7/14/2018 COMCASA – Should India Sign?

| Delhi Defence Review

Over the past decade, India has been steadily purchasing military platforms from the United States
that typically come with secure communication systems of US-origin. However, since India has
thus far refused to sign the so-called Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement
(COMCASA), usually known as the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of
Agreement (CISMOA) in US parlance, it has been forced to use lower-grade commercially
available equipment in lieu of US-origin radio, communications security (COMSEC) and navigation
equipment that apparently give American platforms an operational edge over similar systems
available from elsewhere. By extension, it is claimed that the regional superiority that India was
expecting via such procurement has been somewhat diminished. So, the question is: ‘Should India
just sign COMCASA?’

In this piece, we argue that there are very good reasons for India to not rush into something like
COMCASA.

What is COMCASA?

COMCASA essentially provides a legal framework for the transfer of COMSEC equipment from the
US to India that would facilitate ‘interoperability’ between Indian and US forces, and potentially with
other militaries as well that use US-origin systems for secure tactical data links. The US, however,
tightly controls COMSEC technology and provides access to only those countries that have signed
a CISMOA / COMCASA with it. Obviously, the current denial of this COMSEC equipment to Indian
military forces means that they cannot really exchange tactical information with even friendly
regional forces that might use CISMOA/COMCASA covered communication systems. Furthermore,
not signing COMCASA also means that certain things such as high-precision GPS or the latest
guidance packages for US-origin air to air missiles will not be available to India. Indeed, if a US
origin fighter plane is selected for the recently announced ‘Make in India’ single-engine fighter
aircraft procurement project, the pressure on India to sign COMCASA will likely increase, since the
Indian Air force (IAF) will be hard put to integrate cutting edge non-US origin weapons with an
American fighter platform.

However…

Having said that, even though the US maintains that COMCASA is only ‘foundational’ in nature and
‘innocuous’ in import, there are genuine reasons for India to be concerned about the implications of
this agreement. For instance, from an Indian perspective, it is worth considering whether
COMCASA has the potential to compromise India’s operational security while protecting that of the
US. COMCASA may also increase pressure on India to source all of its COMSEC equipment from
US vendors in the future.

At the end of day, secure communications require high-grade encryption algorithms and
encryption-key management. An encryption algorithm operates the key over messages to produce
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7/14/2018 COMCASA – Should India Sign? | Delhi Defence Review

an encrypted message that any intruder is supposed to find difficult to break, if he has no access to
the keys. This also implies that all communication devices in a network need to be compatible with
one another by incorporating the same encryption algorithms. Now COMCASA requires that US
operators perform functions such as keying for the encryption. Indian operators will not be allowed
to even participate in the maintenance of these systems. So, will India be comfortable with the
presence of US designated personnel on Indian-procured US platforms for long durations of their
operational life? In the COMCASA scheme of things, the US will basically end up controlling the
entire communications and message flow for the sake of ‘interoperability’. Long term analysis of
the message flow could end up revealing tactical doctrines adopted by Indian forces in combat.

Since communication devices and links currently in use with Indian Forces cannot interact with US-
provided systems, it implies that any attempt to establish interoperability between a part of India’s
inventory and participating US forces could actually lead to reduced ‘intra-operability’ within India’s
own military. This is on account of the fact that COMCASA-covered equipment/platforms will
become ‘incompatible’ with the rest of India’s inventory. This could lead to calls to ‘overhaul’ the
Indian military’s entire network to COMCASA-compliant standards through wholesale import of US
systems. Short of which India would have to willfully acquiesce to the creation of a divide in its
inventory, thereby reducing the flexibility of field commanders to deploy available resources during
action. Obviously, neither prospect is a particularly happy one for Indian military planners. The fact
that COMCASA could lead to the secrecy of tactical doctrines getting compromised besides
imposing greater complexity costs on India’s communication systems demands that a detailed
study of the ground realities and practical implications of signing COMCASA be made prior to
deciding on a course of action.

Captain Ramaprasad is a veteran Indian Navy submariner and is a recipient of the Vishisht
Seva Medal (VSM) for his contributions towards the development of an indigenous combat
management system for undersea applications

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