Section 10 & 11 relate to Article XIII

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCo
mmonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not
be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

JOSE ALMEDA VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # 121013 July 16 1998

(Remedial Law, Appeal)
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court due to it being filed
five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court dismissed the petition contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not
only mandatory but jurisdictional such that the petitioner’s failure to comply therewith had the effect of rendering the
judgment final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was found that there was
lack of merit in the petitioner’s reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal within reglementary
period would render a judgment final and executory.

HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute, particularly Sec 39
of BP 129, which provides:

Sec.39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in
all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from…

The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules
as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial
business. Due to petitioner’s negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is no recourse but to deny the petition
thus making the judgment of the trial court final and executory.

Ondoy vs. Ignacio et. al. 97 SCRA 252 G.R.

No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
Ondoy vs. Ignacio et. al. 97 SCRA 252 G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
[Estrella B. Ondoy, petitioner vs. Virgilio Ignacio, Proprietor M/B Lady Estrellita and/or Imperial Fishing
Enterprises and/or the Secretary of Labor and/or The Compensation Appeals and Review Staff, Department of
Labor, Respondents]

Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio
Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondent’s enterprise as
part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due
to drowning. Thus the petitioner asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were
dismissed by the hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed before
the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role in
this case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Jose’s
death, 300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the costs against respondent, Ignacio.

Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and not equality. The
Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from the respondent, as Jose did drown
while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to
the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with
the right of workers for compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no
direct testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the
compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer, usually poor and
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the
latter strict compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.

Section 10, Article II

Section 10, Article II states that “The
State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national
development.”
Salonga vs. Farrales
Facts:
1. Farrales was the titled owner of a
parcel of residential land that was
leased.
2. Prior to the acquisition by Farrales
of the aforesaid land, Salonga was
already a lessee of
some portion of the land. She had built
a house and paid rentals thereon.
3. Sometime prior to November 1968,
Farrales filed an ejectment case (one
of the old forms
of action for recovery of the
possession of real property) for non-
payment of rentals
against Salonga. The lower court
rendered a decision in favor of
Farrales and ordered
Salonga and the other lessees (Pascual
et al.) to vacate the portion occupied
by them
and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney’s
fees and costs.
4. Even before the rendition of the
decision of the lower court, Farrales
sold to Pascual et al.
(the other lessees of Farrales) the areas
occupied by them.
5. Salonga offered to purchase from
Farrales the portion of land that
Salonga was leasing.
Farrales persistently refused the offer
and insisted to execute the judgment
rendered in
the ejectment case. Hence if Salonga’s
offer to purchase was persistently
refused by
Farrales, it is obvious that no meeting
of the minds took place and no
contract was ever
perfected between them. It was
revealed that Farrales wanted the
payment of the portion
of land under consideration to be in
cash but Salonga did not have any
money for that
purpose that is why Farrales
persistently refused to sell the portion
of the leased land to
the lessee.
The appeal was dismissed for lack of
merit and the judgment appealed is
hereby affirmed

Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is impressed with
a social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit
himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article II that in the
promotion of social justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." The
Constitution also ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better
life (Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78
SCRA 194

Section 12 relate to article XV and sec xiv relate to xiv

Citation. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1923 U.S. LEXIS
2655, 29 A.L.R. 1446 (U.S. June 4, 1923)
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a
Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had
not yet completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating
legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to
an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute
that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed
the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty

interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency
of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily
restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the
protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is
a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the
German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the
interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may
permissively regulate.

Case Summary of Pierce v. Society of Sisters:

 The Oregon Compulsory Education Act, adopted in 1922, required Oregon
children to attend public school.
 Owners of two private education institutions sought an injunction to stop
enforcement of the Act.
 The District Court granted preliminary injunctions, finding that the Act
deprived private schools of their property without due process in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held
that a state could not use its power to destroy private schools, and the Act
interfered with a parent’s right to direct his/her child’s upbringing and
education.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
The State of Oregon enacted the Compulsory Education Act in 1922. The Act
requires any person with custody of a child between the ages of eight and
sixteen to send the child to a public school in the district where the child
resides. Appellees, two private corporations named the Society of Sisters and
Hill Military Academy, provided private education to the children of Oregon.
Both appellees sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act. The Society of Sisters
argued that the Act intrudes on parents’ right to have their children educated in a
school of their choice. Hill Military Academy argued that the Act violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against taking property without due process
of law. Both schools claimed that the Act would cause irreparable injury to their
businesses.
Procedural History:
 Appellee sued in the District Court to enjoin enforcement of the Act.
 The District Court issued preliminary injunctions, restraining the State of
Oregon from enforcing the Act. The District Court reasoned that the Act
deprived appellees of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
 The State of Oregon appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which agreed to hear the case.
Issue and Holding:
Can a state government compel parents to send their children to public
school? No.
Judgment:
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
A state government cannot compel children to attend public school because
doing so would infringe on a parent’s choice of how his/her child will be educated
and would improperly interfere with the businesses of private schools.
Reasoning:
First, there is no indication that the private schools run by appellees are harmful,
but rather are useful and meritorious. Enforcement of the Act would lead to the
destruction of those private schools. Nothing stops the State of Oregon, or any
state, from regulating private schools to ensure quality. However, a state
government cannot use its power to arbitrarily and unreasonably destroy the
existence of private schools.
Second, it is clear that the Act is an unreasonable interference of a parent’s
liberty to direct the upbringing and education of his/her child. Indeed, it is
fundamental to liberty that a state government does not have the power to
standardize children by making them attend public school.
Significance:
Pierce v. Society of Sisters established the beginning of the Supreme Court’s
expansive view of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect individual liberties and entities other than individuals. Further, this
case has been often cited by the Court over the last century to stand as an
example of the existence of an implicit right of personal privacy over family
matters, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).

