Baudrillard The Uncouncious

Wayne State University Press
Beyond The Unconscious: The Symbolic

Author(s): Jean Baudrillard and Lee Hildreth
Source: Discourse, Vol. 3 (Spring, 1981), pp. 60-87
Published by: Wayne State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41371589
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6o
Beyond The Unconscious :

The Symbolic
byJeanBaudrillard
Is there a special affinitybetween poetic and psychoanalytic

discourse ? Many interpretations tendto draw analogies between
these two modes to the point of confusingthem.It is clear that
poetic (anagrammatic) form- dissemination, cyclical resolu-
tion, strictlimitationof the corpus- is irreconcilablewith ling-
uisticform( equivalence of signifierand signified,linearnatureof
the signifier,an unlimitedcorpus). On the other hand, poetic
formdoes seem to parallel psychoanalyticformratherclosely.In
dreams, in slips of thetongue,in symptomsand jokes- wherever
the unconscious is at work- it is possible to read withFreudthat
distortion of the signifier/ signifiedrelationship,of the linear
nature of the signifier,of the discretionof the sign- thatdistor-
tion of discourse under the effectof the primaryprocess, that
excess, that transgressionof language in which fantasyis at play
which characterizespleasure. But what is thestatusof desireand
the unconscius in poetic discourse,and to what extentcan it be
said that libidinal economy accounts for the form of poetic
discourse ?
Although they are both at opposite poles from linguistics,

poetic and psychoanalytic discourse are not identical. The
symbolicmode is neitherthemode of theprimaryprocessnorthe
work of the unconscious. There is a dangerof reductionhereand
of a veryserious oversimplification. This means thatto examine
poetic discourse in terms of Freud also means examining
psychoanalyticdiscoursein termsofthesymbolic- analysismust
always be reciprocal,a minimumconditionin ordernot to "ob-
jectify"poetic discourse psychoanalytically,as is done by most
"adepts" of psychoanalysis(in thisrespecttheyare no different
fromlinguistsand othe purveyorsof knowledge.)
The analysis of wit in language- of Witz (Freud, Jokes and

Their Relation to the Unconscious)- is of capital importancein
the issues we are concernedwithhere.That analysisprovidesthe
61
key to the psychoanalyticapproach to poetic discourse- forno

theoreticaldistinctionis made in Freud's workbetweenthesymp-
tomatic fieldproperlyspeakingand thefieldof theworkof art,of
"artistic creation." (The concept of sublimation, as is well
known,suffersfroma lack of rigorand fromhereditary idealism).
Here alreadywe touchupon an importantpoint.It thepoem is not
the slip of thetongueor eventhe joke, somethingto accountforit
is missingfromthetheoryof theunconscious.Thereagain lies the
danger of fallingback upon theunconsciousto explain something
whose process perhaps escapes it. When it is universalized,the
hypothesisof the unconscious becomes reductive,it becomes the
weapon of a discipline.
Unlike Saussure, who is not at all concernedwithpoetic plea-

sure or even,properlyspeaking,withany cause or aim in whathe
is describing, Freud's analysis is a theoryof pleasure. In that
theorythework on thesignifieris always relatedto thefulfilment
of a desire. Witz moves morequickly,by means of short-circuits,
towards what it means,and itsays things,it "liberates" meanings
which would not have been expressed withoutit, except at the
cost of considerable intellectualeffort - it is this ellipsis of the
psychical distance which is the source of pleasure. Or yetagain,
the distortioneffectedby the liftingof the censorship"liberates"
energiesbound to the superego and to the process of repression.
"Liberation" of affects- withdrawal of cathexis fromuncon-
scious or preconscious representations,withdrawalof cathexis
from the repressive psychical agency- in any case pleasure
emergesfroma remainder,a surplus,froma quantumofdifferen-
tial energy,made available throughtheoperationof Witz.
It is in this way that conciseness,or the reusingof the same

material in diverse modes, are fundamentalcharacteristicsof
Witz. Always a savingof effort, meaningis producedfroma single
signifier at multiplelevels. From a minimumof signifiersa max-
imum of meanings(sometimescontradictoryones) are obtained.
There is no need to insiston the many analogies with the poetic
mode - the anagram (same material),the necessarylimitationof
the corpus, and that "maximum in the energyof signs" of which
Nietzsche speaks. Freud also says of the poet that "polyphonic
orchestrationallows himto emitmessageson thetriplelevelofthe
consciousness, the subconscious and the unconscious." Every-
where it is a matterof so muchenergythatis "saved" in compari-
son with theordinarysystemof cathexes.In thepolygonof forces
which is the psychical apparatus, pleasure is like the resultof a
kind of subtractionoperation, of differentialmeasurement,or
6г
rather,of that transversalityof Witz,which, cuttingdiagonally

throughthe various layersof thepsychicalapparatus,reachesits
attains unforeseengoals,
goal at littlecost and even effortlessly
and thus leaves a kind of energysurplus,the pleasure "bonus,"
the "pleasure profit."
This quantitativeenergycalculation has a vaguely capitalist

flavor- thatof a savingseconomy(Freud uses thattermcontinu-
ally) in whichpleasurewould be derivedonlyfromwhathad been
"saved out," would only resultby subtraction,by default,froma
residue of investment,froma surplusand notfroman excess- or
again fromnothingat all- froma processoppositethatof expend-
iture,froman abolition of energiesand aims. We are not speak-
ing for the momentof the actual work Witz at the level of the
signifier,because that level is never firstin Freud. It takes on
meaning (like the dream work moreover) only throughthe pre-
supposition of a libidinal economy based on the existenceof
unconscious contents(affectsand representations),of a repres-
sion and a pro-ductionof the repressed,of a calculation of
cathexes which governs this production with a goal of equili-
brium (resolutionof tensions),of binding/unbindingenergies.It
is in thisgiganticpsychicallaboratory( oř againstthebackground
of these concepts,ifyou prefer),in termsof forcesand quotas of
energy,that Freudian pleasure is produced and spoken. Properly
speaking, in Witz or elsewherethe play of signifiersis neverthe
site or non-siteof pleasure- itonlydispatches,opens theway for
fantasmaticor repressedcontents.It is a "medium" thatis never
in itselfthe "message," because somethinglike desire (speaking
of course in termsof stricttopographicaland economictheory)is
needed to speak throughits voice fromthe "It speaks".f The
signifier,the play of the signifier,never occurs except through
desire. It is here,around this"mode of production"of theuncon-
scious (and its mode of representation),thatthe whole problem
of libidinaleconomyis posed, as well as itscritiquefromthepoint
of view of a kindof pleasurewhichwould have nothingto do with
economics.
Freud, in The Psychopathologyof EverydayLife, on mistakes

made in reading: "it is thereader'sdesirewhichdeformsthetext,
into which he introduceswhat he is interestedin and preoccupied
with ... All thatis needed thenis a resemblancebetweentheword
in the textand theword put in itsplace, a resemblancewhichthe
reader can transformaccording to the dictates of his desires."
Thus, it is clear that what is beinghypothesizedhere is a latent,
repressedcontentwaitingto emergethattakesadvantageor "pro-
¿3
fits" fromfantasies,interstices,weak points in logical discourse,

