INTRODUCTION

The term “federal” is derived from the Latin foedus, which means, “covenant”. This embodies ideas of
promise, obligation, and undertaking; and consequently, the federal idea draws on collaboration, reciprocity,
and mutuality.Federalism is a method of segregating powers so that the central and local governments are
each within a domain, harmonizing and autonomous. To be lucid, federalism postulates a constitutional
apparatus for bringing unity in diversity by toning the divergent forces of centripetal and centrifugal trends
in the country for the attainment of conjoint national targets

India's federalist structure, in spite of its considerable achievements in the face of monumental challenges, is
different from federalism in several countries. At the of the United States, it was the states which helped to
central government. In India, in contrast, power was transferred to a central government by the British, and
the central government plays the decisive role in the formation and the empowerment of the states. The
states of India do not have constitutions as their American counterparts.1 The Constitution provides for a
bicameral legislature consisting of an Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and a Lower House (Lok Sabha). The
Rajya Sabha is the stand-in for the states of Indian Federation, while the Lok Sabha represents the people of
India as a whole. The Rajya Sabha (even though a less powerful chamber) is required to conserve the federal
stability by protecting the interests of the states against the uncalled-for interference of the Centre.

Components of federalism exist in the Indian state, in that there is a division of forces between the inside and
the states. The regions in which the states have ward incorporate open request, police, welfare, wellbeing,
and training, nearby government, industry, agribusiness, and land income. Throughout the years the activity
of these forces by the individual states has brought about a wide diversity of governmental issues and
strategies with the end goal that the states have created unmistakable political identities. Be that as it may,
the state powers are offset a not insignificant rundown of simultaneous forces which enables the inside to
pre-empt the forces of a state in numerous territories. Too, there are numerous forces which have a place
solely with the focal government including power over remote issues, safeguard, citizenship, railroads,
postal/transmit administrations, traditions, money, managing an account, and salary charges. At long last,
articles 352> 355> 356, 360, 256, 257, 249, and 365 of the constitution give a 'bank' of forces which give the

focal government extra specialist to act in state crises, national emergencies, and budgetary exigencies.

1
The constitution of India (modified to 18 May 1981) (New Delhi: Government of India Press 1981). It is over is over 170 pages
long and has more than 390articles.
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BACKGROUND

The development of federal idea has chequered history in India. It has been a product of devolution of
powers to the British Provinces to ensure 'provincial autonomy' under the Constitutional Reforms of 1919
and the Government of India Act of 1935. Ultimately, it culminated as a part of the Cabinet Mission Plan
and later as a part of the present Constitution. Earlier to the attainment of independence, two problems of the
Indian politics - the Hindu-Muslim communal question and the problem of the Princely States - had
contributed to the emergence of a consensus to have a federal polity for India. The solution was to establish
a federal system with minimal powers to the Centre having only three subjects - Defence, External Affairs
and Communications and leaving maximum autonomy to the constituent units including residuary powers.
This offer was made by the famous 'Objectives Resolution' moved by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and
approved by the Constituent Assembly on 13th December 1946 under the terms of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
The objective was to influence the Muslim League and the Princely State to Join the 'Union of India under
the federal scheme

The Constitution of India, which came into effect on 26th January 1950, declares that: lndia, that is Bharath,
shall be a Union of States2. One of the controversies that confronted the Constituent Assembly was regarding
designating India either a 'federation or a 'Union'. Dr. B. N. Rao, Constitutional Advisor, in his Draft
Constitution suggested the term federation for historical reasons. However, the Drafting Committee rejected
it and instead used the word 'Union', in which Dr. Ambedkar played significant part. It builds up a double
commonwealth with the Union at the Center and the States at the fringe, each supplied with sovereign forces
to be practiced in the field allocated to them separately by the Constitution. The Union isn't a League of
States, joined in a free relationship, nor are the States the organizations of the Union getting power from it.
Both the Union and the States are made by the Constitution; both get their individual specialist from the
Constitution. The one isn't sub-ordinate to the next in its own field; and the specialist of one is co-ordinate
with that of the other.3The Constitution provides wide scope for co-operation between the Union and the
States in legislative, administrative and financial fields under the Concurrent List and other parts of the
Constitution. Economic and Social Planning under the Concurrent List has become the basis for undertaking

