CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

By Dean Mariano F. Magsalin Jr. (with updates by RJP)

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Concept and Origin of the Bill of Rights

Classification
1. Civil Rights
2. Political Rights
3. Social and Economic Rights
Doctrine of Preferred Freedom (Hierarchy of Rights)
PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
The Fundamental Powers of the State
Similarities, Differences and Limitations

POLICE POWER

Definition, Scope & Basis

Characteristics
Who exercises said power?
Tests of Police Power
Laws:
Balacuit v. CFI, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988
Lozano vs. Matinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989)
Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances
Ermita – Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)
Tano v. Socrates, G.R. 110249, August 27, 1997
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G. R. No. 118127, april 12, 2005
Administrative Rules and Regulations
Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (1982)
Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006
Anglo-Fil Trading vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983)
PPA v. Cipres Stevedoring, G.R. No. 145742, July 14, 2005
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

EMINENT DOMAIN

Definition
Who exercises the power?
City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919)
Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)
Sps. Yasay v CA, G.R. 156684
Constitutional limitation – Art. II. Sec. 9
Distinguished from destruction due to necessity
Objects of Expropriation
RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)
NIA v Rural Bank, G.R. No. 185124
Where Expropriation Suit is Filed
Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 13896, June 20, 2000
Taking

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 Definition and Scope
Requisites of Taking
Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)
Deprivation of Use
Republic vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443 (1958)
Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006
U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)
Priority in Expropriation
Filstream International v. CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998)
City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
JIL. v. Mun. of Pasig, G.R. 152230, August 9, 2005
Public use
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)
Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA (1987)
Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001
Government Withdrawal
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003
NPC & Pobre v. CA. G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004
Recovery of Expropriated Land
ATO v. Gopuco, G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005
Heirs of Mercader, GR No. 176625
G.R. No. 168770
Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005
Genuine Necessity
Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990
De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
Just Compensation
Defined
Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
RP vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 71176, May 21, 1990
Determination of Just Compensation
EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
Just compensation; determination of just compensation is fundamentally a
judicial function
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January
15, 2014

When Determined
Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147, August 3, 1990
NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, G>R> No. 170846, February 6, 2007
City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142 971, May 07, 2002
Manner of Payment
Assoc. of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1988)
DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995)
Trial with Commissioners
Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)
NPC v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998
Napocor v. Sps. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007
Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, Sep tember 27, 2006
Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases
NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)
Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004

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Writ of Possession
City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001
Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005
Expropriation of Utilities, Landed Estate and Municipal Property
Art. XII, Sec. 18
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
Art. XIII, Sec. 9
City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144 (1959)
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

TAXATION

Definition and Nature

Purpose
CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)
Commissioner vs. Makasiar, 177 SCRA 27 (1989)
Scope (The power to tax is the power to destroy)
Who exercises the power?
Art. VI Sec. 28
Art. XIV, Sec 4 (3)
Art. X, Sec. 5
Tax Exemptions
YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916)
Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927)
Lladoc vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 292 (1965)
Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981)
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila 101 Phil. 386 (1957)
Double Taxation
Punzalan vs. municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil. 46 (1954)
License Fees
Physical Therapy Org. vs. Municipal Board, G.R. 10448, August 30, 1957

DUE PROCESS
Art. III, Sec. 1
Art. III, Sec. 14 (1)
Definition, Nature and Scope
Purpose of the guaranty
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property
Substantive Due Process
Villegas vs. Hu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 275 (1978)
Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
Void for Vagueness/Over breadth
Ople v. Torres, 292 SCRA 141. (1998)
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006
Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005
Procedural Due Process
Publication Requirement
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
PITC v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996)
Republic v. Extelcom, G.R. 147096, January 15, 2002
Impartial Court or Tribunal
Tanada vs. PAEC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)
Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 (1982)
Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005