in order to "pass through,"to make its eruption.At the level of
discourse it is a littlelike what happensto thebody in theconcept
of proppingt- sexual desire "profits" fromthe satisfactionof
physiological need in order to investone or anotherzone of the
body with libido- it too divertsthepure and simplefunctioning
of thebody ( organiclogic) towardstheaccomplishmentof sexual
desire. Yes - but that is preciselythe point- the connectionbet-
ween bodily need and sexual desire has never been clarified.
Between the two termsthus posed withoutfurtherado as postu-
lates, one, of the accomplishmentof a determinedfunction,the
other, of the accomplishmentof an indeterminatedrive (inde-
terminatewith respectto its object), the concept of anaclisis is
only a bridgingconcept, which articulatesnothingat all. The
libidinal economy suffershere fromthe same "collage" thatpla-
-
gues economics plain and simpleintheconceptof need between
the need and thedesirethereis "anaclisis" (the same thingapplies
moreoverin linguisticeconomics- betweenthe signifierand the
signifiedthereis or thereis not "motivation"). All of thesecol-
-
lages have the discreet charm of an insoluble science if the
articulationof the relationshipbetweenthetwo termsis impossi-
ble, it is because the termsare improperlyposed, or ratherit is
because theirveryposition, theirdissociation and theiropposi-
tion, are untenable.At some point,no doubt,theautonomization
of desire as opposed to need, like thatof a signifieropposed to a
signified,like that of a subject opposed to an object, is only an
effectof science. But the economieswhich resultfromthesedis-
tinctions cling to life tenaciously; they will not give up these
controlledoppositions bywhichtheylive- desire/need,uncons-
cious/conscious, primaryprocess/secondaryprocess ... Is the
pleasure principleitselfanythingotherthan the realityprinciple
of psychoanalysis?
Yet it is certainthatpsychoanalysishas alteredtherelationship

betweensignifierand signified,and in a way similarto themanner
in which thatrelationshipis alteredin poeticdiscourse.Insteadof
manifestingthe signifiedin its presence,the signifieris in inverse
relationshipto it- it signifiesthe signifiedin its absence, in its
loss, in its repressionaccording to a negativitywhich neverap-
pears in linguisticeconomy. The signifieris in a necessary(not
arbitrary)relationshipto the signified,but in the way that pres-
ence can be in a necessaryrelationshipto the absence of some-
thing. Signifyingthe lost object and coming in the place of that
loss - Leclaire, in Psychanalyser(p. 65), states "In psychoanal-
ysis the concept of representationwould be situated not at all
64
between an objectiverealityon one hand and itssignificant image

on the other,but ratherbetweenan hallucinatedreality,a mem-
object,on one hand,and a substitute
ory image of a lost satisfying
object on the other hand, whether thatwould be a formula-object,
like the one that constitutedthe fantasy,or an instrumental
gadget, such as a fetishmightbe." It can clearlybe seen herethat
linguisticequivalence is lost, sincethesignifieris in theplace and
instead of somethingelse thatno longerexists,or thatneverwas.
It (the signifier)thereforeneveris what it is either.The fetish-
object, in itswaveringidentity,onlymetaphorizeswhat is forever
denied- the absence of the phallus in the mother,the difference
between the sexes.
The differencebetween meaning in psychoanalysisas com-

pared withmeaningin linguisticsis statedclearlybyO. Mannoni
is introduced
( L'ellipse et la barre,p. 46). "It is whenthesignifier
that meaningis toppled over. And thatis notbecause thesignifier
carried with it a collectionof signifiedssuch as could be charted
by a semanticsof the traditionalsort. It is because we interpret
Saussure's ellipsis as if it kept theplace of the signifiedempty,a
place whichcan onlybe filledin thedifferent discoursesofwhicha
unique signifieris thenthe commonfeature.Ifwe too relievethe
signifierof the weightof the signified,it is not in orderto turnit
over to the laws which linguisticsdiscovers in all manifestdis-
course, but so that it can be said to obey the law of the primary
process, by which it escapes, ifonlyfora brief,faltering moment,
from the constraintsof the apparent discourse, which always
tends towards the unequivocal even when exploiting an
ambiguity." That is a remarkable passage, but what is this
"blank" signified,which is going to be filled in by successive
discourses,what is thissignifierthatis "liberated" in orderto be
placed under the jurisdictionof anotherorder? It is the ambigu-
ous position of the psychoanalystthat is at issue here. Can one
submitthelinguisticcategoriesof thesignifierand thesignifiedto
that kind of "movement" withoutblowing up the bar thatsepa-
rates them?
That bar is thestrategicelementinthestructureofthelinguistic

sign- it is what founds the sign in its principal of non-
contradiction and its components as values. That structureis
coherent and is not to be played with by injectinginto it just
anything (ambivalence, contradiction, primary process).
Benvenistemakes this veryclear in the critiquehe has done of
Gegensinn der Urworte (The Antithetical Sense of Primal
Words). "It is a priori improbable that languages, however
65
archaic theymightbe, could escape the 'principleof contradic-

tion.' If it is to be supposed thatthereexistsa language in which
'big' and 'little' are said in identical fashion, that will be a
language in which the distinctionof 'big' and 'little'literallyhas
no meaning . . . For it is contradictoryto attributeto a language
simultaneously the knowledge of two notions as contrary,as
opposites, and the expression of those notions as identical."
(Problèmes de linguistiquegénérale, p. 82) And thatis correct -
ambivalence is never of the order of the linguisticsign. "The
specific featureof language being to express only what it is pos-
sible to express." It is absurd to imaginea meaningwhichwould
not be conveyed by some distinction,or conversely,a signifier
which would mean everything."To imagine a stage in the de-
velopmentof a language ... in which a certainobject would be
denoted as being itselfand at the same time any other,and in
which the relationshipexpressed would be the relationshipof
permanentcontradiction,in whicheverything would be itselfand
other than itself,thus neitheritselfnor other, is to conceive a
purely chimericalnotion." Benvenisteknows what he is talking
about, fortheentirelinguisticrationalizationexistsspecificallyto
prevent that. The ambivalence of the represseddoes not risk
surfacingin linguisticscience,because thatscienceis entirelypart
of the mechanismof repression.But withinits own sphere,ling-
uistics is right' - nothingwill ever participate in language that
does not obey the principleof non-contradiction,identity,and
equivalence.
It is not a matterof saving linguistics,it is a questionof under-

standing that Benvenistesees clearlythe choice to be made (he
only sees thingsso clearlybecause it is a matterof protectinghis
fieldfrominvasionby the others- he toleratestheexistenceelse-
where of a "symbolic area," but "that is discourse, it is not
language." Let everyone keep within his own territoryand
language will be well protected!). It is not possible to content
oneselfwith "interpreting"the ellipsisand the Saussurianbar in
orderto turnthesignoverto theprimaryprocess,in orderto putit
under psychoanalysis.The whole architectureof thesignmustbe
broken,itsveryequation mustbe broken,and merelymultiplying
the unknowns will not suffice.Or thenit mustbe supposed that
psychoanalysisdoes what itcan at some pointwitha certainmode
of significationand representation,a certainmode of value and
expression- that indeed is what is "signified"by that "empty"
signified of Mannoni's - the place of the signified remains
marked,it is thatof themovingcontentsof theunconscious.
66
Thus, if we are outside the realmof logical equivalence when

dealing with the psychoanalyticsignifier,we are not forall that
outside the realmof value, or beyondit. For what it representsin
its "falteringmovement"is indeed clearlyrepresentedas a value
in absentia under the sign of repression.This value is no longer
conveyed logically by the signifier,it haunts it fantasmatically.
The bar which separates them has changed its meaning,but it
remains standing nonetheless- there is still clearly a latent
signified( contentof unresolved,repressedvalue ) on one side,and
on the other a signifierwhich is itselfresidual, but which is
nonethelessa structureerectedas such throughrepression.
In a word, there is no longer any equivalence,but neitheris

