Valdez v. Republic G.R. No.

180863, 8 September 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring
home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited
until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed
without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed
to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each
other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner
married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was
denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007,
petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of
if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.

Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no
court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have
taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed
no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph
2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Facts:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as a male, underwent sex
reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the Philippines
by virtue of a medical certificate issued by one Dr. Marcelino Reysio Cruz. He then lived
his life as a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex before the RTC of Manila. The court having underwent the
jurisdictional requirements, and there having no opposition, the court proceeded with the
hearing where Rommel presented his American Fiance as witness. RTC gave due course
to his petition, ruling based on equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s
body is not his own doing and should not be taken against him” and that “no harm, injury
or prejudice will be caused to anybody” if the petition were to be granted. His name was
thus changed to Mely, and sex “female.” Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.

Held:

Petitioner’s contention is not meritorious. The Supreme Court ruled that, a ale person who
had a surgical reassignment where she become biologically a woman cannot use that
ground as reason to change his name as person’s sex is immutable from birth.

Ratio decidendi:

1.) Change of Name, primarily Administrative in nature:

Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence that no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors, which can
be changed by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The
jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged with these officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. Hence, the venue to which
petitioner filed is improper.

2.) Grounds for change of name:

RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: 1)
petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that
first name or nickname in the community; or 3) The change will avoid confusion. From
these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name
on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications. Before a person can
legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying.

3.) No law allows the change of entry in the Birth Certificate as to sex on the ground of
sex reassignment. By virtue RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in the entries in the civil register, excluding the clerical or typographical
error. Section 2 of RA 9048 provides expressly that no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of petitioner.