V.

Campaign
1. Premature Election Campaigning - Sec. 80, OEC; Sec. 5, RA 7166

OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

Section 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. - It shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold
political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement
of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.

RA 7166
Section 5. Election and Campaign Period. - Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission, the election period for the
May 11, 1992 regular elections shall commence ninety (90) days before the day of the election and shall end thirty
(30) days thereafter.

The campaign periods are hereby fixed as follows:

(a) For President, Vice-President and Senators, ninety (90) days before the day of the election; and

(b) For Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial, city and municipal officials,
forty-five (45) days before the day of the election.

However, in the preparation of the election calendar, the Commission may exclude the day before the day of the
election itself, Maundy Thursday and Good Friday.

Any election campaign or partisan political activity for or against any candidate outside of the campaign period
herein provided is prohibited and shall be considered as an election offense punishable under Section 263 and 264
of the Omnibus Election Code.

PENERA V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 181613, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

FACTS: Penera and private respondent Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica. Andanar filed a Petition
for Disqualification against Penera for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity
prior to the commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that before the start of the authorized
campaign period, Penera and her party mates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their
candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections.

Penera admitted that a motorcade did take place. She explained that it was simply in accordance with the
usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a
motorcade. The COMELEC disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in premature
campaigning.

THE SC RULED THAT PENERA HAD ENGAGED IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN OR PARTISAN POLITICAL
ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD. However, the same was reversed upon the MR of petitioner Penera.

ISSUE: Whether or not Penera has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign
period.

RULING: Congress has laid down the law – a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. The SC has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within the filing period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Neither can the court turn a blind eye to the express and clear
language of the law that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the campaign period.

Any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed
before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan
political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of
the law.
Section 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. - It shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or
meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five
days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.

Essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the OEC:

1. A person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity;
2. The act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates;
3. The act is done outside the campaign period.

NOTE:
Q: Can a candidate, after filing a COC, campaign without being penalized?
A: Yes, as stated in Penera.
Q: The Supreme Court in Penera seemed to legalize premature campaigning. What about the prohibition on premature
campaigning under Section 80?
A: There is still premature campaigning if done during these days (considered outside the campaign period):
1. Maundy Thursday; 2. Good Friday; 3. Eve of Election Day.

2. Lawful Election Propaganda

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 205728, JANUARY 21, 2015

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6 X 10 in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012. The second tarpaulin subject of the present case contains the heading "Conscience
Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an
"X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
against it form "Team Buhay."

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
provides for the size requirement of two feet by three feet.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated
this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.

ISSUE: Whether the tarpaulins are political advertisement or election propaganda considering that petitioner is not
a political candidate.

RULING: NO, the tarpaulin does not render election propaganda. It is within the right of the petitioner guaranteed
by the Constitution to free expression given to private citizens.
The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed,
displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials,
and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is
intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the
election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take
the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other
forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes
matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable
of pecuniary estimation. It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. This court has held free
speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values." These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy.

NOTE: Campaign includes crediting and discrediting candidates as well.

3. EQUAL ACCESS TO MEDIA

GMA Network v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

FACTS: There are FIVE CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS questioning the constitutionality of Section 9(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties
for national election positions to an aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively.

They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press,
impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.

During the previous elections on May 2007 and 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and
interpreting Section 6 of RA No. 9006 regarding the airtime limitation to mean that the candidate is entitled to the
number of minutes “PER STATION”.
HOWEVER, for the May 2013 electi
ons, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9165 changing the interpretation of said candidates and political
parties airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements FROM “per station” basis to a “TOTAL
AGGREGATE” basis. COMELEC alleged that it would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access
to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing field between
candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without much.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 9165 is constitutional.

RULING: NO. All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space. (Sec.
6, R.A. No. 9006). The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be
based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our
attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed - that it should be on a "per station" basis.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by
which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be
given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate
to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates. In this regard, the media is also given
a very important part in that undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an
interactive process.
 The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is
said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such
dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right
to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled
with substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section
9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime limits unreasonably
restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. "[F]reedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for
the sake of democracy.” Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling
state interest.

All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda
during the campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:

The duration of an air time that a candidate, or party may use for their broadcast advertisements or election
propaganda shall be, as follows:

For Candidates/Registered Political parties for a National Elective Position

Not more than an aggregate total of one hundred (120) minutes of television advertising, whether appearing on
national, regional, or local, free or cable television, and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertising,
whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by purchase or donation

For Candidates/Registered Political parties for a Local Elective Position

Not more than an aggregate total of sixty (60) minutes of television advertising, whether appearing on national,
regional, or local, free or cable television, and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertising, whether airing on national,
regional, or local radio, whether by purchase or donation.

In cases where two or more candidates or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos, insignias, color motifs,
symbols, or forms of graphical representations are displayed, exhibited, used, or mentioned together in the broadcast
election propaganda or advertisements, the length of time during which they appear or are being mentioned or
promoted will be counted against the airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and the cost of the said
advertisement will likewise be considered as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid for the advertisements
or to whom the said advertisements were donated.

4. ELECTORAL EXPENDITURE
a. ALLOWABLE AMOUNT - RA 7166, Sec. 13; RA 10590
Section 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. - The agreement amount that a candidate or
registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and for other candidates Three
Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party
may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any
contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes,
duly reported to the Commission shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. (R.A. No. 7166)

SEC. 22. Regulation on Campaigning Abroad. - Personal campaigning, the use of campaign materials, as well as the
limits on campaign spending shall be governed by the laws and regulations applicable in the Philippines: Provided,
That all forms of campaigning abroad within the thirty (30)-day overseas voting period shall be prohibited. (R.A. No.
10590)

GARCIA V. COMELEC, 611 SCRA 55 (2010)

FACTS: On May 6, 2004, Osmena, then mayoral candidate in Cebu City, filed an election offense case against his
rival, petitioner Garcia, for the publication of political advertisements that allegedly violated the thrice-a-week
publication requirement and failed to indicate the name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the
advertisements were published. He averred that the publication was in violation of the COMELEC Resolution.

Osmena alleged that “MAYOR SA KATAWHAN” was published four times all one-half page in size in the Sun
Star. The “IT’S A NO-CONTEST” was printed seven times. The “NO TO TOM TAX OSMENA” advertisement appeared
thrice, also on one-half page in size. Osmena alleged that all the political advertisements did not indicate the true
and correct name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the advertisements were published.

Petitioner contended that the political advertisements had been made not for a single candidate but for
the entire slate of his party, KUSUG-KNP Party and Loren Legarda, respectively. PETITIONER ASSERTED THAT 22
CANDIDATES X 3 a week results to 66 times a week publication for all the candidates of the KUSUG-KNP Party. Thus,
the advertisements in question had not exceeded the legal limit provided by RA No. 9006. Further, petitioner stated
that the political advertisements in question reflected that they were really campaigns for the benefit of the
candidates of the Kusug-KNP Party, as in fact, they contained the pictures and names of the party’s political
candidates. Hence, he contended that the political advertisements substantially complied with the requirement
provided by the Fair Elections Act that the advertisement shall contain the true and correct name and address of the
party or candidate for whose benefit the election propaganda was printed.

The prosecution committee recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that respondent
did not violate the thrice-a-week rule laid down by Section 6 of RA 9006 as the said political advertisement is not for
the benefit of respondent alone, but for the whole Kusug-KNP Party. THE COMELEC EN BANC DISAGREED WITH THE
RECOMMENDATION.

Petitioner contended that he did not cause the publication of the advertisement in question and that it was
an organization named Friends of Alvin Garcia caused the publication of the said advertisement.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia did not commit election offense as the publication was caused by the Friends of Alvin Garcia.

RULING: NO. Garcia committed an election offense. The law requires that print advertisements donated to a
candidate shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written acceptance
shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the COMELEC. That requirement is a safeguard against
danger of publishing or broadcasting election propaganda beyond the required frequency, size and other limitations
imposed by law.

Since the advertisement in question was published by the Sun Star, there arises a presumption that there
was written acceptance by petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Under the Rules on Evidence, it is presumed that the law has been obeyed, and that private
transactions have been fair and regular.

The Court will not interfere with the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC, absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion that must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.

EJERCITO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 212398, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

FACTS: A Petition for Disqualification was filed by Egay San Luis (gubernatorial candidate) against petitioner
Ejercito on the ground that he induced or corrupted the voters in voting for his favor by distributing to the
electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called “Orange Card” with the intent to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters. Record shows that Ejercito exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for television
campaign commercials alone as he already spent the amount of P23, 730, 784.

The COMELEC resolution stated that a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only
authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX PESOS based on the population of the province of Laguna.

Petitioner claimed the following: that the Orange Card was a priority project of his administration as
incumbent Governor of Laguna and was never intended to influence the electorate; that the advertising contracts
between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were EXECUTED BY AN IDENTIFIED
SUPPORTER WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even
assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized for the conduct of third
parties who acted on their own without his consent. He also alleged that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 that the limit set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by
third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is
presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the government.

ISSUE: Whether Ejercito should be disqualified for spending an amount in excess of what is allowed by the COC.

RULING: Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is
allowed by the OEC.

RA No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be
broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract
and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor,
the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party.

Ejercito’s claimed of forged signature was belatedly raised. Thus, it can no longer be raised on appeal.
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and
whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65
petition.

Section 13 of RA 7166 provides: Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. The aggregate
amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: (a) For
candidates, Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00)
for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a
candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five
pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered
in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for
campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. Sections
100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166. Non-filing of the Statement of Contributions and
Expenses (SOCE) within 30 days after the elections is also an election offense.