thereany ambivalence,thatis, dissolutionof value. Value is only
repressed,but not resolved; itcontinuesto workas suchunderthe
sign (under the bar) of repression.There lies the difference bet-
ween psychoanalyticand poetic discourse,wheretheloss of value
is radical. There is no longeranyvalue, notevenabsentor residual
value, to supply a residual signiferin the formof a symptom,a
fantasy, or a fetish.The fetishobject is not poetic, precisely
because it is opaque, much more saturatedwith value than any
other, because the signiferdoes not dissolve itselfin it; on the
contrary,it is fixed,crystallized,by a value foreversubmerged,
foreverhallucinatedas a lost reality.There is no longeranymeans
of unblockingthesystem,whichis foreverlocked in theobsession
of meaning in the accomplishmentof the perversedesire which
fills the empty form of the object with meaning. In poetic
(symbolic) discourse, the signifer is absolutely dissolved-
whereas in psychoanalyticdiscourse it is only alteredunderthe
effectof primaryprocesses,distortedby the crumplingaction of
repressed values- but whether it is distorted,transversal,or
"padded," it remainsa surfaceindexed on the heavingrealityof
the unconscious. On the other hand, in poetic discourse, it is
diffractedand irradiated in the anagrammaticprocess, it no
longer falls underthe sway of the law whichsets it up, nor under
the influenceof the repressedcontentwhichbinds it,it no longer
has anythingto designate,noteventheambivalenceofa repressed
signified.It is no longer anythingother than dissemination,ab-
solution fromvalue- and this is experiencedwithouta traceof
anguish, in total and non-perversepleasure. The illuminationof
the work of art, or of the symbolicact, is in that point of non-
repression,řof no residue,of no return - thatilluminationwhich
suspends répression and the endless repetitionof inhibitionand
value - and unhesitatinglyplays the card of its own death in the
dissolution of meaning.
TheChronicle
Straub-Huillet, ofAnnaMagdalenaBach
68
"To graspin what has beenwrittena symptomofwhathas been

silenced." (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil) That is a psy-
choanalytic proposition par excellence,one which draws all its
strengthfromthecritiqueof "rational" discoursein communica-
tion. Everythingthat"means" something(and in a singularway,
scientificdiscourse itselfin its "transparency")has the function
of silencing.And what it silences returnsto haunt it, in a minor
but irreversiblesubversionof its discourse.There is the locus of
psychoanalysis,in thatrelativedismissalof all logical discouse.
But poetic discourse,on the otherhand, silencesnothing,and

nothingcomes back to haunt it. It does not mean anything,and
says nothing.What is always repressedand silenced,is death and
the death instinct.Here, in poetic discourse,deathis actualizedin
the sacrificeof meaning.Nothingness,death,absence- is openly
spoken and resolved- at last death is manifest,at last it is
symbolized,whereas it is onlysymptomaticin all theotherforma-
tions of discourse. This of course means the downfall of any
linguisticswhose existenceis dependentupon the bar of equiva-
lence between what is said and what is meant; but it also means
the end of psychoanalysis,whose existenceis dependentupon the
bar of repressionbetween what is said and what is kept silent,
denied, fantasized,indefinitely repeatedin the mode of denial-
death. When, in a social formationor a language formation,
death speaks, when it is spoken and exchanged in a symbolic
structure,then psychoanalysis no longer has anythingto say
either. When Rimbaud says of Une Saison en Enfer,"It is true
literally and in every sense," that also means that there is no
hidden, latent meaning, nothingrepressed,nothingconcealed,
nothingforpsychoanalysis.This is thepriceat whichall meanings
are possible.
"Linguistics was born of the bar that it has set up betweenthe

signifierand the signified,and it risksdyingfromtheirreunion."
( O. Mannoni ) Psychoanalysisalso was bornof thebar thatithas
set up, under the law of castrationand repression,betweenwhat
is said and what is silenced (or "between an hallucinatedreality
and a substituteobject," Leclaire, p. 65), and it also risksdying
fromtheirreunion.Their reunionis thesymbolic(the symbolicis
always the abolition of a separation), in which any determina-
tion, even a hidden one, is removedin the exterminationof the
signifier,therebyopeningupon all possible meanings.
No residue,thatalso means thatthereis no longeranysignifier

or signified,no longer any signifiedbehind the signifier,or on
69
either side of a structuralbar distributingthem- it also means

that thereis no longerany repressedstructureundera repressing
structure,such as in psychoanalyticinterpretation,wherethatbar
is a repressivevalue, no latentunderneaththemanifest,no prim-
ary processes playing hide and seek with secondary processes.
There is no signifiedof any kind produced by the poem. Nor is
thereany "dream thought"behindthepoetic text,or any "signif-
icant formula" (Lecalire), or any libido or any energypotential
which would in anyway stillbe "produced" and actualized,ifnot
represented,which would slip throughtheprimaryprocessesand
bear witnessin some way to a productiveeconomyof the uncon-
scious. There is not more libidinaleconomythanthereis political
economy- nor, of course, linguisticeconomy,that is, political
economy of language. This is because economics,whereveritmay
be found, is based on a remainder,the remainderalone allows
production and reproduction1;whether the remainderis the
symbolicallynot-sharedportionwhich entersinto the trade ex-
change and the circuitof equivalence of merchandise(this re-
mainder,which is in primitiveand feudal tradeonly marginalor
peripheral,invades thewhole realmof tradein our system,but it
is nonetheless a residue and a waste-product); whetherthis re-
mainderis what is not used up in theanagrammaticcirculationof
thepoem and thusentersintothecircuitof discursivevalue, in the
system of meaning; or whether this remainderis simply the
fantasy,thatis, what could not be put intoplay and be resolvedin
ambivalentexchange and death,whichforthisreason is resolved
into thatprecipitateof unconscious individualvalue, of a repres-
sed stock of scenes or representationswhich are produced and
reproducedaccordingto theincessantcompulsionof repetition.
E.A. Dupont,MoulinRouge
7°
To returnto the subject of Witz, is it not possible to suppose

that pleasure is not the effectof "savings," of an increase of
potential due to "the ellipsisof thepsychicaldistance;" nor that
eruption of the primaryprocess in the order of discourse,that
eruption of a meaningbeneath the meaning; nor thatmorepro-
found realitywhich is imposed by the supposed dualityof the
psychicalstructure,i.e., theaim ofthe"otherscene" to manageto
be produced througha distortingof thepresentscene,theaim of
the repressedcontentto re-emergeas a psychicalvalue fromthe
-
veryseparation of the structures(a topographicalhypothesis)
and the corollary of a binding/unbindingof energies which
would resultat a givenmomentfromthatlibidinalsurplusvalue
which is called pleasure (economic hypothesis)?
Can it not be supposed thatthe pleasure we derivefromWitz

comes fromthe opposite of the end of the separation of these
separated fields- that it comes froma point prior to the very
discriminationof structures,and thereforepriorto the differen-
tial movementof cathexes and thereforefroma point priorto or
outside the realmof psychoanalysisand itsorderof logic?
Could it not be a combustion effect,a short-circuit(Kurz-

schluss), a telescopingeffectbetweenseparate fields(phonemes,
words, roles, institutions)which untilthenhad no meaningex-
cept as separate entities and which lose theirmeaning in this
brutal drawing togetherwhich forcesthemto be exchanged? Is
thatnot Witz, theeffectofpleasure,in whichthesubjectalso loses
himself as a separate entity,not only the reflexivedistance of
consciousness, but also according to the agency of the uncon-
scious ? The abolition of the superegoin thatmoment,i.e., of the
effortinvolved in maintainingthedisciplineof the realityprinci-
ple and of theprincipleof rationalityof meaning,means notonly
the obliteration of the repressingagency for the benefitof the
repressedcontent,itmeansthesimultaneousobliterationofboth.
That is the poetic elementin Witzand in thecomic,and whichis
beyond thecompulsiveresurrection of fantasyand therealization
of desire.
Freud quotes Kant- Das Komische ist eine in nichts zer-

