[No. 24950. March 25, 1926] acquire.
However, article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property
VIUDA DE TAN Toco, plaintiff and appellant, vs. THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, defendant and appellee.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; EXEMPTION FROM
EXECUTION.—The property of a municipality, whether real or
personal, necessary for governmental purposes cannot be
attached and sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment against
the municipality.
ID. ; ID. ; PROPERTY EXEMPT.—Auto trucks used by a
municipality in sprinkling its streets, its police patrol automobile,
police stations, and public markets, together with the land on
which they stand, are exempt from execution.
ID. ; ID. ; MANDAMUS.—Where after judgment is entered against
a municipality, the latter has no property subject to execution, the
creditor's remedy-for collecting his judgment is mandamus.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Salas, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Arroyo & Evangelista, for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Borromeo Veloso for appellee.
VlLLAMOR, J.:
It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco
had sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of
P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land, one on
Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 square meters, and the other
on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square meters, which the
municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. The
Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to
pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the
said judgment was on appeal affirmed by this court. 1
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to
pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution
issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of
which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street
sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on
Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete
structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo,
Molo, and Mandurriao.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few
days bef ore the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion
with the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on the
said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared
null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the
defendant municipality.
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the fiscal's motion but the court, by
order of August 12, 1925, declared the attachment levied upon the
aforementioned property of the defendant municipality null and
void, thereby dissolving the said attachment.
From this order the plaintiff has appealed by bill of exceptions. The
fundamental question raised by appellant in her four assignments
of error is whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from
execution.
The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative
Code, provides that:
"Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be
exercised by and through their respective municipal government
in conformity with law.
"It shall be competent f or them, in their proper corporate
name, to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to
acquire and hold real and personal property for municipal
purposes, and generally to exercise the powers hereinafter
specified or otherwise conferred upon them by law."
For the purposes of the matter here in question, the Administrative
Code does not specify the kind of property that a municipality may
of provinces and towns (municipalities) into property for public use
and patrimonial property. According to article 344 of the same
Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains,
and public waters, drives and public improvements of general
benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are
property for public use.
All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is
patrimonial and shall be subject to the provisions of the Civil Code
except as provided by special laws.
Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa says that "In
accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we must
distinguish, as to the patrimonial property of the towns, "between
that of common benefit and that which is private property of the
town. The first differs from property for public use in that generally
its enjoyment is less, as it is limited to neighbors or to a group or
class thereof; and, furthermore, such use, more or less general, is
not intrinsic with this kind of property, for by its very nature it may
be enjoyed as though it were private property. The third group, that
is, private property, is used in the name of the town or province by
the entities representing it and, like any private property, giving a
source of revenue."
Such distinction, however, is of little practical importance
in this jurisdiction in view of the different principles underlying the
functions of a municipality under the American rule.
Notwithstanding this, we believe that the principle governing
property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property
for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is
similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use
of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently,
is inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property
for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man
so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property
is also inalienable.
The American Law is more explicit about this matter as expounded
by McQuillin in Municipal Corporations, volume 3, paragraph
1160, where he says that:
"State statutes often provide that court houses, jails and other
buildings owned by municipalities and the lots on which they stand
shall be exempt from attachment and execution. But independent
of express statutory exemption, as a general proposition, property,
real and personal, held by municipal corporations, in trust for the
benefit of their inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is
exempt.
"For example, public buildings, school houses, streets, squares,
parks, wharves, engines and engine houses, and the like, are not
subject to execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of liquors
carried in a town dispensary, are exempt. The reason for the
exemption is obvious. Municipal cor-porations are created for
public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their aggregate
or public capacity. That they may properly discharge such public
functions corporate property and revenues are essential, and to
deny them these means the very purpose of their creation would
be materially impeded, and in some instances practically destroy
it. Respecting this subject the Supreme Court of Louisiana
remarked: 'On the first view of this question there is something
very repugnant to the moral sense in the idea that a municipal
corporation should contract debts, and that, having no resources
but the taxes which are due to it, these should not be subjected by
legal process to the satisfaction of its creditors. This consideration,
deduced from the principles of moral equity has only given way to
the more enlarged contemplation of the great and paramount
interests of public order and the principles of government.'
"It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where
not used for a public purpose but for quasi private purposes, is
subject to execution on a judgment against the municipality, and
may be sold. This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a
municipal corporation, and the like. But the mere fact that
corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily used
for private purposes does not make it subject to execution.
"If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed, the
insurance money stands in lieu thereof and is also exempt.
"The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are
not personally liable for the debts of the municipality, except that
in the New England States the individual liability of the inhabitant
is generally maintained."
In Corpus Juris, vol 23, page 355, the following is found:
"Where property of a municipal or other public corporation is
sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments
recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether
such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage
and purposes for which it is held. The rule is that property held for
public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks,
promenades, wharves, landing places, fire engines, hose and
hose carriages, engine houses, public markets, hospitals,
cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental
purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under execution against
such corporation. The rule also applies to funds in the hands of a
public officer. Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a
municipal corporation or county cannot be seized under execution
by a creditor of such corporation. But where a municipal
corporation or county owns in its proprietary, as distinguished from
its public or governmental capacity, property not useful or used for
a public purpose but for quasi private purposes, the general rule
is that such property may be seized and sold under execution
against the corporation, precisely as similar property of individuals
is seized and sold. But property held for public purposes is not
subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for
private purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it
becomes subject to execution. Whether or not property held as
public property is necessary for the public use is a political, rather
than a judicial question."
In the case of City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction Co.,
Ltd. (140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a wharf for
unloading sugar and molasses, open to the public, was property
for the public use of the City of New Orleans and was not subject
to attachment for the payment of the debts of the said city.
In that case it was proven that the said wharf was a parcel of land
adjacent to the Mississippi River where all shipments of sugar and
molasses taken to New Orleans were unloaded.
That city leased the said wharf to the Louisiana Construction
Company, Ltd., in order that it might erect warehouses so that the
merchandise upon discharge might not be spoiled by the
elements. The said company was given the privilege of charging
certain fees for storing merchandise in the said warehouses and
the public in general had the right to unload sugar and molasses
there by paying the required fees, 10 per cent of which was turned
over to the city treasury.
The United States Supreme Court on an appeal held that the wharf
was public property, that it never ceased to be such in order, to
become private property of the city; wherefore the company could
not levy execution upon the wharf in order to collect the amount of
the judgment rendered in favor thereof.
In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U. S., 149; 25 Law.
ed., 430), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
public wharf on the banks of the Mississippi River was public
property and not subject to execution for the payment of a debt of
the City of New Orleans where said wharf was located.
In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River,
which formerly was the shore of the river and which later enlarged
itself by accession, was converted into a wharf by the city for public
use, who charged a certain fee for its use.
It was held that that land was public property as necessary as a
public street and was not subject to execution on account of the
debts of the city. It was further held that the fees collected were
also exempt from execution because they were a part of the
income of the city.
In the case of Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of
Guinobatan (32 Phil., 654), the question raised was whether for
the payment of a debt to a third person by the concessionaire of a
public market, the said public market could be attached and sold
at public auction. The Supreme Court held that:
"Even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out
of his debtor's property, yet when among such property there is
included the special right granted by the Government of usufruct
in a building intended for a public service, and when this privilege
is closely related to a service of a public character, such right of
the creditor to the collection of a debt owed him by the debtor who
enjoys the said special privilege of usufruct in a public market is
not absolute and may be exercised only through the action of a
court of justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained
under the special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor.
"The special concession of the right of usufruct in a public market
cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would be
to permit a person who has contracted with the state or with the
administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage a service of
a public character, to be substituted, without the knowledge and
consent of the administrative authorities, by one who took no part
in the contract, thus giving rise to the possibility of' the regular
course of a public service being disturbed by the more or less legal
action of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public
interests.
"The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy the
usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attached and sold,
and a creditor of such person can recover his debt only out of the
income or revenue obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment or
usufruct of the said privilege, in the same manner that the rights of
the creditors of a railroad company can be exercised and their
credit collected only out of the gross receipts remaining after
deduction has been made therefrom 'of the operating expenses of
the road. (Law of November 12, 1869, extended to the overseas
provinces by the royal order of August 3, 1886.)"
