Middle East Critique, 2018

https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1439271

Social Media in Turkey as a Space for

Political Battles: AKTrolls and other
Politically motivated trolling
ERKAN SAKA 
Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

Abstract This article focuses on AKTrolls, defined as pro-government political trolls in Turkey, while
attempting to draw implications about political trolling in the country in general. It examines their
methods and effects, and it interrogates whether (and how) Turkish authorities have attempted to
shape or counter politically motivated social media content production through trolling after the Gezi
Park Protests that took place in 2013. My findings are based on an ethnographic study that included
participant observation and in-depth interviews in a setting that is under-studied and about which
reliable sources are difficult to find. The study demonstrates political trolling activity in Turkey is more
decentralized and less institutionalized than generally thought, and is based more on ad hoc decisions
by a larger public. However, I argue here that AKTrolls do have impact on reducing discourses on
social media that are critical of the government, by engaging in surveillance, among other practices.

Key Words: Censorship; Political trolling; Social media; Surveillance; Turkey

A wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey began on May 28, 2013, initially to
contest the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park, and which, in Twitter
parlance, came to be called ‘Occupy Gezi.’ Social media was a major tool used to mobilize
and disseminate news about the protests. In the aftermath of the Gezi Park Protests, Turkey’s
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), was believed to have started ‘a troll army’1 to
counter the growing hegemony of Gezi protesters on social media.2 This was the first time
AKTrolls—as pro-AKP political trolls came to be called—began to be used widely in public
discourses. This article examines the trolls’ methods and effects, and it interrogates whether
(and how) Turkish authorities have attempted to shape or counter politically-motivated social
media content production in the form of trolls after the Gezi Park protests.
To do so, I pose several questions. First, as the AKP leadership officially never has
acknowledged the relationship between the government and AKTrolls, how do we construct

Correspondence Address: Erkan Saka, Faculty of Communication, Department of Communication Design

and Management, Istanbul Bilgi University, Santralistanbul, Kazım Karabekir cad. No: 2/13 Eyüp—Istanbul,
Turkey. Email: esaka@bilgi.edu.tr
  1 Daisy Sindelar (2014) The Kremlin's Troll Army. The Atlantic (August 12). Available at: http://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932, accessed May 20, 2017.
  2 Isabel Hunter (2015) Turkish President’s social media campaigners deny being a troll army, The Independent
(June 6). Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-president-s-social-media-cam-
paigners-deny-being-a-troll-army-10301599.html, accessed May 20, 2017.
© 2018 Editors of Middle East Critique
2 E. Saka

evidence of that linkage? Second, in the context of rising political pressure on traditional
media, as reported in various Freedom House media reports,3 with increases in censorship,
economic restrictions, journalist imprisonments and media company confiscations, social
media has grown in importance as a communication and political tool. How has government
reacted to this shift? Third, how can we contextualize surveillance, which plays a major role
in debates about government control over social media? The research aims to contribute
to existing surveillance literature by elaborating the role of political trolling as an aid of
surveillance in social media.

Methodology
The research for this article is based on an ethnographic approach that combines conven-
tional and digital sources in a setting that is very much under-studied and in which reliable
data are difficult to obtain. Archival research is used, as most digital data can be purchased
on the open market from social media agencies, enabling the researcher to trace and collect
the necessary digital documents. At times, data is provided free of charge if the purpose is
academic. Media representations of political trolling in mainstream and social media also
have been surveyed.
Participant observation is the primary basis of this research: The author actively engaged
in social media communications with users who took part during and after the Gezi Park
protests. These were both pro-Gezi activists and anti-Gezi social media users, some of whom
can be classified as AKTrolls. Semi-structured interviews were conducted, including three
with actors (interviewee 04, 06, 08) officially involved in social media political campaigns.
Two other interviewees (02, 11) were self-identified as AKTrolls. One was a digital media
producer with close ties to AKP circles, whose documentaries have been broadcast on state
TV channels. Another troll, according to AK party circles, was a ‘Gülenist organizer’ on
Twitter (interviewee 13). I also interviewed a relatively high-level bureaucrat (14) special-
izing in Turkey’s communication sector.4 Additionally, I engaged 30 user-activists in online
and offline conversations/interviews to address specific questions.5
Most online engagement occurred through Twitter and Facebook; offline engagement took
place in cafes in the neighborhood of At Pazarı Meydanı in Istanbul’s conservative district,
Fatih. Well-known for having cafes frequented by Islamists from predominantly pro-AKP
circles, it also became a favorite locale for Gülenists after the December corruption case
in 2013. Gülenists are not known to socialize with other Islamists but the graft case and
the ruling party’s heavy-handed assault on the group motivated some of the members to
socialize with other Islamists to propagate their views. Finally, I used a network-mapping
tool, called Graph Commons,6 to create a map of AKTrolls (see Appendix A). All data used
was collected through fieldwork.

  3 During my interviews in the field, ‘Freedom of the Press 2014’ was the most quoted report. Until 2014,
Freedom House classified Turkey’s press as ‘Partly Free,’ but thereafter as ‘Not Free.’ See Freedom House
(2014) Turkey, Country report, Freedom of the Press, 2014. 2014. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/2014/turkey, accessed March 20, 2015.
  4 Interview details are provided in Appendix B.
  5 Initial engagement with anti-Gezi users at times became adversarial, resulting in ‘unfollows’ or reporting har-
assment on Twitter. Most social media connections remained stable, even at the height of tension, and, in several
cases after a rupture, reconnection took place online through mutual Twitter contacts, offline at conferences, or
in one case, when a troll became my student.
  6 Graph Commons available at: https://graphcommons.com/, accessed May 20, 2017.
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  3

Theory
Trolling has existed since the early days of the internet and was common by 1996.7 In
internet slang, a troll ‘is a person who sows discord on the internet by starting arguments or
upsetting people by posting inflammatory comments.’8 A turning point that gave trolling a
more collective and political sense occurred in 2008 in the course of a showdown between
the Anonymous hacking group and Scientology.9 ‘Political trolling’ as a label emerged later,
the term ‘web brigades,’ known in English media as ‘the troll army,’ being used initially to
describe state-sponsored anonymous internet political commentators and trolls linked spe-
cifically to the Russian government.10 Observations on the Russian case demonstrate that a
centralized political trolling structure was made possible with a series of internet laws and
the opening of centers to host trolls who intervened in digital agendas.11
According to Whitney Phillips, a theoretical shift occurred in the late 2000s in analyz-
ing trolling. Where previously, Lincoln Dahlberg12 and others viewed trolls in terms of
‘deception,’ Gabriella Coleman,13 among others, interpreted them as using a ‘communitarian’
approach. The contrast was stark. Against an emphasis on deviance14 and possible criminali-
zation of trolling activity, trolling for the fun of it was highlighted through aspects of com-
munity building. Both approaches are evident in the literature on Turkey;15 a current study,16
for example, argues that ‘entertainment trolls’ contribute to—using John Hartley’s17 term—
cultural citizenship.18 Political trolling more often is located in the ‘deception’ category and

