Crim 02-08

FULL CASES
Avoidance of Greater Evil
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 149275. September
27, 2004]
D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001.
The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19,
dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22),
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC
of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The
accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value
to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in
the amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within
five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.[3]
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue. The data
are hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00

93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4
June 1992, the Statement of Account[7] shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40.
Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital
bills in the amount of P418,410.55.[8] The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95.
On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in
installments.[9] To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank
payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on
their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to
insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand
letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7)
Informations subject of the instant case.[10]
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.
She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her
mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and
subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and
refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical
treatment of her mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the
hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled
to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers
immediate discharge.[11]
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the
checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the
defense.[12] Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of
violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid
obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX
MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her
defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when
evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee
had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court should not have
applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification.
It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos
(P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the
checks and the hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the
mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the
law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance.[16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance of the
checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard
to the protection of the social order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More
specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR

COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A

GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN

THE ISSUANCE OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK
OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD
NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check
issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an
ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the
drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or
merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of
the case.[22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.[23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that the
issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the
issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil
or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as
previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment
accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below, rather
than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption
from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the
ordinary man would have succumbed to it.[25] It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for
ones life or limb.[26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote.[27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.[28] It must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.[29]
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her continued
stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of
her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less
petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not
impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will,
moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not
take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she
admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the
form of postdated checks or jewelry.[30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and
issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a
violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue
postdated checks because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem.[31] Besides, apart from
petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she
was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this
case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under
this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than
the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.[33] Ty
could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had
the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and
the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre
had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under
the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or
injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case[35] for damages filed by
Tys mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the
findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a
preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments
Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration[38] or for
value.[39] In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without consideration.
She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Valuable consideration
may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an
obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
indorser.[40]
In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to
her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of
her signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the
promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she was
not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41]
tells us that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no
consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred
upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is enough if
the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of
the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement. Appellee accepted
one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note executed by the
appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether
the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the
obligation.[43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.[44] As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,[45] what is primordial is that such issued
checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance,
a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22
provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds.[46] If not
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the
drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is
immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the
offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true
nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the
Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and
mechanical application of the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from
those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty
deposit in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus
operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate
need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease
agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit,
since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual
account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for value. Substantial
evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in
payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that
petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000,[50]
adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the
penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify
the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated
therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions
of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered
as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more
appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a
fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July
2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila
Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total
amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of Right or Office
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. [G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012]
D E C I S I O N PERALTA, J.:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never justified
when their duty could be performed otherwise. A shoot first, think later disposition occupies no decent place in
a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is
never predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 30, 1995
Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated
murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident
on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince
Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
(Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the
Integrated National Police (INP)[2] stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen,
respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu,
Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del
Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated
murder in three Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then
policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to
their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by
firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot
wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican
with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores,
Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of murder
directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder by reason of some cause or accident other
than their own spontaneous desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
and with intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly
at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of
murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants will, namely, the able and timely
medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,[6] the accused except
Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,[7] and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed[8] entered
individual pleas of not guilty.[9] A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his
arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.[10] In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu,
Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.[11] Said motion
was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that these
cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would automatically constitute
evidence at the trial on the merits.[12] On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No.
16612.[13] Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21,
1991.[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the charges against him were
dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial inquest. [16] Hence, joint
trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the
bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican
and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and
7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had
passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully
and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his
companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly,
Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.[17]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see any one on the
road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores executed a sketch[19] depicting the relative location of the
Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated
on the right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said
house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and
his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he,
unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them
Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced
himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them
for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs
house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva
and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated by
Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis
Hospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded each other, and
that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would say.[22] He professed that he,
together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he
observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and
his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off
together with his two armed companions.[23] He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought
Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7, 1988.[24] He claimed that all the
accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified
to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter,
which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were
on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the
vehicle.[26]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence of his companions
at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events
immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession
had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed
when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores frantic
call for help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just
outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he
could not recognize. [27] At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney
occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney
from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a
glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the
same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He
claimed he spent the night at his mothers house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him with
whom, however, he was not able to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in front of Narons
house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He
admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his
injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously
identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, affirmed that
she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the shooting and
found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms were
discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of
the gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused
because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the
Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the
passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that
the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or moving
forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road.[30] Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan,
administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of
firearms and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in
court the memorandum receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra,
Pabalan and Yapyuco.[31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the injuries of Villanueva
and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanuevas head
as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the
incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion
of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the
victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was
fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be
horizontal so that with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He
hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated
victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated
wound at the right temporal region of the head one consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not
a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired
upon from the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of
the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a
wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized
that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the
assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the
leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at
the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if
this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup
had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must
have been caused by a bullet fired at the victims back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting
any hard surface prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been caused by a bullet fired from the
front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit
on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the infliction of the other wounds,
unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney;
however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was
delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licups three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the
bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward
and stoop down with his head lying low and steady.[34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that
the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with and tried for
gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted
investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly
Porquerio, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco
authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his
office. This, according to her, together with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law
enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM
Central Office for consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with
the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander of the
Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and
Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He
narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when
Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by
Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called
on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched.
Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with
them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had
earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly
intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of
armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later,
Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the
middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable
turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with
Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of
stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police
officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they
were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the
direction of Narons house directly at the subject jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they
were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched
the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and
delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to
investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney
was likewise gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape,
as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by
rebel elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of
unidentified armed men therein.[42] That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve
(12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team composed of
Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them,
including himself, were armed.[44] He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all
the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the
passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu
members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had
gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.[46]
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused after the incident
because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his co-accused had already been investigated
by the main police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.[47]
He admitted an administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been
ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He
likewise alluded to an investigation independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando
Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the
volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen
victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted investigations on
the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel
Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane plantations in the
barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos team had already been alerted of the
presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos declaration, he confessed having investigated
the shooting incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuans
statement referring to Flores as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan and found after
surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired
that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well as the latters
documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right
to present evidence and submitted their memorandum as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful
performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as
members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent
of killing them.[52] With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and
Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained
by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in
those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of
Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto
Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts
of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate shares of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in the information, namely,
Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David,
Carlos David y Baez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder
charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto
Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting
them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or
proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the
amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,
and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.[53]
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the
eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace
and order;[54] that the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of
their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle;
that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and
had voluntarily performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official duty;[55] that the
theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that
they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA
members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable
negligence when they acted as they did;[56] that there was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to
assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but
was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a
hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.[57]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution witnesses Villanueva,
Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan
pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as claimed
by Yapyuco especially since as it turned out after the search of the vehicle they had no firearms with them, and
hence, they had nothing to be scared of.[58] It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide
residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to
have known them and the location of their houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so much
so that the presence of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsangs house that evening could not
have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn Statement dated April 11,
1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well as his apparent
certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. [59] It surmised how the defense,
especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men which
allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays were assembled at the house of Naron that
night, and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it
inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of
Salangsangs house such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously
positioned themselves at the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact
that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses
were deliberately not lit that night.[60]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the position of the Tamaraw jeepney
and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney
and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the
assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly
moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms
of petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had
indeed been discharged.[61]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to the
culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on
the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the
number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic
placement of the accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the
deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on
the firearms of petitioners. [62]
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners admission that they did
discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one
another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus,
since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that
injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those
who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night petitioners herein.[63] Interestingly, it was
speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or
contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had
a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;[64] and that on the basis of the self-serving
evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by
Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise found
very consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly
because it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the
weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of
official duty and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that
evening in the front yard of Narons residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by
Yapyuco himself.[66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced
and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this
circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and
cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The
same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons
for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was
found to be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.[67]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for 60 days which were
all charged against his accumulated leave credits;[68] that he was earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he
had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family
had spent P18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot
and P20,000.00 in attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases.[71] He also submitted a certification from
San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.[72] On these bases, the Sandiganbayan
ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b)
the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy and labels the same to
be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts
intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation in a
supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is
belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded
passengers were taken to the hospital on his jeepney.[73] He also points out the uncertainty in the
Sandiganbayans declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a well-planned police
operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay
officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the
latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. [74] He laments that, assuming arguendo that the
injuries sustained by the victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated
because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his
presence at the scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful
performance thereof a fact which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal
the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.[75] He also invokes the concept of
mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these
cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the Sandiganbayan has
not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for
which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were
two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two,
the barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the
presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu,
Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their
behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not participate in the
presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired upon
the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.[77] Also, they believe that the findings of fact by
the Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself
and those presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and
suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution.[78] Finally,
they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even
shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who
fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime.[79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that judging by
the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate
police operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them
are concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that
alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely followed orders from their
commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan,
moments before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal
design with the rest of the accused.[80] They affirm Yapyucos statement that they fired warning shots at the
subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and only after it failed to
stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly shown by
bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof
of ill motives that would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the
victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they were not intending to commit
a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the
jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily fired at the
victims directly.[82]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of conspiracy as
established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the
suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsangs residence. It
posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design
to commit the crimes charged.[83] It believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had
chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target as shown by the trajectories of
the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of
gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence.[85] It refutes
the invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of
the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had
previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely
responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had
exceeded the performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by
innocent individuals instead.[86]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence adduced before the
Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said
petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for
separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their
memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for
the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to
forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an
accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter
has failed to register his objection thereto.[87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to rest on loose
predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to
support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I. It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the incident on the
date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno
as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by
the prosecution,[88] explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the
victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now
appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact.
Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it
became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not
there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them had discharged the
bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal.[89] To this end, the
prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit[90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra;
the counter-affidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-
affidavit[93]of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit[94] of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed
immediately after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team was
forced to fire at the said vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored
Yapyucos signal for it to stop;[95] in their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were
constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle.[96] Yapyucos open court declaration, which
was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject
jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear
that it was trying to escape.[97] He suggested substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was the whole
team [which fired] at the fleeing vehicle [98] that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney
could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and
Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only Manguerra from their
group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning shots,[100] and that it was the policemen
[who] directly fired upon the jeepney.[101] Manguerra himself shared this statement.[102] Yet these accounts
do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which
Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and
oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly
at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already moved past them such that the line of fire to the
passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost
simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno
had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Narons house sitting on the right
side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such
that the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.[103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who among the accused
actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw
jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Narons house had indeed sprayed
bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing
that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted,
they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint
trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but
is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial
admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed
into a judicial admission.[105] It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno
and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive
their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-
participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in
this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
II. The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his
duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106]
The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused,
inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.[107] Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused
has caused the injury or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized
because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the
lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime
charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this
case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement
operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them who were either police and
barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order were bound to, as they
did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty
to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information
they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects
had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that
rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were
acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more
telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety
of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the
accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no
material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the
presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably
prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not they were at
the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the
prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the
actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that
arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law
enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not
require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call.
Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride.
Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the
process pertains to other government officers or agencies.[108]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure
and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm.[109] United States v. Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance of
his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is
attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to
be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the
same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used
necessary force.[111] He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with
wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.[112] People
v. Ulep[113] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances
indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police
officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find
themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is
needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of
their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the
absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound
discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must
always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be
protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.[114]
Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four members of a family in their
home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking
among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing
the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other
than suspicion, there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were
members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On
that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another
uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the
Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.[116]
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that it failed to heed the
first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that
the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed
missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk
from the party they had just been to,[117] still, we find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their
firearms when in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco
which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force, and it is
incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that
respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force,
petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the
moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a
violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless
disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they
actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and
exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which could not have
been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III. At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the
context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the
act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution.[118] Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a
defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime.[119] It may be a defense
even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of
the defendant,[121] and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.[122] A proper
invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of
fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong,[127]
but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of
the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the
accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and,
receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had
broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed
against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact.
Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of
supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt
of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without
fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts,
and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the
right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no
occasion for the extreme measure. x x x [128]
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the justification of an act, which is
otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the
accused.[131] Thus, Ah Chong further explained that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible
who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.[132]
IV. This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been established
beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable
requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the
accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[133] By
reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[134] The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[136] Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and
second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.[137] In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder
cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was
produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause
or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the
killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act
and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to kill is crucial
only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses,
and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of said
offenses.[140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating
the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their
co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners
affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who
harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on
conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that
Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with
NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being
penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of ambuscades
launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA
members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that
Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court
emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and materiality. Motive is
generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains significance when the
commission of a crime is established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The
question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the
person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the
death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to kill anyone of the
victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets
concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were
intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the
discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there
are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact
animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed,
it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so
far as they develop in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber carbine.[145]
While the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless
inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the
possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was
fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the
tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the
gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law
enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the
likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being hit and injured or even
killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding
to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle
by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we
found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the
passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising
from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate
and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts,
is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own
will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the
contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the
homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death
of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
V.Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of killing Licup
and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners
must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident
of another act performed without malice.[147] People v. Guillen[148] and People v. Nanquil [149] declare that a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in
People v. Castillo,[150] we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence
inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated
homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, likewise
militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found,
continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[151]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the
legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.[152] The instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement
among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to
conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had
converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that
petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their
authority when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly
accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were
confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepneys supposed
escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their
concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately
taken around the immediate environment of the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the
driver, they did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of
the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all
the accused had discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since only herein
petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the same,
they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation
which had gone terribly wrong.[153]
VI. The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by
Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted
murder with respect to the unharmed victims.[154] The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized
in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and
evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the
mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt
thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of
the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not
prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed attempted homicide, a
modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a
consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, and
order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of
P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners
are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there
being no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount
of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of
P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
JOHN ANGCACO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 146664.
February 28, 2002]
D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,[1] dated November 29, 2000, of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the decision,[2] dated January 31, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Puerto Princesa City, finding petitioner John Angcaco guilty of murder and sentencing him accordingly.
Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused in the trial court, namely, Ramon Decosto, Protacio Edep, Lydio
Lota, and Mario Felizarte, were members of the Integrated National Police of Taytay, Palawan. At the time of
the incident, they were serving a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay on Restituto
Bergante, who was wanted in connection with a robbery case. Edep was acting station commander, while
Restituto Bergante was the barangay captain of Bato, Taytay, Palawan. The information against petitioner and
his co-accused alleged
That on or about the 25th day of September, 1980, more or less 4:00 oclock in the morning in barangay Bato,
municipality of Taytay, province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, and with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, fire at and shoot FREDDIE GANANCIAL, hitting the latter with gunshots on vital
parts of his body and inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his instant death.[3]
When arraigned on June 3, 1981, all of the accused, with the exception of Ramon Decosto, entered a plea of
not guilty to the crime charged.[4] Decosto, who failed to attend the hearing on that date, was later arraigned
on June 23, 1981, during which he entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented seven witnesses: Noe Bergante,[5] Noel Bergante, Dr. Alberto Lim, Honorato
Flores, Henry Pulga, Antonio Arosio, and Adolfo Jagmis. The gist of their testimonies is as follows:
At around 4 oclock in the morning of September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and his brother Noel Bergante and
his cousin Freddie Ganancial were awakened by the sound of gunfire while they were asleep in their house in
Bato, Taytay, Palawan. Their mother, who was frightened, fainted and had to be helped by Noe. Noel went to
the kitchen and, from there, saw Protacio Edep fire his carbine, as he shouted, Kapitan, you come down, this is
[a] peace officer. He was apparently referring to Restituto Bergante. Noel answered that his father was not in
the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. Edep then ordered the men in the house to come out. Noel
accordingly went to the gate and later called Noe to also come out of the house. Noe and his cousin, Freddie
Ganancial, did as bidden.
Once they were outside the house, Noe and Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on the right side and
accused Ramon Decosto on the left side. Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and warned them not to run.
Noe and Freddie joined Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, You are tough, and pushed
him. Then, shots rang out from the armalite and short firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which
Freddie Ganancial turned around and dropped to the ground face down. Decosto was around three meters
away from Freddie.
In fright, Noe and Noel ran inside the house. After a few seconds, Noe saw, through the window, Lota and
Angcaco turning over the body of Freddie Ganancial. After briefly leaving the body, both came back 15 minutes
later. Noe said Lota brought with him an object wrapped in a newspaper, which Noe surmised was a knife. Lota
placed the object in the right hand of Freddie Ganancial. Noel, on the other hand, said that he returned to the
crime scene and recovered two empty shells which he gave to a certain Major Silos. Noe reported the matter to
Barangay Tanods Sabino Mahinay and a certain Ramon.[6]
Antonio Arosio, a neighbor of the Bergantes, corroborated the testimonies of Noe and Noel Bergante.
According to Arosio, at around 4:30 a.m. of September 25, 1980, while he was asleep in his house in Bato,
Taytay, Palawan, he was awakened by the sound of gunfire. He said he heard a commotion outside, followed
by another volley of shots. He claimed he recognized by their voices some of the persons involved, namely,
Protacio Edep, Noel Bergante, and Freddie Ganancial.
Arosio claimed that accused Decosto and Felizarte fetched him from his house a short time later and took him
to Edep, who was then in the house of the barangay captain. Arosio was asked about the whereabouts of the
barangay captain. He told Edep that Restituto Bergante, the barangay captain, had gone to Puerto Princesa
two days earlier.
Arosio testified that on his way home he saw a person lying on the ground in a prone position. He later learned
it was Freddie Ganancial. Arosio identified in court the policemen whom he saw that morning, that is, Edep,
Decosto, Felizarte, Lota, and Angcaco.
On cross-examination, Arosio claimed that he was investigated by a police officer, whose name he could not
remember, three years after the incident. The investigation was held in the house of Barangay Captain
Restituto Bergante, who told him that he would testify in this case. Although he was reluctant to testify because
of fear, Arosio said he finally agreed to do so in 1984. Prior to the incident, he had not heard Edeps voice but
only assumed that the voice he heard that morning was that of Edep as the latter was the highest-ranking
policeman he later saw.[7]
Although Dr. Romeo D. Valino conducted the postmortem examination on the body of Freddie Ganancial, it fell
to Dr. Alberto H. Lim, Assistant Provincial Health Officer in Palawan, to identify the medico-legal report of Dr.
Valino and to explain its contents in view of Dr. Valinos death pending the trial of the case.
Dr. Valinos report stated in pertinent parts:
Physical Examination:
1. Gunshot wound lateral aspect D/3rd arm right (entrance) with contusion collar thru and thru passing thru the
medial aspect arm right, entering to the lateral aspect mid axillary line at the level of the 9th rib hitting
ascending colon and small intestine.
2. Gunshot wound at the level of the 7th rib at anterior axillary line right with contusion collar (entrance) to the
epigastric region (exit) 10 cm[s]. x 3 cm[s]. hitting the liver (mascerated).
3. Gunshot wound subcostal region right at the level of mid clavicular line (entrance) right side to the subcostal
region left side (exit at the level of mid mammary line).
4. Stomach with alcoholic smell.
5. Clotted blood at abdominal cavity, about 500 cc.
Cause of Death:
- Shock secondary to internal and external hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds - body and abdomen.[8]
Dr. Lim identified the medical report signed by Dr. Valino because he was familiar with the handwriting of the
latter. As regards the contents of the medical certificate, Dr. Lim stated that Freddie Ganancial, alias Edgar
Gallego, 25 years of age, died as a result of shock secondary to internal and external hemorrhage due to
gunshot wounds on the body and abdomen, which means that the victim died because of loss of blood
resulting in shock due to a gunshot wound in the abdomen. He testified that the victim sustained three gunshot
wounds. The first gunshot entered the body at the lateral aspect distal third arm with contusion collar, the bullet
entering the lateral aspect midaxillary line at the level of the ninth rib and hitting the colon and small intestine.
The second gunshot wound was located at the right side of the body at the seventh rib at right anterior axillary
line with contusion collar (entrance), the bullet passing through the epigastric region and hitting the liver, which
was mascerated. The third gunshot wound was in the right subcostal region at the level of the midclavicular
line (entrance) right side to the left side of the subcostal region, the bullet exiting below the nipple.
On cross-examination, Dr. Lim said that based on the findings of the medical report, the victim had been taking
liquor prior to his death. He also admitted that he had not undertaken studies on the identification of
handwriting. Dr. Lim claimed that he identified the signature of Dr. Valino in the medical report on the basis of
the other reports the latter had submitted to their office.[9]
Honorato Flores, senior ballistician of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, identified the
ballistics report he had prepared and the shell fragments presented to him for examination. He said that the
fragments could have possibly been caused by the impact of the bullet on a human being.
When cross-examined, Flores said that no armalite rifle was given to him but only shell fragments were
presented to him for examination. He said that the gun and the lead would have to be examined by using the
bullet comparison microscope to determine whether the lead was fired from the same gun. A bone or a cement
flooring could have caused the shell fragments to break, according to Flores. Upon inquiry by the trial court, he
said it was possible that a piece of copper and the lead formed part of one bullet, but it was also possible that
they did not.[10]
Sgt. Henry Pulga, acting station commander of Taytay, Palawan, testified that on October 6, 1980, he
investigated the complaint filed by Barangay Captain Bergante regarding the killing of the latters nephew,
Freddie Ganancial. He identified the affidavits of Mario Felizarte (Exh. H) and Ramon Decosto (Exh. I), which
he himself prepared. According to Pulga, he informed Felizarte and Decosto of their rights to counsel and to
remain silent and explained to them the import of these rights. He said that Felizarte and Decosto voluntarily
gave their statements before him, although Pulga also admitted that the two did not have counsel to assist
them during the investigation.[11]
The last witness for the prosecution was Adolfo D. Jagmis, the chief investigator of the Palawan Constabulary
based in Tiniguiban. He testified that on October 6, 1980 he investigated Edep, Lota, and Angcaco. He said
that after Angcaco was apprised of his constitutional rights, the latter executed a statement (Exh. J),[12] which
Jagmis identified in court. But Jagmis admitted that the statement was made without the assistance of
counsel.[13]
On cross-examination by counsel for accused Decosto, Jagmis was confronted with the affidavit of Angcaco, in
which the latter identified an armalite which he allegedly used at the time of the incident. Jagmis said the
armalite and the lead recovered from the scene were both given to the Provincial Fiscals Office.
The defense presented as its witnesses Protacio Edep, Ramon Decosto, John Angcaco, and Lydio Lota,
whose testimonies are as follows:
In the early morning of September 25, 1980, petitioner and his co-accused, led by Edep, went to the house of
Restituto Bergante in Bato, Taytay, Palawan to serve a warrant for the latters arrest. When they reached the
house, Edep and his men took positions as they had been warned that Restituto Bergante might resist arrest.
Decosto and Angcaco were each armed with armalites, Lota had a carbine, Felizarte a revolver, and Edep a
carbine and a revolver. Decosto was on the left side of Edep, around seven to 10 meters from the latter.
Angcaco, on the other hand, was on right side of Edep, around four to seven meters from the latter. Edep
called Restituto Bergante to come out of the house as he (Edep) had a warrant for his arrest. Restitutos wife
replied that her husband was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. A commotion then took place
inside the house and, shortly after, petitioner saw a man coming down the house. They fired warning shots to
stop the man, but petitioner saw another person with a bolo near Edep. He shouted, Sarge, this is the man who
tried to hack you!, and shot the unidentified man, who fell to the ground face up. At the time of the incident,
Decosto was on the left side of Edep, while petitioner, Felizarte, and Lota were on the right side of Edep. They
later learned that the person killed was Freddie Ganancial.
Edep conducted an investigation and recovered from the scene of the crime empty shells from armalite bullets,
which he turned over to the provincial fiscal. Edep and his men were then taken to Taytay and investigated by
P/Sgt. Adolfo Jagmis. Thereafter, Edep and his men learned that they were charged with murder. An
administrative complaint for grave misconduct was likewise filed against them in the National Police
Commission, but the case was dismissed.[14]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, this court is of the considered opinion, and
so holds, that accused John Angcaco, is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. With the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of Freddie Ganancial the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity.
Co-accused Protacio Edep, Ramon Decosto, Lydio Lota and Mario Felizarte are ordered ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.[15]
Petitioner Angcaco filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the trial courts
decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification only that the mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of a lawful
duty should be appreciated in determining the imposable penalty, not lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong, the trial court had correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment ranging from seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
the questioned decision is affirmed in all other respects.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence this appeal. Petitioner raises the following issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND/OR MISCONSTRUED THE