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 Tumey vs. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1997)
People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452 (1996)
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Prejudicial Publicity
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995)
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 121039, October 18, 2001
Notice and Hearing:
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita, 330 SCRA 153 (2000)
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139466, October 17, 2000
People vs. Estrada G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000
Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 111397, August 12, 2002
Opportunity to be Heard
PAGC v Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146
Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006
Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. 114944, June 19, 2001
Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004
Ombudsman v Reyes, G.R. 170512
Exceptions to notice and hearing requirements
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989)
Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833 (1957)
De Bisshop vs. Galang, 8 SCRA 244 (1963)
Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 232 (1988)
Administrative Due Process
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940)
Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)
Meralco vs. PSC, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)
Ateneo vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 (1986)
Alcuaz vs. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988)
Non vs. Hon. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990

EQUAL PROTECTION

Political, Economic and Social Equality

Art. XIII, Sec. 1 and 2 (social justice)
Id., Sec. 3 (protection to labor)
Art. XII, Sec. 10 (nationalization of business)
ID., Sec. 2, par. 2 (reservation of marine resources)
Art. II, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to poor)
Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)
Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)
Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and men)

Biraogo, GR 192935 (2010)

Sexual Discrimination
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
Administration of Justice
People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
People vs. Isinain, 85 Phil. 648 (1950)
Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. 130716, December 9, 1998
Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)
Gallardo v. People, G.R. 142030, April 21, 2005

Public Policy
Central Bank Employees Assoc. v. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004
PNB v. Palma, G.R. 157279, August 9, 2005
Unido vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17 (1981)

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 PJA vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700 (1995)
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999
Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres, G.R. 132527, July 29, 2005
ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
PHILRECA vs. DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003
Beltran v. Secretary of Health , G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005

THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

Art. III, Sec. 10
Purpose
When impairment occurs
When Allowed
Emergency Powers
Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953)
Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances
Villanueva vs. Castaneda, 154 SCRA 142 (1987)
Sangalang vs. IAC, 168 SCRA 634 (1988)
Ortigas & Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
Administration Regulations
Tiro vs. Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697 (1983)
Rental Laws
Caleon vs. Agus Development Corp., 207 SCRA 748 (1992)
Tax Exemptions
Meralco v. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750 (1999)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Art. III, Sec. 2 and 3
Purpose and Importance of the guaranty
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 (1946)
To Whom Directed
People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
Who May Invoke the Right?
Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 54 (1978)
Wilson v. Layne, 98-0083, May 24, 1999
Conditions for a valid warrant
Existence of Probable Cause
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Chandler v. Miller, April 15, 1997, D-96-126
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)
People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001
Partially Valid Warrant
People v. Salanguit, G.R. 133254, April 18, 2001
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp., G.R. 140946, September 13, 2004
Personal determination by judge
Sta. Rosa Mining Co., vs. Fiscal Zabala, 153 SCRA 367 (1987)
Paderanga vs. Drilon, G.R. 96080, April 19, 1991
Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1987)
Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1 (2000)
People v. Mamaril, G.R. 147607, January 22, 2004
Examination of witnesses
Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil 68 (1938)
Yee Sue kuy vs. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, (1940)
Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (1937)
Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (1984)
Particularity of description

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 Olaes vs. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989)
Chia vs. Coll. Of Customs, 177 SCRA 755 (1989)
20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (1988)
People v. Choi, G.R. No. 152950, August 3, 2006
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999)
Yousef Al Ghoul vs. CA, G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2009
Del Rosario V. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001
Objects of Seizure
Rule 126, Sec. 3, Rules of Court (ROC)
Unilab vs. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005
Warrantless searches
Valid Waiver
People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992)
People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679 (1998)
People vs. Ramos, G.R. 85401-02, June 4, 1990
People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994)
Veroy vs. Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)
People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457 (1992)
Lopez vs. Comm. of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 5, 2002
People vs. Asis, et. al., G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002
People vs. Tudtud, et. al., G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003
Incident to lawful arrest
Rule 126, Section 13, Rules of Court
Chimel vs. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1964)
People vs. de la Cruz, G.R. 83988, April 18, 1990
People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645 (1991)
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)
Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990)
People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 (2000)
People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003
People vs. Libnao, et. al., G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003