People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel
room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign
object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told
Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the
object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody
skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne
tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the
object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of
rape with homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with
Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received
300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said
to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a
Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.

However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s
heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
Department of Education vs.
San Diego180 SCRA
533Facts:Private respondent is
a graduate of the University of
the East with a degree of
Bachelor ofScience in
Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the
National Medical
AdmissionTest (NMAT) three
times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take
it again,the petitioner rejected
his application on the basis of
the three-flunk rule that a
studentshall be allowed only
three (3) chances to take the
NMAT. After three (3)
successivefailures, a student
shall not be allowed to take
the NMAT for the fourth
time. He thenfiled in the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela petition for
mandamus. He invoked
hisconstitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality
education. Respondent judge
heldthat the private
respondent had been deprived
of his right to pursue a
medical educationthrough an
arbitrary exercise of police
power.Issue:Whether or not
the admission rule by the
petitioner is an arbitrary
exercise of
policepower.Held:The court
held that police power is
validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the
publicgenerally, as
distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the
interference of theState, and
(b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the
attainment of theobject
sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Thesubject
of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of
the police power. It isthe right
and indeed the responsibility
of the State to insure that the
medical profession isnot
infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and
259 Phil. 1016

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who
has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to
take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that -
h). A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the
NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed
to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took
the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.[1] When he applied to
take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional
rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT
scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.[2]In an
amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged
the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,containing the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and
equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,
declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power.[3]
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,[4] this Court upheld the constitutionality of the
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools
only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation
for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a
unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is
some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long
been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago
been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements
i.e, the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school -
for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have
before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates
the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of
the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional
schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of
our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test
like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread
use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and
quite probably in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful
to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case
was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for
the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the
case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of
the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the
admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk
rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.[5]
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which
the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge
to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his
patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as aplumber, he
should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a
plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the
bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise
as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however
appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."[6]
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not
be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the
more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found
wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause
is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between
medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT
and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very
lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not
require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while
belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the
tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality
among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times.[7] While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is
stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he
is probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling
that has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is
more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full
harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward
what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who
should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied
banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich
our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he
is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we
may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of
misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Oposa vs Factoran
Legal Standing: Common and General Interest
Section 16

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993
OPOSA et al, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and
deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to
the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his
opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to
him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and
proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the
decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they
are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he
would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No.
4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is
a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

SECTION 19

Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)

191 SCRA 288
November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products “naphta
cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its
production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan
to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI
granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to
where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the
investors without considering the national interest

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as
feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the
reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the
BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could
have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit:
“.. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign
dictation”.

Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because
the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any
decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner
disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have
appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the
1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in
the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

SECTION 21

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V.

SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA
343), July 14, 1989
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,
GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B.
CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I.
LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J.
CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA
C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN
R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO

FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO
GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS'
COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER
ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR
TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA
and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO,

JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions

including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27
and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the
power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the
President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No.
229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional
provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection.
They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section
5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229
were invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive
orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation
which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their
tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because
the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the
said rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of
Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there

are traditional distinction between the police power and the power
of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious
or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of
such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of
the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property expropriated.

SECTION 22

MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 5
August 2010 Decision[1] and 31 January 2011 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110598.

The present controversy stemmed from the various orders issued by the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative
Region (NCIP-CAR) in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09.

THE FACTS

The Petitions

Private respondents Magdalena Gumangan, Marion T. Pool, Lourdes C.

Hermogeno; Bernardo Simon, Joseph Legaspi, Joseph Basatan, Marcelino
Basatan, Josephine Legaspi, and Lansigan Bawas (Gumangan petition) are
the petitioners in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09. In their petition,[3] filed on 23
July 2009, they prayed that their ancestral lands in the Busol Forest
Reserve be identified, delineated, and recognized and that the
corresponding Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT) be issued. In
addition, the Gumangan petition sought to restrain the City Government of
Baguio, et al., (petitioners) from enforcing demolition orders and to
prevent the destruction of their residential houses at the Busol Forest
Reserve pending their application for identification of their ancestral lands
before the NCIP Ancestral Domains Office.