  7 Marriano Tepper (1997) Usenet Communities and the Cultural Politics of Information, Internet Culture,
pp. 39–54; Whitney Phillips (2015) This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship between
Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Information Society Series), p. 16.
  8 Collins Dictionary (ND) Troll | Definition, meaning & more. Available at: http://www.collinsdictionary.com/
dictionary/english/troll, accessed May 20, 2016.
  9 Gabriella Coleman (2011) Anonymous: From the Lulz to Collective Action, in: The New Everyday: A Media
Commons Project. Available at: http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/tne/pieces/anonymous-lulz-collec-
tive-action, accessed May 20, 2016.
10
Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan (2015) What spawned Russia’s ‘troll army’? Experts on the red web share
their views, The Guardian (September 8). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/sep/08/
russia-troll-army-red-web-any-questions, accessed March 20, 2015.
11
Tetyana Lokot (2016) Center for Monitoring Propaganda and Disinformation Online Set to Open In Russia,
GlobalVoices (March 26). Available at: https://globalvoices.org/2016/03/26/center-for-monitoring-propagan-
da-and-disinformation-online-set-to-open-in-russia/, accessed May 30, 2017.
12
Lincoln Dahlberg (2001) The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring The Prospects of Online Deliberative
Forums Extending the Public Sphere, Information, Communication & Society 4(4), p. 17.
13
Gabriella Coleman (2012) Phreaks, Hackers, and Trolls: The Politics of Transgression and Spectacle, The Social
Media Reader, pp. 99–119. Available at: http://gabriellacoleman.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Coleman-
Phreaks-Hackers-Trolls.pdf, accessed May 25, 2017.
14
John R. Suler & Wende L. Phillips (2009) The Bad Boys of Cyberspace: Deviant Behavior in a Multimedia
Chat Community, Cyber Psychology & Behavior, 1(3), pp. 275–294.
15
Edward Danso Ansong, Tony Takyi, Dominic Damoah, E. Afum Ampomah & Winfred Larkotey (2013) Internet
Trolling in Ghana, International Journal of Emerging Science and Engineering, 2, pp. 42–43; and Jonathan
Bishop (2014) Dealing with Internet Trolling in Political Online Communities, International Journal of
E-Politics, 5(4), pp. 1–20.
16
Şule Karataş & Mutlu Binark (2016) Yeni Medyada Yaratıcı Kültür: Troller ve Ürünleri ‘Caps’ler [Innovative
culture in the new media: Trolls and their products, the ‘Caps’], TRT Akademik, 1(1), p. 431.
17
John Hartley (2004) Creative Industries (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell), p. 429.
18
However, as in Anthony McCosker’s study of YouTubers, digital citizenship ideas may emerge out of ‘agonistic
publics.’ Excluding negative aspects of trolling, such as flaming, hating and provocative reaction, may result in
a limited understanding of citizenship. See A. McCosker (2014) Trolling as Provocation: YouTubers Agnostic,
Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, 20(2), pp. 201–217.
4 E. Saka

currently is seen as anathema to human rights,19 while trolling more generally is experiencing
a new wave of criticism, if Time Magazine’s 2016 ‘Trolls’ cover is any indicator.20
This research focuses on political trolling, which has proved to be long-lasting and effec-
tive. Unlike Whitney Phillips,21 whose research was based on self-identifying trolls, not all
subjects of this study identify themselves as such. Here, trolls are understood as pro-gov-
ernment internet users whose productive engagement with the authorities through social
media networks can be seen as a form of digital surveilling, which in turn triggers restrictive
consequences for citizens located in the ranks of Turkey’s opposition. Evgeny Morozov
has highlighted this networked surveillance approach by demonstrating how authoritarian
governments use social media to track and crush opposition.22 Surveillance literature tends
to focus on software; however, I argue here that political trolling as a social media activ-
ity equally can be used as a tool to track and pressure political rivals. Additionally, this
surveillance technique has networked characteristics. In contra-distinction to a frequently
expressed view that a centralized troll army is in use, my ethnographic work shows that
AKTrolls function in a decentralized networking pattern, with different nodes finding their
own ways to participate in the government’s struggle with opponents.

The Ruling Party’s response to digital dissent

As of 2014, Turkey had the highest Twitter penetration in the world.23 Social media, and
Twitter, in particular, served as organizing tools for political and social purposes24 through-
out the Gezi Park protests. Zeki Osman Gökçe and his colleagues25 highlight the funeral
of Berkin Elvan (a 15-year-old allegedly killed by police during the protests) as just one
example in which online crowd mobilization occurred, concomitant with a massive surge in
social media usage.26 Visual representations would go viral,27 and political humor28 would

19
Bishakha Datta (2016) Belling the Trolls: Free Expression, Online Abuse and Gender, Open Democracy, August
30, 2016. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/bishakha-datta/belling-trolls-free-expression-online-
abuse-and-gender, accessed October 20, 2016.
20
Joel Stein (2016) How Trolls Are Ruining the Internet, Time (August 18). Available at: http://time.com/4457110/
internet-trolls/, accessed June 28, 2016.
21
Phillips, (2015) This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things, pp. 2–8.
22
Evgeny Morozov (2012) The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs).
23
Kamil Demirhan (2014) Social Media Effects on the Gezi Park Movement in Turkey: Politics under Hashtags,
Social Media in Politics, pp. 281–314; Kaya Genç (2013) Rise of Turkish Citizens’ Media, Index on Censorship,
42/4, pp. 92–95.
24
Ali Murat Kırık (2014) A Research on Social and Political Use of Social Media in Turkey, International Journal
of Science Culture and Sport, 2(8), p. 49.
25
Zeki Osman Gökçe, Emre Hatipoğlu, Gökhan Göktürk, Brooke Luetgert & Yücel Saygin (2014) Twitter and
Politics: Identifying Turkish Opinion Leaders in New Social Media, Turkish Studies, 15(4), pp. 671–688.
26
Zeynep Tufekci (2014) The Medium and the Movement: Digital Tools, Social Movement Politics, and the End
of the Free Rider Problem, Policy & Internet, 6(2), pp. 202–208; and Idem (2013) Come, Come, Whoever
You Are: As a Pluralist Movement Emerges from Gezi Park in Turkey, Technosociology, our Tools, Ourselves.
Available at: http://technosociology.org/?pp=142, accessed May 25, 2017.
27
Balca Arda (2014) The Medium of the Gezi Movement in Turkey: Viral Pictures as a Tool of Resistance, paper
presented at APSA Annual Meeting. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2453044,
accessed May 25, 2017.
28
Perrin Öğün Emre, Barış Çoban & Gülüm Şener (2014) Humorous Form of Protest: Disproportionate use of
Intelligence in Gezi Park’s Resistance; Paper presented at New Opportunities and Impasses: Theorizing and
Experiencing Politics, POLITSCI’ 13 Conference October 31–November 2, 2013. Istanbul, Turkey.
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  5