For the reasons contained in the authorities above quoted we
believe that this court would have reached the same conclusion if
the debtor had been the municipality of Guinobatan and the public
market had been levied upon by virtue of the execution.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a
municipality, necessary for governmental purposes, may not be
attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the
municipality. The supreme reason f or this rule is the character of
the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The
necessity for government service justifies that the property of
public use of the municipality be exempt from execution just as it
is necessary to exempt certain property of private individuals in
accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted
authorities, is exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1, page
467, Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:
"Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of
a state for the public good. They exercise, by delegation from the
legislature, a portion of the sovereign power. The main object of
their creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and
to provide for the police and local government of certain
designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are
invested with certain governmental powers and charged with civil,
political, and municipal duties. To enable them beneficially to
exercise these powers and discharge these duties, they are
clothed with the authority to raise revenues, chiefly by taxation,
and subordinately by other modes, as by licenses, fines, and
penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the essential
means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work.
Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a
corporation is practically destroyed, and the ends of its erection
thwarted. Based upon considerations of this character, it is the
settled doctrine of the law that not only the public-property but also
the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be
seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or
when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the
proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are
not subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The
doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is
maintained, although the corporation is in debt, and has no means
of payment but the taxes which it is authorized to collect."
Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the holding of
the court a quo that the proper remedy for collecting the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff was by way of mandamus.
While this question is not necessarily included in the one
which is the subject of this appeal, yet we believe that the holding
of the trial court, assigned as error by appellant's counsel, is true
when, after a judgment is rendered against a municipality, it has
no property subject to execution. This doctrine is maintained by
Dillon (Municipal Corporations, vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based
upon the decisions of several States ,of the Union upholding the
same principle and which are cited on page 2679 of the aforesaid
work. In this sense this assignment of error, we believe, is
groundless.
By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from
should be and is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
 No. L-24440. March 28, 1968.
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FI-
NANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
defendants-appellants.
Municipal corporations; Test as to the extent of
legislative control over properties of the municipalities.—If
the property is owned by the municipality in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has
absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private
or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without
due process and payment of just compensation.
Same; Properties; Classification under the Civil
Code. —Articles 423 and 424 of the Civil Code classify property
of provinces, cities, and municipalities into property for public use
and patrimonial property. Property for public use consists of
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other
property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws.
Municipal corporations; Properties; Law on
municipal corporation.—Under the principles constituting the
law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in
question which are devoted to public service are deemed public;
the rest remain patrimonial . Und er t his n or m, to be consi dered
p it is enough that the property be held and devoted for
governmental purposes like local administration, public education,
public health, etc.
Same; Same; Rep. Act 3039, validity of.—Republic Act
3039 which provides that all buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga, and located
within the City of Zamboanga, are transferred to Zamboanga City
free of charge, is valid insofar as it affects lots used as capitol site,
school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites, and
the high school playground sites—a total of 24 lots—since these
were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental
capacity they are, therefore, subject to the absolute control of
Congress.
Same; Same; Lots adjoining public schools partake
of the nature of the same.—The eight lots which are adjoining
each other, and in turn are between two lots wherein the Burleigh
Schools, are built, constitute the appurtenant grounds of the said
Burleigh Schools, and partake of the nature of the same.
Same; Same; Buildings which were erected by the
national government, using national fund, can very well be
disposed of by Congress in the same manner that it did with
the lots in question.—Buildings built on lots which are public in
nature follow the classification of the lots on which they are built.
Moreover, said buildings, then located in the city, will not be for the
exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed
of also by the provincial residents. The province then—and its
successors-in-interest—are not really deprived of the benefits
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 3039; Effect on
patrimonial project.—Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to
deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest
of the 26 lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not
being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. Moreover, the
fact that they are registered strengthens the proposition that they
are truly private in nature.
Municipal Corporations; Properties; Principles under
Law of Municipal Corporations considered "special laws"—
Under the provisions of Art. 424 of the Civil Code, the principles
obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations can be
considered as "special laws." Hence, the classification of
municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes
as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this
particular case.
Same; Action; Laches.—Defendants' claim that plaintiff and
its predecessor-in-interest are guilty of laches is without merit.
Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor
of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949, after the
Auditor General f ixed the value of the properties in question.
While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved to transfer said properties
practically for free to Zamboanga City, a reconsideration thereof
was reasonably sought. In 1952, the old province was dissolved.
As successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties
involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a reconsideration
of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were
effected subsequently and it was only after the passage of
Republic Act 3039 in- 1961 that the present controversy arose.
Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.
Same; Claim cannot be paid in lump sum.—Plaintiff's
share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the
P43,030.11 already returned to defendant City. The return of said
amount to defendant was without legal basis. Republic Act 3039
took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of
P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide
for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act.
Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned
by defendant City to plaintiff province The remaining balance, if
any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should
then be paid by defendant City in the same manner originally
adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer,
particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of
the first cause of action recited in the complaint clearly shows that
the relief sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly
payment from the internal revenue allotments of defendant City.
Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by
plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has
been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots
in question. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in the name
of defendant Zamboanga City.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instanc e
Zamboanga del Norte.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associate for
plaintif f-appellee.
Solicitor General for def endants-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then
Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act
39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that—
"Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon
the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General."
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and
some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title
in the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can be gleaned
from the records,1 said properties were being utilized as follows—
No. of Lots Use
1. . . . . . . . . Capitol Site
3. . . . . . . . . School Site
3. . . . . . . . . Hospital Site
3. . . . . . . . . Leprosarium
1. . . . . . . . . Trade School
1. . . . . . . . . Curuan School
2. . . . . . . . . Burleigh School
2. . . . . . . . . High School Playground
9. . . . . . . . . Burleighs
 1. . . . . . . . . Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1. . . . . . . . . San Roque
23. . . . . . . . . vacant
It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog.2 Subsequently, or on June
16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the municipality
of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by
the Auditor General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the
value of the properties and buildings in question left by
Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,-244.00.3
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved
dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and
obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two
new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:
"Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and
other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga
shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga.
del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President
of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor
General."
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955,
apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of
Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore
became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the
lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of
the President, issued a ruling4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte
had a vested right as owner (should be coowner pro-indiviso) of
the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and
is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This
ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951
conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga
City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of
the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to
25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of
Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the
quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of the
fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating
P57,373.46, was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte,
in partial payment of the P704,220.05 due it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved
amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that—
"All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga
are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga." (Stressed for emphasis)
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting
further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the
internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga
City admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039,
P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on
March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga
City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without
due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff' s s righ ts and
obligat ions unde r s ai d law b ed; (c) The Secretary of Finance
and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from
reimbursing the sum of P57.373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The
latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of P704,220.05
in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of
preliminary injunction as prayed for. After defendants filed their
respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963, judgment
was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar
as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under certificates of title (Exhibits
'A' to 'A-49') in the name of the defunct province of
Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05, payment
thereof to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal
revenue allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every
quarter until said amount shall have been f ully paid;
ordering def endant Secretary of Finance to direct
defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct
25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment
for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same
to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of
P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper
officials the corresponding public instrument deeding to
defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of !and and
the improvements thereon under the certificates of title
(Exhibits 'A' to 'A-49') upon payment by the latter of the
aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and
declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory
injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order
of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are assessed
against the defendants.
"It is SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants'
appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion to reconsider praying that
Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in
lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over defendants'
opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff province's motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of
declaratory relief filed in the lower court on the assertion that the
law had already been violated and that plaintiff sought to give it
coercive effect, since assuming the same to be true, the Rules
anyway authorize the conversion of the proceedings to an ordinary
action,5 We proceed to the more important and principal question
of the validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature
of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter
involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties
of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The
principle itself is simple: I f t he prope rt y is ow ned by the munic
ipality municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control
over it. But .if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due
process and payment of just compensation.6
The capacity in which the property is held is, however,
dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. Now,
which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining
under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in
classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423
and 424 which provide:
"ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and
municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property"
"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws." (Stressed for emphasis)
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question,
except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be
considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites,
and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not
for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for
public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis
rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
paragraph of Art. 424.7
The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be
said that its actuation was without jurisprudential precedent for in
Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and in
Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands,9 it was held that the
capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their
patrimonial properties. This result is understandable because,
unlike in the classification regarding State properties, properties
for public service in the municipalities are not classified as public.
Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm,
the lower court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2)
lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the
principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those
of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service
are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm,
to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc.10
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following
cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS,11 where it
was stated that "x x x where the municipality has occupied lands
distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court
house, the public school, the public market,
Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same
manner that it did with the lots in question. But even assuming that
provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere
accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they
follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said
buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive
use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also
by the provincial residents. The province then—and its
successors-in-interest—are not really deprived of the benefits
thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive
Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not
being utilized for distinctly governmen tal purposes. Said lots are:
TCT Number Lot Number
5577. . . .. . . 177. . . . . . . . .