On the other hand, private respondents Alexander Ampaguey, Sr., Julio

Daluyen, Sr., Concepcion Padang, and Carmen Panayo (Ampaguey
petition) are the petitioners in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09. In their
petition,[4] filed on 23 July 2009, they prayed that the petitioners be
enjoined from enforcing the demolition orders affecting their properties
inside the Busol Forest Reserve. The Ampaguey Petition claimed that they
have pending applications for their ancestral land claims before the NCIP.

Both the Gumangan and Ampaguey petitions assail that petitioners have no
right to enforce the demolition orders and to evict them from their
properties. They aver that their claims over their ancestral lands are
protected and recognized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).

Proceedings before the NCIP-CAR

In his 27 July 2009 Order,[5] public respondent Atty. Brain Masweng (Atty.
Masweng), NCIP-CAR Hearing Officer, issued a 72-Hour Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the Gumangan petition. On the same date, he
issued another order[6] for a 72-Hour TRO on the Ampaguey petition. On 14
August 2009, Atty. Masweng issued a writ of preliminary injunction in
NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09[7] and 31-CAR-09.[8]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[9] before the CA

assailing the TRO and preliminary injunction issued by Atty. Masweng in
the above NCIP case.

The CA Ruling

In its 5 August 2010 decision, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for

certiorari for being procedurally flawed because they did not file a motion
for reconsideration before the NCIP. The appellate court elucidated that the
present petition constituted forum shopping because petitioners had a
pending motion to dismiss before the NCIP. Further, the CA ruled that the
NCIP had the power to issue the injunctive relief noting that the NCIP did
not act with grave abuse of discretion because the issuances were in
accordance with law. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSSED. The assailed

issuances STAND. Costs against Petitioners.[10]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA
in its assailed 31 January 2011 resolution.

Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR BEING PROCEDURALLY
DEFECTIVE; AND

II.

WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is meritorious.

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, a resolution of certain

procedural matters is in order.

Case mooted due to supervening events

At the onset, the present case has been rendered moot and academic. A
moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justifiable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that declaration thereon
would be of no practical value.[11] In City Government of Baguio v. Atty.
Masweng (contempt case),[12] the Court set aside the provisional remedies
Atty. Masweng issued in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 after
he was found guilty of indirect contempt, to wit:

In this case, respondent was charged with indirect contempt for issuing the
subject orders enjoining the implementation of demolition orders against
illegal structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed
Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City.

xxxx

The said orders clearly contravene our ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that those
owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by
petitioner are not entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by
respondent.

xxxx

As mentioned earlier, the Court while recognizing that the NCIP is

empowered to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction, nevertheless ruled that petitioners in the injunction case
seeking to restrain the implementation of the subject demolition order are
not entitled to such relief. Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing
the demolition advices are simply enforcing the previous demolition orders
against the same occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-in-
interest, only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and, writs issued
by respondent. Despite the Court's pronouncements in G.R. No. 180206
that no such clear legal right exists in favor of those occupants or claimants
to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by petitioner,
and hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their implementation,
respondent still issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction. x x x

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is GRANTED. The assailed

Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31,
2009, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09,
and Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July
31, 2009 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09
are hereby all LIFTED and SET ASIDE.[13]
As a general rule, the Court no longer entertains petitions which have been
rendered moot. After all, the decision would have no practical value.
Nevertheless, there are exceptions where the Court resolves moot and
academic cases, viz: (a) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (b)
the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount
public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (4) the case was
capable of repetition yet evading review.[14]

In the case at bar, there are exceptions warranting an affirmative action

from the Court. The case definitely involves paramount public interest as it
pertains to the Busol Water Reserve, a source of basic necessity of the
people of Baguio and other neighboring communities. In addition, the
present issues are likely to be repeated especially considering the other
cases involving land claimants over the Busol Water Reserve.

Exceptions to the requirement of a motion for reconsideration

in petitions for certiorari

A petition for certiorari is resorted to whenever a tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[15] It is an extraordinary remedy available only when
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[16] In other words, certiorari is a solution of last
resort availed of after all possible legal processes have been exhausted.
Thus, it is axiomatic that a motion for reconsideration is a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari.[17] This is so considering
that the said motion is an existing remedy under the rules for a party to
assail a decision or ruling adverse to it. Nonetheless, the rule requiring a
motion for reconsideration to be filed before a petition for certiorari is
available admits of exception. In Republic of the Philippines v. Pantranco
North Express, Inc.,[18] the Court recognized the following exceptions:

1. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;

2. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been

duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

3. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question

and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable;

4. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would

be useless;

5. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is

extreme urgency for relief;

6. Where, in a criminal case, a relief from an order of arrest is urgent

and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

7. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;

8. Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no

opportunity to object; and

9. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is

involved.[19]
The Court finds that exceptions exist to warrant petitioners' direct resort to
a petition for certiorari before the CA notwithstanding its lack of a motion
for reconsideration filed before the NCIP. First, the issues had been duly
raised before the NCIP especially considering that petitioner had presented
similar arguments or opposition from the TRO initially issued by the NCIP
until the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction. Second, there is
urgency in the petition because petitioners seek to implement its
demolition orders with the goal of preserving the Busol Forest Reserve,
Baguio's primary forest and watershed. It cannot be gainsaid that any delay
may greatly prejudice the government as the Busol Forest Reserve may be
further compromised. Third, the preservation of the Busol Forest Reserve
involves public interest as it would have a significant impact on the water
supply for the City of Baguio.

