New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

New Ideas in Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/
newideapsych

Ontology and scientific explanation: Pluralism as an a priori

condition of psychology
Thomas Teo
Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The field of psychology can be understood in terms of general

Available online 9 October 2009
accounts of mental life that differ over time and between cultures
or in terms of an academic discipline. For the former, pluralism is
an a priori condition because history and culture produce neces-
sarily and universally varying accounts of human subjectivity that
are embedded in local practices and traditions. This argument is
traced to the nature of psychological objects and events that are of
a cultural–historical kind. For Psychology as an academic discipline
it is argued that pluralism depends on varying ontological levels,
ranging from natural to cultural–historical kinds. The same argu-
ment of varying levels applies to the concept of explanation. It is
shown that important accounts in the discipline do not provide
natural–scientific explanations but rather hermeneutic interpre-
tations that afford high levels of pluralism. Based on the idea of
a necessary and universal pluralism in the field of psychology,
conditions for the possibility of integration are provided. It is
argued that the first step of integration includes recognition of
pluralistic accounts of mental life. Instead of assimilation, the
accommodation of new ideas is recommended.
Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The answer to the question of whether pluralism is an a priori condition of psychology requires
a meta-psychological reflection. Indeed, the answer depends on the semantics of pluralism, on the
definition of a priori, and on ideas regarding the meaning of psychology. In terms of psychology it is
necessary to make a distinction between the discipline of Psychology as it emerged as an independent
field of academic study in the second half of the 19th century, and general human accounts of mental life

E-mail address: tteo@yorku.ca

0732-118X/$ – see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.09.017
236 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243

and subjectivity as they have been developed over time in various cultural contexts. For Kant (1781/
1996), who inspired the question of this argument (although the following analyses are by no means
Neo-Kantian or based on a transcendental philosophy), a priori referred to knowledge independent of
experience, and the criteria qualifying knowledge as independent included necessity and universality
(see B4). A judgment was considered valid a priori if it was necessarily and universally true.
The differentiation between psychology as a discipline (Psychology with a capitalized P; see
Richards, 1996) and human accounts of mental life (psychology) requires additional ontological elab-
orations. From a meta-psychological point of view it can be argued that many psychological objects and
events have different ontological statuses than natural objects and events. This issue has been dis-
cussed by philosophers from Dilthey (1883/1959) to Hacking (1994) (who only recently moved away
from his former distinction arguing that there are no natural kinds). Psychologists such as Danziger
(1997) recognized that psychologies are constructed systems that are based on human kinds that have
a history and culture (I call them cultural–historical kinds). Thus, for a reflection or study of mental life
(whereby academic study is only one form among many), individuals from all psychologies invoke
concepts to which they have been socialized and which are embedded in ideas and practices of a given
society and era. So-called Western accounts of mental life have a unique status because what happened
in Western culture (e.g., hysteria) was theorized academically and provided a loop on how a culture
understood the mental life of its individuals. In short, psychology and Psychology have become
intertwined.
Pluralism is an a priori condition regarding accounts of human mental life, if they are interpreted,
–based on the notion of psychological objects and events being of a cultural–historical kind–as culture-
centric and history-centric (see Teo & Febbraro, 2003). If one refers to culture-centrism as a necessary
and universal feature of psychology, then reflections on human subjectivity are constituted and filtered
through the lenses and horizons of one’s culture. As soon as humans reflect on human mental life or
mental competences of themselves, a variety of ideas emerge embedded in practices and traditions.
This does not imply that there will be no overlap in terms of theorized anthropological mental
competences, for sometimes there is, but the meaning is still embedded within a cultural–historical
context (see Paranjpe, 1998). Although integration of some programs is theoretically thinkable it
cannot be achieved practically for internal as well as external reasons (see also Walsh-Bowers, 2010).
Culture-centrism (better: protoparadigm-centrism) can also be found within scientific research
programs of Psychology if we understand them as investigative cultures of academia: Psychoanalysis,
behaviorism, cognitive psychology, etc. can be understood as cultures that operate with different
theories, methods, and practices that exclude other theoretical cultures but also other worldviews.
The problem of culture-centrism has received more recent attention on the background of the
internationalization of Psychology (see Brock, 2006). The recognition of plural cultural accounts of
mental life are not the necessary outcomes of internationalization because American mainstream
Psychology has developed strategies to sustain the Americanization of global Psychology based on
economic development, political power, and cultural status. In that sense, the notion that psychology
(accounts of human mental life) develops in a culture-pluralistic way (if we take all culture-centrisms
into consideration) is an analytic rather than a synthetic judgment in the terms of Kant (the predicate is
contained in the subject). American psychologists may falsely believe that their ideas of mental life are
not embedded in culture and history, that their science is without prejudice, that their science is not
embedded in a particular tradition, and has an unlimited horizon (see also Gadamer, 1960/1997). Yet,
the reality is that global pluralism regarding mental life challenges the hegemony of American accounts
of mental life.
A priori has been defined by Kant as something that is universally and necessarily true while he was
identifying the conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge. However, we cannot ground what
is universally and necessarily true (in the case of pluralism) within logical or mathematical reflections
but need to abandon Kantian streams of argument and address cross-cultural and historical evidence.
Pluralism can be observed synchronically but also diachronically. The idea of pluralism as a ‘‘soft’’
a priori condition of psychology finds confirmation when one studies the past of psychology. A look at
the history of the topics of psychology and Psychology (soul, experience, subjectivity, consciousness,
behavior, mind, brain, etc.) demonstrates that different objects and events were espoused over time. Of
course, the idea of historical pluralism is often confronted with the notion that the past was wrong and
 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243 237