Plain view doctrine

People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001
People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. 139301, September 9, 2004
Enforcement of fishing, customs and immigration laws
Roldan vs. Area, 65 SCRA 320 (1975)
People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785 (1997)
People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000
People vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003
“Stop and frisk”
Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997
Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
Florida v. J.L., 98-1993, March 28, 2000
Search of moving vehicles
Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980)
Salvador v. People, G.R. No. 146706, July 15, 2005
Whren v. United States, 95-5841, January 10, 1996
Emergency circumstances

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 People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
Checkpoints
Gen. De Villa vs. Valmonte, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
Aniag vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 (2000)
People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004
Inspection of building
Camara vs. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
Warrantless arrests
Rule 113, Sec. 5
Art. 125, Revised Penal Code
Rebellion as Continuing Offense
Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. 81567, July 9, 1990
Committed in the Presence of Police Officers
People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 (1991)
People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001
People v Martinez, GR No. 191366
People v Racho, G.R. No. 186529 (2010)
Personal Knowledge of the Offense
People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
People v. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357 (1997)
People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671, November 15, 2000
People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001
Time of Arrest
People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)
Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586 (1992)
People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, August 30, 2001
Marked Money
People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
Lack of Urgency
People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
Effect of Bail
Rule 114, Section 26
Effect of Entry of Plea
People v. Plana G.R. No. 128285, November 27, 2001
Validity of Conviction
People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) (1965)
Arts, 290, 291, 292 and 299. Revised Penal Code.
Navarro vs CA, GR 121087 (1999)
Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)
Katz vs. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Ramirez vs. Ca, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005
Briccio Polo v David, G.R. No. 181881 (2011)
Privileged Communications
In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Deano v. Godinez, 12 SCRA 483 (1964)
Waterhouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Exclusionary Rule

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 Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
Silverthorne Lumber vs. US, 251 US 385 (1920)
People v. Aruta, G.R. 120915, April 3, 1998
People v. Rondero, G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999
Liability for damages
Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)

RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Art. III, Sec. 12
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)
Custodial Investigation
People v. Lugod, G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001
People v. Del Rosario G.R. 127755, April 14, 1999
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)
Evangelista v People, G.R. No. 163267
Jasalva v People, G.R. No. 187725
Administrative Investigations
People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumiling, 271 SCRA 316 (1997)
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005
Police Lineup
Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
United States v. Wade, 388 U.A. 218 (1967)
People v. Escordial, G.R. 138934, January 16, 2002
People vs. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002
Cases before January 17, 1973 not applicable
Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975)
Rule under the 1973 Constitution (Voluntary, knowing & intelligent waiver)
People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
People vs. Tampus, 90 SCRA 624 (1980)
People v. Sayaboc, G.R. 147201, January 15, 2004
The Galit Rule
People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
Rule under the 1987 Constitution
Requirement of Competent and Independent Counsel
People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994)
People v. Quidato, G.R. 117401, October 1, 1998
People v. Januario, 267 SCRA 608 (1997)
People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 12793, December 8, 1999
People vs. Samus, G.R. 135957-58, September 17, 2002
People v. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133138, July 23, 2004
People v. Bagnate, G.R. No. 133685-68 May 20, 2004
Counsel of Choice
People vs. Gallardo, G.R. No. 113684, January 25, 2000
People vs. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450 (1994)
Counsel’s presence required in entire proceedings
People v. Morial, G.R. 129295, August 15, 2001

Seized Articles
People v. Castro, 274 SCRA 115 (1997)
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 102 (1999)
People v. Macabalang, G.R. 168694, November 27, 2006
Confession to Newsmen
People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997)
People v. Endino, G.R. 133026, February 20, 2001
People vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000

