Magali Roqes

The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William

of Ockham

Epekeina, vol. 6, n. 2 (2015), pp. 1-16

Medieval Ontology

ISSN: 2281-3209
DOI: 10.7408/epkn.

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 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter
According to William of Ockham ∗
Magali Roques

This paper is dedicated to William of Ockham’s metaphysics of matter.1

Its aim is to examine how William of Ockham accounts for the identity
conditions of prime matter.2
Two main options concerning the ontological status of prime matter
were available in the Aristotelian tradition at Ockham’s time.3 The
first option was that prime matter is a kind of formless gunk, which is
the position of Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, prime matter
is pure potency, pure potency being halfway between pure nothing
and being in act. The second option was that prime matter is an entity
in act, something like a giant stuff that can be divided into individual
parts that are bits of matter. This is the position of Duns Scotus.
The problem we will examine is the following: if matter is in
everything that can come to be and pass away, hence in you and me,
how can I account for the fact that my matter is not yours? This
problem is quite independent of the question of the ontological status
of matter, one of the main focuses of recent studies on prime matter in
later medieval Aristotelianism.
Indeed, this problem takes its roots in the claim that prime matter is
said to be numerically one in every composite. This claim comes from
Averroes’ commentary on the Physics. It can be found in Aquinas 4 and
others, like Walter Burley,5 who claim that matter is pure potency.

∗ I thank the Dahlem Research School (Freie Universität Berlin) for its financial
support.
1. Ockham’s hylomorphism has been studied by Doncoeur 1921, Wolter 1963
and Goddu 1984, 83-111.
2. The question was asked for the first time by McCord Adams 1987, 690-696.
McCord Adams’s answer has been discussed by Massobrio 1984.
3. For a presentation of the main positions on the ontological status of prime
matter in Ockham’s time, see especially Weisheipl 1963 and McCord Adams 1987,
672-680.
4. Aqinas, De principiis naturae, paragr. 2, 41.
5. Burleus, Expositio in libros octo de physico auditu, 30va: ‘Et eodem modo debet
intelligi illud quod Commentator dicit hic scilicet, quod subiectum quod est in potentia
est unum omnium generabilium et corruptibilium, non quia sit eadem materia numero
 Magali Roques

The medieval metaphysics of individuation has been the object

of extensive studies.6 It is often highlighted that this metaphysics
is centered on substances and accidents. For instance, Scotus’ well-
known discussion of individuation is restricted to material substances.7
The interest of our study lies in the fact that it deals with another
issue in the metaphysics of individuation: how can we account for the
individuation of stuff in medieval metaphysics?
I will argue that Ockham switched from his well known view that
individuality is intrinsic and irreducible to a version of the Leibnizian
view that individuality is reducible to the uniqueness of properties,
because Ockham’s standard theory of identity and distinction cannot
account for the identity conditions of matter.
The paper will be divided into two parts. The first will deal with the
nature of prime matter and the puzzle raised by its identity conditions.
The second will explain the concepts of identity and distinction used
by Ockham in his account of the identity conditions of prime matter.

1. The nature of prime matter

1.1. Matter as a substrate of change

Ockham’s notion of prime matter owes much to Duns Scotus, who
contended that if matter were nothing it could not receive forms.8
Scotus claims that:

“Matter” means a certain being (entitatem) outside the mind and its
causes, and it is through this being that it can receive substantial
forms, which are purely and simply acts.9

Scotus opposes Aquinas, according to whom prime matter does

not have its own being distinct from form: taken in itself it is not an

essentialiter omnium generabilium et corruptibilium, sed quia materiae omnium

generabilium non includunt formas quibus distinguuntur formaliter.’
6. See especially Gracia 1988 and Gracia 1994.
7. See for example Scotus, Opera Omnia, II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, 391-392: ‘Primo
quaerendum est de distinctione individuali in substantiis materialibus [. . . ] utrum
substantia materialis ex se sive ex natura sua sit individua vel singularis.’
8. Scotus, Opera Omnia, II, d. 12, q. 1, 666.
9. Scotus, Opera Omnia, II, d. 12, q. 1, 672.