the present is right, which leads to the paradoxical statement that what is the present must also be
wrong because it will be the past in the future. The assumption that the last account is also the best
account shows historical naivety, is an assumption, and neglects the cultural–historical construction of
the psychological subject matter (see below).
The pluralism of psychology from a historical and cultural perspective, that is, the notion that
different accounts must exist when reflecting on human experiences because experiences depend
necessarily on contextualized practices and traditions, can be compared to reflections on the meaning
of life, life after death, the beginning and end of the world, the moral consequences of behavior, and so
on – in short, when it comes to spiritual issues. Religious objects and events refer to human
constructions even when religious objects and practices have been turned into something real
(churches and baptisms are real). However, because of the cultural and historical embeddedness of
objects and processes that refer to something that is constructed in time and context, pluralism is
a necessary and universal condition of religion. This does not mean that there will be no attempts in
fighting religious pluralism as soon as people believe in the superiority of their own spiritual accounts.
However, such attempts might work only temporally and locally.
If comparing psychology or Psychology to religion is hard to accept, I suggest looking instead at the
academic discipline of philosophy. The study of wisdom allows for a variety of philosophical worldviews
because what is ‘‘wise,’’ which itself is a cultural–historical concept, depends on tradition, culture, and
history. Of course, no philosopher would want to suggest a unification of all of philosophy because it is
obvious that the workings of different ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions would
render such an attempt in vain. A unification of philosophy is neither possible nor required. The love of
wisdom can mean many different things and attempts to reduce pluralism by only allowing one
program such as analytical philosophy have failed in the discipline’s past. A similar argument applies to
the humanities that have accepted that different ways of interpreting socio-historical objects and
events exist, however, without abandoning claims for better interpretations. Thus, since different ways
of interpreting psychological, religious and historical realities exist, it follows that the existence of the
plurality of interpretations as universal and necessary is trivial.

