which deal not only with the automation process but with RULING: No.
LING: No. The Court held that the records show
311. ABAKADA V. ERMITA
496 SCRA 1, SEPT. 1, 2005 & OCT. 18, 2005
FACTS: R.A. No. 9337 (E-VAT Law) is a
consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill
Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Thus, came
R.A. No. 9337. Before said law took effect, petitioners
ABAKADA GURO Party Listassailed the constitutionality
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,on the ground that it
violated the “no amendment rule” of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 9337 violates Art.
VI, Sec. 26 (2) of Constitution on the No-Amendment Rule.
RULING/Main point: No. Amendment Rule
refers only to the procedure to be followed by each
house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of
said respective houses before said bill is transmitted to
the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Thus,
Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to
mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference
Committee of amendments and modifications to
disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon
by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
312. BANAT V. COMELEC
595 SCRA 477 (2009)
FACTS: Petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral
organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that
RA 9369(Election Automation Law) violated Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution. It alleged that the title of RA
9369 was misleading because it speaks of poll
automation but contains substantial provisions dealing
with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner
also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither
embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of
RA 9369. Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintained that
the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics
everything related to its purpose encouraging a
transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9639 violated Section 26(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution?
RULING/ Main Point: NO.
The requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The
title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise
nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
The assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter
of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others.
313. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR 196271, October 18, 2011
FACTS: On June 30,2011, RA 10153 (An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the
National and Local Elections and for other
purposes)resetting the next ARMM regular elections to
May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country was enacted. Petitioner assailed
the constitutionality of both bills from HOR and Senate
before the promulgation of RA 10153 for violation of the
three-readings-on-separate-days requirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153
violates Section 26(2),Art. VI of the Constitution.
that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of the law synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the National and Local Elections. In the case of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court held that the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from hearing to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
MAIN POINT: Section 26(2), Art. VI of the
Constitution provides that before bills passed by either the
House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass
through three (3) readings on separate days. The
EXEMPTION is when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
314. ABAS KIDA V. SENATE
GR 196271, October 18, 2011 Supra no. 305.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further
maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply
with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution.
1. W/N provisions of RA No. 10153, constitutes
a Rider
2. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153
violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
Ruling:
1. No. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054
reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
the first ARMM elections; it does not
provide the date for the succeeding regular
ARMM elections.
2. No. In the present case, the records show
that the President wrote to the Speaker of
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 the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a
law synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections.Following
our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and
the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
MAIN POINT: In Relation to Prohibition of Riders RA 10153
cannot be considered as Rider because it does not amend
the 1st organic Act being a separate act.
ART. VI SEC. 27 - Passage of Bills
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate
his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
315. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
277 SCRA 268 (1997)
Facts: The petitioners (members of the HOR) filed a
case questioning the validity of R.A. 8240 (which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
for imposition of SIN TAXES). The law originated in the
House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. A bicameral
conference committee (reconciled the disagreeing
versions of the Bill) submitted its report to the House for
their review. Rep. Sarmiento was the first one to
interpellate. However, Rep. Arroyo interrupted him and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. Petitioners'
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the "constitutional
mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious
Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that what was alleged based
from the foregoing facts were merely violations of internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-
27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum
but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of
the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Main Point: The Constitution requires that the
yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a
house has to vote upon:
1. The last and third readings of the Bill. (Art VI,
26 (2))
2. The request of the one-fifth of the members
present (Art VI, Sec. 27 (1))
3. In repassing the bill over the veto of the
President.
316. ABAKADA V ERMITA(SUPRA NO. 303)
469 SCRA 1
FACTS:The constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 or the
RVAT/EVAT Law (Revitalized Value Added Tax Law) was
put into issue as alleged to be not duly enacted. In the
Senate, several provisions, which were not found in the
H.B. 3705, were inserted. A Bicameral Conference
Committee (BCC) was formed where representatives from
both Houses were sent to settle the disagreeing
provisions. BCC further inserted several provisions to S.B.