"
gangene Erwartung ("The comic is an expectancywhich is
resolved into nothingness,which dissolves into nothing.") In
otherwords, therewheretherewas something,thereis no longer
anything- not even the unconscious.Wheretherewas some aim
(even unconscious), or again a value (even repressed),thereis no
longer anything.Pleasure is thehemorrhaging of value, thedisin-
7i
tegrationof thecode, of therepressivelogos. In thecomic,itis the

moral imperativeof institutionalcodes (situations,roles, social
types) which is suspended- in Witzit is themoral imperativeof
theveryidentityprincipleof thewords and ofthesubject,whichis
abolished. For no reason. Not in orderto "express" the "uncon-
scious." Lichtenberg'sdefinitionoftheknife(of thenon-knife)-
which is a radically poetic example of witticism - veryclearly
describes that explosion of meaningwithouthidden motives.A
knifeis somethingthatexistsinsofaras it can be said thata blade
and a handle can be said to exist separatelyand be named sepa-
rately. If the separation between the two is removed (and the
blade and the handle can only be joined in theirrespectivedisap-
pearance, which constitutes Lichtenberg's joke), there is no
longeranythingthereat all - exceptpleasure.The "expectation"
of the knife,Kant would say, the real and practicalexpectation,
but also thefantasmaticexpectation(we knowwhattheknifecan
"mean") are resolved into nothing.And that is not a primary
process (displacement,condensation,etc.), thereis no eruptionof
somethinghidden behind the knifeor its handle,thereis nothing
behind thisnothing.It is the end of separation,theend of castra-
tion, the end of the unconscious. It is total resolution,total
pleasure.
The Lichtenbergexample is not a special case. If closely ex-

amined, all the cases of absurd logic (which is the limitof Witz,
and where pleasure is most intense) given by Freud- the kettle,
the pie, the salmon mayonnaise,the catskinwith holes cut pre-
cisely at the place where theireyes are, the good fortunea child
has to finda motherreadyto take care of itwhenitis born- all of
themcould be analyzed in thesameway, as thereduplicationofan
identityor a rationalitywhich turnsback upon itselfto disinte-
grateand destroyitself,to abolish itself,likethereabsorptionofa
signifierinto itselfwithouta traceof meaningbeingleft.
The revolutionof the signifierupon itself.

Eifersuchtisteine Leidenschaft, die mitEifersucht, was Leiden
schafft(untranslatable as an example of Witz- "Jealousy is a
passion which obstinatelyseeks that which causes suffering.")
Here we have an example of there-useof thesame material,thus,
a savings,an economy- and thereforeof pleasurederivedfroma
deduction of energy? But Freud himselfadmitsthatthe re-useof
the verysame material,neithermore nor less, and which is thus
the most successfulWitz, is also themost difficult- the simplest
thing being to say two differentthings by using different
signifiers.What is changed is that two thingsare said simul-
7*
ça va
Goddard,Comment
Jean-Luc
73
taneously but the essential featurethen is that abolition of the

timeit takes to say or produce thesignifier,itssuccessivenessin a
word- so the pleasure comes not fromthe addition of all the
signifiedsunderthe same signifer( an economic,almostcapitalist
interpretation),but fromthatcancellingout of thelogical timeof
the enunciation,which is equivalent to the cancellingout of the
signifieritself( an anti-economicinterpretation, and one which
coincides with what we have said about Saussure's Anagrams).
"
Moreover, the above Witz ( Eifersucht etc.) does indeed consti-
tute a sort of anagram, with the deducting and dispersingof
polyphoniccomponentson eitherside of thesentence.Or itcan be
consideredthatwhat takesplace here,crudely,and on thelevelofa
sentence and its "anti"-sentence,is what Saussure said of each
vowel and its "counter-vowel" in a line of poetry.The rule op-
erates here at the level of significantelements (monemes or
syntagm), whereas in Saussure it operates at the level of non-
significantelements (phonemes or diphones)- but it is stillthe
same rule of the revolutionof a signifierupon itself,fromwhich
comes the spark of pleasure in Witz, or in a poem. The signifieds
have nothing to do with it, and the "wealth" of meaning or
multiplemeaningsis of no importance.Quite the contrary - the
wealth of meaning in the EifersuchtWitz, for example, is the
reason why gives relativelymeagerpleasure.Signifiedswhich
it us
can be "retrieved," identified,are a block to pleasure, theypre-
vent the cyclical process fromreturningto the zero degreeof the
signifier,fromopeningout onto totalindétermination, theyclose
the movement by salvaging meaning. Or rather,by fixingthe
meaningon one or more determinedsignifieds.Whereasbetween
a given signifierand its cancelled out version,in thelapse of time
of that cancellingout (an infinitesimal lapse of emptinessin Witz,
where the signifiedveryquicklyregainstheupperhand- a lapse
of emptinessthatis infinitein thepoem, wherethetermof mean-
abolished ), thereis an infinitequantityofmean-
ing is definitively
ings, a possibility of limitlesssubstitutions,a mad and super-
rapid expenditure,a short-circuiting - an instantaneouscircuit
of all messages, of all exchanges,but forevernon-signified.The
meaninghas nothingto hold onto, it remainsin a stateof circula-
tion, and thereforeof total richnessof "centrifugation,of (si-
dereal) revolution." That is the originof this sudden excess of
pleasure- not in theaccumulationof signifiedswhichcome from
differentlevels of the psyche,but fromthe hemorrhagingof all
signifieds,not in thetransversality ofthesignifierundertheeffect
of the primaryprocess, but in the total revolutionof thesignifier
upon itself.
74
Freud speaks throughouthis workin a characteristic way ofthe

"technique" of the joke, which he thusisolates and distinguishes
from the fundamentalprocesss. Thus he says of the anagram,
"The techniqueof the Witzconsistsof usingthesameword in two
ways, the firsttimeas a whole word, and thesecond timebroken
down into syllablesafterthefashionof a rebusor a charade." But
thatis only the "technique." The same holds trueforthere-useof
the same material- all the techniquesare summedup in a single
category- condensation. "Condensation remains the wider
category. All these techniques are dominated by a tendencyto
compression,or ratherto saving. It all seems to be a questionof
economy. In Hamlet's words: "Thrift,thrift, Horatio!"ft What
escapes Freud here is that these techniques of Witz are in
themselvessources of pleasure. He nonethelesssays so himself
(op. cit., p. 119), but quickly adds, "We now see thatwhat we
have described as the techniquesof jokes ( . . . ) are ratherthe
sources fromwhich jokes provide pleasure (...) The technique
which is characteristicof jokes and peculiar to them,however,
consists in their procedure for safeguardingthe use of these
methods of providingpleasure against the objections raised by
criticismwhich would put an end to the pleasure. (...) Their
functionconsists fromthe firstin liftinginternalinhibitionsand
in making sources of pleasure fertilewhich have been rendered
inaccessible by those inhibitions."(op. cit., p. 130) Thus every-
where what could emergein the way of pleasure fromthe very
operation of Witz is sublimated,diverted,reinscribedin termsof
content,of an original "source," of "liberation," of which Witz
and its techniquesare thenonlythemedium.
The same patternreappears in the passages dealing with the

