1.
benefit the RCC enjoyed was merely
(a) If you were the counsel of XX, expound
on his arguments. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The commemorative issuance is
unconstitutional.
The Constitution is very clear that the
separation of the Church and the State shall
be inviolable and that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion. It
likewise provides that no public money shall
be used, directly or indirectly, for any
sectarian purpose except if the beneficiary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, government orphanage or
leprosarium.
In this case, the commemorative stamps,
which were issued using public funds, were
primarily designed to honor Pope Francis, the
head of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC).
This breaches the supposed wall of
separation between the Church and the State
and in effect establishes—or favors and
benefits—the RCC. The favor given to, or
benefit derived by, RCC is not merely
incidental to a secular objective as the design
of the stamps focuses on the pontiff himself.
It therefore promotes the leader of the RCC,
not per se the Philippines as his destination.
Thus, the commemorative issuance is
unconstitutional.
(b) If you were the lawyer representing
Philpost, give your counter-arguments. (5
points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The commemorative issuance is not
unconstitutional.
The norm that the separation of the Church
and the State shall be inviolable does not
mean that they are separated by an iron wall
absolutely barring all forms of interaction.
Also, the establishment clause only means
that the State should be neutral and should
not favor or discriminate against any religion.
Finally, Aglipay v. Ruiz teaches that as long
as public fund is used for a secular purpose,
any incidental sectarian benefit derived
therefrom would not render such use
unconstitutional.
In this case, the purpose of the issuance was
decidedly secular: (1) to honor Pope Francis,
not just as the head of the RCC but more
importantly as the head of state of the
Vatican, and (2) more importantly to raise
funds from the sale of the limited edition
commemorative stamps. Whatever indirect
incidental to the said secular objectives.
Hence, commemorative issuance is not
unconstitutional.
2.
(a) If you were the judge, would you dismiss
the case? (5 pts.)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, I would not dismiss the case.
Ordinarily, a suit against an unincorporated
government agency performing a
governmental function is a suit against the
state. However, if such agency implements a
project for which a sum of money has already
been appropriated as a standard procedure,
a collection suit arising from the
implementation thereof may be filed against
it. This is no longer a suit against the state
without its consent as there is no more
affirmative act that the government needs to
perform to comply with the relief prayed for in
the complaint.
In this case, it is reasonable to presume
based on standard government practice that
there is already an existing sum of money
appropriated for the DA project. The
collection case filed by AZ no longer requires
the government to set aside anew a sum of
money. The only issue here would be
whether the DA is obliged to release the
budgeted sum to pay for AZ’s delivery.
Thus, if I were the judge, I would not dismiss
the case.
(b) Assume that the DA is suable and there
is already a final decision finding it liable to
AZ. May AZ now validly cause the execution
of the money judgment in its favor?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YES, AZ may now validly cause the
execution of the money judgment in its favor.
As a rule, suability is not equivalent to liability,
in the same manner that consent to be sued
is not consent to the execution of a judgment
against the state. However, where there is
prior appropriation of a sum of money
intended for a particular project, execution
may lie in a collection case arising from the
implementation of such project.
In this case, a sum of money has been
appropriated specifically for the
implementation of the project. Thus, no
consideration of public policy will bar the
execution of the money judgment in favor of
 AZ against the DA fund specfically
appropriated for the said project.
Ergo, AZ may now validly cause the
execution of the money judgment in its favor.
3.
(a) Is the government of President GMA at
the precise moment of her succession to the
Office of the President in February 2001 a
revolutionary government? (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, the government of President GMA at the
precise moment of her succession to the
Office of the President in February 2001 was
not a revolutionary government.
A revolutionary government is established in
derogation of the existing legal order. It is
extra-constitutional in the sense that it comes
into being in complete breach of the
prevailing constitutional norms.
In this case, the government of PGMA was
established by way of succession when the
Office of the President became vacant upon
the resignation of President Estrada. This is
in accordance with, and not in derogation of,
the 1987 Constitution, which states that if the
Office of the President becomes vacant, the
Vice President shall succeed as President.
Thus, the government of President GMA was
not revolutionary.
(b) Was the situation of the Philippines in the
immediate aftermath of EDSA People Power
2 similar to the situation of the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation when we
had two presidents, one for the de jure
government and another for the de facto
government? (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, the situation of the Philippines in the
