Rule 115

1. What are the rights of the accused in a criminal proceeding?

Section 1. Rights of the accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable

doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may,
however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his
bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat.
When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right
to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon
motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of
counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination

on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased,
out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses

and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.


(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
2. Does presumption of innocence admit exemptions? Yes

Right of presumption of innocence

- means that the presumption must be overcome by evidence of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt means that there is moral certainty
as to the guilt of the accused. Conviction should be based on the strength of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The significance of this is that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt.

Rationale of right of presumption of innocence

- There ought to be a balance between the machineries of the State and the accused

Exceptions to the constitutional presumption of innocence

1. If there is a REASONABLE CONNECTION between the fact presumed

and the fact ultimately proven from such fact.
Examples:

When an accountable public officer fails to account for funds or property

that should be in his custody, he is presumed to be guilty of
malversation; 


Persons in possession of recently stolen goods are presumed guilty of the

offense in connection with the goods. 


2. In cases of SELF-DEFENSE, the person who invokes the self-defense is

presumed guilty. The burden of proving the elements of self-defense is
incumbent upon the accused.

3. When does right to counsel arise?

The right to counsel is an inherent part of due process.

The right to counsel attaches as soon as the person becomes the focus and object
of police interrogation. And the accused needs the guidance of counsel at every
stage in the proceedings against him. (Escobido vs. the State of Illinois)

4. Is the client bound by his lawyer’s mistake?

Yes
Generally, the client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. To trivialize this
rule would bring about a dangerous trend of endless litigation, as parties to a case
could simply change counsels and claim that due to some mistake committed by their
former counsel, they are entitled to new trial.

Exception: when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and

inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.

- If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the

error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise
has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be
reopened to give the client another chance to present his case.

The defendant, in order to secure a new trial must satisfy the court that he has a good
defense and that the acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction
of the omitted evidence. What should guide judicial action is that a party be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.

5. What is the difference between waiver or right to counsel during custodial

investigation and during trial?

During trial, the right to counsel means the right to effective counsel. During
trial, the purpose of the counsel is not so much to protect the accused from being
forced to confess, but rather to defend the accused.

On the other hand, a custodial investigation has stricter requirements. A

custodial investigation requires the presence of a competent and independent counsel,
who is preferably the accused’s own choice. Furthermore, the right to counsel could
only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel.

6. Is the right to counsel absolute?

No since the right of choice must be exercised in a reasonable manner within

reasonable time. The accused cannot insist on a counsel that he cannot afford, or one
who is not a member of the bar, or one who declines for a valid reason. Also, the right
of the accused to choose counsel is subject to the right of the state to due process and
adequate justice.

7. Is right to counsel applicable in administrative investigation?

No. A party in an administrative proceeding may or may not be assisted by

counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person
with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement. There is no
law, jurisprudence, or rule which mandates that an employee be assisted by counsel in
an administrative case. Assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative
proceedings.

8. What is meant by Silence in Rules of Evidence?

9.What is the extent of the right against self-incrimination?

The right against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion only and the
compulsion to produce incriminating documents, papers, and chattels. It does not
cover the compulsion to produce real or physical evidence using the body of the
accused.

10.Exceptions to right against self-incrimination?

The right cannot be invoked when the State has the right to inspect documents under
its police power, such as documents of corporations.
11.What is the purpose of right to confrontation
1. To allow the court to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying.
2. To give the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in order to test
their recollection and credibility.

12. In people vs Berdaje (99 SCRA 388), how was the compulsory process to
secure attendance of defense witness stressed?
Again, one of the rights of an accused is "to have compulsory process issued to secure
the attendance of witnesses on his behalf. ADELINO had stated that, while
MARCELINA was in the house of Ceferino Armada, she curled the hair of Narita.
One of the latter's children, as well as the hair of other girls in the vicinity. In capital
cases, it should be desirable that, whenever a discrepancy is noted between the
designation of the crime made by the Fiscal and the crime described by the facts
pleaded in his Information. The lower Court should call attention of the accused to the
discrepancy, so that the accused may be fully apprised of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. This was not done in regards to ADELINO who all the time
was under the impression that he was being tried for Rape with Illegal Detention, and
not for Forcible Abduction with Rape. If ADELINO had known that he was being
tried for Forcible Abduction with Rape, he may have changed the strategy or tactics
of his defense. Not that it could be said he would have done so; but he should have
been advised he had the right, and given the opportunity, to do so.
ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and a subpoena had been
issued to her. But instead of taking effective steps to have Narita brought to Court, the
lower court gave responsibility for Narita's attendance to the defense, expressly
stating that, if the defense was not able to bring her to the Court, her testimony will be
dispensed with.
Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the lower
Court acted precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by ordering her arrest
if necessary ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have compulsory process issued
to secure the attendance of witnesses on his behalf."

