STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
India’s Opposition to
China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor Is Flawed
Atul Bhardwaj
China is opening up its land
borders in Xinjiang to interact
more freely with Central
Asia and Europe. China and
Pakistan are jointly building
the China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor, which passes through
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India
views this as a violation of its
sovereignty. Geopolitics rather
than geoeconomics predominates
India’s thinking on possibilities
offered by the revival of the old
Silk Road by the Chinese.
Atul Bhardwaj (atul.beret@gmail.com) is
Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science
Research, at the Institute of Chinese Studies,
Delhi.
10
T
he 3,000 km-long China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) consis-
ting of highways, railways, and
pipelines is the latest irritant in the
India–China relationship. The corridor
connects China’s landlocked western
province of Xinjiang to Gwadar port in
south Pakistan. India feels that the cor-
ridor infringes on its sovereignty because
it passes through Gilgit–Baltistan in
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Paki-
stan and China have invited India to be a
part of the CPEC, but India has declined
the offer. Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar,
addressing the second Raisina Dialogue,
an international conference held in New
Delhi, in mid-January 2017, said that
China remained oblivious to the impact
that the CPEC project would have on
India’s sovereignty. India is also con-
cerned over the China–Pakistan naval
cooperation in Gwadar port, the entry
point to the CPEC. In January 2017, China
handed over two ships to the Pakistan
Navy for the security of Gwadar port.
India’s outright opposition to the CPEC
and its indifference towards the Chinese
One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative are
difficult to comprehend. Connectivity
with Central Asia and Europe through
its northern frontiers would be economi-
cally more beneficial for India than con-
tinued reliance on the shipping lanes. The
problem is that the Indian strategic psy-
che is fixated on seeing control of oceans
as the only means to acquire greatness.
It is for this reason that it demands free-
dom of navigation on the oceans, but
opposes smooth trade flows across soft
borders on land. If trade has the right to
move freely on sea lanes of communica-
tion (SLOCs), then land-based trade should
also be allowed to move with relative ease.
Border disputes should not be allowed
january 28, 2017
to interfere with land lanes of communi-
cation (LLOCs). In fact, India should wel-
come the revival of the old Silk Road as it
gives India more choices and reduces its
dependence on trade routes controlled
by the United States (US).
India’s foreign policy approach in respect
of the CPEC is worrisome. It is demand-
ing respect for India’s sovereign rights in
PoK from China; something that it has
been unable to extract from Pakistan in
the past 70-odd years. India has never
raised any concerns about US involve-
ment in PoK. No cognisance is paid to the
funding of education projects by United
States Agency for International Develop-
ment in PoK. Unfortunately, India con-
tinues to see China through the Cold
War lens. It sees the emerging Chinese
empire, but remains oblivious to the
well-entrenched US empire. It sees
Chinese ships and submarines in the
Indian Ocean, but fails to see the US air-
craft carriers reign supreme in every
nook and corner of the ocean. The fact is
that US proximity to the Pakistani ruling
elite as well as its military failed to dis-
suade it from conducting nuclear tests in
1998 and foment a protracted proxy war
against India. Yet, it is intriguing that
India is willing to put all its eggs in the
US basket.
History of Connectivity
Xinjiang, the northwest province of China,
is the pivot of Eurasia. The province borders
Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakhstan,
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajik-
istan. Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, is
coming up as the hub for China–Europe
freight trains. More than 328 cargo
trains have been launched from Urumqi
since 2014. In November 2016, a daily
cargo train was launched from Urumqi
to Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan.
The importance of Xinjiang was well-
understood by the American scholar
Owen Lattimore in 1950. His book—Pivot
of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian
Frontiers of China and Russia—owes its
origin to a seminar held at Johns Hopkins
University. It was an attempt to under-
stand the geopolitical importance of the
Chinese province and the role it could
vol liI no 4 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

play in engineering the Sino–Soviet
split. The book also looked at how India,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan could assist
the US strategy in the region. This was
the time when Mao Zedong and Joseph
Stalin agreed to put a lid on their nation-
alists’ urges to dominate Sinkiang and
build rail bridges. However, after Stalin’s
death and the arrival of Nikita Khrush-
chev on the scene, the pace of the pro-
posed rail links from Xinjiang to Central
Asia slowed down.