No forum shopping if different reliefs are prayed for

The CA also found petitioners' petition for certiorari dismissible for

violating the rule on forum shopping. It opined that a ruling on the said
petition for certiorari would amount to res judicata in view of the
petitioners' motion to dismiss filed before the NCIP.

Forum shopping exists when a party, against whom an adverse judgment or

order has been rendered in one forum, seeks a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari it is the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[20] The following are the elements of forum shopping:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.[21]

The petition for certiorari filed before the CA did not amount to forum
shopping despite the existence of the motion to dismiss before the NCIP.
The two actions involved different reliefs based on different facts. In their
petition, petitioners questioned the issuance of provisional remedies by the
NCIP and prayed that these be dismissed for lack of a clear legal right to be
protected. On the other hand, the motion to dismiss filed before the NCIP
sought the dismissal of the main complaint of private respondents for the
issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin the demolition orders and/or
to recognize their purported native title over the land involved.

In addition, judgment rendered in the petition would not amount to res

judicata with respect to the motion to dismiss, and vice versa. To invoke res
judicata, the following elements must concur: (a) the judgment sought to
bar the new action must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered
by a. court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be, as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.[22] As stated, the petition for certiorari assailed
the propriety of the issuance of provisional remedies while the motion to
dismiss attacked the principal action of private respondents. Evidently, the
petition for certiorari and the motion to dismiss had different causes of
action especially since the grant or denial of the provisional remedies does
not necessarily mean that the main action would have the same conclusion.

Having settled the procedural matters, we now address the merits of the
case.

Clear legal right and irreparable injury

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or

proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.[23] It is an
equitable and extraordinary peremptory remedy to be exercised with
caution as it affects the parties' respective rights.[24]

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction

may be granted when it is established that: (a) the applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period
or perpetually; (b) the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or (c) a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening or attempting to do; or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

In other words, the following requisites must concur before a preliminary

injunction is issued: (1) the invasion of a right sought to be protected is
material and substantial; (2) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.[25]

Before the preventive writ may be issued, first and foremost there must be a
clear showing by the complainant that there is an existing right to be
protected, a clear and unmistakable right at that.[26] Thus, it is incumbent
upon private respondents to establish that their rights over the land in the
Busol Forest Reserve are unequivocal and indisputable. They, however,
admit that their claims for recognition are still pending before the NCIP;
they are but mere expectations-short of the required present and
unmistakable right for the grant of the issuance of the provisional remedy
of injunction.[27]

Private respondents also bewail that it would be more prudent that the
injunctive writs be issued to prevent the baseless or unnecessary demolition
of their house should their land claims be ultimately recognized. While the
Court understands their predicament, there is still no basis for the issuance
of the injunctive writs because it can be compensable through the award of
damages. A clear and unmistakable right is not enough to justify the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as there must be a showing that
the applicant would suffer irreparable injury. Thus, the Court in Power
Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon[28] ruled:

It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to

prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual,
substantial and demonstrable. Here, there is no irreparable injury as
understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely,
immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients and the
cost of the billboard which is a considerable amount of money is easily
quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable
damage or injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona:

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the
issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy. An irreparable injury which a
court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and
continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be
estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of
measurement. An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a
serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either
physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or
when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary
value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof.[29] (emphasis
omitted)
More importantly, their continued occupation absent any clear legal right
cannot be countenanced because of the threat it poses to the Busol Water
Reserve. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary,[30] the Court
emphasized the importance of preserving watersheds, to wit:

This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must
be saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to
reaffirm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on the primordial importance of
watershed areas, thus: The most important product of a watershed
is water, which is one of the most important human
necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of
water for future generations and the control of flash floods that not only
damage property but also cause[s] loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is
an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered
now.[31] (emphasis and underlining supplied)
While the Court does not discount the possible loss private respondents
may suffer should their land claims be recognized with finality, still it bears
re.iterating that they failed to show that they are entitled to an injunctive
relief. In summary, private respondents do not have a clear and
unmistakable legal right because their land claims are still pending
recognition and any loss or injury they may suffer can be compensable by
damages. To add, their occupation of the Busol Water Reserve poses a
continuing threat of damaging the preservation or viability of the
watershed. Any danger to the sustainability of the Busol Water Reserve
affects not only individuals or families inside the watershed but also the
entire community relying on it as a source of a basic human necessity-
water. Furthermore, unlike the injury private respondents may suffer, any
damage to the Busol Water Reserve is irreversible and may not only affect
the present generation but also those to come.
Stare decisis vis-a-vis res judicata

