Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal

Volume 13, Number 1

Descartes On the Freedom of the Will

Is the knowledge of our own freedom the first one we obtain
when we philosophize in an orderly way?

Jean-Marie Beyssade

I should like to discuss Descartes' thesis concerning freedom. What

exactly is the position and the value, i n Descartes' metaphysics, of
the statement that "we [we men] possess a free w i i r ' ? i
In discussing this question, I shall essentisilly draw on an article
of Principia Philosophiae, i.e., article 39 of Part I. Descartes asserts
in the title that the freedom of the will, "libertas arbitni^ is
self-evident, "per se nota/* Is not this claim of freedom placed on
equal footing—in terms of certainty—with the first truth, "I think,
therefore I am"? Might it not even precede it, i n the order of
knowledge? For Descartes, i n this article, points out that even
before the cogito, i n the earlier moment of universal doubt, this
freedom "ha[d adready] reached maximum clarity [patuitque hoc
maxime).** A n d he ends by maintaining that "nothing can be
known better by itself [nee ulla magis esse possunt per se notaY*—
which comes very close to an expression used i n the Third Replies
(to Hobbes, "the Englishman") i n reply to his twelfth objection,
namely, to the term "notissimum*: what I have assumed concerning
freedom is notissimum, according to the natural light.^
To frame my question better, I shall borrow one of his aneilyses
from my friend and colleague Jean-Luc Marion, an outline of which
appeared a few years ago i n this very journail.^ He established that
there are i n Descartes' metaphysics two ontologies, two general the-

This paper was delivered at the New School for Social Research on April 4, 1988. We
would like to thank the author for granting us permission to publish it.

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ories of all that is, i n as much as it is. The first one defines being, as
being an object of knowledge: esse est cognoscU i.e., to be is to be
known; or ens est ens qua notum, i.e., a being is a being inasmuch
as it is known. The second one defines being as being caused: esse
est causari, i.e., to be is to be caused; or ens est ens ut causatum,
a being is a being inasmuch as it is caused. Each of these two
ontologies has its most eminent or highest being [ens summum),
and what this highest being is depends on the definition of esse.
The second ontology, wherein the highest being is the God of blank
theology (de la theologie blanche*), namely, the causa sui i n the
positive sense, does not immediately concern us here. According to
the first ontology, the gray ontology [Vontologie grise**) of the ens
qua notum, the highest being is to be called the ens notissimum.
What is this "most known being"? Apparently, it is the ego of the
first truth, "ego cogito, ergo sum." A letter to Clerselier, written i n
June or J u l y of 1646, explicitly assigns this ego to the place of first
principle: "there is nothing whose existence is more known to us."^
The question which I wish to address is whether i n Descartes' meta-
physics i n general, and i n article 39 i n particular, the place of no-
tissimum usually granted to the ego (the ego of 'ego cogito, ergo
sum*) is not taken by the notion of freedom, and whether this free-
dom does not i n fact become first knowledge. It all can be reduced to
the question of how we translate the Latin superlative 'notissimum*.
This superlative is either absolute or relative. If it is an absolute
superlative, then human freedom is a very well-known truth—amon^f
others which may be as known or even more so. If it is a relative
superlative, then it means 'the most known of alV. Consequently,
even if there are others that are very well-known, firstly, none can be
more known, and, secondly—which is not the same—none can be as
well-known, all other truths being less known.
In order to attempt to resolve this question, I have divided this
lecture into four parts: a brief presentation of article 39 (I); a survey
of the problems it raises (II); an examination of the notion of
freedom it presents [quid sit libertas?, or what is freedom?) (Ill);

* Editor's note. See Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la theologie blanche de Descartes,

Analogic, creation des verites etemelles et fondement (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1981).
** Editor's note. See Jean-Luc Marion, Sur Vontologie grise de Descartes, Science
cartesienne et savoir aristotelicien dans les Regulae (Paris: Librairie Philosophique
J. Vrin, 1975; 2nd ed., 1981).

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and an inquiry into the way i n which freedom is known [quomodo

cognoscatur?, or how is it known?) (IV).