flash through the crowd, enabling the protests to build a particular public sphere among het-
erogeneous social elements.29A major tool for the Turkish authorities to intervene in digital
communications is the 2007 Internet Law, commonly known as ‘No. 5651.’ Amendments
in 2014 restricted the law further. They broadened the scope of administrative blocking and
allowed the authorities to access user data without a warrant. A month after their passage,
the Constitutional Court overturned these provisions, but they were passed again in March
2015 after the court’s chief judge retired.30 Although circumventing the block is not diffi-
cult, recent changes in 2015–2016 centralized the governance of Internet Service Providers
(ISPs),31 making blockage easier.32
Effective internet regulation relies on advanced software-based blocking and surveil-
lance. The center-left opposition daily Cumhuriyet33 reported on October 18, 2014, that
Turkey’s internet regulatory body, ICTA (The Information and Communication Technologies
Authority), has a budget of 2 billion liras in the context of a story on Turkey’s possible
acquisition of advanced surveillance services from foreign companies.34 The most concrete
evidence of software-based surveillance came from the hacking scandal related to Italy’s
HackingTeam, an information technology company that sells offensive intrusion and sur-
veillance capabilities to governments, law enforcement agencies and corporations.35 A data
breach in 2015 demonstrated that the company had customers all over the world36 including,
allegedly, the Turkish Police Department.37
Once the Gezi protests began, pro-AKP individuals, not only in the government but also
in communications industries, saw opportunity. An interviewee, who would become one
of the best-known AKTrolls, explained the process. He38 co-owned a small social media
agency that worked with AKP municipalities and various public institutions, and realized
he needed to seize the moment. In the early days of the Gezi protests, in a cafe in Üsküdar,

29
Taner Sezer, Erhan Arslan, Berna Arslan & Bengü Sever Sezer (2014) Taksim Gezi Park protests, public sphere
and new media. Paper presented at the 12th International Communication in the Millennium Symposiums,
Anadolu University; see also Sofia Hafdell (2014) Social Media and the ‘Menace to Society’: Potentials and
Limitations of Alternative Media in Turkey, Glocal Times, No. 21.
30
Freedom House (2015) Turkey, Country report, Freedom on the Net, 2015. Available at: https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-net/2015/turkey, accessed May 20, 2017.
31
All ISPs are organized under Erişim Şağlayıcıları Birliği (ESB) [Union of Service Providers] since February
6, 2014. An article was added to existing Internet Law to legalize the union. The official statement (only in
Turkish) is available at: https://www.esb.org.tr/biz-kimiz, accessed July 24, 2017.
32
As of August 2016, more than 110,000 sites in Turkey have been blocked according to a civil initiative that lists
all blocking of such cases (https://engelliweb.com/). The site is now closed. The latest version is available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20161127220929/https://engelliweb.com/, accessed May 20, 2017.
33
Mustafa Çakır (2014) BTK'ye dev bütçe [Huge Budget for the BTK], Cumhuriyet Gazetesi (October 18). Available
at: http://img-cumhuriyet.mncdn.com/haber/turkiye/131917/BTK_ye_dev_butce.html, accessed May 30, 2017.
34
Hurriyet Daily News (2014) Germany clamps down on spy tech exports to Turkey, citing human rights deficien-
cies. (May 21). Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/germany-clamps-down-on-spy-tech-exports-
to-turkey-citing-human-rights-deficiencies-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=66756&NewsCatID=510, accessed May
15, 2017.
35
Angus Batey (2011) The spies behind your screen, Telegraph (November 24). Available at: http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/8899353/The-spies-behind-your-screen.html, accessed May 30, 2017.
36
Hacking Team—The Enemies of Internet (2016). Available at: http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/hacking-team/,
accessed May 28, 2016. See also Samia Errazzouki (2017) Under Watchful Eyes: Internet Surveillance and
Citizen Media in Morocco, the Case of Mamfakinch, The Journal of North African Studies 22 (3), pp. 361–385.
Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2017.1307907
37
Efe Kerem Sozeri (2015) Turkey paid Hacking Team $600K to spy on civilians, The Daily Dot (July 7). Available
at: http://www.dailydot.com/politics/hacking-team-turkey/, accessed May 20, 2016.
38
Interviewee 02.
6 E. Saka

an old and relatively conservative Istanbul district on the Asian side, he met with a group of
notable pro-AKP columnists and told them about the power of social media. This gathering
formed the basis of a strong node that would lead to many counter campaigns. Most of the
columnists who contributed to the media dissemination of the infamous Kabataş harassment
incident39 were in that Üsküdar gathering. The interviewee, and his associates listed activist
names and agencies that supported the protests and sent the list to Yeni Şafak a pro-govern-
ment newspaper.40 A well-known advertiser included on that list, Serdar Erener, lost many
contracts that included Turkish Airlines.41 Critically the AKTroll does not mention in the
interviews any support or input from the AKP; he acted on his own. In contrast, another
leading AKTroll (@tahaun) who might have followed a similar path, later would be sidelined
in the intra-party quarrels. After being labeled in a now famous blog post Pelikan bildirisi
(the Pelican Declaration42 as pro-Davutoğlu (then prime minister), he stopped tweeting in
May 2016.43 The creators of the Pelikan Declaration,44 whose financial backer is believed to
be Erdoğan’s son-in-law, Serhat Albayrak, emerged from one of the major centers critical
of the AKTrolls’ role within the party. This incident also demonstrated most explicitly that
AKP is composed of factions.

