Nigeria and the Establishment of the OAU and Its Transformation to the AU

Sharkdam Wapmuk,

Research Fellow,
Research and Studies Department,
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
sharksnaw@yahoo.com, swapmuk@niianet.org

Abstract
This chapter examines Nigeria’s role in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) and later its transformation to African Union (AU). It argues that the pursuit of the
objective of promoting African integration and support for African unity is on Nigeria’s foreign
policy agenda and was taken seriously by successive Nigerian governments. Nigeria
demonstrated her commitment by showing pragmatic realism in the pursuit of African unity and
integration and her historic role saw to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 and later the
transformation of the organization to the AU in 2002. Since the emergence of the OAU/AU,
Nigeria has consistently pledged and honoured its commitment to the success of the organisation
through its financial contributions; maturity in handling the big power politics at the AU; its role
in promoting peace, security and economic development under the framework known as the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM). The author, while noting the challenges of the AU, argues that Nigeria has remained
committed to overcoming these challenges by working closely with other African countries. It
however notes that, despite Nigeria’s contributions and sacrifices towards the continental unity
project, her efforts have hardly been recognised, acknowledged and compensated. Even so, it is
in Nigeria’s interest to continue to build a more united, free, stronger and secured Africa. The
chapter concludes by underscoring the fact that the future of the AU depends on the commitment
of all the member states to make the continental unity project work. It recommends that member
states should continue to work closely to overcome the challenges that hamstrung OAU/AU from
being the dynamic and vibrant continental organisation that fulfils the aspirations of Africans.

Introduction
The Nigerian nation is known as one, whose foreign policy is essentially tailored to reflect her
commitment to African unity, peace and development. Declaring Nigeria’s foreign policy stand
on October 10, 1961 at the 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York,
Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Jaja Anucha Wachukwu, said that:
Our foreign policy is based on three basic pillars: the concept that Nigeria is an
African nation; it is part and parcel of the continent of Africa, therefore it is so
completely involved in anything that pertains to the continent, that it cannot be
neutral and must never be considered to be a neutralist country… we are
independent in everything, but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of
Africa. The moment Africa is affected, we are involved. We want to make this

1
 absolutely clear, Nigeria finds itself involved in anything affecting the African
continent anywhere, in any square inch of the African territory-we are
involved…And being a member of the African community and feeling
ourselves completely bound to its destiny and accepting our involvement in
everything that pertains to it, obviously all questions pertaining to Africa must
be considered questions pertaining to Nigeria. The peace of Africa is the peace
of Nigeria. Its tribulations are our tribulations and we cannot be indifferent to
its future.1

No doubt, since her independence in 1960, Nigeria has sustained the Pan-African engagement of
her foreign policy without wavering. In both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, the promotion of African integration and support of African unity constitute
a key foreign policy objective. Nigeria demonstrated her commitments by showing pragmatic
realism in the pursuit of African unity and integration which saw to the establishment of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and later the transformation of the organization to
the African Union (AU) in 2002. Nigeria’s unwavering commitment in the struggle against
apartheid and decolonization of the continent earned her recognition among the frontline states in
Southern Africa and Nigeria kept faith with this until the last vestiges of apartheid was crushed
and South Africa become independent in 1994. Nigeria has also been dedicated to the promotion
of peace, development and unity of Africa and this has cost the country huge human and material
resources since independence. While Nigeria has remained committed to the development of
Africa, it is evident that her role in the continent is hardly understood, not only by Nigerians and
Africans, but by the larger international community.

Our task in this paper is to examine Nigeria’s role in the establishment of the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) and later its transformation to African Union (AU). Addressing such
questions of the roles played by Nigeria in the process of evolution of the OAU/AU may help the
current crop of Nigerian policy makers and practitioners to make more informed judgements as
they grapple with current challenges facing Africa as a whole and the continental organisation in
particular. The analysis is also considered necessary because of some challenges to the OAU/AU
being the dynamic and vibrant continental organisation that fulfils the aspirations of Africans,

1
Dede, Brownson N. ‘’Nigeria in African Institutions: ECOWAS, AU, ADB, etc’, in Anyaoku, Emeka (ed) Review
of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues and Perspectives, (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2013),
pp.205-206

2
may be rooted in the circumstances in which it evolved. This is particularly so with regard to the
different ideas that were thrown up by the nationalist leaders on how Africans should unite to
protect their had won independence, sovereignty and dignity, which were debated and
culminated in the consensus to follow the functional cooperation path leading to the formation of
the OAU in 1963. In the making of the AU, the divide between the different schools of thought
again resurfaced in new forms and again Nigeria triumphed by persuading other African
countries to accept the functionalist approach. The paper is divided into six sections. Following
the introduction, the second section looks at the theoretical perspectives on integration and
revisits the idea of pan-Africanism and the pan African search for unity. The third section
discusses Nigeria’s role in the establishment of OAU. The fourth section focuses on Nigeria and
the making of the AU, while the fifth section is on Nigeria and the future of the AU. The sixth
section is the conclusion.

