JURISDICTION DEFINITION

GOMEZ VS MONTALBAN

The first issue raised in the present petition is one of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter—meaning, the nature of the cause
of action and of the relief sought. Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a cause. It is a
question of law. The second issue refers to the aptness of the grant of a Petition for Relief from Judgment. These questions are
undoubtedly one of law, as they concern the correct interpretation or application of relevant laws and rules, without the need for review
of the evidences presented before the court a quo. Thus, with only questions of law raised in this Petition, direct resort to this Court is
proper. Gomez vs. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, G.R. No. 174414 March 14, 2008

Contrary to respondent’s contention, jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated in the course of
the trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional
amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately
substantiated and awarded. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. Gomez vs. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, G.R. No. 174414 March 14, 2008

RAPSING VS ABLES

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. Rapsing vs. Ables, 684 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 171855
October 15, 2012

In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents’ case since the offense for
which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of “service-connected offenses or crimes” as provided for under Section 1
thereof. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC,
and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only
application. Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder. Rapsing vs. Ables, 684
SCRA 195, G.R. No. 171855 October 15, 2012

ARULA VS ESPINO

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

Well known is the rule that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction
of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of the
complaint in one court does not give that court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the court
where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of the defendant (Crisologo v. People, 94 Phil. 477).

We thus ineluctably reach the following conclusions: (1) the airstrip on Corregidor island where the shooting and wounding of the
petitioner Arula allegedly took place has not been removed from the ambit of Proclamation No. 69, series of 1948, and is therefore to be
properly considered a part of the military reservation that is Corregidor island; (2) because the prime imputed to the accused, who are
persons subject to military law, was committed in a military reservation, the general court-martial has jurisdiction concurrent with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite to try the offense; and (3) the general court-martial having taken jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, must be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the latter court.

DE JOYA VS MARQUEZ

In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he
continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the
exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus: x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the
court acquires such jurisdiction: a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner. b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the
voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him,
generally by the service of summons.

PEOPLE VS FAUSTINO

Accused-appellant was fingered by three witnesses, namely: Dante K. Inting, SPO1 Zaldy Cres and Michael Laurenti. In assessing an
out-ofcourt, as well as in-court, identification of suspects, court ought to be guided by the “totality of circumstances test.” Under this
standard, various factors figure in the appreciation of the testimony of the witness, to wit: “(1) The witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.”
Inting’s behavior is less than congruent with human nature and experience. The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime and
recognizes the offender is to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity. “The natural tendency of a person who has witnessed
the commission of a crime is to report it, and describe the malefactors at the earliest possible opportunity. This is particularly true where
the victim is so closely related to the witness who claims to have seen the commission of the crime. Edwina’s failure to promptly come
out with such information to the police, casts a serious doubt on the accuracy, if not veracity, of the identification of accused-appellant
later made by the same witness.” Even perhaps more strangely is that the witness would only come out into the open when, precisely,
fear is instilled by a threat against it.

While the Court is not unmindful of the natural reticence of witnesses from volunteering information on criminal acts they have
witnessed, the impasse and the number of opportunities wherein they could have relayed such vital information and failed to do so,
however, somehow detract from the credibility of their testimony. Inting’s failure to tell on accused-appellant to SPO1 Abangan, Major
Pascual and SPO1 Cres casts doubts on his reliability and can merely infer an afterthought. Notably, the delay in identifying
accusedappellant to the authorities has not been sufficiently explained.

The identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for
the prosecution. But even while significant, an eyewitness identification, which authors not infrequently would describe to be “inherently
suspect,” is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence like fingerprint or by DNA testing. In cases
where only pictures of accused appellant are presented for identification, the supposed positive identification is regarded as being
tainted almost like an uncounselled confession.

Alibi is not always undeserving of merit, for, at times, it can only be the possible defense that can be offered by an accused. Where the
prosecution evidence on the identification of an accused enfeebles, so, also, alibi assumes commensurate strength. Here, the time and
sequence constituting the alibi proffered by accused-appellant are corroborated by five witnesses, namely, S/Ins. Amatosa, SPO2 Datu,
Chairmen Neri and Rosales, and Celeste, none of whom appears to be a relative or possessed with a perceptible reason, cause, or
motive to give false testimony and to thus perjure themselves. In fact, the purported positive identification of the prosecution witnesses
pales when juxtaposed against the individual testimony of the defense witnesses. People vs. Faustino, 339 SCRA 718, G.R. No.
129220 September 6, 2000

FRAILTY OF HUMAN MEMORY

PEOPLE VS NUNEZ

The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness identification are two (2)-pronged: on one level, eyewitness identifications are
inherently prone to error; on another level, the appreciation by observers, such as jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers of how
an eyewitness identifies supposed culprits is just as prone to error: The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be more clearly
documented. The painstaking work of the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and others who have documented wrongful convictions,
participated in the exonerations of the victims, and documented the role of flawed evidence of all sorts has clearly and repeatedly
revealed the two-pronged problem of unreliability for eyewitness evidence: (1) eyewitness identifications are subject to substantial error,
and (2) observer judgments of witness accuracy are likewise subject to substantial error. The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance
on eyewitness identification is borne not only by the intrinsic limitations of human memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire
exercise of identification operates. It is as much the result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as environmental factors,
flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time.