VI. CASTING AND COUNTING OF VOTES

1. Automated Election System (AES)

a. Two Types – RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, Sec. 2(7) and (8)
SEC. 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"7. Paper-based election system - a type of automated election system that use paper ballots, records and counts
votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count;"
"8. Direct recording electronic election system - a type or automated election system that uses electronic ballots,
records, votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component that can be
activated by the voter, processes data by means of a computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and
transmits voting results electronically;

b. Some Requirements for the Use of AES - RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, Secs. 11(4) and (5) and 14

"SEC. 11. Functions of the Technical Evaluation Committee. - The Committee shall certify, through an
established international certification entity to be chosen by the Commission from the recommendations of the
Advisory Council, not later than three months before the date of the electoral exercises, categorically stating that
the AES, including its hardware and software components, is operating properly, securely, and accurately, in
accordance with the provisions of this Act based, among others, on the following documented results:
1. The successful conduct of a field testing process followed by a mock election event in one or more cities/municipalities;
2. The successful completion of audit on the accuracy, functionally and security controls of the AES software;
3. The successful completion of a source code review;
4. A certification that the source code is kept in escrow with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;
5. A certification that the source code reviewed is one and the same as that used by the equipment; and
6. The development, provisioning, and operationalization of a continuity plan to cover risks to the AES at all points in the process
such that a failure of elections, whether at voting, counting or consolidation, may be avoided.

SEC. 14. Section 13 of republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 17. Ballot box. - Where applicable, there shall be in each precinct on election day a ballot box with
such safety features that the Commission may prescribe and of such size as to accommodate the official
ballots."

2. Electoral Boards
a. Can Teachers Still be Compelled to Serve in Elections? RA 10756 or the Election Service
Reform Act (April 8, 2016), Section 3

SECTION 3. Rendering of Election Service. – The Electoral Boards to be constituted by the Commission shall be
composed of a Chairperson and two (2) members, all of whom shall be public school teachers who are willing and
available to render election service.

Should there be a lack of public school teachers willing, available or qualified to serve, the Commission may instead
appoint the following persons in this order of preference:

(a) Private school teachers;

(b) National government employees:
(1) DepED non-teaching personnel;
(2) Other national government officials and employees holding regular or permanent positions,
excluding uniformed personnel of the Department of National Defense and all its attached
agencies;

(c) Members of the Commission-accredited citizen arms or other civil society organizations and
nongovernmental organizations duly accredited by the Commission; and
(d) Any registered voter of the city or municipality of known integrity and competence who is not connected
with any candidate or political party.
In cases where the peace and order situation so requires as determined by the Commission and where there are no
qualified voters willing to serve, uniformed personnel of the Philippine National Police shall be deputized to render
election service as a last resort.

VII. PROCLAMATION

1. Remedies Before Proclamation

a. Denial of Due Course to or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy for False Material Representation

b. Declare a Nuisance Candidate to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy

c. Disqualification

d. Suspension of Proclamation (Pending Case for Disqualification or Cancellation of COC) – RA 6646, Section 6, last
sentence, in relation to Sec. 7 thereof.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.

Section 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. - The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

e. Postponement of Election – OEC, Sec. 5

Section 5 Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision,
the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

f. Failure of Election – OEC, Sec. 6

Section 6 Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
USMAN V. COMELEC, 42 SCRA 667 (1971)

FACTS: On November 10, 1970, RA 6132 called for the election of 320 delegates apportioned among 67
representative districts in Lanao Del Norte.

Private respondents Quibranza et al, candidates for delegate, petitioned the COMELEC for a declaration of
nullity of the election returns from all the precincts of 7 municipalities and 4 barrios in Lanao del Norte. They alleged
that NO ACTUAL VOTING TOOK PLACE because of terrorism and other machination and that FICTITIOUS ELECTION
RETURNS WERE PREPARED under duress, and the influence of terrorism and/or bribery wherein it was made to
appear that certain favoured candidates obtained most, if not all the votes fictitiously cast therein, WHILE private
respondents were made to appear as having OBTAINED VERY FEW, IF NO VOTES AT ALL. They prayed for the holding
of special election in the said municipalities and barrios concerned AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE CANVASS AS WELL
AS THE PROCLAMATION OF THE WINNING CANDIDATES until the hearing and decision on the merits of the petition.

The COMELEC issued two resolutions ordering the BOC to canvass the election returns in Manila and
ordering them to desist from proclaiming the winning candidates until further orders.

Petitioners USMAN et al claimed that free, clean, peaceful and orderly election took place in all the places
and precincts enumerated the respondents.

During the preliminary conference, it was assented by the parties the summoning of the 42 chairmen of the
board of inspectors. The 4 chairmen testified. Three of whom testified a free, honest and orderly election was
conducted. However, one of them broke down on cross examination and revealed what really transpired. He related
that only about 10% to 20% of the registered voters in his precinct actually voted and that armed men prepared and
filled up the rest of the ballots.

The COMELEC found out that there were 9,419 registered voters; and that 9,557 had actually voted, or that
138 votes were in excess of the number of registered voters. Of these 9,557 who voted, only 239 had been
established to have actually voted among the registered voters in all the 42 precincts; 6,147 of the registered voters
had been voted for by substitute voters, while an additional 673 persons who were not registered in any of the 42
precincts were able to vote without using name of any of the registered voters. 2,498 of those who voted could not
be determined whether they were registered vote or persons who voted in substitution of the registered voters.
HENCE, failure of election.

ISSUE: Whether or not the election returns from the 42 precincts of Karomatan be excluded.

RULING: Yes. The broad power of the Comelec, conferred upon it by the Constitution, to enforce and administer
"all laws relative to the conduct of elections" and to decide all administrative questions affecting elections "for the
purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections," has been the key in the resolution of many pre-proclamation
controversies involving the integrity and authenticity of election returns. Invoking the aforestated power of the
Comelec, justified the action and upheld the authority of the Comelec to order the exclusion of "obviously
manufactured returns, or tampered returns, or returns prepared under threats and coercion or under circumstances
affecting returns' integrity and authenticity, emphasizing the duty of the Comelec to see to the use and inclusion in
the canvass of only genuine elections.

One commissioner believed that the canvass should be completed on the basis of the valid returns from
the other precincts of Lanao del Norte and that the proclamation of the third winning candidate on the basis of the
said canvass should logically follow; the other commissioner maintained his original view that there is need of a
special election in Karomatan.

A reading of section 17 (e) of Republic Act 6132 makes it apparent that Congress has delegated to the
Comelec the power to call for a special election — a power essentially legislative in nature, being merely an incident
to or an extension or modality of the power to fix the date of the elections. However, in the proper exercise of the
delegated power, Congress saw fit to require the Comelec ascertain that (1) no voting has been held in any precint
or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect
the results of the elections. The language of the provision clearly requires the concurrence of the two circumstances
to justify the calling of a special election.

The Comelec concedes that what transpired in Karomatan constitutes "not merely a simple case of
irregularity in the voting but a case of no voting or no election at all. However, the Comelec attributes this to
"massive fraud rather than to force majeure, violence or terrorism the — three causes explicitly enumerated by
section 17 (e). Unlike section 17 (d) which empowers the Comelec to postpone the election in any political division
or subdivision whenever it finds that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election therein is rendered impossible
by reason of fraud, violence, coercion, terrorism, or any other serious cause or causes, section 17 (e) excludes the
situation where no voting has been held because of fraud. Furthermore, doubt exists whether or not the
irregularities committed in Karomatan properly partake of violence or terrorism. This being the case, we find that
the first circumstance is not attendant.

g. Pre-proclamation Controversies – OEC Sec. 243

Section 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified,
or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which
materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

RAMIREZ V. COMELEC, GR NO. 122013, MARCH 26, 1997 (CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERRORS)

FACTS: Petitioner Ramirez was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on the basis of the results
showing that he obtained 1, 367 votes against respondent’s 1235 votes. Private respondent filed a petition for the
correction of what he claimed was manifest error in the Statement of Votes. He alleged that based on the entries in
the Statement of Votes, he obtained 1, 515 votes as against petitioner’s 1, 367 but because of error in addition, he
was credited with 1,235 votes.

Petitioner Ramirez disputed private respondent’s claim alleging that the entries in the Statement of Votes
actually referred to the number of votes obtained by Fabillar, a mayoralty candidate, and not to the votes obtained
by private respondent.

The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution directing the MBC to reconvene and recomputed the votes in the
Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate for vice mayor Giporlos, Eastern Samar. Petitioner and MBC
filed separate motions for clarification, to which the COMELEC En Banc issued another Resolution reiterating its
earlier ruling, rejecting MBC’s recommendation to resort to the election return. Hence, this petition for certiorari
and mandamus seeking the annulment of the resolutions of the COMELEC, and the reinstatement of petitioner as
the duly elected vice mayor.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the COMELEC acted without its jurisdiction because the case was resolved without having been
first acted upon by any of its divisions. (2) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the recomputation of votes based on the alleged uncorrected errors eventhough the MBC had already made a
correction motu propio.

RULING: (1) NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction over petition for correction of
manifest error directly filed before it. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. —
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing as
where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the
election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a
mistake in the copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from
non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite
the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.
(e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.

However, petitioner is stopped in questioning the issue of jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc because he
participated in the proceedings and sought affirmative reliefs.

(2) NO. The certification issued by the MBC is thus not the proper way to correct manifest errors in the
Statement of Votes. More importantly, the corrections should be based on the election returns but here the
corrections appear to have been made by the MBC on the bases of the Certificates of Votes issued. That the clerk
who prepared the Statement of Votes was tired and drowsy does not necessarily mean the entries she made were
erroneous. But what is clear is that the Statement of Votes was not prepared with the care required by its
importance.

