FRANK N.

LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse execution and bound the estate to convey the property on full
Diana Liu, and children, namely: Walter, Milton, Frank, Jr.,
Henry and Jockson, all surnamed Liu, Rebecca Liu Shui and
Pearl Liu Rodriguez, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO LOY, JR.,
TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE VAÑO, respondents.
LIU vs. LOY
G.R. No. 145982, September 13, 2004
Digested by: Erven John Claros
payment of the consideration.
The orders of the probate court dated 19 and 23 March 1976
approving the contracts of sale to the Loys are VOID and did
not ratify the sales because there was already a prior order of
the probate courted dated 24 February 1976 approving the
sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Frank Liu. Hence, the probate court
had already lost jurisdiction over Lot Nos. 5 and 6 since the lots
no longer formed part of the Estate of Jose Vaño.

SC ruled in favor of LIU.

FACTS:
Teodoro Vaño, in his capacity as Attorney-in-Fact of Jose
Vaño, sold Lot Nos.5 and 6 to BENITO LIU and Cirilo Pangalo
on 13 January 1950, or prior to the death of Jose Vaño on 28
January 1950. (Note: Contracts to Sell)

On 22 April 1966, Benito Liu sold the lots to Frank Liu.

Later Cirilo Pangalo sold his shares (Lots 11, 14 and 15) to
FRANK LIU.

On August 19, 1968, Teodoro Vaño sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita

Loy while Lot No. 5 was sold to Alfredo Loy, Jr. on 16 December
1969.

Prior to the sale of the above-mentioned lots to the Loys,

Teodoro Vaño wrote Frank Liu a letter and it was apparently
shown that the latter offered to settle the whole balance of the
lot should the title be immediately transferred in his brother’s
name and Mr. Pangalo’s.

The letter also informed Liu of Supreme Court’s decision

regarding all the sales Vaño had made over the properties of
his father to be legal.

The Loys, on the other hand, insisted that the transaction

between Teodoro Vaño and Benito Liu was a contract to sell
while the transaction between the former and Teodoro Vaño
was a contract of sale and that the contracts of sale in favor of
the Loys transferred ownership as the conveyances were
absolute.

ISSUE:
W/N the sale of the lots by Teodoro Vaño to Benito Liu was
valid.

HELD:
YES. The SC held that a prior contract to sell made by the
decedent during his lifetime PREVAILS over a subsequent
contract of sale made by the administrator without probate
court approval.

It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to sell

and does not immediately convey ownership. Moreover, Frank
Liu’s contract to sell became valid and effective, upon its
TSN: The decedent, during his lifetime, was bound to respect the
contract he executed. He could not sell the property anymore
because he has already contracted to sell it previously. Although it
was only a contract to sell, there were already obligations attached
to it. And when he died, his obligations arising from that contract
were inherited also by his heirs. So the heirs cannot anymore enter
into a subsequent contract of sale over the same property.

G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE vs. ROMAN ABAYA
Facts:
Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and
Sabina Labadia died on the 1899.
Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and
Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya
moved the settlement of the intestate succession.
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate.
However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and
opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being
the nearest relative of the deceased.
The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano
Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the
property of said estate.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but
that she considered her right was superior to his and moved
for a hearing on the matter.
She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to
the property left by Casiano Abaya.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in
the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the
child is of a personal character and generally pertains
exclusively to him.
Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime.
As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to
the heirs of the child, to wit:
if he or she died during his or her minority, or
while insane, or after action had already been
instituted.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim
his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he
or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or
his or her heirs.
The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child
is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
G.R. No. L-12379 March 14, 1917
LAO HU NIU vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
(In the syllabus: Junio vs. Collector but I believe this is the
correct name of the case)
Facts:
This case involves the exclusion from the Philippine
Islands of a Chinese woman and her minor children.
She claims to be the wife of a former resident Chinese
merchant who, prior to the attempt of the appellant to
enter, died in the Philippine Islands owning property
therein and leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin
his widow, the appellant herein, and her minor children.
The board of special inquiry refused them permission to
enter and that refusal was affirmed by the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Issue: WON the rights of a Chinese merchant is
transmissible to his Widow and children upon his death
Held: No.
We have held in the case of Ng Hian vs. Collector of
Customs (34 Phil. Rep., 248) that the widow and minor
children of a deceased Chinese merchant resident and
doing business in the Philippine Islands at the time of
his death are not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands
solely by reason of such relationship.
It may be said that it does not appear in the record of this
case that the applicant is a merchant.
It appears simply that her husband was, at the time of his
death, a resident Chinese merchant doing business in the
Philippine Islands, and that he died leaving property
including a mercantile business.
The assumption of the appellant is that the mere fact of
the death of a merchant makes his wife and children also
merchants, as it leaves to them as heirs and next of kin a
mercantile business as a part of their inheritance. We do
not believe that this necessarily follows.
But if it does, the fact remains that she is not a resident
merchant. She is still outside of the Philippine Islands and
has never held the status of a resident merchant. She
must, therefore, establish her right to enter as a
merchant in the first instance. This she did not do. She
did not present the section six certificate which is the
only evidence upon which her right to enter can be
based.

From these observations it necessarily follows that the

applicant is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands
upon the status of her deceased husband; and that when
she seeks to enter upon her own personal status she
must produce the evidence which the law requires to
establish that status.

Not having done this her application to enter was

properly denied. The judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.