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF DEFENSE OF [THE] PERSON OR RIGHTS
OF A STRANGER ARE PRESENT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS OR THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONER-ACCUSED HAS BEEN
VIOLATED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED OR FAILED TO APPRECIATE
THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE AND ITS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING [PETITIONER]
APPELLANT.[17]
First. Petitioner Angcaco argues that the prosecution evidence failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He points out inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies and affidavits of prosecution
witnesses Noel and Noe Bergante.
We agree with accused-appellants contention. Generally, contradictions between the contents of the witness
affidavit and his testimony in court do not impair his credibility because affidavits are usually taken ex parte
and, for that reason, often incomplete and inaccurate.[18] An affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and
will even at times, without being noticed by the witness, inaccurately describe the occurrences related therein.
Thus, we have time and again held that affidavits are generally inferior to testimonies in court. Affidavits are
often prepared only by the investigator without the affiant or witness having a fair opportunity to narrate in full
the incident which took place, whereas in open court, the latter is subjected to cross-examination by counsel
for the accused.[19]
However, where the discrepancies between the affidavit and the witness testimony on the stand are
irreconcilable and unexplained and they refer to material issues, such inconsistencies may well reflect on the
witness candor and even honesty and thus impair his credibility.[20] Hence, we have recognized as exceptions
to the general rule instances where the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony
in court or where the omission in the affidavit refers to a substantial detail which an eyewitness, had he been
present at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime, could not have failed to mention.[21] The case
at bar is such an instance.
Noe Bergante pointed to Decosto and Edep as the ones who shot Freddie Ganancial.[22] However, in his
affidavit, dated November 24, 1980, Noe pointed to Decosto as the lone assailant. Noe also failed to mention
the presence of Angcaco at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime.[23] Noe tried to explain these
material omissions in his affidavit by claiming that he mentioned these details to the fiscal but the latter must
have forgotten to include them in the affidavit because he (the fiscal) was in a hurry to leave that day.[24] This
explanation is too pat to be accepted. To begin with, Noe admitted that the investigating fiscal, Fiscal Vergara,
explained to him the contents of the affidavit before he (Noe) signed it.[25] Noe, therefore, could have noticed
the omission of such vital matters which concerned the identification of the persons responsible for his cousins
death and called attention to such omission. The identity of the malefactors is too important a detail for anyone
who allegedly witnessed the incident to overlook its omission in the very statement of the incident one is giving.
The omissions suggest Noes ignorance of the details of the incident as well as his readiness to perjure himself
in order to implicate all of the accused in this case.
Noel Bergante fared no better than his brother on the witness stand. On direct examination, Noel, like his
brother, identified Edep and Decosto as the assailants of Freddie Ganancial.[26] However, Noels affidavit,
dated November 24, 1980, only mentioned Decosto as the person responsible for the killing of Freddie
Ganancial.[27] Worse, Noel executed an affidavit earlier on September 26, 1980, in which he identified
Jardiolin,[28] Mario Toledo, Lydio Lota, and Mario Gonzales as the companions of Decosto at the time of the
commission of the crime.[29] But, in his testimony, Noel said that Decostos companions were Edep, Angcaco,
Felizarte, and Lota.[30] When confronted with the discrepancy, Noel said that he really meant to refer to
Angcaco, instead of Jardiolin, and to Ramon Decosto instead of Toledo. When further questioned, Noel said
that he was referring to Lota when he mentioned the name of Toledo,[31] thus creating more confusion with his
answers. These contradictions, when taken together with Noels claim that he had known Jardiolin, Felizarte,
and Angcaco for a long time, cast serious doubts on his credibility.
Thus, prosecution witnesses Noel and Noe Bergante failed to give a credible and consistent account of the
identity of the person or persons responsible for the killing of Freddie Ganancial. There is apparent from a
reading of their testimonies a manifest tendency to improvise, modify, and even contradict themselves in order
to implicate each of the accused. It is in fact doubtful whether Noe and Noel saw what they testified about.
Even the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Noe and Noel Bergante and acquitted Edep and Decosto in
spite of their identification by these witnesses.
We are thus left with no clear picture of the events that transpired on September 25, 1980 and of the identity of
the shooter or shooters. It cannot be overemphasized that the constitutional presumption of innocence
demands not only that the prosecution prove that a crime has been committed but, more importantly, the
identity of the person or persons who committed the crime.[32] But in the case at bar, what passed for the
prosecution evidence was a befuddling amalgamation of half-truths and lies obviously fabricated by these
supposed eyewitnesses to hold responsible each of the accused in this case for the killing of their cousin. For
this reason, we hold that the prosecution evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt necessary for conviction in a criminal case.
Second. The conviction of petitioner Angcaco must, however, be upheld in view of his admission that he shot
Freddie Ganancial. The rule is that while the prosecution has the burden of establishing the guilt of the
accused, once the defendant admits commission of the act charged, although he invokes a justification for its
commission, the burden of proof is shifted to him to prove the said justifying circumstance.[33] Petitioner
Angcaco cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, for even if it is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after he has admitted the killing itself.[34] This is because a judicial confession constitutes
evidence of a high order. It is presumed that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of
an act unless moved by the desire to reveal the truth.[35]
Petitioner claims that he acted in defense of Sgt. Protacio Edep, whom Freddie Ganancial was about to strike
with a bolo. We do not agree. For petitioner to successfully claim the benefit of Art. 11, par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be proof of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, which must be sufficiently proven by the defense,[36] is present
when there is actual or imminent peril to ones life, limb, or right. There must be actual physical force or actual
use of a weapon by the victim himself.[37] In this case, it is contended that the victim, who was armed with a
bolo, approached Edep menacingly. But, there is no other competent evidence to corroborate this self-serving
claim. Edep testified that he heard petitioners warning that an armed man was behind him.[38] However, when
asked about the weapon allegedly held by the victim, Edep replied that he did not see any as he turned around
to face his supposed assailant.[39] It was only later that Edep claimed seeing a knife in the area where the
victim fell.[40] One is thus led to suspect that Edeps claim that he saw a knife was a mere afterthought
designed to exculpate his fellow officer from the charges against him.
Petitioners own testimony suffers from inconsistencies and improbabilities on material points.
First, there was no reason for the victim, Freddie Ganancial, to attack Sgt. Edep, who was looking for Restituto,
because the latter was not there in his house, having earlier gone to Puerto Princesa. In fact, Edep admitted he
was about to order his men to leave the premises when they found that their quarry was not there. The victim
himself was not wanted by the police. Dr. Lim said Ganancial was drunk. In that condition, he could have easily
have been overpowered by any member of the arresting team, if he made any aggressive move, without
shooting him to prevent him from doing harm to the latter.
Second, when cross-examined about the bolo, petitioner said he could not remember who took it away.[41]
However, at a later hearing, petitioner stated that it was he who picked up the bolo and turned it over to Edep,
his superior officer.[42] But how could he not remember who took the bolo if he was the one who did so? Once
again, petitioner was prevaricating.
Third, petitioner said that he merely intended to fire a warning shot when he saw Ganancial. This claim is
belied by the fact that the victim sustained three gunshot wounds on the chest and abdomen. It is apparent that
petitioner intended to kill the victim and not merely to warn him.
Indeed, even assuming that the victim was charging at Sgt. Edep, it would have been sufficient for petitioner to
warn Sgt. Edep of the danger. Not that petitioner was not expected to pause for a moment while his colleague
was in danger.[43] However, the rules of engagement do not, on the other hand, require that he should
immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person accosted did not heed his call.[44] But rather than confront
the victim as to his intended purpose, petitioner immediately shot the former without further thought.
Petitioner claims the victim was armed with a bolo. The circumstances, however, indicate otherwise. Petitioner
was questioned by the prosecutor on the existence of the bolo during the hearing held on October 7, 1986. The
bolo was presented in court only on October 17, 1986. At the hearing on that date, petitioner and Lydio Lota
both claimed that they could identify the bolo by the markings placed on it by Sgt. Edep.[45] But Sgt. Edep
made no mention of having recovered a bolo, much less of marking it. In fact, Edep at one point testified that
he did not see any weapon near the victim. It is doubtful, therefore, that the bolo offered in evidence by the
defense was the one actually recovered from the scene of the crime.[46] It is more likely that the idea to offer
the bolo in question was a mere afterthought by the defense brought about by the fiscals own reminder that the
presentation of the weapon was crucial to petitioners plea of defense of stranger.[47]
Nor can petitioners claim that the killing was done in fulfillment of a lawful duty be sustained, as the Court of
Appeals ruled. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that the
offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.[48]
In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. As Edep
himself explained, the standard procedure in making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves as police
officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to
take the arrestee under custody.[49] But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance
of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent
petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to
how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted
person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can
be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made
on Restituto Bergante.
Reliance by the Court of Appeals on the case of People v. Oanis[50] is misplaced. In Oanis, the accused, who
were police officers, shot and killed the victim under the erroneous notion that the latter was the person they
were charged to arrest. The Court held that the first requisite that the offenders acted in performance of a
lawful duty was present because the offenders, though overzealous in the performance of their duty, thought
that they were in fact killing the man they have been ordered to take into custody dead or alive. In this case,
petitioner did not present evidence that he mistook Freddie Ganancial for Restituto Bergante and, therefore,
killed him (Ganancial) perhaps because he placed the lives of the arresting officers in danger.
Third. On the other hand, we think the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery against petitioner. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.[51]
For treachery to exist, two conditions must be present: (1) there must be employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted.[52] As has been discussed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Noe and Noel Bergante cannot be given credence. As we already stated, even the trial court acquitted accused
Decosto and Edep, both of whom were implicated as the assailants. Without evidence of the manner the
aggression was made or how the act resulting in the death of the victim began and developed, it is not possible
to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of treachery.[53]
Nor can evident premeditation be appreciated in this case. Evident premeditation requires proof of the following
elements: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[54] None of these elements has been shown in
this case.
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is liable only for homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the crime, the penalty must be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Art. 64(1) of the
Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty on accused-
appellant falls within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, or from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant must be fixed
within the range of prision mayor, or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) years, as
minimum, to reclusion temporal medium, or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.
Petitioner should also be made to pay the heirs of the victim, Freddie Ganancial, the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages,[55] in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals as indemnity.[56] The purpose of making such an award of moral damages is not to enrich the heirs of
the victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings.[57]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 29, 2000, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is found guilty of the crime of homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Freddie Ganancial, P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Obedience to a Lawful Order