2
 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

actually existing being (ens aliquid actu existens) but a pure potentiality
to receive form and to exist.10 Indeed, it is form that gives being to
matter.11 For Scotus, on the contrary, matter has its own being and
does not receive it from form. Following Scotus, Ockham defines prime
matter as

a certain thing which exists in act in the nature of things, which is in

potency to every substantial form, while not necessarily having any
of them, even if one always is in it.12

Ockham’s definition is based on Scotus’ distinction between objec-

tive potency and subjective potency.13 For something to be in objective
potency means that it is not but can be. In this sense, there is no being
that is in potency, since a being actually exists and actuality and po-
tency in this sense are mutually exclusive.14 Matter is in potency only
in the subjective sense that it does not necessarily have every form it
could have.15 Hence matter exists in itself in act and does not take its
being from substantial form.16
According to Ockham, the metaphysical possibility that matter
exists without this or that form is sufficient for there to be a real
distinction between matter and form.17 Moreover, each substantial
form is such that it could exist without this or that matter. On this
point, he is quite close to Scotus.18 However, Ockham’s position has
some peculiarities which are quite important.

10. Aqinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Expositio, 8.1, n.1687.

11. Aqinas, De principiis naturae, 43.
12. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula, I, 9, Opera Philosophica
(from now on abbreviated as: OPh), VI, p. 179, l. 5-8. The reasons why Ockham
stipulates a real distinction between matter and form have been studied by White
1984.
13. Scotus, Opera Omnia, II, d. 12, q. 1, 670.
14. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Exp. Phys. III, 2, § 1, OPh IV, p. 415,
l.25.
15. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 10, OPh VI, p. 182, l.
27-39.
16. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Exp. Phys. I, 18, OPh IV, p. 206, l.
26-30.
17. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 9, Oph VI, p. 179, l. 8-11.
18. Scotus, Opera Omnia, II, d. 12, q. 1, 671.

3
 Magali Roques

Scotus argues that since matter and form are really distinct from
each other and since matter is ontologically prior to substantial form, it
is possible for God to make matter without any form.19 Ockham thinks
that Scotus’ point relies on a fallacy. It is not acceptable to reason that
since matter can be without this or that form, it can be without any
form.20 This reasoning is not logically valid, because ‘form’ is taken
in a divided sense in the antecedent, and in a collective sense in the
consequent. However, it must not be denied that God is able, at least
in some cases, to make matter without any form,21 but this theological
possibility is not derived from the nature of matter.
This is why prime matter should not be thought of as a giant stuff
which is divided into chunks of matter by substantial forms, which
seems to be Scotus’ picture. Indeed, Ockham claims that prime matter
is by definition that than which nothing is simpler. Otherwise, matter
could be generated from a part of itself, which is, according to Ockham,
absurd.22 In other words, prime matter is only a substrate, i.e. what
is stipulated in order to account for substantial change, under the
hypothesis that nothing comes from nothing.
This is confirmed by Ockham’s claim that there is not just one prime
matter, but as many prime matters as there are composite substances.23
The terms ‘matter’ and ‘form’ are common nouns which do not refer to
anything universal. The reason is that matter and form are particulars.
As a consequence, there is no single matter that is numerically the
same in every composite.24
With this idea, Ockham differs significantly from Aquinas and
Scotus who both agree that prime matter of itself is just as common

19. Scotus, Opera Omnia, II, d. 12, q. 2, 682.

20. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL III-4, 12, OPh I, p. 829-830, l.
113-122.
21. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 9, q. 3, Opera Theologica
(from now on abbreviated as: OTh), p. 309, l. 5-17. These texts were not taken into
account by Adams in her analysis (see McCord Adams 1987, 645-647). In my view,
these texts do not support her reading of Ockham’s conception of prime matter as a
giant stuff.
22. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 11, OPh VI, p. 187, l.
18-23.
23. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 8, OPh VI, p. 177, l.
29-33.
24. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 12, OPh VI, p. 189, l. 32.

4
 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

as any substantial form. Ockham says that my prime matter is not

yours. We are not made of the same stuff. Let us examine now the
philosophical implications of this nominalistic affirmation.

