Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

FACTS:

The case was an original action filed by Jose Angara for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain
and prohibit the Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the former.

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, et.al., were candidates for the position of National Assembly member
for 1st district of Tayabas Province.

On October 7, 1935, Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Angara as the winner. Angara then
took his oath of office. National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 (Confirming the election of
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had been filed)

Subsequently, Respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against
the election of Angara. Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
“The commission will not consider any protest that is not submitted on or before this day (Dec. 9)”

Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to dismiss the protest” on the ground that it
must uphold Resolution No. 8 of National Assembly. Ynsua countered that there is no constitutional
prohibition barring the filing of protest.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying the “Motion to dismiss the Protest” filed
by Angara.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission as well as the subject
matter of the controversy (Resolution of National Assembly or Resolution of EC) – YES.

2. WoN the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when: (1)it assumed
cognizance of the protest despite the previous confirmation by the National Assembly; (2) it adopted
its resolution in Dec. 9 – NO.

3. WoN Resolution No. 8 can “nullify” filing of protest or toll the time of filing protest effectively
rendering the resolution of the Electoral Commission moot – NO.

RATIO:

1. On judicial review

“In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.”
Sec. 4 of Art VI provides EC the sole power of deciding such matters. Also, from the transcript of the
Framers’ discussion, it is clearly the intention of the Framers to give EC “sole” jurisdiction over
election protests.

Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of powers within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere but it does not follow that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

Constitution institutes the system of checks and balances. Moderating power of the court is granted
by clear implication from section 2 article VIII of the Constitution.

The judiciary does not intend to assert superiority over other departments or deliberately nullify of
invalidate acts of the legislature. It merely asserts the obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims for authority under the Constitution and establish rights for the parties.

“Power of judicial review is limited only to actual cases and controversies…and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.”

2. On the legality of the Electoral Commission’s acts

National Assembly has no jurisdiction over election protests so it follows that they don’t have the
authority to prescribe the time or prevent the filing of protest. Separation within same branch of
government.

Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative. It acted
within its jurisdiction. The EC’s resolution will stand. National Assembly’s Resolution No. 8 should
neither prevent the filing of protest within the time prescribed in EC’s resolution nor “toll the time” in
filing protests.
Caltex vs. Palomar (G.R. L-19650, 09/29/1966)

FACTS:

Caltex conceived a promotional scheme which will increase its patronage for oil products called
“Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.” The contest calls for participants to estimate the number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. To participate, entry
forms are only needed which can be made available upon request at each Caltex station. No fee is
required to be paid nor purchase has to be made prior to participating. Foreseeing the extensive use
of mails to publicize the promotional scheme, Caltex made representations with the postal authorities
to secure advanced clearance for mailing. Caltex, through its counsel, posited that the contest does
not violate anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. The Postmaster General Palomar declined the
grant of the requested clearance. Caltex sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the
contest was pursued, a fraud order will be issued against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief

2. Whether or not the proposed contest violates the Postal Law

RULINGS:

The Court held that the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief since it
qualifies for the 4 requisites on invoking declaratory relief available to any person whose rights are
affected by a statute to determine any question of construction or validity. To the petitioner, the
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business while to the respondent,
suppression of the petitioner’s proposed contest believed to transgress the law he has sworn to
uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty.

Likewise, using the rules of Statutory Construction in discovering the meaning and intention of the
authors in a case clouded with doubt as to its application, it was held that the promotional scheme
does not violate the Postal Law in that it does not entail lottery or gift enterprise. Using the principle
“noscitur a sociis’, the term under construction shall be understood by the words preceding and
following it. Thus, using the definitions of lottery and gift enterprise which both has the requisites of
prize, chance and consideration, the promo contest does not clearly violate the Postal Law because
of lack of consideration.