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. [G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17, 1997]
D E C I S I O N FRANCISCO, J.:
Through their separate petitions for review,[1] Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta (Tabuena and Peralta,
for short) appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990,[2] as well as the Resolution dated
December 20, 1991[3] denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having malversed
the total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their
incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA, and were thus
meted the following sentence:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 11758, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount
malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 11759, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum, and twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount
malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 11760, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are each sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum and
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and for each of them to pay separately a fine of FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the amount malversed. They shall also reimburse jointly and severally the
Manila International Airport Authority the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00).
In addition, they shall both suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office.
A co-accused of Tabuena and Peralta was Gerardo G. Dabao, then Assistant General Manager of MIAA, has
remained at large.
There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of P55 Million
was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the principal accused - he being
charged in all three (3) cases. The amended informations in criminal case nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760
respectively read:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Pasay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G.
Dabao, both public officers, being then the General Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of
the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they
being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board
resolutions, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a managers check for
said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAAs Savings Account No. 274-
500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial
payment to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused
Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding obligation
of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned managers check, accused Luis A.
Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds
thereof to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G.
Dabao, both public officers, being then the General Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of
the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they
being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board
resolutions, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a managers check for
said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAAs Savings Account No. 274-
500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial
payment to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused
Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding obligation
of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned managers check, accused Luis A.
Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds
thereof to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta,
both public officers, being then the General Manager and Acting Manager, Financial Services Department,
respectively, of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to
the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA
pursuant to its board resolutions, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriate the
amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a
managers check for said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAAs Savings
Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International Airport in Pasay City,
purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of
which said accused Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no
outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned managers
check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both accused misappropriated and
converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents:
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the presidents office and in cash
what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, Yes,
sir, I will do it. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of
Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS
Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, to wit:
Office of the President of the Philippines Malacaang
January 8, 1986
MEMO TO: The General Manager
Manila International Airport Authority
You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office,
the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAAs account with
said Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985
and duly approved by this Office on February 4, 1985.
Your immediate compliance is appreciated.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND MARCOS.[4]

The January 7, 1985 memorandum of then Minister of Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin referred to in the
MARCOS Memorandum, reads in full:
MEMORANDUM
For: The President
From: Minister Roberto V. Ongpin
Date: 7 January 1985
Subject: Approval of Supplemental Contracts and Request for Partial Deferment of Repayment of PNCCs
Advances for MIA Development Project
May I request your approval of the attached recommendations of Minister Jesus S. Hipolito for eight (8)
supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development Project (MIADP) between the Bureau of Air
Transport (BAT) and Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, as follows:
(xerox copies only; original memo was submitted to the Office of the President on May 28, 1984)
In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly
CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA Development Project aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of
accomplishments for the aforecited contracts. In accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances
totalling P93.9 million are to be deducted from said billings which will leave a net amount due to PNCC of only
P4.5 million.
At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in the following stages of
approval/evaluation:
There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet residual amounts due to
PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to PNCC due to additional cost of money to service its
obligations for this contract.
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending escalation billings, may we
request for His Excellencys approval for a deferment of the repayment of PNCCs advances to the extent of
P30 million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million
has been officially recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of funding.Korte
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing MIA Project funds. This
amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the
repayment of advances of P63.9 million.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO V. ONGPIN
Minister[5]
In obedience to President Marcos verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and
Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
The first withdrawal was made on January 10, 1986 for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by
Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA - the depository branch of MIAA funds,
to issue a managers check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the
PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which,
Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash were then placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags,
loaded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez located at Aguado
Street fronting Malacaang. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received.
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million,
made on January 16, 1986.
The third and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuenas co-
signatory to the letter- request for a managers check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the
PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the
money was placed in two (2) peerless boxes which were loaded in the trunk of Tabuenas car. Peralta did not
go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez office at Aguado Street. It was only upon delivery of the
P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt,
dated January 30, 1986, reads:
Malacaang
Manila
January 30, 1986
RECEIVED FROM LOUIE TABUENA THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FIFTY FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P55,000,000.00) as of the following dates:
Jan. 10 - P25,000,000.00
Jan. 16 - 25,000,000.00
Jan. 30 - 5,000,000.00
(Sgd.) Fe Roa-Gimenez
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, out of the ordinary
and not based on the normal procedure. Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the
disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented.
Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC,
even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the months of January to June
of 1986.
The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the time of
the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and Peralta, in short, was that
they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum
which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the President P55 Million in cash as partial payment
of MIAAs obligations to PNCC, and that he (Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to
PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the same belief and so he heeded the request of Tabuena, his superior, for
him (Peralta) to help in the release of P5 Million.
With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their conviction,
Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors[6] committed by the Sandiganbayan for this Courts
consideration. It appears, however, that at the core of their plea that we acquit them are the following:
1) the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended informations, and
2) they acted in good faith.
Anent the first proposition, Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being charged with intentional
malversation, as the amended informations commonly allege that:
x x x accused x x x conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriated the amount of x x
x.
But it would appear that they were convicted of malversation by negligence. In this connection, the Courts
attention is directed to p. 17 of the December 20, 1991 Resolution (denying Tabuenas and Peraltas motion for
reconsideration) wherein the Sandiganbayan said:
xxxxxxxxx
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the P55 Million to people who
were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of MIAA or of the PNCC.Sclaw
It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or abandonment, some
other person to take such public funds. Having done so, Tabuena, by his own narration, has categorically
demonstrated that he is guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of P55 Million of public funds.
(Underscoring supplied.)
To support their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, Tabuena and Peralta argue that:
1) While malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence, both modes cannot be committed at
the same time.
2) The Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where the
amended informations charged them with intentional malversation.[7]
3) Their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation.[8]
We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan[9] where the Court passed upon similar protestations raised by therein accused-petitioner
Cabello whose conviction for the same crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise:
x x x even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by
negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his
conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration
of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is
involved and conviction thereof is proper. x x x.
In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., we held that an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification
can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the
Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a distinct crime in our Penal Code, designated as a
quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes
the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful
falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal
intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real
claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge
willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.
xxx
Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elements of the
offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements or
ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime proved. x x x.
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no
moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the
result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be
incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.
Subsequently, we ruled in People vs. Consigna, et. al., that the aforestated rationale and arguments also apply
to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful malversation, in an information
containing allegations similar to those involved in the present case, can be validly convicted of the same
offense of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the
offense.
Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation
for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Thus, in the two (2) vintage, but significant
malversation cases of US v. Catolico[10] and US v. Elvia,[11] the Court stressed that:
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of is innocent.
The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana,[12] although this case involved falsification of public documents
and estafa:
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent in embezzlement
is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can
be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.[13]
The accused may thus always introduce evidence to show he acted in good faith and that he had no intention
to convert.[14] And this, to our mind, Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum, we
are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of
such memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would buttress
his innocence of the crime of malversation.
First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum
required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive,
and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuenas superior the
former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government
agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC.[15] In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-
government agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to
another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming
from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuenas compliance, without
hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.[16] The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the
lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of
the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). However, the unlawfulness of the MARCOS
Memorandum was being argued, on the observation, for instance, that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the
presidential directive reveals a liability of only about P34.5 Million. The Sandiganbayan in this connection said:
Exhibits 2 and 2-a (pages 1 and 2 of the memorandum of Min. Ongpin to the President dated January 7, 1985)
were mainly:
a.) for the approval of eight Supplemental Contracts; and
b.) a request for partial deferment of payment by PNCC for advances made for the MIAA Development Project,
while at the same time recognizing some of the PNCCs escalation billings which would result in making
payable to PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing MIAA Project funds.
Thus:
xxx
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending escalation billings, may we
request for His Excellencys approval for a deferment of repayment of PNCCs advances to the extent of P30
million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.6 million has
been officially recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing MIA Project funds. This
amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the
repayment of advances of P63.9 million.
While Min. Ongpin may have, therefore recognized the escalation claims of the PNCC to MIAA to the extent of
P99.1 million (Exhibit 2a), a substantial portion thereof was still in the stages of evaluation and approval, with
only P32.6 million having been officially recognized by the MIADP consultants.
If any payments were, therefore, due under this memo for Min. Ongpin (upon which President Marcos Memo
was based) they would only be for a sum of up to P34.5 million.[17]
xxxxxxxxx
V. Pres. Marcos order to Tabuena dated January 8, 1986 baseless.
Not only was Pres. Marcos Memo (Exhibit 1) for Tabuena to pay P55 million irrelevant, but it was actually
baseless.
This is easy to see.
Exhibit 1 purports to refer itself to the Ongpin Memorandum (Exhibit 2, 2-a); Exhibit 1, however, speaks of P55
million to be paid to the PNCC while Exhibit 2 authorized only P34.5 million. The order to withdraw the amount
of P55 million exceeded the approved payment of P34.5 million by P20.5 million. Min. Ongpins Memo of
January 7, 1985 could not therefore serve as a basis for the Presidents order to withdraw P55 million.[18]
Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuenas good faith so as to make him criminally liable.
What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOS Memorandum is patently legal (for on its face it
directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million
was a due and demandable debt and that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. This belief is
supported by defense witness Francis Monera who, on direct examination, testified that:
ATTY ANDRES
Q Can you please show us in this Exhibit 7 and 7-a where it is indicated the receivables from MIA as of
December 31, 1985?
A As of December 31, 1985, the receivables from MIA is shown on page 2, marked as Exhibit 7-a, sir,
P102,475,392.35.
x x x x x x x x x.[19]
ATTY. ANDRES
Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, what these obligations represent?
WITNESS
A These obligations represent receivables on the basis of our billings to MIA as contract-owner of the project
that the Philippine National Construction Corporation constructed. These are billings for escalation mostly, sir.
Q What do you mean by escalation?
A Escalation is the component of our revenue billings to the contract-owner that are supposed to take care of
price increases, sir.
x x x x x x x x x.[20]
ATTY ANDRES
Q When you said these are accounts receivable, do I understand from you that these are due and
demandable?
A Yes, sir.[21]
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.[22] Such is the
ruling in Nassif v. People[23] the facts of which, in brief, are as follows:
Accused was charged with falsification of commercial document. A mere employee of R.J. Campos, he
inserted in the commercial document alleged to have been falsified the word sold by order of his principal. Had
he known or suspected that his principal was committing an improper act of falsification, he would be liable
either as a co-principal or as an accomplice. However, there being no malice on his part, he was exempted
from criminal liability as he was a mere employee following the orders of his principal.[24]
Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as out of the ordinary, did not
comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
a) [except for salaries and wages and for commutation of leaves] all disbursements above P1,000.00 should
be made by check (Basic Guidelines for Internal Control dated January 31, 1977 issued by COA)
b) payment of all claims against the government had to be supported with complete documentation (Sec. 4,
P.D. 1445, State Auditing Code of the Philippines). In this connection, the Sandiganbayan observed that:
There were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no bills to support the
disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of funds for an unquestionably staggering sum
of P55 Million.[25]
c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)