AKTrolls and the Party

The first public news about AKTrolls, according to a Google News search, was in the Wall
Street Journal on September 16, 2013,45 which quoted AKP party officials as stating they
were recruiting ‘6,000’ people for a ‘social media army.’ In a leaked tape,46 Erdoğan’s

39
This widely was reported in pro-government media, which claimed a head-scarf mother with her baby
was harassed in Gezi Park by protesters in the Kabataş district, a busy hub for Istanbul’s ferries. Erdoğan
immediately declared the tape of the harassment should be aired, but to this day there has appeared no
proof: see Berivan Orucoglu (2015) Turks, Lies, and Videotape, Foreign Policy (March 13). Available at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/turks-lies-and-videotape-turkey-erdogan/, accessed May 30, 2017.
40
T24 (2013) Yeni Şafak'ın 'Ajanslar fenomenlere para verdi iddiasına Pucca'dan Yanıt [Pucca’s response on
allegation that Yeni Şafak ‘gave money to agency phenomena’], (June 4). Available at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/
yeni-safakin-ajanslar-fenomenlere-para-verdi-iddiasina-puccadan-yanit,231320, accessed May 30, 2017.
41
A story printed by pro-government newspaper Haber7.com (2013) Gezi destekçisi Erener'e darbe üstüne
[Blow upon blow for Gezi supporter Erener] (July 2). Available at: http://www.haber7.com/unlulerin-dunyasi/
haber/1044781-gezi-destekcisi-erenere-darbe-ustune-darbe, accessed May 30, 2017.
42
Pelikandosyasi [The Pelikan File] (2016) Pelikan Dosyasi. Pelikandosyasi – WordPress.com. (May 1); Available
at: https://pelikandosyasi.wordpress.com/, accessed May 20, 2017.
43
He resumed tweeting after Davutoğlu resigned following the Pelikan case.
44
All data in this paragraph is based on author interviews. For more on the Pelikan story see Efe Kerem Sozeri
(2016) Pelikan Derneği: Berat Albayrak, Ahmet Davutoğlu’nu neden devirdi? [The Pelikan Club: Why did
Berat Albayrak topple Ahmet Davutoğlu], Medium (November 3). Available at: https://medium.com/@efekerem/
pelikan-derne%C4%9Fi-berat-albayrak-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flunu-neden-devirdi-5fabad6dc7de#.3q4vkwf4v,
accessed May 30, 2017. The Pelican Declaration is shrouded in online mystery. In a single long Wordpress
blog post, Davutoğlu was accused of plotting against President Erdoğan and that trolls under his control were
promoting his agenda on social media. Strongly believed to be the work of columnist Hilal Kaplan and her
husband, Süheyp Öğüt, who led a pro-Erdoğan clique inside the party, they have gained status since Davutoğlu’s
resignation.
45
Ayla Albayrak & Joe Parkinson (2013) Turkey’s Government forms 6,000-Member Social Media Team, The
Wall Street Journal (September 16). Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873235270
04579079151479634742, accessed May 15, 2017.
46
YouTube (2014) Haramzadeler Sümeyye Erdoğan Bombası Bizim Trollere söyle kampanyaya destek olsunlar
[Breaking News Alert: Sümeyye Erdoğan says Trolls to support the campaign] (February 22). Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCa_SblktOI, accessed May 16, 2015.
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  7

daughter, Sümeyye, can be heard demanding that his advisor, Mustafa Varank, ask ‘our
trolls’ to help a campaign for an NGO she heads up (February, 2014). Yet, AKP personalities
also have been targets, and pursued47 by AKTrolls with hate speech directed against them
when they strayed from the party line (August, 2014). It turned out that Prime Minister
Davutoğlu’s faction in the AKP had controlled most of the AKTrolls in the early months of
2016, according to several anonymous interviews. Most of the revenue sources for these trolls
go through government channels, and thus a gatekeeper Prime Ministry could easily control
them through contracts and by employing some trolls as civil servants.48 Interviewees 03,
05 and 09 confirmed this. When he came to power, Davutoğlu may have seen that AKTrolls
could help control both intra-party rivals and political opponents.
After the June 7, 2016 elections, a pro-AKP columnist in Yeni Safak accused49 AKTrolls
of contributing to the AKPs June 2015 electoral loss. During fieldwork, it became clear,
however, that this accusation was due more to a clash among cliques within AKP circles
to control the party’s media strategies. The Pelikan Declaration creators had gained more
power by early 2016, but several interviewees stressed that only Erdoğan could contain the
increasing discord and competition between the Pelikan group and notable AKTrolls to
control the party’s social media strategies.50
The nature of AKTrolling protects the AKP from accusations of direct involvement. This
also gives more autonomy to those involved. 51 A group of Ankara-based graduate students
initiated a Twitter network data-based study52 about the AKTroll network in 2015. The study53
focused on a Twitter network analysis around the site nicknamed Esad Ç (Twitter address:
@esatreis)54 that openly claimed to be an AKTroll.55 The analysis starts with @Esad Ç, a
well-known troll (as I too found in my fieldwork), who has a cascading network with at least
40 connections.56 That is, each of the accounts that @esatreis follows, themselves follow at
least 40 other accounts (this is shown in the network mapping in Figure 1).57 The map shows

47
Taraf.com.tr (2014) Trollere yargı yolu haberi [News on Trolls pending Trials] (July 6). Available at: http://
arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-trollere-yargi-yolu-162601/, accessed May 20, 2015. This daily first was published in
2007. Most of its columnists were liberal anti-military individuals. After Gezi Park and the Gülenist instigated
corruption case in December 2013, Taraf’s coverage became anti-government. This news piece appeared during
this period, when the daily was also more pro-Kurd than pro-Gülen. After the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, it
was closed due to alleged Gülenists links.
48
Taraf Gazetesi, Trollere 'maaş havuzu' haberi [News about ‘salary pools’ for Trolls], August 28, 2014. Available
at: https://odatv.com/aktroller-ne-kadar-maas-aliyor-2808141200.html, accessed May 20, 2015.
49
İsmail Kiliçarslan (2015) Niçin oldu bu? [Why did this happen?], Yeni Şafak (June 9). Available at: http://www.
yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ismailkilicarslan/nicin-oldu-bu-2012320, accessed May 20, 2015.
50
Interviewee 03 and 05 particularly.
51
Taraf Gazetesi (2015) Fiyatları belli oldu…AKP'nin sövme timi bin liraya küfrediyormuş! [Their prices have
been revealed: AKP’s cursing team swears for thousand Lira] (29 September); accessed May 20, 2016; and
Interviewee 06.
52
The original page seems to have gone but it is available online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20151022132903/
http://hafizakolektifi.org/index.php/2015/10/07/ak-troller-kimler, accessed June 5, 2017. An open source soft-
ware, Gephi, was used to create network mapping.
53
Diken (2015) Ak Trol’lerin haritası çıkarıldı: Merkezde Erdoğan’ın danışmanı Varank var [An Ak Troll map has
been drawn out: Erdoğan’s advisor Varank is at the center] (October 14). Available at: http://www.diken.com.tr/
ak-trollerin-haritasi-cikarildi-merkezde-erdoganin-danismani-varank-var/, accessed May 30, 2016.
54
Twitter closed this account after complaints. The last archived version of this handle can be seen here:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160913165021/https://twitter.com/esatreis, accessed May 31, 2017.
55
Haber 10 (2016) AKTroll problemi [The AKTroll problem] (21 January). Available at: http://www.haber10.
com/yazar/esat_c/aktroll_problemi-492745, accessed May 30, 2016.
56
The number 40 seems to be an estimation used by the Ankara group for research purposes.
57
This too seems to be an estimate for research purposes, used to limit the accounts with smaller followers/
following numbers.
8 E. Saka

