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Augustine and Wittgenstein on Language

Patrick Bearsley

Philosophy / Volume 58 / Issue 224 / April 1983, pp 229 - 236

DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100068716, Published online: 30 January 2009

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Patrick Bearsley (1983). Augustine and Wittgenstein on Language. Philosophy,
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Augustine and Wittgenstein on
Language
PATRICK BEARSLEY

St Augustine was one of the few philosophers who found favour with
Wittgenstein. However, he is not always quoted with approval. The
opening of the Philosophical Investigations is an obvious case. Wittgenstein
has often been criticized for the cavalier fashion in which he treats other
philosophers, and he has been taken to task by Kenny1 for the way he
treats Augustine in these opening paragraphs. However, I think Kenny's
criticism is unfounded, and he goes too far when he says: 'Augustine is a
curious choice as a spokesman for the views which Wittgenstein attacks
since in many respects what he says resembles Wittgenstein's own views
rather than the views that are Wittgenstein's target' (p. i).
Wittgenstein's target in the opening sections of the Investigations is
indeed (as Kenny says) 'the view that naming is the foundation of language
and that the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands' (p. i).
Wittgenstein is quite right to link this view with Augustine, but he exagge-
rates when he says that that is all there is to Augustine's theory of language
and meaning.2 Even a casual reading of Augustine's De Magistro (for
example) would give the lie to any impression that Augustine was naive
when it came to appreciating the complexities of language.
Of the 'many respects' in which Kenny sees a similarity between the
views of Augustine and those of Wittgenstein, the first he mentions
concerns ostensive definition. He thinks that Wittgenstein has Augustine in
mind when he argues that 'ostensive definition cannot have the fundamental
role sometimes assigned to it in the learning of language because . . . the
understanding of an ostension presupposes a certain mastery of language'
(Ghost, p. i). Kenny maintains that contrary to Wittgenstein's reading of the
the Confessions text, Augustine would in fact agree with this. In support
of this contention he notes that Augustine believes the intention to teach
the meaning of a word by ostension is expressed by 'bodily movements, as
it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the

1
A. Kenny, 'The Ghost of the Tractatus', Understanding Wittgenstein, Royal
Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 7, 1972/73, G. Vesey (ed.) (London:
Macmillan, 1974).
2
'When Augustine talks about the learning of language he talks about how we
attach names to things or understand the names of things. Naming here appears as
the foundation, the be all and end all of language' (Philosophical Grammar, 56).

Philosophy 58 1983 229

Discussion

play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of
voice'. This 'natural language' then is a presupposition to learning by
ostension. Kenny notes that Augustine is not saying that a child 'already
has a language, only not this one' (PI I, 32); rather, 'he is drawing attention
to a point often made by Wittgenstein, that the setting up of linguistic
conventions presupposes a uniformity among human beings in their
natural, pre-conventional, reactions to such things as pointing fingers
(PG, p. 94; PI I, 185)'.
To this interpretation several points can be made. First of all, rather than
Wittgenstein misrepresenting Augustine, it seems that Kenny has mis-
represented Wittgenstein. For on this point Wittgenstein seems to agree
with Augustine; he is not criticizing Augustine for emphasizing the role of
ostension in the learning of language. 'An important part of the training
will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's
attention to them, and at the same time uttering the word' (PI I, 6).
Rather Wittgenstein is critical of Augustine for suggesting that teaching a
language consists solely in ostension. 'Augustine, we might say, does
describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call
language is this system' (PI I, 3). The first language game that Wittgen-
stein describes—the limited game between the builder and his assistant
consisting of words such as 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', etc.—purports to be one
which fits the description that Augustine gives (PI I, 2; also PG, p. 57). He
then goes on to show how very limited this is. Augustine has failed in
Wittgenstein's eyes to appreciate the great complexity of language and
his description of learning a first language fails to take into account the limits
of ostension as a learning device. Wittgenstein considers Augustine's account
to be right as far as it goes—only it does not go anywhere near far enough.
Moreover, Wittgenstein makes an important distinction between
'ostensive definition' and 'ostensive teaching of words' (PI I, 6). What
Augustine was describing was ostensive teaching of words, not ostensive
definition 'because the child cannot yet ask what the name is' (ibid.).
Thus early on Wittgenstein mentions that ostensive definition presupposes
language—a point he will argue for later on.
Ostensive teaching helps to bring about understanding of words, but it is
only part of the process. Understanding comes about only if the ostensive
teaching is coupled with training. 'With different training the same osten-
sive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different under-
standing' (ibid.). And it is here that I think the significance of Augustine's
'natural language of all peoples' is felt. The gestures, tone of voice, express-
ion of the face, etc., which Augustine lists are part of the training which
together with the ostensive teaching bring about understanding of the
word. Of course 'understanding of a word' means different things for
Wittgenstein and for Augustine. For Wittgenstein: 'Don't you understand
the call "Slab!" if you act upon it in such-and-such way? '(ibid.—my