1.2. A puzzle about individuation

Ockham defends the idea that every prime matter is of the same reason
in every composite substance, while every prime matter is numerically
distinct from any other prime matter. When Ockham says that chunks
of matter are of the same reason, he means that no chunk of matter is
determined to receive one form rather than another.25
Ockham justifies his claim by means of an argument based on
a structural property of substantial change, namely that change can
be transitive or, in Ockham’s terms, ‘immediate’. The conservation
of matter through change implies that matter is at least specifically
identical in every composite.26
Someone could argue that since matter can be numerically the
same through change, matter can be numerically the same in every
composite. Ockham cannot accept this idea because he thinks that
there are as many matters as there are composites. He argues that
this is a consequence of the fact that some forms are incompatible
with each other.27 Ockham’s point is quite interesting. However, this
argument presupposes what is to be proven, since it presupposes that
incompatible forms are received in numerically distinct matters.
Ockham therefore gives another argument, which is based on the
nature of prime matter. The argument has been called by M. McCord
Adams ‘the Argument From Distinct Places’.28 It runs as follows:

‘This prime matter is not numerically one in everything that can

be generated and corrupted. For my matter is not the same as your
matter. Nor is anything imaginable numerically the same in a man
and a donkey, since (1) nothing extended could exist simultaneously

25. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Rep. II, q. 12-13, OTh V, p. 291, l.
8-11.
26. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 12, OPh VI, p. 189, l.
12-19.
27. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 12, OPh VI, p. 189, l.
32-36.
28. McCord Adams 1987, 687-688.

5
 Magali Roques

in many places. Therefore, since (2) prime matter is truly extended,

(3) it will not be able to be numerically the same in those things that
are distinct in subject and place [. . . ]. Therefore (4) there are different
matters of different things.29 ’

The reason why matter is not numerically the same in every com-
posite would be that extension or quantity is incompatible with multi-
location. Quantity is a feature of some things (material substances
and qualities) which accounts for the fact that they have ‘partes extra
partes’.30 To have ‘partes extra partes’ means first to be extended and
divisible into parts that have a position,31 second to be impenetrable 32
and third to be in a place circumscriptively, i. e. whole in the whole
and part in part.33
Ockham’s argument seems to imply that spatio-temporal location
belongs to the identity conditions of chunks of matter. Let us examine
in a second part whether this is really the case.

2. The identity conditions of prime matter

2.1. The debate over individuation

Ockham’s claim is dependent on his position in the debate, at the
end of the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th century, over
the individuation of substances and accidents. Ockham rejects the
positions of Aquinas and Scotus as incoherent.

29. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Exp. Phys. I, 18, OPh IV, p. 207.
Ockham gives another formulation of this very same argument in another place
(Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 12, OPh VI, p. 190.
30. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL I, 44, OPh I, p. 137, l. 156-157;
Rep. IV, q. 6, OTh VIII, p. 71, l. 7-p. 72, l. 2; Rep. IV, q. 6, OTh VIII, p. 88, l. 22-24; Exp.
Praed. 10, OPh II, p. 210, l. 133-135.
31. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL I, 45, OPh I, p. 143, l. 128-131.
32. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, TCC 41, OTh X, p. 223, l. 50-54.
‘Distare localiter’ is equivalent to ‘not to be in the same place’, which is the definitional
property of impenetrability. See for example Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica,
Exp. Praed. 10, p. 215, l. 279-283.
33. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Rep. IV, q. 6, OTh VIII, p. 80. For
Ockham’s conception of the ontological status of quantity and its function in the
metaphysical structure of composite substances, see especially Maier 1955, 141-223
and McCord Adams 1987, 169-214.