Figure 1. Image source: http://www.diken.com.tr/ak-trollerin-haritasi-cikarildi-merkezde-

erdoganin-danismani-varank-var/

President Erdoğan’s advisor, Mustafa Varank (@varank), as one of the connections who
acts as a bridge among anonymous trolls and known pro-AKP politicians and columnists.
The image in Figure 1 was the first one to challenge a simple generalization of anonymity
on the part of AKTrolls. According to my interviews with AK party members in 2016, the
majority of the powerful trolls are only anonymous to outsiders, but within party circles, their
real identities are known.58 In another case, Netherlands-based social media researcher, Efe
Kerem Sözeri, whose journalistic columns frequently report on the AK Troll social media

58
However, the network image reproduced here might be misleading in that it gives a centralized mapping of
AKTrolls (see Appendix A for a more accurate picture).
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  9

scene, demonstrated in a series of Twitter messages59 in 2015 that Beytüşşebap District

Governor Kadir Güntepe was using an anonymous anti-PKK Twitter account, @pohjoh02.
Güntepe once mistakenly tweeted an official message from the troll account, and although
he deleted it within a minute, the damage was done. Sözeri used software at greptweet.com
to demonstrate that Güntepe very probably produced the deleted Twitter message. His han-
dle, @pohjoh02, includes abbreviations of ‘police special forces’ and ‘gendarmerie special
forces’ in Turkish, and its ownership probably already was known within party circles, but
it took a mistaken Tweet for others to learn about it.

Trolling Practices
A two-time AKP candidate in charge of intra-party organizations in western parts of Turkey
stated, according to an interview with an AKP official, that he60 once ‘employed 40 trolls’61
but found them ineffective and reported this to President Erdoğan. This implies the existence
of bursaries for such work. How effective AKTrolls are in maintaining the AKP’s political
hegemony is hard to determine, but undoubtedly they have impact.62 To contextualize AKTrolls
and their political function better, I discuss below their most prominent practices. For clarity,
all tweets have been translated. The original can be accessed through the given links.

Trolls can Function as a Form of Social Lynching 63

The sheer volume of threats and insults can discourage targeted citizens. For example, Pelin
Batu, daughter of a well-known Turkish diplomat, and herself a historian with her own TV
show, used Twitter on July 21, 2016, to state that she no longer was going to tweet due to
threats and insults from AKTrolls.64

Trolls will Acquire Pop-culturally Effective Social Media Accounts and Refashion them
for their own Purposes65
Accounts that are secular looking and engaging are believed to be effective in reaching
non-AKP audiences. Through primarily non-contractual methods, trolls will take over
the passwords, and rewrite the messaging, turning them into AKP propaganda tools.66 An
example, revealed during fieldwork, was that of @gafebesi, a Twitter account with some 2.3

59
Twitter (2016) efe kerem sozeri on Twitter (May 25). Available at: https://twitter.com/efekerem/sta-
tus/735473935752515584?s=03, accessed May 31, 2017.
60
Interviewee 07.
61
This ‘employment’ probably was similar in nature to the ones offered by Davutoğlu, see above, but the existence
of bursaries also was implied.
62
YouTube (2015) Emre Kızılkaya | Trolls are people, too: How Turkey’s AKP fails to dominate social media
(October 6). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9I0pjstZ7E, accessed May 31, 2017.
63
Efe Kerem Sozeri (2015) Mapping Turkey’s Twitter-troll lynch mobs, The Daily Dot (October 22). Available
at: http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-twitter-trolls/, accessed May 31, 2017.
64
Twitter (2016) Pelin Batu on Twitter (July 21). Available at: https://twitter.com/PelinBatuRevnak/sta-
tus/756024531878305792, accessed May 31, 2017.
65
Efe Kerem Sozeri (2015) ‘Oy ve Hilesi’ kimin hilesi? [‘Vote and Fraud.’ Whose fraud?], Jiyan’ın Sesi (October
25). Available at: https://medium.com/@jiyaninsesi/oy-ve-hilesi-kimin-hilesi-fcdecdb3450d.
66
Each case may be handled differently. The particulars of @gafebesi forms the basis of this explanation. It was
not an official transaction. An agreed amount was paid in return for gaining control of the account upon receiving
the password and other relevant access data. Twitter itself is excluded in the exchange.
10 E. Saka

Figure 2. Observations were verified with a bots analysis report released by a major internet
security company, Norton (November, 2016). Turkey is one of the top countries in automated bots
usage; see report at https://uk.norton.com/emeabots

million followers. When it was acquired by @DetroitliKizil, a well-known AK Troll who is

known for relatively high brow content, its content changed.

Using Automated Bots to Counter anti-AKP Discourse

The use of automated bots has been on the rise and does not need sophisticated investment.67
Evidence suggests that as of April 2016, AKTrolls rely heavily on bots (Figure 2). A case
brought to public attention revealed, for example, that Twitter banished a bot-powered
hashtag that praised president Erdoğan.68 Twitter is struggling against spam-creating bots
and trolls,69 and despite Turkish ministers’ claims, it is unclear whether this is a result of
a general policy. Use of an automated bot differs from having extra accounts in terms of
scale.70 One easily can buy bot services or fake followers for Twitter or Facebook on pirate
sites such as www.r10.net.

67
Amit Agarwal (2016) How to Write your own Twitter Bots without Code, Digital Inspiration (April 9). Available
at: https://www.labnol.org/internet/write-twitter-bot/27902/, accessed May 31, 2017.
68
Hurriyet Daily News (2016) Turkish ministers accuse Twitter of plotting against Erdoğan (March 30). Available
at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-ministers-accuse-twitter-of-plotting-against-erdogan-.aspx?Page-
ID=238&NID=97106&NewsCatID=338, accessed May 31, 2017.
69
Issie Lapowski (2015) Why Twitter Is Finally Taking a Stand Against Trolls, Wired (April 21). Available at:
https://www.wired.com/2015/04/twitter-abuse/, accessed May 31, 2017.
70
Interviewee 11.
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  11

Figure 3. In the biography part: ‘Ayyıldız Team Special Operation Team. This is not a comedian
but a disguised FETÖ member’.;;; In the tweet: is a not a comedian but a FETÖ member in
disguise.;;;;;Fixed Twitter message: ‘This is a call to our Security Forces. In his deleted direct
messages Atalay Demirci says he would sacrifice himself for Fethullah Gülen’.;;;;; http://i.cdn.
ensonhaber.com/resimler/diger/atalay-demirci_6903.jpg

Phishing for Political Purposes

Phishing differs from mere hacking by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic
communication with the intent to steal personal data for malicious reasons. Though it is
difficult to develop hard data at this stage, and the situation may simply reflect a general
trend, many hacked accounts soon begin to produce pro-AKP discourses.71 A self-pro-
claimed national hacking team, AyYıldız Tim decorates hacked accounts with pro-AKP or pro-
Erdoğan images and discourses. One of the latest victims was a popular comedian Atalay
Demirci (see Figure 3).
Demirci’s private messages were made public, and he was arrested on allegations of being
a Gülenist. Here is an image after it was seized and doctored. According to an interview with
the coder,72 to access private messaging, the hacking group might be receiving assistance
from state institutions.