Theoretical Perspectives
How to achieve African unity has been a subject of serious debate between the federalists,
realists, functionalists, and several other integration theorists. The federalist approach to
integration presupposes the coming together of diverse entities in order to create a central unit, to
which they relinquish their sovereignty, thus leading to the creation of a supra-national entity 2.
The state, according to Charles Pentland, possesses sufficient political authority and coercive and
material power to satisfy the member states’ need for collective defense; internal security and
economies of scale; while still permitting them to maintain their individual identities and
exercises local autonomy in appropriate fields of policy3. The federalists assumed that the
establishment of political organization and processes that can address political issues has the goal
of promoting greater unity and development4. Proponents of this approach to integration argue
that this will fast-track the time table for addressing the most important political question of state
sovereignty, which they view as an obstacle to Africa’s integration. But critical questions arise

2
Mitrany, D. ‘The Prospects of Integration: Federal or Functional’ In Groom A. J.R and Paul, T (eds.)
Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations, (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp.50
3
Pentland, C., ‘Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration,’ In Groom A. J.R and Paul, T
(eds.) Opp.Cit. pp.12
4
Adogamhe, Paul G. ‘Pan-Africanism Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development’, African
Review of Integration, Vol.2 No.2, July 2008, pp5

3
here: are African states ready to pursue genuine federalism in which case authority and power
will be given to a supra-national authority or federal government? Are African states ready to
view national interest as federal interests? The realists have expressed serious reservations about
Africa’s ability to sustain one territorial jurisdiction because the institutional and physical
infrastructure to support this kind of arrangement is lacking. They have also pointed out the lack
of political will on the part of leaders to surrender their exclusive claim to sovereignty. Others
have argued for a more gradual approach to integration.

The functionalist approach to integration is one of the oldest arguments put forward that supports
those that favour ‘gradual incrementalism’. In the view of David Mitrany, the leading exponent
of functionalism, integration could be effected through the creation of a transnational complex of
economic and social organization. International activities could be organized around basic
functional needs such as transportation, health and welfare necessities, cultural activities, trade
and production. This process would not involve the surrender of national sovereignty, but would
promote international peace and security. The basic rationale for the existence of any given
political community, in Mitrany’s conception, is welfare and security; and once a ‘moderate
sufficiency of what people want and ought to have is given to them, they will keep peace’ 5.
African states emerging from colonialism were deeply concerned about preserving their
sovereignty. This partly explains the choice of the functional approach to integration as the
framework for the establishment of the OAU in 1963. The ideas thrown up by the functionalist
approach has been taken up by the neo-functionalist school. The neo-functionalist approach is
the intellectual descendant of functionalism, because it builds on the work of Mitrany. It derives
support from the experience and success of regional integration in the European Economic
Community (now European Union). Based on the experience gained from European Coal and
Steel Community, and its companions-Eurotom and EEC- the neo-functionalists felt justified in
reformulating the functionalist approach both as practise and theory. Based on their observations
of the integration processes of these organisations, they argued that while certain functionalist
dynamics were clearly at work, the progress of integration could not be explained simply in
terms of technical self determination and the learning of habits of cooperation. This argument

5
Mitrany, D. ‘The Prospects of Integration: Federal or Functional’, opp.cit. pp.51

4
prompted Adogamhe6, to note that ‘in a way, the neofunctionalists are not so much concerned
with the attainment of integration as an end, but rather, with the understanding of why and how
actual integration outcome occur’. In an attempt to draw lessons from the various perspectives,
Jacob and Teune7 have argued that ‘political integration generally implies a relationship of
community…a feeling of identity and self awareness. As for the essence of this relationship, they
stated that, ‘the essence of the integration relationship is seen as collective action to promote
mutual interest’.

Pan Africanism and the Pan African Search for Unity

Pan Africanism as a political project of forging unity of all blacks of African descent dates back
to the 1900s. Prominent pan-African personalities such as Henry Sylvester Williams, William
Edward Burghardt Dubois, David Levering Lewis and many others were instrumental for the
success of the early pan African congresses which served as inspiration for the pan African
movements on the African soil. With the representation of pan African delegates from Africa, the
fifth pan African congress under Dubois was held in London in 1945. Africans in attendance who
later became nationalist leaders included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom
Mboya of Kenya; Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; and Peter Abrahams
of South Africa8. It was at the 1945 conference that pan-Africanism became an instrument of
African nationalism as borne out by the resolutions and declarations made there. While affirming
the rights of the African peoples to freedom from imperial control, both economic and political,
they also declared that ‘the struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples is the first
step towards, and the necessary prerequisite to complete social, economic and political
emancipation’.9 The Congress anticipated a quick freedom for the peoples of Asia and Africa
who had for centuries been in the chains of colonialism. From this point attention shifted towards