6
 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

In Ockham’s view, Aquinas is interested in a general principle that

explains the possibility of numerical diversity within a species.34 Mat-
ter, as pure formless potency, lacks any distinctive character by which
it could diversify a received form into the many singular members
of a species. Thus, in order for a form to be multiplied and individ-
uated as a concrete material substance, it must be ‘received in this
particular matter, determined to this place and this time’.35 In short,
‘a form is individuated by being in matter subject to quantity’ 36 Such
matter, marked by quantity, is called ‘signate’ matter. The dimensions
demarcating an individual material substance from all other formally
identical individuals are definite at any instant in time, but are variable
over time. It is these ‘indeterminate’ dimensions that define signate
matter.37
Ockham contests Aquinas’ assertion that signate matter is the
cause of distinction among forms of the same species.38 He argues that
this assertion is circular because it implies that forms are individuated
by matter and matter by form 39 Even if this were granted, it would
still rely on the false hypothesis that a form’s nature determines which
amount of matter it needs. Indeed, by God’s power, any form can be
in any chunk of matter. If this is not the case, it is because of some
intrinsic limitation of the natural efficient cause that puts this form into
this chunk of matter.40 Aquinas should then accept that the principle
of individuation is the efficient agent which puts this form into this
matter. Obviously he cannot accept this, since he does not accept

34. For an extensive study of Aquinas’ theory of individuation and its evolution,
see Roland-Gosselin 1926, 104-117.
35. Aqinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, p. 97.
36. Aqinas, Summa Theologicae, I, q. 115, a.1, ad 3. Against the standard objection
that mere accidents cannot fulfill the task of pluralizing and individualizing a physical
substance, see Aqinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, ad. 2, p. 99.
37. Aqinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 4, a.2, c, p. 97-98.
38. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord. d. 7, q. 3, OTh III, p. 149, l.
12-13.
39. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord. d. 7, q. 3, OTh III, p. 149, l.
21-p. 150.
40. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord. d. 7, q. 3, OTh III, p. 151, l.
21-p. 152, l. 8.

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 Magali Roques

that the cause of individuation is extrinsic to what is individuated.41

Aquinas’ theory is therefore simply inconsistent.
Let us come to Scotus, who seeks an account of what makes some
member of a species the very individual that it is. Scotus is looking for
an intrinsic individuator.42 Scotus’s strategy is to revise the very no-
tions of identity and difference, by accepting a new kind of distinction
that lies between rational distinction and real distinction. An individual
substance is a composite of two parts that are really identical with each
other, one of which is a common nature, the other is an individuating
principle called ‘haecceity’ or ‘thisness’.43 These parts are formally
distinct from each other.
Ockham’s well-known attack on Scotus consists in showing that
the notion of ‘formal distinction’ is ill-grounded, at least for creatures.44
Ockham’s main weapon rests on the Principle of the Indiscernability
of Identicals: if a is identical with b, then whatever is true of a is true of
b.45 Since the individual difference is not formally distinct from itself,
it follows that ‘the nature is not formally distinct from the individual
difference 46 ’, which contradicts Scotus’s own thesis.
In answer to Scotus, Ockham holds that no principle or cause
accounts for the individuality of the individual, and thus there is no
metaphysical problem of individuation at all.47 Rather, individuality
is primitive and needs no explanation. In light of this conclusion,

41. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord. d. 7, q. 3, OTh III, p. 151, l.

15-20.
42. Scotus, Opera Omnia, Ord. II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 57, Vat. ed. vol. VII, p. 416, l.
20 - p. 417, l. 4. See also Scotus, Opera Omnia, Ord. II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 57, Vat. ed.
vol. VII, p. 413 l. 4-11.
43. As R. Adams suggests, ‘A thisness is the property of being identical with a
certain particular individual, not the property that we all share, of being identical with
some individual or other, but my property of being identical with me, your property
of being identical with you, etc.’Adams 1979, 6.
44. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL II, 2, OPh I, p. 254, l. 139-143. On
Ockham’s attack on the formal distinction, see especially McCord Adams 1987, 13-70.
45. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 2, q. 1, OTh II, p. 16, l. 15-19.
46. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL I, 16, OPh I, p. 56.
47. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 2, q. 6, OTh II, p. 196, l. 1-6;
SL I, 16, OPh I, p. 55, l. 30-31. For a more detailed account of Ockham’s position on
the problem of individuation, see Maurer 1994, 373-397.