Accordingly, as the Solicitor General states, what the COMELEC should have ordered the MBC to do was
not merely to recompute the number of votes for the parties, but to revise the Statement of Votes, using the election
returns for this purpose.

2. Remedies After Proclamation

a. Election Protest (OEC, Secs. 249-252 and 255)

Section 249. Jurisdiction of the Commission. - The Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city
officials.

Section 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. - A sworn petition
contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be
filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Section 251. Election contests for municipal offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer
shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election.

Section 252. Election contest for barangay offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer
shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of
the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and
whose decisions shall be final.
Section 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest. - Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the
book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it
and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.

Grounds for the filing of election protests:

1. Fraud;
2. Vote-buying;
3. Terrorism;
4. Presence of flying voters;
5. Misreading or misappreciation of ballots;
6. Disenfranchisement of voters;
7. Unqualified members of board of election inspector; and
8. Other election irregularities.

Pendency of election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin the protestee from assuming office.

b. Quo Warranto (OEC, 253)

Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation
of the results of the election.

Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or
metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election.

i. Election Protest vs. Quo Warranto

ELECTION PROTEST (Article XXI)
An election protest is a contest between the
defeated and winning candidates on the ground
of frauds or irregularities in the casting and
counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of
the returns. It raises the question of who actually
obtained the plurality of the legal votes and
therefore is entitled to hold the office. (Samad v.
COMELEC, GR. No. 107854, July 16, 1993)
Frauds or irregularities in the casting and
counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of
the returns (Samad v. COMELEC, supra)
Electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the
protested precincts. (Section 11 of Rule 2,
Supreme Court Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests)
Any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office
(Sections 250-252, OEC)
PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO (Section 253)
A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus
Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a
proceeding to unseat the respondent from office
but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his
place. (Samad v. COMELEC, GR. No. 107854, July
16, 1993)
(1) Ineligibility;
(2) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
(Section 253)
Any voter (Section 253, OEC)
(1) If contest involves any Member of the House
of Representative or any regional, provincial, or
city, COMELEC Division (Section 250, OEC
(2) If the contest involves a municipal officer,
proper Regional Trial Court (Section 251, OEC)
(3) If the contest involves a barangay officer,
proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court
(Section 252, OEC)
Verified Petition with Certification against Forum
Shopping (Section 7 of Rule 2, Supreme Court
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests)
Within 10 days after the proclamation of the
results of the election
(1) the position involved;
(2) the date of proclamation; and
(3) the number of votes credited to the parties
per proclamation. An election protest shall also
state:
(4) the total number of precincts of the
municipality or the barangay concerned;
(5) the protested precincts and votes of the
parties in the protested precincts per the
Statement of Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of
the parties are not specified, an explanation why
the votes are not specified; and
(6) a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the
protested precincts.
(Section 11 of Rule 2, Supreme Court Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests)
(1) For contests involving a barangay officer,
Regional Trial Court within 10 days from the
receipt of the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court
(2) Within five (5) days after promulgation of the
decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file
with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a
copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the
adverse party. (Section 2 of Rule 22, Rules
Governing Pleadings, Practice, Procedure before
the COMELEC or any of its Offices)
(1) If the petition involves any Member of the
House of Representatives or any regional,
provincial, or city, COMELEC Division
(2) If the petition involves any municipal or
barangay officer, proper Regional Trial Court or
Municipal Trial Court, respectively (Section 253,
OEC)
Verified Petition with Certification against Forum
Shopping (Section 7 of Rule 2, Supreme Court
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests)
Within 10 days after the proclamation of the
results of the election
(1) the position involved;
(2) the date of proclamation; and
(3) the number of votes credited to the parties
per proclamation. An election protest shall also
state:
(4) the total number of precincts of the
municipality or the barangay concerned;
(5) the protested precincts and votes of the
parties in the protested precincts per the
Statement of Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of
the parties are not specified, an explanation why
the votes are not specified; and
(6) a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the
protested precincts. (Section 11 of Rule 2,
Supreme Court Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests)
(1) For contests involving a barangay officer,
Regional Trial Court within 10 days from the
receipt of the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court
(2) Within five (5) days after promulgation of the
decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file
with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a
copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the
adverse party. (Section 2 of Rule 22, Rules
Governing Pleadings, Practice, Procedure before
the COMELEC or any of its Offices)
LUISON V. GARCIA, 103 Phil 453 (1958)

FACTS: Luison and Garcia were candidates for mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The COC of Luison was filed by the
Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively The COC of Garcia was filed
by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor. The
COMELEC, after making its own investigation, issued a Resolution declaring Garcia ineligible to run for office. The
COMELEC striked out the name of Garcia from the registered candidates.

Garcia filed an action for prohibition against the Municipal Secretary of Tubay for invalidating his COC and
the votes cast for him.

Despite the cancellation of his COC, Garcia continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility
became an issue in the campaign. The Board of Inspectors counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited
to him. The BOC proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan.

LUISON filed a petition for quo warranto in the CFI for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and
securing his consequent ouster from office but he same was dismissed for lack of merit. Luison also filed a protest
in the same court on the same ground that Garcia was ineligible because his COC was declared null and void by
the COMELEC.

The CFI dismissed the protest and declared that the COMELEC erred in declaring him legally insufficient.

ISSUE: The issue now to be determined is whether, the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained
the next highest number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.

RULING: NO. The protestant is not entitled to office to be vacated by the protestee. The general rule is that the
fact a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle
the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case the electors have failed
to make a choice and the election is a nullity.

The protestee (Garcia) is ineligible to hold the office for which he was proclaimed based on the resolution
of the COMELEC declaring that said COC was not prepared in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court ruled that
neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay,
Agusan.

PROTEST QUO WARRANTO

Fraud and irregularities
The protestant may assume office
via election protest
Pertains to the counting of ballots
This is a case of quo warranto.
Ineligibility
The protestant will not be seated
via Petition of quo warranto
Pertain to the eligibility of the candidates

Effect of filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto

Generally, it bars the subsequent filing of a pre proclamation controversy or a petition to annul
proclamation. It also amounts to the abandonment of one filed earlier, thus, depriving the COMELEC of the authority
to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. Once the competent
tribunal has acquired jurisdiction over an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative
thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. (Villamor v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
169865, July 21, 2006)

ii. Summary of Jurisdiction of Courts

1. COMELEC – sole judge of all contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials (reviewable by SC under Rule 64 using Rule 65).
2. Presidential Electoral Tribunal – President and Vice President
3. SET – Senator
4. HRET – representative
5. RTC – over contests for municipal officials which may be appealed to COMELEC
6. MeTC or MTC – for barangay officials which may be appealed to RTC.

Authority to prosecute election offenses

DOJ and COMELEC exercise concurrent jurisdiction in conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses. The
grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue
of the Constitution but by the OEC which was eventually amended by Sec. 43 of RA 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts
preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the COMELEC and no longer as mere deputies (Jose
Miguel T. Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., G.R. No. 199082, Sept. 18, 2012).

Prosecution of election offenses

Election offenses are prohibited acts such as:
1. Vote buying and vote selling (1991 Bar);
2. Conspiracy to bribe voters;
3. Wagering upon result of election;
4. Coercion of subordinates;
NOTE: Coercion of subordinates as an election offense [OEC, Sec. 261(d)] has been expressly repealed by Sec. 2, R.A.
7890 and the express repeal has been affirmed by SC in Javier v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 215847, January 12, 2016.
5. Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion;
6. Coercion of election officials and employees;
7. Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, giving of salary increases;
8. Intervention of public officers and employees;
9. Undue influence;
10. Unlawful electioneering;
11. Carrying firearms outside the residence or place of business; and
12. Use of armored land, water or aircraft (OEC. Sec. 261)

Prescriptive period of election offenses

5 years from the date of their commission (OEC, Sec. 267)

Jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses

According to Sec. 2 (6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute cases involving violations of election laws, but it may delegate the power to the Provincial prosecutor
(People v. Judge Basilia, G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). The COMELEC shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and prosecute the same. (R.A. 9369,
Sec. 43)

Jurisdiction to try and decide violation of election laws

General Rule: The RTC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the OEC.

Exception: The MTC has jurisdiction over offenses relating to failure to register or failure to vote. (OEC, Sec 267)
c. Annulment of Election and Proclamation – FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 (1989)

Facts: In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Mu-
nicipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and
proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense,
Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him;but
that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pur-suant to
American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto
which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.
Issue: Whether

RULING: The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing
to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a
foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from
her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged
shortly thereafter. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks
to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

CHAPTER 3: Administrative Law

I. Administrative Agencies

1. Manner of creation

a. Constitutional provision
b. Authority of law
c. Legislative enactment Creation and Abolition of Office

The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function (Eugenio v. CSC, G.R. No.
15863, March 31, 1995). However, the President may abolish an office either from a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)

Elements of a valid abolition of office:

1. In good faith; (good faith is presumed)
2. Not for political or personal reasons; and
3. Not in violation of law.

NOTE: The Congress has the right to abolish an office even during the term for which an existing
incumbent may have been elected EXCEPT when restrained by the Constitution.

Reorganization

Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by

reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of government offices or
the units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them to make the
bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. (Pan v. Pena G.R.
No. 174244, Feb. 13, 2009).