6
Adogamhe, Paul G. ‘Pan-Africanism Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development’, opp.cit.
pp.6
7
Jacob Philip E. and Henry Teune, ‘The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political
Community’, in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities,
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964),pp.4-5
8
Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges ‘An African Perspective’, in Nicoletta Pirozzi (ed) Ensuring Peace and Security in
Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership, (San Romano: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2010), pp.17-18
9
Ajala, A. Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects, (London: Deutch, 1973), Pp.9-11

5
mobilsation of the people of Africa and the formation of political parties in order to bring an end
to colonialism.

The attainment of independence by Ghana in 1957 naturally opened a new chapter on the course
of the Pan-African Movement. Kwame Nkrumah, who had attended the Pan-African Congress of
1945, emerged as the Head of the independent government of Ghana favoured a radical approach
for the Pan-African Movement. Ghana’s Independence also served as an inspiration for other
African countries still under the colonial yoke. Between 15 th to 22nd April, 1958 all the
independent African states were called to an All African Peoples' Congress in Ghana. The
countries that attended were Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the
United Arab Republic and the host country, Ghana. This Conference of Independent African
States (CIAS) no doubt set a precedent by asserting and proclaiming unity among the
independent African states at that time and demonstrated that pan-Africanism had emerged from
the realm of idealism into the field of practical politics. However, its major shortcoming was that
only a few African countries that had attained independence were qualified to attend, thus
necessitating the convening of an All African People Organisation Conference that took place in
Accra in 1958. They elected Tom Mboya of Kenya as Chairman, with F.S McEwen of Nigeria
and J.K Tetteh of Ghana as joint secretaries. This conference had immense significance,
particularly because of the presence of many African political parties and the declaration that ‘…
the first loyalty of African states will be an African commonwealth’.10

From the interactions of African countries in the early days of their independence it is evident
that the point of disagreement that will later emerge between African countries was not over
whether there was the need for Africa states to unite, as noted by Nkrumah’s treatise- ‘Africa
Must Unite’11; however a major point of disagreement that emerged was how African states
should unite. Our task here is to paint a clear picture of the role of Nigeria in the pan-African
search for unity under the framework a continental organization and to this task we turn our
attention.
10
Ajala, Adekunle, ‘Background to the Establishment, Nature and Structure of the Organization of African Unity’, in
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Special Edition on The Organization of African Unity, 1963-1988: A Role
Analysis, Volume 14, No.1, 1988, pp. 41
11
Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite (London: 1963)

6
Nigeria’s Role in the Establishment of OAU
An early sign of the emerging points of departure as to how African states should unite was
observed when Guinea and Ghana proposed to form a nucleus of a Union of West African states.
This nucleus called the Ghana-Guinea Union (GGU) was proclaimed on 1 st May, 1959. Instead
of this marriage being celebrated as sign of a good future for Africa, it came under severe
criticism from several sides. The first criticism came from Chief Anthony Enahoro of Nigeria
who stated that ‘any idea of a union of West African States ‘pre-determined by Ghana and
Guinea was unacceptable’.12 It was not only Nigeria that criticized the proposed union, Guinea’s
other French Africa too were opposed to the union because of the way and manner Guinea
decided to be free. In an effort to find a way out of the crisis, President Tubman of Liberia
organized a conference at Sanniquelle, a small village in Liberia. In attendance at the Conference
which held in July, 1959, were the Heads of State of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia. These leaders
differed in their views as to whether to wait or not for other African countries to achieve
independence before proceeding with the discussions on African unity. At the end of
deliberations at this conference, it was resolved that any decision on the form, method and timing
of concrete measures towards African unity and cooperation be deferred until Nigeria and the
other African countries achieved independence.13

At the same time this meeting was being held in Liberia, Nigeria’s Nnamdi Azikiwe was in the
USA addressing a press conference, where he said that ‘certain practical steps would have to be
taken before any African unity could be achieved’. He added that ‘if for many years certain
parties have fought for their sovereignty, it is unlikely that they will surrender that sovereignty to
a nebulous organization simply because we feel it necessary to work together’. 14 Apart from
concerns as to the implication of transferring sovereignty to a supra-national organization to
achieve African unity, there were other issues such as suspicion of Ghana by her West African
neighbours. Nigeria and other West Africa neighbors of Ghana were particular dissatisfied to
learn that Ghana which was suppose to be the leading campaigner for African unity was, at the
12
Ajala, Adekunle, ‘Background to the Establishment, Nature and Structure of the Organization of African Unity’,
opp. cit. pp.44
13
Ajala, Adekunle, opp. cit. pp.44
14
Ajala, Adekunle, opp. cit. pp.44

7
same time, taking measures to break up the British west African boards. Another reason for
Nigeria’s suspicion of Ghana’s motive at that time was the growing awareness that some
‘Nigerian dissidents’ were getting support from Ghana. Most French speaking African countries,
had by middle 1960, come to the conclusion that Ghana was financing subversion against their
government. Though it was difficult to prove these allegations, it clouded their judgment towards
Ghana, the supposedly champion of African unity.