Before partition, India had two openings
into Xinjiang. The first was the 600-mile-
long Ladakh route extended from Kash-
gar to Yarkand and then over Karako-
ram pass to Leh. The second was the
460-mile-long caravan route from Kash-
gar to Gilgit. Besides for commerce, the
routes were used by Hajj pilgrims from
Xinjiang. The Hajis, who entered India
through Gilgit, reached Karachi for their
onward journey. Those who entered
India via Leh went to Bombay for further
journey by ship.
Post partition, the British ensured
that Gilgit remained a part of PoK. This
cut off the Ladakhi links with Central
Asia. In the wake of the communist take-
over of Xinjiang, the Indian government
decided to scrutinise people entering Leh
from the Chinese side. This put severe
restrictions on trade between the two
countries. The British also ensured that
the Gilgit connectivity with Kashgar was
snapped. The net result was that India
had no option but to use the oceans to
trade with Central Asia. In fact, after the
consolidation of the Soviet empire in
Central Asia, Britain discouraged India–
Central Asia trade. The years 1920–21
are considered the best for India–Central
Asia trade. During that period, the total
trade stood at `93 lakh with exports val-
ued at `47 lakh and imports at `46 lakh
(National Archives of India 1949).
Interestingly, Britain, which was instru-
mental in locking the borders in the sub-
continent and ensuring that international
commercial transaction used SLOCs, is
now keen to be a part of the CPEC. Last
year, Britain’s Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs Boris
Johnson termed the CPEC a wonder pro-
ject in which he expected United Kingdom
firms to grab big contracts (Hasnain
Economic & Political Weekly EPW january 28, 2017
2016). Even Russia is keen to partake in
opportunities offered by the CPEC. In
early 1942, when the Chinese govern-
ment had approached the Soviet and the
British governments with a proposal to
transport 4,000 tonnes of war supplies
to China via Iran, the Caspian Sea, the
railroad leading therefrom to Tashkent,
and thence overland via the Urumchi
route, the Russians refused to open
access to the Soviet Union. That was a
time when the Russians were wary of
the Americans, British, Japanese, and
Germans (Office of the Historian 1942).
The harsh reality is that the Anglo–
American shadow continues to loom large
over the India–China relationship. In 1949,
when the Chinese Communist Party
took control of Xinjiang, the US consul in
Kashgar, S Paxton fled to India via the
Leh route. This event was published in the
Indian media in 1949 and public opinion
was built up against the Chinese com-
munists. Douglas Mackiernan, Paxton’s
junior in the US consulate did not accom-
pany his boss to India. Instead, he took
a route from Xinjiang towards Tibet
where he was shot at by a Tibetan. The
Chinese blame him for fomenting rebel-
lion in Xinjiang. It was later revealed by
Thomas Laird, in his book Into Tibet:
The CIA’s First Atomic Spy and His Secret
Expedition to Lhasa, that Mackiernan did
work for the Central Intelligence Agency
and was one of their first spies engaged
in gathering intelligence on Soviet nuclear
developments.
Pakistan on CPEC
Much like in India, there are many in
Pakistan opposed to the concept of the
CPEC. The domination of the Punjabi
elite in Pakistan in deciding the routes
and special economic zones along the
corridor has led to a growing perception
that the CPEC stands for the “China Pun-
jab Economic Corridor” (Quint 2016).
Several rebel and separatist organisa-
tions in Balochistan are opposed to the
CPEC on the grounds that it is inimical to
the interests of their state. Residents of
Balochistan fear that new roads will bring
in outsiders, which will alter the demo-
graphy of the state and cause greater
ethnic tension. Many residents of Gilgit–
Baltistan also fear the encroachment
vol liI no 4
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
and exploitation of their land and its
resources by unscrupulous outsiders.
Some extremist outfits in Pakistan have
begun to target Chinese workers engaged
in the construction of mega projects
there. Besides, environmentalists are
equally unhappy with the adverse impact
that rapid and massive development will
have on the fragile ecosystem in the
mountainous region. It is assessed that
mega projects, which include the Karachi–
Lahore rail link, coal-based power plants,
and other infrastructure projects, are
likely to quicken the pace of climate
change in the region.