In accordance with the constant order of Cartesian philosophy,

the article which is to be the object of my commentary occurs after
the articles on doubt (Part I, articles 1 to 5 or 6—we shall return to
that point), those on the cogito (articles 7 to 12 or 13), and the
proofs of God's existence (articles 14 and following). Descartes takes
up again the question of human error i n article 29; i n article 32, he
posits the distinction within the mind, within our thoughts,
between the understanding, which perceives ideas, and the will,
which acts by decisions. In other words, the same order obtains
here as i n the Meditations: doubt (as i n Meditation I), the cogito (as
in Meditation II), God (as i n Meditation III), and lastly, the
equivalent of the fourth Meditation. Descartes puts forth the thesis
that i n our will there is freedom.
What does he say? He utters three sentences, each one being a
topic.
First sentence. He claims that this freedom—which he begins by
describing, if not defining—is a primary notion [prima notio), a
common, or universal, notion and even one of the most common
notions [maxime communis notio), and an innate notion [quae
nobis sit innata). These three characteristics—primacy, universal-
ity and innateness—constitute the self-evidence of freedom: they
are that which makes it manifest [manifestum].
Second sentence. Descartes reminds us that this freedom of the
will was raised to its clearest insight a little way back i n the text,
when the darkness of doubt was at its maximum. "Somewhat
earlier [paulo ante],** i.e., i n article 6, just after the occurrence of
doubt (articles 1-5) and just before that of the cogito (articles 7 and
following), Descartes put forward exactly the same thesis: "we
possess a free will," we experience it V'experimur**]. In article 39,
this experience is taken up again, word for word, but i n the past
tense: ''experiebamur** (we experienced it). We experienced it
during the night and the darkness of doubt, from which we have
now just begun to emerge.
Third sentence. With it, Descartes comes back to this past
experience, as if he meant to validate it. It has no pendant i n article
6, for it ushers i n what is new i n article 39. Now, with the cogito, I

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have acquired a first certain proposition. Moreover, with the true

God, I have acquired the possibility of the true and certain, or
perfect, science ''scientia peifectissima**).^ I, therefore, can add a
modal emphasis—an extra epistemological modality. A l l that
appeared to me not to be doubtful during the time of universal
doubt ("tunc temporis"), has henceforth acquired a new dignity, a
new quality: it is per se notum, i.e., self-evident. The French
translation, which was approved by Descartes, says: "cela est aussi
certain qu'aucune chose que nous puissions connaitre." Transla-
tion: "it is as certain as any thing we can ever know." The Latin text
says that "nothing can be more self-evident and transparent [magis
per se nota et perspecta).**
Following the principle that whatever has withstood the on-
slaught of supreme doubt has passed the test and, so to speak,
earned its stripes, the last sentence thus retrospectively validates
two very different arguments. It vedidates perhaps implicitly the
first and more certain proposition, namely, the *I think, therefore I
am' of article 7, which had not been i n need of validation for quite
some time. It surely validates explicitly the experience of freedom,
which had been waiting i n the wings since article 6 and is finailly
brought to the stage again i n article 39, where it acquires the status
of per se notum,

This abstract of article 39 seems to me to raise several important

problems. I shall deal with three of them.
1. The first problem concerns the exact determination, i n the
order of reasons, of the fundamentum, the fixed and unshakable
Archimedian point that must constitute first knowledge. If we wish
to leave behind the traditiongd position, which gives pride of place
to the cogito, two possibilities are available to us, which are not
standard. We can either go backwards or forwards i n the order of
reasons. If we go forwards, we shall claim that there is, prior to the
knowledge of God, no other knowledge that can be certain or perfect
and therefore worthy of the name ^science'. This is precisely the title
of article 13. Conversely, we can also go backwards, to a point
preceding the cogito. We can say that this act qua intellectucd
reflection presupposes some foundation, which is simpler and more
universal. S u c h is literally the doctrine set forth i n The Search after
Truth: "from this universal doubt, as from a fixed and immovable
 BEYSSADE/DESCARTES ON FREEDOM