71
Interviewee 12; personal observations; and Twitter exchanges with journalists.
72
Interviewee 10.
12 E. Saka

Figure 4. Twitter, Steven A. Cook on Twitter: ‘AKP Twitter trolls: you can call me a spy, Gulenist,
Islamophobic, Zionist provocateur, and threaten my safety, but you won’t intimidate me’. (29 July
2016). Screen shot from https://twitter.com/stevenacook/status/759009022376681472

Mobilizing in non-Turkish Languages

New types of actors are becoming active in targeting foreign nationals who are critical of
AKP policies. Steven A. Cook, who is Eni Enrico Mattei, senior fellow for Middle East
and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, often posts complaints
about AKTrolls (see Figure 4).
As noted, these tactics do not appear to be determined centrally. Decentralized troll groups
act voluntarily or because of a particular power struggle or just for mere business interests.

Conclusion
The emergence of AKTrolls can be attributed to the AK party’s initial reaction to the Gezi
Park protests. However, as a general cyber tool, the targets and functions of AKTrolls have
changed as the perceived enemy or situations have changed. This article provides evidence
to show the relationships between the AK government and AKTrolls, although these never
have been formally acknowledged. By doing so, it shows that there never has been an organ-
ized party decision to centralize troll organization. However, the AKP leadership often has
declared its desire to counter opposition in social media, and many individuals and circles
connected in various ways to the party structure, and who believed action of this nature
might help the party or their own upward mobility within it, took initiatives on their own
to become AKTrolls. Second, the article demonstrates how the AK government has reacted
against social media, which has grown in importance as a communication and political tool.
Surveillance through political trolls seems to have become one of the major government
responses. The major functions of AKTrolls are twofold: Surveillance through surfing the net;
and disruption, by targeting critical accounts in a wide array of ways to change the discourse,
discredit the individual or movement, obtain proprietary information, or block an account.
Troll targeting has become most effective when it spotlights an item or person to become
part of the social media agenda; governmental action or intervention then often follows.

Acknowledgements
This research and its publication would not have been possible without the generous support of the Al Jazeera
Media Corp. and the University of Cambridge—Al Jazeera Media Project.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  13

ORCID
Erkan Saka   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1845-4129

References
Abutaleb, Y. & Sezer, C. (2016) Turkey Appears to be Vanguard of ‘Throttling’ Social Media after Attacks, Reuters,
July 6. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-socialmedia-idUSKCN0ZM2O3,
accessed May 20, 2017.
Agarwal, A. (2016) How to Write your own Twitter Bots without Code, Digital Inspiration, April 9. Available at:
https://www.labnol.org/internet/write-twitter-bot/27902/, accessed May 31, 2017.
Akser, M. & Baybars-Hawks, B. (2012) Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of Neoliberal Media
Autocracy, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 5(3), pp. 302–321.
Albayrak, A. & Parkinson, J. (2013) Turkey’s Government Forms 6,000-Member Social Media Team, The Wall
Street Journal, September 16. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732352700457
9079151479634742, accessed May 15, 2017.
Ansong, E. D., Takvi, T., Damoah, D., Ampomah, E. A. & Larkotey, W. (2013) Internet Trolling in Ghana,
International Journal of Emerging Science and Engineering, 2, pp. 42–43.
Arda, B. (2014) The Medium of the Gezi Movement in Turkey: Viral Pictures as a Tool of Resistance. Paper
presented at APSA 2014 Annual Meeting. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2453044, accessed May 25, 2017.
Batey, A. (2011) The Spies Behind your Screen, Telegraph, November 24. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/8899353/The-spies-behind-your-screen.html, accessed May 30, 2017.
Bishop, J. (2014) Dealing with Internet Trolling in Political Online Communities, International Journal of
E-Politics, 5(4), pp. 1–20.
Çakır, M. (2014) BTK’ye dev bütçe [Huge Budget for the BTK], Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, October 18. Available at:
http://img-cumhuriyet.mncdn.com/haber/turkiye/131917/BTK_ye_dev_butce.html, accessed May 30, 2017.
Coleman, G. (2011) Anonymous: From the Lulz to Collective Action, The New Everyday: A Media Commons
Project. Available at: http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/tne/pieces/anonymous-lulz-collective-action,
accessed May 20, 2016.
Coleman, G. (2012) Phreaks, Hackers, and Trolls: The Politics of Transgression and Spectacle, The Social Media
Reader, pp. 99-119. Available at: http://gabriellacoleman.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Coleman-Phreaks-
Hackers-Trolls.pdf, accessed May 25, 2017.
Collins Dictionary (No Date) Troll | Definition, Meaning & More | Collins Dictionary. Available at: http://www.
collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/troll, accessed May 20, 2016.
Dahlberg, L. (2001) The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring The Prospects of Online Deliberative
Forums Extending the Public Sphere, Information, Communication & Society, 4(4), pp. 615–633.
Datta, B. (2016) Belling the Trolls: Free Expression, Online Abuse and Gender, Open Democracy, August 30, 2016.
Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/bishakha-datta/belling-trolls-free-expression-online-abuse-and-
gender, accessed October 20, 2016.
Demirhan, K. (2014). Social Media Effects on the Gezi Park Movement in Turkey: Politics Under Hashtags, in:
Social Media in Politics, pp. 281–314 (Cham: Springer).
Diken (2015) Ak Trol’lerin haritası çıkarıldı: Merkezde Erdoğan’ın danışmanı Varank var [An AK Troll Map has
been drawn out: Erdoğan’s advisor Varank is at the center] (October 14). Available at: http://www.diken.com.
tr/ak-trollerin-haritasi-cikarildi-merkezde-erdoganin-danismani-varank-var/, accessed May 30, 2016.
Emre, P. Ö., Çoban, B. & Şener, G. (2014) Humorous form of protest: Disproportionate use of intelligence in Gezi
Park’s Resistance, New Opportunities and Impasses: Theorizing and Experiencing Politics. Paper presented at
POLITSCI’ 13: Political Sciences Conference, 31 October 31–November 2, 2013, Istanbul, Turkey.
Erişim Şağlayıcıları Birliği (ESB) [Union of Service Providers]. Available at: https://www.esb.org.tr/biz-kimiz,
accessed July 24, 2017.
Errazzouki, S. (2017) Under Watchful Eyes: Internet Surveillance and Citizen Media in Morocco, the Case of
Mamfakinch, The Journal of North African Studies, 22(3), pp. 361–385. Available at: https://doi.org/10.108
0/13629387.2017.1307907.
Freedom House (2015) Turkey, Country Report, Freedom of the Press.
Freedom House (2014) Turkey, Country Report, Freedom of the Press. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-press/2014/turkey, accessed March 20, 2015.
Freedom House (2015) Turkey, Country Report, Freedom of the Press. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-net/2015/turkey, accessed May 20, 2017.
14 E. Saka

