Professional Documents
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High Alert Medication (Ref)
High Alert Medication (Ref)
Attachment 1.G
(adapted from “High-Alert Medications: Safeguarding Against Errors” by Michael Cohen and Charles
for
Kilo, In: Medication Errors; edited by Michael Cohen, American Pharmaceutical Association, 1999)
© Institute for Safe Medication Practices
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Pathways
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1.G.1 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 2
(adapted from “High-Alert Medications: Safeguarding Against Errors” by Michael Cohen and Charles Kilo, In:
Medication Errors; edited by Michael Cohen, American Pharmaceutical Association, 1999)
© Institute for Safe Medication Practices
for
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Pathways
Nearly all drugs have a wide safety margin, a few drugs have a higher risk of causing harm when
an error involving these agents occurs. These are referred to as “high-alert medications”. Although
errors may not be more common with these drugs than with others, their consequences may be
much more devastating. High-alert medications can be, and should be, targeted for specific error
reduction interventions.
Three principles may be used to safeguard the 3. Minimize the consequences of errors
use of high-alert medications: (for example, fatal errors have occurred
1. Reduce or eliminate the possibility of when the contents of 50mL vials of 2%
error (for example, reducing the number lidocaine were injected instead of mannitol,
of high-alert medications stocked by the which has a similar appearance – had
hospital; reducing the available lidocaine 2% been only available in the
concentrations and volumes; and removing clinical area in a 10mL vial, if administered
high-alert drugs from clinical areas). erroneously in place of another drug in a
2. Make errors visible (for example, having 10ml vial, the amount of lidocaine injected
two individuals independently check would likely not have been fatal).
infusion pump settings for high-alert drugs
is one way to make errors visible and thus
caught before reaching the patient).
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1.G.2 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 3
Steps in the Ideal Medication Use Process 4. Use Forcing Functions, which are
1. Physician enters a drug order into the techniques that reduce the possibility
computer system. that a medication can be administered in a
2. The computer checks for drug interations, potentially lethal manner (e.g. using oral
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allergy interactions and dosing. syringes, for oral liquid doses, that will not
3. A pharmacist verifies the order, reviewing fit with IV tubing and to which needles
system generated alerts and screens for cannot be attached; and computer order
entry which can be used to ‘force’ the
for
filling area, where a technician fills the order 5. Externalize or Centralize Error-
in the pharmacy. Prone Processes (e.g. centralizing all IV
5. A pharmacist checks the technician’s work. solution preparations).
6. A nurse receives the drug and checks the 6. Use Differentiation (e.g. identify and
nursing record against the medication sent. isolate look-alike and sound-alike products;
7. The nurse administers the drug to the use generic names which do not tend to
patient after checking the patient’s name- sound alike as often as brand names).
band against the order, telling the patient the 7. Store Medications Appropriately (e.g.
name of the drug, the dose, and its purpose, separate potentially dangerous drugs with
thereby allowing the patient to also serve similar names or similar packaging).
as a double-check (where possible). 8. Screen New Products (e.g. Pharmacy
8. Unused drugs are returned to the pharmacy, and Therapeutics should inspect all new
where a pharmacist/technician reviews drugs and drug delivery devices for poor
them for mistakenly unadministered drugs. labeling and packaging).
9. Extra (missing doses) doses requested are 9. Standardize and Simplify Order
reviewed by a pharmacist/technician to Communication (e.g. minimize verbal
understand why the doses are not where orders and the use of abbreviations).
the nurses expect. 10.Limit Access (e.g. high-alert medications
should only be stored in the pharmacy
Key Change Concepts for Safeguarding where only a pharmacist can access them).
High-Alert Medications 11.Use Constraints (e.g. pharmacy
screening of all orders for high-alert
1. Build in System Redundancies (e.g. unit
medications prior to preparation and
dose drug distribution).
administration; automatic stop orders and
2. Use Fail-safes (e.g. pumps with
dose or duration limits).
electronic fail-safe clamping mechanisms to
12.Use Reminders (e.g. use auxiliary labels
prevent free flows).
on high-alert medications; computer
3. Reduce Options (e.g. instead of having the
screens with warning information about
option of ordering heparin in various
high-alert drugs).
concentrations, like 20,000 units/250mL and
13.Standardize Dosing Procedures (use
20,000 units/500mL and 25,000 units/500mL
standard dosing tables or charts, rather than
- only one option should be available).
calculate doses based upon weight or renal
function which is error-prone).