But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time
to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS Memorandum
enjoined his immediate compliance with the directive that he forward to the Presidents Office the P55 Million in
cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was
acting in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal. This follows the
decision in Villacorta v. People[26] where the Court, in acquitting therein accused municipal treasurer of
Pandan, Catanduanes of malversation after finding that he incurred a shortage in his cash accountability by
reason of his payment in good faith to certain government personnel of their legitimate wages, leave
allowances, etc., held that:
Nor can negligence approximating malice or fraud be attributed to petitioner. If he made wrong payments, they
were in good faith mainly to government personnel, some of them working at the provincial auditors and the
provincial treasurers offices. And if those payments ran counter to auditing rules and regulations, they did not
amount to a criminal offense and he should only be held administratively or civilly liable.
Likewise controlling is US v. Elvia[27] where it was held that payments in good faith do not amount to criminal
appropriation, although they were made with insufficient vouchers or improper evidence. In fact, the Dissenting
Opinions reference to certain provisions in the revised Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances -
apparently made to underscore Tabuenas personal accountability, as agency head, for MIAA funds - would all
the more support the view that Tabuena is vulnerable to civil sanctions only. Sections 29.2 and 29.5 expressly
and solely speak of civilly liable to describe the kind of sanction imposable on a superior officer who performs
his duties with bad faith, malice or gross negligence and on a subordinate officer or employee who commits
willful or negligent acts x x x which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted
under order or instructions of his superiors.
Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the P55
Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC, proceeding from the following
definitions/concepts of conversion:
Conversion, as necessary element of offense of embezzlement, being the fraudulent appropriation to ones own
use of anothers property which does not necessarily mean to ones personal advantage but every attempt by
one person to dispose of the goods of another without right as if they were his own is conversion to his own
use. (Terry v. Water Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County, 64 p. 2d 904, 906, 179 Okl. 106)
- At p. 207, Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition 9A.
Conversion is any interference subversive of the right of the owner of personal property to enjoy and control it.
The gist of conversion is the usurpation of the owners right of property, and not the actual damages inflicted.
Honesty of purpose is not a defense. (Ferrera v. Parks, 23 p. 883, 885 19 Or. 141)
- At page 168, id.
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The words convert and misappropriate connote an act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were
ones own. They presuppose that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or use different from that agreed
upon. To appropriate to ones own use includes not only conversion to ones personal advantage but every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.
People vs. Webber, 57 O.G.
p. 2933, 2937
By placing them at the disposal of private persons without due authorization or legal justification, he became as
guilty of malversation as if he had personally taken them and converted them to his own use.
People vs. Luntao, 50 O.G.
p. 1182, 1183[28]
We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena to pay immediately
the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION...., and that
was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in
effect delivery to the Office of the President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos secretary then.
Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55
Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control over
government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the Presidents office
(thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it
later turned out that PNCC never received the money. Thus, it has been said that:
Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation.
xxxxxxxxx
Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is malversation only if the public officer
who has custody of public funds should appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds. Where the
payment of public funds has been made in good faith, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the public
officer to whom the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is
no criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly but not
criminally liable.[29]
Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out
public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to
Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the
MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious scheme. In short, no conspiracy
was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55 Million. In the cases of US v.
Acebedo[30] and Ang v. Sandiganbayan,[31] both also involving the crime of malversation, the accused therein
were acquitted after the Court arrived at a similar finding of non-proof of conspiracy. In Acebedo, therein
accused, as municipal president of Palo, Leyte, was prosecuted for and found guilty by the lower court of
malversation after being unable to turn over certain amounts to the then justice of the peace. It appeared,
however, that said amounts were actually collected by his secretary Crisanto Urbina. The Court reversed
Acebedos conviction after finding that the sums were converted by his secretary Urbina without the knowledge
and participation of Acebedo. The Court said, which we herein adopt:
No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown in this case, nor did such conspiracy
appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of the theft committed by the secretary was shown on
the part of the appellant in this case, nor does it appear that he in any way participated in the fruits of the
crime. If the secretary stole the money in question without the knowledge or consent of the appellant and
without negligence on his part, then certainly the latter can not be convicted of embezzling the same money or
any part thereof.[32]
In Ang, accused-petitioner, as MWSS bill collector, allowed part of his collection to be converted into checks
drawn in the name of one Marshall Lu, a non-customer of MWSS, but the checks were subsequently
dishonored. Ang was acquitted by this Court after giving credence to his assertion that the conversion of his
collections into checks were thru the machinations of one Lazaro Guinto, another MWSS collector more senior
to him. And we also adopt the Courts observation therein, that:
The petitioners alleged negligence in allowing the senior collector to convert cash collections into checks may
be proof of poor judgment or too trusting a nature insofar as a superior officer is concerned but there must be
stronger evidence to show fraud, malice, or other indicia of deliberateness in the conspiracy cooked up with
Marshall Lu. The prosecution failed to show that the petitioner was privy to the conspirational scheme. Much
less is there any proof that he profited from the questioned acts. Any suspicions of conspiracy, no matter how
sincerely and strongly felt by the MWSS, must be converted into evidence before conviction beyond
reasonable doubt may be imposed.[33]
The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in
relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he, upon the
directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds.
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed
order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In
the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the
President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued.
And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This
fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia
est legis essentia. Besides, the case could not be detached from the realities then prevailing. As aptly
observed by Mr. Justice Cruz in his dissenting opinion:
We reject history in arbitrarily assuming that the people were free during the era and that the judiciary was
independent and fearless. We know it was not; even the Supreme Court at that time was not free. This is an
undeniable fact that we can not just blink away. Insisting on the contrary would only make our sincerity suspect
and even provoke scorn for what can only be described as our incredible credulity.[34]
But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accuseds basic
constitutional right to due process. Respect for the Constitution, to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruzs words,
is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.[35] While going
over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised this as an error,
there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the
settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made
the subject of assignments of error or not.[36]
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. At the taking of the testimony of
Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, Atty. Andres asked
sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes only asked six (6) questions on cross-
examination in the course of which the court interjected a total of twenty-seven (27) questions (more than four
times Prosecutor Viernes questions and even more than the combined total of direct and cross-examination
questions asked by the counsels). After the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the court
further asked a total of ten (10) questions.[37] The trend intensified during Tabuenas turn on the witness stand.
Questions from the court after Tabuenas cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67).[38] This is more than five
times Prosecutor Viernes questions on cross-examination (14), and more than double the total of direct
examination and cross-examination questions which is thirty-one (31) [17 direct examination questions by Atty.
Andres plus 14 cross-examination questions by Prosecutor Viernes]. In Peraltas case, the Justices, after his
cross-examination, propounded a total of forty-one (41) questions.[39]
But more importantly, we note that the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations
characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.[40] (The insinuating type was best exemplified in one
question addressed to Peralta, which will be underscored.) Thus we beg to quote in length from the transcripts
pertaining to witness Monera, Tabuena and Peralta. (Questions from the Court are marked with asterisks and
italicized for emphasis.)
(MONERA)
(As a background, what was elicited from his direct examination is that the PNCC had receivables from MIAA
totalling P102,475,392.35, and although such receivables were largely billings for escalation, they were
nonetheless all due and demandable. What follows are the cross-examination of Prosecutor Viernes and the
court questions).
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q You admit that as shown by these Exhibits 7 and 7-a, the items here represent mostly escalation billings.
Were those escalation billings properly transmitted to MIA authorities?
A I dont have the documents right now to show that they were transmitted, but I have a letter by our President,
Mr. Olaguer, dated July 6, 1988, following up for payment of the balance of our receivables from MIA, sir.
*AJ AMORES
*Q This matter of escalation costs, is it not a matter for a conference between the MIA and the PNCC for the
determination as to the correct amount?
A I agree, your Honor. As far as we are concerned, our billings are what we deemed are valid receivables.
And, in fact, we have been following up for payment.
*Q This determination of the escalation costs was it accepted as the correct figure by MIA?
A I dont have any document as to the acceptance by MIA, your Honor, but our company was able to get a
document or a letter by Minister Ongpin to President Marcos, dated January 7, 1985, with a marginal note or
approval by former President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Basically, the letter of Mr. Ongpin is to what effect?
A The subject matter is approval of the supplementary contract and request for partial deferment of payment
for MIA Development Project, your Honor.
*Q It has nothing to do with the implementation of the escalation costs?
A The details show that most of the accounts refer to our escalations, your Honor.
*Q Does that indicate the computation for escalations were already billed or you do not have any proof of that?
A Our subsidiary ledger was based on billings to MIA and this letter of Minister Ongpin appears to have
confirmed our billings to MIA, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Were there partial payments made by MIA on these escalation billings?
A Based on records available as of today, the P102 million was reduced to about P56.7 million, if my
recollection is correct, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Were the payments made before or after February 1986, since Mr. Olaguer is a new entrant to your
company?
WITNESS
A The payments were made after December 31, 1985 but I think the payments were made before the entry of
our President, your Honor. Actually, the payment was in the form of: assignments to State Investment of about
P23 million; and then there was P17.8 million application against advances made or formerly given; and there
were payments to PNCC of about P2.6 million and there was a payment for application on withholding and
contractual stock of about P1 million; that summed up to P44.4 million all in all. And you deduct that from the
P102 million, the remaining balance would be about P57 million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q What you are saying is that, for all the payments made on this P102 million, only P2 million had been
payments in cash?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q The rest had been adjustments of accounts, assignments of accounts, or offsetting of accounts?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This is as of December 31, 1985?
A The P102 million was as of December 31, 1985, your Honor, but the balances is as of August 1987.
*Q We are talking now about the P44 million, more or less, by which the basic account has been reduced.
These reductions, whether by adjustment or assignment or actual delivery of cash, were made after December
31, 1985?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And your records indicate when these adjustments and payments were made?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q You said there were partial payments before of these escalation billings. Do we get it from you that there
was an admission of these escalation costs as computed by you by MIA, since there was already partial
payments?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q How were these payments made before February 1986, in case or check, if there were payments made?
A The P44 million payments was in the form of assignments, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The question of the Court is, before December 31, 1985, were there any liquidations made by MIA against
these escalation billings?
A I have not reviewed the details of the record, your Honor. But the ledger card indicates that there were
collections on page 2 of the Exhibit earlier presented. It will indicate that there were collections shown by
credits indicated on the credit side of the ledger.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your ledger does not indicate the manner of giving credit to the MIA with respect to the escalation billings.
Was the payment in cash or just credit of some sort before December 31, 1985?
A Before December 31, 1985, the reference of the ledger are official receipts and I suppose these were
payments in cash, your Honor.
*Q Do you know how the manner of this payment in cash was made by MIA?
A I do not know, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q But your records will indicate that?
A The records will indicate that, your Honor.
*Q Except that you were not asked to bring them?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q At all events, we are talking of settlement or partial liquidation prior to December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Subsequent thereto, we are talking merely of about P44 million?
A Yes, your Honor, as subsequent settlements.
*Q After December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And they have liquidated that, as you described it, by way of assignments, adjustments, by offsets and by
P2 million of cash payment?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your standard operating procedure before December 31, 1985 in connection with or in case of cash
payment, was the payment in cash or check?
A I would venture to say it was by check, your Honor.

*Q Which is the safest way to do it?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And the business way?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You mentioned earlier about the letter of former Minister Ongpin to the former President Marcos, did you say
that that letter concurs with the escalation billings reflected in Exhibits 7 and 7-a?
WITNESS
A The Company or the management is of the opinion that this letter, a copy of which we were able to get, is a
confirmation of the acceptance of our billings, sir.
Q This letter of Minister Ongpin is dated January 7, 1985, whereas the entries of escalation billings as
appearing in Exhibit 7 are dated June 30, 1985, would you still insist that the letter of January 1985 confirms
the escalation billings as of June 1985?
A The entries started June 30 in the ledger card. And as of December 31, 1985, it stood at P102 million after
payments were made as shown on the credit side of the ledger. I suppose hat the earlier amount, before the
payment was made, was bigger and therefore I would venture to say that the letter of January 7, 1985 contains
an amount that is part of the original contract account. What are indicated in the ledger are escalation billings.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q We are talking about the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A The letter of Minister Ongpin refers to escalation billings, sir.
*Q As of what date?
A The letter is dated January 7, 1985, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS. VIERNES
Q In accordance with this letter marked Exhibit 7 and 7-a, there were credits made in favor of MIA in July and
November until December 1985. These were properly credited to the account of MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q In 1986, from your records as appearing in Exhibit 7-a, there were no payments made to PNCC by MIA for
the months of January to June 1986?
A Yes, sir.
Q And neither was the amount of P22 million remitted to PNCC by MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY ANDRES
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ AMORES
*Q From your records, for the month of January 1986, there was no payment of this escalation account by
MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor. But on page 2 of Exhibit 7 there appears an assignment of P23 million, that was on
September 25, 1986.
*Q But that is already under the present administration?
A After February 1986, your Honor.
*Q But before February, in January 1986, there was no payment whatsoever by MIA to PNCC?
A Per record there is none appearing, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The earliest payment, whether by delivery of cash equivalent or of adjustment of account, or by assignment,
or by offsets, when did these payments begin?
A Per ledger card, there were payments in 1985, prior to December 31, 1985, your Honor.
*Q After December 31, 1985?