In its assailed decision, the CA ruled that the NCIP did not act with grave
abuse of discretion because its actions were in accordance with law as it
complied with the IPRA and its implementing rules and regulations. Still, it
must be remembered that judicial decisions form part of the law of the
land.[32]

In The City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng (City Government of

Baguio),[33] the Court explained that Proclamation No. 15 is not a definitive
recognition of land claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reserve, to wit:

The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its
own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be
deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights
recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA
demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these recognize-land
rights and titles.

The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents'

ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in
which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After
all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must
show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
which injunction is directed are violative of said right.

Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive

recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation
merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessor-in-
interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.

xxxx

The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by
the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The
declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion
into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with
jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.[34]
In City Government of Baguio, it was recognized that the NCIP is
empowered to issue TROs and writs of injunction. Nevertheless, the said
case ruled that therein respondents were not entitled to an injunctive relief
because they failed to prove their definite right over the properties they
claimed. The circumstances in City Government of Baguio and the present
case are similar. In both cases, the claimants principally rely on
Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol
Forest Reserve. Unfortunately, it was ruled that the said proclamation is
not a definitive recognition of their ancestral land claims as it only
identifies their predecessors-in-interest as claimants.

Thus, it is quite unfortunate that the CA found that the actions of the NCIP
were in accordance with law. A cursory reading of the decision indicates
that it merely relied on the applicable statute without regard to the
doctrines and principles settled by the Court. The pronouncements in City
Government of Baguio should have put the appellate court on notice that
the actions of the NCIP were baseless because it settled that claimants of
lands in the Busol Water Reserve cannot rely on anticipatory claims for the
issuance of the preventive writ. It befuddles the Court why the CA did not
bother to address the said ruling in its discussions and perfunctorily relied
on the statute alone.

On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioners erred in relying

on City Government of Baguio in that res judicata did not arise
considering that they were not parties to the said case and that only parties
may be bound by the decision.

Nevertheless, while res judicata may be inapplicable, the ruling in City

Government of Baguio still finds relevance under stare decisis. The said
doctrine states that when the Court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same, regardless
whether the parties and property are the same.[35] Stare decisis differs
from res judicata in that the former is based upon the legal principle or rule
involved while the latter is based upon the judgment itself.[36]

Thus, the Court in The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng

(Baguio Regreening)[37] held:
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority
to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not
convinced that private respondents were entitled to the relief granted by
the Commission. Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents' ancestral land claim, as it merely
identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of
the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights over
the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this
Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City
Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction
issued therein.

In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very
same arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of
injunction, against fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same
legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at
bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both
cases, petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction against
government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the
ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear
right to be protected. Private respondents, on the other hand, presented the
same allegations in their Petition for Injunction, particularly the alleged
recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject
matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs
of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained
by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition.[38]
Like the private respondents in City Government of Baguio and in Baguio
Regreening, herein claimants principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as
basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest Reserve. Thus, the
Court is constrained to similarly rule that the injunctive relief issued in the
present case are without basis because the applicants failed to establish a
clear and legal right. After all, it has been settled that Proclamation No. 15
is not a definite recognition or their ancestral land claims.

It is noteworthy that in the contempt case, Atty. Masweng was cited for
indirect contempt for issuing TROs and preliminary injunctions in NCIP
Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09. He was found in indirect contempt
because the Court had already ruled that the occupants in the Busol Water
Reserve had no clear legal right warranting the issuance of preventive
remedies. In the present case, the preventive writs issued in NCIP Case
Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 themselves are being questioned. Thus,
the Court had, on more than one occasion, found occupants of the Busol
Watershed Reservation not entitled to the preventive writ for lack of a clear
legal right, considering that their recognition claims were still pending
before the NCIP.

Taking into account all the cases involving land claims over the Busol Water
Reserve, it is settled that Proclamation No. 15 and the IPRA,
notwithstanding, provisional remedies such as TROs and writs of
preliminary injunction should not ipso facto be issued to individuals who
have ancestral claims over Busol. It is imperative that there is a showing of
a clear and unmistakable legal right for their issuance because a pending or
contingent right is insufficient. Nevertheless, the grant or denial of these
provisional remedies should not affect their ancestral land claim as the
applicants are not barred from proving their rights in an appropriate
proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 5 August 2010 Decision

and 31 January 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
110598 are REVERSED. The Temporary Restraining Order and the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction issued by the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region in NCIP Case Nos.
29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ.,

concur.