Circumstances that may be considered as evidence of bad faith in a removal pursuant to reorganization,
thus warranting reinstatement or reappointment:

1. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
2. Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is created;
3. Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
4. Where there is reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the classified
offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices;
5. Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Sec. 3 of R.A. 6656 (Cotiangco v.
Province of Biliran, G.R. No. 157139, Oct. 19, 2011)

2. Kinds

1. Those created to function in situations where the government offers gratuity, grant, or special privilege.
Example: GSIS, SSS, PAO
2. Those set up to function in situations where the government seeks to carry on certain functions of
government. Example: BIR, BOC, BOI
3. Those set up in situations where the government performs business service for the public. Example:
PNR, MWSS, NFA, NHA
4. Those set up to function in situations where the government seeks to regulate businesses imbued with
public interest. Example: Insurance Commission, LTFRB, NTC
5. Those set up to function in situations where the government seeks under the police power to regulate
private businesses and individuals. Example: SEC, MTRCB
6. Those agencies set up to function in situations where the government seeks to adjust individual
controversies because of strong social policy involved. Example: NLRC, ECC, SEC
7. Those with investigative power. Example: DOJ, NBI

II. Powers of Administrative Agencies/Bodies

Alliance for the Family Foundation vs. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, 26 April 2017

Facts: Subject of this resolution is the Omnibus Motion[1] filed by the respondents, thru the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking partial reconsideration of the August 24, 2016 Decision
(Decision),[2] where the Court resolved the: [1] Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction (G.R. No. 217872); and the [2] Petition for Contempt of
Court (G.R. No. 221866), in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the case docketed as G.R. No. 217872 is hereby REMANDED to the Food and
Drugs Administration which is hereby ordered to observe the basic requirements of due process
by conducting a hearing, and allowing the petitioners to be heard, on the re-certified, procured
and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, and
to determine whether they are abortifacients or non-abortifacients.

Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and its power to issue rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, the Court hereby:

1. DIRECTS the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in the
screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices that will be used under
Republic Act No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the following minimum
requirements of due process: (a) publication, notice and hearing, (b) interested parties shall be
allowed to intervene, (c) the standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic
Act No. 10354, as to what constitutes allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, that is,
those which do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, (d) in
weighing the evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the protection and
preservation of the right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, and (e) the other
requirements of administrative due process, as summarized in Ang Tibay v. CIR, shall be
complied with.

2. DIRECTS the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies to

formulate the rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern the purchase and
distribution/dispensation of the products or supplies under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10354
covered by the certification from the Food and Drug Administration that said product and supply
is made available on the condition that it will not be used as an abortifacient subject to the
following minimum due process requirements: (a) publication, notice and hearing, and (b)
interested parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules and regulations or guidelines shall
provide sufficient detail as to the manner by which said product and supply shall be strictly
regulated in order that they will not be used as an abortifacient and in order to sufficiently
safeguard the right to life of the unborn.

3. DIRECTS the Department of Health to generate the complete and correct list of the
government's reproductive health programs and services under Republic Act No. 10354 which
will serve as the template for the complete and correct information standard and, hence, the duty
to inform under Section 23(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 10354. The Department of Health is
DIRECTED to distribute copies of this template to all health care service providers covered by
Republic Act No. 10354.
The respondents are hereby also ordered to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations to
conform to the rulings and guidelines in G.R. No. 204819 and related cases.
Issue: Whether FDA is acting in its regulatory power and is valid?
RULING: The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate
legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body
to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy.

"[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof." The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power
through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and
hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation
shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties,
the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction
which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of the requirements of due
process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.

On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its
"regulatory powers" and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the power to
review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the
Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that "no person
is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law." The Court's power cannot be
curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its regulatory power. In so arguing, the respondents cited Atty. Carlo
L. Cruz in his book, Philippine Administrative Law. Lest there be any inaccuracy, the relevant portions of
the book cited by the respondents are hereby quoted as follows: xxx.

B. The Quasi-Judicial Power xxx 2. Determinative Powers To better enable the administrative body to
exercise its quasi-judicial authority, it is also vested with what is known as determinative powers and
functions.

Professor Freund classifies them generally into the enabling powers and the directing powers. The latter
includes the dispensing, the examining, and the summary powers. The enabling vowers are those that
permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and which would be unlawful with
government approval. The most common example is the issuance of licenses to engage in a particular
business or occupation, like the operation of a liquor store or restaurant. x x x.

From the above, two things are apparent: one, the "enabling powers" cover "regulatory powers" as
defined by the respondents; and two, they refer to a subcategory of a quasi-judicial power which, as
explained in the Decision, requires the compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
Nowhere from the above-quoted texts can it be inferred that the exercise of "regulatory power" places
an administrative agency beyond the reach of judicial review. When there is grave abuse of discretion,
such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can come in and exercise its
power of judicial review. It can review the challenged acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial,
quasi-judicial or regulatory power. In the past, the Court exercised its power of judicial review over acts
and decisions of agencies exercising their regulatory powers, such as DPWH, TRB, NEA, and the SEC,
among others. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, the Court properly exercised its power
of judicial review over a Comelec resolution issued in the exercise of its regulatory power. x x x x x x x x x
x x x The Court is of the view that the FDA need not conduct a trial-type hearing. Indeed, due process does
not require the conduct of a trial-type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that the Constitution requires
is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and decide on the applications submitted
by MAHs after affording the oppositors like the petitioners a genuine opportunity to present their science-
based evidence. As earlier pointed out, this the FDA failed to do. It simply ignored the opposition of the
petitioners. In the case of Perez, et al. v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, et al., it was stated
that: A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. In the fairly recent case of Vivo v. Pagcor, the
Court explained: The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative
proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not
always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals
elaborates on the well- established meaning of due process in administrative proceedings in this wise: x x
x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Incidentally, Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720 and Section 9 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247 provide that any
decision by the FDA would then be appealable to the Secretary of Health, whose decision, in tum, may be
appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

Thus: Sec. 32. The orders, rulings or decisions of the FDA shall be appealable to the Secretary of Health. -
An appeal shall be deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal and posting of the corresponding
appeal bond. An appeal shall not stay the decision appealed from unless an order from the Secretary of
Health is issued to stay the execution thereof. Sec. 9. Appeals. - Decisions of the Secretary (DENR, DA,
DOH or DOST) may be appealed to the Office of the President. Recourse to the courts shall be allowed
after exhaustion of all administrative remedies. In view thereof, the Court should modify that part of the
Decision which allows direct appeal of the FDA decision to the Court of Appeals.

As stated in the said decision, the FDA decision need not be appealed to the Secretary of Health because
she herself is a party herein. Considering that the Executive Secretary is not a party herein, the appeal
should be to the OP as provided in Section 9. NOTE: In this case, the Supreme Court held that licensing is
considered an exercise of quasi-judicial power. As such, notice and hearing is required.

A. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) power or subordinate legislation.

The exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely
the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Notice and hearing required? General Rule: An administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing, in the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as
issuing rules and regulations. (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R. No.
111963, December 12, 1997)

Exceptions: The legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain
facts as determined at an appropriate investigation. (Hon. Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy
Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164171, August 22, 2006)

The administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
governed. (CIR v. CA, G.R. No. 11976, August 26, 1996).

Limitations to the exercise of quasi-legislative power

1. Within the limits of the powers granted to administrative agencies.

2. Cannot make rules or regulations which are inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution or
statute.
3. Cannot defeat the purpose of the statute.
4. May not amend, alter, modify, supplant, enlarge, or limit the terms of the statute.
5. A rule or regulation must be uniform in operation, reasonable and not unfair or discriminatory.

Administrative rule

Any agency statement of general applicability, which implements or interprets a law fixes and describes
procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes
memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not
affecting the rights of, or procedure available to the public. [Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 2 (2)]
Source of the power to promulgate administrative rules and regulations

Derived from the legislature, by virtue of a valid delegation, either express or implied.

Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation

Power of administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations on matters within their own
specialization.

Reason behind the delegation

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that:

(1) the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
(2) that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conforms to the standards that the law
prescribes (People of the Philippines v. Exconde, G.R. No. L-9820, August 30, 1957) i.

Publication Requirement

Required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the
law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. (Philippine
International Trading Corporation v. COA, G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999)

NOTE: If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices
of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.

[1987 Administrative Code, Administrative Procedure, Sec. 9(1)] Requisites for a valid delegation of quasi
legislative or rule-making power:
1. Completeness Test - The statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by
the agency
2. Sufficient Standard Test - Statute fixes a standard, mapping out the boundaries of the agency’s
authority to which it must conform. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which
it is to be implemented. (ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008)

B. Quasi-judicial power (Determinative powers) Power of administrative authorities to make

determinations of facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they
construe it to the facts so found. It partakes the nature of judicial power, but exercised by a person
other than a judge.

i. Adjudicatory powers

Cardinal Requirements of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings (HEDS-RIK)

1. Right to a hearing which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. The decision must be supported by evidence.
4. Such evidence must be substantial.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the
record, and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy in arriving at a decision.
7. The board or body should render decision in such a manner that parties can know the various issues
involved and the reasons for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27,
1940).
NOTE: The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side
or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. (Flores v. Montemayor, G.R.
No. 170146, June 6, 2011).

Conditions for the Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power:

1. Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body;
2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

Limited jurisdiction of quasi-judicial agencies: An administrative body could wield only such powers as
are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Its jurisdiction is interpreted strictissimi juris.

ii. Determinative powers

a. Directing powers – Orders the doing or performing of particular acts to ensure the compliance
with the law and are often exercised for corrective purposes. Examples: public utility
commissions, powers of assessment under the revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws,
and awards under workmen’s compensation laws, and powers of abstract determination such as
definition-valuation, classification and fact finding.

b. Enabling powers (Regulatory or licensing powers) – Notice and hearing required?

Permits the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and which would be unlawful without
governmental orders. It is characterized by the grant or denial of permit or authorization. Example:
Issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business. As mentioned earlier, notice and hearing is
required.