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 People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004
Other Confessions
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
People v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432 (1997)
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)
People v. Lugod, G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001
Re-enactment
People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992)
Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
People v. Alicano 251 SCRA 293 (1995)
Harris vs. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
New York vs. Quaries, 104 U.S. 2626 (1984)
Ho Wai Pang v People, GR 176229 (2011)

RIGHT TO BAIL
Art. III, Sec. 13
Bail Defined
Rule 114, Section 1, ROC
Kinds of Bail
Rule 114, Sections 10, 11, 14 & 15
When right may be invoked
Gov’t of the US vs Judge Purungganan, GR 148571 (2002)
Gov’t of Hongkong vs Olalia, GR 153675 (2007)
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)
People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)
Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997
Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000
Government v. Judge Puruganan, G.R. 148571, December 17, 2002
Procedure for bail
Paderanga v. Drilon, 247 SCRA 741, (1995)
Go v. Bongolan, A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999
People v. Gako, G.R. 135045, December 15, 2000
Bail and Habeas Corpus
Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990)
People vs. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
Bail on appeal
People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993)
Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 114350, January 16, 1997
Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 9
Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967)
De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971)
Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975)
Yap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001
Cabañero v. Cañon, A.M. No. MTJ-01-369, September 20, 2001
Victory Liner v. Belosillo, G.R. 425 SCRA 79 (2004)
Bail and the Right to Travel Abroad
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1980)

RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
Art. III, Sec. 14

Presumption of Innocence

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Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 (1971)
Order of Trial
Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1988) (modified by Rule 119 Sec. 3 (e)
Presumption of Guilt
Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 857 (1953)
Applicability to Juridical Persons
Feeder Int’l Line vs. Ca CR 942 62, May 31, 1991
Official Duty
People vs. Martos, 211 SCRA 805 (1992)
Equipoise Rule
Corpuz vs. People, 194 SCRA 73 (1991)
Dizon Paminatuan v. People, July 11, 1994
Right to be heard personally or by counsel
Importance of Counsel
People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 (1950)
Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)
Improvident Plea of guilt
People vs. Baluyot, 75 SCRA 148 (1977)
People vs. Magsi, 124 SCRA 69 (1983)
People v. Besonia, G.R. No. 151284-85, February 5, 2004
People v. Murillo, G.R. No. 134583, July 14, 2004
Right to Lawyer of Choice
People vs. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493 (1975)
Libuit v. People, G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
Deprivation of Right to be Heard
Moslares v. CA, 291 SCRA 440 (1998)

Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation

Lack of Arraignment
Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
People v. Alcalde, G.R. 139225, May 29, 2002
People v. Dy, G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
Sufficiency of the Information
People v. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 82 (1998)
People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998
People v. Lozano, G.R. 125080, September 25, 1998
People v. Ladrillo, G.R. No. 124342, December 8, 1999
People v. Valdesancho, G.R. 137051, May 30, 2001
People v. Alcaide, G.R. Nos. 139225-28, May 29, 2002
People vs. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804. February 26, 2003
People vs. Flores Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002
People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004

Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

Speedy trial
Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970)
People vs. Judge Laya, 161 SCRA 327 (1988)
Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924)
Dacanay vs. People, 240 SCRA 490 (1995)
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
Solar Team Entertainment v. How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000
Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165996, October 17, 229, 2005
Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166606, November 29, 2005
Public trial
Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)
Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001

10
 In RE Live coverage of Ampatuan Trial, AM No. 10-11-5 SC, June 14, 2011
Impartial trial
Tumey vs. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
Soriano vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31, 2000

Right to confront witnesses

U.S. v. Javier, 37 Phil. 449 (1918)

Right to secure attendance of witnesses

U.S. vs. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384 (1908)
People vs. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1938)
People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204 (1989)

Right to be present during trial

Trial in absentia
Rule 115, Sec. 1 (c)
People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140285, September 27, 2006
When presence of the accused is a duty:
Arraignment and plea
Rule 116, Sec. 1 (b)
During trial for identification
Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 63 SCRA 546 (1975)
People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
Promulgation of sentence
Rule 120, Sec. 6
Exception: Light offenses

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Art. III, Sec. 17
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Scope covers compulsory testimonial incrimination

People v Gallarde; GR 133025 (2000)
United States vs. Tan Teh, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)
His physical body was treated as object evidence. Hence, Privilege against self-
incrimination cannot be invoked.
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.