In accordance with the decision taken at the first CIAS of April 1958, the second CIAS was
scheduled to take place in 1960. The Sanniquellie conference of July 1959 had also specified that
another conference be organized in 1960. This time around it was expected not only to be
attended by independent African countries alone, but also, by those with fixed date for
independence. Accordingly, apart from the eleven states already independent namely: Cameroun,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and the United Arab
Republic, - also by Nigeria, Leopoldville (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mali
federation, Somalia and Algeria. Invitations were therefore sent to these countries. However,
when the conference opened at Addis Ababa on 15th June, 1960, only Cameroun, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and
the Algerian provisional government were represented. The French speaking African states were
absent because they did not want to offend France, this is so because of the attendance of the
Algerian provisional government, which would have amounted to recognition of a ‘rebel
government’. While the conference was able to reach agreement on topics such as the liberation
of the remaining dependencies in Africa, the war in Algeria and the apartheid policy of the South
African government, the issue of African unity proved to be the most controversial topic.

Even though delegates to this meeting realized the need for African unity, there was substantial
disagreement on how that unity should be achieved and what form it should take. Ghana,
supported by Guinea, called for a political union and wanted the conference to make use of the
Sanniquellie Declaration as a basis for the achievement of a union of African states. Nigeria
opposed that suggestion. The leader of the Nigerian delegation, Maitama Sule voiced out that ‘at
this moment the idea of forming a union of African states is premature’. He further argued that:

8
 At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form a union by government with
any African states by surrendering our sovereignty…President Tubman’s idea of
the association of state is therefore more acceptable for it is yet premature to form
a Union of States under one sovereignty…we must first break all artificial
barriers; build international roads, promote mutual exchanges- exchange of
information, scientific and otherwise etc; lifting any ban on the movement of free
trade and people between the various African countries. All those must be done in
order to pave the way for this Union of African states. But while it is true to say
that the formation of a Union of African states is premature, yet one can hardly
ignore the necessity for the emerging African states, more especially West African
States, to be united under one sovereignty. Something of a loose federation at first
having got the way clear may be a good beginning. Sooner or later the unity will
come by necessity or circumstantially…the unity of Africans comes as a natural
course and there can be no barrier against it. It is by unity that Africa will be able
to project her identity before the eyes of the world. It is by unity that African
states will be able to command respect among other nations of the world and it is
by that we shall be able to satisfactorily achieve peace and prosperity.15

The Leader of the Nigerian Delegation, the Honourable Maitama Sule, at the Second Conference
of Independent African States, did not stop there, he further cautioned against personal ambition
that might set some African countries bitterly against one another:
We must threat ourselves like brothers and sisters, and we must not go out and
make some of our brothers and sisters objects of ridicule in the eyes of the world
for our selfish interests. If we feel that any one of the African countries is not
pursuing the right policy let us by all means try to convince that country in a
brotherly way to abandon that policy and take the right one…In short we must not
be too bitter against one another no matter what our objectives. This and only this
is the way to achieve our objective and get to our goal.16

The Second CIAS, apart from exposing the lukewarm attitude of the French speaking countries
to towards pan-Africanism at that time, also marked a beginning of an open controversy on the
approach to African unity and also gave an indication of the type of continental organization that
would likely emerge in the end.

While African states were grappling with the issue of how to achieve African unity, certain
foreign powers whose nationals had vested interest in African countries were interfering in the

15
Extracts of the Statement of the Leader of the Nigerian Delegation, the Hon. Y.M Sule, at the Second Conference
of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, June 1960 in Ajala, A. opp. cit. pp.47
16
Opp. Cit. Pp.47