Other Classifications of Adjudicatory Powers:

Dispensing powers – Notice and hearing required?

Exemplified by the authority to exempt from or relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from
an affirmative duty. Its difference from licensing power is that dispensing power sanctions a deviation
from a standard.

As it is an exercise of a quasi-judicial power, notice and hearing is required.

Summary powers – Apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose
without a judicial warrant to authorize such action.
Examples: Abatement of nuisance, summary restraint, levy of property of delinquent taxpayers

Equitable powers – The power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts that has the right to,
and must, consider and make proper application of the rules of equity. Examples: Power to appoint a
receiver, power to issue injunctions.

Examining powers – This is also called as investigatory power. Requires production of books, papers, etc.,
and the attendance of witnesses and compelling the testimony.
Notice and Hearing, Effect of Non-observance – As a rule, it will invalidate the administrative proceedings.
A failure to comply with the requirements may result in a failure to acquire jurisdiction. NOTE: Right to
notice may be waived.

Necessity of Notice and Hearing - A hearing may take place after the deprivation occurs. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard.

NOTE: There has been no denial of due process if any irregularity in the premature issuance of the assailed
decision has been remedied by an order giving the petitions the right to participate in the hearing of the
MR. The opportunity granted by, technically, allowing petitioners to finally be able to file their comment
in the case, resolves the procedural irregularity previously inflicted upon petitioners. (Nasecore v. ERC,
G.R. No. 190795, July 6, 2011)

Exceptions to the Requirement of Notice and Hearing

1. Urgency of immediate action;

2. Tentativeness of administrative action;
3. Grant or revocation of licenses or permits to operate certain businesses affecting public order or morals;
4. Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects safety of persons or property;
5. Preventive suspension of public officer or employee facing administrative charges;
6. Cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
7. Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon property of a delinquent taxpayer;
8. Replacement of a temporary or acting appointee;
9. Right was previously offered but not claimed.

Fact-finding, investigative, licensing and rate fixing powers

Fact-finding Power:

a) Power to declare the existence of facts which call into operation the provisions of a statute;
b) Power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of
particular laws.

NOTE: The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be does not affect private rights do
not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 21, 1963).

Exceptions to the Rule that Findings of Facts of Administrative Agencies are Binding on the Courts:

1. Findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion;

2. Procedure which led to factual findings is irregular;
3. Palpable errors are committed;
4. Factual findings not supported by evidence;
5. Grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest;
6. When expressly allowed by statute;
7. Error in appreciation of the pleadings and in the interpretation of the documentary evidence presented
by the parties.

Fact-finding Quasi-judicial Body

A fact-finding quasi-judicial body (e.g., Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board) whose
decisions (on questions regarding certificate of public convenience) are influenced not only by the facts
as disclosed by the evidence in the case before it but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors
that are periodically submitted to it, has the power to take into consideration the result of its own
observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision, in connection with other evidence
presented at the hearing of the case. (Pantranco South Express, Inc. v Board of Transportation, G.R. No.
L-49664, November 22, 1990).

Investigatory Power Power to inspect, secure, or require the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements and testimony of witnesses. It is implied and not inherent in
administrative agencies. Power to issue subpoena not inherent in administrative bodies. It is settled that
these bodies may summon witnesses and require the production of evidence only when duly allowed by
law, and always only in connection with the matter they are authorized to investigate.

Power to cite a person in contempt not inherent in administrative bodies It must be expressly conferred
upon the body, and additionally, must be used only in connection with its quasi-judicial as distinguished
from its purely administrative or routinary functions.

NOTE: If there is no express grant, the agency must invoke the aid of the RTC under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court.

Licensing power
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license,
permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity.

License

Includes the whole or any part of any agency’s permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the
exercise of a right or privilege. [1987 Administrative Code, Sec. 2(10), Administrative Procedure]

Licensing

Includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment,
withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. [1987 Administrative Code,
Sec. 2(11), Administrative Procedure]

NOTE: Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security,
health, or safety requires otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without
notice and hearing. [1987 Administrative Code, Sec. 17(2), Administrative Procedure]

Nature of an administrative agency’s act if it is empowered by a statute to revoke a license for

noncompliance or violation of agency regulations
Where a statute empowers an agency to revoke a license for non-compliance with or violation of agency
regulations, the administrative act is of a judicial nature, since it depends upon the ascertainment of the
existence of certain past or present facts upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities
determined.

Rate

It means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual
or joint rates, tolls, classification or schedules thereof, as well as communication, mileage, kilometrage
and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by a
person. [1987 Administrative Code, Administrative Procedure, Sec. 2(3)]

Rate-fixing power

Power usually delegated by the legislature to administrative agencies for the latter to fix the rates which
public utility companies may charge the public. NOTE: The power to fix rates is essentially legislative but
may be delegated. (Philippine Inter-Island v. CA, G.R. No. 100481, Jan. 22, 1997) The legislature may
directly provide for these rates, wages, or prices. But while the legislature may deal directly with these
subjects, it has been found more advantageous to place the performance of these functions in some
administrative agency. The need for dispatch, for flexibility and technical know-how is better met by
entrusting the rate-fixing to an agency other than the legislature itself. (Cortes, 1963)

Rate-fixing Procedure: The administrative agencies perform this function either by issuing rules and
regulations in the exercise of their quasi-legislative power or by issuing orders affecting a specified person
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

NOTE: In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks before the first hearing thereon. [1987
Administrative Code, Administrative Procedure, Sec. 9(2)]

Requirements for the delegation of the power to ascertain facts to be valid: The law delegating the
power to determine some facts or state of things upon which the law may take effect or its operation
suspended must provide the standard, fix the limits within which the discretion may be exercised, and
define the conditions therefor. Absent these requirements, the law and the rules issued thereunder are
void, the former being an undue delegation of legislative power and the latter being the exercise of
rulemaking without legal basis. (U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. L-17122, February 27, 1992)

Standard required on delegated power to fix rates

That the rate be reasonable and just. (American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-26803,
October 14, 1975) In any case, the rates must both be non confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature. Even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. A rate-fixing order, though temporary or provisional it may
be, is not exempt from the procedural requirements of notice and hearing when prescribed by statute, as
well as the requirement of reasonableness. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. NTC, G.R.
No. 84818, December 18, 1989)
Re-delegating power to fix rates is prohibited

The power delegated to an administrative agency to fix rates cannot, in the absence of a law authorizing
it, be delegated to another. This is expressed in the maxim, potestas delagata non delegari potest.
(Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994) .

III. Judicial Recourse and Review

a. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:

It calls for resorting first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction and must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest
level before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Premature invocation of court
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for
judicial review; it is a condition precedent which must be complied with.

Rationale:

1. To enable the administrative superiors to correct the errors committed by their subordinates.
2. Courts should refrain from disturbing the findings of administrative bodies in deference to the doctrine
of separation of powers.
3. Courts should not be saddled with the review of administrative cases.
4. Judicial review of administrative cases is usually effected through special civil actions which are
available only if there is grave abuse of discretion.
5. To avail of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies.

Department of Finance vs. Hon. Mariano M. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 209331, 24 April 2015

Facts: The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September 2013,
which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF)
CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration... policies, rules and procedures,
and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of the same."
Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon... issued Customs Personnel Order
No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of
Customs V and VI,... including respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until
sooner revoked."... approved by DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima... espondents filed
an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period... of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person
acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the
sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
rder of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela Cruz's 72-hour TRO for
20 days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
on 18 October 2013.
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer for the issuance
of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is... under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
etitioners also alleged that respondents failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality of CPO
189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Co
Respondents further alleged that EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code... etitioners alleged that
respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their filing of an action for declaratory relief.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action
before the RTC;
RULING: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party may seek
intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the
administrative level. If there is still a remedy available within the administrative machinery, "then such
remedy should be exhausted first before [the] court's judicial power can be sought." The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that both the courts and the administrative agency
have concurrent jurisdiction. This is because non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx Hence, when jurisdiction is
exclusively granted to an administrative agency, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply. Here, considering that the Civil Service Commission is granted exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving personnel actions, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, not the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies.

United Overseas Bank of the Philippines vs. The Board of Commissioners-HLURB, G.R. No. 182133, 23
June 2015

Facts: Respondent J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. (JOS Managing Builders) is the registered owner and
developer of the condominium project Aurora Milestone Tower. On December 16, 1997, JOS Managing
Builders and respondent EDUPLAN Philippines, Inc. (EDUPLAN) entered into a
Contract to Sell covering Condominium Unit E, 10th Floor of the Aurora Milestone Tower
In August 1998, EDUPLAN effected full payment, and in December 1998, JOS Managing Builders and
EDUPLAN executed a Deed... of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit.
JOS Managing Builders failed to cause the issuance of a Condominium Certificate of Title over the
condominium unit in the name of EDUPLAN.
EDUPLAN learned that the... lots on which the condominium building project Aurora Milestone Tower
was erected had been mortgaged by JOS Managing Builders to petitioner United Overseas Bank of the
Philippines (United Overseas Bank) without the prior written approval of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Due to the inability of JOS Managing Builders to deliver the condominium certificate of title covering the
unit purchased by EDUPLAN, the latter filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
JOS Managing Builders and United
Overseas Bank before the HLURB praying that: (a) the mortgage between JOS Managing Builders and
United Overseas Bank be declared null and void; (b) JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank
be compelled to cause the issuance and release of the Condominium Certificate of
Title; and (c) JOS Managing Builders be ordered to provide emergency power facilities, to refund the
monthly telephone carrier charges, and to permanently cease and desist from further collecting such
charges.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES... whether the HLURB is correct in declaring null and void
the entire mortgage constituted by JOS Managing
Builders in favor of United Overseas Bank, as well as the foreclosure of the entire mortgage, is a legal
question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RULING: The issue on whether noncompliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB would
result to the nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part of it is purely legal which will have
to be decided ultimately by a regular court of law. It does not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final
decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.