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 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

how should we understand Ockham’s idea that chunks of matter are

numerically distinct because their extensions are numerically distinct?

2.2. Ockham on identity and distinction

The basic notion at stake is numerical identity. Numerical identity
holds between things, not names.48 It can hold only between a thing
and itself.49 Numerical identity characterizes only individuals.50 Its
opposite is plurality, because everything which is numerically one is not
many nor is it in many.51 To put it roughly, individuality consists in the
possession of determinate self-identity and numerical distinctness from
other things. Identity and distinction are modal relational properties.52
Ockham makes the indiscernibility of identicals the primary crite-
rion of distinction among real things.53 In other words, things which
do not have the same properties are distinct.54 This is not a new idea in
Ockham’s time.55 Indeed, Aquinas says that ‘Things that are identical
are related to each other such that whatever is predicated of the one
is also predicated of the other.56 ’ He appeals to the contrapositive
of the indiscernibility of identicals to establish distinctions.57 Scotus
argues similarly in a context dealing with Trinity: a divine person and
the divine essence are distinct on the ground that they are subject to

48. In this last case, one speaks of a relation of co-designation.

49. See for example Scotus, Opera Omnia, Ord., 1.2.2.1-4, n. 403, ed. Vat. vol. II p.
356.13-15.
50. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL I, 39, OPh I, p. 111, l. 63-65; SL I,
14, OPh I, p. 48, l. 14-15; SL II, 2, OPh I, p. 253, l. 109-110.
51. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord. d. 2, q. 4, OTh 2, p. 114; SL II,
2, OPh I, p. 254, l. 126-128; SL III-1, 5, p. 380, l. 104-106.
52. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 26, q. un., OTh IV, p. 537, l.
5-7.
53. See especially McCord Adams 1976, for a first attempt to relate Ockham’s
criterion for real distinction to the principle of identity of indiscernibles. In this article,
McCord Adams does not distinguish between the identity of indiscernibles and the
indiscernibility of identicals.
54. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 2, q. 6, OTh II, p. 173-174.
55. For the following remarks on Aquinas and Scotus, see especially Cross, forth-
coming.
56. Aqinas, Summa Theologicae, I, q. 40, a. 1, obj. 3.
57. Aqinas, Summa Theologicae, I, d. 39, a. 1, obj. 2.

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 Magali Roques

different predications.58 Like Aquinas, he thinks that a strong version

of the principle of non-contradiction can be used to solve questions
of identity and distinction: ‘the distinction between things can be
immediately inferred from the first principle’. 59
Ockham likewise appeals to the principle of non-contradiction to
argue from identity to indiscernibility:
But among creatures the same thing cannot be truly affirmed and
truly denied of the same thing. Therefore they are not the same.60

Indeed, according to Ockham, ‘contradiction is the most powerful

way of proving a real distinction of things from one another’. 61 Identity
is not relative, since discernibility is without qualification a property
of any distinction.62 Ockham regards identity as primitive and non-
reducible.
In this sense, Ockham’s position on identity is opposed to positions
that claim that numerical identity can be analyzed in terms of some
other concept. The most prominent among such reductionist views is
the Leibnizian view according to which the individuality of an entity
supervenes on the entity’s properties.
This approach to individuality is associated with the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles, which expresses a relation between
objects and their properties. Stated crudely, it says that objects that
are indiscernible are identical. The principle is also associated with a
certain theory of substance held by Leibniz, Hume and Russell, known
as the bundle theory. According to this theory, substances are identical
to their properties. Two substances cannot differ solely in number.63
Ockham’s Argument From Distinct Places is meant to answer this
question: is the nonidentity of numerically distinct matters grounded?
The answer is clearly affirmative, on the ground that if something is
extended, it is not multi-located. This supposes that there are no two

58. Scotus, Opera Omnia, Ord. I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1-4, n. 388, Vat. ed. vol. II, p. 349.
59. Scotus, Opera Omnia, Ord. II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 201, Vat. ed. vol. VII, p. 102.
60. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 2, q. 6, OTh II, p. 173-174.
See also Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL I, 16, OPh I, p. 56, l. 71-73.
61. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 2, q. 6, OTh II, p. 174, l. 2-3.
62. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Ord., d. 2, q. 1, OTh II, p. 14, l. 10-12.
63. The principle, with no restrictions on what to count as a property, is trivially
true. On this subject, see especially Adams 1979 and Black 1952.