9
internal affairs of African countries and creating instability. This was the case in Congo
Leopoldville (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) shortly after its independence on 30th
June, 1960. Worried about the problem in Congo, Abbe Fulbert Youlou of Congo-Brazzaville
took the initiative to convene a meeting of French-speaking African states to discuss the issue in
December. In attendance at the meeting were- Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo-Brazzaville, Benin Republic, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Burkina Faso. Apart from discussing the developments in Congo, the
conference also discussed ways and means of achieving economic cooperation among their
countries. In reaction to the decision taken at Brazzaville over the Congo crisis, and the need to
find an urgent solution to the crisis, another conference was held in Casablanca, Morocco. It was
attended by Heads of State of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic, the
Prime Minister of Libya and the Congolese Ambassador. Though this conference found it
difficult to reach immediate consensus on how the Congo crisis should be settled, they agreed to
withdraw their troops and other personnel from the UN Operational Command in Congo, if the
UN continue to connive with the secessionist forces in Katanga region. However, on the issue of
African unity, the participating states were determined to do their best to establish an effective
form of cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields. To achieve their purpose, they
decided to create an African Consultative Assembly, to be composed of the representatives of
every African state. In addition, four committees namely; African political committee, African
economic committee, African cultural committee and joint African high command were set up
and a liaison office was established to ensure effective coordination of the various committees.
At the end of the Casablanca conference, it had become clear that African states were moving in
two different directions and this was not good for African unity.

While the Brazzaville Group was basically interested in economic cooperation, the Casablanca
Group was basically interested in a political union with among others, a Joint High Command.
While controversy ranged among these groups there was another set of countries which belonged
to neither of the two. These included Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the
Sudan, Togo and Tunisia. Nigeria, with Liberia decided to sponsor another conference in
Monrovia, Liberia. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Sudan and United Arab Republic declined to

10
attend for different reasons of interest to them. The meeting of the Monrovia Group had
concluded amongst other things that ‘unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the
political integration of sovereign African States but unity of aspirations and of action considered
from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity’. 17 It also supported the
UN intervention in Congo and condemned in strong terms apartheid in South Africa. Another
major significance of this conference was that while the Casablanca group remained intact, the
Brazzaville group had expanded to include many of the states that were not part of that group,
thus becoming the Monrovia group. As the conference in Monrovia was finishing, the Foreign
Ministers of the Casablanca group were getting set to consider recommendations made by the
committee of experts appointed during the January meeting and later approved the Protocol of
the African Charter which gave legal backing to the decisions taken at Casablanca by their Heads
of State and Governments (HSG). Meanwhile the governments of Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Morocco, and the United Arab Republic and the Provisional Government of Algeria, formally
signed the Protocol on 5th May, 1961.18 The legal documents prepared by the Casablanca group
for African unity clearly made references to the Charter for ‘Union of African states’ that was
approved by Ghana, Guinea and Mali at Accra on 1 st July, 1961. That document specifically spelt
out that ‘the Union of African States’ was to the established and also dealt with the structure of
the envisaged body.

Again, another conference was called in Lagos, Nigeria in January, 1962 and all independent
African states were invited to attend. The Lagos conference considered the proposals submitted
by Nigeria, Ethiopia and Liberia for a functional approach to African Unity. After much
deliberations, the conference agreed to set up an inter-African and Malagasy organization for the
purpose of ‘promoting a better life for the peoples of Africa’, by enlisting the efforts of member
states and joint actions in order to accelerate economic and social development of the people.
The proposed organization was expected to have certain organs such as Assembly of Heads of
State, a Council of Ministers, a General Secretariat and Commissions. It was on the basis of the
deliberations that the Lagos Charter emerged. In view of this development, three legal documents
17
Ministry of Information, African Summit in Monrovia, Published on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria
(Ministry of Information , Lagos, 1961), pp. 13-19
18
Ajala, Adekunle, ‘Background to the Establishment, Nature and Structure of the Organization of African Unity’,
opp. cit. pp.54

11
had emerged each suggesting different approach to African unity. These were the Protocol of the
African Charter and the Charter for the Union of African States, from the Casablanca Group and
the Lagos Charter from the Monrovia Group. While both groups agreed on the need for African
unity, the point of departure was whether it should take the form of economic cooperation as
proposed by the Monrovia group led by Nigeria or political union proposed by Casablanca group
led by Ghana. Given the divergent views of the two groups, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia
argued for an ‘African Group’ instead.19 The significance of the Lagos conference was that it
brought together for the first time all the groups, with exception of the Algerian provisional
government. It was also at the Lagos conference that African states agreed to move forward with
the continental project of African unity. And the country that provided the platform to host the
conference with its resources was Nigeria. Following this encouragement, negotiations were
carried out through formal and informal diplomatic channels. State visits by African Heads of
State became more frequent. For instance, the Nigerian Prime Minister, the Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa visited Guinea in December 1961 to discuss the issue of African unity. The various
consultations yielded desired result as both the Casablanca group and Monrovia group supported
the idea for another continental conference. Through the efforts of the Ethiopian government a
conference of all independent African states was held in Addis Ababa in 1963.