1950, i.e., stand by power was granted to the President to
raise the valued-added tax rate. Further still, the “No pass”
provision was deleted – this provision prohibited the
passing of value-added tax to consumers. Said version was
passed into law hence the promulgation of R.A. No.
9337.ABAKADA questioned its constitutionality.
Respondents in this case invoked the ruling in the case of
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance or the Enrolled Bill
Doctrine, which state that the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. As such, R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the conclusive
presumption of constitutionality and that the courts
cannot go behind the enrolled bill.
ISSUE: W/N the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this
case.
RULING/Main point: Yes. There is no reason to
abandon the ruling in Tolentino. The Supreme Court is not
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the proper venue to raise concerns regarding
parliamentary procedures. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Congress is the best judge of how it should
conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most
orderly manner. If a change is desired in the practice of
the BBC it must be sought in Congress since this question
is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only
an internal rule of each house. To date, Congress has not
seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court.
It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of
the BCC to be very useful for purposes of prompt and
efficient legislative action.
Sec. 27.Procedure in Passage of Bills; Item Veto
Presidential Veto
317. CIR vs. CTA and Manila Golf and Country Club
185 SCRA 329 [1990]
Facts: Petitioner assessed Manila Golf club caterer’s
tax pursuant to RA 6610. PR contest the assessment by
alleging that the Section 42* (providing the 20% caterer’s
tax on gross receipts on various operators of restaurants)
was vetoed by President Marcos, hence it is without legal
basis. CIR argued that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed
but merely the words "hotels, motels, resthouses" on the
ground that it might restrain the development of hotels
which is essential to the tourism industry. CTA opined that
the President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but
only an entire item.
Issue: whetherthe veto referring merely to the
inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20%
caterer's tax bracket and not to the whole section is a valid
exercise of presidential veto;
Ruling/ Main point: Yes. The inclusion of hotels,
motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are
"items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3),
Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the
President has the power to veto.
An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an
entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but
rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the
portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a
section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons
liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate.
*SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section 191-A which
imposes a caterer's tax of three percent of the gross
receipts of proprietors or operators of restaurants,
refreshment parlors and other eating places; three
percent of gross receipts from sale of food or
refreshment and seven percent on gross receipts from the
sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines, on
proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and
other eating places, including clubs, where distilled spirits,
fermented liquors, or wines are served; and twenty
percent of gross receipts on proprietor or operators of
restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other
eating places maintained within the premises or
compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race
track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club, or which are
accessible to patrons of said establishments by means of a
connecting door or passage.
The burden of petition will be shifted to the consuming
public.
The development of hotels, essential to our tourist
industry, may be restrained considering that a big portion
of hotel earnings comes from food sale
318. GONZALES v. MACARAIG
191 SCRA 452 (1990) Landmark case, important.
Hence, the (semi) long digest.
Re: Inappropriate provisions; General Appropriations
Act
FACTS: The President Aquino vetoed provisions of the
GAA 1989 (Sec 55) and GAA 1990 (Sec.16) which prohibits
the restoration/ increase (by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes throughaugmentation) of
appropriations disapproved/ reduced (recommended by
the President in the Budget) by the Congress. **Such item
of appropriations is deemed disapproved if no
corresponding appropriation for specific purpose is
provided in the Act. (Meaning, there’s no SPECIFIC amount
of money indicated for SPECIFIC purpose.) The President
opined that these provisions would nullify his
constitutional and statutory authority to augment items
from savings, and such Sections are inconsistent with the
other provisions of the Act.
SolGen says Sec. 55 is a “rider”because it is
extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore,
merits the President’s veto.
Petitioners argue: 1) Provision in issue is not an “item”
but a “provision”; 2) power of “item veto” does not
include the power to veto a condition without vetoing the
entire provision; 3) power of “augmentation” has to be
provided by Congress and may be restricted by Congress.
ISSUE:Whether or not the President exceeded the
item-veto power accorded by the Constitution.
Or differently put, has the President the power to
veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
RULING: Yes. Explicit is the requirement that a
provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some" particular appropriation" therein. The
challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply
generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress
in the Appropriations Bill.
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 Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover
them, resort will have to be made to the original
recommendations made by the President and to the
source indicated by petitioners themselves.
Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and
Section 16 (FY ‘90) although labelled as "provisions," are
actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated
as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
MAIN POINT: pg. 265:The doctrine of “inappropriate
provisions” refers to a provision that is constitutionally
inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out
for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue
“item”. In essence what this means is that the President
may veto “riders” in an appropriation bill.
319. BENGZON v. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the veto
by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The instant petition filed by the petitioners with the
assertions that:1) The subject veto is not an item veto;2)
The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers;3) The veto deprives the retired
Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;4) The
questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President of
certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional
Ruling/ Main point: No.Veto is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation
and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill
refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose. An "item"of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself
is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill."
What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by
Congress to insure that permanent and continuing
obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell
due.
An examination of the entire sections and the
underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will
readily show that portions of the item have been
chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all
of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed
portions are not items. They are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations
found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by
transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a
provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief
Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There
is no specific appropriation of money involved.
320. PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ (LONG CASE!)
235 SCRA 506 (1994)
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of the
Presidents veto on the RA 7663 or General Appropriations
Act of 1994 (GAA). GAA contains special provision that
authorized any member of the Congress to propose and
identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and
to realign their respective operating budgets provided that
the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations
on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. Petitioners contest
the constitutionality of the veto.
Issue: Does the President have the power to veto
“provisions” of an Appropriations Bill?YES.
Ruling: The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks
the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Section 25 [2]).
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, said that
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions
inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as
it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in
the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds
other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the
General Appropriations Act of 1991. Likewise the vetoed
provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to
reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
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in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a
separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds. The
President cited Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,
Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, and Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, in vetoing said appropriation, further stating that all
income earned by all government offices and agencies
shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government.
Hence, the creation and establishment of revolving funds
shall be authorized by substantive law.
Main Point: EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT simply
means refusal of the President to spend funds already
allocated by Congress for a specific purpose.
321. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA
11 SCRA 486 (1964)
Facts:A public works bill contained an item
appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television
stations, subject to the condition that the amount would
not be available to places where there were commercial
television stations. Then President Macapagal approved
the appropriation but vetoed the condition. Petitioners
now assail the validity of the veto.
Issue: Whether or not the veto is validly exercised in
this case
Ruling: No. The veto isineffectual and that the
approval of the item carried with it the approval of the
condition attached to it.
Main Point: A CONDITION IN AN APPROPRIATION
BILL MAY NOT BE VETOED WITHOUT VETOING THE ITEM
TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED.
322. TANADA v. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (1986)
FACTS:Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked
due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval.
ISSUE: May the publication of laws prior to their
effectivity be dispensed with?
RULING/ Main point: No. publication in every case is
indispensable. Total omission of publication would be
denial of due process in that the people would not know
what laws to obey
ART 6, SEC 28: TAXATION
Scope and Purpose:
323. PLANTERS v. FERTIPHIL
548 SCRA 485
FACTS:Petitioner assail the validity of LOI no. 1465
which provided the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of
fertilizers in the Philippinesfor being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid, and an unlawful imposition and alleged
that the LOI solely favored PPI, a private owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its
monopoly of the fertilizer industry
ISSUES:Whether LOI 1465 constitutes a valid
legislation pursuant to the exercise of taxation
RULING:No. The levy is unconstitutional because it
was not for a public purpose. The levy was imposed to give
undue benefit to PPI.
MAIN POINT:An inherent limitation on the power of
taxation is for public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a
public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private
purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.
The power to tax exist for the general welfare; hence,
implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used
only for a public purpose.
Limitations on the power: Uniform and Equitable
324. CIR v. CA
261 SCRA 236 (1996)
FACTS:The CIR issued a revenue memorandum
circular which set an ad valorem tax of 55% to cigarette
products of Fortune Tobacco for being foreign branded
cigarette without public notification. Thus, private
respondent assails said circular on the basis that it violates
their rule that there should be prior notice and hearing
before the circular’s implementation considering that said
circular is a quasi-legislative function of CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not CIR has violated the due
process law of taxation?