The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience, but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law. There is, thus, no need to exhaust administrative remedies, under
the premises. The HLURB erred in declaring null and void the entire mortgage executed between JOS
Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank. Since EDUPLAN has an actionable interest only over Unit E,
10th Floor, Aurora Milestone Tower, it is but logical to conclude that it has no standing to seek for the
complete nullification of the subject mortgage and the HLURB was incorrect when it voided the whole
mortgage between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank. Considering that EDUPLAN had
already paid the full purchase price of the subject unit, the latter is entitled to the transfer of ownership
of the subject property in its favor.

iii. Doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction n (Doctrine of Prior Resort)

Under the principle of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
question within the jurisdiction of an administrative body prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal where the:
1. Question demands administrative determination requiring special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal;
2. Question requires determination of technical and intricate issues of a fact;
3. Uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

NOTE: In such instances, relief must first be obtained in administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. The judicial
process is accordingly suspended pending referral of the claim to the administrative agency for its view.

Rationale:

1. To take full advantage of administrative expertness

2. To attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws which can be secured only if determination of the
issue is left to the administrative body Instances.

Where the Doctrine Finds No Application

1. By the court's determination, the legislature did not intend that the issues be left solely to the
initial determination of the administrative body.
2. The issues involve pure questions of law.
3. Courts and administrative bodies have concurrent jurisdiction.

iv. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
3. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
4. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
5. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice;
6. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
7. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
8. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
9. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
10. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. When strong public interest is involved;
12. In quo warranto proceedings (The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development
Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013)

Exceptions to the Application of the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1991, 2000,
2004 Bar)

1. Violation of due process;

2. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

3. When the issue involved is a purely legal question;

4. When there is irreparable injury;

5. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

6. When the respondent is a Department Secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;

7. When the subject matter is a private land case proceedings;

8. When it would be unreasonable;

9. When no administrative review is provided by law;

10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

11. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;

12. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention;

13. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim; and 14. Where the rule on qualified political
agency applies (Laguna CATV Network v. Maraan, G.R. No. 139492, November 19, 2002)

Effect of Non-exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction
of the Court. The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a
cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996)

b. Doctrine of finality of administrative action.

No resort to the courts will be allowed unless the administrative action has been completed and there is
nothing left to be done in the administrative structure. (Sta. Rosa Mining v. Leido, 156 SCRA 1) A party
aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but must
also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary
and premature resort to the courts. (Zabat v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 551)

CHAPTER 4: LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

I. General Principles

Public Office

It is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
(Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995).
Purpose of a Public Office

A public office is created to effect the end for which government has been instituted which is the
common good; not profit, honor, or private interest of any person, family or class of persons (63C Am.
Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees 667 [1997]).

Characteristics of Public Office (P3VN)

1. It is a Public trust – The principle of “public office is a public trust” means that the officer holds the
public office in trust for the benefit of the people—to whom such officers are required to be
accountable at all times, and to serve with utmost responsibility, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives (1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1).

2. It is not a Property – The concept "public office is not a property” means that it is outside the
commerce of man; hence, it cannot be the subject of a contract. (Santos v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.L-
21624, Feb. 27, 1968)

3. It is personal to the Public officer – It is not a property transmissible to the heirs of the public officer
upon the latter’s death (Santos v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.L-21624, Feb. 27, 1968).

4. It is not a Vested right.

NOTE: However, right to a public office is nevertheless a protected right. With the exception of
constitutional offices that provide for some immunity as regards salary and tenure, right to a public
office is protected by the constitutional provision on security of tenure. It cannot be taken from its
incumbent without due process. (Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; Aparri v. CA, G.R.
No. L-30057, Jan. 31, 1984).

5. It is not a Natural right – Under our political system, the right to hold public office exists only because
and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.

Elements of a public office (CALIC)

1. Created by Constitution or by law or by some body or agency to which the power to create the office
has been delegated;

2. Invested with Authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power of the State;

3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined directly or impliedly by the
Legislature or through legislative authority;

4. Duties are performed Independently without control unless those of a subordinate;

5. Continuing and permanent (Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995; Tejada v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 91860, Jan. 13, 1992)

Creation

1. By the Constitution, e.g. Office of the President;

2. By valid statutory enactments, e.g. Office of the Insurance Commissioner; and

3. By authority of law, e.g. the Davide Commission.

Public office vs. Public contract

Public Office Public Contract

As to Creation
As to persons affected
As to subject matter and scope
Incident of sovereignty
Has for its object the carrying
out of sovereign as well as
governmental functions
affecting even persons not
bound by contract.
Embraces the idea of tenure,
duration, and continuity. The
duties connected therewith are
generally continuing and
permanent.
Originates from the will of the
contracting parties, subject to
the limitations imposed by law.
Imposes obligations only upon
persons who entered the same.
Is almost always limited in its
duration and specific in its
objects. Its terms define and
limit the rights and obligations
of the parties, and neither may
depart therefrom without the
consent of the other.

Public officer

Any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the government of the Philippine Islands, or
shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or class (Revised Penal Code, Art. 203).

NOTE: Under Sec. 2. RA 3019, the term public officer includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt service, receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government.

Kinds of a public officer

1. Constitutional or statutory;

2. National or local;

3. Legislative, executive, or judicial;

4. Lucrative or honorary;

5. Discretionary or ministerial;

6. Appointive or elective;

7. Civil or military;

8. De jure or de facto.
Kinds of Government Employment

CAREER SERVICE NON-CAREER SERVICE

Entrance is based on merits and Entrance is based on

fitness, which is determined by qualifications other than merit
competitive examination and fitness.
(except for noncompetitive
positions) or based on highly
technical qualifications

Impeachable Officers:

1. President;

2. Vice President;

3. Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

4. Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions; and

5. The Ombudsman.

The foregoing enumeration is exclusive.

Qualifications

It is to be understood in 2 different senses:

1. May refer to endowments, qualities, or attributes which make an individual eligible for public office,
e.g. citizenship; or

2. May refer to the act of entering into the performance of the functions of a public office, e.g. taking
the oath of office.

When used in the sense of endowments, qualities, or attributes, the individual must possess the
qualifications at the time of appointment or election and continuously for as long as the official
relationship continues.

When the qualifications are prescribed by the Constitution, they are generally exclusive, except where
the Constitution itself provides otherwise. Relative to public offices created by statute, Congress has
virtually plenary powers to prescribe qualifications, provided that:

1. the qualifications are germane to the objective/s for which the public office was created; and

2. the qualifications are not too specific as to fit a particular, identifiable person, because that would
deprive the appointing authority of discretion in the selection of the appointee.
Disqualifications The legislature has the right to prescribe disqualifications in the same manner that it
can prescribe qualifications, provided that the prescribed disqualifications do not violate the
Constitution.

General Disqualifications under the Constitution

1. No candidate who lost in an election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any
office in Government. (Section 6, Article IX-B)

2. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure. (Section 7(1), Article IX-B)

3. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other position in Government. (Section 7(2), Article IX-B)

XPN: It was held that when another office is held by a public officer in an ex officio capacity, as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of his office, there is no violation, because such other
office does not comprise “any other position.” The ex officio position is actually and, in legal
contemplation, part of the principal office. But the official concerned is not entitled to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position because his services are already paid for and covered
by the compensation attached to his principal office. (National Amnesty Commission v. COA, G.R. No.
156982)

Specific Disqualifications Under the Constitution

a) The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure
[Sec. 13, Art. VII].

b) No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected [Sec. 13, Art. VI]. See Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431.

c) The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions [Sec. 12, Art. VIII]. See In Re: Manzano,
166 SCRA

d) No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment [Sec. 2, Art. IX-A]. The same disqualification applies to the Ombudsman and his Deputies
[Sec. 8, Art. XI].

e) The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office [Sec. 11, Art. XI],

f) . Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. [Sec. 1,
Art. IX-B' Sec. 1 Art. IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D; Sec. 8, Art. XI]. ’
g) Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed to a term
of seven (7) years, without reappointment [Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-C; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-D;.]

h) The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of
the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations [Sec. 13, Art. VII],

De Facto Officers

One who has the reputation of being the officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in
point of law [Torres v. Ribo, 81 Phil 44]. He must have acted as an officer for such length of time, under
color of title and under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public
authorities, as to afford a presumption of election or appointment, and induce people, without inquiry,
and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action.

The acts of the de facto public officer, insofar as they affect the public, are valid, binding and with full
legal effect. The doctrine is intended not for the protection of the public officer, but for the protection
of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of a
public office [Monroy v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 620].

Elements of De Facto Officer

1. A validly existing public office.

2. Actual physical possession of said office.

3. Color of title to the office.

There is color of title to the office in any of the following cases:

a) By reputation or acquiescence, the public, without inquiry, relies on the supposition that he is the
public officer that he purports to be. This is acquired usually when the individual has acted as an officer
for such a length of time that the public believes that he is the public officer that he assumes to be.

b) Under a known and valid appointment or election, but the officer failed to conform to a requirement
imposed bv law, e.g., taking the oath of office.

c) Under a known appointment or election, void because of the ineligibility of the officer, or want of
authority of the appointing or electing authority, or because of an irregularity in his appointment or
election, such ineligibility, want of authority or irregularity being unknown to the public. d) Under a
known appointment or election pursuant to an unconstitutional law, before the law is declared
unconstitutional.
As to Entitlement to Salaries: The general rule is that the rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure,
even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title. However, where there is no
de jure public officer, the officer de facto who in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may, in
an appropriate action, recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.