pleasure of recognitionand rediscoveryof the familiar- "This
rediscoveryof what is familiaris pleasurable,and once moreit is
not difficultfor us to recognize this pleasure as pleasure in
economyand to relateitto economyin psychicalexpenditure (...)•
-
Recognition pleasurable in itself i.e., through relievingpsy-
chical expenditure (...). Rhymes, alliterations,refrains,and
other formsof repeatingsimilarverbal sounds which occur in
verse, make use of the same source of pleasure- the rediscovery
of somethingfamiliar."(op. cit., p. 120, 122) Thus, here again,
"these techniques,which show so much similarityto that of
'multiple use' in the case of jokes," (op. cit.,p. 122) do not have
any meaningin themselves;theyare subordinatedto theresurfac-
ing of contents buried in the memory (conscious or uncon-
scious- it may be a primalor a childhoodfantasy,etc.), ofwhich
theyare merelythemeans of expression.2
75
Buñuel,L'Aged'or
Now let us look at theexample of Witzcitedby O. Mannoni in

Clé pour Гimaginaire- C'est en lisant qu'on devientliseron."t
Are we to suppose thatsome repressedcontentis involvedhere? It
is clear thatthe pleasure we derivefromit comes fromthesimple
" "
paradigmaticplay on C'est en forgeantqu'on devientforgeron ,
fromtheformalparody,whichmightbe called a "technique,"but
a technique involvingthe essence of what we are concernedwith
here. For the logical associationof forgeant!
forgeronis destroyed
when it is reduplicatedin its raw material(that is, withoutbeing
mediated by meaning). The repetitiondestroystheregulatedplay
of meaning,destroysthe lexical or syntacticalreferenton either
side- neitherlire nor forgerhas any meaningany more,and it is
this suddeñ loss which causes pleasure, not theeruptionof some
hidden meaning,of some meaningcoming fromanothersource.
Pleasure is circumscribedin the literal (the almost surgical) op-
erationon meaning.This Witzmayappear "innocent,"and itwill
be objected that in many other cases an unconscious desire is
clearly implicated,and thatit is thatbringingintoplay of repres-
sed contentswhichmakes us laugh in Witz.Not so - in situations
in which anothermeaningerupts,or when seveal meaningscome
into play simultaneously,the response is not laughter,but anxi-
ety. Ambiguous, polysemous signifiersare distressing,theyare
sources of anguish, because in themthe imperativeof meaning
( themoral law of signification) remainswhole,whilethemeaning
itself no longer obeys that law (it is no longer clear or un-
equivocal). On the contrary,the pleasure given by Witz comes
from the fact that any and all imperativeof meaninghas been
banished. Thus, any interpretationof Witz (or of poetic
discourse) in termsof a "liberation" of fantasies,of unconscious
signifieds, is false- when the signifiederupts and circulates
meaning "in every direction," the result is hallucination and
madness. Pleasure or satisfactionis achieved only to the extent
that liquidation of any referenceof meaning(manifestor latent)
is achieved.
When we laugh, it is because, in one way or another,a distor-

tion of thesignifierhas "ceated a void." Thus, anotherexampleof
thisis to be foundin thestoryof themanwho losthis keyin a dark
and narrow streetand who looks forit beneath the streetlamp,
because thatis theonlyspot wherehe has anychanceofbeingable
to find it- the same logical reasoning that doubles back upon
itselfand destroysitselfwithouttakingthesignified( thekey) into
consideration. In the void thus created laughterand pleasure
"
explode. Freud says veryclearly,"Entfesselungdes Unsinns -
the outburst of nonsense. But nonsense is not the latenthell of
meaning, nor the emulsion of all meanings,repressedand con-
tradictory.It is thecompletedeath,thecompleteextermination of
meaning.
Buñuel,L'Ageďor
77
One of the "external" characteristicsof Witz can also be in-

terpretedaccordingto thisinternallogic of Witz; it is shared,itis
not consumed in solitude, it is meaningfulonly in an exchange.
The wittyremarkor the funnystoryare in thisrespectsimilarto
symbolic possessions, to champagne,to the gift,to rare posses-
sions, to women in primitivesocieties. Witz evokes laughterin
response, or the reciprocityof another funnystory,or again, a
veritable potlatch of stories, produced in succession one after
another, in which an entiregroup is mobilized. Moreover, the
symbolic network of complicityconnectingcertain stories or
plays on words, which lead fromone to another,the way that
poetryused to do, is well known. Everything hererespondsto the
symbolic obligation. To keep funnystory oneselfis absurd,
a to
not to laugh at a funnystoryis offensive,but to be the firstto
laugh at your own joke is also an infractionof the subtlelaws of
exchange.3
Now if Witz is fromthe outset and necessarilyinscribedin a

symbolicsocial relationship,thismustat some pointbe linkedto
a mode thatis itselfsymbolic( and noteconomic) ofthepleasureit
procures. If the pleasure of Witz came, as Freud would have it,
fromthe economic sphere,fromthe saving of psychicalenergy,
thereis no reason whywe would notlaugh all alone, or first,at all
that "liberated" psychical energy.So theremust be something
besides unconscious economic mechanismsat work, which re-
quires reciprocity.That somethingelse is preciselythe symbolic
cancelling out of value accomplished by Witz. It is because
signifiersare symbolicallyexchangedin it,in thisveryoperation,
that poetic discourse or Witz immediatelyinstitutesa symbolic
relationship of the same type between subjects. Only subjects
dispossessed of theiridentity,like words in Witz or poetic dis-
course, are destinedto reciprocityin laughterand pleasure.
An Anti-Materialist Theory of Language
A materialist theory of language can be inferredfrom the

analytic interpretationof dreams,of Witz, of neuroses,and, by
extension,of poetry.What makestheworkoftheprimaryprocess
(displacement, condensation, etc.) possible is that, unlike the
logical discourse of representation,the unconscioustreatswords
as iftheywere things.The signifier, escaping fromthecontrolof
syntax and vocabulary,freedfromthe limitationsof thehorizon
78
and the intentionof the signified,becomes raw materialagain,

available for other work- "elemental" materialcomparable to
stones, fire,and earth, ready to be subjected to the crumpling
action, the foldingand overlapping,thetelescopingeffectsof the
primaryprocess. The phonic substanceof language acquires the
immanenceof a materialthing,it returnsto a state( iftheseterms
do indeed have a meaning) prior to the firstarticulation(signi-
ficantunits), perhaps even priorto the second articulation(dis-
tinctiveunits). The sounds (or even letters)are thenconceivedof
as theatoms of a substanceno different fromthatofotherbodies.
It may seem that therelies a radical limitof language beyond

