Will Electoral Alliances Work This Time

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General election 2014 & 2019 – How a single party come with full

majority in era of Mandal Commission??


Introduction
The Bharatiya Janata Party garnered 37.4% of the votes in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. The
NDA as a whole, received nearly 45% of the vote. This is the highest vote share received by
the party nation-wide in any Lok Sabha election since the party was reformed in 1980. The
BJP-led coalition won a cumulative vote share of nearly 45%, which is higher than what the
NDA got in 2014 i.e. 38%.
The dominant victory of the BJP and its allies by repeating the 2014 win, and then some
psephologist suggests that the era of coalitions determining the balance of power at central
has decisively come to an end. This period, which began in 1977 following the end of
Emergency, extended till 2014 with the notable exception of the Congress rule between 1984
and 1989.
The BJP and its allies have thus far not only increased their respective vote shares and seat
shares from 2014, but also expanded their geographic reach in electoral success. Only the
southern States, such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, have bucked the trend.
We could now characterise the period when the BJP came to power in 2014 as the beginning
of a new single-party hegemonic system in Indian politics that was akin to what prevailed
since Independence and looks impossible after the implementation of mandal commission.
What led to this humongous victory of the NDA is a subject of analysis to many
psephologists and researcher but in this article I am analysing how BJP has able to succeed in
breaking the cast coalition in one of the most diverse state of India which sends the maximum
no of legislator to the lower house of parliament.

Arithmetic alliances

Like all partnerships, Indian polls witness many kinds of alliances, opportunistic alliances,
seasonal alliances, long-suffering alliances and much else. The best kinds are where there’s
political chemistry between alliance partners and also sound underlying electoral arithmetic
where the whole becomes larger than the sum of the parts. But those are rare.
In Uttar Pradesh, the fulcrum off the caste politics where the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan
Samaj Party-Rashtriya Lok Dal alliance, hailed as a unique political experiment together
polled 38.99% of votes trailing far behind the BJP’s 49.49%.
With the slogan Haathi, Lathi aur Saat Sau Chhiyasi where Haathi referred to BSP’s symbol
elephant, lathi used for SP’s stick to shepherd cattle and Saat Sau Chhiyasi (786) a reference
to Muslims, on paper they were perfect. The allies worked in perfect harmony in spite of
historical differences. The campaign was well co-ordinated. They managed the optics also
well, with SP Chief Akhilesh Yadav playing loving Bhatija to Bua Mayawati.

The year was 1996 and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) cofounder Kanshi Ram was scouting for
an ally for the assembly polls to expand the party’s base in Uttar Pradesh (UP). BSP had
severed ties with the BJP over power sharing differences in 1995. With the 1993 guest house
incident when SP men attacked Mayawati after she pulled out support from the government
allying with Mulayam Singh. Now of course the unthinkable has happened and Mayawati has
joined hands with Akhilesh Yadav’s SP to defend their political fiefdom against the BJP.
The SP-BSP alliance in UP is just the most important one among a number of alliances this
election season.

Yadav-Jatav-Dalit Factor

The SP-BSP alliance is perhaps among the trickiest ones to have been forged in this country.
With OBCs still seeing Dalits as rivals post 1993, it’s as yet unclear if the SP voter will return
the BSP’s favour. The 2018 Lok Sabha bypolls in erstwhile BJP bastions Gorakhpur and
Phulpur were the first test of SP-BSP unity. SP won both the seats with BSP’s backing.

Nonetheless, the poll arithmetic is in their favour, unlike the 2017 SP-Congress assembly
election alliance that failed badly, decimating the ruling SP. In the same elections, SP and
BSP had together polled similar vote share (42.12%) as had the BJP (42.63%)
It is this arithmetic the regional parties are banking on. The Mahagatbandhan in Bihar’s 2015
assembly polls was the original model for longstanding local rivals joining hands to keep out
an ascendant BJP.

The Narendra Modi juggernaut brutally undid the caste combination of Samajwadi Party
(SP), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) in Uttar Pradesh, just a year
after the Grand Alliance tasted success in the bypolls in Gorakhpur, Phoolpur and Kairana.
Out of the 80 Lok Sabha seats in UP, the BJP and ally Apna Dal won 64, mahagathbandhan
15, while the Congress managed to win only Raebareli. Priyanka Gandhi's much-hyped entry
into politics turned out to be a damp squib, and Congress president Rahul Gandhi bit the dust
at family bastion Amethi. The mahagathbandhan was hopeful of transfer of votes between
constituents, but the BJP upset their caste calculations riding high on PM Modi's flagship
schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana, toilets, power and LPG connections, which
ensured rural votes in favour of the saffron party.

The India Today-Axis My India exit poll data shows that Jats, who have historically voted for
the RLD, mostly supported the BJP this time. In UP, 57 per cent of the Jat votes went to BJP,
35 per cent to the Grand Alliance, and 8 per cent to the Congress and other regional parties.
The growing inclination of Jats towards the BJP is the biggest reason Ajit Singh's party drew
a blank despite support from SP and BSP. The India Today-Axis My India post poll survey
shows that 60 per cent non-Jatav Dalits voted for the BJP, 30 per cent for the
mahagathbandhan, while the Congress and other parties managed to get only 10 per cent.
Jatav Dalits, considered loyalists of BSP supremo Mayawati, largely voted for the Grand
Alliance. The mahagathbandan got 74 per cent Jatav votes, NDA 21 per cent, UPA 3 per
cent, and other parties 2 per cent.( https://carnegieendowment.org/)
Building New Caste census

Upper caste voters once again trusted the BJP, which received 77 per cent of their vote share.
The mahagathbandhan got only 12 per cent upper caste votes, while the remaining 11 per
cent went to UPA and other parties. Yadavs, the core voter base of SP, once again supported
Akhilesh. While the SP-BSP-RLD alliance received 72 per cent Yadav votes, NDA received
20 per cent. The remaining 8 per cent went to the UPA and other parties.