The Foreign Affairs Ministers first met at Addis Ababa on 15 th May, 1963 and deliberated on the
agenda for the conference of the Heads of State, however, the issue of African unity proved to be
a thorny issue at that meeting. In the end, the Ministers agreed that the summit conference should
accept the Ethiopian document as a basis for discussion, with a view to drawing up the Charter
for an All African Organisation. They also suggested that the document should be given to all
member governments to enable them consider and to make comments and amendments before
the meeting of the foreign ministers conference to be held at the end of the year 1963 in Dakar.
In addition, it was also suggested that the provisional secretariat should assemble all documents
such as the African Charter of Casablanca, the Lagos Charter and the Ghanaian comments, for
submission to the next Foreign Ministers conference. The point is that the Ministers were
advocating the postponement of the establishment of a continental organization till a later date.
On their own part the African Heads of State rejected this recommendation and agreed with
19
See Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite (London: 1963), pp. 147

12
Emperor Haile Selassie that the conference should not close without adopting a single charter
and establishing a single African organization. While majority of African leaders spoke in favour
of a gradual approach to African unity and the establishment of an organization based more or
less on the Lagos Charter, the Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah was the only exception. He
still insisted on the setting up of a Committee of Foreign Affairs Officials and experts
empowered to establish amongst others, a commission to frame a constitution for a union
government of African states and another to work out a continent wide plan for a unified or
common economic and industrial programmed for Africa. These were to include a common
market for Africa, an African currency, an African monetary zone, an African central bank, an
African communications system and also commissions to draw up proposals for common foreign
policy and diplomacy; common system of defense and common citizenship. The Speech made by
Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a man often described as the “The Golden Voice
of Africa’, at the inaugural summit of the OAU in Addis Ababa on May 24, 1963,
was apt and convincing to participants at the conference. He argued that:
There have been quite a lot of views on what we mean by African
unity. Some of us have suggested that African unity should be
actualised by the political fusion of the different states of Africa;
some of us feel that African unity could best be achieved by
taking practical steps in economic, political and scientific and
cultural cooperation and by trying first, to get the Africans to
understand themselves before embarking on the more
complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union. My
country stands for the practical approach to the unity of the
African continent. We feel that if this unity is to last, we must
start from the beginning20

At the end of the general debate, the conference adopted the Charter which reflected the
moderate views expressed by Nigeria’s Prime Minister 21. The significance of Nigeria’s role in
the Addis Ababa conference that led to the establishment of the OAU cannot be quantified. Apart
from Nigeria’s leadership role through the steering of the Monrovia group and the diplomatic
efforts that led to the conviction and winning of support of states belonging to the Casablanca
group, it also provided the draft charter which was adopted at this meeting. It is on record that

20
Balewa, A.T., Nigeria Speaks: Speeches between 1957 and 1964, (Lagos: Longman Press, 1964) pp.159
21
Shinkaye, Kayode, ‘Nigeria and the African Union’, in Akinterinwa, Bola A. (ed) Nigeria and the Development of
the African Union, (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005), pp 79

13
Nigeria’s Dr. Taslim Elias was instrumental to the drafting of the 1963 OAU Charter which came
into force on the signature by representatives of 32 Governments on 25 May 1963 in Addis
Ababa.22 In addition, Nigeria demonstrated maturity when a new dilemma emerged in form of
where to locate of the secretariat of the OAU. This became an issue between three key countries,
namely Nigeria, Senegal and Ethiopia, whom all competed for the location of the secretariat in
their countries. It took Nigeria’s maturity and respect for the Ethiopian leader, Emperor Haile
Selassie, to give way to Ethiopia, and to also persuade Senegal to do same.

As more and more African states gained independence, they joined the political, economic and
socio-cultural interaction in the continent, mediated and coordinated by the regional organisation.
The main purposes of the OAU were:
i. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
ii. To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the
peoples of Africa;
iii. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
iv. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
v. To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.23

Thus, through cooperation and harmonisation of policies on a wide range of issues, the
objectives of African solidarity and unity would be achieved. This was the arrangement which
guided the prosecution by the OAU and African states of the national liberation struggle in
Africa and the campaign against racist regimes on the continent. Through political, diplomatic
and financial support provided by the OAU member states through its Liberation Committee, the
OAU succeeded phenomenally in its self assigned task of liberating African states from the yoke
of colonial rule. As a result, under OAU guidance, countries like Mozambique (1974), Sao Tome
and Principe (1974), Cape Verde, Angola (1975), Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and South
Africa (1994) were liberated. The OAU also successfully mediated some disputes such as

22
Akinterinwa, Bola A. ‘Africa in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2005: Beyond Forty Five Years of Unwavering
Commitment’, in Akinterinwa, Bola A. (ed) Nigeria and the Development of the African Union, (Ibadan: Vantage
Publishers, 2005), pp.9
23
OAU, Charter of the Organization of African Unity, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963)

14
Algeria-Morocco dispute between 1964-1965, and Kenya-Somalia border disputes between
1965-1967. In all these endeavours, despite the ups and downs of global politics, the OAU was
able to mobilise Africa’s political and diplomatic resources to achieve the ultimate objective of
liberating the continent from colonial yoke. That critical goal was achieved in about three
decades with the end of the apartheid system and the enthronement of democratic rule in South
Africa with the election of Nelson Mandela as President in 1994.