point, I propose to derive the knowledge of God, of yourself and of

everything i n the universe."^ Article 39 opts for the same direction,
since it returns to a point prior to the cogito, but it does so i n a less
paradoxical manner. Instead of choosing doubt as a fixed point,
which choice would be paradoxical since nothing is positively
asserted i n Meditation IJ Descartes turns to an experience, that of
freedom, which was asserted before the cogito, namely, i n article 6.
There, then, we have the first conversion of doubt into a statement,
i.e., the assertion "that we possess a free will."
2. The second problem concerns the paredlel between the
Meditations and the Principles, Descartes had adready i n the
Meditations established the connection between doubt and free-
dom, and, at the end of Meditation I, had made the following
assertion concerning our freedom: "and even if it is not i n my power
to know any truth, I may at least do what is i n my power, that is,
resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehoods, so that the
deceiver, however powerful and cunning he may be, will be unable
to impose on me i n the slightest degree."^ But i n the Principles, the
thesis acquires a new emphasis, and even a new significance. The
division into six meditations confined the assertion of freedom to
the first meditation, that of doubt, i n which no truth is
categorically asserted, while the second one, where doubt is turned
into assertions, begins with the position of the ego's existence and
not with the position of its freedom. In the Principles, on the other
hand, the division into articles means that article 6, which
categorically asserts freedom, is not really any closer to—is not any
more bound up with, if you wish—the preceding articles about
doubt, than it is to article 7, which asserts the cogito as first truth.
Let me point out another difference. Whereas the Meditations very
carefully distinguishes the hypothesis of the deceiving God from the
fiction of an evil genius or malignant demon, which is mainly a
methodological device^ and is not to be compared with divine
omnipotence, article 6 of the Principles tends to confuse the
deceiving God and the evil genius, which it never explicitly names.
Consequently, when Descartes asserts our freedom, he does so i n
opposition to this all-powerfulness—be it that of God our creator,
or of an external ubiquitous evil genius. As a result, the famous
problem of how to reconcile our freedom of will with divine
preordination immediately arises when we turn i n article 39 to the
thesis of human freedom, a problem that remained unposed i n the

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Meditations, It looks as if a more full-blooded liberty is more

positively asserted i n article 6 than is the case i n Meditation I.
3. The third difficulty concerns the manner i n which article 39 of
the Principles asserts the thesis of freedom. There is indeed a
considerable difference between the Latin original, written by
Descartes and published i n 1644, and the French translation,
possibly read and corrected by him, and i n any case published with
his consent and under his name i n 1647. The Latin says simply
both i n the article's title and within the article, that freedom is "per
se nota** (self-evident). The Latin never speaks of proof. The French
version, however, speaks twice of proof, and it does so i n
contradictory terms. The French title says that the freedom of our
will is known to us "without any proof, merely by the experience we
have of it": proof and experience are opposed to each other; there is
no proof and there is no need for proof, because there is an
experience and this experience is sufficient. But i n the second
sentence of the article, we are told that "we have previously had a
very clear proof of this," this proof being none other than our
experiencing, at the moment of doubt, that we would be able to
resist freely all deceitful lures. Here, proof and experience are
assimilated. There is a proof of freedom. Where the Latin text says:
"hoc patuit maxime** (it became evident), the French text renders:
''nous en avons eu une preuve Men claire** (we have had a very
clear proof of it). It is i n fact this experience from article 6 which i n
article 39 becomes the proof.
It would seem, then, that article 39 presents us with several
rather thorny problems.

To shed some light on the situation, we now direct our attention

to the content of this experience. What sort of freedom do we
experience i n doubt? Can we answer the question: quid sit
libertas? (what is freedom?)? In what does freedom of the will
consist?
It is not an easy question to resolve. If we turn to the most famous
passages, we find different answers corresponding to different
experiences. The most well-known text is to be found i n Meditation
IV. Its sense has received additional depth and emphasis from the
famous letter to Mesland, dated February 9, 1645. Descartes
essentially distinguishes between two notions of freedom, which

