation 2.4 ft above the top of the wall.

Figure 6. Gate Guide for Right Vertical Spillway Lift Gate (Note Damaged Concrete
Downstream of Gate Guide, Which Caused Binding of Gate (Fiedler et al., 2010).

The embankment dam performance during prior high water levels did not reveal
problems associated with foundation or embankment seepage, or the problems were not
severe enough to be observed and documented. The 2010 event loaded the structure to
reservoir levels not previously experienced and resulted in the reservoir water surface
exceeding the top of the core wall (El. 898.8) for the first time. Shortly after the reservoir
level exceeded the top of the core wall, whirlpools were observed in the reservoir and
seepage appeared at the downstream toe, at the left end of the embankment section.

The period of reservoir levels above core wall loading prior to dam failure is estimated to
have been about 17 hours. Overtopping of the embankment dam began around 10 a.m. on
July 24 and continued until erosion breached the road shortly after midnight. If the
embankment had not breached, the duration of loading above the core wall would have
been about 38 hours, and the period of overtopping the crest would have been about 13
hours.

The time of hydraulic loading was judged to be too short in duration for steady state
seepage to develop, suggesting that the seepage was following a weakness within the
embankment. There were several areas where seepage could have tracked, including

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 8

above the top and along the downstream side of the core wall where compaction or stress
conditions may have been low.

It is believed that the embankment breach was a combination of overtopping and internal
erosion (Fiedler et al., 2010). The downstream slope was not completely armored, and the
embankment materials were considered low plasticity and erodible. Piping discharge had
been described as muddy and occurring prior to overtopping. The quantity of seepage
was significant and, had the embankment not overtopped, the duration of loading would
likely have been sufficiently long enough to cause the dam to breach from the internal
erosion mechanism.

Flaws in Decision-Making. There were a number of flaws in the design of Delhi Dam.
The concrete cutoff wall did not extend to the dam crest, which created a vulnerability
once the reservoir reached the top of the cutoff wall. The embankment design did not
include filters, which led to internal erosion of the downstream embankment materials. In
terms of operational decisions, there were inconsistent evaluations of the hazard
classification for the dam. The hazard classification was important because it determined
the design flood level that the dam had to safely pass. The water district also failed to
adequately address the faulty operation of one of the spillway gates, reducing the
spillway capacity, which contributed to the maximum water surface in the 2010 event and
the amount and duration of overtopping of the dam crest.

Teton Dam

Background and Failure. Teton Dam was a central core zoned earthfill structure with a
structural height of 405 ft (Figure 7). The dam included a river outlet works at the left
abutment, an auxiliary outlet works at the right abutment, and a gated chute spillway on
the right abutment. The dam was designed and owned by the Bureau of Reclamation.
Construction of the embankment was completed in November 1975. The dam failed on
June 5, 1976, with the reservoir at El. 5301.7, which was 3.3 ft below the spillway crest
elevation (Figure 8). The dam failure resulted in 11 fatalities.

Figure 7. Typical Cross-Section over Abutment Sections.

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 Figure 8. Teton Damsite after Failure (from Reclamation Photo Archives).

Factors Influencing the Failure. A key design decision was in the form of a 70-ft deep
key trench and grout curtain on the abutments. The objective of the deep cutoff trench
was to remove the more open jointed foundation rock and facilitate more effective
foundation grouting in more sound rock. Three rows of grout holes were designed (see
Figure 7); and the outer holes were not intended to achieve closure, but to provide a
barrier for the center row. The design allowed for full head on the upstream side of the
steep narrow key trench. The design decisions made regarding the erodible fill placed in
the narrow key trench; the geometry of the key trench, which allowed for arching of the
fill and low stress zones; and the permeable and jointed rock below the key trench
(Figure 9) created the conditions for erosion of the embankment material into the
foundation (Figure 10). The objective of the design focused on providing a seepage
barrier to reduce seepage through the foundation. The state-of-the-art design philosophy
in the late 1960s and early 1970s would have been to assume that a defect (crack or
concentrated leak) would occur and to include design elements, such as filter and
drainage elements, to control seepage associated with a potential defect. The design of
Teton Dam did not follow current design practice to include a filter on the downstream
side of the narrow key trench.

There were no design or construction provisions for foundation shaping and treatment.
The 1971 Teton Dam Design Considerations report stated that, “erosive seepage under
the embankment will be eliminated by injecting the foundation with a grout mix,” but this
was not included in the construction specifications. The state of practice by many dam-
building organizations at the time was to use dental concrete, shotcrete, or slush grouting
to treat foundations. The 1972 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Committee
on Embankment Dams published “Foundation and Abutment Treatment of High
Embankment Dams on Rock” documenting the practice at the time (Barron, 1972).

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 Figure 9. Jointed Rock in Foundation Key Trench (from Reclamation Photo Archives).

Figure 10. Depiction of Fully Developed SeepageFA Path.