But, such concerns are brushed aside
by the supporters of the CPEC who see it
as a “game changer.” The CPEC brings in
Chinese investments to the tune of $46
billion and a promise to infuse fresh
energy into Pakistan’s economy. Many
also see the CPEC as an opportunity to
break the umbilical cord that has kept
Pakistan tied to the West. For the past
six decades, the Pakistani military estab-
lishment has actively engaged in helping
the US achieve its strategic aims. Affluent
China is seen as a potential counterweight
to the US. Perhaps, the Pakistani elite want
to play Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-align-
ment game and be the proverbial clever
calf that “sucks two cows” (Baru 2017).
The neutrality game in international
politics is not as simplistic as foreign pol-
icy experts and economists would have
us believe. It is naïve to assume that non-
aligned “calves” were clever and the two
Cold War “cows” stupid. India as a non-
aligned buffer state was as much a Cold
War strategic imperative as it was Nehru’s
dream. While the US offered India eco-
nomic aid in the 1950s, it also extracted
its pound of flesh; not simply in terms of
cheap manganese for its steel industry,
but also by stirring up the hornets’ nest
in Tibet. Nehru professed neutrality and
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11
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
simultaneously aided US military opera-
tions in Tibet. At the same time, trouble
in Tibet was not antithetical to Soviet
interests; just as the Suez crisis was not
anti-US. A tamed China was essential for
the Soviets to maintain their hold over
the socialist bloc. It was equally crucial
for the US to kick out the English and
French colonialists to shape the post-war
world order on its own terms.
Therefore, it is premature to assume
that the Pakistan–China nexus is well
entrenched and the US has walked out of
the relationship like a loser. It is unthink-
able that the US will let go of its Pakistani
collaborators and allow its hegemony to
be destroyed so easily. It is in this con-
text that one needs to locate the linkages
in the US strategy that permits Pakistan
to get closer to China. The popularisa-
tion of the perception that the “China–
Pakistan nexus” was out to devour India
ensures that Indian public opinion con-
tinues to view China as an enemy and
the US as its saviour; just as the coming
closer of India and the Soviet Union had
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12
created a perception in China that Soviet
friendship could not be trusted. Such
divisive politics benefits the US since it
causes fissures in the camp that has
some potential to oppose it.
The possibility of an India–China–
Russia triangular relationship haunted
the US in the initial years of the Cold War.
Despite similarities, the current inter-
national political game is fundamentally
different from the post-war scenario. In
1945, both the declining as well as the
ascending nations were maritime pow-
ers and military allies. The US, when it
replaced the British empire, did not
disturb the maritime trade routes and
regimes that Britain had assiduously
built over two centuries. In the present
situation, China, a continental power, is
rising and challenging the existing mari-
time order. China is palpably relying on
land-based trade routes rather than oce-
anic commercial lanes. It is creating
alternative channels for trade move-
ment across continents. The US wants
maximum international trade to flow on
january 28, 2017
the oceans that it commands. Trade
flows across the Silk Route will draw a
huge proportion of commerce away
from the oceans, thus eroding the ability
of the US to control and extract rent
from international trade flows.
REFERENCES
Baru, Sanjay (2017): India and the World: Essays on
Geoeconomics and Foreign Policy, New Delhi:
Academic Foundation.
Hasnain, Khalid (2016): “Boris Wants UK Firms to
Be Part of CPEC,” Dawn, 26 November, viewed
on 14 January 2017, http://www.dawn.com/
news/1298747.
National Archives of India (1949): “Revival of Trade
with Central Asia Unlikely,” Statesman, 4 Nov-
ember, MEA/F/303/CJK.
Office of the Historian (1942): “Efforts to Establish
a Supply Route to China via Iran, the Soviet
Union, and Sinkiang, 893.24/1314: Telegram,
The Ambassador in Soviet Union (Standley) to
the Secretary of State,” 10 April, Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1942, China, Bureau of Public Affairs, United
States Department of State, viewed on 23 Jan-
uary 2017, https://history.state.gov/historical-
documents/frus1942China/pg_591.
Quint (2016): “CPEC: Pakistan’s Newest Holy Cow
Could Also Become Its Millstone,” 20 December,
viewed on 25 December 2016, https://www.the-
quint.com/world/2016/12/20/cpec-pakistans-
newest-holy-cow-could-also-become-its-mill
stone-china.
Features
Presents all-India
and state-wise
annual data from
1981 onwards.
Structured in three
sections :
• Literacy in India
• School Education
• Higher Education
Includes data on
SC/ST students and
school education in
rural areas.
vol liI no 4 EPW Economic & Political Weekly