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correspond to two experiences of freedom and to two definitions of

freedom. We begin with Meditation IV: "It consists simply i n our
having the power of choosing to do a thing, or choosing not to do it
(that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather [vel potius)
it consists simply i n the fact that when we affirm or deny, pursue or
avoid those things which the understanding places before us, we
act i n such a way that we do not feel we are determined by any
external or outside compelling force or constraint."io The expres-
sion 'vel potius* clearly separates two forms of liberty and arranges
them hierarchically.
The higher form of freedom, i n the fourth meditation, does not
entail the power to choose. It is the experience of freedom that we
feel i n asserting something self-evident, and first of all the cogito. In
this case, according to the Descartes of the Meditations, we do not
have the power to withhold our consent. To say that the proposition
is undeniable, or indubitable, is to say that we cannot choose the
opposite, that we cannot choose not to assert it. "I could not but
judge that something which I understood so clearly was true; but
this was not because I was compelled so to judge by any external
force, but because a great light i n the intellect was followed by a
great inclination i n the will, and thus the spontaneity and freedom
of my belief was all the greater i n proportion to my lack of
indifference."! 1 Therefore, both the indifference to choosing (which
is a state, a sentiment, or a feeling) and the power to choose (which
is a faculty) are excluded from this higher freedom, which may be
called enlightened freedom. The state of indifference that I
experience when there are equivalent reasons for one side and for
the other (or even non-equivalent reasons, with most of them for
one side and at least one, possibly a very slight one, for the other) is
the lowest degree of freedom. In a state of self-evidence, the power to
choose, which always presupposes the state of indifference but is
not to be confused with it, disappears along with it. Consequently,
I cannot not judge. I am, however, free; I enjoy the highest form of
freedom. But this freedom consists i n spontaneity, that is to say, i n
internal necessity. Freedom qua internal necessity must be
contradistinguished to contingency, which rests on the "potestas
ad opposita,** the power of opposites. In this first case, one cannot
not judge: the power or the possibility of the opposite is not
available. This is free necessity without contingency.
According to Descartes, there is also another freedom, i.e.,
freedom of choice. In this second case, contingency and the

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possibility of opposites are present (one may either judge or not

judge). We experience it at the moment of doubt, when we rccdize
that we can assert or deny many opinions—even very probable ones.
The fact remains, however, that i n the Meditations (1641), this
power does not extend to all cases: it stops short i n the face of
indubitable evidence. O n the other hand, the letter to Mesland (of
February 9, 1645) extends it to all cases: even i n the face of
something self-evident, 1 still have the power to withhold my
consent, if only to prove the greatness of my free will. This freedom
has a certain diabolic quality to it. It corresponds to the experience
of someone who sees the best, who feels a natural inclination
towards this good and this truth, and who, i n order to prove his
independence and the extent of his power, decides to reject it.
"Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequof*: "I see the better part, I
am inclined to it, but I choose the worst one." In opposition to the
happy experience of enlightened freedom, of the good angel who
freely and spontaneously adheres to what is evident, it is the
experience of the headstrong mind which, as the bad angel, chooses
out of pride and against the grain of what it knows to be the
evidence. 12
What, then, is the experience spoken of i n articles 6 and 39 of the
Principles? It is neither the one nor the other.
Let us take another look at the beginning of article 39: we are told
that i n many cases rmultis**), we can either consent or not.
Although this is so i n many cases, it is not always the case: the
same reservation holds as i n 1641 (in Meditation JV); we do not yet
have the thesis of 1645, which states that we can withhold our
consent i n all cases. Descartes lifts the restriction only i n the
French translation of article 39, i n 1647, after the letter to Mesland.
Which, then, is this freedom that we experience i n doubt? It is
certainly not enlightened freedom, since i n doubt we are not yet
enlightened. Neither is it the freedom to refuse the light, or to reject
what is evident. It is, of course, a freedom to refuse or reject, but it
is a freedom to refuse or reject anything that is not yet evident.
Article 6 spoke of "the power to abstain from accepting into our
beliefs any things not perfectly well known to us (semper ab lis
credendis quae non plane certa sunt et explorata), and so prevent
ourselves from ever being deceived." Article 39 says the same: "to be
able to prevent ourselves from believing what we do not yet know
perfectly well [ab lis credendis abstinere, quae non plane certa
erant et explorata]" It is, then, that freedom which i n the dark

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night of doubt, orients us towards what is evident, be it awaited or

hoped for, and to which we will hold fast once we know it. It will be
the same freedom which i n moral life will define generosity. When
we know that we can never, i n our life, attain to perfect and infinite
science, then generosity, as far as the will is concerned, consists i n
directing ourselves towards understanding, i n seeking what the
higher good is—even if it is not absolutely good—and i n following
this course of action.
Article 39, therefore, offers us an experience of freedom which i n
some way precedes the distinction between enlightened freedom
(which adheres to what is plainly evident) and freedom to refuse
(which refuses that which appears as evident). Refusing all that
which is not yet absolutely evident, this freedom directs itself i n
darkness towards what will, once discovered, put an end to doubt.