13. What is the purpose of public trial?

The trial should be public in order to prevent abuses that may be committed by
the court to the prejudice of the defendant.
The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it
signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language
is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The
trial must be public.It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.The
thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is
afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity
and not tainted with any impropriety. (Garcia vs. Domingo)

14. Is there an exception to the requirement of public trial?

 Yes. The court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the evidence
to be presented may be offensive to decency or public morals, or in rape cases, where
the purpose of some persons in attending is merely to ogle at the parties.

15. In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has
been violated what are the guidelines set under MGen Carlos Garcia vs.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012)?

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical

reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows:

(1) the length of the delay;

(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

16. When is the right of the accused to speedy trial deemed violated? factors to
consider (Braza vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013)?

Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that
"[A]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition
of a case is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. The constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative
or flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances.
What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
which render rights nugatory.

17. What is meant to the notion that right to appeal is not a natural right but a
statutory right?

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. To do
so, the right to appeal is lost. Rules of Procedure are required to be followed. (Sps.
Ortiz vs. CA)

The rationale of this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are
designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. (di pako sure ani guys
pero mangita ko lain answers)
 Cases

1. MGen Garcia vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012
2. Cadet Cudia vs. PMA
3. US vs Katigbak et al. 35 Phil 367
4. Herrera v. Alba and Hon. Cuesta-Vilches, G.R. No.148220
5. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
6. Gutang vs People, 390 Phil. 805 (2000).
7. Garcia vs Domingo, 52 SCRA, 143)
8. Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013
9. Anita Ramirez vs people, G.R. 197832, October 2, 2013

1. MGen Garcia vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012

Facts:
On 2004, the Provost Martial General of AFP, Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by
command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters placing
Major General Carlos F. Garcia (MGen Garcia), under guard pending investigation of
his case; that he is not allowed to leave his quarters without the expressed permission
from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP; and that in case he needs immediate medical
attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in a hospital, he shall
likewise be under guard.
 A Charge Sheet was filed with the Special General Court Martial charging
petitioner of violations of:
1. 96th Article of War (Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman) –
that on or about 16 March 2004, he knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to
disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net Worth for the year 2002 and 2003.
- violate his solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and
serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an
immigrant/permanent residence of the USA in violation of the State policy governing
public officers,
2. 97th Article of War (Conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline), for knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully making untruthful statements
under oath of his true assets in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth
for the years 2002 and 2003.

Petitioner, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty and upon reaching the age of
56, compulsorily retired from military services. Pursuant to a Resolution, petitioner
was transferred from the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center. After six (6) years
and two (2) months of preventive confinement, was released from the Detention
Center. The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP and acting as the Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed
the sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner. Petitioner was
sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place the
reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. On 2011, petitioner was
arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for
certiorari and petition for habeas corpus, which was denied. Petitioner filed a motion
for but was also denied.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of his case was
violated.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the
provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time within which the
petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence
confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the
same law.

Ratio Decidendi:

No. The Court finds the issue to be without merit. No less than our
Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the
speedy disposition of cases.

In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has
been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines:
 (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons forsuch delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice ecaused by the delay.

It noted that Garcia did not allege any delay during the trial but only the delay
in the confirmation of the sentence by the President. The Court found such delay to
Garcia’s advantage because his sentence could not be served absent such
confirmation. Basically, the case has already been decided by the General Court
Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities without any
delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President.
The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the
General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by
the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. This is similar to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of
Appeals, where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still
held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain the delay violating his right to
speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason for the failure of
his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution.

Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights. In fact, the
delay in the confirmation of his sentence was to his own advantage, because without
the confirmation from the President, his sentence cannot be served.

2. Cadet Cudia vs PMA

G.R. No. 211362
February 24, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of
2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors
as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet
graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two
minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The
DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to
the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty
of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.

Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per
violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in
his written appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late
for the succeeding class. Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report.
The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1
guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the
chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)

conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued
placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to
Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.

Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of
the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights
Violations.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Cudia in utter disregard of his right to due process, education, and privacy of
communication, and in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying.