1. Ontology and kinds in the discipline of psychology

I have suggested that psychological concepts are of a cultural–historical kind, and that, therefore,
different ways of interpreting human subjectivity are possible. Based on these ideas I have argued that
pluralism is indeed a ‘‘soft’’ a priori condition of psychology, if we understand pluralism as referring to
different cultural and historical approaches to human mental life, a priori as something that is
culturally and historically necessary and unavoidable, and psychology as general accounts of human
mental life and reflections on human subjectivity. In the academic discipline of Psychology these
accounts are expressed in concepts and theories that are embedded in particular scientific traditions.
Although the same argument has been made for the natural sciences, I would emphasize that the
traditional natural sciences deal with natural objects and events that have often transcultural and
transhistorical (‘‘objective’’) qualities. Although I cannot do justice to the complexity of the natural
sciences, this simplified argument would mean that pluralism takes on a different meaning in the
natural sciences. Pluralism occurs on the level of interests, the selection of hypotheses, the interpre-
tation of data, and the level of expertise. Of course, it must be admitted that the process of referring to
natural objects and processes is also interlaced with ideological realities when it comes to addressing
issues that have policy implications (e.g., causes of global warming).

Table 1
Levels of inquiry.

Ontology Human process Discipline Explanation Pluralism

Level I Natural kinds Discovery Classical Physics Deductive-nomological Low
Level II Natural kinds Discovery or construction Evolutionary Biology Natural-historical Medium
Level III Cultural–historical kinds Construction or invention Humanities Hermeneutic High
238 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243

In making this distinction between natural and human sciences (see Table 1), I follow Dilthey’s
writings that justified ontologically and epistemologically a dualistic view of science. Accordingly, I
submit that objects and events in the natural sciences are not the same as the objects and events of the
human sciences. A rock found in the Grand Canyon is not the same as a First Nations rock painting that
might be found in the same area. The former is a result of geological natural processes whereas the latter
is the result of the human mind expressing a meaningful activity. However, it should be pointed out that
one should not see this distinction as absolute but rather as relative. Indeed, natural objects and events
can have a human imprint (e.g., human-made ecological changes) (see also Watanabe, 2010).
If we take the distinction between cultural–historical and natural kinds as relative, then we do not
need to obey the assumption that all psychological objects are natural and have been discovered, nor
the assumption that all objects and events, including natural ones, are socially constructed. Academic
Psychology is in a unique position because it has dealt with natural as well as social kinds. This suggests
a sliding scale of psychological concepts that can be justified as natural (physiological psychology) as
well as cultural–historical kinds. These psychological kinds can be divided into concepts that mirror
a biological reality (e.g., grasping reflex), concepts that are invented but have become a reality in social
practices (e.g., ethnicity, race, personality, IQ), concepts that are invented and have not become a reality
in social practices but have a reality in academic practices (e.g., g factor of intelligence, Big Five
personality factors), concepts that are constructed for practical purposes and may have a natural or
social origin (e.g., the zone of proximal development, developmental stages), and concepts that are
constructed for methodological purposes (e.g., variable, reliability).
The problem for psychology is that some psychological concepts have been discovered, others have
been constructed, and some have been invented, whereby discovered means that the concepts were
constructed based on the features of the object and event (of course, the question remains as to who
decides on the features of an object?); constructed means that concepts were developed based on the
cultural–historical subjectivity of human beings but have an external reference; and invented means
that concepts were created based on something that had not existed before the concept was developed.
The notion of pluralism shifts with these statuses in the following way: something that is discovered
has a low affordance of pluralism, something that is constructed has a medium affordance of pluralism,
and something that is invented has a high affordance of pluralism.
Obviously, my argument is based on a ‘‘semi-realist’’ (or critical-realist) position that suggests that
most natural kinds require a realist perspective whereas many cultural–historical kinds require
constructionist ontologies and epistemologies. In addition, it should be mentioned that from a meta-
psychological perspective it is not clear, ahead of analysis, which concept belongs to which status
(discovered, constructed, invented). The border is shifting and there will be different assignments based
on different worldviews. The status of a concept can also change with the development of a discipline.
The agreement and disagreement about the status of a concept is itself subject to pluralistic discussions
that could only be overcome if one were to pretend that all psychological concepts are of a natural kind
that mirrored a natural reality. But an objective look at the concepts of Psychology reveals that the
discipline deals with all types of concepts through which we perceive reality, and they often express
a certain worldview (e.g., this person is not adapted vs. this person is alienated).