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 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

(quantified) things that are in the same place at the same time. This
implies in turn that Ockham admits the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles, which is, in one of Leibniz’ formulations:

There are never in nature two beings which are perfectly alike and
in which it would not be possible to find a difference that is internal
or founded upon an intrinsic denomination.64

Put another way, Ockham’s argument implies a denial of differ-

ences solo numero in at least one case. We must find a qualitative
fact that explains why my matter is not yours, even if they are the
same specifically. Ockham seems to think that this qualitative fact is
related to spatial position. The basic idea is that spatial position is
nonrepeatable, i.e. it cannot characterize more than one thing.
Ockham’s argument is baffling because it seems to suppose that, in
at least one case, he accepts that something explains why something is
nonrepeatable. How can this exception be justified?

2.3. Ockham’s use of the Identity of Indiscernibles

Let us begin by recalling that Leibniz committed himself to a strong
version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, one takes into
account only monadic intrinsic properties. However, a weaker form of
the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is possible. This weaker
principle allows for things that are otherwise qualitatively identical
to be numerically distinct by the mere fact that they exist in different
places. This would explain the first premise of the Argument From
Distinct Places, which seems to imply that if there are two chunks of
matter, then they are in different places.
The argument appeals to multiple location rather than to impene-
trability. The principle of impenetrability states that no two individuals
can exist at the same spatial location at the same time. This is an as-
sumption of Russell’s use of the identity of indiscernibles.65 It is by
means of positional qualities that different things are individuated.

64. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Monadology, p. 42. For Leibniz’s position, see
among others Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1990; Rodriguez-Pereyra, forthcom-
ing.
65. For the relation between impenetrability, ‘determinate’ or ‘indeterminate’
dimensions and quantity, see especially Donati 1998.

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 Magali Roques

Positional qualities ground individuation for one such quality cannot

be ‘in’ two discrete things at the same time by the synthetic a priori
laws of space.66
Nevertheless, Ockham’s Argument From Distinct Places presup-
poses the principle of impenetrability. Indeed, when trying to confirm
his argument, he affirms that matter can be divided into parts that are
extended, which implies in turn that these parts impenetrable to each
other:

‘Further, matter is extended, and therefore it has part distant from

part. But it is certain that matter can be divided, at least inasmuch
as the whole can be divided. Therefore when the whole has been
divided into parts, one part of the matter will be in one part and the
other part of the matter in the other part. Therefore there are distinct
matters there, and consequently it is not the same matter that exists
in all distinct things existing at the same time.67 ’

Moreover, Ockham does not defend an absolutist conception of

space. Distance relations defined in dynamic terms do all the work.68
Particular places and times are intrinsically featureless and so lack
any internal basis for differentiation among themselves. In this sense,
they are structurally similar to Scotus’ haecceities inasmuch as one
can speak of the distance relation as an intrinsic individuator.
Ockham’s position suffers from an important weakness related to
the thesis that numerically distinct chunks of matter are specifically
the same. If matter is of the same reason in every composite, there is no
reason why all chunks of matter cannot be considered integral parts of
a single, big prime matter. Indeed, if matters are specifically the same
in every composite, then everything which is predicated of any term
referring to a prime matter is predicated of any other term referring

66. Russell 1948, 310-320. See also Russell 1946, 24: ‘For my part, I hold that a
“thing” is nothing but a bundle of qualities and that, therefore, two different things
cannot be exactly alike. But I hold this only because I regard position in space as
defined by means of certain qualities not usually recognized as such.’
67. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 12, OPh VI, p. 190.
68. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Exp. Praed. 16, OPh II, p. 300, l.
66-67: ‘positio non dicit nisi partes diversimode distantes inter se.’