III. Modes and Kinds of Appointment

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, 22 November 2016

Facts: PER CURIAM:

We hereby consider and resolve respondent Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation
for the Show Cause Order filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated on November 22, 2016 disposing
against her as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU GUILTY of GROSS
INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY,
DISMISSES her from the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS,
except accrued leave credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government controlled
corporations.

Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why
she should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined herein.
Issue: Whether Mrs. Lagman’s appointment is valid?

RULING: Although Judge Yu insisted on the irregularity of the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez for lack
of personal endorsement from her as the Presiding Judge, and of the appointment of Ms. Lagman due to
a pending administrative complaint, the appointments of Ms. Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Lagman were valid
and regular. As such, Judge Yu had no good reason to reject the appointments.

To start with, Ms. Tejero-Lopez and other applicants had undergone scrutiny and processing by the duly
constituted committee, and the OCA had then signed and executed the appointment. Nonetheless, the
authority to appoint still emanated from the Court itself. Judge Yu's objection to Ms. Tejero-Lopez's
appointment for lack of her personal endorsement was not enough to negate the appointment. Judge
Yu had no right to reject the appointment, making her rejection another instance of gross
insubordination by her. Judge Yu could only recommend an applicant for a vacant position in her court
for the consideration of the SPBLC, which then accorded priority to the recommendee if the latter
possessed superior qualifications than or was at least of equal qualifications as the other applicants she
did not recommend. The SPBLC explained to Judge Yu the selection process that had resulted in the
appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez. She could not impose her recommendee on the SPBLC which was
legally mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its assessment of the applicants based on
performance, eligibility, education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments, psycho-
social attributes and personality traits, and potentials. Secondly, Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment
of Ms. Lagman was just as unwarranted. Under Section 34, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), a pending administrative complaint shall not
disqualify an employee from promotion. Accordingly, Judge Yu's administrative complaint had no
bearing on Ms. Lagman's appointment, more so because Ms. Lagman was held liable only for simple
misconduct, a less grave offense that did not merit termination from public service for the first offense.
It is relevant to point out, too, that Judge Yu had no personality to object to or oppose Ms. Lagman's
appointment, considering that only a qualified next-in-rank employee has been recognized as a party-in-
interest to file the protest in accordance with paragraph 1.6.1, Article IX of the 2002 Revised Manual of
Clerks of Court.

Public offices are filled up either by:

1. Appointment;

2. Election;

3. Designation – The mere imposition of new or additional duties upon an officer to be performed by
him in a special manner.

4. In some instances by contract or by some other modes authorized by law. (Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 111091, Aug. 21, 1995)

Appointment The act of designation by the executive officer, board or body to whom that power has
been delegated, the individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office. In this
sense, it is to be distinguished from the selection or designation by a popular vote. (Borromeo v.
Mariano, G.R. No. L-16808, Jan. 3, 1921) It refers to the nomination or designation of an individual to an
office (Borromeo v. Mariano, ibid.). It is, in law, equivalent to “filling a vacancy”. (Conde v. National
Tobacco Corp., G.R. No. L-11985, Jan. 28, 1961)

Classifications of Appointment Permanent or temporary.

Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite
eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the
necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power
has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at
any time a permanent choice is made. A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not
make the incumbent a permanent appointee.

Regular or Ad Interim. A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session,
takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues
until the end of the term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President
while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad
interim appointment is deemed “by-passed” through inaction. The ad interim appointment is intended
to prevent interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged
vacancies in government offices. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. It is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office.

The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution: disapproval
of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments, or adjournment by Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on the appointment. There is no dispute that when the
Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be
extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the
exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval is final and
binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-
passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no
final decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment.

Nature of appointment

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (Luego v. CSC, G.R. No. L-
69137, Aug. 5, 1986)

Appointment vs. Designation

APPOINTMENT DESIGNATION
It is the selection by the proper authority of an It merely connotes the imposition of additional
individual who is to exercise the functions of a duties, usually by law, upon a person who is
given office. already in public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment or election.
It connotes permanence. It implies temporariness and therefore does not
confer upon the designee security of tenure.

Appointing authority

Inherently belongs to the people. It belongs to where the people have chosen to place it by their
Constitution or laws. (63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees 738, 1997) Entrusted to designated
elected and appointed public officials. The appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as
properly belonging to the executive department. Appointments may also be made by Congress or the
courts, but when so made should be taken as an incident to the discharge of functions within their
respective spheres. [(Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, affirmed in Springer v. Government, 277 U.S.
189, 72 Ed. 845, 48 S.CT. 480 (1928)]

NOTE: The general rule is that the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon
which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the
concurrence of the Commission of Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to
prescribe the qualifications or disqualifications to a given appointive office. (Rafael v. Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspections Board, G.R. No. L-19978, Sept. 29, 1967).

Where the law is silent as to who is the appointing authority, it is understood to be the President of the
Philippines. (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006) Absent any contrary statutory provision,
the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or discipline. (Aguirre, Jr. v. De Castro, G.R. No.
127631, Dec. 17, 1999).

Appointee’s Acceptance of Office

GR: An appointee’s acceptance of office is not necessary to complete or to make the appointment valid
where there is no provision of law to the contrary.

XPN: Acceptance, however, is necessary to enable the appointee to have full possession, enjoyment,
and responsibility of an office.

Procedure for the appointment of those that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments:

1. Nomination by the President;

2. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;

3. Issuance of commission; and

4. Acceptance by the appointee.

NOTE: Appointment is deemed complete upon acceptance. Pending such acceptance, which is
optional on the part of the appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn.

GR: Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen.

XPN: For purposes of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art. 2 (also an XPN to the rule against
involuntary servitude: POSSE COMMITATUS). (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, Oct. 14, 1949)

NOTE: • For ad interim appointments, steps 1, 3 and 4 precede step 2. • For appointments which do not
confirmation, step 2 is skipped.

III. Rights of Public Officers

The Provincial Government of Camarines Norte vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013

Facts: Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by
then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. An
administrative case was filed against her for gross insubordination, this was later on captioned as
Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that
she be held administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc
Investigation Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.

On appeal, the CSCmodified Governor Pimentels decision finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination
and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC
denied.

The CSC then issued Resolution No. 002245,which directed Gonzales reinstatement. Governor
Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her
services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to the CSC reporting his compliance
with its order, and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee.

The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,which again directed Gonzales reinstatement as
provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No.
RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature,
this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent
appointments as administrators prior to the new laws effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has
acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to
continue holding this office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position.

Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes incumbent
governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988,which ordered
Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position. Thus, the
petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the
CSCs Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No. 061988.

The CA supported the CSCs ruling. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition before the SC. In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues
that the provincial administrator position has been converted into a highly confidential, coterminous
position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held
prior to RA 7160s enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzales should be reinstated as the provincial administrator or to an equivalent
position

RULING: As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158, the administrator position demands a
close intimate relationship with the office of the governor (its appointing authority) to effectively
develop, implement and administer the different programs of the province. The administrator’s
functions are to recommend to the Sanggunian and to advise the governor on all matters regarding the
management and administration of the province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the governor’s
full trust and confidence.
To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators’ functions have with the office of
the governor, RA 7160 even made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its
appointing authority. This provision, along with the interrelations between the provincial administrator
and governor under Section 480, renders clear the intent of Congress to make the provincial
administrator position primarily confidential under the non-career service category of the civil service.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial administrator position
but significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-
career service tranche of the civil service. This change could not have been aimed at prejudicing
Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was
enacted. Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further
empower local governments and decentralize the delivery of public service. Section 3(b) of RA 7160
provides as one of its operative principles that: (b) There shall be established in every local
government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating
mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities. Thus,
Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the enactment of RA 7160 is
immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator.

For purposes of determining whether Gonzales’ termination violated her right to security of tenure,
the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should be considered, and not
merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered government service. Congress’
reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative
power that does not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure. To be sure, both career and non-career
service employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil
service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to
this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after
procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for
primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position.
Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of
office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the
confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires" and the
loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that results in the termination of
employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we
cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer
entrust his confidence in Gonzales. Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer
or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due
process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the
office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner
violated Gonzales’ right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from
her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as
ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the
termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no
longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable
 position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement
benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.

IV. Accountability of Public Officers

a. The “Threefold Liability Rule”

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011)

FACTS: Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political
positions to vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the former Deputy Director of
the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al.
was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees,
Andutan et al. were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification
of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and
administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs)
to Steel Asia, among others. The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves,
retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and
controlled agencies or corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,
ruling that the latter “should not have considered the administrative complaints” because: first, Section
20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman “may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of”; and second, the administrative case
was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation

ISSUES: Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed.

Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government
employee who had already resigned.

RULING: The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled
by jurisprudence. [W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In
disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and
confidence in our government. The Court held that the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770
does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on
whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the
provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. The use of the word "may"
clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a
statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed
after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not
barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied) Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed.
Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in
Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.

The court held that ombudsman can no longer file the administrative case because it is moot and
academic First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to
resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was
filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. However, the
State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed violations while in
office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the threefold liability rule, the wrongful
acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the
Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned
or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged
transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for Estafa and
violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found
guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the penalties of
perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.

b. RACCS – IA1 Magcamit vs. Internal Affairs Service - Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (IAS-
PDEA), G.R. No. 198140, 25 January 2016

Facts: In a letter dated April 13, 2008, addressed to Director General Dionisio R. Santiago, a person named Delfin
gave information about an alleged extortion done to his mother by Magcamit and other PDEA agents. The PDEA
agents denied the irregularities imputed to them and maintained that the letter-complaint was made only to destroy
their reputation.