United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917)

Force to discharge the morphine from the accused mouth. Same as Tan Teng case.;

People vs. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 (1950)

Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege against self-
incrimination. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the
requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
It is not violative, if a person is not being asked to communicate or confess as
his body is merely treated as object evidence. Any mechanical act that a person
have to be performed is not compelling or extorting communication or
confession.

Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)

Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant?

11
The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the
trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is
that torture or force shall be avoided.

Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929)

Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is
not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a
means to determine or not he is the falsifier.
Writing is more than a mechanical act. It compelled a person to think in a way
that it incriminates herself.
If the accused take the witness stand, he may be compelled to write to
compare the handwriting. The reason is that the moment the accused take the
witness stand, the prosecution has a co-equal right to prove his case and
become open to cross examination.
Reminder: Do not take your client to the witness stand.

People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994)

Whether the subjection of Tranca’s body to ultraviolet powder violates Tranca’s right
against selfincrimination.
What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion
of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a
prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of Tranca's
body to ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the
presence of counsel.

South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)

Whether the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to such a test
likewise offend the right against self-incrimination. (Blood Test)
The Court therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling
"communications" or "testimony." Since a blood test was "physical or real" evidence
rather than testimonial evidence.
Blood Test is not violative of self-incrimination but unreasonable search as
Suspicionless Search which is in the nature of search of human body.

Schemerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)

In requiring Schmerber to submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood
the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be
used to prosecute him for a criminal offense.
The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the
privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence"
does not violate it.
Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was
neither Schmerber's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by Schmerber, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.

People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999

Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are admissible as
evidence.
Under Section 12 (Exclusionary Rule) and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is
actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from Rondero and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

12
 People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000
Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against
selfincrimination.
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does
not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is
not required.

In what proceedings available

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail
of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.
Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

Use Immunity v. Transactional Immunity.

Art. XIII, Sec. 18 (8)
R.A. No. 1379, Section 8
Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The
distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness'
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs
to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any
statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on
the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness
immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-
incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and
nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets
up his right against self-incrimination.

Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, in comminicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Effect of denial of privilege by court

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for the court’s
disregard of Chavez’ constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty
is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case presents a
clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper.

*When a body is treated as a human being, it violated the privilege. If the body
is treated as object evidence, no violation e.g. measures, photographs, size of
foot – the human was not forced to testify against himself.
*As an object person, he cannot be compelled to write.
*Re-enactment – treated as human body not an object. It depends.
*Voice – not violative. It depends.

13
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Art. III, Sec. 16
Art. VIII, Sec. 15
Art. VII, Sec. 19 par. 3
Art. IX, A, Sec. 17
Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)
Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 145851, November 22, 2001
Dimayacyac v. Judge Roxas, G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004
Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R> No. 158018, May 20, 2004

PUNISHMENTS

Excessive fines and cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments

People vs. Dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 906 (1953)
People vs. Borja, 91 SCRA 340 (1978)
People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Loiusiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1974)
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
The death penalty
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

Involuntary servitude
Art. III, Sec. 18
Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1979)

Imprisonment for debt

Art. III, Sec. 20
Sura vs. Martin, 26 SCRA 286 (1969)
People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726 (1992)
In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003

Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

Art. III, Sec. 22
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. A bill
of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.
Wright vs. CA, 235 SCRA 341 (1994)
Whether the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws.
Ex post facto laws are (1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such
act was not an offense when committed; (2) laws which, while not creating new
offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; (3) statutes which prescribe greater
punishment for a crime already committed; or, (4) laws which alter the rules of evidence
so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional
principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation
which affects the substantial rights of the accused."
Here, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an
offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at
the time the treaty was ratified."