A There appears also P23 million as credit, that is a form of settlement, your Honor.
*Q This is as of September 25?
A Yes, your Honor. There were subsequent settlements. P23 million is just part of the P44 million.
*Q And what you are saying is that, PNCC passed the account to State Investment. In other words, State
Investment bought the credit of MIA?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And the amount of credit or receivables sold by PNCC to State Investment is P23 million?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is there a payback agreement?
A I have a copy of the assignment to State Investment but I have not yet reviewed the same, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q As of now, is this obligation of MIA, now NAIA, paid to PNCC?
A There is still a balance of receivables from MIA as evidenced by a collection letter by our President dated
July 6, 1988, your Honor. The amount indicated in the letter is P55 million.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Any clarifications you would like to make Mr. Estebal?
ATTY ESTEBAL
None, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Viernes?
PROS VIERNES
No more, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
The witness is excused. Thank you very much Mr. Monera. x x x.[41]
(TABUENA)
(In his direct examination, he testified that he caused the preparation of the checks totalling P55 Million
pursuant to the MARCOS Memorandum and that he thereafter delivered said amount in cash on the three (3)
dates as alleged in the information to Marcos private secretary Mrs. Jimenez at her office at Aguado Street,
who thereafter issued a receipt. Tabuena also denied having used the money for his own personal use.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q The amount of P55 million as covered by the three (3) checks Mr. Tabuena, were delivered on how many
occasions?
A Three times, sir.
Q And so, on the first two deliveries, you did not ask for a receipt from Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q It was only on January 30, 1986 that this receipt Exhibit 3 was issued by Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So January 30 is the date of the last delivery?
A I remember it was on the 31st of January, your Honor. What happened is that, I did not notice the date
placed by Mrs. Gimenez.
*Q Are you telling us that this Exhibit 3 was incorrectly dated?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Because the third delivery was on January 31st and yet the receipt was dated January 30?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was Exhibit 3 delivered actually by Mrs. Gimenez?
A January 31st, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You did not go to Malacaang on January 30, 1986?
A Yes, sir, I did not.
Q Do you know at whose instance this Exhibit 3 was prepared?
A I asked for it, sir.

Q You asked for it on January 31, 1986 when you made the last delivery?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see this Exhibit 3 prepared in the Office of Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q This receipt was typewritten in Malacaang stationery. Did you see who typed this receipt?
A No, sir. What happened is that, she went to her room and when she came out she gave me that receipt.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q What you are saying is, you do not know who typed that receipt?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Are you making an assumption that she typed that receipt?
A Yes, your Honor, because she knows how to type.
*Q Your assumption is that she typed it herself?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Proceed.
PROS. VIERNES
Q This receipt was prepared on January 31, although it is dated January 30?
A Yes, sir, because I was there on January 31st.
Q In what particular place did Mrs. Gimenez sign this Exhibit 3?
A In her office at Aguado, sir.
Q Did you actually see Mrs. Gimenez signing this receipt Exhibit 3?
A No, sir, I did not. She was inside her room.
Q So, she was in her room and when she came out of the room, she handed this receipt to you already typed
and signed?
A Yes, sir.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q So, how did you know this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez?
WITNESS
A Because I know her signature, your Honor. I have been receiving letters from her also and when she
requests for something from me. Her writing is familiar to me.
*Q So, when the Presiding Justice asked you as to how you knew that this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez
and you answered that you saw Mrs. Gimenez signed it, you were not exactly truthful?
A What I mean is, I did not see her sign because she went to her room and when she came out, she gave me
that receipt, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is why you have to wait for the question to be finished and listen to it carefully. Because when I asked
you, you said you saw her signed it. Be careful Mr. Tabuena.
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q Was there another person inside the office of Mrs. Gimenez when she gave you this receipt Exhibit 3?
A Nobody, sir.
Q I noticed in this receipt that the last delivery of the sum of P55 million was made on January 30. Do we
understand from you that this date January 30 is erroneous?
A Yes, sir, that January 30 is erroneous. I noticed it only afterwards. This should be January 31st, sir.
PROS VIERNES
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ANDRES
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why did you not ask for a receipt on the first and second deliveries?
A Because I know that the delivery was not complete yet, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So you know that the total amount to be delivered was P55 million?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Response by Mr. Peralta to the testimony of Mr. Tabuena.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
We are adopting the testimony of Mr. Tabuena and we will also present the accused, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q From whom did you receive the Presidents memorandum marked Exhibit 1? Or more precisely, who
handed you this memorandum?
A Mrs. Fe Roa Gimenez, your Honor.
*Q Did you ask Mrs. Fe Gimenez for what purpose the money was being asked?
A The money was in payment for the debt of the MIA Authority to PNCC, your Honor.
*Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no voucher prepared to cover such payment? In
other words, why was the delivery of the money not covered by any voucher?Calrky
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this particular disbursement?
A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of the President for obligations of the MIAA
in payment of its obligation to another entity?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the President.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?
A Yes, your Honor.

*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such payment was being ordered?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Why not?
A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed, your Honor.
*Q Before receiving this memorandum Exhibit 1, did the former President Marcos discuss this matter with you?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was that?
A He called me up earlier, a week before that, that he wants to me pay what I owe the PNCC directly to his
office in cash, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q By I OWE, you mean the MIAA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q And what did you say in this discussion you had with him?
A I just said, Yes, sir, I will do it/
*Q Were you the one who asked for a memorandum to be signed by him?
A No, your Honor.
*Q After receiving that verbal instruction for you to pay MIAAs obligation with PNCC, did you not on your own
accord already prepare the necessary papers and documents for the payment of that obligation?
A He told me verbally in the telephone that the Order for the payment of that obligation is forthcoming, your
Honor. I will receive it.
*Q Is this the first time you received such a memorandum from the President?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And was that the last time also that you received such a memorandum?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you not inquire, if not from the President, at least from Mrs. Gimenez why this procedure has to be
followed instead of the regular procedure?
A: No, sir.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Why did you not ask?
A I was just ordered to do this thing, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q You said there was an I OWE YOU?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Where is that I OWE YOU now?
A All I know is that we owe PNCC the amount of P99.1 million, your Honor. MIAA owes PNCC that amount.
*Q Was this payment covered by receipt from the PNCC?
A It was not covered, your Honor.
*Q So the obligation of MIAA to PNCC was not, for the record, cancelled by virtue of that payment?
A Based on the order to me by the former President Marcos ordering me to pay that amount to his office and
then the mechanics will come after, your Honor.
*Q Is the PNCC a private corporation or government entity?
A I think it is partly government, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the former CDCP?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why were you not made to pay directly to the PNCC considering that you are the Manager of MIA at that
time and the PNCC is a separate corporation, not an adjunct of Malacaang?
WITNESS
A I was just basing it from the Order of Malacaang to pay PNCC through the Office of the President, your
Honor.
*Q Do you know the President or Chairman of the Board of PNCC?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q How was the obligation of MIAA to PNCC incurred. Was it through the President or Chairman of the Board?
A PNCC was the one that constructed the MIA, your Honor.
*Q Was the obligation incurred through the President or Chairman of the Board or President of the PNCC? In
other words, who signed the contract between PNCC and MIAA?
A Actually, we inherited this obligation, your Honor. The one who signed for this was the former Director of BAT
which is General Singzon. Then when the MIA Authority was formed, all the obligations of BAT were
transferred to MIAA. So the accountabilities of BAT were transferred to MIAA and we are the ones that are
going to pay, your Honor.
*Q Why did you agree to pay to Malacaang when your obligation was with the PNCC?
A I was ordered by the President to do that, your Honor.
*Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact that this was not the regular course or
Malacaang was not the creditor?
A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming from the President, your Honor.
*Q The amount was not a joke, amounting to P55 million, and you agreed to deliver money in this amount
through a mere receipt from the private secretary?
A I was ordered by the President, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q There is no question and it can be a matter of judicial knowledge that you have been with the MIA for
sometime?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Prior to 1986?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Can you tell us when you became the Manager of MIA?
A I became Manager of MIA way back, late 1968, your Honor.
*Q Long before the MIA was constituted as an independent authority?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And by 1986, you have been running the MIA for 18 years?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And prior to your joining the MIA, did you ever work for the government?
A No, your Honor.

*Q So, is it correct for us to say that your joining the MIA in 1968 as its Manager was your first employment
with the government?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q While you were Manager of MIA, did you have other subsequent concurrent positions in the government
also?
A I was also the Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board, your Honor.
*Q But you were not the executive or operating officer of the Games and Amusement Board?
A I was, your Honor.
*Q As Chairman you were running the Games and Amusement Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q What else, what other government positions did you occupy that time?
A I was also Commissioner of the Game Fowl Commission, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the cockfighting?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Here, you were just a member of the Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So you were not running the commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Any other entity?
A No more, your Honor.
*Q As far as you can recall, besides being the Manager of the MIA and later the MIAA for approximately 18
years, you also ran the Games and Amusement Board as its executive officer?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And you were a commissioner only of the Game Fowl Commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Who was running the commission at that time?

A I forgot his name, but he retired already, your Honor.
*Q All of us who joined the government, sooner or later, meet with our Resident COA representative?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And one of our unfortunate experience (sic) is when the COA Representative comes to us and says:
Chairman or Manager, this cannot be. And we learn later on that COA has reasons for its procedure and we
learn to adopt to them?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q As a matter of fact, sometimes we consider it inefficient, sometimes we consider it foolish, but we know
there is reason in this apparent madness of the COA and so we comply?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And more than anything else the COA is ever anxious for proper documentation and proper supporting
papers?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Sometimes, regardless of the amount?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Now, you have P55 million which you were ordered to deliver in cash, not to the creditor of the particular
credit, and to be delivered in armored cars to be acknowledged only by a receipt of a personal secretary. After
almost 18 years in the government service and having had that much time in dealing with COA people, did it
not occur to you to call a COA representative and say, What will I do here?
A I did not, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Did you not think that at least out of prudence, you should have asked the COA for some guidance on this
matter so that you will do it properly?
WITNESS
A What I was going to do is, after those things I was going to tell that delivery ordered by the President to the
COA, your Honor.
*Q That is true, but what happened here is that you and Mr. Dabao or you and Mr. Peralta signed requests for
issuance of Managers checks and you were accommodated by the PNB Office at Nichols without any internal
documentation to justify your request for Managers checks?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q Of course we had no intimation at that time that Mr. Marcos will win the elections but even then, the Daily
Express, which was considered to be a newspaper friendly to the Marcoses at that time, would occasionally
come with so-called expose, is that not so?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And worst, you had the so-called mosquito press that would always come out with the real or imagined
scandal in the government and place it in the headline, do you recall that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under these circumstances, did you not entertain some apprehension that some disloyal employees might
leak you out and banner headline it in some mosquito publications like the Malaya at that time?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
I bring this up because we are trying to find out different areas of fear. We are in the government and we in the
government fear the COA and we also fear the press. We might get dragged into press releases on the most
innocent thing. You believe that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And usually our best defense is that these activities are properly documented?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In this particular instance, your witnesses have told us about three (3) different trips from Nichols to Aguado
usually late in the day almost in movie style fashion. I mean, the money being loaded in the trunk of your
official car and then you had a back-up truck following your car?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is that not quite a fearful experience to you?
A I did not think of that at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q You did not think it fearful to be driving along Roxas Boulevard with P25 million in the trunk of your car?
WITNESS
A We have security at that time your Honor.
ATTY. ANDRES
Your Honor, the P25 million was in the armored car; only P5 million was in the trunk of his car.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you for the correction. Even P1 million only. How much more with P5 million inside the trunk of your car,
was that not a nervous experience?
A As I have said, your Honor, I never thought of that.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much, Mr. Tabuena. You are excused. x x x.[42]
(PERALTA)
(He testified on direct examination that he co-signed with Tabuena a memorandum request for the issuance of
the Managers Check for P5 Million upon order of Tabuena and that he [Peralta] was aware that MIAA had an
existing obligation with PNCC in the amount of around P27 Million. He affirmed having accompanied Tabuena
at the PNB Villamor Branch to withdraw the P5 Million, but denied having misappropriated for his own benefit
said amount or any portion thereof.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS VIERNES
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why was it necessary for you to co-sign with Mr. Tabuena the
request for issuance of Managers check in the amount of P5 million?
A At that time I was the Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, sir, and all withdrawals of funds should
have my signature because I was one of the signatories at that time.
Q As Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, you always co-sign with Mr. Tabuena in similar requests for
the issuance of Managers checks by the PNB?
A That is the only occasion I signed, sir.
Q Did you say you were ordered by Mr. Tabuena to sign the request?
A Yes, sir, and I think the order is part of the exhibits. And based on that order, I co-signed in the request for
the issuance of Managers check in favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena.
PROS VIERNES
Q Was there a separate written order for you to co-sign with Mr. Tabuena?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir, an order was given to me by Mr. Tabuena.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Was that marked in evidence?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What exhibit?
WITNESS
I have here a copy, your Honor. This was the order and it was marked as exhibit N.
PROS VIERNES
It was marked as Exhibit M, your Honor.
Q How did you know there was an existing liability of MIAA in favor of PNCC at that time?
A Because prior to this memorandum of Mr. Tabuena, we prepared the financial statement of MIAA as of
December 31, 1985 and it came to my attention that there was an existing liability of around P27,999,000.00,
your Honor.
Q When was that Financial Statement prepared?
A I prepared it around January 22 or 24, something like that, of 1986, sir.
Q Is it your usual practice to prepare the Financial Statement after the end of the year within three (3) weeks
after the end of the year?
A Yes, sir, it was a normal procedure for the MIAA to prepare the Financial Statement on or before the 4th
Friday of the month because there will be a Board of Directors Meeting and the Financial Statement of the prior
month will be presented and discussed during the meeting.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This matter of preparing Financial Statement was not an annual activity but a monthly activity?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This Financial Statement you prepared in January of 1986 recapitulated the financial condition as of the end
of the year?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You made mention of a request for Escalation Clause by former Minister Ongpin. Did you personally see that
request?
A When this order coming from Mr. Tabuena was shown to me, I was shown a copy, sir. I have no file because
I just read it.
Q It was Mr. Tabuena who showed you the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
And that will be Exhibit?
ATTY. ANDRES
Exhibit 2 and 2-A, your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q You also stated that you were with Mr. Tabuena when you withdrew the amount of P5 million from the PNB
Extension Office at Villamor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was it necessary for you to go with him on that occasion?
A Mr. Tabuena requested me to do the counting by million, sir. So what I did was to bundle count the P5 million
and it was placed in two (2) peerless boxes.
Q Did you actually participate in the counting of the money by bundles?
A Yes, sir.
Q Bundles of how much per bundle?
A If I remember right, the bundles consisted of P100s and P50s, sir.
Q No P20s and P10s?
A Yes, sir, I think it was only P100s and P50s.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q If there were other denominations, you can not recall?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q In how many boxes were those bills placed?
A The P5 million were placed in two (2) peerless boxes, sir.