2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class

Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process,
education, and property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code.
All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of a military
academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interest for the proper
functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures
and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the
institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of the internal rules and regulations.

2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by

Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1,
Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only to “settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”
but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in
violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
3. US Vs. Catimbang
35 PHIL 367
November 24, 1916

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment convicting the two defendants and
appellants of the crime of theft. The prosecution established its evidence as follows:
On the night of November 30, 1914, two cows with their calves, tied closely by the
houses of their owners disappeared. After a fruitless search for the stolen animals the
owners reported their loss to the police. While looking for the animals, one of the
owners, Antonino Templo, met the accused Miguel Catimbang, told him of his loss,
and asked him to aid in the search. Catimbang promised to do so, and the next day in
reply to an inquiry as to whether he had seen the animals, asked Templo for P40 as
ransom for the return of his property, warning him that if he did not pay the money
demanded of him, he would lose the animals altogether. Templo did not have the
money demanded of him and failed to recover the animals. Soon thereafter Miguel
Catimbang was arrested, and having been set at liberty on bail, went to Templo's
house and promised to return Templo's animals if he would aid him to escape from
the criminal charges pending against him. Templo agreed, and sent two men to
Catimbang's house to get the animals. Catimbang gave them the calf which had been
stolen from Templo but despite his promises, he did not turn over the cow.

Two brothers, named Lirit, testified that the appellants, together with a third
person unknown, approached the witnesses, who were working on a hemp late, and
asked them to take care of two cows and their calves for a few days, until their owners
should ransom them. The party had the animals with them, and the description as
given by the witnesses tallied with that given by the owners of the two cows with
their calves. The brothers declined to take care of the cattle, and the party went away,
taking the animals with them.

The accused Catimbang went on the witness stand and testifying in his own
behalf, denied the truth of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution in so far
as it tended to show that he had ever been in possession of the animals or had any
guilty knowledge of the theft with which he was charged.

The other accused, Pedro Malauan, did not go on the witness stand, and the
only other witness called for the defense was the owner of the hemp late on which the
brothers Lirit said they were working when they saw the accused with the stolen
animals, who testified, in substance, that if the brothers were working on the
hemp late on that occasion, they were doing so without his authority.
The trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses testify, accepted as true the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, and declined to give any credence to
the denials of Catimbang testifying in his own behalf.
ISSUE: WON the Trial Court’s doctrine upon which the conviction rests runs counter
to the constitutional provisions which forbid that accused persons be required to
testify against themselves.

RULING: No. When the prosecution closes its case there must be enough evidence in
the record to establish the guilt of the accused if nothing further appears; and proof of
the possession of recently stolen goods taken together with proof of the commission
of the theft, may be and generally will be sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused, if there is nothing in the record to raise a doubt as to the guilty character of
the possession, though there is no presumption of law to that effect.

It then rests with the accused to rebut the inference of fact as to his guilt
arising from his possession of the stolen goods by the submission of evidence tending
to prove that his possession of the stolen goods was not inconsistent with his
innocence of the crime of larceny. But this is not to compel him to give evidence
against himself. It is merely to give him the opportunity which is given the defendant
in all criminal cases, to submit evidence in his own behalf after the prosecution has
introduced evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction unless that evidence is rebutted
or satisfactorily explained.

4. Herrera Vs. Alba and Hon. Cuesta-Vilches

G.R. No. 148220
June 15, 2005

FACTS: On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent),

represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998,
petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological
father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to

abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an
Associate Professor at DLSU where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the
UP Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She
was a former professor at the UP Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the
Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr.
Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had
an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA Paternity Testing violates the petitioner’s right
against self-incrimination.
RULING: No. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing
violates his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores SC’s earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Quoting
the Trial Court’s Decision, “Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal
case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in
this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies
only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from
a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from
his body; the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as
evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced
out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order
by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to
submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the
privilege is the restriction on testimonial compulsion.”

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where
the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern
science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits
established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

7. Garcia vs Domingo, 52 SCRA, 143

G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973

FACTS:
Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there
were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8)
criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana. The trial of the cases was jointly held. The trial of
the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their
counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia.
After proceedings duly had, there was an order "declaring that 'the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely
affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases
lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the
public'.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge denied the accused of public trial.
RULING:
 No. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of
those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression
of this right.

Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it

suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have
his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged."

Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the
part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran should
erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriately the lack of
weight, to any such objection raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was
held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the
procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears
on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place
where it was held, his right is deemed waived."