14
*Both are limits of the power to legislate.
*Both deprive a person of due process.

Double Jeopardy
Art. III, Sec. 21
Rule 117, Sec. 7
Rule 120, Sec. 5
*No person shall be twice put in “danger” of punishment of the same offense.
*The burden of proof is on the accuser, corollary, the accuser only gets one shot.
*The moment a person was placed in danger of punishment, a person can never be put
in the same danger of punishment again.
*When a person was placed in danger of punishment, first jeopardy attaches.
Elements
People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 (1968).
(a) a valid complaint or information;
If invalid, violation of right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation
against him. Therefore, cannot be convicted.
If charged with invalid complaint, the court never acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter and therefore the accused was never put in danger of punishment.
(b) a competent court;
If without jurisdiction, jeopardy is not attached.
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
Arraignment is important to inform the accused of the nature and the cause of
accusation against him.
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Acquitted/Terminated and Convicted: First jeopardy attached. In criminal case, only the
accused, as the GR, can appeal. If convicted – appeal. If acquitted – no appeal – double
jeopardy.
Dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent:
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non
conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally
or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must
not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
*If an accused sought to dismiss the case, then he is estopped from saying that he is in
danger of punishment.
*Motion to dismiss: all defects which cannot be lead to conviction, e.g. jurisdictional
defects, the accused does not put in danger.
*Motion to dismiss based on failure to prosecute: e.g. postponements – on the ground
of speedy trial. DJ attaches, although upon the instance of the accused, but the
dismissal amounts to acquittal.
*Demurrer of Evidence: prosecution presented all the evidence but failed to discharge
the burden of proof – motion of the accused - amounts to acquittal – first jeopardy
attaches.

Subsequent prosecution barred; Exceptions

Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1959)
Whether the second information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the
accused’s right against double jeopardy
There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information. This rule of identity does not apply,
however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent.

15
*If an accused was charged with the higher crime, he will be convicted for a
lower crime. Corollary, if the accused was charged by a lower crime, he cannot
be convicted with the higher crime.

People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971) (overruled)

Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on 17 January
1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on 10
December 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to
have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The new finding of
fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very
superficial and inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray
examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed.
The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first
examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made.

Heirs of Rillorta vs. Firme, 157 SCRA 518 (1988)

There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused
in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The
petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting
the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and
therefore null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been
committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
*Filing of civil action is not violative of DJ.

People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586 (1982)

People vs. Judge Vergara, 221 SCRA 560 (1993)
Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the
dismissal of the original Informations. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who
after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in
favor of both accused.
1Flagrante Delicto 2Inquest
1Crime
1Complaint 2Probable Cause 3Information 4Court
No PC-Dismissed
Appeal PC 1Inv. Prosec.PC 2CityProsec.NPC 3.Sec. of JusticePC
4Court Dismiss Refile
DJ attached

Tupaz v. Ulep, G.R. No. 127777, October 1, 1999

Argel v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, August 20, 2001
Jurisdiction of Courts
People v. Bocar , 138 SCRA 166 (1985)
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

16
Whether the acquittal of the 26 accused during Marcos’ time bars subsequent
prosecution, on account of new evidence that the proceedings leading to said acquittal
was rigged.
A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the present case is a
void judgment. Therefore, no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal
effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it
are void.
People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 (1988)
People vs. Judge Santiago, 174 SCRA 143 (1989)
Identity of Acts
People vs . Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
Identity of Offenses
People vs. City Court, 154 SCRA 175 (1987)
Nierras vs. acuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 (1990)
Military Court Proceedings
Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
Tan v. Barrios, October 18, 1990