Q And you also went with Mr. Tabuena to Aguado?
A No, sir, I was left behind at Nichols. After it was placed at the trunk of the car of Mr. Tabuena, I was left
behind and I went back to my office at MIA.
Q But the fact is that, this P5 million was withdrawn at passed 5:00 oclock in the afternoon?
A I started counting it I think at around 4:30, sir. It was after office hours. But then I was there at around 4:00
oclock and we started counting at around 4:30 p.m. because they have to place it in a room, which is the office
of the Manager at that time.
Q And Mr. Tabuena left for Malacaang after 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of that date?
A Yes, sir. After we have counted the money, it was placed in the peerless boxes and Mr. Tabuena left for
Malacaang.
PROS VIERNES
Q And you yourself, returned to your office at MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q Until what time do you hold office at the MIA?
A Usually I over-stayed for one (1) or two (2) hours just to finish the paper works in the office, sir.
Q So, even if it was already after 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, you still went back to your office at MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Did you not consider it as odd that your obligation with the PNCC had to be paid in cash?
WITNESS
A Based on the order of President Marcos that we should pay in cash, it was not based on the normal
procedure, your Honor.
*Q And, as Acting Financial Services Manager, you were aware that all disbursements should be covered by
vouchers?
A Yes, your Honor, the payments should be covered by vouchers. But then, inasmuch as what we did was to
prepare a request to the PNB, then this can be covered by Journal Voucher also.
*Q Was such payment of P5 million covered by a Journal Voucher?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you present that Journal Voucher here in Court?
A We have a copy, your Honor.
*Q Do you have a copy or an excerpt of that Journal Voucher presented in Court to show that payment?
A We have a copy of the Journal Voucher, your Honor.
*Q Was this payment of P5 million ever recorded in a cashbook or other accounting books of MIAA?
A The payment of P5 million was recorded in a Journal Voucher, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the recording was made directly to the Journal?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q There are no other separate documents as part of the application for Managers Check?
A Yes, your Honor, there was none.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q After the payment was made, did your office receive any receipt from PNCC?
A I was shown a receipt by Mr. Tabuena, the receipt given by Mrs. Fe Roa Gimenez, your Honor. Inasmuch as
the payment should be made through the Office of the president, I accepted the receipt given by Mrs. Fe
Gimenez to Mr. Tabuena.
*Q After receiving that receipt, did you prepare the necessary supporting documents, vouchers, and use that
receipt as a supporting document to the voucher?
A Your Honor, a Journal Voucher was prepared for that.
*Q How about a disbursement voucher?
A Inasmuch as this was a request for Managers check, no disbursement voucher was prepared, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Since the payment was made on January 31, 1986, and that was very close to the election held in that year,
did you not entertain any doubt that the amounts were being used for some other purpose?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, we are objecting to the question on the ground that it is improper.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I dont think there was any basis, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection on record.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q As a Certified Public Accountant and Financial Manager of the MIAA, did you not consider it proper that a
check be issued only after it is covered by a disbursement voucher duly approved by the proper authorities?
A Your Honor, what we did was to send a request for a Managers check to the PNB based on the request of
Mr. Tabuena and the order of Mr. Tabuena was based on the Order of President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In your capacity as Financial Services Manager of the MIAA, did you not think it proper to have this
transaction covered by a disbursement voucher?
WITNESS
A Based on my experience, payments out of cash can be made through cash vouchers, or even though
Journal Vouchers, or even through credit memo, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q This was an obligation of the MIAA to the PNCC. Why did you allow a disbursement by means of check in
favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena, your own manager?
A We based the payment on the order of Mr. Tabuena because that was the order of President Marcos to pay
PNCC through the Office of the President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor.
*Q You are supposed to pay only on legal orders. Did you consider that legal?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, the question calls for a conclusion of the witness.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering that the witness is an expert, witness may answer.
WITNESS
A The order of president Marcos was legal at that time because the order was to pay PNCC the amount of P5
million through the Office of the President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor. And at that time, I know
for a fact also that there was an existing P.D. wherein the President of the Republic of the Philippines can
transfer funds from one office to another and the PNCC is a quasi government entity at that time.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Are you saying that this transaction was made on the basis of that P.D. which you referred to?
A I am not aware of the motive of the President, but then since he is the President of the Philippines, his order
was to pay the PNCC through the Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q As Financial Manager, why did you allow a payment in cash when ordinarily payment of an obligation of
MIAA is supposed to be paid in check?
A I caused the payment through the name of Mr. Tabuena because that was the order of Mr. Tabuena and also
he received an order coming from the President of the Philippines at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the Journals to correct certain statements of
accounts earlier made in the same journal?
In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal Voucher is to explain a transaction was
otherwise not recorded.
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper, you are saying it is proper only because of
the exceptional nature of the transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally authorize such a movement of money unless it is
properly documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the question is misleading because what the
witness stated is...
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the language you are speaking, and therefore,
you might be coaching him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that...
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness stated earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this
particular case was supported, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled, may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of the General Manager at that time and the
order of President Marcos, your Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate basis for the movement of money?
A Yes, your Honor, because at that time we have also a recorded liability of P27 million.
*Q We are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we are saying is, is the order of the General
Manager by itself adequate with no other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
A Yes, your Honor. The order of Mr. Luis Tabuena was based on our existing liability of P27,931,000.00,
inasmuch as we have that liability and I was shown the order of President Marcos to pay P5 million through the
Office of the President, I considered the order of Mr. Luis Tabuena, the order of President Marcos and also the
existing liability of P27 million sufficient to pay the amount of P5 million. Inasmuch as there is also an
escalation clause of P99.1 million, the payment of P5 million is fully covered by those existing documents.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not asking you whether or not there was valid
obligation. We are not asking you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether or not this particular
order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to justify the movement of funds?
WITNESS
When we pay, your Honor, we always look for the necessary documents and at that time I know for a fact that
there was this existing liability.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to the question being asked and not to
whatever you wanted to say. I know you are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your statement that
there are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the order of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
WITNESS
A As far as I am concerned, your Honor, inasmuch as we have a liability and I was shown the Order of
President Marcos to pay PNCC through his office, I feel that the order of the General Manager, the order of
President Marcos, and also the memorandum of Minister Ongpin are sufficient to cause the payment of P5
million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to transfer funds from one department to another,
is this not the one that refers to the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is concerned?
WITNESS
A Because at that time, your Honor, I have knowledge that the President is authorized through a Presidential
Decree to transfer government funds from one office to another.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA covered by the Appropriation Act?
A I think the liability was duly recorded and appropriations to pay the amount is.....
(interrupted)
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are you just throwing words at us in the hope
that we will forget what the question is?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA are covered by the Appropriations Act so that the
payment of this debt would be in the same level as the realignment of funds authorized the President? Or are
you telling as you did not read the Decree?
A I was aware of that Decree, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the Decrees authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not an officer of the MIAA, was he?
A No, your Honor.
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different officers and different officials in any company
either government or private, which are supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by authority of not only one person alone so
that nobody will restrain him?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one person can dispose of funds in any way he
likes?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to documents and negotiable documents is for the
same purpose?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as Financial Services Manager and as counter
signatory are in a position to tell Mr. Tabuena, I am sorry, you are my superior but this disbursement is not
proper and, therefore, I will not sign it., if in your opinion the disbursement is not proper?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, as co-signatory, you are expected to exercise your judgment as to the propriety of a particular
transaction?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and because you are a Certified Public
Accountant?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO

*Q You admit that the payment of P5 million and P50 million were unusual in the manner with which they were
disposed?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you submit a written protest to the manner in which such amount was being disposed of?
A A written protest was not made, your Honor, but I called the attention of Mr. Tabuena that since this payment
was upon the order of President Marcos, then I think as President he can do things which are not ordinary.
*Q If you did not prepare a written protest, did you at least prepare a memorandum for the record that this was
an extra-ordinary transaction?
A I called the attention of Mr. Tabuena that this was an extra-ordinary transaction and no written note, your
Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much Mr. Peralta, you are excused. x x x.[43]
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind
upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides.[44] But not only
should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions,[45] the right should be sparingly and
judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of the trial.[46] Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one
avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the
cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-
examined the witnesses, their cross-examinations supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far
exceeding the latters questions in length. The cold neutrality of an impartial judge requirement of due process
was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the observation made in the Dissenting Opinion to the effect that
the majority of this Court was unduly disturbed with the number of court questions alone, is quite inaccurate. A
substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on numbers alone, but
more importantly to show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart
from that common standard of fairness and impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the
records, confronted with numbers without necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court. In US v. De Sisto (2
Cir., 1961, 289 F 2d 833), for example, a new trial was required because the trial judge, as in this case,
indulged in extensive questioning of defendant and his witnesses, and the reviewing court also had to amplify
on numbers to bolster this. It was pointed out in the De Sisto case that the judge asked 3,115 questions of all
witnesses, the prosecutor asked but 1,381, defense counsel 3,330. The judges questions to the defendant De
Sisto totalled 306, the prosecutors 347, and the defense counsels, 201. After referring to these figures, the
court stated:
. . . It is indeed an impressive proportion, but no such mathematical computation is of itself determinative.

However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous examination of the defendant himself by the
judge, and the repeated belittling by the judge of defendants efforts to establish the time that Fine left the pier,
we fear that in its zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury too strong an impression of
the courts belief in the defendants probable guilt to permit the jury freely to perform its own function of
independent determination of the facts. x x x
The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive that it cannot
be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard employed in a non-jury trial where
the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional
relevant evidence. At the risk of being repetitious, we will amplify on this via some specific examples. Based on
the evidence on record, and on the admission of Tabuena himself, the P55 million was delivered to the
Presidents Office thru Mrs. Gimenez, in obedience to the Presidential directive. One Sandiganbayan Justice,
however, hurled the following questions to Peralta:
AJ DEL ROSARIO
Q: Since the payment was made on January 31, 1986, and that was very close to the election held in that year,
did you not entertain any doubt that the amounts were being used for some other purposes?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, We are objecting to the question on the ground that it is
improper.
AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I dont think there was any basis, Your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection on record.
Nothing from the preceding questions of counsels or of the court would serve as basis for this question. How
then, can this be considered even relevant? What is the connection between the payment made to the
Presidents office and the then forthcoming presidential snap election? In another instance, consider the
following questions of Presiding Justice Garchitorena:
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the Journals to correct certain statements of
accounts earlier made in the same journal?
xxx
*Q In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal Voucher is to explain a transaction was
otherwise not recorded.
xxx
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper, you are saying it is proper only because of
the exceptional nature of the transactions?
xxx
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally authorize such a movement of money unless it is
properly documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the question is misleading because what the
witness stated is...
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the language you are speaking, and therefore,
you might be coaching him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that...
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness stated earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this
particular case was supported, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled, may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of the General Manager at that time and the
order of President Marcos, your Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate basis for the movement of money?
*Q We are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we are saying is, is the order of the General
Manager by itself adequate with no other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not asking you whether or not there was valid
obligation. We are not asking you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether or not this particular
order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to the question being asked and not to
whatever you wanted to say. I know you are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your statement that
there are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the order of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to transfer funds from one department to another,
is this not the one that refers to the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is concerned?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA covered by the Appropriation Act?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are you just throwing words at us in the hope
that we will forget what the question is?
xxx
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA are covered by the Appropriations Act so that the
payment of this debt would be in the same level as the realignment of funds authorized the President? Or are
you telling as you did not read the Decree?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the Decrees authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not an officer of the MIAA, was he?
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different officers and different officials in any company
either government or private, which are supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by authority of not only one person alone so
that nobody will restrain him?
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one person can dispose of funds in any way he
likes?
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to documents and negotiable documents is for the
same purpose?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?