13198. . . . . . . . . 127-D. . . . . . . . .
5569. . . . . . . . . 169. . . . . . . . .
5558. . . . . . . . . 175. . . . . . . . .
5559. . . . . . . . . 188. . . . . . . . .
5560. . . . . . . . . 183. . . . . . . . .
5561. . . . . . . . . 186. . . . . . . . .
5563. . . . . . . . . 191 .. . . . . . . . .
5566. . . . . . . . . 176 .. . . . . . . . .
5568. . . . . . . . . 179 . . . . . . . . . .
5574. . . . . . . . . 196. . . . . . . . . .
5575. . . . . . . . . 181-A. . . . . . . . .
5576. . . . . . . . . 181-B. . . . . . . . .
5578. . . . . . . . . 182 .. . . . . . . . .
5579. . . . . . . . . 197. . . . . . . . .
5580. . . . . . . . . 195. . . . . . . . .
5581. . . . . . . . . 159-B. . . . . . . . .
5582. . . . . . . . . 194. . . . . . . . .
5584. . . . . . . . . 190. . . . . . . . .
5588. . . . . . . . . 184. . . . . . . . .
5589. . . . . . . . . 187. . . . . . . . .
5590. . . . . . . . . 189. . . . . . . . .
5591. . . . . . . . . 192. . . . . . . . .
5592. . . . . . . . . 193. . . . . . . . .
5593. . . . . . . . . 185. . . . . . . . .
7379. . . . . . . . . 4147. . . . . . . . .
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered
strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On
the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes
are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot
convert public property to private.16
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The
controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of
Municipal Corporations—State vs. Province—than along that of
Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that
municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the
same category as ordinary private property. The consequences
are dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon
and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse
possession—all these to the detriment of the local community.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public
use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil
Code is "x x x witho ut prejudicet to the provisions of special laws."
For purposes of this article, the principles obtaining under the Law
of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws".
Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for
distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the
Civil Code classification in this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-
ininterest are guilty of laches is without merit. Under
Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the
defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor
General fixed the value of the properties in question. While in
1951, the Cabinet resolved to transfer said properties practically
for free to Zamboanga City, a reconsideration thereof was
seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province was dissolved. As
successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties involved,
Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a reconsideration of the
Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected
subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic Act
3039 in 1961 that the present controversy arose. Plaintiff brought
suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to
collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in
the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to be
computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as
contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum,
except as to the P43,030.11 already returned to defendant City.
UThe
se return of said amount to defendant was without legal basis.
Mydro,
Republic
MagayAct 3039 took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a partial
San
payment
Roqueof P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did
15
Burleigh
not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a
Vacant
completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be
" immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff province. The
" remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff s 54.39% share
" in the 26 lots should then be paid by defendant City in the same
" manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's
" prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and
" 11 of the first cause of action recited in the complaint 17 clearly
" shows that the relief sought was merely the continuance of the
" quarterly payments from the internal revenue allotments of
" defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal
" obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is
" inapplicable since there has been so far in legal contemplation no
complete delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the registered
lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to
plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of
P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the
sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in
favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39%
share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom
the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated
March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor
General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary
of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs.
So ordered.

No. L-29788. August 30, 1972.
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Governor of the
Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs.
HON.HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch
XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J.
VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and the CITY OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Civil law; Property; Municipal corporations;
Presumption where manner of acquisition of land by
municipality not shown.—It is true that the City of Manila as well
as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de Manila, could validly
acquire property in its corporate or private capacity, following” the
accepted doctrine on the dual character—public and private—of a
municipal corporation. And when it acquires property in its private
capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into
contracts or making transactions for the transmission of title or
other real rights. In the absence of title deed to any land claimed
by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with
its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land
came from the State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson
vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil 695).
Same; Same; Same; Ownership of communal lands
belongs to the State.—Communal lands or “legua comunal”
came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in this
country under the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI,
Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the
Philippines were not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the
public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law
provided that the usufruct of a portion of the public domain
adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the government
for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but until granted, no
rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the
ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 327).
Same; Same; Same; Rule as to ownership of land in
possession of municipality.—It may be laid down as a general rule
that regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held
iv trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be
for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands
Rubiect to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the
same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the
performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but
a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration.
Constitutional Law; Separation of powers; Legislative
classification of land not subject to judicial review.—The Congress
has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal use
(terreno comunal). The act of classifying State property calls for
the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it should
not be interfered with by the Courts.
Constitutional law; Statutes; Presumption of
constitutionality of statutes.—It is now well established that the
presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law. To
declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is
aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of
constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be
a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or
prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.
Municipal corporations; City of Manila; No presumption of
State grant of ownership to municipality where land remained
idle.—Since the City of Manila did not actually use said land for
any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City may
be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or
patrimonial property.
Constitutional law; Eminent domain; City of Manila;
Republic Act 4118 merely confirmed character of property in
possession of the City of Manila.—Republic Act 4118 was never
intended to expropriate the properly involved but merely to confirm
its character as communal land of the State and to make-it
available for disposition by the National Government; the
subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision
lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not
operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without
just compensation but simply as a manifestation of its right and
power to deal with state property.
PETITION FOR REVIEW by certiorari of a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio A. Torres, Solicitor Raul L Goco and Magno B.
Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land Authority for
petitioners-appellants.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents-
appellees.
ESGUERRA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946,
dated September 23, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment
declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and
invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property
without due process and payment of just compensation.
Respondent Executive Secretary and Governor of the
Land Authority are hereby restrained and enjoined from
implementing the provisions of said law. Respondent
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila is ordered to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he
had issued in the name of the Land Tenure
Administration and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 22547 in the name of the City of Manila which he
cancelled, if that is feasible, or issue a new certificate of
title for the same parcel of land in the name of the City of
Manila.”1
The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as
follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration court,
rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111,
declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the
City of Manila, containing an area of 9,680.8 square meters, more
or less, Pursuant to said judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila
on August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of Manila, Original
Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the aforementioned parcel of
kind. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of
the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura Villanueva. As
a consequence of the transactions Original Certificate of Title No.
4329 was cancelled and transfer certificates of title were issued in
favor of Pura Villanueva for the portions purchased by her. When
the last sale to Pura Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21974 in the name of the City of
Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title (T.C.T,) No. 22547 covering the residue thereof known as Lot
1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an area of 7,490.10 square meters, was
issued in the name of the City of Manila.
On September 21, 1980, the Municipal Board of Manila,
presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a
resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City property
bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets, under
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a
total area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the
City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual
occupants thereof.2
The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila was officially transmitted to the President of the Philippines
by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960,
with the information that the same resolution was, on the same
date, transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Congress of the Philippines.3
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the
Philippines, House Bill No. 191 was filed in the House of
Representatives by then Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang
seeking to declare the property in question as patrimonial property
of the City of Manila, and for other purposes. The explanatory note
of the Bill gave the grounds for its enactment, to wit:
“In the particular case of the property subject of this bill,
the City of Manila does not seem to have use thereof as a public
communal property. As a matter of fact, a resolution was adopted
by the Municipal Board of Manila at its regular session held on
September 21, 1960, to request the feasibility of declaring the city
property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets
as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. Therefore, it
will be to the best interest of society that the said property be used
in one way or another. Since this property has been occupied for
a long time by the present occupants thereof and since said
occupants have expressed their willingness to buy the said
property, it is but proper that the same be sold to them.” 4
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen
Manuel Cases. Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor Yñiguez as House
Bill No. 1453, with the following explanatory note:
“The accompanying bill seeks to convert one (1) parcel
of land in the district of Malate, which is reserved as communal
property into a disposable or alienable property of the State and to
provide its subdivision and sale to bona fide occupants or tenants.
“This parcel of land in question was originally an
aggregate part of a piece of land with an area of 9,689.8 square
meters, more or less, x x x On September 21, 1960, the Municipal
Board of Manila in its regular session unanimously adopted a
resolution requesting the President of the Philippines and
Congress of the Philippines the feasibility of declaring this property
into disposable or alienable property of the State. There is
therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided
and sold to bona fide occupants. This parcel of land will not serve
any useful public project because it is bounded on all sides by
private properties which were formerly parts of this lot in question.
“Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the
Administration of land for the landless and the Fifth Declaration of
Principles of the Constitution, which states that the promotion of
Social Justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
people should be the concern of the State. We are ready and
willing to enact legislation promoting the social and economic well-
being of the people whenever an opportunity for enacting such
kind of legislation arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure
fairness and justice to the present bona fide occupants thereof,
approval of this Bill is strongly urged.”5
The Bill having been passed by the House of
Representatives, the same was thereafter sent to the Senate
where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced by the
Congressional Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion of
which is as follows:
“SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, it will be
recalled that when the late Mayor Lacson was still alive, we
approved a similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor Lacson
came here and protested against the approval, and the approval
was reconsidered. May I know whether the defect in the bill which
we approved, has already been eliminated in this present bill?
“SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand Mr. President,
that that has already been eliminated, and that is why the City of
Manila has no more objection to this bill.
“SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, in view of that
manifestation and considering that Mayor Villegas and
Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of Manila are in favor of
the bill. I would not want to pretend to know more what is good for
the City of Manila.
“SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there being no
objection, I move that we approve this bill on second reading.
“PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The bill is approved on second
reading after several Senators said aye and nobody said nay.”
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the
President on June 20, 1964, and became Republic Act No. 4118.
It reads as follows:
Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the
City of Manila, situated in the District of Malate. City of Manila,
which is reserved as communal property, is hereby converted mto
disposal or alienable land of the State, to be placed under ihe
disposal of the Land Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure
Administration shall subdivide the property into small lots, none of
which shall exceed one hundred and twenty square meters in area
and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide
occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned:
Provided, That no down payment shall be required of tenants or
bona fide occupants. who cannot afford to pay such down
payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase more
than one lot: Provided, furthermore, That if the tenant or bona fide
occupant of any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he
shall be given a lease from month to month until such time that he
is able to purchase the lot: Provided, still further, That in the event
of lease the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight
per cent per annum of the assessed value of the property leased:
And provided, finally, That in fixing the price of each lot, wMch
shall not exceed twenty pesos per square meter, the cost of
subdivision and survey shall not be included.
“Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no ejectment
proceedings against any tenant or bona fide occupant of the above
lots shall be instituted and any ejectment proceedings pending in
court against any such tenant or bona fide occupant shall be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant: Provided, That any
demolition order directed against any tenant or bona fide occupant
shall be lifted.
“Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the tenant or bona
fide occupant is in arrears in the payment of any rentals, the
amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be payable in
twenty-four equal monthly installments from the date of liquidation.
“Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of this Act shall
be transferred, sold, mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of within a
period of five years from the date full ownership thereof has been
vested in the purchaser without the consent of the Land Tenure
Administration,
“Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the purchaser prior to the
complete payment of the price of the lot purchased by him, his
widow and children shall succeed in all his rights and obligations
with respect to his lot.
“Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration
shall implement and issue such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
“Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred fifty thousand pesos in
appropriated out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
“Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
“Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
“Approved, June 20, 1964.”
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and
pursuant to the request of the occupants of the property involved,
then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land Authority (which
succeeded the Land Tenure Administration) addressed a letter,
dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio Villegas, furnishing
him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan of said lot as
prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for resale of the
subdivision lots by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants. 6
On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his
Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the
proposed subdivision plan of the property in question attd informed
the Land Authority that his office would interpose no objection to
the implementation of said law, provided that its provisions be
strictly complied with.7
With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of
Manila for the implementation of Republic Act No. 4118, the Land
Authority, thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the
City Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor, for the surrender and
delivery to the former of the owner’s duplicate of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22547 m order to obtain title thereto in the
name of the Land Authority. The request was duly granted with the
knowledge and consent of the Office of the City Mayor. 8
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
22547, which had been yielded as above stated by the City
authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title
(T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Manila and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876
was issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration (now
Land Authority) pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
4118.9
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the
City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for on December 20,
1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of
Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public
corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein
appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the
Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing Republic
Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No.
4118 as unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained
in the partial stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court and
approved by respondent Judge, the parties waived the
presentation of further evidence and submitted the case for
decision. On September 23, 1968, judgment was rendered by the
trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and
invalid on the ground that it deprived the City of Manila of its
property without due process of law and payment of just
compensation. The respondents were ordered to undo all that had
been done to carry out the provisions of said Act and were
restrained from further implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the
resolution of which the decision in this case hinges, to wit:
I. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City
of Manila?
II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to
the Constitution?
I.
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the
land involved is a communal land or “legua comunal” which is a
portion of the public domain owned by the State; that it came into
existence as such when the City of Manila, or any pueblo or town
in the Philippines for that matter, was founded under the laws of
Spain, the former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a
pueblo, the administrative authority was required to allot and set
aside portions of the public domain for a public plaza, a church
site, a site for public buildings, lands to serve as common pastures
and for streets and roads; that in assigning these lands some lots
were earmarked for strictly public purposes, and ownership of
these lots (for public purposes) immediately passed to the new
municipality; that in the case of common lands or “legua comunal”,
there was no such immediate acquisition of ownership by the
pueblo, and the land though administered thereby, did not
automatically become its property in the absence of an express
grant from the Central Government, and that the reason for this
arrangement is that this class of land was not absolutely needed
for the discharge of the municipality’s governmental functions.
It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not
been used by the City of Manila for any public purpose and had
not been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some
public buildings; that this circumstance confirms the fact that it was
originally “communal” land al-loted to the City of Manila by the
Central Government not because it was needed in connection with
its organization as a municipality but simply for the common use
of its inhabitants; that the present City of Manila as successor of
the Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign
merely enjoys the usufruct over said land, and its exercise of acts
of ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily convert
the land into a patrimonial property of the City of Manila nor divest
the State of its paramount title.
Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like
a city is a governmental agent of the State with authority to govern
a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs
in a given political subdivision, and the extent of its authority is
strictly delimited by the grant of power conferred by the State; that
Congress has the exclusive power to create, change or destroy
municipal corporations; that even if We admit that legislative
control over municipal corporations is not absolute and even if it is
true that the City of Manila has a registered title over the property
in question, the mere transfer of such land by an act of the
legislature from one class of public land to another, without
compensation, does not invade the vested rights of the City.
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has
treated the land involved as one reserved for communal use, and
this classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if the City of
Manila feels that this is wrong and its interests have been thereby
prejudiced, the matter should be brought to the attention of
Congress for correction; and that since Congress, in the exercise
of its wide discretionary powers has seen fit to classify the land in
question as communal, the Courts certainly owe it to a coordinate
branch of the Government to respect such determination and
should not interfere with the enforcement of the law.
Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting
portions of the appealed decision of the trial court, which read
thus:
“The respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend,
among other defenses, that the property in question is communal
property. This contention is, however, disproved by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4329 issued on August 21, 1920 in favor of
the City of Manila after the land in question was registered in the
City’s favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of
Manila was the owner in ‘fee simple’ of the said land. Under Sec.
38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of
confirmation and registration in favor of the City of Manila . . . shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons including the Insular
Government and all the branches there . . . There is nothing in the
said certificate of title indicating that the land was ‘communal’ land
as contended by the respondents. The erroneous assumption by
the Municipal Board of Manila that the land in question was
communal land did not make it so. The Municipal Board had no
authority to do that.
“The respondents, however, contend that Congress had the
power and authority to declare that the land in question was
‘communal’ land and the courts have no power or authority to
make a contrary finding. This contention is not entirely correct or
accurate. Congress has the power to classify ‘land of the public
domain’, transfer them from one classification to another and
declare them disposable or not. Such power does not, however,
extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and
municipalities in their ‘patrimonial’ capacity.
“Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that properties of
provinces, cities and municipalities are divided into properties for
public use and patrimonial property. Art. 424 of the same code
provides that properties for public use consist of provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades and public works for public service paid for
by said province, cities or municipalities. All other praperty
possessed by any of them is patrimonial. Tested by this criterion
the Court finds and holds that the land in question is patrimonial
property of the City of Manila.
“Respondents contend that Congress .has declared the land
in question to be ‘communal’ and, therefore, such designation is
conclusive upon the courts. The Courts holds otherwise. When a
statute is assailed as unconstitutional the Courts have the power
and authority to inquire into the question and pass upon it. This
has long ago been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60,
when the United States Supreme Court speaking thru Chief
Justice Marshall held:
‘x x x If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void, does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind the courts, and
oblige them to give effect? It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is ... So if a law be
in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of unconstitutional judicial duty.’”