2
Constitution of India, Article 1
3
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, P 33. Constitution of India, Article 1
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national development through the five-year plans for foster socio-economic change.4 Further, as a part of co-
operative federalism, the Constitution provides for an Inter-State Council to promote inter-governmental co-
operation in matters of common interest; to make recommendations for better co-ordination of policy and

coordination; and to provide a forum at the highest level to resolve many Union ,State as well as inter-state
differences and conflicts.5

RESEARCH QUESTION

ATTACK ON INDIAN FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF JUDICIARY

There are, in general, two arguments made with regard to the Constitution of India. On the one hand, it is felt
that the very constitutional arrangements made initially are unsuitable unless the same party is ruling both at
the center and in the states. On the other hand are those who believe that there is nothing wrong with the
Constitution itself; it is the people who failed,6 as they had not developed the healthy conventions on which
so much trust was placed by the founding fathers. The truth is that in the absence of idealism, when politics
pervade human behaviour and power dictates, a piece of parchment may not be of much use. While the
founding fathers had the best of intentions as they wrote the Constitution-and they all agreed on the need for
a strong center-they would probably be surprised at the arbitrary and capricious way some of the powers
have been used by the center over the states, particularly those governed by opposition parties. It is thus
proved that ample mischief was caused by using some of the provisions of the Constitution for partisan
reasons, and the federal form as envisaged was given short shrift. .

The Indian judiciary has time and again heard a number of cases involving the issue of the federal character of
the Indian constitution. To understand the challenges and dynamic nature of federalism few cases in a

4
Government of India , the First Five Year Plan ,1952
5
Constitution of India, Article 263

6
See N. A. Palkhivala, We, the People: India the Largest Democracy (Bombay: Strand Book Stall, 1984), p. 43.
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chronological order are discussed below that will help in understanding the role of judiciary’s take by analysing
different cases on this:-

State of West Bengal v. Union of India7

“The Constitution of India is not truly Federal in character. The basis of the distribution of powers between
the Union and States is that only those powers which are concerned with the regulation of local problems are
vested in the States and the residue, especially those which tend to maintain the economic industrial and
commercial unity of the country are left to the Union.”

State of Rajasthan v. Union of India8

“In a sense, the Indian Union is federal. But the extent of federalism in it is largely watered-down by the needs of
progress and development of the country which has to be nationally integrated, politically and economically co-
ordinated and socially, intellectually and spiritually uplifted. With such a system, the States cannot stand in the
way of legitimate and comprehensively planned development of the country in the manner directed by the Central
Government”

State of Karnataka v. Union of India9

“The Indian Constitution is not federal in character but has been characterized as quasi-federal in nature.
Even though the executive and legislative functions of the Centre and States have been defined and
distributed, there runs through it all a thread or rein in the hands of the Centre in both the fields. “

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala10

7
1963 AIR 1241.
8
1977 AIR 1361
9
1978 AIR 68
10
(1973) 4 SCC 225
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Some of the judges, in this case, held federalism to be a part of the basic structure of the constitution which
means it can’t be tampered with.

The integrated and independent judiciary is definitely a merit for the nation as it helps in proper remedy for
rights. On the other hand, a written constitution with the kind of flexibility and rigidity possessed by the
Indian constitution is a boon when it comes to the codification of rights but the same rigidity can stand as a
bane if amendments need to be made. So from the above discussed cases we can observe that Indian
judiciary time to time has given landmark judgements in response to safeguard of federalism. Decisions are
progressive in nature and are in accordance to evolution of dynamic nature of our country.

ORIGINAL WRITING: OVERVIEW TO SAFEGAURD FEDERALISM

Challenges Faced

Emergency Powers and Constitutional Dictatorship:

Emergency provisions exist in every single law based constitution to ensure and safeguard the State, give it
the forces to guard itself from its foes, both inner and outside. Be that as it may, critical contrasts concerning
the confinements, checks and defends gave. Averting misuse has been a noteworthy distraction as far back
as Hitler unavoidably seized supreme and absolute power under the Weimar Constitution. Significant
exercises were learnt in this are on the conceivable outcomes of maltreatment. A believing Constituent
Assembly had dedicated little idea to tight shields, given the setting of the discussion and the flawless
majority rule qualifications of the national initiative. The requirement for more tightly shields emerged
sooner than anticipated Uncertainties surfaced over common military relations. Forsaking the rough street of
majority rules system has its very own appeal and allurement in times of extraordinary political disturbance.
The challenges emerge in picking the minute for restoring the law based process. Consequently the
requirement for stringent confinements and shields to guarantee that this condition of exemption stays as
short as could be allowed, with different organizations pushing towards an arrival to regularity at the most
punctual. Suspension of federalism was a noteworthy result of the use of crisis powers, very separated from
its consequences for crucial rights and opportunities.