In the economic field, the OAU achieved part of its commitments. Its leaders recognised the
economic challenges facing the continent and were determined to address them. At the level of
economic integration, cooperation, and development, there emerged over the 40 years under the
OAU several regional and sub-regional groupings reflecting an acceptance of transitional, state-
led economic cooperation involving the pooling of resources in response to shared problems and
opportunities. This led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) by the Heads of State
and Government of the OAU in 1980. The LPA and the Final Act of Lagos were raised as a
central idea of ‘collective self reliance’ of the continent. This idea was strongly reinforced by the
Abuja treaty of June 1991, establishing the African economic community (AEC) which sought to
increase economic self reliance and promote self sustaining development.

However, enormous security, governance and developmental challenges still confronted African
states. The evidence for this was the sporadic conflict that spread across the entire continent from
Liberia to Angola to Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire etc. The conflicts were the result of failure of
governance in the critical areas of economic development, particularly social provisioning,
poverty eradication and the political crisis of marginalisation, injustice, identity and others. In
addition, the world has changed significantly; globalisation has impacted on world affairs in a
manner which has further worsened the standing of many African states in the global economy.
With these critical issues arising, African leaders appreciated the need to adjust to the dynamics
of a new era and pursue the rapid socio-economic development. This was the reason why after
several negotiations among African states and the endorsement of the Sirte Declaration in 1999
and the adoption of the Constitutive Act in Lome on July 11 2002, the OAU was transformed to
the African Union on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa. Again, Nigeria and like minded

15
countries played significant roles in the processes that led to the transformation of the OAU to
AU. As with many other organisation and institutions in Africa, from the very beginning of its
life, the OAU was dismissed by pessimistic detractors as an organisation that was destined to
fail. Each time it convened, its critics predicted that it would end in disarray and collapse.
However, the organisation proved its critics wrong. All, but one, of the 54 African countries were
members of the OAU up to the time of its transformation into the AU.

Nigeria and the Making of AU

The journey towards the making of the AU started long before the proposal was tabled by
Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya, at the Extra Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte in September
1999 as part of the discussion on the future of the OAU. According to Zdenek Cervenka:
There are times in the life of human institutions when a factor or a combination of
factors not only brings out the strengths and weaknesses of that institution, but
pointedly makes the necessity for restructuring of that institution a matter for
urgent consideration if that institution is to continuously serve the purpose of its
creation.24
The OAU had achieved its primary mission of liberating the continent from colonial and racist
regimes, it was however ineffective when it came to coordinating the affairs of member states on
violent conflicts, political corruption, economic development, governance, respect for human
rights, gender equality, eradication of poverty and rule of law. As Murithi argued, certain
principles of the OAU such as non-interference in the internal affairs of member states affected
the organisation negatively.25 The OAU was deeply handicapped in the face of tragic conflicts
such as the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the collapse of the state of Somalia, the crises of Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and others. A combination
of factors actually brought out the weaknesses of the OAU and the need for transforming the
organisation. First, the end of the cold war and rivalries between the West and East, led to retreat
from Africa. Hence, it became obvious to African leaders that only a united Africa could remain
relevant in the international system.26 The second factor is the failure of models proffered by the

24
Cervenka, Zdenek, The Unfinished Quest for African Unity: Africa and the OAU, (London: Julian Friedman
1977), pp.18
25
Murithi, Tim, Institutionalising Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Union Values and Principles into Policy
and Practice, ISS Paper 143, (Institute of Security Studies, 2007), pp.3
26
Kawonishe, Dayo, ‘Metamorphosis of the OAU to AU: Problems and Prospects’, African Journal of International
Affairs and Development, Volume 7 (1), 2002, pp.89

16
Bretton Wood Institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) to alleviate poverty and promote
meaningful development in Africa. Despite many attempts by international economic bodies
such as Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), African Development Bank (ADB), which
collaboratively developed initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), African Priority
Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), African Alternative Framework to Structural
Adjustment Programme etc, not much progress was been achieved.27 Another factor which
exposed the weakness of the OAU was the debt situation in Africa. As at 2004, external debt of
Africa states stood at US$ 330 billion in nominal terms, equivalent of fifty percent of the
continent’s GDP.28 At the same time, there was considerable decline in foreign aid and
investment coming into the continent. Official aid had dropped from US$ 17.9 billion in 1992 to
US$ 10.8 billion in 1999. Foreign investment had also remained modest totalling US$ 7.3 billion
in 2000 that is equivalent of four percent of aggregate Foreign Direct Investment flows of US$
178 billion in the developing world.