However, the NDA pocketed a large chunk of non-Yadav votes. Data shows 76 per cent
OBCs, excluding Yadavs, supported the NDA, while the Grand Alliance could only get 14
per cent. The UPA received 4 per cent non-Yadav OBC votes and the remaining went to
other parties.

This is part of the BJP’s continuous effort in Uttar Pradesh to wean away the numerous OBC
and Dalit communities which are not socially and numerically dominant such as the Yadavs
among the OBCs and the Jatavs among the Dalits.
The strategy aims to reduce the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)’s core vote to Mayawati’s caste,
the Jatavs, and the Samajwadi Party (SP)’s core vote to Mulayam Singh Yadav’s caste, along
with attracting other communities such as Sainis/Malis, Kashyaps, Kuhars, Badhais, Lohars,
Lodhs and Patels among the OBCs and Valmikis, Khatigs and Pasis among the Dalits.

A deeper analysis shows that BJP's social engineering was more lethal than the
mahagathbandhan. The saffron party, with support from non-Jatav Dalits, non-Yadav OBCs,
Jats and upper castes, returned to power with thumping majority. The BJP received 59 per
cent of the total vote share in UP. The mahagathbandhan may have been supported by Jatav
Dalits, Yadavs and Muslims, but its 39 per cent vote share couldn't convert to enough seats.
The Congress, on the other hand, with only 6 per cent of the vote share, has been rejected by
every section of society.
.
Losers and gainers

The results clearly indicate that while SP managed to transfer its votes to the BSP, it did not
happen the other way round.
The BJP's success in UP makes it clear that the mahagathbandhan's focus on caste arithmetic
and its strategy of targeting PM Modi in joint rallies failed to connect with voters. However,
people in most parts of the state voted in Modi's name and not for the candidate.

Caste census Vs Nationalism

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's appeal and sentiments that built up after the Balakot episode
broke the caste barriers which is predominantly the key guiding force in the politics of the
Hindi heartland states, especially Bihar. The Yadavs and Muslims have been considered to be
the traditional vote bank of the RJD for the last three decades but this time around, the data
showed, both of them voted for the BJP-led NDA. Thirteen per cent of Muslims and 27 per
cent Yadavs voted for the BJP and JD(U) in this elections. It seems the Yadavs deserted the
RJD as they sensed that the party might not make it big in the national politics.
The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, 63 per cent and 62 per cent also voted in favour of
the NDA. Other Backward Caste, which has been a traditional vote bank of the JD(U), voted
71 per cent in favour of the NDA. Seventy-three per cent of the Forward caste voted for the
BJP and JD(U).

The mahagathbandhan, on the other hand, failed to woo all the other castes except the Yadavs
and Muslims who voted 56 per cent and 65 per cent respectively for them. Besides this, all
the other sections, including the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, OBCs and Forward caste
rejected the mahagathbandhan. Only 18 per cent Scheduled Caste, 22 per cent Scheduled
Tribe, 13 per cent OBC and only 10 per cent Forward votes were polled for the
mahagathbandhan. https://www.indiatoday.in

Caste Census Vs Development

One can argue that development only is not the sufficient condition to win the election in
India undoubtebly it is one of the necessary condition to win but history has shown us that
PV Narsimha Rao government has lost the election even after giving us a growth rate of 9%
from 3.3% same goes with the Chandrasekhar government who lost the election even after
controlling the food inflation to exemplary figure. The notion here is that it is not always true
that the government who has delivered the high economic growth and development always
won the election but in the case of BJP the last mile delivery of the schemes and policies has
create a sense of tangibility among the recipients and people stating feeling that this
government is really doing something for the poorest of the poor of the country.

Ujjwala Yojana, prohibition law and open defecation free (ODF) seem to have shown results
in the state as women voters, especially housewives, supported the NDA. Besides this,
students, labour and farm labour also expressed confidence in the NDA. In this Lok Sabha
elections, right from the illiterate to the highly educated voted in large number for the NDA.
PM Modi promised two crore jobs annually when he came to power in 2014 but allegedly
despite not having delivered on this promise, the unemployed voters in Bihar backed the
NDA and shown faith on Modi.

Strategic victory or Fluke

Despite having one of the highest unemployment rate in the last 45 years and the sluggish
economy growth between 2014-2019 it is interesting to figure out the strategy led by the
NDA which bring this type of humongous result and bring a single party to the majority in
one of the biggest democracy. One key demographic that BJP has energized in 2019 is
women. Although they do not vote as a bloc per se, the party believes several of its welfare
schemes have special resonance with women and has influenced their votes. This is
significant because Indian females are voting in greater numbers than ever before. In 2014,
women voted at higher rates than men in sixteen of India’s thirty-five states and union
territories. At the state level, female turnout now regularly surpasses male turnout. Modi and
Shah were wasting no time in recalibrating their approach to mitigate the BJP’s unexpected
challenges. For instance, the government’s last budget was packed with pro-poor rhetoric and
numerous sops meant to allay rural anger. As existing allies are growing wary with the BJP’s
modus operandi, the party’s high command has stepped up its outreach to smooth frayed
relations. And, concerned about waning voter enthusiasm, Modi had directed the party’s
elected representatives to redouble efforts to connect with constituents. In one instance, Modi
has reported to have warned sitting BJP MPs that they must amass at least 300,000 followers
on social media or risk losing their party tickets.

Credit : www.thehindu.com

What explains the BJP’s gains among sections of the electorate that expressed high
discontentment on various policies and performance issues not too long ago?

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