Domestic jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness identification is affected by “normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.”
People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), introduced in this jurisdiction the totality of circumstances test, which relies on factors
already identified by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972): (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. A witness’ credibility is ascertained by considering the first two
factors, i.e., the witness’ opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness’ degree of attention at that time,
based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have been, for the witness to be exposed to the
perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their identity.

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time between the crime and the identification made by
the witness. “It is by now a well-established fact that people are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long
retention interval than after a short one.” Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the incident.
This Court has considered acceptable an identification made two (2) days after the commission of a crime, not so one that had an
interval of five and a half (5 1/2) months. The passage of time is not the only factor that diminishes memory. Equally jeopardizing is a
witness’ interactions with other individuals involved in the event. As noted by cognitive psychologist Elizabeth F. Loftus, “[p]ost[-]event
information can not only enhance existing memories but also change a witness’ memory and even cause nonexistent details to become
incorporated into a previously acquired memory.”

Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses do not necessarily jeopardize the prosecution’s
case. This, however, is only true of minor inconsistencies that are ultimately inconsequential or merely incidental to the overarching
narrative of what crime was committed; how, when, and where it was committed; and who committed it. “It is well-settled that
inconsistencies on minor details do not affect credibility as they only refer to collateral matters which do not touch upon the commission
of the crime itself.”

FORENSIC FOOTWEAR ANALYSIS

in addition, the brothers' footprints and fingerprints were lifted from the crime scene. Before they fled they both tried to wipe out traces
of their foot and handprints. Both admitted that they ransacked the place for valuables after the spouses were slain. Lastly, on their way
out of the compound, a witness whom they threatened to be butchered like a hog, saw them with their shirts bloodstained.

All the foregoing details presented as evidence by the prosecution more than suffices to show that the brothers were united and had
cooperated in a conspiracy to attack the spouses. In a conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of the other co-conspirator.
Thus, Joey is equally responsible as his brother, Mario for the death of the Sorianos.
FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS

PEOPLE VS MEDINA

It is now well settled that evidence as to the correspondence of finger prints is admissible for the purpose of proving identity (Moon vs.
State, Arizona Supreme Court, June 7, 1921, 198 Pac., 288; 16 A.L.R., 362, and the authorities there cited). The history of the finger
print system of identification is stated in one of the leading cases, People vs. Sallow (165 N.Y. Supp., 915, 918), as follows:

Scientific authority declares that finger prints are reliable as a means of identification. (10 Ency. Brit. [11th ed.], 376.) The first
recorded finger prints were used as a manual seal, to give a personal mark of authenticity to documents. Such prints are found
in the Assyrian clay tablets in the British Museum. Finger prints were first used to record the identity of individuals officially by
Sir William Herschel, in Bengal, to check forgeries by natives in India in 1858. (C. Ainsworth Mitchell, in "Science and the
Criminal" 1911, p. 51.) Finger print records have been constantly used as a basis of information for the courts since Sir Francis
Galton proved that the papillay ridges which cover the inner surface of the hands and the soles of the feet form patterns, the
main details of which remain the same from the sixth month of the embryonic period until decomposition sets in after death,
and Sir Edward Henry, the head of the Metropolitan Police Force of London, formulated a practical system of classification,
subsequently simplified by an Argentine named Vucetich. The system has been in general use in the criminal courts in
England since 1891. It is claimed that by means of finger prints the metropolitan police force of London during the 13 years
from 1901 to 1914 have made over 103,000 identifications, and the Magistrates' Court of New York City during the 4 years
from 1911 to 1915 have made 31,000 identifications, without error. (Report of Alfred H. Hart, Supervisor, Fingerprint Bureau,
Ann. Rep., N.Y. City Magistrates' Courts, 1915.) Their value has been recognized by banks and other corporations, passport
bureaus of foreign governments, and civil service commissions as a certain protection against impersonation.

It was held in 1909 by the Lord Chief Justice of England that the court may accept the evidence of finger prints, though it be
the sole ground of identification. (Castleton's Case, 3 Crim. App. C., 74.)

Although there is some differences of opinion among the authorities as to what constitutes proof of identity, the older writers regarding
twelve points as necessary to prove certain identity; and more than that for absolute identification, the more recent writers think that six
or eight homologous points of comparison leave no room for reasonable doubt. "In the end it is the microscopic identity of the ridge
characteristics (Galton's minutiae) that settles the question." (Personal Identification, p. 263.)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1575

REQUIRING PRACTITIONERS OF DENTISTRY TO KEEP RECORDS OF THEIR PATIENTS

WHEREAS, the identification of persons is a necessary factor in solving crimes and in settling certain disputes such as claims for
damages, insurance, and inheritance;

WHEREAS, in those cases where the identification of persons cannot be established through the regular means, identification through
definition has been proven to be necessary and effective;

WHEREAS, however, records of dentition of persons are often not available due to the lack of systematic recording by dental
practitioners of the dental history of their patients.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following:

Section 1. It shall be obligatory upon all practitioners of dentistry to keep and maintain an accurate and complete record of the dentition
of all their patients which shall include a history and description of the patient's dentition and the treatments made thereon.