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1.G.3 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 4
High-Alert Medications –
Problems and Key Improvements
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Source 2002 © Institute for Safe Medication Practices. Reprinted with permission.
Adrenergic Agonists ❑ In the OR, these items are often ❑ Communicate orders in a
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Pathways
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and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
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and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
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1.G.6 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
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vials is a problem – the vial may be place dose stickers on heparin bags and
labeled 10,000/mL but the user may double check all rate changes. If a bolus
believe that the vial contains 10,000 is ordered, give it from a syringe, rather
units total (if a 10mL vial, then a 10-fold than modifying the rate of the infusion
error can occur) ❑ Differentiate all look-alike products
❑ Both heparin and insulin are measured ❑ Separate the storage of all drugs ordered
in units and both are stored in in units
medication floor stock areas ❑ Standardize the dosing using weight-
❑ Heparin has been confused with based protocols
vaccines where prefilled syringes are ❑ Have infusion pump rate settings and
used since they can look alike line placement on dual-channel pumps
❑ Heparin is associated with drug checked by two persons
allergies and thrombocytopenia ❑ Develop and follow standard treatment
❑ If heparin is ordered with only a “U” protocols
and not the word “units” the potential ❑ Do not use “U” for units
for the “U” to be interpreted as a “0” ❑ Use only ‘free flow’ protected pumps
exists and thus a 10 fold dosage error
❑ In newborns, heparin that is not
preservative free may contain benzyl
alcohol
❑ Heparin solutions are often made
throughout institutions and stocked in
regular floor stock – potential errors
Hypertonic Saline ❑ Rapid changes in serum sodium ❑ Allow only commercially available,
concentrations caused by standard (e.g. isotonic) concentrations of
administration of nonisotonic, and sodium chloride outside the pharmacy
especially hypertonic, saline are ❑ Limit options – do not stock the 3%
dangerous. Yet, hypertonic saline is sodium chloride injection
floor stocked in many areas. Five ❑ Develop a protocol for administering
percent saline has been confused with sodium chloride for use in treating
D5W/NS. Three percent saline has hyponatremia – covering the rate and
been confused with 0.3% saline. volume of administration and the
❑ Pediatric ICUs may stock 23.4% saline frequency of serum sodium monitoring
for use in preparing enteral feedings ❑ Limit addition of sodium to enteral
❑ Dialysis units may use hypertonic feedings to the pharmacy
salines to increase blood volumes and ❑ In dialysis units, stock a single
reduce cramping hypertonic concentration and store in a
locked area with limited access and affix
special hazard labeling
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1.G.8 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 9
another since both are ordered in units ❑ Take extra precautions when writing and
and typically stored near each other on interpreting orders for insulin mixtures
nursing units) (Mixtard 70/30 premixed insulin)
❑ Problems may arise if pumps are ❑ Standardize preparation and
programmed incorrectly administration (e.g. never prepare U100
❑ If insulin is ordered with only a “U” and insulin doses in tuberculin syringes –
not the word “units” the potential for always use insulin syringes; use only a
the “U” to be interpreted as a “0” tuberculin syringe for U500 insulin)
exists and thus a 10-fold dosage error ❑ Do not use slash marks to separate NPH
❑ Mix-ups may occur because of sound- and regular insulin doses (e.g. NPH 10/12
alike names (e.g. Humalog and regular has been confused with 10 NPH
Humulin), multiple types of insulins and 112 regular because the slash mark
(e.g. animal source and human source) was read as the numeral one
and varying concentrations (U500 and ❑ After dispensing/using insulin do not
U100) return to the box it came in – this
❑ Insulin has reportedly given to the increases the risk that a vial might be
wrong patient placed in the wrong box and the next
person may automatically select the
wrong product
❑ Nurses should inform the patient that
they are to receive insulin – patients not
expecting this will immediately question
the need
Potassium Chloride ❑ If potassium chloride (KCI) is injected ❑ Remove all KCl vials from floor stock.