SECTION 25

Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation

197 SCRA 52 [GR No. 91649 May 14, 1991]

Facts: A TV ad proudly announces: “The New PAGCOR – Responding Through Responsible Gaming.” But the
petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD
1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because –
a. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila
city government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;

b. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceeding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy;

c. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR – conducted gambling,
while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

d. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from the monopolistic and crony economy, and toward
free enterprise and privatization.

Issue: Whether or not the city of Manila may levy taxes on PAGCOR.

Held: No. The city of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, the
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to
tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself
which has the inherent power to tax.

The city of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power
of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was withdrawn by PD
no. 771 and was vested exclusively on the national government.

Therefore, only the national government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of “licenses or
permits” is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

Local governments has no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
national government.

The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which congress
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption
clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.”

What is settled is that the matter of regulating; taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling in a state concern and
hence, it is the sole prerogative of the state to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly
of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner
accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly
Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly
held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his
position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and
be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings
of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case
before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because of
its resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case
moot and academic.

2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction of

the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the
two autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?

Ruling:

1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of the
expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to make the
petition moot and academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of due process,
the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is no showing
that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not appear that the
petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and corruption before his
colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut
their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere accusations
that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the petitioner.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by

Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential
Decree provides that “the President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to
“ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has not control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities.

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree creating
the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree,
in the first place, mandates that “the President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly administrative
services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be invalid.
Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of
the Sanggunian.

SECTION 28

LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Case number:

G.R. No. 72119

Country:

Philippines

Date of decision:

29 May 1987

Court / Arbiter:
Supreme Court ( Supreme )

Relevant law :

Constitution ( Constitution )

Decision:

The Constitution requires government agencies to to provide information upon request; if they
do not want to disclose information, they carry the burden of proving that the information is
not of public concern or, if it is of public concern, that the information has been specifically
exempted by law. Moreover, a citizen does not need to show any legal or special interest in
order to establish his or her right to information.

Keywords:

Burden of proof (including requests for additional evidence)

Constitution
Freedom of expression (including RTI as element of or integral to)
Public interest (including public interest override, information of public interest)
Status of requester (including interest in information, citizenship, legal person, standing)

Case details:

Facts
Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information on the civil
service eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The
Commission rejected the request, asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information.
Legaspi instituted an action for mandamus from the Court to require that the information be
provided (pg. 1).

Decision
The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7)
constitutions recognize the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Further, they specify that information shall be provided, subject only to limitations provided by
law (pg. 1). While the Solicitor General interposed a procedural objection challenging the
requester’s standing in this petition for mandamus, the Court ruled that, in this case, the
people are regarded as the “real party in interest” and the requester, as a citizen interested in
the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in the result (pg. 2).
Further, government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to information of
public concern, a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy (pg. 3-4). That is, the government agency denying information access has the
burden to show that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the information has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee (pg. 5).
Here, the information was of a public concern because it is the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by eligible
persons, and the Civil Service Commission failed to cite any law limiting the requester’s right to
know (pg. 5). Thus, the Court ordered the Civil Service Commission to provide the information
(pg. 6).

Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991
Bidin, J.

Facts:

In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television

Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed
to examine the board’s records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that
films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.

Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.

Petitioner’s request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely
private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the
exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first
secure his (the member’s) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in
character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of
examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen
seeking examination of the board’s records.
 On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to
discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of
the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the
same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato
denied petitioner’s request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July
27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private
and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows
the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which
are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly
confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously
reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that
reviewed the film.

Issue:

whether or not the assailed MTRCB Resolutions contravenes petitioner’s right of access to
official records as guaranteed by the constitution

Held:

Yes. The term private has been defined as “belonging to or concerning, an individual
person, company, or interest”; whereas, public means “pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a
nation, state, or community at large”. May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual
members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may
be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no
doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It
being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the
individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and
acting in, the discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since
what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official
functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of
protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.

Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither
personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records
access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being
a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and
caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The
constitutional recognition of the citizen’s right of access to official records cannot be made
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would
be rendered nugatory.

CASE DIGEST : AQUINO vs MORATO

G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991 MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL
L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents.

FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on
the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting
of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17)
members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the
members.

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person,
company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state,
or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to
serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual
voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions,
and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore,
public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the
land

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act
. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x
xx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as
a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of
a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary
to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation
and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-
AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress
or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao
to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest
or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

IN RE: MANZANO, A.M. NO. 8871861RTC OCTOBER 5, 1988

Facts:

Judge Rodolfo Manzano sent a letter to the Supreme Court requesting to allow him to accept
appointment as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committe on Justice create pursuant to
Presidential Executive Order No. 856 as amended by EO No. 326.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Manzano can accept appointment as a member of INPCJ.

Held:

No. The committee was created by the executive branch of the government where its members
discharge administrative functions. Though it may be quasi-judicial, it is still administrative in
nature. Judge Manzano is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however
eminent. His integrity in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure.
RTC Judges may only render assistance to the aforesaid committees when such assistance are
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial functions.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA

G.R. No. 76633 166 SCRA 533 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA
on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he
was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797
and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued
that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers.
Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation.