Bureau of Reclamation designers believed that surface treatment and grouting was a field
problem to be negotiated with the contractor. The field procedures for surface grouting
involved pouring grout into open fractures. This practice didn’t work for fractures less
than 0.5 inch wide, and some fractures were infilled with silt. The practice was
discontinued above El. 5205, with no input from designers. “Special compaction” of

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Zone 1 material over/around open joints was utilized to protect against erosion into the
joints.

Some of the key findings from the Independent Panel report on the Failure of Teton Dam
(Independent Panel, 1976) were that the joint conditions were evident in the foundation
(open joints, stepped configuration, near vertical faces and small overhangs); and there
were open transverse joints in the bottom of the key trench (notably near station 14+00)
where several sets of through-going joints were apparent. No slush grout or dental
concrete was placed at these features; embankment soil was placed directly against the
joints.

The Independent Panel report on the Failure of Teton Dam (Independent Panel, 1976)
concluded that the failure of Teton Dam was caused not because of some unforeseeable
fatal combination of events, but because the many combinations of unfavorable
circumstances inherent in the situation were not anticipated and, therefore, adequate
defenses against these circumstances were not included in the design. Dr. Ralph Peck (a
member of the Independent Panel) stated that, “The failure of Teton Dam resulted from
overconfidence in the seepage barrier and from the consequent failure to provide those
additional defenses needed to cope with its inevitable imperfections” (Peck, 1978).

Flaws in Decision-Making. There were a number of flaws in the design of Teton Dam. A
key decision was made to incorporate a deep cutoff into the foundation due to the desire
to avoid foundation grouting of the excavated material. This decision was unprecedented
in the Bureau of Reclamation’s history. Critical decisions were made during construction
to treat the cutoff trench foundation by pouring grout into larger discontinuities in lieu of
more robust dental concrete treatment and to not treat any of the discontinuities in the
upper portions of the abutments. There was a lack of communication between the dam
designers and the construction staff, which resulted in key field decisions being made
without input from the designers. There were no formal foundation design approvals,
which prevented designers from fully appreciating potential issues with the dam
foundation. And there were critical decisions made during the operation of the dam,
including the decision to allow a faster filling rate for the dam (2 ft/day instead of the
original criteria of a maximum of 1 ft/day).

ELEMENTS OF GOOD DECISION-MAKING

There are some consistent elements to include in any significant decision related to dam
safety. The decision should be arrived at by a group of individuals with varied technical
perspectives. Having multiple perspectives improves the chances of identifying
assumptions and approaches that may be faulty or inappropriate. This may result in
questioning these key inputs and placing less reliance on precedent or past experiences.
An independent review of key dam safety decisions should also be performed. This helps
ensure that a fresh perspective is obtained and that key issues are not overlooked.

It is important to check, review, and formally document all decisions that relate to dam
engineering. There is a range of decisions that vary in importance. Simple, more basic

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 12

decisions, such as assumptions on material properties and the size and spacing of drains,
should be spelled out in design documentation, and the justification for selection should
be provided. Higher-level decisions that relate to the location and alignment of a new
dam, the design loads, and the foundation treatment require more justification and
scrutiny. These should be spelled out in more detail and appropriate decision-makers
should be involved. For the evaluation of an existing dam, decision-makers should sign
off on the overall conclusions regarding the safety of the dam and the need for follow-up
actions.

Dam owners should clearly define what decisions need to be documented, who is
responsible for reviewing and signing off on the decisions, and the processes that will be
used to discuss and formalize decisions. It should be recognized that making a decision to
not take additional action at a dam is just as important as a decision to take action. If key
issues or conditions are overlooked or determined to be non-threatening, a no-action
decision may allow the situation to escalate. On the other hand, it is better to take no
action than to take action that results in worsening the safety condition of a dam.

Decision-makers must also determine if they have adequate information to make a sound
decision or if additional information is needed. Additional information could include
additional explorations, additional testing, refined loading studies, more analyses, and
refined risk analyses. Whether additional information is needed before a decision is made
is a function of the uncertainty and confidence in the existing information. If the
confidence is high that additional information would not likely change the findings and
conclusions, then the existing information is likely adequate to make a good decision. If
there is significant uncertainty (reflected in a lack of confidence in the findings and
conclusions), there is likely justification to pursue the additional information. Sensitivity
studies can be used to explore the effects of uncertainty and can be used to help
determine the confidence in the findings and conclusions from the current information.

A well-developed dam safety case supports and documents key decisions related to dam
safety. The dam safety case is a logical set of arguments used to advocate a position that
either additional dam safety-related action is justified, or that no additional dam safety-
related action is justified at any given time. In the dam safety case, key decisions should
be transparent, and the basis for the decision should be well-supported. Alternative
arguments are recognized, but the case should be built for the findings or decisions made.