Genç, K. (2013) Rise of Turkish citizens’ media, Index on Censorship, 42(4), pp. 92–95.
Gökçe, O. Z., Hatipoğlu, E., Göktürk, G., Luetgert, B. & Saygin, Y. (2014) Twitter and Politics: Identifying Turkish
Opinion Leaders in New Social Media, Turkish Studies, 15(4), pp. 671–688.
Graph Commons. Available at: https://graphcommons.com/, accessed May 20, 2017.
Haber 10 (2016) AKTroll problemi [The AKTroll Problem], 21 January. Available at: http://www.haber10.com/
yazar/esat_c/aktroll_problemi-492745, accessed May 30, 2016.
Haber7.com (2013) Gezi destekçisi Erener’e darbe üstüne darbe [Blow upon Blow for Gezi Supporter Erener],
July 2. Available at: http://www.haber7.com/unlulerin-dunyasi/haber/1044781-gezi-destekcisi-erenere-darbe-
ustune-darbe, accessed May 30, 2017.
Hacking Team—The Enemies of Internet (2016). Available at: http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/hacking-team/, accessed
May 28, 2016.
Hafdell, S. (2014) Social Media and the ‘Menace to Society’: Potential and Limitations of Alternative Media in
Turkey, Glocal Times, 4(21), pp. 1–14.
Hafıza Kolektifi (2015) Ak Troller Kimler [Who are the Ak Trolls]. Available at: https://web.archive.org/
web/20151022132903/http://hafizakolektifi.org/index.php/2015/10/07/ak-troller-kimler, accessed June 5, 2017.
Hakemy, S. (2016) Are you a Populist Turkish President in Hiding During a Coup? There’s an App for that,
Mashable, July 16. Available at: http://mashable.com/2016/07/16/turkish-president-facetime-social-media-
coup/#BPXwfWMlQOqp, accessed May 20, 2016.
Hartley, J. (2009) Creative industries (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell).
Hunter, I. (2015) Turkish President’s Social Media Campaigners Deny being a Troll Army, The Independent, June 6.
Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-president-s-social-media-campaigners-
deny-being-a-troll-army-10301599.html, accessed May 20, 2017.
Hurriyet Daily News (2014) Germany Clamps Down on Spy Tech Exports to Turkey, Citing Human Rights
Deficiencies, May 21. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/germany-clamps-down-on-spy-tech-
exports-to-turkey-citing-human-rights-deficiencies-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=66756&NewsCatID=510,
accessed May 15, 2017.
Hurriyet Daily News (2016) Slow Down in Access to Social Media in Turkey a ‘Security Measure,’ says PM.,
November 4). Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/problems-in-access-to-social-media-in-turkey-
a-security-measure-says-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=105744&NewsCatID=509, accessed May 20, 2017.
Karataş, Ş. & Binark, M. (2016) Yeni Medyada Yaratıcı Kültür: Troller ve Ürünleri ‘Caps’ ler [Innovative Culture
in the New Media: Trolls and their Products, the ‘Caps’], TRT Akademik, 1(1), pp. 426–448.
Kiliçarslan, I. (2015) Niçin oldu bu? [Why did this Happen?], Yeni Şafak, June 9. Available at: http://www.yenisafak.
com/yazarlar/ismailkilicarslan/nicin-oldu-bu-2012320, accessed May 20, 2015.
Kırık, A. L. (2014) A Research on Social and Political Use of Social Media in Turkey, International Journal of
Science Culture and Sport, 2(8), pp. 49–60.
Lapowski, I. (2015) Why Twitter Is Finally Taking a Stand Against Trolls, Wired, April 21. Available at: https://
www.wired.com/2015/04/twitter-abuse/, accessed May 31, 2017.
Lokot, T. (2016) Center for Monitoring Propaganda and Disinformation Online Set to Open in Russia, GlobalVoices
(March 26). Available at: https://globalvoices.org/2016/03/26/center-for-monitoring-propaganda-and-
disinformation-online-set-to-open-in-russia/, accessed May 30, 2017.
McCosker, A. (2014) Trolling as Provocation: YouTubers Agonistic Publics, Convergence: The International Journal
of Research into New Media Technologies, 20(2), pp. 201–217.
Morozov, E. (2012) The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York, NY: Public Affairs).
Orucoglu, B. (2015) Turks, Lies, and Videotape, Foreign Policy, March 13. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/03/13/turks-lies-and-videotape-turkey-erdogan/, accessed May 30, 2017.
Pelikandosyasi [The Pelikan File] (2016). Available at: https://pelikandosyasi.wordpress.com/, accessed May 20,
2017.
Phillips, W. (2015) This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship between Online Trolling
and Mainstream Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Information Society Series).
Sezer, T., Sever, B., Arslan, B. & Arslan, E. (2014) Taksim Gezi Park Protests, Public Sphere and New Media. Paper
presented at 12th International Communication in the Millennium Symposiums, Anadolu University, Turkey.
Sindelar, D. (2014) The Kremlin’s Troll Army. The Atlantic (August 12). Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932, accessed May 20, 2017.
Soldatov, A. & Borogan, I. (2015) What spawned Russia’s ‘troll army’? Experts on the red web share their views,
The Guardian, September 8. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/sep/08/russia-troll-
army-red-web-any-questions, accessed March 20, 2017.
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  15