Section 2. Upon the lapse of ten years from the last entry, dental practitioners shall turn over the dental records of their patients to the
National Bureau of Investigation for record purposes: Provided, that the said practitioners may retain copies thereof for their own files.

FORENSIC SEROLOGY

JAO VS CA

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite
in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-
paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and
alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible
blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the
alleged father.4

PEOPLE VS REYNO

His alibi, however, cannot overcome the positive identification by prosecution witness Ruiz, Jr., which was spontaneously made, after
the accused-appellant had been confronted by Ruiz, at the bus terminal. Moreover, the identification of the appellant finds convincing
corroboration in the findings of the NBI Chemist, to the effect that the tell-tale knife found among the belongings of the accused, at the
time he was going away, was positive with human blood; that the blood found on the hem of the T-shirt belonging to him (Exh. D) tallied
with the blood grouping of the deceased. Appellant attributed the blood on his T-shirt as having been placed there by Atty. Vigilia, the
brother of the deceased, when he was being investigated in the municipal building. This was, nevertheless, discarded by the lower
court, which considered the imputation as preposterous, with the noteworthy observation that Atty. Vigilia would not fabricate evidence
against the accused in the presence of many townspeople. We share this view of the court a quo, specially when, by the very
admission of the appellant, the deceased did not have any ill-feeling with him.

PEOPLE VS PRUNA

Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis report 13 includes a positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr.
Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on
the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the vagin al
opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger. 14

Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations and prepared the corresponding
reports,15 testified that sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE. 16

DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE

TIJING VS CA

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage.20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21 Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.

G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch
48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s
wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not
yet been accorded official recognition by our courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim
matched the accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We
declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.37

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of
the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to
the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ
of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the
DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction of
appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De
Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission
of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child
does not preclude the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two United States cases to support their respective
positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v. U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v.
U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During
trial, Frye’s counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test 42 made on defendant.
The state Supreme Court affirmed Frye’s conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." The Fryestandard of general acceptance states
as follows:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and
blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for DNA testing to a government facility and a private facility. The
prosecution introduced the private testing facility’s results over Schwartz’s objection. One of the issues brought before the state
Supreme Court included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded that:

While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that
admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory’s compliance with appropriate standards and controls,
and the availability of their testing data and results. 44

In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubertwas a product liability
case where both the trial and appellate courts denied the admissibility of an expert’s testimony because it failed to meet
the Frye standard of "general acceptance." The United States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of
evidence. Thus:

Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits
on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimony’s reasoning or method is scientifically valid
and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error;
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique is
generally accepted in the scientific community.

Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further modified the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of
Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as follows:

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously, neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor
the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines. 47 At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our
decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of
Court.48 Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be
received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral
matters is allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue."50

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA
analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-
Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We
reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.51]

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:

In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.52
It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of
the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest
standard adopted in an American jurisdiction,53 trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of
Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the
probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine
population database, is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to
those conducted between the putative father and child alone.54

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than
99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

Re: Reynaldo de Villa

Before the enactment of statutes in some states providing for post-conviction DNA testing, American courts had no
precedents to work on to justify post-conviction DNA testing and the reversal of final judgments of conviction when
the DNA results turned out to be exculpatory. Before the passage of the DNA testing statutes, it was unclear under
what right and procedure a convict was entitled to post-conviction DNA testing. Even in the absence of statutes,
American courts allowed post-conviction DNA testing by requiring the convict to apply for such testing before the
verdict could be vacated. The application enables the courts to determine the basis for the application and to set the
standards in case the request is granted. Once the DNA result confirms the innocence of the convict, American courts
conduct a motion in limine hearing on admissibility or order a new trial. The prosecution usually refuses to re-try the
case and the convict is released. Under American jurisprudence, post-conviction DNA testing is availed through a
petition for habeas corpus and motion for new trial. These conventional modes of relief, however, have built-in
restrictions that pose problems to the granting of post-conviction DNA testing

The 1987 Constitution expressly empowers the Court to “[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enhancement of constitutional rights.” Even in the absence of a law allowing post-conviction DNA testing, the Court
under its constitutional mandate may order a new trial if the post-conviction DNA testing will establish that the
convicted felon could not have possibly committed the crime. This is the case when the post-conviction DNA testing
shows that the semen in the victim’s vagina does not match that of the convicted felon. A new trial on the ground of
post-conviction DNA testing is different from a new trial under Rule 121, which is available only before final judgment.
Unlike a new trial under Rule 121, a new trial for post-conviction DNA testing does not vacate the judgment of
conviction, which stands until recalled by the court as a result of the new trial. A new trial after final conviction may
be ordered only on the sole ground that DNA testing will establish that the convicted felon could not have committed
the crime. Moreover, DNA testing must not have been available or possible during the original trial.

People vs Umanito

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the RTC shall consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.39

Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is
adequately borne in the records, i.e.: that the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately
identified at their sample collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons
in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of
the samples and the acts he performed in relation thereto.