2. Epistemology and the problem of explanation in the discipline

I have not only suggested that pluralism is an a priori feature of cultural–historical accounts of
mental life but is also characteristic of the discipline of Psychology, albeit that there may be different
affordances of pluralism depending on the nature of the concepts involved. Thus far the argument has
remained abstract and therefore I would like to address the problem of pluralism more concretely by
looking at the issue of explanation (in its widest sense) in Psychology. Explanation is one of the most
important tasks of science, which has always attempted to elucidate objects and events. For the
purpose of argument, and fully aware that the problem is more complex, I will discuss three in my view
qualitatively different levels of ‘‘explanation’’ associated with different meanings of pluralism. I will
show how they apply to Psychology. The argument presented here is based on the idea that different
ontological levels require different kinds of ‘‘explanation.’’
 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243 239

Physical explanations can be understood as causal explanations and the philosophy of science has
conceptualized them often as deductive-nomological explanations. According to Hempel and
Oppenheim (1948), for whom explanations serve as modes of answering ‘‘why’’ questions in the
sciences, it is possible to move from the explanans to the explanandum (that which needs to be
explained) via logical deduction. The explanans contains general laws and specific antecedent condi-
tions. Hempel and Oppenheim used the following example: The part of an oar, which is under water,
appears bent upward to an observer in a row boat – but why? This phenomenon can be explained by
means of general laws and facts (law of refraction, fact that water is optically denser than air) and by
means of certain antecedent conditions (part of the oar is indeed in the water).
I suggest that the explanatory pluralism for physical objects and events is low as long as there is an
agreement regarding the antecedent conditions and as long as there is an agreement regarding the
law’s applicability for a given case. Pluralism does not come into play in challenging basic concepts
within a paradigm but in challenging details within a research program (unless there is a scientific
revolution). Physical laws also allow for a unification of the discipline. This does not mean that
unification within a paradigm cannot be challenged or abandoned with the advent of new ideas, new
evidence, or a new generation, and so on (see Kuhn, 1962). We also know that parts of physics operate
with objects and events the ontological status of which is unclear so that pluralism is increased (e.g.,
quantum physics).
Hempel and Oppenheim believed that their ideas on explanation could be applied to the social
sciences and deductive-nomological explanations have been endorsed by many psychologists in theory.
If the argument that Psychology deals with natural and cultural–historical kinds is correct, and if
different ontological levels exist, then one should conclude that deductive-nomological explanations
could be employed in Psychology when they concern elementary psychological processes. It should be
mentioned that mainstream Psychology often follows the physicalism of logical positivism by oper-
ationalizing variables without theorizing the ontological status of the variables (and the concept of
a variable itself). However, for many psychological issues deductive-nomological explanations seem to
have a low psychological relevance because Psychology has not developed many general laws (a pre-
condition for deductive-nomological explanations). More often psychological laws are theory-specific
and are used as explanatory tools within the framework from which they emerge. The relevance of this
type of explanation is low because one can question whether such explanations apply actually to
a specific case. All of these problems increase de facto the pluralism of Psychology.
Natural-historical explanations do not use the general laws of the physical sciences but principles
and general theories that have accumulated a high level of corroboration. Evolutionary explanations in
biology have often a medium level of pluralism when it comes to explaining objects and events below
the level of principles and general theories due to the indirect nature of evidence. If one were to
compare the types of explanation to legal proceedings I would suggest that classical physical sciences
(there are exceptions if we think about astronomy) deal with direct evidence, and evolutionary
explanations are based on indirect and often circumstantial evidence, whereas a large part of the
humanities deal with tradition, eyewitness accounts, and hearsay.
In human evolution there is a consensus based on overwhelming evidence that the original location
of humanity was Africa. Scientific pluralism comes into play when it concerns answering the question
of the time line for when human ancestors moved out of Africa (see e.g., Dawkins, 2004; Teo, 2009).
There exists a ‘‘Young Out of Africa’’ theory that argues that all living human beings came out of Africa
less than 100,000 years ago and replaced existing populations that emerged from Africa in previous
waves, hundreds of thousands years earlier. There also exists an ‘‘Old Out of Africa’’ theory that argues
that the first wave of an out-of-Africa expansion happened 1.9 million years ago, the second one
700,000 years ago, and the third one around 100,000 years ago. The migrants from the last wave were
mating with populations from earlier waves; thus current humans are an amalgam of all waves. Both
theories are able to provide evidence as support (it may be genetic, linguistic, archeological, or
statistical). Despite this difference, there is a consensus that evolutionary theory is the most appro-
priate principle for understanding these migrations.
As a general guideline I suggest that the explanatory pluralism for biological objects and events is
medium. Although evolution as a general principle has a low affordance of pluralism, many principles
and ideas on the mechanisms within the theory are much more disputed. Of course, evolutionary
240 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243