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 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

to another prime matter except ‘to be there’. This is the definitional

property of an integral part.69
The upshot of this argument is that one cannot affirm like Ockham
that every chunk of matter is countable,70 because ‘matter’ is a mass
noun. M. McCord Adams is right to say that Ockham fails to distin-
guish mass nouns and count nouns and that this failure has important
consequences for the identity conditions of prime matter.71
Even if it is granted that ‘matter’ behaves like a count noun, Ock-
ham cannot affirm that matters are countable as he does. Indeed, ac-
cording to him, for things to be countable, it does not matter whether
things are in distinct places or not.72
Nevertheless, one could think that Ockham’s position holds if one
says that matter is individuated by its location only insofar as it is a
constituent of a natural substance. In the argument proposed to confirm
the Argument From Distinct Places, Ockham says that ‘matter can be
divided, at least inasmuch as the whole can be divided’. Either matter is
here part of a giant matter or it is part of the substantial composite. That
matter must be understood here as part of the composite is confirmed
by Ockham’s claim that impenetrability only stands for composite
substances and not for prime matter alone.73 In this sense, Ockham’s
Argument From Distinct Places would mean that it is hard to see how
two composite entities could share literally part of their constituents
and still be two, while being in distinct places.
However, this implies that the identity conditions of the parts
of a substance depend on the identity conditions of the substance,

69. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Exp. Praed. 10, OPh II, p. 212, l.
194-197.
70. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Exp. Phys. I, 16, OPh IV, p. 170, l.
22-27.
71. McCord Adams 1987, 686: ‘Actually, Ockham’s way of talking obliterates any
distinction between count-nouns and mass-nouns: he counts, not parcels or quantities
of stuffs or prime matter, but stuffs and prime matters. For instance, he speaks of
“two waters”, rather than two glasses of water or volumes of water, coming to make
numerically one water. Having thus assimilated stuffs to things as alike countable,
Ockham not surprisingly advances the following principle: each generated composite
has its own prime matter that is numerically distinct from the prime matter of any
other simultaneously existing generated composite.’
72. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, SL I, 45, OPh I, p. 143, l. 108-114.
73. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, TCC 41, OTh X, p. 222, l. 9-20.

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 Magali Roques

which means that there is some metaphysical priority of the whole

over the parts. This runs counter to Ockham’s reductionist conception
of material substance according to which a composite substance is
nothing more than its parts disposed in a certain way.74

Conclusion

To conclude, in his reflections on the identity conditions of prime

matter, Ockham seems to change his conception of identity, moving
from a view of individuality as based on mere numerical difference
and countability, to a view of identity as discernibility grounded in
spatio-temporal location. This move does not come from the fact that
Ockham claims that prime matter is an entity in act with a nature of
its own, independently of any form. It comes instead from the fact
that Ockham is dissatisfied with the common idea of numerically the
same matter existing in every composite. Since he claims nevertheless
that matter is specifically the same in every composite, he is obliged to
find a qualitative ground for the numerical distinction between chunks
of prime matter. Ockham claims that differences of spatio-temporal
location explain why chunks of matter are numerically distinct. In this
sense, I disagree with M. McCord Adams, according to whom Ockham
sees prime matter as a giant stuff that gets divided into numerically
distinct matters by substantial forms.75
All in all, Ockham should not have given up his absolute concept
of identity in order to defend the idea that there are as many prime
matters as composite substances. He nevertheless has the merit of
having tackled a problem that had gone unnoticed by his predecessors.

74. Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, Summula I, 19, OPh VI, p. 207, l.
64-68.
75. McCord Adams 1987, 687: ‘Thus, despite wide disagreements about the on-
tological status of prime matter, Aquinas and Ockham seem to share the picture
of matter as extended into a giant cookie dough that gets divided into numerically
distinct matters with determinate boundaries by substantial forms that function as
cookie cutters!’. Massobrio follows McCord Adams in part, when she says Massobrio
1984, 199: ‘If I am right, it will turn out that Ockham does not really need something
to individuate matter over and above matter itself, in some sense at least. I think he
will be able to rely on the location of matter and on the inherence of forms in matter
for its individuation.’

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 The Identity Conditions of Prime Matter According to William of Ockham

Magali Roques
magali.roques@unige.ch

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