IV

By what cognitive means do we come to know this freedom

(quomodo cognoscatur) at the end of article 39, and under which
k i n d of knowledge does it fall, and, according to my claim, shall we
maintain it forever i n the subsequent system? At this point, I would
like to state a hypothesis, which may be entirely wrong, but which
deals with an important and often neglected point of Cartesian
methodology. O n the basis of the theory of notions (notiones), I
suggest that Descartes is committed to a strong (steady, settled)
doctrine of first principles (of notitia or principiorum notitia) whose
knowledge is strictly distinguishable from the science of proven
propositions, the science of conclusions.
What seems to me to suggest such a hypothesis is the difference
between the Latin original, which speaks of experience without
even mentioning a proof, and the French translation, which
introduces the word 'proof twice, i n an entirely contradictory
manner. In the French translation, the title of the article says that
"the freedom of our will is known without any proof, merely by the
experience of it"; the Latin title, however, speaks of "perse notum,**
without any mention of either proof or experience. The second
sentence of the French rendition strictly speaking contradicts the
French title, for it says: "we have previously had a very clear proof of
this, when we became aware of our freedom" (the Latin text says
that it was shown or made manifest C'patuit**] when we had the
experience of it C'experiebamur**)). In other words, one thing is

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sure: there is an experience, and even a feeling (belonging only to

the pure soul anyway), of which the French version hesitates to say
whether it is to be opposed to the proof (the title says that the
freedom of the will is known without proof, hy experience) or
whether it actually constitutes a proof (the second sentence speaks
of a clear proof of it, namely, this experience). The Principles, I
believe, does not allow the experience of freedom to be transformed
into a thesis, into a conclusion of true and certain science. In its
originad Latin form, it does not use the language of proof at all. In
my view, the freedom of the will remains throughout the Principles
the object of an awareness or a consciousness. To put it
negatively, it is not a thesis within the science of conclusions. This
consciousness is never transformed into a science: "every man
must feel and experience it i n himself rather than persuade himself
of it by reason, by reasoning or rationed arguments."^^ Moreover, it
is better that the arbitrium's freedom so remains (i.e., from
beginning to end of the book) the object of a consciousness.
It seems to me that a passage of the "Second Replies" throws
much light on article 39 and on the curious terminology imported
from the methodologicad context and applied to the experience of
freedom. The text i n question situates the first truth of Cartesian
metaphysics (that of Meditation II) i n relation to the distinction
between the knowledge of principles [principiorum notitiaV^ and
the science of conclusions [scientia conclusionum]. In this famous
passage, 1® Descartes distinguishes between two stages i n what we
misleadingly call *the cogito*.
The first stage remains at the level of a prima notio—a. first
notion, which is not the conclusion of any syllogism. The phrase is
the exact doublet of 'principiorum notitia*. "When we become aware
that we are things which think, this is a first notion which is not
drawn from any syllogism." The generality of the 'we' (as i n 'we
perceive', 'we are aware', 'we are') designates both the generality of
a basic or primary notion, the notion of thought, and the generality
of a constant and infallible experience. The existential import is not
yet emphasized: 'we are things which think' is not yet an
affirmation of existence, even though it is already more than a
logical possibility.
We now proceed to consider the second stage inside what is
usually called 'the cogito*. "Moreover (etiam),** says the Latin text,
which alone is genuinely Cartesian, the word 'etiam* stressing the
new move that is about to be performed, "when someone says (dicit)