explanations have become very popular in Psychology. One irony is that Darwin has been claimed by
functionalists and behaviorists, as well as by eugenicists, and evolutionary psychologists. There exist
liberal interpretations of Darwin, socialist interpretations, as well as reactionary interpretations (see
Weikart, 1999). Contradictory evolutionary interpretations are sometimes provided to explain one and
the same object or event. Based on a unified general principle, pluralism and contradiction are possible
and, thus, biological-evolutionary explanations in Psychology have contributed to a de facto pluralism
in Psychology. In addition, the problem for evolutionary explanations in Psychology is that cultural–
historical kinds are mostly interpreted as biological kinds, which falsely reduces pluralism and
increases irrelevance.
Hermeneutic explanations are used in the humanities. I suggest that the explanatory pluralism for
hermeneutic objects and events is high. The history of hermeneutics in Judeo–Christian thinking and in
interpretations of the Bible is well documented (Ormiston & Schrift, 1990). If we interpret the past, or if
we discuss a play, a text, a painting, a piece of architecture, and so on, hermeneutic principles come into
play. These principles operate with a high level of pluralism – despite the fact that some defenders
believe that their own interpretation must be the correct one. Although hermeneutic interpretations
afford high pluralism it should be clear that this does not mean that an ‘‘anything goes’’ mentality is
implied. Scholarship and training play an important role in good interpretations. Many hermeneutic
interpretations in Psychology have a high relevance because they directly address the issue under
question and they deal with cultural–historical kinds even when they may fall short on traditional
natural-scientific criteria such as falsfiability and reliability.
Many psychological explanations are expressed on the hermeneutic level. I would even go so far as to
suggest that intended natural-scientific explanations (that operate with theory-specific laws or prin-
ciples) in Psychology are hermeneutic interpretations from a de facto but also a de jure point of view. For
example, if I ask a psychologist ‘‘Why is Dan, this child, so fussy?’’ they are not able to invoke general laws
as in physics but theories that operate with principles that make sense within the proto-paradigm.
Alternatively they are not able to answer the question at all. Because Mach (1905/1976) who had
a significant impact on psychological methodology wanted to eliminate explanation in general and
believed that the identification of the functional relationship of variables would solve the problem,
psychologists would only be able to conclude that a certain variable has a functional relationship with
another variable (fussy behavior, operationalized, has a functional relationship with variable, x, y, z, etc.).
That there is a significant correlation between x and y, or a functional relationship between x and y, does
not explain in a relevant way why Dan is fussy. However, this is a general research strategy in Psychology,
which increases the practical and emancipatory irrelevance of Psychology (Holzkamp, 1972).
Theory-driven explanations in traditional Psychology are in fact often hermeneutic interpretations.
For example, a behaviorist could argue within a deductive-nomological (D-N) mode of explanation that
‘‘whenever a fussy behavior is reinforced, increased fussy behavior is the consequence’’ (‘‘theory-
relevant law’’) and because ‘‘Dan’s fussy behavior is reinforced’’ (antecedent condition) in consequence
‘‘Dan shows fussy behavior’’ (this is a logical deduction based on syllogistic thinking). However, an
attachment theorist might argue that ‘‘whenever a fussy behavior is not responded to, increased fussy
behavior is the consequence’’ (‘‘theory-relevant law’’) and because ‘‘Dan’s fussy behavior is not
responded to’’ (antecedent condition) as a consequence ‘‘Dan shows fussy behavior.’’ A temperament
theorist on the other hand might argue that ‘‘fussy behavior is the outcome of a difficult temperament’’
(‘‘theory-relevant law’’) and because ‘‘Dan has a difficult temperament’’ (antecedent condition), that
therefore ‘‘Dan shows fussy behavior,’’ and so on.
This example does not even address the idea of the cultural–historical nature of the term fussy but
shows that in Psychology different interpretations are possible, all of which can claim empirical
support. Different cultures have different notions of what constitutes fussy behavior and different
traditions within the academic discipline of Psychology will also not agree on the definition of fussy. As
pointed out the laws invoked in these explanations are not laws in the sense of the natural sciences but
are interpretations located within a general framework that itself reflects the pluralism in the disci-
pline. If one acknowledges this problem then one should realize that so-called laws and principles in
Psychology, when it comes to subjectivity (the most complex level of the psychological subject matter),
are indeed pluralistic hermeneutic interpretations. Thus, it is a misunderstanding for many areas of
Psychology that the discipline provides natural-scientific explanations.
 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243 241