230
 Discussion

emphasis); whereas for Augustine one understands the meaning of the word
if one knows what object it 'signifies' (significare).
Augustine may well agree that this 'natural language of all peoples' is a
presupposition of the learning of language, but it would be reading too
much into his text to suggest that he saw the same significance of this pre-
supposition as did Wittgenstein. Augustine is merely making an obser-
vation easily available to any casual observer, and the fact that he does not
elaborate on it or give it any special emphasis seems to indicate that he sees
it as no more than an obvious part of the description of the learning
process. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, as is well known, made great
philosophical mileage out of the presuppositions of our linguistic con-
ventions (see especially his On Certainty). Similarity in data, in observations
about the world, is not sufficient to establish similarity in philosophical
views.
Moreover, the weighty philosophical presuppositions of language which
Wittgenstein was most concerned with are not the ones that Kenny indi-
cates. It is true enough to say that for Wittgenstein 'the setting up of
linguistic conventions presupposes a uniformity among human beings in
their natural pre-conventional reactions . . . ' ; but not to add ' . . . to such
things as pointing fingers' (Ghost, p. 2). The references Kenny gives
(PG p. 94; PI I, 185) will not bear the weight he gives them. Although
Wittgenstein does say in both texts that man naturally reacts to a pointing
finger, it is clear that in both cases he envisages someone who already has
mastery of a language (see also PI I, 25). These 'natural' reactions are
certainly not pre-conventional. They are reactions to conventions. In PG,
p. 94, Wittgenstein immediately goes on to say: 'As it is also part of
human nature to play board games and to use sign languages that consist of
written signs on a flat surface'. Board games and the use of sign writing are
certainly not pre-conventional. And in the text from the Investigations
Wittgenstein is in fact giving an example of someone who reacts 'naturally'
to a pointing gesture in an opposite fashion to the way we would react:
'Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally
reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction
of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to fingertip'—a situation
which in the Philosophical Grammar he says would cause a misunderstanding.
Thus much of what Wittgenstein considered to be natural to us is in fact
learned (in contrast to Augustine's position). We have to learn how to
understand gestures and non-linguistic behaviour, such as pointing,
smiling and so forth. Nevertheless, once they are learned, we respond to
them 'naturally' without anything special in the way of thought, mental
images or other psychological apparatus.3 In fact Wittgenstein's later
3
Cf. 'When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the series, /
act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does not trouble me'
(PI I, 212—my emphasis).

231
Discussion

philosophy does not admit of much that can be strictly called pre-con-
ventional. If anything could be called the foundation of language for
Wittgenstein, it would be his notion of a 'form of life' which is something
given and has to be simply accepted (PI II, xi, 226). Nowhere does
Wittgenstein give an explanation of what he means by this important
term, and possibly he is not always consistent in his use of it, but it seems
clear that he understands it dynamically, as a form-of-living, an 'activity'
(PI I, 23), and as something very basic, 'as something animal' (On Cer-
tainty, 359—henceforward abbreviated to OC). 4 The certainty with which
we live our daily life, the confidence with which we perform the most
ordinary actions, is not something which we have to justify. It is 'something
animal', a form of life, a way of acting. 'My life shews that I know or am
certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on' (OC, 7; see also
110,204).
However, the notion of the form of life and its place in Wittgenstein's
philosophy must be complemented by his discussion in On Certainty of
Moore's common sense view of the world and the propositions he lists as
descriptive of this view: 5 our view of the world which is grounded on what
we do is integral to an adequate understanding of our form of life. More-
over, on two occasions he hints at a further factor which must be taken into
account if the foundations of our language are to be understood adequately:
the 'very general facts of nature' (PI II, xii, 230, also footnote p. 56), the
'natural history of man' (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1,141,
p. 43). Wittgenstein is not very explicit about what he means by these, but
they are observations on facts which no one has doubted, and which have
gone unremarked only because they are always before our eyes (ibid.; also
PI, 56, 230). These very general facts seem to be contingent, for the
propositions expressing them are not logically necessary and analytic, and it
is conceivable that the facts could have been different. But nevertheless
they are 'constitutive' of our very human nature: they are responsible for
human nature being what it is, i.e. having the form of life that it does
have. 6
Although Wittgenstein does consider the world-view and form of life to
be presuppositions of our ordinary use of language, 7 this does not make
them pre-conventional. Our world-picture is something which must be
4
See J. F. M. Hunter, ' "Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical
Investigations" ', Essays on Wittgenstein, E. D. Klemke (ed.) (University of
Illinois Press, 1971), 273-297.
5
G. E. Moore, 'A Defence of Common Sense', Philosophical Papers (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1959), 32-59.
6
B. Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity', Philosophical Review 74
(1965), 514.
7
OC 162, also 415. See W. D. Hudson, 'Language-Games and Presupposi-
tions', Philosophy 53 (1978), 94-99.