*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
*Q In other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as Financial Services Manager and as counter
signatory are in a position to tell Mr. Tabuena, I am sorry, you are my superior but this disbursement is not
proper and, therefore, I will not sign it., if in your opinion the disbursement is not proper?
*Q Therefore, as co-signatory, you are expected to exercise your judgment as to the propriety of a particular
transaction?
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and because you are a Certified Public
Accountant?[47]
How can these questions be considered clarificatory when they clearly border more on cross-examination
questions? Thus, the Dissenting Opinions focus on the distinction between the two kinds of trial to justify the
Sandiganbayans active participation in the examination of petitioners Tabuena and Peralta and witness
Monera, with due respect, appears insignificant to this case. Let it, therefore, be emphasized anew that:
A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression that he is allied
with the prosecution.[48]
We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of the transaction, but it is
never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for
the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant
accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of society.[49]
Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at length. The
circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so doing....This court, however, has more
than once said that the examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and the
instances are rare and the conditions exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an
extensive examination. It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he may deem improper
questions by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for the judge
to preserve a judicial attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a trial, and it is his duty to see
that justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to conduct such examinations. The extent to which this
shall be done must largely be a matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular
case, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of an advocate....[50]
While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the discretion of the trial
judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding
judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at
the expense of occasional delays....The judge is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and while he has the
right, and it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that justice shall prevail, we can conceive of no
other reason, for him to take the trial of the cause out of the hands of counsel.[51]
The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is believed the instances are
rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which will justify the presiding judge in entering upon and
conducting an extended examination of a witness, and that the exercise of a sound discretion will seldom deem
such action necessary or advisable.[52]
He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary
waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue interference,
impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses,
especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the
proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.[53]
The impartiality of the judge his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of either one side or
the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special importance in criminal
cases....[54]
Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to
dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties,
should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less partial attitude in order not to create
any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for
the preservation of the peoples faith in our courts.[55]
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are
entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.[56]
We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent in that
those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape criminal liability by
the mere expedient of invoking good faith. It must never be forgotten, however, that we render justice on a
case to case basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is presented. Thus, where the evidence
warrants an acquittal, as in this case, we are mandated not only by the dictates of law but likewise of
conscience to grant the same. On the other hand, it does not follow that all those similarly accused will
necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on this case as a precedent. For the decision in this case to be a
precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the evidence that led to the petitioners acquittal must also be
present in subsequent cases.
Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a dangerous precedent and an actual violation of

constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For the most
dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so that it becomes
lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the
malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of
visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant
[G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017]
D E C I S I O N VELASCO. JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06456, which
affirmed accused-appellant's conviction for the offense of murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, in its Decision in Criminal
Case No. P-4100, promulgated on September 3, 2013.
The present case stems from an Information filed against accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa (Roa) on
June 5, 2007, charging him for the murder of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as follows:
That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay San Miguel, Municipality of Bula,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and stab Eliseo Delmiguez with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as "ginunting," hitting and
injuring the body of the latter, inflicting multiple mortal hack wound[s] thereon, which were the immediate and
direct cause of his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount
that may be proven in court.
That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying circumstance or which qualified the killing to
murder, and 2) [w]ith taking advantage of superior strength, as aggravating circumstance.2
The Facts
The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are as follows:
A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is known to have suffered mental disorder
prior to his commission of the crime charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said condition to an
incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson]
Ballebar claimed to have learned from others and the mother of the accused that the ailment is due to his use
of illegal drugs when he was working in Manila. When accused returned from Manila in 2001 , Issac recalled
that, in marked contrast to the silent and formal deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the
latter became talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself' and "complaining of a headache."
On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J. Rodriguez
Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005 certification issued by
Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent treatment for schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical
Center] BMC in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. In her Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. [Edessa
Padre-]Laguidao also stated that accused was prescribed antipsychotic medication which he was, however,
not able to continue taking due to financial constraints. Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew
accused since childhood, admitted hearing about the latter's mental health issues and/or his treatment therefor.
Throughout the wake of an unnamed aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac that
accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all the way to Bagumbayan, Bula.
On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually silent, refused to take a bath and even
quarreled with his mother when prompted to do so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it appears that Eliseo,
then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in front of the store of Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3, San
Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters, the pair was spotted by Rico who, while
waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby.
When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was approached from behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him
on the left lower back with a bolo locally known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches. Taken
aback, Eliseo exclaimed "Tara man, " before falling to the ground. Chased by both Edgar and Rico and spotted
running by Mrs. Sombrero who went out of the Barangay Hall upon hearing the resultant din, accused
immediately fled and took refuge inside the house of his uncle, Camilo Mejaro.
With the incident already attracting people's attention, Barangay Captain Herminion Ballebar called for police
assistance even as Isaac tried to appease Eliseo's relatives. Entering Camilo's house, Issac saw accused who
said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly thereafter, SPO 1 Hermilando Manzano arrived on board
a motorcycle with SPO 1 Ballebar who called on accused to surrender. Upon his voluntary surrender and tum
over of the jungle knife he was holding to the police officers, accused was brought to the Bula Municipal Police
Station for investigation and detention. In the meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Bula Municipal Health
Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival and, after the necropsy examination, later certified by Dr.
Consolacion to have died of Hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds.3 (citations omitted)
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty," but in the certificate of arraignment, he signed his
name as "Amado M. Tetangco." Trial on the merits ensued. There was no contest over the fact that accused-
appellant, indeed, stabbed the victim, but he interposed the defense of insanity.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur found that accused-
appellant is guilty of the offense of Murder. The RTC ruled that the defense of insanity was not sufficiently
proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from the offense charged. The RIC noted that as an exempting
circumstance, insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, the RTC said, the accused must be shown to
be deprived of reason or that he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. It is the accused who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity that has the burden of proving the same with clear and convincing evidence. This
entails, the RTC added, opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude
that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.4
In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he failed to discharge the burden of proving the claim of
insanity. First, while Isaac Mejaro's testimony was able to sufficiently prove that accused-appellant started
having mental health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court ruled that his past medical history does not suffice
to support a finding that he was likewise insane at the time that he perpetrated the killing of Delmiguez in 2007.
To the trial court, the lack of showing of any psychotic incidents from the time of his discharge in 2002 until
March 2007 suggests that his insanity is only occasional or intermittent and, thus, precludes the presumption of
continuity.5
Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant exhibited abnormal behavior after the incident,
particularly in writing the name of Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It also noted that
midway through the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, accused-appellant's mental condition
worsened, prompting his counsel to file another motion for psychiatric evaluation and treatment, and that he
was subsequently diagnosed again to be suffering from schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type. The trial
court, however, cited the rule that the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be
accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crime. The trial court then ruled that the witnesses' account of the incident provides no clue
regarding the state of mind of the accused, and all that was established was that he approached Delmiguez
from behind and stabbed him on his lower back. To the trial court, this actuation of the accused, together with
his immediate flight and subsequent surrender to the police authorities, is not indicative of insanity.
Finally, while the accused was reputed to be "crazy" in his community, the trial court ruled that such is of little
consequence to his cause. It said:
The popular conception of the word "crazy" is to describe a person or act that is unnatural or out of the
ordinary. A man may, therefore, behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily or conclusively prove
that he is legally so. The legal standard requires that the accused must be so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent.6
Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Christopher Mejaro Roa GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez the following sums: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of said victim; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of conviction by the trial court. The CA first noted
that all the elements of the crime of murder had been sufficiently established by the evidence on record. On the
other hand, the defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA said:
Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to prove that he was insane when he fatally
stabbed the victim on March 16, 2007. To prove his defense, accused-appellant's witnesses including Dr.
Edessa Padre-Laguidao testified that they knew him to be insane because he was brought and confined to the
Bicol Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry for treatment in the year 2001 . However, such fact does not
necessarily follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the time he fatally attacked and stabbed the
victim, Eliseo Delmiguez. No convincing evidence was presented by the defense to show that he was not in his
right mind, or that he had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally
been regarded as insane around the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him.
An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the act under prosecution was committed. Mere prior confinement in a mental institution does not
prove that a person was deprived of reason at the time the crime was committed. It must be noted that
accused-appllant was discharged from the mental hospital in 2002, or long before he committed the crime
charged. He who relies on such plea of insanity (proved at another time) must prove its existence also at the
time of the commission of the offense. This, accused-appellant failed to do.7 (citations ommitted)
Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses that purport to support the claim of
insanity are based on assumptions, and are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to be convincing. To
the CA, their observation that accused-appellant exhibited unusual behavior is not sufficient proof of his
insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.8 On the contrary,
the CA found that the circumstances of the attack bear indicia that the killing was done voluntarily, to wit: (1)
the use of a long bolo locally known as ginunting, (2) the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of
accused-appellant to flee from the scene of the crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being called by
the police authorities.
Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the conviction of the RTC for the offense charged.
The CA merely modified the award of damages, and dispositively held, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher
Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is ORDERED
to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as civil indemnity for the death
of the said victim, (b) P50,000 .00 as moral damages, and (c) P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages as provided
by the Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear
legal interest at the rate of six [percent] (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.9
Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, accused-appellant elevated the case before this Court by way of a Notice of
Appeal.10
The Issue
The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold the
conviction of accused-appellant for the offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, there being no contest that accused-appellant perpetrated the stabbing of the victim, which
caused the latter's death, the resolution of the present issue hinges on the pleaded defense of insanity.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA. Hence, the assailed Decision
affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for murder must be upheld.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to discuss the nature of the defense of
insanity as an exempting circumstance. The Court there said:
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served
by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.
xxxx
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by
a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony
or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. (citations omitted)
In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature of
confession and avoidance.12 Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane,
a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already
admitted committing the crime.13 This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper,
the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an
exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting
circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged.14
In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of accused-appellant Roa was supported by the testimony of the
following witnesses: (1) his uncle, Isaac Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs. Lourdes Padregon
Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao).
Dr. Laguidao testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted at the Bicol Medical Center, and was
discharged in 2002. She examined accused-appellant on March 15, 2012 and August 15, 2012. She evaluated
his mental condition and found out that his answers to her queries were unresponsive, and yielding a
meaningless conversation. She then diagnosed him as having undifferentiated type of Schizophrenia,
characterized by manifest illusions and auditory hallucinations which are commanding in nature. She also
recommended anti-psychotic drug maintenance.15
Mejaro testified that accused-appellant's mental illness could be attributed to an incident way back in May 8,
2000, when he was struck on the head by some teenager. After that incident, accused-appellant, who used to
be silent and very formal, became very talkative and always talked to himself and complained of headaches.
On September 27, 2001, accused-appellant had a psychotic episode, prompting his mother to confine him at
Don Suzano Rodriguez Mental Hospital (DSRMH). He was observed to be well after his confinement. The
illness recurred, however, when he failed to maintain his medications. The symptoms became worse in March
2007, when his aunt died. He neither slept nor ate, and kept walking by himself in the morning until evening.
He did not want to take a bath, and even quarreled with his mother when told to do so.16
The foregoing testimonies must be examined in light of the quantum of proof required, which is that of clear
and convincing evidence to prove that the insanity existed immediately preceding or simultaneous to the
commission of the offense.
Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster.
First, the testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from undifferentiated
schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the accused in 2012, or about five years after the crime
was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was committed is irrelevant for purposes of
determining whether he was also insane when he committed the offense. While it may be said that the 2012
diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony that the accused was also diagnosed with
schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the
accused is pure hearsay, as she had no personal participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that
portion of her testimony is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely provides
basis for accused-appellant's mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense in 2007.
Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was insane
during the commission of the offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the possible underlying
reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao's testimony, it failed to shed
light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately prior to, during, and immediately after accused-
appellant stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation.
Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case, because of
the rule that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane is presumed to
continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while accused-appellant was confined in a
mental institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his
confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors would not have
allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity
resumes and must prevail.
In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental
condition when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the date of the
commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-appellant was
conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court cannot sweepingly conclude that
accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year period from 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him
criminal liability for an act committed in 2007. It was the defense's duty to fill in the gap in accused-appellant's
state of mind between the 2001 diagnosis and the 2012 diagnosis, and unfortunately, it failed to introduce
evidence to paint a full picture of accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in 2007.
With that, the Court has no other option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity, and conclude that when
accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was conscious of what he was doing, and was not suffering from an
insanity.
This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the circumstances
surrounding the incident.1âwphi1 As the prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee's Brief, there are
circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence on the part of accused-
appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. This is
supported by the companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any
danger when they saw accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accused-appellant's attempt to
flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that what he just committed
was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily
came out of the house where he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them.
The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he committed
the offense indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed the act of stabbing,
knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such act of stabbing is a morally reprehensible
wrong. His actions and reactions immediately preceding and succeeding the act of stabbing are similar if not
the same as that expected of a fully sane person.
Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that
accused-appellant's culpability had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to the award of damages, however, the Court finds the need to modify the same, in line with the rule
enunciated in People v. Jugueta, where the Court laid down the rule that in cases where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded damages should be ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000
as moral damages and ₱75,000 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 06456, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of the Decision must read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher
Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accusedappellant is ORDERED
to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
of the said victim, (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and (c) ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided
by the Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANACITO OPURAN, appellant. [G.R. Nos. 147674-75.
March 17, 2004]
D E C I S I O N DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan, Province
of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to
kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5 long from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting
upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.[1]
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as
pisao, thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which wounds
resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.[2]
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued.[3]
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution witness
Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were
outside sitting side by side with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying
on a bench.[4]
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambis house, shouting: Theres a long-haired man! Bambi stood up and
looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the
latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on different
parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambis house, with Anacito chasing him. Bambi
immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter tried to force the
door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito
left.[5]
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the hospital. He
saw Anacitos two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said: Never mind because
he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced.[6] As nobody from among his neighbors responded to his plea
for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion of the neighborhood.
Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to the hospital. Allan,
however, died about fifteen minutes later.[7]
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the latters
wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people running.
He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.[8]
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise
noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-called
lovers lane, Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to four
times.[9]
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He then
saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents house, but the latter did not make it because he collapsed near
the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the Opurans.
Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital, where he died the
following day.[10]
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of
Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allans body, one of which was fatal because it affected
the upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel.[11] Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds and died of
pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage.[12]
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He declared that
on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another barangay in
Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight policemen
entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the police station and
detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place and time of the stabbing
incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom he had not quarreled with.
As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He
asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and lowly regarded by his
accusers.[13]
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present witnesses. Then
on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the following grounds: (1) on 10
January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing the psychiatric
examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito underwent a psychiatric examination on 26
January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000
stating that Anacito had a normal mental status on that date but was suffering from some degree of Mental
Aberration, which required further psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban City.[14]
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for the psychiatric examination
of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.[15]
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist of the
EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20
November 2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through interviews. From her
interview with Anacitos sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of Anacitos psychiatric history of
inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly. She found that Anacito had a psychotic disorder characterized by flight
of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and
during the commission of the crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need
treatment and monthly check-up. Her diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.[16]
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking irrelevantly.[17]
Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne.[18] They stayed in Manila
for one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the same medicine. Since
they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments, Remedios requested that her brother be
treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990,
Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed an
injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the
medicine in that same year. Since then until the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he
subjected to examination or treatment.[19]
Anacitos other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he heard a
loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When Francisco went out
to verify, he did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the street carrying a
knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him. Anacito struggled to free
himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios house. Before the incident, he observed Anacito to be
sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes silent.[20]
In its decision[21] of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P43,500.00 by way of actual damages, and
to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences him to suffer
an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amount of
P50,000.00 plus P10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in disregarding the
exempting circumstance of insanity.[22] He contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was,
therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even assuming in gratis argumenti
that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, which is illness as would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. He likewise maintains that since treachery was not
specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the
death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to establish with the required
proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. The mental
state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents. Further,
Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain that Anacito was
unconscious at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues that treachery was duly alleged and
proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a qualifying circumstance in the killing of
Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial courts judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element. Without it,
the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally
sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is
dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A mans act is presumed
voluntary.[23] It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously,[24] for the moral
and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind,[25] or that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.[26] Thus, the presumption under Article 800 of the Civil
Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which
under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability.[27]
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it,[28] for insanity as a
defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance.[29] An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission
of the offense with which he is charged.[30] It is, therefore, incumbent upon accuseds counsel to prove that his
client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity immediately before or
at the time he executed the act attributed to him.[31]
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know
what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and
judged by his behavior.[32] Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of
which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts conform
to the practice of people of sound mind.[33]
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct.[34] However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.[35] As consistently held by us, A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so.[36] Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of insanity
certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming three sticks of
marijuana before raping the victim;[37] slurping the victims blood and attempting to commit suicide after
stabbing him;[38] crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney.[39]
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones[40] requires that there be a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment because of a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,[41] we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the test
of cognition whether there was a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act and (b) the
test of volition whether there was a total deprivation of freedom of the will. We observed that our case law
shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any
case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the will,
i.e., without an accompanying complete deprivation of intelligence. This is expected, since a persons volition
naturally reaches out only towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy.[42]
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who
is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based
on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.[43]
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacitos defense of insanity. The appellant points to the
testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply stare at the
lady boarders a few days before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and long pants when
there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the testimony of prosecution
witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time interval between the two stabbing incidents shows
that the stabbing spree was without any known motive.[44]
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of Anacito two to
three days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was angry
with her.[45] His brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to himself, laugh,
shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet.[46] Also relied upon by the appellant are the
testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and the expert testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr.
Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambis personal perception that there was no
reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself,
staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane
immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as mere
abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability.[47]
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What it
shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to remedy his
lack of sleep and noisiness. As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental
illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and
Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the confinement of Anacito and that
the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito was never confined in a mental institution.
Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a recommendation for Anacitos confinement, there was no
indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made, who made the recommendation, and the
reason for the recommendation.[48]
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,[49] we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to the
incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged insane by
the institute. Applying this principle to Anacitos case, we find another cogent reason to reject his plea of
insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no
proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the
medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000 because he was
again noisy in the jail.[50] It seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his
symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Veronas examinations on Anacito were based on
incomplete or insufficient facts.[51] For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only three
sessions lasting one to two hours each.[52] Her one-page medical report[53] reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in appearance, wearing blue shirt
and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory
hallucination, kabastosan, kanan yawa. He further said his sleep was minanok and complained of occasional
headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a psychiatric disorder. It
is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and during the commission of the crime. He is presently
psychotic and cannot stand trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Veronas conclusions have no supporting medical bases or data. She failed to
demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing.[54] Further, she did
not have Anacitos complete behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she mentioned that
Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not conscious of killing his
victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of schizophrenia, but stated in the next
breath that Anacito was not grossly insane.[55]
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Veronas short psychiatric evaluation report and her
testimony that Anacitos judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his
mental condition in 1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically
examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident
and, hence, would prove Anacitos mental condition only for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane at
the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability, insanity could have been contracted during the
period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was
perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a
bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the inquiry.[56] His mental
condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal
liability.[57]
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in the year
2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the
invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental
faculties.[58] Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-
behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to
a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear
indication that insanity is a mere concoction[59] or an afterthought.[60] In any event, Anacito failed to establish
by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus
presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction.[61]
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of
insanity, it was clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that
affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission of the act he was
being held for.[62] The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito was
diagnosed as psychotic with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found to be schizophrenic.
There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at the time he stabbed the victim.
Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her report, only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is concerned
because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.[63] For treachery to be
considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed.[64]
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim in a
dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the lovers lane, Anacito emerged from his
hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacitos attack came without warning; it was deliberate
and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend
himself.[65]
We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio
Jr. because treachery was not alleged with specificity as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such
contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to
properly qualify an offense.[66]
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower
of the two indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the
range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no modifying circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent P43,500 for the wake and
burial of his son, only P11,945[67] is substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall
award to Demetrio Jr.s heirs temperate damages[68] of P25,000[69] conformably with current
jurisprudence.[70]
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent P10,000. However, he
failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the
amount of P10,000 on the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred
expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of P50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and Allan is affirmed in line with
recent jurisprudence.[71] Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime.[72]
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the amount
of P50,000 consistent with controlling case law.[73] Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof
of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent
death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.[74]
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 in view
of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery.[75]
Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the total amount of P161,945
and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of P110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal
Case No. 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the P50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered
to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b) P25,000
as temperate damages; and (c) P25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of P150,000; and (2) the heirs of
Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; and (b) P10,000 as temperate damages, or a
total of P110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000]
D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D.[1] We nullify the proceedings in the court a quo
and remand the case for proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the
crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a
butchers knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of
worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his death
shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per
Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this
City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of
not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.[2]
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel, the Public Attorneys Office, filed an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General
Hospital. It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric
ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the
issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital.[3]
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions
on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him intelligently, the court
denied the motion that same day.[4]
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellants behalf.[5]
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of
Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan,
an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-
appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation
was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The
cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop
went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his
blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the
Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishops chair. The man was
accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant.
Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishops chair. Gripping the chairs
armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: No matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing
this, Santillan moved away.[6]
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near
accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishops chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard.
Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did not
budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when
suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below
his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac
parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and
shouted: Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it
again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar.[7]
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion
inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains
on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and
advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands.
Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the
confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-
appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was
able to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather
scabbard tucked around his waist.[8] He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes
upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound.[9] He was
found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The
autopsy reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 x 1 penetrating. The edge of
one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x x . The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and
pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The left
pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.[10]
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He
claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped
accused-appellants hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to
calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.[11]
The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused pretended to be
weak, tame and of unsound mind; that after he made the first stab, he furiously continued stabbing and
slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious
ceremony was being conducted; and the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court
in its order of January 6, 1995.[12]
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the
trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to
be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to
some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been
exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family.[13]
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail wardens letter. He reiterated that
the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent
government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper
person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not.[14]
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence.[15] Accused-appellant
moved for reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a
Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the
court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the
top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and
sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by
him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste
matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellants counsel
prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General
Hospital.[16] Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector
Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of appellants
irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for the immediate psychiatric and mental
examination of accused-appellant.[17] The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to
Inspector Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail.
The letter, signed by the president, secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of
appellants unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent
incidents in the jail.[18]
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to Evidence.
The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996.[19]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria
Soledad Gawidan,[20] a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital,
and accused-appellants medical and clinical records at the said hospital.[21] Dr. Gawidan testified that
appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered
from Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;[22] and after
four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition.[23] The medical
and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao,
Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment
after a relapse of his violent behavior;[24] (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH;[25] (3) the
consent slip of appellants wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH;[26] (4) the Patients Record;[27] (5)
the Consent for Discharge signed by appellants wife;[28] (6) the Summary and Discharges of appellant;[29] (7)
appellants clinical case history;[30] (8) the admitting notes;[31] (9) Physicians Order Form;[32] (10) the
Treatment Form/ medication sheet;[33] and (11) Nurses Notes.[34]
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-
appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[35]
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO
MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING
ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.[36]
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.[37]
Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free
will.[38] Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil.[39]
When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily,[40] i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.[41] Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[42]
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind[43] and that
all acts are voluntary.[44] The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person.[45] This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other
factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.[46]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court
therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court
shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An
acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution.[47]
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.[48] The accused must be so insane as to
be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.[49] He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of
the will.[50]
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance
must prove it by clear and positive evidence.[51] And the evidence on this point must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.[52]
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time.[53] Direct testimony is not
required.[54] Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.[55]
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by
overt acts. A persons thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine
whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.[56]
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed
Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant
was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan[57] attached to the Information,
there are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have
been in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane
person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy
Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior
for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during
sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to
flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system,
uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He then returned to the Bishops chair
and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention on the day of the arraignment.
Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client could not
properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized
under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him
and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and
order the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such
confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time he is
informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a felo
de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
thereto.[58]
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court.[59]And the test to
determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused, even
with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the
ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the
accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under
a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so
particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself.[60] In the American
jurisdiction, the issue of the accuseds present insanity or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is
separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The defense of
insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission.
Present insanity is commonly referred to as competency to stand trial[61] and relates to the appropriateness of
conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendants present inability to participate meaningfully and
effectively.[62] In competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the
offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial
is simply postponed until such time as he may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a
defense; it merely postpones the trial.[63]
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend
his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a
rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available
defense may be interposed.[64] This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory
recognition of the rule at common law.[65] Thus:
[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and [has] some
recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.[66]
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently
coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.[67] The first requisite is the
relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with
his counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have
a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings.[68]
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the
public.[69] It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just
defense for his life or liberty.[70] To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is
a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial[71] and due process of law;[72] and this has several reasons
underlying it.[73] For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant
who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his
innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal
case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to
confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the
fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal
proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity
of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom
in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of
comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially
an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses
its character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an invective
against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a
comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent
defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized
retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot
comprehend its significance.[74]
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the
discretion of the trial court.[75] Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt[76] or a bona fide doubt[77] as to defendants competence to
stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendants irrational behavior, history of
mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the
defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case.[78]
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of
accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on
appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared::
xxx
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the accused, and
he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in
Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[79]
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive
evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks
of an unsound mental condition that effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind
as to fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The
plea of not guilty was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court because of his refusal to plead.[80]
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a
psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the
state of a persons mental health. To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in
the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of
the latters history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants
competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its
case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-appellants unusual
behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or
be placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellants
counsel filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Attached to this
motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the
members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters,[81] the judge
ignored the Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. The records are
barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present
his evidence.[82]
Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a lifetime
illness and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses.[83] After accused-appellant was
discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up.[84]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was waiving
the right to testify in his own behalf because he was suffering from mental illness.[85] This manifestation was
made in open court more than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by
the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the judge
persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental examination.[86] The
human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large
degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation.[87] Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds
capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric
diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time,
the accuseds abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.[88]
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served a
dual purpose[89] by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In
some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of
the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused.[90] The crime in the instant case was
committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone
may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission for
him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.[91] Nonetheless, under the present circumstances,
accused-appellants competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his
trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The
trial courts negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the
proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica,[92] we ordered that the joint decision
of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused,
who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of guilty
to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accuseds plea was not an unconditional
admission of guilt because he was not in full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim; and
thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity
at the time of commission of the crime.[93]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No.
94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the
case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-
appellant. [G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000]
D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.: HTML
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is
designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason.
Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the
accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA
MADARANG in an Information[1] which reads:
"That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2
inches by 1 1/2 inch(es)long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral
to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab
wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing
upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang."
"Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code."
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not
guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his
client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the
same date, the Court issued an Order[2] directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. CODES
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him.[3]
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence
on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter
LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally
married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16)
years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and
stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and
started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to
cockfighting.[4]
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with
their eight child and was about to give birth.[5]
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of
another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children,
the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise.[6]
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying
inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew
barged into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing
by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house
holding a bolo. She scampered for safety.[7] yacats
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice
anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her.[8]
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment.[9]
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that
the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three
(3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first
medical report, dated August 2, 1994,[10] the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,
classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by
impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care,
insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity
to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent.[11] A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals
during which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong.[12] Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental
illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was
already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime.[13]
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27,
1996,[14] showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused
was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial.[15] olanski
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he
committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that
accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed
to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since
the death penalty was suspended or abolished at the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby
sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
"SO ORDERED."[16]
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making
his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful
day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the
testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes -- he may be violent and destructive, or
very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife
and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did
not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this
is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would
have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993.[17] The defense posits that
his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started
through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-
law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle. haideem
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful
day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his
wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth
child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his
right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient
reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served
by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.[18]
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional
test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of
insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was
wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to
moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen[19] as follows: A kills B
knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him
to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is
not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely
to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may
know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions.[20]
MNaghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as
insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient,
including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does
not solely determine man's conduct.[21] kirsten
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to
prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what
he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that
there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what
is right and wrong.[22] This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement
is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it
requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the
purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged,
and; (4) it is difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse.[23]
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect."[24] Critics of this test argued that it gave too
much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity
beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental
disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely
dependent on the testimonies of experts.[25]
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal
Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person
is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.[26]
Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as
there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was
sufficient.[27] Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus
undeserving of punishment.[28] barth
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation.
It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all
federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to
prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited
the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of
accused found to be insane.[29]
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.[30]
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by
a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.[31] The
testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.[32] Jksm
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to
the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis.[33]
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in
aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and
hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place
and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social
customs are disregarded.[34] During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal
behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied
and dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an
intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself
from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of
spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness.[35] A variety of subjective
experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral
changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in
conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will
be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to
his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes
in his attempt to hold his attention.[36]
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the
record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.[37] Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense.
Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also
proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on
the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.[38] Chiefx
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact
that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife
does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of
his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that
the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the
appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest
reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on
his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be
sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune
and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's
mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house, she
did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was
suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is
tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial
on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime.[39] As the appellant, in the case at bar,
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained
to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. PUNOJ