Most of academic Psychology relevant to human subjectivity is an interpretation-based empirical

science. Pluralism, as pointed out, is an a priori condition for such a program. Due to the lack of laws and
due to the lack of generally accepted principles that are applicable to human mental life, it is impossible
to find an ‘‘explanation’’ that everyone in the scientific community would agree upon. The best answer
to the question of why Dan is fussy would depend on an idiographic reconstruction that takes Dan’s
cultural, social, personal, physiological and familial context into account as well as the historical
meaning of the concepts used. But an idiographic research strategy will produce not one single true
explanation of a behavior but rather pluralistic accounts.
Similarly, the question of why John became a criminal and whether he will commit a crime again
should be considered interpretation-based, idiographic reconstructions. But even if pluralism is an
outcome of such reconstructions, it does not mean that all interpretations have the same status. The
point would be to identify criteria that would allow for a discussion of the viability of interpretations.
The suggestion that ‘‘John committed the crime because he was instructed by aliens’’ (he may believe
that he was instructed by aliens) cannot have the same explanatory power as an interpretation that is
based on a long scholarly tradition for understanding criminology. The acceptance of certain inter-
pretations over others is itself a pluralistic endeavor and cannot be decided in advance. It should be
realized that there is always a moment of a historically and culturally contingent expert consensus in
these types of interpretations.