Sozeri, E. K. (2015a) Turkey paid Hacking Team $600K to Spy on Civilians, The Daily Dot, July 7). Available at:
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/hacking-team-turkey/, accessed May 20, 2016.
Sozeri, E. K. (2015b) Mapping Turkey’s Twitter-troll lynch mobs, The Daily Dot, October 22). Available at: http://
www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-twitter-trolls/, accessed May 31, 2017.
Sozeri, E. K. (2015c) ‘Oy ve Hilesi’ kimin hilesi? [Whose Ploy is ‘Oy ve Hilesi’?], Jiyan’ın Sesi, October 25.
Available at: https://medium.com/@jiyaninsesi/oy-ve-hilesi-kimin-hilesi-fcdecdb3450d, accessed March 20,
2017.
Sozeri, E. K. (2016a) Pelikan Derneği: Berat Albayrak, Ahmet Davutoğlu’nu neden devirdi? [The Pelikan Club:
Why did Berat Albayrak Topple Ahmet Davutoğlu], Medium, November 3. Available at: https://medium.
com/@efekerem/pelikan-derne%C4%9Fi-berat-albayrak-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flunu-neden-devirdi-
5fabad6dc7de#.3q4vkwf4v, accessed May 30, 2017.
Sozeri, E. K. (2016b) The Rotten Politics Infecting Turkey’s Social Media, The Daily Dot, March 30. Available
at: http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-social-media-yeni-safak-facebook-twitter-manipulation/, accessed
May 31, 2017.
Stein, J. (2016) How Trolls are Ruining the Internet, Time, August 18. Available at: http://time.com/4457110/
internet-trolls/, accessed June 28, 2016.
Suler, J. R. & Phillips, W. L. (2009) The Bad Boys of Cyberspace: Deviant Behavior in a Multimedia Chat
Community, Cyber Psychology & Behavior, 1(3), pp. 275–294.
T24 (2013) Yeni Şafak’ın ‘Ajanslar fenomenlere para verdi’ iddiasına Pucca’dan Yanıt [Pucca’s Response on
Allegation that Yeni Şafak ‘gave Money to Agency Phenomena’], June 4. Available at: http://t24.com.tr/
haber/yeni-safakin-ajanslar-fenomenlere-para-verdi-iddiasina-puccadan-yanit,231320, accessed May 30, 2017.
Taraf Gazetesi (2016) Trollere ‘maaş havuzu’ haberi [News about ‘Salary Pools’ for Trolls], August 28.
Taraf Gazetesi (2015) Fiyatları belli oldu…AKP’nin sövme timi bin liraya küfrediyormuş! [Their Prices have been
Revealed: AKP’s Cursing Team Swears for Thousand Lira], September 29).
Taraf Gazetesi (2014) Trollere yargı yolu haberi [News on Trolls Pending Trials], July 6. Available at: http://arsiv.
taraf.com.tr/haber-trollere-yargi-yolu-162601/, accessed May 20, 2015.
Tepper, M. (1997) Use Net Communities and the Cultural Politics of Information, in: Porter D. (ed.) Internet
Culture, pp. 39–54 (New York: Routledge).
Tufekci, Z. (2013) ‘Come, Come, Whoever You Are’: As a Pluralist Movement Emerges from Gezi Park in Turkey,
Technosociology, our Tools, Ourselves. Available at: http://technosociology.org/?p=142, accessed May 25,
2017.
Tufekci, Z. (2014) The Medium and the Movement: Digital Tools, Social Movement Politics, and the End of the
Free Rider Problem, Policy & Internet, 6(2), pp. 202–208.
Twitter (2016) Efe Kerem Sozeri on Twitter, May 25. Available at: https://twitter.com/efekerem/status/
735473935752515584?s=03, accessed May 31, 2017.
Twitter (2016) Pelin Batu on Twitter, July 21. Available at: https://twitter.com/PelinBatuRevnak/
status/756024531878305792, accessed May 31, 2017.
Web Archive. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20161127220929/https://engelliweb.com/, accessed May
20, 2017.
YouTube (2015) Emre Kızılkaya: Trolls are People, Too: How Turkey’s AKP Fails to Dominate Social Media,
October 6. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9I0pjstZ7E, accessed May 31, 2017.
YouTube (2014) Haramzadeler Sümeyye Erdoğan Bombası Bizim Trollere söyle kampanyaya destek olsunlar
[Breaking News Alert: Sümeyye Erdoğan says Trolls to Support the Campaign], February 22. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCa_SblktOI. Accessed May 16, 2015.

Appendix A. A new AKTroll mapping proposal

The image shown in Figure A5 depicts major nodes on Twitter that produce AKTroll discourse. Here, I deliberately
connect independent nodes to the AKP or the Palace (President’s Office) in order to make all connections link
together. This image gives a picture of centralization that many observers believe is plausible. The independent
connections can be linked to the AKP and the Palace via individual Twitter connections.
In a more realistic image (Figure A6), I eliminate the AKP and the Palace as the central connectors and the image
becomes organically more decentralized: The data is based on ethnographic findings and archival research, and
the images were created with Graph Commons software.
16 E. Saka

Figure A5. Screenshot from the researcher’s Graph Commons-based mapping https://
graphcommons.com/graphs/0bb5856e-a7d8-4b5a-b0fc-502844bd1f64

Figure A6. Screenshot from the researcher’s Graph Commons-based mapping. https://
graphcommons.com/graphs/29696523-1f35-42 cc-bb6e-73df5eb27c19
 Social Media in Turkey as a Space for Political Battles  17

Appendix B. Interviews
Interviewee 01. An academic with a telecommunications industry experience. Face-to-face. Istanbul. 2016 May.
Interviewee 02. A social media agency owner. A self-identified AKTroll. Face-to-face and Twitter exchanges.
Istanbul. 2016 June and October.
Interviewee 03. A TV producer and advisor. Face-to-face. Istanbul. 2016 August.
Interviewee 04. A social media specialist. Twitter exchanges. 2016 September.
Interviewee 05. An academic and activist with Islamist orientations. Face-to-face. Facebook exchanges. Istanbul.
2016 August.
Interviewee 06. Social media specialist. Digital contributor to AKP related campaigns. Face-to-face. Istanbul.
2016 July.
Interviewee 07. An AKP party representative and deputy candidate. Face-to-face. Istanbul. 2016 September
Interviewee 08. A pro-AKP online news site owner. Face-to-face. Istanbul. 2016 October.
Interviewee 09. Social media specialist close to AKP youth circles. Face-to-face. Istanbul. 2016 August.
Interviewee 10. An open source coder. Face-to-face. Istanbul. 2016 July.
Interviewee 11. An AKP-led municipality employee who is involved in AKTroll activities. Face-to-face. Istanbul.
2016 May.
Interviewee 12. Public policy director in Turkey (Facebook or Twitter or Google. Not specified for anonymity).
Face-to-face. Istanbul, June 2016.
Interviewee 13. A Gülenist organizer on Twitter. Twitter communication, May 2016.
Interviewee 14. A relatively high-level bureaucrat specializing in Turkey’s communication sector. Face-to-face.
Ankara. 2016 September.