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*I think, therefore I am or I exist', he does not conclude his existence

from his thought, as on the strength of some syllogism, but as a
thing self-evident. Note the occurrence of the verb 'dicif : we no
longer have a mere experience, which is perceived, but an
utterance, or a judgment, which is preferred. At the second stage,
the individuality of the assertion 'I am, I exist', which is clearly
existential, contrasts with the semi-existential generality of the
previous stage ('we perceive that we are things which t h i n k ' ) . i n
order to transit from the first to the second stage, we must rely on a
maxim or common notion, namely, "all that which thinks is or
exists." This axiom, which is innate to our mind, is eilso known, i n
its application to the particular case of the ego, by an experience
and a feeling which are the experience and feeling of understanding
itself. The universal maxim is taught to the thinker by his feeling i n
himself "that it is impossible that he should think without
existing." Here we witness the point at which the experience
denoted by 'cogito* is transformed into a kind of science—a science
that is endowed with a deduction, namely, a proof from axiom to
conclusion.
This last move i n no way affects our knowledge of freedom, which
remains a mere awareness with its infallible generality and without
any claim to deductive science, i.e., knowledge of conclusions.
Neither individuality, nor a universal axiom, nor a deduction can be
found here: neither an assertion such as 'I am free', nor one such as
'Everything which doubts is necessarily free'. The experience of
cogitatio is turned into a first proposition—that is, 'I am, I exist'—
which is improperly called 'cogito*, since it is an existential
proposition, namely 'ego existo* and not 'ego cogito*: and henceforth
the so-called cogito belongs to the true science of deductively
established conclusions. The experience of freedom, however,
remains confined to the first stage.

Conclusion

I shall conclude briefly, answering the question I raised at the

outset, and indicating how this answer might shed light on a
paradox, which I shadl call the paradox of the infinity of the will.
If I am right i n leaving the assertion of free will i n the sphere of
the notitia principiorum, i n considering it as a first notion, and
not as a theorem or proposition of science, then it must be granted
that this assertion is to be counted among the self-evident things

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and fails to have any particular preeminence within the edifice of

science. The Latin version of our article says precisely that, placing
it as it does among [inter) the uncounted and perhaps uncountable
mass of innate notions. Despite its importance and its interest, it
remains one notion among others, which may even be more certain.
The superlative 'notissimum* is only an absolute superlative: we
translate it as 'a very well-known thing'. The place of the most
well-known thing of all, of the notissimum as ens summum
according to the ontology of certainty, can therefore be reserved for
a proposition or a conclusion of "reflective knowledge,"^^ to which it
is cilone appropriate, strictly speaking, to apply the term 'certain'
(the true and certain science). Since it is not immediately relevant
to my discussion, I leave aside the issue of determining whether
this proposition is 'I think, therefore I am' (this proposition
expressing the first and most certain knowledge we obtain when we
philosophize i n an orderly way), or whether it is the conclusion that
God exists.
But there is a point that must certainly be made. If, i n order to
define that which within the ontology of certainty I have called the
notissimum (the most well-known thing of all), we were to
disregard, to efface or wipe out, as it were, two differences: namely,
if firstly we were to efface the intellectual privilege of reflective
science i n order to promote immediate knowledge [cognitio
interna)—owing to its more originary and more inherent charac-
ter—to the superlative function of the most known; and if secondly
we were to identify chronological precedence (x is encountered and
named before y) with geneadogical priority (x is i n some way more
known than y), then we should have to pay a price. The assertion '1
think, therefore I am', and its ego, could no longer occupy the place
of the notissimum. This place would now instead be occupied by
the assertion of free will. For the freedom of the will is certainly an
assertion ("I assert that which 1 have felt, and I affirm that which I
have experienced, and which every man can test i n himself ")2o, an
explicit assertion, and this assertion precedes the 'I think, therefore
I am' by some lines—in fact, by exactly one article (article 6 to article
7).
This, then, would be the consequence of our disregarding the just
mentioned two differences. But if, as I think we ought to, we reserve
the place of notissimum for the cogito (or, eventually, for what
follows it), and if we maintain the intellectual and reflective
character of the first certainty, so that we preserve for all that