immediate aftermath of EDSA People Power
2 was not similar to the situation of the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation.
Under normal times when the presidential
succession is in accordance with the
procedure enshrined in the Constitution, the
government of the new President is both de
jure and de facto. On the other hand, when a
state is under a belligerent occupation, the
government established by the belligerent
occupant is considered de facto while the
rightful government, which is not in power in
the meantime, is de jure.
In the case of the Philippines in the
immediate aftermath of EDSA People Power
2, we only had one government, which was
both de jure and de facto, the government of
PGMA. It was de jure because it had legal
title by virtue of a valid succession under the
Constitution. It was also de facto because it
was in actual control of the whole country. On
the other hand, during the Japanese
occupation, we had two governments: the de
jure Commonwealth Government and the de
facto Japanese-sponsored government.
Thus, at that time we had concurrently two
presidents—one for each government.
Thus, the situation of the Philippines in the
immediate aftermath of EDSA People Power
2 was not similar to the situation of the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation.
4.
(a) Is the contention on the non-self-
executing nature of provisions under Article II
correct? (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, the contention on the non-self-executing
nature of the provisions under Article II is not
correct.
As a rule, provisions of Article II are non-self-
executing because they are merely
statements of principles and state policies.
However, jurisprudence teaches that there
are provisions in Article II that the Supreme
Court finds self-executing, such the right to a
healthful and balance ecology (implied in
Oposa v. Factoran).
In this case, the respondents made a
sweeping generalization that all provisions
found in Article II, including the rights to life
and to health, are not self-executing. This is
erroneous because the rights to life and to
health are so fundamental and vital that they
need not even be enshrined in the
Constitution to be self-executing. It cannot be
seriously argued that there is a need for
Congress to enact an implementing law
before people can invoke their right to life and
right to health.
Thus, the contention is not correct.
(b) If you were the judge, rule on the
opposing contentions. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will rule that the law is not unconstitutional.
Laws are presumed constitutional. He who
challenges the constitutionality of a law has
the burden of proving his case by clear and
convincing evidence.
In this case, the RH Law is attacked on the
ground that it violates the right to life and right
 to health enshrined in Article II. But there is
no clear showing that the provision on post-
abortion treatment and counseling violate the
said rights. Neither is there a showing that
indeed hormonal contraceptives, IUDs and
injectables are abortifacient other than the
petitioner’s bare assertion to that effect. In
fact, the reverse may be argued more
plausibly: The assailed provisions are
consistent with the recognition by the state of
the right to life and to health of women.
Hence, I will rule that the law is not
unconstitutional.
there is a revolution and the existing legal
order is overthrown, the Filipinos are bound
to comply with the plebiscite requirement
they themselves agreed on in the Basic
Charter.
In this case, the 1987 Constitution is
categorical that a plebiscite is required to
ratify proposed amendments or revision
thereto. The sovereign Filipino people have
bound themselves to comply with this rule
when they ratified the 1987 Constitution;
thus, the fact that sovereignty resides in them
cannot be used as an excuse for such non-
compliance.

5. Thus, the argument of the respondents is

(a) Was there a valid ratification of the only partially correct.
proposed constitution in this case? (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO, there was no valid ratification in this

case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, there is only

one way to ratify a proposed amendment or
revision thereto: By way of a plebiscite
specifically called for that purpose.

In this case, the scheduled plebiscite was no

longer held because the President submitted
directly to the people the questions (1)
whether they approve of the proposed new
constitution; and (2) whether a plebiscite is
still needed to ratify it. Even assuming that
the people overwhelmingly voted in the
affirmative on the first question and in the
negative on the second question, still this is
not the form and procedure of ratification
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, a social
contract binding upon all sovereign Filipinos.
In fact, the proclamation itself only said the
people already accepted the proposed
constitution. Implicit therefrom is a
recognition of the non-compliance with the
ratification procedure in the Constitution.

Thus, there was no valid ratification in this

case.

(b) Regardless of your answer to question

(a), comment on the argument of the
respondents. (5 points)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The argument of the respondents is only

partially correct.

It is true that sovereignty resides in the

people. However, if the sovereign Filipino
people themselves covenanted that any
amendment or revision to the existing
Constitution shall be ratified in accordance
with the procedure laid down therein, they are
legally bound to comply therewith. Unless