which we cannot go- a revolutionarymaterialityas comparedto
the logical ideality of discourse- "treatingwords like things"
would be theprincipleat theoriginof theunderlying operationof
a
language, principle that is materialist, as it should be, since it
would seem that everythingthereis to say has been said, once a
"materialist" base has at last been isolated. But what is trueof
materialism everywhere else holds true here as well. The
philosophical destinyof thistheoryis to effecta simplereversalof
idealism, without going beyond endless speculation, and by a
simplemovementof alternation.It is in thisway thattheconcepts
of "thing" and "matter,"negativelyforgedbyidealismas itshell,
its negative fantasy,have quietlyassumed the statusof positive
reality,of a positive,even revolutionaryprincipleof explanation,
without losing any of that abstractionwhich thisprincipleowes
to its idealist origins. In the process of repressionidealism has
fantasizeda certain"matter,"and it is thismatter,laden withall
the stigmas of idealist repression, which re-emerges in
materialism.In a word, it is matterchargedwithpositivitywhich
re-emergeson the horizon of idealism. Let us carefullyexamine
this concept of "thing" which some would use as a means to
discern what is beyond representation.When all transcendance
has been expelled, thereremainsan actual, raw, opaque, "objec-
tive" matter,a beingthatis as substantialas stone,theirreducible
base of reality.But is it not clear thatit is thefinaland mostsubtle
strokeof idealism,to have enclosedtheverythingthatdeniedit in
this irreduciblesubstantiality,thus legitimizingit as an adverse
reference,as an alibi, and conjuringit in this way as a reality
"effect"whichbecomes thebestsupportforidealistthought?The
"thing," the "substance," the"infrastructure," "matter"- none
of themhave any othermeaning.And the "materialist" theoryof
language fallsinto the same trap of idealistcounter-dependency.
It is not true that words become "things" when theycease to
represent,when theylose thereasonof thesign,and thenembody
79
a more fundamentalstatusof objectivity,an elementalpositivity,

a plus of reality,a recovered state of determinationin the last
instance.There is no greatermisconception.
Treatingwords as things... in orderto expressthething- the

unconscious- in order to materializea latentenergy,repressed
representations.That is always thepitfallof expression- except
thatwhat is givenpositivestatushereas referenceis therepressed
content,what is not said, the inexpressibleperhaps- but which
at some point recovers the force and status of a determining
structure,ifnot of a substance.Westernthoughthas at base never
tolerateda vacuum of meaning,thenon-siteand thenon-value.It
musthave a topographyand an economics.The radical reabsorp-
tion of thesigninauguratedin poetry( and no doubt also in Witz)
must become the decipherablesignof an unspokencontent,of a
thingwhich will perhaps neveryieldits code, but whose value is
only increasedthereby.I mean in factthatpsychoanalysisis nota
vulgar hermeneutics,it is a more subtle one to the extentthat
behind the operation of signifyingmaterial, somethingelse is
always taking place, another world, another scene, whose out-
lines can be grasped by a specialized discourse. Even when they
have been dislocated, deconstructed, the raw material of
language, thething-wordsare neverpure negativity, and pleasure
is neversimplya matterof theirconsumptionpure and simple.It
is always a question of the degree of libido metabolized in the
operation, of what "speaks" fromthedepthsof the fantasies,of
the amount of affectliberated.In short,thismaterialof language
is already determinedby a positivetransformation (here a tran-
scription), it is answerable in advance to an interpretationwhich
envelops it like its analytical reason.4 The "thing" hides, and it
hides somethingelse. Look forthe force,look forthesignifier.
The underlyingmotivationof the sign/symptom,the consub-

stantialityof the word and the thing,of the destinyof language
and the destinyof instincts,of figureand force- these are the
terms of a libidinal economy whose principle is always (in a
"metonymical" and non-discursivecausality) to metaphorizethe
unconscious, the body, the libido, the fantasy,in a language
disorder. In linguisticmotivation (the "symbol"), it is the ar-
bitrarynature of the sign which yields,givingway to a positive
analogy of the signifierand the thingsignified.In psychoanalytic
motivation, it is an invertednecessitywhich links the decon-
structedsignifierto a primaryenergypotential.Motivation ap-
pears here as a transgressionof a formby a content (a drive,
energy,instinct)in revolt.It is the blind,transversalsurrealityof
8o
the libido which comes to bursttherealityprincipleand transpa-

rencyprincipleof language. This is how, underthe best circum-
stances,poetryis interpreted - it is thevitalnoise
as transgression
of Luciano Berio, it is Artaud's theatreof cruelty- a roar, a
scream, a panting,the invocationand eruptionof thebody in the
repressive,interiorizedspace of language. It is an eruptionof
partial instincts,which re-emergeas partial under the sign of
repression;theyare at thesame timetransgressive/ regressive,for
that liberation is precisely only that of a repressed content,
marked as such by thehegemonyof form.
This is betterthan Swinburne'sbreeze,but it is stillmotivation

and metaphor. This theatreof crueltyis a vitalistic,energetic,
corporeisticmetaphor.And thus,in thelast analysis,it is finalist,
even ifthefinalityis a wild one. It is themagicof a "liberation"of
the original force(Artaud's oftenscandalous affinity withmagic
and exorcism, even orgiasticmysticism,is well known,witness
Héliogabale. ). Metaphysicsis always just around thecorner,just
as it is in the economic/energeticvision of the unconsciouspro-
cess (that is, simply in the concept of the unconscious)- the
metaphysical temptationof the substantificationof the Ucs as
content, as body, and thus of the aim of its liberation.This is
anothersecondaryillusion,contemporarywithrepression,which
conjures and representstheunconsciousas a content,as a force.It
is the triumphof formto circumscribewhat it denies as content,
and to discernit in an aim of expressionof content.
At this point thereis not much differencebetweenlinguistics

and psychoanalysis. In both cases thereis the same attemptto
found poetic discourse in the allied nature of discourse and its
object. "The distance betweenwords and thingsis gottenaround
by the use of what there is of "things" in the word, by the
mediation of its flesh,and theecho thatfleshcan produce,in the
cavern of feeling,of the rumor aroused there by the thing."
(Lyotard, Discours figure, p. 77). Thus the linguistwill try- at
best- to save the "symbolic" value of sound fromthe arbitrary
nature of the sign. Later on in the same passage- "The thingis
not 'introduced' into language, but the arrangementof language
is such thatrhythmsdevelop on and betweenwords,rhythms that
harmonize with those rhythmswhich would be evoked in our
body by the thing of which discourse speaks." What miracle
would make the "thing" and the word harmonizethroughthe
mediumof thebody? Rhythm? That is anotherone of thosemagic
concepts which are used to fitone nature( "things") intoanother
bit of nature (the body). In otherinstances,thethingtakeson the
8i
aspect of theunconscious,whichis structuredlikea language,and

the body is its tabernacle,the matrixof this language. All this
serves as a basis (in Lyotardalso) fora positiveeconomyof the
metaphor- theidea of a reconciliation betweenthe"thing"and the
word restoredto its materiality.But this is false.If it is truethat
logical discourse denies the materiality of the word (the
Wortkörperdoes not treatwords as things),poetic discourseis
not, by simpleinversion,theresurrection oftheword as thing.Far
frombringingabout themanifestationof thinghood,itsaim is the
destructionof language itselfas a thing.Poetryis preciselythe
volatilization of the respectivestatus of thingsand discourse.
That is, it aims at the exterminationof language as discoursebut
as a materialentityas well- not by repressingthatmaterialityin
the way that discourse does, but by dealing with it until it has
annihilatedit.
Their affinitydoes not lie in thismateriality,but in theircon-

tinual dissolution. That resolution, that revolutionis what is
poetic; that is what is rendered inoperativein psychoanalytic
interpretation,reduced by its transpositioninto a substantial
"unstated" statement,revealedin a denial or anotherstatement.
In the symbolicoperation thereis no materialistpointof refer-

ence, not even an "unconscious" one. It is much more like an
"anti-matter"operation. Much as it may sound like science fic-
tion, it is true that the notion of a particle and its anti-particle,
whose meetingresultsin the annihilationof both so thatnothing
remains except a fabulous energy,is a notion somewhatanalog-
ous to Saussure's principleof a vowel and its counter-vowel,or,
more generally,of any signifierand itsanagrammaticdouble that
abolishes it- thereagain nothingremainsexceptpleasure.
Kristeva: "In that other space, where the logical laws of