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occurred prior to it (including the assertion of freedom of the will)

its mere character of internal experience which does not claim
scientific exactness, then I think we may be able to prevent the
paradox of article 41 from becoming a contradiction. What I here
refer to as the paradox of article 41 is not the reconciliation of
divine omnipotence with human freedom or indifference. This, of
course, is also a paradox, belonging to article 40, however. Article
41 contains another paradox, more profound perhaps, earlier i n
any case and independent of the first one: I shall call it the paradox
of the impossible infinity of freedom. Let me formulate it:
1) for Descartes, infinity is incomprehensible (by definition);
2) for h i m , human will is infinite,
3) and freedom is comprehensible.
Something is wrong here. The three theses are incontestably at-
tested to by explicit and genuinely Cartesian texts. The first is
amply documented from beginning to end by the texts of the
metaphysical work. The second has one witness, the letter to
Mersenne of December 25, 1639.21 The third is to be found i n the
Principles, a book intended for future school teachers, where it is
explicitly stated twice i n article 41 (it appears i n the Latin text only
and vanishes from the French translation of 1647): "there is
nothing which we comprehend more evidently and more perfectly
[quod evidentius et perfectius comprehendamus) . . . something
which we comprehend from inside (quam intime comprehen-
dimus).**
How, then, is this paradox to be resolved? It might be suggested
that the comprehension of our freedom does not comply with,
perhaps does not have access to the purely scientific dimension. It
is a consciousness, an inner knowledge, a sens intime, a personad
feeling. It is an experience within us. As long as it remains a
consciousness which does not posit itself as a scientific thesis,
there is no difficulty. We i n no way feel that anything limits it, we
simply experience it to be so great that no greater one can be
supposed. In brief, at the level of experienced freedom, of the
consciousness that wills, there is nothing that distinguishes
infinity from indefiniteness. However, if our comprehension of
freedom were to become a truth of science, then we would certainly
have to downgrade or demote the experienced infinity of freedom to
a bare indefiniteness. For will, human will at least, can only have
claims to infinity i n one single form (and as such it differs from
God's will). Even i n that form, it seems to be infinite only i n the

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sense that we do not notice anything that could constrain it (this is

a merely negative way of speaking). Those are the two characteris-
tics of the indefinite according to article 27, and presumably
Descartes has not forgotten i n article 35 the content of article 27. If
we were to make of freedom a truth of science, which we might be
able to do, but which Descartes never did, we would certainly have
to say that freedom is indefinite and not infinite. It could become
the object of sin as yet unwritten treatise. De libertate, which would
stand to the experience of freedom as Les passions de Vdme are to
the experience of the u n i o n between body and mind.
It may be, however, that Descartes' wisdom resided i n his having
not given it the status of a scientific thesis. As long as we remain
faithful to our inner experience, we can without any risk of error
say that we understand ourselves from within, which is to say that
we comprehend ourselves, and that we feel within us an
unrestricted desire for complete light and total perfection—which
amounts to infinity. To say that there is a paradox is to say there is
a struggle between science and doxa, and where we remain within
doxa, without any claim to science, there can be no paradox.

NOTES

1. Rene Descartes, Oeuvres Completes, eds. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris:

Librairie J . Vrin, 1974), Volume VIII-1: Principia Philosophiae, I, article 39.
Hereinafter referred to as AT, followed by volume and page numbers.
For the English, instead of using the standard translation by Haldane and
Ross, I shall refer to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 2 volumes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), to be abbreviated as CSM,
followed by volume number.
2. AT, VII: Meditationes, p. 191, line 7; and IX-1: Meditations, p. 48. CSM, II:
"Third Replies," p. 134.
3. Jean-Luc Marion, "On Descartes' Constitution of Metaphysics," Graduate
Faculty Philosophy Journal 11, No. 1 (1986), pp. 21-33. See also his
"Descartes et I'onto-theologie," Bulletin de la Societe Frangaise de Philosophie
LXXVI (1982), pp. 117-158, and his Sur le prisme metaphysique de Descartes
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1986), chapter 2, which is entitled
'Onto-theo-logie'.
4. AT, IV: Correspondance (juillet 1643-avril 1647), pp. 444-445. See also the
preface to Principes de la Philosophic, ibid., IX-2, p. 10, lines 4-7.
5. AT, VIIM: Principia philosophiae, p. 14, line 13. See also AT. VII: Meditationes
de prima philosophia, pp. 70-71, especially p. 70, lines 17-18 ["veram et
certam scientiam"), and p. 71, lines 5-6 {"petfecte scire").

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6. AT, X: Recherche de la verite, p. 515, lines 9-11. CSM, II, p. 409.