3. Recognition before integration

I have distinguished two domains where pluralism emerges: The cultural–historical domain
(accounts of mental life) and the academic–cultural one (academic programs within the discipline of
Psychology). Psychological concepts are meaningful within but not necessarily between these contexts.
I suggest that a two-step approach (recognition before integration) is necessary for a program of
integration and that the second step is unreachable if the first one is not fulfilled. The first step is
acknowledging the diversity of worldviews that attempt to understand the culturally, subculturally,
and historically constrained conceptualizations of human mental life (see also Gülerce, 2010). Given
that all psychological accounts have produced differing worldviews, ideas, theories, concepts, and
practices that address the form and content of human mental life, there is not a single one that should
be privileged in advance.
Although I do not think that because cultures and subcultures have developed different accounts of
human mental life all of them are equally valid, I am equally hesitant to give supremacy to the concepts
that are most familiar to me. Thus, before moving to integration, it should be recognized that
psychological objects and events can be studied, understood, discussed, explained, and so on, from
many different perspectives, and that it might be impossible to integrate these perspectives. ‘‘Before
integration comes recognition’’ also applies to Psychology as a discipline. Furthermore, if we find two
different perspectives on perception, a physiological one and a phenomenological one, and if we do not
see how these perspectives could be integrated, then we should acknowledge that these perspectives
exist. The problem in Psychology is that due to specialization there exists exclusion and dismissal so
that a physiological psychologist does not recognize that a phenomenologist addresses problems that
are not addressed in physiology (and vice versa). Many psychologists have not even reached the first
step.
It also should be mentioned that the step of recognition is sometimes sufficient. Let us assume that
an art historian provides an interpretation of the Pergmanon Altar from Asia Minor (now in Berlin)
whereas a chemist analyzes the chemical composition of the marble that was used in the construction
of the altar. Both perspectives are legitimate, interesting, and valuable; but there is no need to integrate
these perspectives, for recognition of the existence of different perspectives on the same object is
sufficient. One could imagine an expert combining the two perspectives in suggesting that the
chemical composition of the marble allowed an artist to develop a certain artistic expression, but this
does not mean that this integrated perspective is superior to the other two perspectives. Recognition
also involves an understanding of the assumptions, goals, and practices that are associated with
particular psychological worldviews.
242 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243

In terms of possible integration I suggest accommodation instead of assimilation whereby North

American Psychology is changed based on knowledge from other cultures. I call this an accommodative
integration for the dominant Psychology and I emphasize it because this part is often neglected.
Accommodation is a counter-measure to the limits of recognition. Of course, accommodation is fol-
lowed by assimilation (both in a Piagetian sense) so that the process of integration can be labeled as
dialectical boundary work. This means that the boundaries of all psychological systems should be
opened up for accommodation and assimilation in order to reach a new understanding of mental life
within and outside of academia. Although sympathetic to Goertzen’s (2007; 2010) convergent
pluralism, the question remains as to how concepts on different ontological levels can be integrated.
How does one integrate something that is invented with something that is discovered? How does one
integrate different worldviews or different religions?
Above I have mentioned that an integrated perspective should also exclude certain interpretations
(‘‘Aliens made me kill X’’ – but not ‘‘I think that aliens made me kill X’’). The idea of restricting and
limiting academic and public pluralism would have to be subjected to pluralist endeavors. Academic
criteria of legitimate accounts could include internal criteria such as coherence, argumentative quality,
historical awareness, and self-reflexivity as well as external criteria such as praxis (an interpretation
that is able to predict whether John will commit a crime again is better than one that does not). I also
suggest that being aware of potential alternative explanations rather than arguing for a single one
would be an important step in this dialectical process. Yet again, the process of inclusion and exclusion
must be subject to pluralistic accommodations and changes.
At this point I would like to address what I consider false solutions to the integration problem: To
reject all cultural–historical kind concepts and favor an exclusive physiological brain science is not
a solution. This would mean the end of psychology (i.e., accounts of mental life and subjectivity); and as
the past has shown, anti-pluralistic, exclusionary programs (e.g., behaviorism) are prone to fail. Equally
problematic is the attempt to pretend that all cultural–historical kind concepts are natural kind
concepts. The need for a reductionistic unification in Psychology has its roots in the assumption that
Psychology is a natural science like physics (or nowadays like biology) that must be accepted by most if
not all scientists in the field. I have suggested that Psychology due to its subject matter cannot achieve
the status of a natural science as a whole and that to develop Psychology as a natural science would
mean to abandon the most relevant psychological questions. Another implicit attempt in Psychology is
to seek integration not on the level of concepts but on the level of method through Psychology’s
statistical-experimental methodology. Although statistics is a required course for most Psychology
majors around the world, this obviously will not produce an integration of the discipline because
methodology cannot solve ontological issues.
At the beginning of this article I have compared psychology / Psychology to religion. Indeed, in
religious systems we actually find an integrated program: In Baha’i faith (2008) disunity is considered
a problem and unity is considered the base for solving the social, economic, and political problems of
the world. But the focus on monotheism and the lack of integration with atheism shows the
boundaries of this system. It also remains open to me whether a religion that is able to integrate
elements of other world religions is therefore a better religion. The comparison between Psychology
and religion opens another question: Do unification and religious needs stem from the context
of monotheistic religions? This question does not even address the practical problem that proponents
of other religions or psychological systems do not care about integration but rather stick with their
own categories (see Walsh-Bowers, 2010). This again underlines my plea for recognition before
integration.
The question of this article is mostly meta-psychological. Indeed, what I conceive as the history and
theory of psychology is mostly meta-psychological. Rather than searching for an abstract program of
pluralism, unification, or integration, I recommend examining how theories have been used for inte-
gration or how in history individuals and groups have tried to privilege a particular framework. Such
a perspective is psychological because it might tell us something about the working of human nature
and human mental life. Finally, it should be admitted that the problem of a priori expresses a certain
contradiction when it is answered in an affirmative way. If there are a priori conditions in psychology,
conditions that are necessarily and universally true, then these conditions themselves cannot be
subject to pluralism; and if these conditions are not subject to pluralism, then other ones might exist,
 T. Teo / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 235–243 243