The dam safety case presents rationale in a formal and methodical manner to persuade
decision-makers to take responsible action. The arguments string together key evidence
regarding the three basic risk components—load probability, response probability, and
consequences— to convince decision-makers that the dam's existing condition and ability
to withstand future loading, risk estimates, and the recommended actions are all coherent.

The construction of a dam safety case is valuable even for a deterministic design where
the discussion would focus on the results of a standards-based analysis in lieu of
conditional probability risk estimates, while incorporating discussions of the loadings and
of the consequences of dam failure. Because uncertainty is inherent in each claim, the

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 13

arguments should also address whether confidence is high enough to stand on the basis of
existing evidence. The dam safety case represents the understanding of existing condition
and predicted future behavior stated as objectively as possible. It should not be used to
back-fit an argument for design decisions or business decisions that have already been
made.

BENEFITS OF WELL-DOCUMENTED DECISIONS

Good decisions that are well-founded are expected to result in the most efficient use of
money and resources within a dam owner organization. If the wrong priorities are
established, critical issues may not be addressed and may lead to incidents or even dam
failures. Issues that could be addressed in the present could become larger, more costly
issues in the future. If decisions are not well-founded, limited resources may be unwisely
expended on unnecessary projects.

Well-documented and supported dam engineering decisions and a strong dam safety case
provide multiple benefits. The initial benefit is a well-informed decision. In dam owner
organizations with a large portfolio of dams, decisions on dam safety are typically made
by high-level managers, with input from technical staff. The high-level managers may
have technical backgrounds but often will not have the time or the multidisciplinary
expertise to fully understand/appreciate all the details of the key assumptions and
arguments that support a recommended decision. For dam owner organizations without a
specialized technical staff, decisions may be made by designated staff with significant
input from consultants and possibly regulators.

A well-supported and documented decision helps decision-makers quickly grasp the key
arguments and question the basis for the decisions, to effectively debate the issues and
consider alternative actions, and to ultimately make an informed decision. Decisions that
are not well-documented and supported may be based on a false sense of confidence on
the part of decision-makers if information they believe is complete is actually lacking.
Another pitfall of incomplete documentation is that reviewers of a study may not fully
understand the basis of a decision and may inject their own biases and interpretations into
the information, when the critical information for the decision is actually something
different.

Once a decision is made, the documentation and the dam safety case are beneficial. If
unexpected performance occurs in the future or if potential dam safety issues are being
evaluated, the documented thought process behind key decisions during design are
invaluable. It can provide future engineers an improved understanding of the basis of the
original design. It can save time by allowing future engineers to see what specific
assumptions or interpretations were made in previous studies and to compare those to the
current conditions at the dam. While there might be a reluctance to be transparent about
the basis of decisions, the thorough documentation can validate that due diligence was
performed and that previous engineers were thorough and responsible in the studies they
conducted.

Copyright © 2019 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 14

 CONCLUSIONS

Good decisions are critical to the efficient and safe design of dams. A number of factors
can contribute to flawed decisions, and these factors were evident in the failure case
histories of St. Francis Dam, Delhi Dam and Teton Dam. Well-documented decisions
improve the understanding of the decision-makers and are valuable information to
include in a dam’s safety records. Good decision-making for critical aspects of design or
dam safety reviews should involve multiple perspectives; incorporate independent
reviews; outline clear procedures and responsibilities for making and documenting
decisions; and include the development of a thorough dam safety case that addresses
uncertainties and instills confidence in the information that forms the basis for decision-
making related to dam safety.

REFERENCES

Barron, Reginald A., Abutment and Foundation Treatment for High Embankment Dams
on Rock, Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, 1972, Vol. 98, Issue
10, Pg. 1017-1032

Fiedler, W., King, W., Schwanz, N., 2010, Independent Panel of Engineers: Report on
Breach of Delhi Dam, December 2010.

Independent Forensic Team Report, Oroville Dam Spillway Incident, January 5, 2018

Independent Panel, Report to U.S. Department of Interior and State of Idaho on Failure of
Teton Dam by Independent Panel to Review Cause of Dam Teton Dam Failure, Idaho
Falls, Idaho, December 1976

Jackson, D. C. (2003). It is a crime to design a dam without considering upward pressure:

Engineers and uplift: 1890-1938. In G. O. Brown, J. Garbrecht, and W. H. Hager (Eds.),
Henry P. G. Darcy and other pioneers in hydraulics: Contributions in celebration of the
200th Birthday of Henry Philibert Gaspard Darcy (pp.220- 230). June 23-26,
Philadelphia, PA.

Peck, Ralph, “Let’s get it straight about those dams” Military Engineer, 70:453. Jan-Feb
1978.

Rogers, J. David,
https://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/st_francis_dam/reassessment_of_st_francis_dam_failure.p
df, May 2013

Transcript of Coroner’s Inquest, St. Francis Dam Disaster, Los Angeles, March-April
1928.

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