Roderick Daoang and Rommel Daoang vs The Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (GR No. L-
34568, 28 March 1988) 159 SCRA 369

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father
and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified
to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

HELD:

The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who
cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the
word “descendant”, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to
“children”. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include
grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel
Daoang , the grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
judgement of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the
joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal
obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for
Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family
names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with “Agonoy”, which is the family name of the petitioners,
without pronouncements as to costs

Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest

Leonardo Paat vs Court of Appeals, et. Al. GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997 266 SCRA 167

FACTS

The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while
on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of
the truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action
for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the
DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against
petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because
the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD

The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action.
 The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness
of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation
of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the
part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would
be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained
by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower
court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the
return of the truck.

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa G.R. No. L-2230 August 30, 1967 En Banc

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On
August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made
revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns
the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent
appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the
accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he
is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is
covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit
that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the
accused is not exempted.

Del Mar v. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 138298 / November 29, 2000

SUMMARY. PAGCOR requested legal advice from the Secretary of Justice if it’s authorized under
its charter to operate jai-alai games (a form of sport). The Secretary of Justice said that PAGCOR
has the authority; hence PAGCOR has the power under its charter to operate. Petitioner del Mar filed
a petition for prohibition preventing PAGCOR from managing jai-alai since its illegal and devoid of
any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter. However, PAGCOR still entered in
an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME, hence, del Mar filed a Petition for Certiorari questioning
the validity of the agreement. Members of the House of Representative also filed a petition stating
that operation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in its scope. Respondents
then questioned the locus standi or legal standing of petitioners filing as taxpayers and members of
the House of representatives. As stated by the Court, they have legal standing to the case since it
affects public interest (involves taxes) and affects the powers of the legislative.

DOCTRINE. Locus Standi or Legal Standing to file a petition as taxpayers and member of the House
of Representatives

FACTS.

 PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is
authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country in relation to
Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.

 The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games
of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and
that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose.

 On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent PAGCOR from
managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games on the ground that the act is
patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.

 On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME
wherein the latter parties would provide all the required facilities and requirements for the
establishment and operation of jai-alai.
  On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the
validity of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, authority, legislative
franchise, or authority to enter into such agreement for the operation and establishment of jai-
alai games.

 A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition
for Injunction. A Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the
operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in PAGCOR’s scope.

 Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor Zubiri are suing as taxpayers and in
their capacity as the members of the House of Representatives.

 Respondent questions the locus standi or the standing of the petitioners to file the petition at
bar as taxpayers and as legislators because the operation of jai-alai does not involve the
disbursement of public funds.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition – YES.

As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is without an “oven ready” legal support. A party suing
as taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. The record shown under their agreement is barren of evidence that
the operation and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public money. The
Court also holds that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to
file the petition at bar. The operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the
legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. Hence, powers of Congress are being impared, so as
the powers of each of its members.

DECISION.

Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition

NOTES.

The states issue is only a “procedural issue” questioning when can taxpayers file a suit.

The substantive issue concerns whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the right to
manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT to operate
jai-alai because:

 It was not stated under its scope.

 In accordance with its historical creation, there is a separate Executive Order which controls
the operating of Jai-Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila. PACGOR’s franchise was
never given a franchise to operate jai-alai.
  Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from each other.

 PAGCOR is engaged in the business affected with public interest.

CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180016 / APRIL 29, 2014 / PERALTA J. / ESTAFA / AABPAYAD

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari

PETITIONER Lito Corpuz

RESPONDENT People of the Philippines

FACTS.

• Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990.

• Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at
the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.

• Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an
18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet,
with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.

• They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return
the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the
proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner,
the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
avail.

• A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz.

• On the prosecution, it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of
Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees.
For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business
with Tongcoy.

• However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was
made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used
as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he
did not even see.

• RTC and CA – accused is guilty of estafa.

ISSUE & RATIO.

1. WON the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if
sold, is a valid demand under one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC? –
YES.

Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be
used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. As
expounded in Asejo v. People:

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa
need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the
form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the
law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning
as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written
demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other
proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of
all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the
same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the
prejudice of the latter.

Caveat: There’s a discussion about the penalty for estafa, like need na daw sya i-amend. But the SC
didn’t impose the same kasi duty daw yun ng Congress. Basta, it’s long kasi kaya I didn’t include it
here. Check nyo nalang powz.
DECISION.

Petition denied.