language are shakenoff,thesubjectis dissolvedand intheplace of
the sign,it is thecollision of signifiers
annihilatingeach otherthat
takes over. It is an operation of generalizednegativitywhichhas
nothing to do with the negativitythat constitutesjudgement
( Aufhebung) or with the negativityinternalto judgement(0-1
logic) - it is a negativity that annihilates (Buddhism-
sunyavada). A zerological subject, a non-subject that comes to
assume this thoughtthat annihilatesitself."That is a rigorously
anagrammaticformulation,whichcancels out both thelinguistic
economy of representationand the libidinal economyof the un-
conscious and primaryprocesses.
82
Beyond The Unconscious
This is the question: in an examinationof poeticdiscourse,are

theregroundsforhypothesizingtheexistenceof theUnconscious,
that energy,that potential affectwhich, in its repressionand
throughits work is at the basis of the disturbance,the "expres-
sive" dislocationof theorderof discourseand opposes itsprimary
process to the secondary process? And of course, everything
stands or falls together.If the unconscious is that irreversible
agency, then the primaryprocess/secondaryprocess duality is
itselfirreducible,and thework of meaningcan onlyconsistin the
resurgenceof the repressedcontents,in its manifestationin the
structureof discourse. In this respectthereis no difference be-
tween poetic discourse and neurotic between
discourse, the poem
and the slip of the tongue. We duly note the radical positionof
psychoanalysis- if the primaryprocesses "exist," thentheyare
at work everywhere,and they are everywherethe determining
factor.But conversely,the simplehypothesisof a different order,
of a symbolic order which would do withoutthe unconscious,
inhibition,and repression,and whichwould afterall resolvethe
very distinction between primary process and secondary
process- that simple hypothesisis sufficientto relativizethe
whole psychoanalyticperspective,and not only in those fields
(anthropology, literature,politics, etc.) into which, although
-
theyare marginalforit,itintrudeswithsovereignauthority but
on its own groundas well, in theanalysisof themind,in neurosis
and cure. To paraphrase Mannoni, it is not inconceivablethat
psychoanalysis,which was born of the distinctionbetweenthe
primaryprocess and the secondaryprocess, mightone day die
fromtheabolition of thatdistinction.The symbolicis alreadythat
realm beyond the unconscious and psychoanalysis,that realm
beyond the libidinal economy,as it is beyondthe realmof value
and political economy.
The hegemonyof theprimaryprocessmustbe broken( through

the attack of poetryfirst,but thereafter more generally,at every
level) . It mustbe understoodthatthesymbolicprocesses( cyclical
resolution, anagrammatic dispersion,reabsorptionwithout re-
sidue) are in no way to be confusedwith the primaryprocesses
(displacement, condensation, repression). These two processes
are even opposed to each other,even ifbothtakentogetherare in
opposition to the logical discourse of meaning (equivalence,
linearity,infinitediscursiveness). It is this singular difference
(with respectto pleasure also) thatmeans thata dream,a slip of
»3
the tongue,a witticismare not thesame thingas a workof artor a

poem. The differencebetween the symbolic and the libidinal
unconscious is at present greatlyobscured by the privilegeof
psychoanalysis,but it must be reinstated- psychoanalysismust
be prohibited frommaking incursionsinto realms where it has
nothing to say. Concerning poetry (the work of art), the
symbolic, (primitive) anthropology,neither Freud nor Marx
were able to say anthingthatwas notreductive,eitherto themode
of production or to repression and castration. In those areas
where psychoanalysisand Marxism break down, we mutnot be
temptedto cast themaside as eitherangels or beasts; ratherthey
must be analyzed relentlesslyin termsof what escapes them.The
limitatons of each are at this time the strategicpoints of any
evolutionaryanalysis.
Poetic discourse is one of those points, symbolicexchange is

another. In this respect,Saussure's Anagramsas well as Mauss's
Exchange/Giftare of capital importance- as pointsof view that
are perhaps more radical in the long run than those of Freud or
Marx, points of view which have been censoredin a certainway
preciselyby the imperialismof Freudianand Marxist interpreta-
tions. The anagram and the exchange/giftare not curious
episodes on the outer limitsof the disciplinesof linguisticsand
anthropology, subordinate modalities in comparison with the
awesome mechanismsof the unconscious and the revolution -
one can discernthroughthemtheoutlinesof thesame greatform
fromwhich Marxism and psychoanalysishave perhaps deviated
only througha misunderstanding,a formwhich dismissesboth
political economy and libidinal economy,while revealing,here
and now, a realm beyond value, a realm beyond law, beyond
repression,beyondtheunconscious.These thingshappen.
Marx believes that in economics and its dialectical process he

has grasped the fundamentalstructure.In fact, what he has
grasped, througheconomics and its convulsions,is what haunts
it- the very separation of economics as a structure.What cuts
througheconomics,plungesit into conflict,makes it the locus of
contradictions,what those contradictions,howeverviolentthey
may be, resolve in their way, is the fantasyof autonomising
economics promotedto thedignityof realityprinciple.
But the same is also trueof psychoanalysis.In the termsof the

unconscious and the work of the unconscious (the primarypro-
cess), Freud graspsas thefundamentalstructurewhat,hereagain,
results,in the formof an individualpsyche,froma fractureof the
84
symbolic. The conflict-riddenconscious/unconscious relation-

ships are only the expression of the obsession with that very
separation of the psyche as such. The Freudian topography
(UCS/PCS/CS) merelyformalizesand theorizesas an original
given statewhat is in facttheresultof a deconstruction.
Marx's and Freud's analyses are critical.But neitherof them

takes a critical attitudeconcerningthe respectiveseparationof
their fields. They are not conscious of the coupure that founds
them. They are criticalsymptomatologies whichsubtlyturntheir
respectivesymptomaticfieldsinto the determining field.Primary
processes, mode of production, "radical" terms, irreducible
schemes of determination - those are the groundson whichthey
export theirconceptsand practiceimperialism.
CurrentlyMarxism and psychoanalysisare attempting to mix,

to exchange theirconcepts. Logically, in fact,if theyboth had
their origins in "radical" critique,theyshould be able to make
exchanges in the name of the revolution.But thatis not at all the
case. What we see is thefantasyand failureofFreudo-Marxismin
all its forms. Now, the underlyingreason for the unremitting
failure of this transferof concepts,the reason why it is only a
desperatemetaphoron eitherside- is preciselybecause Marxism
and psychoanalysis are both coherentonly withintheirpartial
circumscriptions,and are thereforenot generalizableschemesof
analysis.
Neither their"synthesis"nor theircontamination- onlytheir

respectiveextermination - can provide a foundationforradical
theory. Marxism and psychoanalysisare going througha crisis.
We must telescope and precipitatetheirrespectivecrises rather
than usingone to supporttheother.They can stilldo each othera
great deal of harm.We mustnot depriveourselvesof thisspecta-
cle. They are only criticalfields.6
- Translatedby Lee Hildreth
«5
NOTES
1Charles Malamoud, "Sur la notion de reste dans le brah-

manisme," WienerZeitschriftfürdie Kunde Südasiens, vol. XVI,
1972).
2This Freudian reduction,this primacyof the economy oř the