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law
unconstitutional it does not mean that the judicial power is superior
to the legislative power. It simply means that the power of the
people is superior to both and that when the will of the legislature,
declared in statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people,
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by
the Constitution rather than by the statutes.
There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in
mind in resolving the character of the land involved, and it is that
the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as
owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in
what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial
property. It is true that the City of Manila as well as its predecessor,
the Ayuntamiento de Manila, could validly acquire property in its
corporate or private capacity, following the accepted doctrine on
the dual character—public and private—of a municipal
corporation. And when it acquires property in its private capacity,
it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts or
making transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights.
When it comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under
any of the modes established by law for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights. In the absence of a title deed to
any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it
was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption
is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the
municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally
the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that
were granted by the State not for its public but for private use.
Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise
of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which category a
municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or “legua comunal” came into existence
when a town or pueblo was established in this country under the
laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Ley
es de Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines were not
entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public domain for
use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the
usufruct of a portion of the public domain adjoining municipal
territory might be granted by the Government for communal
purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein
passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title
remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government,
10 Phil 827).
“For the establishment, then, of new pueblos the
administrative authority of the province, in representation of the
Governor General, designated the territory for their location and
extension and the metes and bounds of the same; and before
alloting the lands among the new settlers, a special demarcation
was made of the places which were to serve as the public square
of the pueblo, for the erection of the church, and as sites for the
public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa
real, as well as of the lands which were to constitute ‘the common
pastures, and propios of the municipality and the streets and roads
which were to intersect the new town were laid out, x x x.”
(Municipality of Catbalo-gan vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216,
220) (Italics supplied)
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that
regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession
of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its
private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the
State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject
to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same,
for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance
of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision
or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.
Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself
holds the property and puts it to a different use (2 McQuilin,
Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs.
Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal
corporation is not absolute even when it comes to its property
devoted to public use, for such control must not be exercised to
the extent of depriving persons of their property or rights without
due process of law, or in a manner impairing the obligations of
contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate
capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its
administration and disposition to an agency of the National
Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it
did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the
people.
It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a
Municipal airport to an Airport Commission created by the
legislature, even without compensation to the city, was not
violative of the due process clause of the American Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnessota in Monagham vs.
Armatage, supra, said:
“x x x The case is controlled by the further rule that the
legislature, having plenary control of the local municipality, of its
creation and of all its affairs, has the right to authorize or direct the
expenditures of money in its treasury, though raised, for a
particular purpose, for any legitimate municipal purpose, or to
order and direct a distribution thereof upon a division of the
territory into separate municipalities xxx. The local municipality
has no such vested right in or to its public, funds, like that which
the Constitution protects in the individual as precludes legislative
interferences. People vs. Power, 25 111. 187; State Board (of
Education) vs. City, 56 Miss. 518. As remarked by the supreme
court of Maryland in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37 Md. 180: ‘It is of the
essence of such a corporation, that the government has the sole
right as trustee of the public interest, at its own good will and
pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control, and direct the corporation,
its funds, and franchises.’
“We therefore hold that c.500, in authorizing the transfer of
the use and possession of the municipal airport to the commission
without compensation to the city or to the park board, does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.”
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one
reserved for communal use (terreno comunal). The act of
classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered with
by the courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity
of Republic Act No. 4118, viewed in the light of Article III, Sections
1, subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which ordain that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law and that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
II.
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118
unconstitutional for allegedly depriving the City of Manila of its
property without due process of law and without payment of just
compensation. It is now well established that the presumption is
always in favor of the constitutionality of a law (U.S. vs. Ten Yu,
24 PhiL 1; Go Ching, et al vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp.
703, 705). To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of
that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for
even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a
law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done (Morfe vs.
Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424).
That situation does not obtain in this case as the law assailed does
not in any manner trench upon the constitution as will hereafter be
shown.
Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the
social justice policy of the Constitution and the Government
program of “Land for the Landless”. The explanatory note of
House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118, reads
in part as follows:
“Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the
administration of ‘land for the landless’ and the Fifth Declaration of
Principles of the Constitution which states that ‘the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
people should be the concern of the State.’ We are ready and
willing to enact legislation promoting the social and economic well-
being of the people whenever an opportunity for enacting such
kind of legislation arises.’ ”
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, “by
converting the land in question—which is the patrimonial property
of the City of Manila into disposable alienable land of the State and
placing it under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration—
violates the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and 2) of the
Constitution which ordain that “private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation, and that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”.
In support thereof reliance is placed on the ruling in Province of
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440,
March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that Congress
cannot deprive a municipality of its private or patrimonial property
without due process of law and without payment of just
compensation since it has no absolute control thereof. There is no
quarrel over this rule if it is undisputed that the property sought to
be taken is in reality a private or patrimonial property of the
municipality or city. But it would be simply begging the question to
classify the land in question as such. The property, as has been
previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its
own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its
name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be
deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered
thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by
the sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government,
through the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor
General, in the cadastral proceedings did not contest the claim of
the City of Manila that the land is its property, does not detract
from its character as State property and in no way divests the
legislature of its power to deal with it as such, the state not being
bound by the mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of
Manila expressly recognized the paramount title of the State over
said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the
Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas,
requested “His Excellency the President of the Philippines to
consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by
Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of
7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila
for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof.” (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of Facts, Civil Case No.
67945, CFI, Manila, p. 121, Record of the Case) [Italics Supplied]
The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership
of the City of Manila is totally belied by the City’s own official act,
which is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden.
If it were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be
requesting the President to make representation to the legislature
to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual
occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact
that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in
usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the
City did not actually use said land for any recognized public
purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long
time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State
grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be
acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or
patrimonial property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director of
Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 327; Municipality of Luzuriaga V3. Director of Lands, 24 Phil.
193), The conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No,
4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a
parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away from the
City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last
analysis the land in question pertains to the State and the City of
Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein
for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate
powers.
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the
property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal
land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the
National Government: And this was done at the instance or upon
the request of the City of Manila itself. The subdivision of the land
and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants
by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise
of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in
violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution,
but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with
state property.
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted
upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board o£ Manila in
the form of a legally approved resolution* The certificate of title
over the property in the name of the City of Manila was accordingly
cancelled and another issued to the Land Tenure Administration
after the voluntary surrender of the City’s duplicate certificate of
title by the City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the
City Mayor. To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118,
the then Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated
February 18, 1965, to the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of
the “proposed subdivision plan of the said lot as prepared for the
Republic of the Philippines for subdivision and resale by the Land
Authority to bona fide applicants.” On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of
Manila, through his Executive and Technical Adviser,
acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan and informed the
Land Authority that his Office ‘Viii interpose no objection to the
implementation of said law provided that its provisions are strictly
complied with.” The foregoing sequence of events, clearly indicate
a pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the
reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts
were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and
power of the Congress to dispose of the land involved.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it
owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent
domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the
Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved
given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power
to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore,
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed,
and petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled
implementation of Republic Act No, 4118 without any obstacle
from the respondents. Without costs.

Notes.—Test as to the extent of legislative control aver

properties of the municipalities. If the property is owned by the
municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property
is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the
property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. Province of Zamboanga del Norte
vs. City of Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334.
Classification of properties of public corporations.—Articles
423 and 424 of the Civil Code classify property of provinces, cities,
and municipalities into property for public use and patrimonial
property. Property for public U3e consists of provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed
by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by the Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
 U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS
Syllabus
Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near
a municipal airport. The safe path of glide to one of the runways of
the airport passed directly over respondents' property at 83 feet,
which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and
18 feet above the highest tree. It was used 4% of the time in taking
off and 7% of the time in landing. The Government leased the use
of the airport for a term of one month commencing June 1, 1942,
with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months
after the end of the national emergency, whichever was earlier.
Various military aircraft of the United States used the airport. They
frequently came so close to respondents' property that they barely
missed the tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare
from their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This
destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused
loss of sleep, nervousness, and fright on the part of respondents.
They sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an alleged taking
of their property and for damages to their poultry business. The
Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an
easement over respondents' property, and that the value of the
property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000; but it
made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of the
easement.
Held:
1. A servitude has been imposed upon the land for which
respondents are entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-267.
(a) The common law doctrine that ownership of land
extends to the periphery of the universe has no place in
the modern world. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261.
(b) The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public
highway and part of the public domain, as declared by
Congress in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Pp. 328
U. S. 260-261, 328 U. S. 266.
(c) Flights below that altitude are not within the
navigable air space which Congress placed within the
public domain, even though they are within the path of
glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
Pp. 328 U. S. 263-264.