(KCI) too rapidly (i.e. at a rate exceeding Centralize KCl infusion preparation in the
(see also 10 mEq/hr) or in too high a dose, it pharmacy. Use premixed containers.
Phosphate Salts) may cause cardiac arrest. KCI should ❑ Use protocols for KCl delivery, including:
never be given as an IV push and • indications for KCl infusion
initiation of an infusion is not an • maximum rate of infusion
emergency. Therefore, there is no • maximum allowable concentration
need to store concentrated KCl • guidelines for when cardiac monitoring
outside of the pharmacy. is required
❑ Some MDs use the term “bolus” • stipulation that all KCl infusions must
when ordering potassium at a be given via pump
rapid rate to treat hyperkalemia. • prohibition of multiple simultaneous
This term has been interpreted to KCl solutions (e.g. no IV KCl while KCl is
mean IV push. being infused in another IV)
• allow for automatic substitution of oral
KCl for IV KCl when appropriate
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1.G.9 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 10
labeling is similar. Errors have also dose vials reduce the risk of overdose
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occurred when 50mL vials of lidocaine and eliminate the risk of contamination.
were confused with other drugs also ❑ Use premixed, adequately labeled
available in 50mL vials. solutions for all cardiology patients.
❑ Multidose vials of lidocaine used as a
local anesthetic may be contaminated
as a result of poor aseptic technique
❑ Problems may arise because of
misunderstanding how topical lidocaine
is absorbed
❑ The use of topical (viscous) lidocaine in
the oral cavity for painful mouth
lesions has caused aspiration due to
oropharyngeal anesthesia and loss of
sensation of food bolus that may be
present in the oral cavity
Intravenous ❑ Errors have resulted from mix-ups ❑ Require protocols for the use of
Magnesium between the abbreviations “MS” or magnesium
“MSO4” for morphine sulfate and ❑ Educate staff about proper dosing
“MgSO4” for magnesium sulfate ❑ Establish and publicize maximum doses
❑ Other terminology problems have also ❑ Do not permit the use of abbreviations
led to errors; for example “mg” for morphine and magnesium
(milligrams) and “mL” (milliliters) are ❑ Store containers containing more than
confused, as are “mg” and “mEq” 2mL only in the pharmacy
(milliequivalents) ❑ Use only premixed containers for
❑ Infusion pump settings have led to patients on IV magnesium replacement
fatal overdoses with free-flow therapy and for women with
intravenous solutions preeclampsia
❑ Health professionals are often unaware ❑ Standardize ordering methods (i.e. either
that an excessive dose has been in grams or milliequivalents)
ordered and administer an overdose ❑ Require independent, redundant checks
of all calculations, dose preparations,
and infusion pump settings
Narcotics and Opiates ❑ Narcotic accidents are among the ❑ Educate staff about the potential for
including Patient- most frequent of all serious incidents mixing up hydromorphone and morphine
Controlled Analgesia reported. One reason for errors with ❑ Standardize concentrations of
(PCA) these drugs is that parenteral intravenous solutions
narcotics are usually stored in ❑ Minimize the amount of drug in a single
nursing areas as floor stock. They container
are often identified, prepared, and
administered by a single nurse; no
redundant checks are performed.
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1.G.10 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 11
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1.G.11 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Tool 1 Attachments 12/2/02 4:10 PM Page 12
Thanks to Greg Prouty, PharmD, Director, Pharmacy Services, UC Irvine Medical Center, for his assistance in
abstracting the information from “High-Alert Medications: Safeguarding Against Errors” by Michael Cohen and Charles
Kilo, in Medication Errors, edited by Michael Cohen.
www.medpathways.info
1.G.12 2002© American Hospital Association, Health Research & Educational Trust,
and the Institute for Safe Medication Practices