232
 Discussion

learned (OC, 167). The forms of life are what is given, not at birth, but
when we learn to speak and recognize things in the world. 'Light dawns
gradually over the whole' (OC, 141).
Thus although for Wittgenstein our reactions to such things as pointing
might be done 'naturally', they have to be learned. They are not pre-
conventional. Nor are they what Wittgenstein would consider presupposi-
tions of language-use. Reactions to gestures, facial expressions and the like
are learned together with learning the use of words in language: they are part
of the ostensive teaching of words which Wittgenstein allows is an impor-
tant part of the learning of a language. This is a far cry from Augustine's
opinion which sees such gestures as 'the natural language of all peoples',
presupposed by the acquiring of any language.
Wittgenstein may have been a little unfair to Augustine when he con-
tinues his exposition on the nature of language in the early sections of the
Investigations with an attack on the notion that ostensive definition is at the
root of learning language (PI I, 26ff.). Here he still has Augustine in mind
as typical of his target, though his more immediate target is the logical
atomism of Russell and his own views expressed in the Tractattis.8 However,
there is sufficient justification for thinking that Augustine did give a prime
place to ostensive definition, for he did not make any distinction between
ostensive teaching and ostensive definition and confused the two. More-
over, he does seem to have ostensive definition in mind when in the quoted
text of the Confessions he says: 'When they (my elders) named some object,
and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that
the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it
out'.
Wittgenstein's principal objection to giving ostensive definition a
fundamental role in the learning of language is that understanding a name
already presupposes a certain linguistic competence. Naming is a relatively
sophisticated practice. Thus if naming is truly the basic teaching/learning
device, knowledge of naming and calling must be innate to the child.
He must already have a kind of language. 'Thus the matter is represented as
though the child never learned language, so never learned to think but only
to translate a language it already knows into another.'9 That Augustine had
an idea something like this is revealed in an earlier quotation from the
Confessions which Wittgenstein cited in his early version of the Investi-
gations: 'Thus little by little I sensed where I was, and was led to reveal my
desires to those who could satisfy them, and I could not, for the desires
were within me . . . So I flung out limbs and sounds, making signs similar
to my desires' (Confessions, 1, 6.8). And even more clearly:

8
\ G. Hallett, SJ, A Companion to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"
(Cornell University Press, 1977), 98.
9
Wittgenstein quoted by Hallett, Companion, 108.

I 233
Discussion

For of necessity, when we say what is true—i.e. say what we know—the

knowledge itself, which we retain in memory, gives birth to a word that is
altogether of the same kind as the knowledge from which it is born. For
the thought formed by the thing that we know is a word spoken in the
heart, which is neither Greek nor Latin nor of any other language. But
since it is necessary to convey it into the knowledge of those with whom
we speak, some sign is adopted by which it is signified (De Trinitate,
XV, 10, i 9 ).io

The later Wittgenstein is opposed to any such view as this. Learning to

think comes with learning to speak; it is not something innate nor is it
something presupposed by language. Thus Wittgenstein is justified in
describing Augustine's view in terms of someone with linguistic competence
coming into a strange country and learning the foreign language through
ostensive definitions (PI I, 32).
Another point of similarity that Kenny sees between the views of
Augustine and Wittgenstein arises out of a sentence in the Confessions that
comes just before the beginning of the extract Wittgenstein quotes: 'By
cries and various sounds and movements of my limbs I tried to express my
inner feelings and get my will obeyed' {Confessions, 1.8). Kenny sees this as
being similar to Wittgenstein's view that 'words are connected with the
primitive, the natural expressions of the sensation and used in their
place' (PI I, 244).
First of all, it must be remarked that what Augustine says here is quite
consistent with, and should probably be interpreted in the light of, the
quotations given above. These seem to suggest an 'inner language' in the
child—a view that Wittgenstein was concerned to refute.
Secondly, Wittgenstein is clearly concerned with the limited class of
words referring to sensations, whereas there is no indication that Augustine
had imposed a similar limitation on himself. Rather he seems to suggest
that our language begins with the need to express our 'inner feelings'
and grows in orderly development from there. For after his description of
the learning process Augustine concludes with: 'Thus, as I heard words
repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually
learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my
mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires' (my
emphasis).
Thirdly, Wittgenstein does not consider that words are translations of
behaviour expressive of our sensations. 'So you are saying that the word
"pain" means crying? On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain
10
A similar point can be found in cc. 10 and 11 of the De Magistro where
Augustine is arguing that the use of language by a teacher cannot convey any new
information to a pupil, but can only arouse in his mind ideas and images with which
he is already familiar.