Governors and their Discretionary Powers.

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Governors as the eyes and ears of the Central Government were a heritage of provincial Rule. It was viewed
as important to hold this establishment, which turned into the most questionable instrument of focal
intercession. Is the Institution Necessary. The inquiry has been presented over and again, when endeavors to
check misuse and change the framework met with little achievement. Government adaptability was
amusingly one noteworthy reason and barrier of the organization. The key issue if the ill-conceived exercise
of real powers, the maltreatment of forces. The Judiciary has been a noteworthy power in controling this
pattern, setting down standards and rules for the activity of gubernatorial forces

RECENT CONFLICTS IN REGRAD TO FEDERALISM

TUSSLE BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVT AND NEW DELHI STATE GOVT

The Supreme Court’s Constitution bench judgment in Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India is
the latest exhibit in what is becoming a nuanced and well developed position of the court on federalism. The
key issue at stake in the tussle between the lieutenant governor and Aam Aadmi Party government was the
nature of Delhi’s statehood. The issue really boils down to this – is the National Capital Territory of Delhi
more like a “state” (as the Aam Aadmi Party government argued in court) or is it more like a “Union
territory” (as the lieutenant governor and the Union government argued). The Supreme Court’s eventual
conclusions agree with the Aam Aadmi Party’s interpretation of Article 239-AA of the Constitution – that
even though the National Capital Territory of Delhi does not have a state list of exclusive legislative powers,
whatever concurrent powers of legislation it does have comes from the Constitution itself and is therefore
plenary. This puts it in the “more like a state” category rather than the “more like a Union Territory”
category

This is an important point and highlighted by all the three judges who delivered separate opinions in the
case. Unlike states, even though Delhi does not have exclusive legislative power on any subject and shares it
all with the Union, yet, as Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra pointed out, “pragmatic federalism” requires

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that the government of Delhi acts on its own save in exceptional circumstances where the lieutenant
governor refers a dispute to the President of India. Justice Chandrachud saw Article 239-AA as indicative of
the federal structure of the Constitution and even the limits he imposes on the lieutenant governor’s powers
seem to suggest unless there are some “national issue” at stake, the Union government should not really be
bothering itself with Delhi’s governance at all. Only Justice Ashok Bhushan did not explicitly ground his
conclusions on federal principles but he did largely agree with Misra and Chandrachud.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SCHEMES AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

Three-and-a-half months are too short a period to judge the performance of any policy. The period is
definitely too brief for the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY) to come into full play. Even then,
West Bengal’s withdrawal from the Centre’s ambitious health insurance scheme, last week, raises disturbing
questions. The state government’s reason for the move bares the fact that ownership of the project remains a
fraught issue. West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has alleged that the Centre is taking “all credit”
for the scheme. She said that her government will not honour its commitment to pay 40 per cent of the

scheme’s expenses because pamphlets being distributed by Ayushman Bharat PMJAY’s nodal agency
“mention the name of the Prime Minister and have his photograph”. This certainly smacks of petty politics.

However, West Bengal’s exit from the PMJAY also speaks poorly of the Centre’s efforts to make the states,
especially the ones where the NDA does not hold office, partners in its flagship project. Punjab, Delhi,
Kerala, Telangana and Odisha non-NDA- ruled states had opted out of the PMJAY when the programme
was launched. But Kerala and Punjab eventually agreed to implement the scheme. Delhi, Telangana and
Odisha, however, continued to raise issues over converging their existing health programmes with the
PMJAY. West Bengal too had similar reservations to begin with, but the state government came around to
aligning its existing scheme, Swasthya Saathi, with the Centre’s programme. This decision meant that an
additional one crore people in West Bengal got a health insurance cover. But the state’s volte face means
that these beneficiaries stand to lose out.

PMJAY’s architecture gives states the flexibility to decide the modalities of implementation. But Delhi,
Telangana and Odisha’s objections show that more work needs to be done in this respect. The greater
problem, however, is that the boundaries between genuine differences over modalities and politicking have
become blurred. The three states, for instance, claim their policies are better than the PMJAY. Instead of
finding ways to end the stand-off, the Centre has often resorted to grandstanding. Union Minister of Textiles
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Smriti Irani had berated Odisha CM Naveen Patnaik for withholding the benefits of Ayushman Bharat from
the state’s people. West Bengal’s withdrawal signals a new low.