unconscious, is the source of the impossibilityof ever truly
theorizingthedifferencebetweenthefantasyand theworkof art.
He will be able to say simplythateverything he has analyzedhad
been intuitivelyunderstoodby thepoets beforehim,or again (in
Gradiva ), that the psychiatristdoes not enjoy any privilegenot
possessed by thepoet, and thatthelattercan verywell expressthe
problemof theunconsciousin all itsprofundity "withoutsacrific-
ing any of the beauty of his work." (!) The poetic act remains
accumulative, sublime, but accumulative. J.F. Lyotard tries to
help Freud out on thispoint, acknowledgingthe fullimportance
of the distinctionbetween the fantasyand the work of art, but
seeking all the while to establisha rigorousrelationshipbetween
them.
3Still following the logic of the economic interpretation,Freud

thinksthat if we are not the firstto laugh at our own joke, it is
because the initiativeof the Witzitselfrequiresa certainexpendi-
tureof psychicenergy- thereforethereis no surplusavailable for
pleasure. He himself admits this is not a very satisfactory
explanation.
4A11matteris raw material.That is, matterand itsconceptappear

only as a functionof the aim of an order of production and
transformation.All those who consider themselvesmaterialists
( scientists, semioticians, historical materialists, dialectical
materialists, etc.) must remember that. Even the sensualist
materialismof the 18th centuryis thefirststeptowardsa "libera-
tion" of the body accordingto a finalgoal of pleasure,as theraw
materialof a productionof thevalue/pleasure.
Matter is neveranythingbut productiveforce.But production
itselfhas nothing"materialist"about it,nor anythingidealistfor
that matter. It is an order and a code (and a certain social
relationship)- it is no more "materialist" than magic or any-
thingelse.
5On thispoint,again see Kristeva,Poésie et Négativité,p. 274.
86
6The unconscious and the symbolicare not to be confusedwith

each other. The unconscious is as yet only the symptomof the
symbolic- the fantasized form,the obsession, the fantasmatic
resurgenceof the symbolicwithin the (psychoanalytic)frame-
work of an autonomisation of the psyche. The concept of the
unconscious is in a way itselfonlya fantasy,in thesame way that
the concept of ideology is itself an ideological concept. The
symbolicis the resolutionof thatfantasy.
E.A. Dupont,MoulinRouge
87
TRANSLATOR'S NOTES
fThe French text at this point reads as follows: C'est un

"médium" qui n'est jamias en lui-mêmele "message", puisqu'il
faut quelque chose comme le désir- en strictethéorietopique et
économique s'entend- pour parler par sa voix, du "Ça parle".
The expression "ça parle" is associated withtheworkofJacques
Lacan, in whose essay, "La chose freudienne,"the following
sentenceappears : "On se prenaitseulementà repeteraprès Freud
le mot de sa découverte: ça parle, et là sans doute où l'on s'y
attendaitle moins,là ou ça souffre."(See Jacques Lacan, EcritsI ,
Paris: Seuil, 1971, p. 222.) This sentencehas been renderedin
English as follows: "One began only to repeat afterFreud the
word of his discovery: it speaks, and, no doubt, whereit is least
expected, namely,wherethereis pain." In Jacques Lacan, Ecrits:
A Selection, translatedfromthe Frenchby Alan Sheridan,NY :
Norton, 1977, p. 125 ) This slogan, "ça parle," "it speaks," might
be considered the deep structureforthe more elaborate motto,
"the Unconscious is structuredlike a language," which will be
equally familiarto readersof Lacan and hisepigones,and whichis
cited by Baudrillard on page 33 of this essay. The term,"the
Symbolic," is of course also part of theLacanian Lexicon. All of
this makes it more than curious that Lacan's name is never
mentionedin thesepages, in which Baudrillardseemsto be quar-
relling iwth Lacan about the proper definitionof the Symbolic
( see in particular the footnoteon page with which this essay
concludes. ) The name Lacan thus hoversthroughoutthesepages
like a kind of invisiblepresence,a (the) repressedsignifiedof the
entirearticle.
ft Following LaPlanche, we have used "propping" to renderthe

word "etayage." Jean LaPlanche, Life and Death in Psycho-
analysis John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976, Baltimore,transi,by
Jeoffrey Mehlman.

Baudrillard The Uncouncious

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Wayne State University Press

Beyond The Unconscious: The Symbolic

Beyond The Unconscious :

Is there a special affinitybetween poetic and psychoanalytic

Although they are both at opposite poles from linguistics,

The analysis of wit in language- of Witz (Freud, Jokes and

key to the psychoanalyticapproach to poetic discourse- forno

Unlike Saussure, who is not at all concernedwithpoetic plea-

It is in this way that conciseness,or the reusingof the same

rather,of that transversalityof Witz,which, cuttingdiagonally

This quantitativeenergycalculation has a vaguely capitalist

Freud, in The Psychopathologyof EverydayLife, on mistakes

fits" fromfantasies,interstices,weak points in logical discourse,

Yet it is certainthatpsychoanalysishas alteredtherelationship

between an objectiverealityon one hand and itssignificant image

The differencebetween meaning in psychoanalysisas com-

That bar is thestrategicelementinthestructureofthelinguistic

archaic theymightbe, could escape the 'principleof contradic-

It is not a matterof saving linguistics,it is a questionof under-

Thus, if we are outside the realmof logical equivalence when

In a word, there is no longer any equivalence,but neitheris

"To graspin what has beenwrittena symptomofwhathas been

But poetic discourse,on the otherhand, silencesnothing,and

"Linguistics was born of the bar that it has set up betweenthe

No residue,thatalso means thatthereis no longeranysignifier

either side of a structuralbar distributingthem- it also means

To returnto the subject of Witz, is it not possible to suppose

Can it not be supposed thatthe pleasure we derivefromWitz

Could it not be a combustion effect,a short-circuit(Kurz-

Freud quotes Kant- Das Komische ist eine in nichts zer-

tegrationof thecode, of therepressivelogos. In thecomic,itis the

The Lichtenbergexample is not a special case. If closely ex-

The revolutionof the signifierupon itself.

taneously but the essential featurethen is that abolition of the

Freud speaks throughouthis workin a characteristic way ofthe

The same patternreappears in the passages dealing with the

Now let us look at theexample of Witzcitedby O. Mannoni in

When we laugh, it is because, in one way or another,a distor-

One of the "external" characteristicsof Witz can also be in-

Now if Witz is fromthe outset and necessarilyinscribedin a

An Anti-Materialist Theory of Language

A materialist theory of language can be inferredfrom the

and the intentionof the signified,becomes raw materialagain,

It may seem that therelies a radical limitof language beyond

a more fundamentalstatusof objectivity,an elementalpositivity,

Treatingwords as things... in orderto expressthething- the

The underlyingmotivationof the sign/symptom,the consub-

the libido which comes to bursttherealityprincipleand transpa-

This is betterthan Swinburne'sbreeze,but it is stillmotivation

At this point thereis not much differencebetweenlinguistics

aspect of theunconscious,whichis structuredlikea language,and

Their affinitydoes not lie in thismateriality,but in theircon-

In the symbolicoperation thereis no materialistpointof refer-

Kristeva: "In that other space, where the logical laws of

Beyond The Unconscious

This is the question: in an examinationof poeticdiscourse,are

The hegemonyof theprimaryprocessmustbe broken( through

the tongue,a witticismare not thesame thingas a workof artor a

Poetic discourse is one of those points, symbolicexchange is

Marx believes that in economics and its dialectical process he

But the same is also trueof psychoanalysis.In the termsof the

symbolic. The conflict-riddenconscious/unconscious relation-