234
• Discussion

replaces crying and does not describe it' (PI I, 244). The sensation-language
replaces the behaviour characteristic of the sensation but it does not mean
it. Words of praise do not mean a smile, nor do words of blame mean a
frown; they are all different expressions of approval or disapproval.
Sensation-language is an extension of our primitive behaviour (Zettel 545).
The meaning of the words is not determined by the characteristic be-
haviour, but by the way they are used in the language-game.11 Augustine,
on the other hand, would consider verbal expressions to be translations of
inner feelings, as the quotation given above from the De Trinitate shows.
A minor point that ends Kenny's discussion of Augustine and
Wittgenstein is worth a brief comment. 'Finally, it is worth noting that this
spokesman for the name-theory nowhere uses the word nomen in this
passage, and calls words signa voluntatum as often as he calls them signa
rerurri (Ghost, p. 2). This is true but it is not very significant, for Augustine
does use the verbs appellare (to call something by name) and vocare (to
call). Moreover, in another work of his, the De Magistro, Augustine
brings forward a long argument to show that all words in a language are
really nouns or names (notnina) (c. 5, 11-16). In fact throughout this work
the words nomen and nominare are frequently used in the context of a
discussion on the meaning of words. It is also to be noted that although
Augustine correlated the meaning of the word with the object it signified,
it was no part of his theory that these objects had to be public objects
existing independently of the speaker's mind, i.e. 'things in reality' (res).
The object signified could quite easily be something mental, as the extract
from the Confessions makes clear, and as is confirmed in the De Magistro
(c. 2) where he attempts to find objects signified by the words 'if and
'nothing' and concludes that they must signify states of mind.12 And so it is
not surprising if he says 'signa voluntatum' as well as 'signa rerum'. However,
Wittgenstein was opposed to any view of meaning based on a correlation
between words and objects, whether mental or real. And so although
Wittgenstein in his discussion of Augustine concentrated on correlation
with real objects, I do not think he would have been impressed by Kenny's
observation.
Thus, although I disagree with Kenny in his criticisms of Wittgenstein's
use of Augustine, I feel that fault can still be found with Wittgenstein for
representing Augustine in such a simplistic fashion. This would be
understandable if all he knew of Augustine's writings was his Confessions.
It would be interesting to know if he had also read the De Magistro, a
remarkable work which is almost entirely given over to a discussion of

u
! See Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious
i Belief, 2, n. 5; Blue Book, 64. See also Hallett, Companion, 323-324.
12
At least this is his provisional conclusion, but he does not return to the
subject later in the work.
Discussion

meaning and language—a theme that would certainly have appealed to

Wittgenstein. The De Magistro was well known to the Scholastics—
Aquinas quoted from it, though as far as I can see not in the sections of the
Summa Theologiae which Wittgenstein had in his possession when he
died13—and it has received attention from philosophers in recent times.14
However, Hallett has found no evidence of his having read anything but the
Confessions {Companion, 761).
Augustine spends a great deal of space in the De Magistro discussing the
different sorts of words and the different ways they refer to objects (modes
of signification) (cc. 2-5). Thus it is unjust of Wittgenstein to ascribe to
Augustine a view of language which does not distinguish between the kinds
of words, and which sees meaning purely in terms of the naming or
'labelling' of objects (cf. PG p. 56; PI I, 15, 26). Augustine would not see
his theory of meaning in such simple terms as attaching labels to things.
Although he always invoked the thing signified (stgnificatum) in order to
explain the meaning of a word, his theory and his understanding of the
complexities of language were relatively sophisticated. To accuse Augustine
of a simplistic view of language because he always sought to explain the
meaning of a word in terms of what it signified would be like accusing
Wittgenstein of a simplistic view of language because he always sought to
explain the meaning of a word in terms of its use.

Mount St. Mary's, Taradale, New Zealand

13
Hallett, Companion, 761.
14
For example: L. Moonan, 'Word Meaning', Philosophy 51 (1976), 195-207;
N. Kretzmann, 'Semantics, History of, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VII
(New York, London: Free Press, 1967), 366; see also note 1 in St Augustine, The
Greatness of the Soul: The Teacher, trans. J. M. Colleran, Ancient Christian
Writers, IX (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950).

336