too. I am left with opening the discourse to individuals from other cultural–historical and subcultural
contexts: Let the dialogues begin and the monologue end!

References

Baha’i faith. (2008) Retrieved July 24, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. http://www.search.
eb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/eb/article-9001542.
Brock, A. C. (Ed.). (2006). Internationalizing the history of psychology. New York: New York University Press.
Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the mind: How psychology found its language. London, UK: Sage.
Dawkins, R. (2004). The ancestor’s tale: The dawn of evolution. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Dilthey, W. (1959). Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. [Introduction to the human sciences]. In: Gesammelte Schriften. [In:
Collected writings], I. Band. Stuttgart, Germany: Teubner. Original work published 1883.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1997). Truth and method. J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall, Trans. New York: Continuum. Original work pub-
lished 1960.
Goertzen, J. R. (2007). Convergent pluralism and the unity-disunity debate in psychology. History and Philosophy of Psychology
Bulletin, 19(1), 11–16.
Gülerce, A. (2010). Self-reflective ransformational-transformative co-ordinations of the psychological. New Ideas in Psychology,
28(2), 210–218.
Goertzen, J. R. (2010). Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology,
28(2), 201–209.
Hacking, I. (1994). The looping effects of human kinds. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. J. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition: A
multi-disciplinary approach (pp. 351–382). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy of Science, 15, 135–175.
Holzkamp, K. (1972). Kritische Psychologie: Vorbereitende Arbeiten. [Critical psychology: Preparatory works]. Frankfurt am Main,
Germany: Fischer.
Kant, I. (1996). Critique of pure reason. W.S. Pluhar, Trans.. Indianapolis: Hackett. Unified edition with all variants from the 1781
and 1787 editions.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mach, E. (1976). Knowledge and error: Sketches of the psychology of enquiry. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. German original first published
in 1905.
Ormiston, G. L., & Schrift, A. D. (Eds.). (1990). The hermeneutic tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press.
Paranjpe, A. C. (1998). Self and identity in modern psychology and Indian thought. New York: Plenum.
Richards, G. (1996). Putting psychology in its place: An introduction from a critical historical perspective. New York: Routledge.
Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. Theory and Psychology, 13, 673–694.
Teo, T. (2009). Psychology without Caucasians. Canadian Psychology, 50(2), 91–97.
Walsh-Bowers, R. (2010). Some social-historical issues underlying psychology’s fragmentation. New Ideas in Psychology, 28(2),
244–252.
Watanabe, T. (2010). Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 28(2), 253–262.
Weikart, R. (1999). Socialist Darwinism: Evolution in German socialist thought from Marx to Bernstein. San Francisco: International
Scholars Publications.