(d) Flights of aircraft over private land which are so low
and frequent as to be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land are
as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a
more conventional entry upon it. Pp. 328 U. S. 261-
262, 328 U. S. 264-267.
2. Since there was a taking of private property for public
use, the claim was "founded upon the Constitution," within the
meaning of § 141(1) of the Judicial Code, and the Court of
Claims had jurisdiction to hear and determine it. P. 328 U. S.
267.
3. Since the court's findings of fact contain no precise
description of the nature or duration of the easement taken, the
judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of
Claims so that it may make the necessary findings. Pp. 328 U.
S. 267-268.
(a) An accurate description of the easement taken is
essential, since that interest vests in the United States.
P. 328 U. S. 267.
(b) Findings of fact on every "material issue" are a
statutory requirement, and a deficiency in the findings
cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion.
Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268.
(c) A conjecture in lieu of a conclusion from evidence
would not be a proper foundation for liability of the
United States. P. 328 U. S. 268.
104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751, reversed and remanded.
The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment
for the value of property destroyed and damage to their property
resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by
low-flying military aircraft of the United States, but failed to
include in its findings of fact a specific description of the nature or
duration of the easement. 104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751. This
Court granted certiorari. 327 U.S. 775. Reversed and
remanded, p. 328 U. S. 268.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This is a case of first impression. The problem presented
is whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and
navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes. The Court of
Claims held that there was a taking, and entered judgment for
respondent, one judge dissenting. 60 F.Supp. 751. The case is
here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because
of the importance of the question presented.
Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also
various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens.
The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet
from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their house. The path
of glide to this runway passes directly over the property -- which is
100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle
[Footnote 1] approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority [Footnote
2] passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the
house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree.
[Footnote 3] The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant
to a lease executed in May, 1942, for a term commencing June 1,
1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals until
June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever is the earlier.
Various aircraft of the United States use this airport --
bombers, transports, and fighters. The direction of the prevailing
wind determines when a particular runway is used. The northwest-
southeast runway in question is used about four percent of the
time in taking off and about seven percent of the time in landing.
Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-
motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its
fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents' land
buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together. They
come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of
the trees, and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow
the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And, at night, the glare
from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise,
respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as
six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the
walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about
150. Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the
use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. Respondents
are frequently deprived of their sleep, and the family has become
nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane
accidents on respondents' property, there have been several
accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place. These
are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the basis
of these facts, it found that respondents' property had depreciated
in value. It held that the United States had taken an easement over
the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property
destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000.
I. The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of
1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. § 171 et seq., as amended by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. § 401 et
seq. Under those statutes, the United States has "complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the air space" over this country.
49 U.S.C. § 176(a). They grant any citizen of the United States "a
public right of freedom of transit in air commerce [Footnote 4]
through the navigable air space of the United States." 49 U.S.C. §
403. And "navigable air space" is defined as "airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority." 49 U.S.C. § 180. And it is provided that "such navigable
airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate
and foreign air navigation." Id. It is therefore argued that, since
these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which
had been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right
of travel through the airspace. The United States concludes that,
when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any
physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has
been no taking of property. It says that, at most, there was merely
incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air
navigation. It also argues that the landowner does not own
superadjacent airspace which he has not subjected to possession
by the erection of structures or other occupancy. Moreover, it is
argued that, even if the United States took airspace owned by
respondents, no compensable damage was shown. Any damages
are said to be merely consequential for which no compensation
may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the
land extended to the periphery of the universe -- cujusest solum
ejus est usque and coelum. [Footnote 5] But that doctrine has no
place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as
Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private
claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously
interfere with their control and development in the public interest,
and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public
has a just claim.
But that general principle does not control the present
case. For the United States conceded on oral argument that, if the
flights over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable, there
would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. It is
the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the
value of the property taken. United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369.
Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the
recovery. Id. And that value may reflect the use to which the land
could readily be converted, as well as the existing use. United
States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 319 U. S. 275, and cases
cited. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights,
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss
would be complete. [Footnote 6] It would be as complete as if the
United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken
exclusive possession of it.
We agree that, in those circumstances, there would be a
taking. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was
taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary,
normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a
definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the
surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the
surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the
feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's
right to possess and exploit the land -- that is to say, his beneficial
ownership of it -- would be destroyed. It would not be a case of
incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance, such as was
involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546.
In that case, property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line
were denied recovery for damages resulting from the noise,
vibrations, smoke, and the like, incidental to the operations of the
trains. In the supposed case, the line of flight is over the land. And
the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were
used for the runways themselves.
There is no material difference between the supposed
case and the present one, except that, here, enjoyment and use
of the land are not completely destroyed. But that does not seem
to us to be controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might
reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a
vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some
value would remain. But the use of the airspace immediately
above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a
diminution in its value. [Footnote 7] That was the philosophy
of Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U. S. 327. In that case, the petition
alleged that the United States erected a fort on nearby land,
established a battery and a fire control station there, and fired guns
over petitioner's land. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, reversed the Court of Claims which dismissed the petition
on a demurrer, holding that "the specific facts set forth would
warrant a finding that a servitude has been imposed." [Footnote 8]
260 U.S. at 260 U. S. 330. And see Delta Air Corp. v.
Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245. Cf. United States v. 357.25
Acres of Land, 55 F.Supp. 461.
The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was
that approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority does not change
the result. The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in
the public domain is "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes
of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." 49 U.S.C. §
180. If that agency prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe
altitude, then we would have presented the question of the validity
of the regulation. But nothing of the sort has been done. The path
of glide governs the method of operating -- of landing or taking off.
The altitude required for that operation is not the minimum safe
altitude of flight which is the downward reach of the navigable
airspace. The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet
during the day and 1000 feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air
Regulations, Pt. 61, §§ 61.7400, 61.7401, Code
Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1) and from 300 to 1000 feet
for other aircraft depending on the type of plane and the character
of the terrain. Id., Pt. 60, §§ 60.350-60.3505,
Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., supra. Hence, the flights in question were
not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within
the public domain. If any airspace needed for landing or taking off
were included, flights which were so close to the land as to render
it uninhabitable would be immune. But the United States
concedes, as we have said, that, in that event, there would be a
taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is not the minimum
safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the statute. The Civil
Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the power to prescribe air
traffic rules. But Congress has defined navigable airspace only in
terms of one of them -- the minimum safe altitudes of flight.
We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet
it is obvious that, if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of
the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be
erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be
run. The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in
case overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land.
[Footnote 9] The landowner owns at least as much of the space
above the ground as the can occupy or use in connection with the
land. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755. The fact
that he does not occupy it in a physical sense -- by the erection of
buildings and the like -- is not material. As we have said, the flight
of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much
an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
entry upon it. We would not doubt that, if the United States
erected an elevated railway over respondents' land at the precise
altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking,
even though none of the supports of the structure rested on the
land. [Footnote 10] The reason is that there would be an intrusion
so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full
enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While
the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of
airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use
it in somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings
for the purpose of light and air is used. The superadjacent airspace
at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions
of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that 28 U.S.C. § 288. The importance of findings of fact based on
the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it, evidence is emphasized here by the Court of Claims' treatment of
and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the nature of the easement. It stated in its opinion that the
the surface. [Footnote 11] easement was permanent because the United States "no doubt
In this case, as in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. intended to make some sort of arrangement whereby it could use
v. United States, supra, the damages were not merely the airport for its military planes whenever it had occasion to do
consequential. They were the product of a direct invasion of so." That sounds more like conjecture, rather than a conclusion
respondents' domain. from evidence, and if so, it would not be a proper foundation for
As stated in United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 243 liability of the United States. We do not stop to examine the
U. S. 328, ". . . it is the character of the invasion, not the amount evidence to determine whether it would support such a finding, if
of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, made. For that is not our function. United States v. Esnault-
that determines the question whether it is a taking." Pelterie, supra, p. 299 U. S. 206.
We said in United States v. Powelson, supra, p. 319 U. Since on this record it is not clear whether the easement
S. 279, that, while the meaning of "property" as used in the Fifth taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature
Amendment was a federal question, "it will normally obtain its for us to consider whether the amount of the award made by the
content by reference to local law." If we look to North Carolina law, Court of Claims was proper.
we reach the same result. Sovereignty in the airspace rests in the The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded
State "except where granted to and assumed by the United to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings
States." Gen.Stats.1943, § 63-11. The flight of aircraft is lawful in conformity with this opinion.
"unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing Reversed.
use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the
is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently consideration or decision of this case.
dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water
beneath."
Subject to that right of flight, "ownership of the space
above the lands and waters of this State is declared to be vested
in the several owners of the surface beneath." Our holding that
there was an invasion of respondents' property is thus not
inconsistent with the local law governing a landowner's claim to
the immediate reaches of the superadjacent airspace.
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life,
and the inconveniences which it causes are normally not
compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart
from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public
domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise
limits are. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they
are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. We need not
speculate on that phase of the present case. For the findings of
the Court of Claims plainly establish that there was a diminution in
value of the property, and that the frequent, low-level flights were
the direct and immediate cause. We agree with the Court of
Claims that a servitude has been imposed upon the land.
II. By § 145(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 250(1),
the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear and determine "All
claims (except for pensions) founded upon the Constitution of the
United States or . . . upon any contract, express or implied, with
the Government of the United States."
We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might
give rise to an implied contract. Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land &
Hotel Co. v. United States, supra. If there is a taking, the claim is
"founded upon the Constitution," and within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims to hear and determine. See Hollister v. Benedict
& Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59, 113 U. S. 67; Hurley v.
Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 285 U. S. 104; Yearsley v. W. A. Ross
Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 309 U. S. 21. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case is clear.
III. The Court of Claims held, as we have noted, that an
easement was taken. But the findings of fact contain no precise
description as to its nature. It is not described in terms of frequency
of flight, permissible altitude, or type of airplane. Nor is there a
finding as to whether the easement taken was temporary or
permanent. Yet an accurate description of the property taken is
essential, since that interest vests in the United States. United
States v. Cress, supra, 243 U. S. 328-329, and cases cited. It is
true that the Court of Claims stated in its opinion that the easement
taken was permanent. But the deficiency in findings cannot be
rectified by statements in the opinion. United States v. Esnault-
Pelterie, 299 U. S. 201, 299 U. S. 205-206; United States v.
Seminole Nation, 299 U. S. 417, 299 U. S. 422. Findings of fact
on every "material issue" are a statutory requirement. 53 Stat. 752,
 No. L-21231. July 30, 1975.*
CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners, vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO
JASMIN, et al., respondents.
Courts; Trial court may authorize the clerk of court to
receive evidence.—No provision of law or principle of public
policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive
the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence
by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task—the taking
down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the
pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party
present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of
the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called
for when the other party who is present objects to questions
propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence
proffered. More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the
merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to
personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the
evidence reported.
Same; When hearing conducted by clerk of court
subject to attack.—But where the proceedings before the clerk
of court and the concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment
rendered by the court based on the evidence presented in such
limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the
aggrieved party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant
the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.
Civil law; Property; Accion reinvindicatoria; Party
suing to recover ownership of land must prove identity of the
property.—The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in
order to maintain an action to recover ownership, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not
only his ownership of the property claimed but also the identity
thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of
the land he claims. And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to
the identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the question
by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic,
oral or written.
Same; Marriage; Conjugal property; There is a
presumption that property is conjugal if acquired during
marriage.—It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo
committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land subject to
the “Absolute Deed of Sale” belongs to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the spouses Laluan and
Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio Marquez
“sometime in 1912” or, specifically, during the marriage. Following
the rule then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute
during the marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative, it seems clear enough that the parcel covered by the
“Absolute Deed of Sale” pertains to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Laluan and Malpaya.
Same; Succession; Civil Code of 1889; Property
transmitted by succession in 1948 is governed by the Civil
Code of 1889.—The court a quo committed no error in declaring
the “Absolute Deed of Sale” null and void as to the one-half portion
of the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse of
the respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners the owners
pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject of the said “Absolute
Deed of Sale;” and in ordering the respondents Tambot and
Jasmin to deliver the possession of the said half-portion to the
petitioners. The court a quo also correctly cited and applied the
provisions of articles 953 and 837 of the Civil Code of 1889 which,
pursuant to article 2263 of the new Civil Code, govern the rights of
the petitioner and the respondent Malpaya to the property left by
Marciana Laluan who died on July 17, 1948 or before the
effectivity of the new code.
CASTRO, J.:
In 1950 the Laluans,1 the Laguits2 and the
Sorianos3 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against
Apolinario Malpaya, Melecio Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin
(hereinafter referred to as the respondents) for recovery of
ownership and possession of two parcels of land. The petitioners
seek a declaration that they are the owners pro indiviso of
A PARCEL OF RICELAND, situated in the barrio of
Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, Philippines ... containing an
area of 1 hectare nine hundred seventy one (10,971) square
meters, more or less; bounded on the N. by Nicolas Estares; on
the E. by Zanja; on the S. by Estero Inoman and on W. by Aniceta
Marquez; ...,
and the owners pro indiviso of one-half of
A PARCEL OF RICELAND AND CORNLAND, situated
in the barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, ...
containing an area of (31,548) square meters, more or
less, bounded on N. by Rosendo Serran; E. by Esteban
Malpaya; S. by Creek and W. by Creek that surround it;
....
They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal
succession, from Marciana Laluan (the respondent Malpaya's
wife) who died intestate on July 17, 1948 and without any children.
The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the
late Marciana Laluan. They claim that the respondent Malpaya,
taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the
respondent Tambot, as evidenced by the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property" dated June 26, 1948. The second parcel of land
they allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and
Laluan, and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with right to sell
only one-half thereof, sold the whole property, four days after the
death of his wife, to the respondents Tambot and Jasmin, as
evidenced by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21, 1948.
The respondents filed their answer,4 denying the allegations of the
complaint and claiming that the parcels of land belonged to the
respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The respondents
Tambot and Jasmin further aver that the respondent Malpaya had
the "perfect legal right" to dispose of the said parcels of land and
that they bought the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw
in the title of their vendor.
To expedite the proceedings, the parties entered into a partial
stipulation of facts at the hearings of August 31 and October 25,
1950. The petitioners then proceeded to adduce their evidence.
Several postponements of the scheduled hearings followed. Then,
at the hearing scheduled on August 1, 1957 neither the
respondents nor their counsel appeared, notwithstanding due and
proper notice served on them. Nor did they file any motion for
postponement. The petitioners thus moved for leave to continue
with the presentation of their evidence. This the court a
quo granted, allowing the petitioners to adduce their evidence
before the clerk of court.
On September 23, 1957 the court a quo rendered judgment
declaring null and void the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" dated June 26, 1948 as well the "Absolute Deed of Sale"
dated July 21, 1948, except as regards the one-half portion of the
land described in the latter document which belonged to the
respondent Malpaya. With respect to the parcel of land covered
by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the court a
quo declared the petitioners owners pro indiviso of the entirety
thereof and ordered the respondent Tambot not only to deliver the
possession of the land to them but also to pay them, by way of
damages, the amount of P750 — the value of the crops which the
petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the land —
plus P500 annually from date until possession thereof shall have
been delivered to them. With respect to the parcel of land subject
of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," the court a quo likewise declared
the petitioners owners pro indiviso of one-half thereof and ordered
the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of
the half-portion to the petitioners, as well as to pay them, in
damages, the sum of P1,343.75 — the value of the produce which
the petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the half-
portion of the land - plus P687.50 annually from date until
possession thereof shall have been delivered to them.
On October 7, 1957 the respondents Tambot and Jasmin filed
their Mocion de Reconsideracion. On October 18, 1957 the court a
quo, finding the grounds invoked by the respondents in their
motion without merit, denied the same.
The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Court). On January 31,
1963 the respondent Court rendered judgment setting aside the
appealed decision and entered another remanding the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings. The respondent Court voided
the procedure whereby, at the continuation of the hearing of the
case on August 1, 1957, the court a quo, in the absence of the
respondents and their counsel, allowed the petitioners to present
their evidence before the clerk of court.
In due time, the petitioners, through a motion for reconsideration,
asked the respondent Court to re-examine its decision. This
motion, however, the respondent Court denied.
In the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for the
reversal of the decision of the respondent Court as well its
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration, and ask that
judgment be rendered affirming in toto the decision of the court a
quo dated September 23, 1957.
The petitioners and the respondents point to what they believe is
the sole question for resolution; whether or not the reception by
the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of the
respondents and their counsel, constitutes a prejudicial error that
vitiated the proceedings.
The petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate
its clerk of court to receive the evidence of the party present when
the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the
petitioners continue, the clerk of court merely performs a
ministerial task. The ministerial nature of such a task allows the
clerk of court to dispense with the procedural steps5 prescribed by
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the court a
quo arrogated unto itself the power, otherwise denied it, to
designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence. No
provision of the Rules of Court, according to them, empowers a
trial court to authorize its clerk of court to receive the evidence of
a party litigant; only when the clerk of court becomes a
commissioner, by appointment pursuant to Rule 33, has he the
authority to so receive the evidence of a party litigant, and even in
such a situation Rule 33 requires the clerk of court to observe the
procedural steps therein prescribed.
The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both
parties properly relate to the reference by a court of any or all of
the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report
thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing
the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties before,
during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance with
these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the court
formally orders a reference of the case to a commissioner. Strictly
speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no application to the
case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the clerk of
court to take down the testimony of the witnesses 6 presented and
to mark the documentary evidence7 proffered on a date previously
set for hearing.
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court
from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party
litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court
constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the
testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of
documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This
task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of
court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when the
other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to
the admission of the documentary evidence proffered. 8 More
importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case
still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly
prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported. 9
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the
concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the
court based on the evidence presented in such limited
proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved
party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter
complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.
1. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property," the court a quo, in its decision dated September
23, 1957, declared it as the paraphernal property of the deceased
Marciana Laluan. In so doing, the court a quo relied mainly on the
documents — the deed of donation propter nuptias and the
translation thereof in English — presented by the petitioners
before the clerk of court at the hearing on August 1, 1957.
However, the respondents contend — and this the respondent
court took significant note of in its resolution dated March 30, 1963
— that the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" is not any of those set forth in the deed of donation.
The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" describes the land
subject thereof as follows:
A parcel of riceland, together with all the
improvements existing thereon situated in the
Barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan,
Philippines, ... containing an area of 1 hectare
nine hundred seventy one (10,971) square
meters, more or less; bounded on the N. by
Nicolas Estaris; on the E. by Zanja; on the east
by Estero Inoman and on the W. by Aniceta
Marquez; the boundaries consists of visible
dikes that surround it; declared under Tax No.
20006 in the name of the Vendor and assessed
at P330.00 of the current year of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan; said land is not registered under
Act No. 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage
Law. 10
On the other hand, the deed of donation propter nuptias treats of
three parcels of land in this manner.
First: A parcel of riceland situated in Paldit,
municipality of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, the
measurement and boundaries on all sides could
be seen from the sketch at the back hereof, this
 parcel of land is given in lieu of jewelry, whose
value is TEN (P10.00) PESOS.
Second: Another parcel of riceland situated in
the same place mentioned above, also its
measurements and boundaries on all sides
could be seen from the sketch at the back
hereof, and valued at THIRTY (P30.00)
PESOS.
... a parcel of riceland ... situated in Inmatotong,
this municipality, its measurements in brazes
and boundaries on all sides could be seen on
the sketch herein below, and this said parcel of
land is valued at TEN (P10.00) PESOS.
The sketch appearing on the deed of donation covers three
parcels of land: the first parcel, 63 X 52 brazas, 11bounded on the
north by Jacinto Malpaya, on the west by a payas, and on the
south and east by Pedro Malpaya; the second parcel, 30 X
63 brazas, bounded on the north by Tomas Tollao, on the west by
Jacinto Laluan, on the south by a colos, and on the east by Pedro
Malpaya; and the third parcel, 52 X 23 brazas, bounded on the
north and west by Pedro Malpaya, on the south by Roman
Gramata, and on the east by Eustaquio Marquez. All of these three
parcels have stated metes and bounds quite different from those
of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property," the location too of the latter land differs from those of
the parcels described in the deed of donation. While the land
subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" lies in
Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, the parcels included in the deed
of donation lie either in Paldit or in Inmatotong, both also in
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. At first sight also appears the marked
variance between the respective areas of those parcels described
in the deed of donation and the parcel subject of the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property."
Indeed, there arises the possibility that in the interim of fifty six
years from February 15, 1892 (the date of the deed of
donation propter nuptias) to June 26, 1948 (the date of the "Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Property"), the parcels of land contiguous
to those described in the deed of donation passed in ownership
from one hand to another, or changes in the man-made or natural
boundaries used to indicate the confines of the parcels set forth in
the said document occurred. This could very well explain the
discrepancies between the names of the boundary owners of the
piece of land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" and the names of the adjacent owners of the parcels
subject of the deed of donation as well as the absence of any
mention of the payas and colos in the later "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property." In addition, the variance between the location
of the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" and those of the parcels set forth in the deed of donation
could reasonably be due to the creation of new barrios in the
municipality of Pozorrubio Pangasinan, or the alteration of the
boundaries of the barrios therein.
However, the apparent difference between the area of the land
described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and the
areas of the parcels included in the deed of donation propter
nuptias should be fully and properly explained. The record shows
that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any
evidence indicating that the land sold by the respondent Malpaya
to his co-respondent Tambot corresponds with any of the three
parcels described in the deed of donation. The petitioners failed to
specify precisely which of the three parcels — its location, area,
and contiguous owners — subject of the deed of donation
constitutes the very land delimited in the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property."
All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one
of the parcels of land in dispute which the court a quo neither
noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact that the
location, area and boundaries of the land covered by the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not coincide with those of any
of the parcels described in the deed of donation propter nuptias.
The invariable applicable rule 12 is to the effect that in order to
maintain an action to recover ownership, the person who claims
that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof. The
party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land he
claims. 13 And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity
of the land claimed, a court should resolve the question by
recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic
evidence, oral or written.
Absent, therefore, any indicium in the record to show and identify
with absolute certainty any of the three parcels of land included in
the deed of donation propter nuptias as the land described in the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the prudent course open
obviously consists in an investigation by the court a quo, either in
the form of a hearing or an ocular inspection, or both, to enable it
to know positively the land in litigation. If, indeed, the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" treats of a piece of land entirely
different and distinct from the parcels described in the deed of
donation propter nuptias, and considering that the court a quo, in
its decision dated September 23, 1957, relied mainly on the said
deed of donation in declaring the land subject of the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" as the paraphernal property of the
late Marciana Laluan and in nullifying the latter document, then
there exists sufficient ground to remand the case to the court a
quo for a new trial on the matter.
2. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale,"
the court a quo, in its decision dated September 23, 1957, found
and declared it as the conjugal property of the spouses Laluan and
Malpaya. In so doing, the courta quo relied heavily on the
presumption established by article 1407 14 of the Civil Code of
1889 that "[a] 11 the property of the spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs
exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo committed
no error in declaring that the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute
Deed of Sale" belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the spouses Laluan and Malpaya
acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio Marquez
"sometime in 1912" or, specifically, during the marriage. Following
the rule then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute
during the marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative, 15 it seems clear enough that the parcel covered by the
"Absolute Deed of Sale" pertains to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Laluan and Malpaya.
Likewise, the court a quo committed no error in declaring the
"Absolute Deed of Sale" null and void as to the one-half portion of
the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse of
the respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners the
owners pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject of the said
"Absolute Deed of Sale;" and in ordering the respondents Tambot
and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the said half-portion to the
petitioners. The court a quo also correctly cited and applied the
provisions of articles 953 16 and 837 17 of the Civil Code of 1889
which, pursuant to article 2263 18 of the new Civil Code, govern
the rights of the petitioners and the respondent Malpaya to the
property left by Marciana Laluan who died on July 17, 1948 or
before the effectivity of the new code. Consequently, the court a
quo correctly ordered the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to pay
to the petitioners, by way of damages, the amount of P1,343.75
which is the value of the produce which the said petitioners failed
to realize for nine years from the half-portion of the land subject of
the "Absolute Deed of Sale" — plus the sum of P687.50 annually
from September 23, 1957 until possession of the said half-portion
of land shall have been delivered to them.

ACCORDINGLY, (1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated

January 31, 1963 and its resolution dated March 30, 1963 are set
aside; (2) the judgment of the court a quo dated September 23,
1957, insofar as it pertains to the "Absolute Deed of Sale," is
hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the court a quo of the
same date, insofar as it relates to the "Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property," is set aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is
hereby remanded to the court a quo for a new trial, to the end that
the identities of the parcels of land in dispute may be specifically
established. At the new trial, it will not be necessary to retake
evidence already taken, but the parties shall be afforded
opportunity to present such evidence as they may deem relevant
to the particular question raised herein. No costs.