POLTICAL CONFLICT

The Supreme Court had stated the apprehension of the state government of a possible law and order situation
as the reason behind the ruling. The court then asked the BJP to submit a revised plan to the state
government, asking the party to take all possible steps to address apprehensions. After that session court
single bench allowed the rath yatra but again the case went to larger bench and it stops the rath yatra . At last
matter went to SC and few days ago it ruled that it is at the decision of state government of Bengal to allow
rath yatra or not. Thus, it was a god decision by SC to save the sovereignty, decision making of state along
with safeguard of federal structure,

CONCLUSION

So as in a country like India which is highly diverse in nature federalism plays a great importance as it helps
to maintain and suspect diversity , helps in better management of conflicts , takes governance to grass root
level , prevents corruption.

The context of S.R. Bommai v UOI likewise gives us a thought regarding the government structure of India
.The subject of Federalism emerged regarding the fundamental point of dialog, of the intensity of President
to proclaim the failure of Constitutional Machinery, under Art.356. In this association, Justice Sawant and
Kuldip Singh saw that federalism was a basic element of our Constitution and were a piece of essential
structure. 'Equity , Jeevan Reddy saw that, 'the way that under the plan of our Constitution, more prominent
power is given upon the state opposite the States does not imply that they are minor limbs of the Center.
Indeed, even after the abuse of Article356 in four essential occasions, the improvements after Bommai's
judgment have turned out to be ready to check the abuse of the Article 356 to much degree and assumed a
fundamental job in contracting focal government long arm. Be that as it may, some different protections are
additionally expected to check the abuse of this Article. The rules and restricting standards articulated in
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Bommai case are adequate to check the abuse of Article356 yet because of the corrupt demonstrations of
Central Governments after the milestone judgment, a correction in Article356 as for the line of move made
in Bommai case is the most extreme need today. ‘Thus we can observe that before the case of SR Bommai
there was several attack by centre on federal structure of India and it is even true that still India face this
problem but after this landmark case which often is used as precedent by Indian judiciary to safeguard our
integrity sovereignty , separation of power , limiting the political interest . Thus as of now after this case
Federalism is considered as basic structure of constitution so it can led up to smooth functioning between
centre and state which will ultimately full fill the diverse demand of our country and will led us to on path of
development and prosperity.

FEEDBACK
Interdependence among governments has become a universal feature in all contemporary federal systems.
Harmony and cooperation between the centre and the states is essential for healthy functioning of our
federation. There are problems like increasing competition among the states and on the other, there are
disputes over sharing of river waters. Therefore, there is a need for evolving a national policy on these issues
and for putting in place a suitable mechanism for resolving such disputes.

It is also imperative that the centre should allow the state governments enough to grow and expand and there
would be nothing to prevent any state government from reaching its ultimate goal consistent with the
common obligation. On the other hand, the state governments also should work in the spirit of the

Constitution. The State governments should keep in mind that the need for national integrity and a strong
union government. Therefore, the spirit of co-operative federalism should forward the relations between the
centre and the states

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Bakshi, P M. The Constitution of India. New Delhi: Lexis Nexis, 2018.

Shukla's, VN. Constitution Of India. Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2015.
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The Constitution of India. New Delhi: Lexis Nexis, 2018.
Basu, DD Comparative Federalism,( 2nd Ed., 2008), Wadhwa &Co. Nagpur.

JOURNALS
Jackson, Vicki C. “Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law.” 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 1998: 1-10.
RAJU, K. H. CHELUVA. “Dr. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION: A Case
Study of IndianFederalism.” Indian Political Science Association, 1991: 2-20.
CHAUDHURI, JOYOTPAUL. “Federalism & the Siamese twins: diversity & entropy in India's domestic
and foreign policy.” International Journal,, 1993: 6-12.
SAXENA, MANISH TEWARI and REKHA. “The Supreme Court of India: The Rise of Judicial Power and
the Protectionof Federalism.” University of Toronto Press, 2017: 30-34.
Taylor, Brian D. “Force and Federalism: Controlling Coercion in Federal Hybrid Regimes.” Comparative
Politics, Vol. 39,, 2007: 421-430.
Tillin, Louise. “United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism.” Publius, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2007: 10-
15.
Tummala, Krishna K. “India's Federalism under Stress.” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, 1992: 5-10.

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