Right to Speedy Trial

Que vs. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 (1989)
Caes vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 (1989)
Administrative & Criminal Proceedings
Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377 (1992)
Vincoy v CA, G.R. No. 156558, June 14, 2004
People v. Larannaga, G.R. No. 138874, July 25, 2005
Plea of Guilt to Lesser Offense
People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Art. II, Sec. 15
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919)
Moncupa vs. Ponce Enrile, 141 SCRA 223 (1986)
Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971)
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 420 (1971)
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 663 (1968)
In re Abadilla, 156 SCRA 92 (1987)
Norberto Feria vs. CA, et al. G.R. 122954, Feb. 15, 2000
Illusorio v. Bildner, G.R. 139789, May 12, 2000

WRIT OF AMPARO
Roxas v GMA, G.R. 189155

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, Sec. 4
*Foundation of democracy
*Free flow of ideas
*Freedom of Speech ends when someone else’ right begins. You are free to speak but
this freedom is limited to the rights of someone else. You should respect the right of the
others.
Except: Public Officials: They are accountable to people. They hold the power
that belongs to the people. Therefore, citizen has the right of full discussion of public
affairs. This is not a limit of freedom of expression because to criticize the politicians. It
is a duty of every citizen to discuss public affairs, it extends to public figures.
*Limitations: Libel, except public officials, Obscenity

17
*The state will suppress the freedom of expression if it threatens the state itself
*Prior restraint: Suppression before dissemination: licensing system is form of
suppression
*Subsequent punishment
*Content Neutral Regulation: The state may regulate freedom of speech e.g. licenses.
*Content Based Regulation: Suppressing the Freedom of Speech by imposing conditions
which in the guise of controlling the freedom of speech but in truth suppressing it.
*JBL Reyes: Clear and present also applies to Freedom of Assembly.
*Intelligence Report is not a clear and present danger.

I d., Sec. 18 (1)

Restrictions

Social Weather Station v. Comelec, G.R. 147571, May 5, 2001

RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression,
and the press. §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the
press prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the
prescribed periods of 15 days immediately preceding a national election and 7 days
before a local election. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is
not made less so because it is only for a period of 15 days immediately before a national
election and 7 days immediately before a local election. In fine, §5.4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

Balancing of Interest Test

Dangerous Tendency Test

*Clear and Present Danger Test of a substantive evil to the state has a right to protect
itself against.
Elements:
Danger: must be substantive evil, i.e. when the state has the right to protect itself
Clear and Present: capacity
*Free discussion not suppression is the idea of the constitution.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. 90878, January 29, 1990

During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio
or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues."
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis. Plebiscite
issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed
and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people
affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

Miriam College v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000
Campus Journalism Act is read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article
materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others.
Further, the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or
expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That

18
power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom
of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.

Freedom of Expression, Libel and National Security

Babst vs. NBI, 132 SCRA 316 (1984)

Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their subsequent
interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and
unconstitutional as they are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression
since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the
aggrieved party, and no one among the officials has the authority to restrain any of his
subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit.
Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez and Doyo in his personal
capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does not appear
to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

Espuelas vs. NBI, 132 SCRA 316 (1984)

Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in
truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. Alberto Reveniera and addressed
to the latter's supposed wife, stating therein in part that "if someone asks you why I
committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration
of Roxas.
The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's
simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to particularize.
When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on
creating disturbance, the rationable of free speech can not apply and the speaker or
writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

Elizalde vs. CFI, 116 SCRA 93 (1982)

A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or
by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of
one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."

Borjal v. CA., 301 SCRA 1 (1999)

There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A
reading of the imputations of Borjal against Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily
bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive
Director of the FNCLT.
But no matter how intemperate or deprecatory the utterances appear to be, the
privilege is not to be defeated nor rendered inutile for. Debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public officials.