8. Braza vs. Sandiganbayan,

G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013

FACTS:

The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006. In
preparation for this international diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the
designated venue, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified
projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of
traffic safety devices and lighting facilities.

One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the

installation of street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International
Convention Center in Mandaue City. Three projects were bidded out only less than
two (2) weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and
FABMIK executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged
itself to implement the projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the
payment of the work accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects
within the deadline of ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities.

After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance
and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman –Visayas, alleging that the
ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. A panel composing of three
investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation to determine the veracity of the
accusation. Braza, being the president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the
respondents.
 The fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Report recommending the filing of
charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the DPWH officials and
employees in Region VII and the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu, and private
contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and Development, Inc. (GAMPIK).
It was found that the lampposts and other lighting facilities installed were indeed
highly overpriced and that the contracts entered into between the government officials
and the private contractors were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel abroad. He

entered a plea of "not guilty."

The motions for reinvestigation filed by Arturo Radaza (Radaza), the Mayor
of Lapu-lapu City, and the DPWH officials were denied by the Sandiganbayan for
lack of merit.

Braza filed a motion in support of the abandonment of reinvestigation with a

plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation of the case would
only afford the prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation which would
be vexatious, oppressive and violative of his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case, warranting its dismissal with prejudice.

Braza's Alternative Relief for Dismissal of the Case was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was

violated.

RULING:

No. Record shows that the complaint against Braza and twenty-three (23)
other respondents was filed in January 2007 before the PACPO-Visayas. After the
extensive inquiries and data-gathering, the PACPO-Visayas came out with an
evaluation report on March 23, 2007. PACPO-Visayas recommended that the
respondents be charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thereafter,
the investigatory process was set in motion before the OMB-Visayas where the
respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits and submitted voluminous
documentary evidence to refute the allegations against them. The OMB-Visayas
resolved the complaint only on January 24, 2008 with the recommendation that the
respondents be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Court notes
that Braza never decried the time spent for the preliminary investigation. There was
no showing either that there were unreasonable delays in the proceedings or that the
case was kept in idle slumber.

After the filing of the information, the succeeding events appeared to be part
of a valid and regular course of the judicial proceedings not attended by capricious,
oppressive and vexatious delays. On November 3, 2008, Sandiganbayan ordered the
reinvestigation of the case upon motion of accused Radaza, petitioner Braza and other
accused DPWH officials.

Indeed, the delay can hardly be considered as "vexatious, capricious and

oppressive." The complexity of the factual and legal issues, the number of persons
charged, the various pleadings filed, and the volume of documents submitted, prevent
this Court from yielding to the petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. Rather, it appears that Braza and the other accused were
merely afforded sufficient opportunities to ventilate their respective defenses in the
interest of justice, due process and fair investigation. The re-investigation may have
inadvertently contributed to the further delay of the proceedings but this process
cannot be dispensed with because it was done for the protection of the rights of the
accused. s arbitrary and inordinate delay.

The delay in the determination of probable cause in this case should not be
cause for an unfettered abdication by the anti-graft court of its duty to try and
determine the controversy. The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of
cases should not operate to deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in
prosecuting criminal cases.

9. Anita Ramirez vs Republic

GR No. 197832

MATERIAL FACTS:
On January 5, 2009, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 97 convicted Ramirez
and another person (Barangan) of the crime of Estafa. Judgment was promulgated on
March 25, 2009 and warrants of arrest were accordingly issued.

Three months after, Ramirez filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant
of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond, both of which were denied by the RTC. Ramirez
then filed the motion to admit notice of appeal on Nov. 17, 2010 and was
consequently denied as the CA ruled that THE PETITIONER FAILED TO FILE
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN THE 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
prescribed by the Rules.

Aggrieved, Ramirez elevated the case before the SC contending that the lapse
was due to her counsel’s failure to apprise her of the status of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused, Ramirez, is entitled to file an appeal after the
judgment attained finality.

RULING: The petition was denied. The SC affirmed the CA ruling that the right to
appeal is not a natural right and is not a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks
to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so,
the right to appeal is lost.
In this case, the petitioner filed an appeal only after more than a year since the RTC
denied her motion when she should have instituted the same 15 days from the
promulgation of judgment on March 25, 2009.

The petitioner, in this case, cannot put all the blame on her counsel because she
herself failed to show that she had been diligent in following up for her case. That
being said, the rules that omission or negligence of the counsel binds the client applies
in this case.