7. AT, VII: Meditationes, p. 474, lines 17-19. CSM, II: "Seventh Replies," p. 319.
8. AT, VII: Meditationes, p. 23, lines 5-9; and IX-1: Meditations, p. 8. CSM, II, p.
15.
9. For this distinction, see Henri Gouhier, La Pensee metaphysique de Descartes
(Paris: Vrin, 1962), chapter V, section I. And his Essais sur Descartes (Paris:
Vrin, 1937), chapter VI.
10. AT, VII: Meditationes, p. 57, lines 21-27; and IX-1: Meditations, p. 46. CSM, II,
p. 40. I should add that here I mixed Haldane and Ross's translation with
Cottingham's.
11. AT, VII, pp. 58-59; and IX-1, p. 47. CSM, II, p. 41. Here I followed Cottingham's
translation, which is excellent and strictly faithful to the original Latin text.
12. AT, W, pp. 173-175 (Lettre ä Mesland, 9 fevrier 1645). See especially pp. 173,
lines 17-20, and 174, lines 10-12 and 14-15.
13. AT, VIII-1: Principia, p. 20, line 24: "nos ita conscios esse." The French
translation renders these words as "tellement assures." 'Conscious' ('conscios'
in Latin) is equivalent to 'certain' ('assures' in French). This certainty is the
most perfect, or perfectissima, but it is not the certainty proper to the science of
conclusions, or scientia conclusionum. Cf. AT, VII, pp. 145-146. CSM, II:
"Second Replies," pp. 103-105.
14. Ibid., VII: Meditationes, p. 377, lines 19-20. CSM, II: "Fifth Replies," p. 259.
See also AT, V: Entretien avec Burman, p. 159, lines 4-8.
15. Perhaps 'notitia' could be translated by 'awareness', 'experience', or even
'feeling'.
16. AT, VII, pp. 140-141; and IX-1, pp. 110-111. CSM, II: "Second Replies," p. 100.
17. The French text, whose punctuation is different from that of the Latin, stresses
the transformation of the existential judgment into a conclusion. Descartes
speaks of concluding his existence, but, of course, not on the strength of some
syllogism. Rather, he speaks of concluding it as a thing known of itself [per se
notum).
18. In the expressions 'nous sommes des choses qui pensent', 'nos esse res
cogitantes', 'we are things which think' (first stage), the verbs 'etre', 'esse', 'to
be', do not have a fully existential sense (to be or to exist, esse vel existere, etre
ou exister). However, they have a more than predicative sense (etre des choses
qui pensent = penser; esse res cogitantes = cogitare; to be things that think =
to think). I call this use semi-predicative (and semi-existential). Moreover, since
at this first stage there occurs a plural pronoun ('we') and not a singular one (T),
I speak of semi-predicative generality (in distinction to individuality).
19. AT, VII, p. 422, lines 6-22; and IX-1, pp. 225-226. CSM, II: "Sixth Replies," p.
285. That internal awareness is the infallible and constant experience referred
to in point 3 of the "Sixth Replies": AT, VII, pp. 425-427; and IX, pp. 228-229.
CSM, II, pp. 287-289. The French text speaks of "une experience continuelle et
infaillible" [AT, IX, p. 229, lines 29-30), whereas the Latin text speaks of a
constant experience or consciousness (ibid., VII, p. 427 lines 7-8: "non possunt
non semper apud se experiri"; and lines 18-19: "cujus non potest non esse sibi
conscius"). What in point 1 of the "Sixth Replies" is called 'cognitio ilia interna'
(ibid., VII, line 13), translated in English by 'internal awareness' (CSM, II, p.
285, line 10) is identical with what in the French rendition of point 3 is denoted
by 'experience continuelle et infaillible', which translates 'semper apud se

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experiri' or 'esse sibi conscius' {in English: "to experience within themselves all
the time" and "he cannot fail to be aware," respectively, ibid., II, p. 288, lines
25-26, and 35).
20. AT, VII, p. 377, lines 26-27. 'Affirmo' on page 377, line 26, is tantamount to
'assumpsi' on page 191, line 5. CSM, II: "Fifth Replies," p. 259 (to be compared
with ibid., p. 134).
21. AT, II: Correspondance (mars 1638-d6cembre 1639), p. 628, line 8 (Lettre ä
Mersenne, 25 decembre 1639).