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FULL CASES

Avoidance of Greater Evil

Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount

93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00

93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00

93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00

93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00

93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00

93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]

A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR

B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A

C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN

Criminal Case No. 16612:

Criminal Case No. 16613:

Criminal Case No. 16614:

Dr. Valinos report stated in pertinent parts:

4. Stomach with alcoholic smell.

5. Clotted blood at abdominal cavity, about 500 cc.

Costs against the accused.

Hence this appeal. Petitioner raises the following issues

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND/OR MISCONSTRUED THE

Obedience to a Lawful Order

Office of the President of the Philippines Malacaang

MEMO TO: The General Manager

Manila International Airport Authority

Your immediate compliance is appreciated.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND MARCOS.[4]

For: The President

From: Minister Roberto V. Ongpin

Date: 7 January 1985

(Sgd.) ROBERTO V. ONGPIN

January 30, 1986

2) they acted in good faith.

a.) for the approval of eight Supplemental Contracts; and

V. Pres. Marcos order to Tabuena dated January 8, 1986 baseless.

This is easy to see.

Q What do you mean by escalation?

c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)

- At p. 207, Words and Phrases,

Permanent Edition 9A.

People vs. Webber, 57 O.G.

People vs. Luntao, 50 O.G.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES

*Q Basically, the letter of Mr. Ongpin is to what effect?

*Q It has nothing to do with the implementation of the escalation costs?

*Q Were there partial payments made by MIA on these escalation billings?

A Yes, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

*Q This is as of December 31, 1985?

A Yes, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

A I do not know, your Honor.

*Q But your records will indicate that?

A The records will indicate that, your Honor.

*Q Except that you were not asked to bring them?

A Yes, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

*Q Subsequent thereto, we are talking merely of about P44 million?

A Yes, your Honor, as subsequent settlements.

*Q After December 31, 1985?

A Yes, your Honor.