Issues:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power.

Discussions:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Rulings:
No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.

Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted
of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the
errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent
himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual
procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797,
promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-
employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract
workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on
Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits"
arising out of such employment. 2

The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee
and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to
appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas
employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined
as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person
working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a
local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died
while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the
M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its
submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The
second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's
signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano
Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's
own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered
Saco to be an overseas employee.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its
shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly
appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen
nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984.
This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier
been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this
Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco,
but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the
circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on
board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01
February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date."
In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless
deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents
an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, reading as follows:

... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had
itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the
POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not whatthe law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled
Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may
see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There
is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee
as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving
commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation
of legislative powers.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest"
in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience
and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v.
Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of
men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security"
in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of
P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from
the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract
of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that—

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall
pay his beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and

master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate
and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is
entitled to under Philippine laws. ...

3. ...
 c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the
owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not
exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the
National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted,
in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his
beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the
NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine
Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance
with such laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class,
consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the
protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been
denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also
sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative
agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first
enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates
on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange
Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram
Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources
and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been
accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process
as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor
of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that
those with less in life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the
right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which
he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal
partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Belgica v. Ochoa (pork barrel case)
Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251,
November 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely
or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044,
otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of
funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were
subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also
became involved in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”)
called “Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving
of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not
only public works project or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as
those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork
barrel was revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas
Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”).
The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community
projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to
implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any kind of project from “hard
projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual
legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-President was given an
allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department
of Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee
on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made
from the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside
from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of
CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii)
Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a
provision requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release of
funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA.
PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the
release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category
except personal services and other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project
may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the
GAAs from 2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a
provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed
only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies.
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative
district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD
No. 1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the Presidential Management
 Staff and is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings
of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of
money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a
syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit
investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds
had gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the
Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws
are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d)
accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties
regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for
their utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof
does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have
constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case
considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character
 and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a
definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the
public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual
occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme
Court has the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the
Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public
funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez because the
Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically
on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF
article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to
the areas of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress.
This power cannot be exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority
to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed
on a procedural technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments
has been violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities and the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of
the separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in
nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only
recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding
source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority
to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of
them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system
fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item
veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
 consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment
of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is because the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President‘s power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is
incapable of checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to
perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed
based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing
provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already
legally mandated to―assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have
no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation
laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”, it is enough that (a) the provision of
law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the
same for a particular public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: a Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
[Energy Development] Board from any and all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a
determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
[PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x
x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue
delegation of legislation powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it
allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective
and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers
because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law.
 The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects”
and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification
since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
CASE DIGEST : Sanidad Vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER,
respondents. G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T.
GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. MARTIN, J,:

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881),
said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition
dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist
of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of
Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167,
which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined
in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has
also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of
their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there
are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction
of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make
a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec
radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information
to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific
radio or television times

DAZA VS SINGSON
Posted by kaye lee on 12:35 PM

G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989

FACTS:

The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to
only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing
the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson
as the additional member from the LDP.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the
Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO
that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
RULING:

No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima

undue delegation of power; separation of power

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in
his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335
was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
“transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid
basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all
other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as
it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.

Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:

1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the
law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction
is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to
the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335
was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

DELEGATION OF POWER

GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750
FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of
violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the
97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all
his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by
RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a
penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of
the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for
six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against
him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security
compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not
applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2) Whether or not
the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
(Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the
petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office
of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as
a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the
Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s
decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the
deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the
Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

People vs Vera
undue delagation of power; equal protection of the law

Caption: PEOPLE VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial,
he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The
Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that
the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila
because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment
of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend
the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a
violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in
section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower
than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may
be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to
defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This
means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province
would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the
probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the
obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
2.3.G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality
of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
 petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling
of RTC.
3.4.
4.5. Issue:
5.6.
6.7. Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
7.8.
8.9. Ruling:
9.10.
10.11. The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
11.12.
12.13. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process.

YNOT V. IAC | POWERS OF

ADMINITRATIVE AGENCIES
June 3, 2018

G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987

Petitioner: Restituto Ynot
Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station Commander, Integrated National
Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo and the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal Industry, Region IV,
Iloilo City
Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Law Applicable: EO No. 626-A
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order
as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
 Summary
EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:
1. The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
3. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
4. Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