Vopper
In determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, the COurt looks
to the purpose behind the regulation; typically, "government regulation of expressive
activity is content neutral so long as it is "justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.'" Herein, the basic purpose of the statute at issue is to "protect
the privacy of wire, electronic, and oral communications." The statute does not
distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations, nor is it justified by
reference to the content of those conversations. Rather, the communications at issue
are singled out by virtue of the fact that they were illegally intercepted--by virtue of the
source, rather than the subject matter. On the other hand, the naked prohibition against
disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech. Unlike the prohibition
against the "use" of the contents of an illegal interception in §2511(1)(d),10 subsection
(c) is not a regulation of conduct. It is true that the delivery of a tape recording might be
regarded as conduct, but given that the purpose of such a delivery is to provide the

19
recipient with the text of recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a
pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of "speech" that the First Amendment protects. As
the majority below put it, "if the acts of 'disclosing' and 'publishing' information do not
constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category, as distinct
from the category of expressive conduct."

Freedom of Expression and the Administration of Justice

People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 (1939)

Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt
which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is
ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere
with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications
should be held for contempt

Freedom of Expression, Movie Censorship, Obscenity and the Right to Privacy

Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katikbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)

Whether the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television have the power to
classify the movie “Kapit sa Patalim” under the classification “For Adults Only” and
impose conditions to edit the material to allow it a “General patronage” rating.
The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression
may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that
the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it
suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its being well-nigh
inevitable. The basic postulate, therefore, is that where the movies, theatrical
productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are
concerned — included as they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if
an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that
"every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use,
should be freed from the censor." The law, however, frowns on obscenity.

Lagunzad vs. Sotto, Vda. De Gonzales 92 SCRA 476 (1979)

Whether the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, Lagunzad had the
right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior
restraint.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle "requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type
of situation." Herein, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by Soto
vda. de Gonzales and the right of freedom of expression invoked by Lagunzad.
Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988)
The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not
an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.
Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the
right of privacy is the right to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the
realm of legitimate public concern."

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To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation
of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into Enrile's privacy
cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out
even without a license from Enrile.

Go Pin
If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for
the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would
be no offense committed. However, the pictures here were used not exactly for art's
sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities
of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or
minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the
exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons
who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were
not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions
and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of
satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement,
including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and
shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Thus the Court herein (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is not
protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such material can be regulated by the
States, subject to the specific safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that the
material is "utterly without redeeming social value"; and (c) hold that obscenity is to be
determined by applying "contemporary community standards," not "national standards."

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)
Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948)
Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
Ignacio vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
J.B.I. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233 (1983)
Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
Arreza vs. GAUF, 137 SCRA 94 (1985)
German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985)
Acosta v. CA and CSC GR 132088 Jun 28, 2000
Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169848, April 25, 2006

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Art. III, Sec. 7
Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Tanada vs. Tuvera, supra
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Garcia vs. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
Province of Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR No. 183591,
2008

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Art. III, Sec. 8
Art. IX, Sec. 2 (5)
Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 2
Occena vs. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 404 (1985)

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 In re Edillon, 84 SCRA (1979)
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art. III, Sec. 5
Nonstablishment Clause
Operation of Secretarian schools
Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2)
Religions instruction in Public schools
Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3)
Civil Code, Art. 359(1)
Anti-evolution laws
Epperson vs. Arkansas, 33 U.S. 27 (1968)
Prayer and Bible reading in public schools
Engel vs. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
Abington Schools Dist. vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1973)
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
Tax exemption
Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)
Pubic aid to religion
Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)
Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
Islamic Da ‘wah Counsil v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003
Intramural religious disputes
Fonacier vs. CA, 96 Phil. 417 (1955)
Free Exercise Clause
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006
Flag salute
West Va Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
Ebralinag v. Division Superintended (March 1, 1993)
Freedom to propagate religious doctrines
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 181 Phil. 386 (1957)
Swaggart Ministries v. Cal Bd. Of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
Exemption from Union shop
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974)
Disqualification for local government officials
Pamil vs. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
Religious Test
Torcaso vs. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961)

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Art. III, Sec. 6
Salonga vs. Hermosa, 97 SCRA 121 (1989)
Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 (1940)
Manotok vs. CA. 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
Silverio vs. CA, G.R . no. 94284 April 8, 1991
Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 end.

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