RULING:Yes. The CTA held that
petitionerCommissioner of Internal Revenue failed to
observe due process of law in issuing RMC 37-93 as there
was no prior notice and hearing, and that RMC 37-93 was
in itself discriminatory
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 MAIN POINT: The RMC was made to place the
three brands as locally made Cigarettes bearing foreign
brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.
Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory
provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes
which at the time of its effectivity were not classified as
having foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC,
the brands were subject to 45% ad valorem tax. In so
doing, the BIR did not simply interpreted the law but it
legislated under its quasi legislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
of publication should not have been then ignored.
ART 6, SEC 28: Limitations on the power: Uniform and
Equitable
325. CIR v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc
164 SCRA 27
FACTS: PR assails the constitutionality of the
municipal franchise tax imposed by the municipality of
Pangasinan. The franchises provided that the grantee shall
pay quarterly to the provincial treasury of Pangasinan, 1%
of the gross earnings attained through the privilege for the
first 20 years (from 1946), and 2% during the remaining 15
years of the lifetime of the franchise. In 1955, the BIR
assessed and demanded against the company deficiency
franchise taxes and surcharges from the years 1946 to
1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on gross
receipts from 1948 to 1954. The company asked for a
reinvestigation, which was denied. CTA, however, ruled for
Lingayen.
ISSUE: Whether a rate below 5% is violative of
the uniformity clause in the Constitution
RULING: No. The legislature has the inherent
power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to
grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have never been
deemed violative of the equal protection clause. Herein,
the 5% franchise tax rate provided in Section 259 of the
Tax Code was never intended to have universal
application. Section 259 expressly allows the payment of
taxes at rates lower than 5% when the charter granting
the franchise precludes the imposition of a higher tax. RA
3843, the law granting the franchise, did not only fix and
specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts but made
it in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary
notwithstanding. The company, hence, is not liable for
deficiency taxes.
MAIN POINT:A tax is uniform when it operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property
belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. The
Legislature has the inherent power not only to select the
subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax
exemptions have never been deemed violative of the
equal protection clause
ART 6, SEC 28: Limitations on the power: Uniform and
Equitable
326. TOLENTINO v SEC. OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 596
FACTS: Petitioners challenge the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme (SNITS) due to its violation of the
constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation. Said
law imposed a tax on taxable net income from all sources,
other than income from salaries, of every individual
whether a citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in
the Philippines who is self-employed or practices his
profession herein. Pet argues that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorship and professionals
differently from the manner that it imposes tax on
corporations and partnerships
ISSUE: Is the law invalid for it runs counter to the
constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and
equitable?
RULING:No, uniformity in taxation merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly
situated be treated alike in both privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not forbid classification as long as – 1) The
standards that are used therefore are substantial and not
arbitrary; 2) The categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose; 3) The law applies all things being
equal, to both present and future conditions, and 4) The
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to
the same class. What may instead be perceived to be
apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent
to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
scheduler approach in the income taxation of individual
taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global
treatment on the taxable corporations. We certainly do
not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.
MAIN POINT:The VAT is not a license tax. It is not
a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease
or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange
of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is
not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Petitioner’s theory amounts to saying that under
the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which
only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI,
SEC 28 (3).
327. TAN v. DEL ROSARIO
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 237 SCRA 324 (1994)
FACTS:Petitioner seeks declaration of
unconstitutionality of RA7496 (also known as Simplified
Net Income Taxation) due to violation of Article VI, Section
28(1). The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal
protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one who
practice his profession and not to those who are engaged
to single proprietorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates Art 6, Sec
28 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
RULING:No. The said law is not arbitrary; it is
germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all
things of equal conditions and of same class.
It is neither violative of equal protection clause
due to the existence of substantial difference between
one who practice his profession alone and one who is
engaged to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA
7496 is just an amendatory provision of the code of
taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in to four main
groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial
Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have
appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496
was an independent law. But since it is attached to a law
that has already classified taxpayers, there is no violation
of equal protection clause.
MAIN POINT:Where tax measure becomes as
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of
property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for
despite all its plentitude, the power to tax cannot override
constitutional prescriptions. The said law is not arbitrary; it
is germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all
things of equal conditions and of same class.
328. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT v. PHIL. CEMENT
G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004
FACTS:Petitioner Southern Cross is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of cement
manufacturing, production and importation on 22 May
2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry
(“DTI”) accepted an application from Philcemcor (PCMC).
Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of
provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on
the import of cement pursuant to the SMA (RA No. 8800,
also known as the Safeguard Measures Act.) After
preliminary investigation, the Bureau of Import Services of
the DTI, determined that critical circumstances existed
justifying the imposition of provisional measures. The DTI
then issued an Customs Memorandum Order to take
effect that same day and to remain in force for two
hundred (200) days. Due to DTI’s imposition of the
provisional measure, Southern Cross filed with the Court a
“Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his
decision. Southern Cross prayed to "cease and desist from
taking any and all actions pursuant to or under the null
and void CA Decision and DTI Decision, including
proceedings to extend the safeguard measure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the executive can impose
taxation safeguard measures
RULING: Yes. The safeguard measures imposable
under the SMA generally involve duties on imported
products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on
the importation of a product into the country. Without
Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no
authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies
involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that
Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the
SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it
would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative
power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such
delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be
recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to
the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent
executive power. The qualifiers mandated by the
Constitution on this presidential authority attain
primordial consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2) there
must be specified limits; and (3) Congress may impose
limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority.
MAIN POINT:Under the conditions of Sec 28 (2).
This delegation of taxation power by the legislative to the
executive if authorized by the Constitution itself. At the
same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating
authority (Congress) to right to impose restrictions and
limitations on taxation power delegated to the President.
The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Congress
take on the mantle of a constitutional command which the
executive branch is obliged to observe
ART 6, SEC 28: Delegated Tax Legislation
329. ABAKADA v. ERMITA (SUPRA 303)
FACTS:Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect,
petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on
sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT
on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT
on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniformed provision is
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have
been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:Whether or not there is undue delegation
of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of
the Constitution
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RULING: NO. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
MAIN POINT:It is the ministerial duty of the
President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President
Art. 6/Sec 28, Doctrine of Qualified Agency
330. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO v. CUISIA
GR 106064 Oct. 13 2005
Facts: Petitioners Constantino are members of
the non-government organization, Freedom from Debt
Coalition, which advocates a “pro-people and just
Philippine debt policy.” They question the Financing
Program started by then President Corazon Aquino,
characterized as a “multi-option financing package”,
wherein the President entered into three restricting
agreements with foreign creditor governments. Spouses
Constantino et.al seeks to enjoin respondents from
executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto
and stresses that the power to incur foreign debts is
expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President.
Issue: W/N the President can validly delegate the
power to incur foreign debts to the respondents
Ruling: Yes, based on the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency. Each head of the department is and must
be, President’s alter ego who in this case is the Secretary
of Finance in the matters of that department where the Main Point: Exemption on favour of property used
President is required by law to exercise authority under exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is ‘not
Section 28(2), Article 6, the delegation of the taxation limited to property actually indispensable’ but extends to
power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
the Constitution itself. for the accomplishment of the said purposes.
Main Point: Congress could designate the DTI
Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of the President, to
exercise the authority, but Constitution also grants the
Congress the right to impose restrictions and limitations
on the taxation power.
Art. 6/Sec. 28, Exemptions
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
162 SCRA 106, June 15, 1988
Petitioner, an education corporation and
institution of higher learning filed a complaint to annul and
declare the “Notice of Seizure” and “Notice of Sale” of
their lot and building for the non-payment of real estate
tax. Respondents stated that the school lot and building in
question are not only used for educational purposes of the
school, but also as the permanent residence of the
Director and his family while the ground floor is being used
and rented by a commercial establishment. The Court
declares that the distraint seizure and sale of the lot and
building of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc., is valid.
Issue(s)/Ruling
W/N the lot and building in question should be
exempted from tax?No.
The court ruled that the school building as well as
the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the
2nd floor is used by the Director and his family for
residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is
being used for commercial purposes. However, only a
portion is used for the purposes of commerce, it is only
fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school
involved.
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