FACTS:
 Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos.
 Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for recovery,
and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of replevin.
 After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for 1)
lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed validity. (Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.
RULING:
EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)
 To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of
the carabaos but on their movement, providing that “no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another.” The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
 We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there.
 The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
 In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
 In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner’s
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded
all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
 Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which
alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and
conviction of the accused.
 The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
OTHER ISSUES
Constitutionality is not always presumed.
 while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted if there be a clear showing of their invalidity,
and of the need to declare them so, then “will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant warning.
 Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue
more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.
 EO 626-A is really a presidential decree that promulgates a new rule instead of implementing
an existing law.
 EO 626-A was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed
but in the exercise of the President’s legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. (whenever
in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or
letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law)
 In this case, there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of the executive order.
 Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the
President “in his judgment, ” a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion.
For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
History of Due Process Clause
 The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient.
 This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental
law, an “iron rule” laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due
process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting
its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require
No Due Process in this case.
 The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness.
 We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to “the law of the land,” which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years
ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as “the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
 This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are
a number of admitted exceptions.
Police Power, as an exception for due process
 The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process.
EO 622-A as an exercise of Police Power
 The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
“present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.”
 We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis
and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve
them.
What constitute a valid exercise of police power
 To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (US v. Toribio)
HOWEVER, the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was
at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce
it.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as

affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
Tablarin Vs. Gutierrez Case Digest
Tablarin Vs. Gutierrez
152 SCRA 730
G.R. No. 78164
July 31, 1987
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April
1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;

x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-
five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and
who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a
certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c)
a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may
be deemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an
instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools
and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for
the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by
the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements
as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a
word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue
that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought
by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the
current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving
its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the
NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY,Respondent.FACTS:Pe
titioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc.
(petitioner) is a company engaged in
thebusiness of laundry services. On 6
June 2001, the Environmental
Management Bureau of theDepartment
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) endorsed to respondent
LagunaLake Development Authority
(LLDA) the inspection report on the
complaint of black smokeemission
from
petitioner’s plant located at 114
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On
22 June
2001, LLDA conducted an
investigation and found that untreated
wastewater generated from
petitioner’s laundry washing activities
was discharged directly to the San
Francisco Del Mo
nte
River. Furthermore, the Investigation
Report stated that petitioner’s plant
was operating
without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI,
and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On
5 September 2001,the Environmental
Quality Management Division of
LLDA conducted wastewater
sampling of
petitioner’s effluent.
The result of the laboratory analysis
showed non-compliance witheffluent
standards particularly Total Suspended
Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen
Demand(BOD), Oil/Grease
Concentration and Color Units.
Consequently, LLDA issued to
petitioner aNotice of Violation.
Petitioner submitted its application for
LLDA Clearance and DischargePermit
and informed LLDA that it would
undertake the necessary measures to
abate thewater pollution. No
compliance followed. It was reported
that petitioner’s wastewater
treatment facility was under
construction. Subsequently, another
wastewater sampling wasconducted
but the results
still failed.A Pollution Control and
Abatement case was filed against
petitioner before theLLDA. Petitioner
requested another test. This time, it
showed compliance. Respondent
prayedthat the Notice of Violation
issued on 30 October 2001 and its
corresponding daily penalty beset aside
and that the imposable penalty be
reckoned from the date of actual
hearing and not
on 5 September 2001. It is
respondent’s position that the Notice
of Violation and the
imposition of the penalty had no legal
and factual basis because it had already
installed thenecessary wastewater
treatment to abate the water
pollution.This Publ
ic Hearing Committee finds
respondent’s arguments devoid of
merit. Presidential
Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge
of pollutive wastewater and any person
found inviolation thereof shall pay a
fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(PhP5,000.00) [sic] forevery day
during which such violation continues.
The mere discharge of wastewater
notconforming with the effluent
standard is the violation referred to in
PD No. 984.CA held that LLDA has
the power to impose fines.ISSUE:
WON LLDA have the implied power
to impose fines as set forth in PD
984.HELD: YES.Petitioner asserts that
LLDA has no power to impose fines
since such power toimpose penal
sanctions, which was once lodged with
the National Pollution
ControlCommission (NPCC), is now
assumed by the Pollution Adjudication
Board pursuant toExecutive Order No.
192 (EO 192). SC disagree.
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984)
createdand established the NPCC
under the Office of the President. EO
192, which reorganized theDENR,
created the Pollution Adjudication
Board under the Office of the DENR
Secretary whichassumed the powers
and functions of the NPCC with
respect to adjudication of
pollutioncases.Under Executive Order
No. 927 (EO 927),
LLDA is granted additional powers
andfunctions to effectively perform its
role and to enlarge its prerogatives of
monitoring,licensing and
enforcement.Under Section 4(h) of EO
927, LLDA may "exercise such
powers and perform suchother
functions as may be necessary to carry
out its duties and responsibilities." In
LagunaLake Development Authority
v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld
the power of LLDA to issuean
ex-parte
cease and desist order even if such
power is not expressly conferred by
law,holding that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in theexercise of its
express powers. The Court ruled that
LLDA, in the exercise of its express
powersunder its charter, as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in theLaguna Lake
region, has the implied authority to
issue a "cease and desist order." In the
samemanner, we hold that the LLDA
has the power to impose fines in the
exercise of its function asa regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region