On May 5, 2008, Magcamit and his co-agents, namely, IO3 Carlo Aldeon, IO2 Renato Infante, IO2 Ryan Alfaro, and
IO2 Apolinario Mationg, Jr., were formally charged with Grave Misconduct for demanding and/or obtaining
P200,000.00 from Luciana M. Jaen (Jaen) in exchange for her release after she was apprehended in a buy-bust
operation in Lipa City. After they had submitted their Answer, their case was submitted for recommendation and
action.

In a memorandum dated May 20, 2008, Special Investigator V Romeo M. Enriquez (SI V Enriquez) found Magcamit
and his co-agents liable for grave misconduct and recommended that they be dismissed from the civil service.
Accordingly, they were dismissed on June 5, 2008.

Issue: Whether or not the letter is sufficient to initiate the administrative complaint against petitioner.

RULING: The administrative complaint was initiated when Jaen and Delfm executed sworn statements
and filed them with the IAS-PDEA. As the CA correctly pointed out, the lettercomplaint did not, by itself,
commence the administrative proceedings against Magcamit; it merely triggered a factfinding
investigation by the IAS-PDEA. Accordingly, these sworn statements - together with the letter-complaint
-were used as pieces of evidence to build a prima facie case for extortion warranting a formal charge for
grave misconduct.

Administrative determinations of contested cases are by their nature quasi-judicial; there is no

requirement for strict adherence to technical rules that are observed in truly judicial proceedings. As a
rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings in order "to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses." By relaxing technical rules, administrative agencies are, thus, given leeway in coming up with
a decision.

Nonetheless, in deciding disciplinary cases pursuant to their quasi-judicial powers, administrative

agencies must still comply with the fundamental principle of due process. Administrative tribunals
exercising quasijudicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject
to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases
presented before them.

Due process in administrative cases, in essence, is simply an opportunity to explain one's side or to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling. For as long as the parties were given fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently
met.

Boston Finance and Investment Corporation v. Judge Gonzalez, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520 (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 14- 4296-RTJ), October 09, 2018

FACTS: Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent for undue delay in rendering an
order amounting to gross dereliction of duty and violation of AM No. 99- 10-05-02 relative to Civil Case
No. 10-27-MY. Complainant alleged that on November 19, 2010, plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 10-27-
MY, filed a petition with application for preliminary injunction and/or TRO before the RTC, praying for
the writ of issuance of a preliminary injunction/TRO to enjoin the sale at public auction of the
preoperties that served as collateral for the loans they obtained from complainant. Respondent judge
issued an order directing complainant to show cause why an injunctive writ should not be issued, and
directed the Clerk of Court to cease and desist from conducting the scheduled public auction pending
resolution of the petition, without, however, specifying the duration of its effectivity.

On December 2, 2010 complainant filed its compliance, maintained that no injunctive writ should issue,
and that the petition should be dismissed for forum shopping and litis pendentia. It appears that the
plaintiffs had instituted a similar case before the MTC of Bacolod City seeking the enjoinment of the
foreclosure sale.

Unfortunately, respondent failed to resolve all pending incidents in connection with the case for a very
long time. Thereafter, on March 18, 2013, complainant again moved for the prompt resolution of all
pending incidents in the case, expressing its willingness to enter into a compromise agreement with
plaintiffs. However, no compromise was reached for failure of the plaintiffs to cooperate with
complainant. Finally, respondent, in an order, suspended the proceedings and archived Civil Case No.
10-27-MY pending resolution of the other related case in Bacolod City.
Respondent admitted that although there were several incidents which remained unacted upon, he
insisted that it was because the preliminary hearing on complainant’s affirmative defense has not yet
been terminated due to the latter’s failure to appear.

The OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and undue delay
in resolving pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY, as well as violation of Sections 3 and 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and that he be fined.

Citing the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the OCA found that since respondent issued the "cease and desist" Order dated November
19, 2010 - which was in the nature of a TRO - without any justification or any indication of its
effectivity, and that he also failed to conduct a summary hearing within seventy-two (72) hours from
its issuance to determine whether the same should be extended, he should therefore be found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. The OCA held that while there was no finding of malice or
bad faith against respondent, the rules that the latter violated were so basic that all magistrates are
presumed to know.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and undue
delay in rendering an order.

"To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges
should be embodiments of competence, integrity[,] and independence. Judges are also expected to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them
properly in all good faith. Judges are likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles oflaw,
keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith."

In this case, respondent's "cease and desist" Order issued on November 19, 2010 was, as the OCA had
correctly pointed out, in the nature of a TRO. However, the aforesaid order failed to justify the
necessity for its issuance, as it merely issued the directive to the Clerk of Court, acting as Ex-Officio
Sheriff, and the Deputy Sheriff without stating the reasons therefor. Likewise, it did not specify any
period for its effectivity, in essence making the same indefinite.

In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe the rules and
restrictions regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of procedure, and hence, renders
him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Case law states that "when a law or a rule is
basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law." It is of no moment that he was motivated
by good faith or acted without malice, as these affect his competency and conduct as a judge in the
discharge of his official functions. According to jurisprudence, gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. Similarly, the Court finds respondent guilty
of undue delay in rendering an order for his failure to expeditiously resolve the pending incidents in
Civil Case No. 10-27-MY despite complainant's repeated motions for early resolution. In fact, it was
only when the case was transferred to another judge that it was finally acted upon. Likewise, his
explanation for archiving the case on the ground that the parties were in the process of entering into
an amicable settlement does not justify the prolonged inaction thereon, in light of the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 or the "Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases," which provides that a
case may be archived only for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, after which, it shall be
immediately included in the trial calendar after the lapse thereof. Respondent's failure to perform his
judicial duty with reasonable promptness in this respect clearly contravenes the provisions of Sections
3 and 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

At this juncture, it may be ruminated: is not Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) - which provides that "[i]f the respondent is found guilty of two (2)
or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances" - applicable in meting
out the penalties on herein respondent?

The Court is aware that in previous cases, it had indeed applied Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS in
imposing penalties on erring judges who were found guilty of multiple administrative charges or
counts. In contrast, in another set of cases (which were above-cited and applied herein) the Court had
imposed separate penalties on respondent judges who were found guilty of two (2) or more offenses.

Recognizing these diverging strands of jurisprudence, the Court finds it opportune to herein settle the
conflict by resolving that henceforth, in administrative cases involving judges and justices of the lower
courts, the respondent shall be charged and penalized under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
accordingly, separate penalties shall be imposed for every offense. The penalty provisions under the
RRACCS shall not apply in such cases. To avoid any confusion, the underlying considerations therefor
shall be explicated below.

Thus, to summarize the foregoing discussion, the following guidelines shall be observed:

(a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall exclusively govern administrative cases involving judges or
justices of the lower courts. If the respondent judge or justice of the lower court is found guilty of
multiple offenses under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall impose separate penalties for
each violation; and

(b) The administrative liability of court personnel (who are not judges or justices of the lower courts)
shall be governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which incorporates, among others, the
civil service laws and rules. If the respondent court personnel is found guilty of multiple administrative
offenses, the Court shall impose the penalty corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest
shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. The multiplicity of penalties to be imposed on judges
and justices is consistent with the higher level of decorum expected from them. Nevertheless, it must
be pointed out that the guidelines herein set forth are based on the prevailing legal framework in
judicial discipline cases, which the Court may, in its discretion, eventually revise through the proper
administrative issuance. After all, the power of supervision over all judiciary personnel is exclusively
vested in the Court.

c. Quantum of Proof in Administrative Case Against Judges

Datoon vs. Kapili, 644 SCRA 384 (2011)

RULING: Administrative charges against judges have been viewed by this Court with utmost care, as
the respondent stands to face the penalty of dismissal or disbarment. Thus, proceedings of this
character are in their nature highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules of law
applicable to criminal cases. The charges in such case must, therefore, be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. NOTE: This is similar to administrative cases of revocation of doctor’s license. The quantum of
proof required is also proof beyond reasonable doubt as the proceeding is akin to a criminal case.

c. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)

Civil Service Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 682 SCRA 353 (2012)

RULING: The Civil Service Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over the cases filed directly with it,
regardless who initiated the complaint. CSC as the central personnel agency of the government has the
power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article XI(B) of the 1987
Constitution defines the scope of the Civil Service: The Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters. By virtue of PD 1341, PUP became a chartered stated
university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter
whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of EO 292. However,
the CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases. The
uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decided
administrative cases directly brought before it: Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. –
The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, brought before
it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of
its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation
and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. The CA regrettably failed to take into
consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which undeniably granted original concurrent
jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases on
appeal:

Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. – Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities,

municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the
Commission, over their respective officers and employees.

Department of Finance vs. Hon. Mariano M. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 209331, 24 August 2015

RULING: The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule is that
disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification,
 promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation,"
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. This rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
(Omnibus Rules) which states:

SECTION 1. x x x. As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in
the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation, x x x.

A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their mass
detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith
and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a
personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further
assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013
was issued even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189- 2013 was issued, became effective.
Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on
Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the
scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of
CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is
no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of
the action.

d. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Samson vs. Restrivera, 646 SCRA 481 (2011)

RULING: We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add,
however, that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. We agree with the CA that the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint against petitioner although the act
complained of involves a private deal between them. Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or
omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or
improper. Under Section 1614 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also
states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions
which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or
employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law
does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected
with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.