The collapse of apartheid in South Africa gave additional impetus for the transformation of
OAU. The achievement actually marked the end of a historical era, and the end of the era of
national liberation struggle. With this development and against the background of globalization
which has raised some critical problems, the suppressed issues of socio-economic development
came to the fore. Against the forgoing, it became necessary to review the charter of the OAU as a
prelude to the restructuring of the continental body and the framework for its work. The need to
review the charter has always been there. A committee to review the charter was set up in 1980
and between 1980 and 1996, the committee held six meetings. However, the exercise did not
lead to a successful and fruitful conclusion.29 In 1991, the OAU summit in Abuja, Nigeria,
adopted the treaty of the African Economic Community (AEC). The treaty entered into force in
1994, and provided a thirty four year timeframe and a six stage process for the creation of an
African Economic Community (AEC). By 1993, it had become much clearer that the OAU could
not handle the task set out in the AEC. Other regions of the world were also transforming and/or
27
Kouassi, Rene N’Guettia, ‘The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical
Landmarks’, African Integration Review, volume 1, No. 2, July 2007, pp.11
28
Mkwezalamba, Maxwell M. and Chinyama, Emmanuel J., ‘Implementation of Africa’s Integration and
Development Agenda: Challenges and Prospects’, African Integration Review, volume 1, No. 1, January 2007, pp.6
29
Kouassi, Rene N’Guettia, ‘The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical
Landmarks’, pp.13

17
moving towards greater unity and interaction in the economic and political spheres in order to
confront the challenges of globalization. This was evidenced in the expansion and consolidation
of the European Union (EU) in 1992, the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) and the growing strength of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
others. It therefore became imperative for African leaders to consider the possibility of designing
a new continental institutional mechanism to manage and coordinate its affairs.

In the mist of all these, Africa had one critical factor in its favour, which was the emergence of a
new crop of democratically elected, fairly knowledgeable, dedicated and visionary leaders that
were eager to lift the continent from poverty and underdevelopment. These leaders included
presidents Oluesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdulazziz Bouteflika
of Algeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal amongst others. While these leaders were busy trying to
craft a new economic and development agenda for Africa, which eventually culminated in the
introduction of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Colonel Muammar
Ghaddafi concentrated on the politics of building a united states of Africa.

In 1999, Muammar Ghaddafi proposed the African Union to replace the OAU, with continent
institutions that include African presidency, a continental parliament, one army, and one central
bank. What this meant was that the proposed African Union would entail the eventual
elimination of boundaries and state sovereignty. Ghaddafi’s proposal received full support from
Togo and Burkina Faso. Nigeria on the other had expressed some reservations. The support
Libya received from Burkina Faso and Togo did not come as a surprise as Libya had given these
two countries and several others bilateral aid. Libya had also paid ten year’s worth of back dues
to OAU for ten African nations and paid most of the $17 million cost of 2001 OAU meeting. 30
Nigeria’s response to Ghaddafi’s proposal did not come as a surprise either, given his past
relations with Nigeria. It was Nigeria that threatened Ghaddafi with military action when he
proposed to merge part of Chadian territory with Libya. Instead of Ghaddafi’s idealistic notion of
United States of Africa, Nigeria took a principled stand that helped to steer the debate to

30
Adetula, Victor A.O, ‘Nigeria and the African Union’, in U. Joy Ogwu (ed) New Horizons for Nigeria in World
Affairs, (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2005), pp.172

18
concentrate on a pragmatic and realistic African union. As noted by Shinkaye 31, Nigeria therefore
worked tirelessly with other like minded countries to ensure that Africa entered into a
commitment that were realisable.

Nigeria’s position on the establishment of the AU was clearly a re-echo of the moderate stance
taken by her during the formation of the OAU. In his intervention during the OAU Ministerial
Conference between 30th May and 1st June 2000, in Tripoli, Libya, Nigeria’s former Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Sule Lamido, told his colleagues that:
Nigeria favours the establishment of a strong African union, one which would
replace, over a period of time, existing continental organisations- the OAU and
AEC. This needs not be a replica of the United States of America, given the
realities in our continent and the political experiences of our nation states. but, it
should be of such character, content and form which does justice to the cherished
vision of the founding fathers of the OAU and satisfies the dreams and aspirations
of the peoples of our continent...let me emphasise that in our quest to achieve our
objectives of establishing a Union, we must bear in mind the elements that make
for a strong, ...and lasting union. These include trust, recognition, of the realities
of the units making up the Union; tolerance; understanding and compromise. A
union is very much like a marriage... For marriage to last and to be fruitful, both
partners must be willing to make necessary sacrifices. For our Union to endure we
must have trust between ourselves; we must have confidence in each other; we
must understand each other well; we must accept the realities of each member
state’s peculiar situation; and, there must be mutual respect. Nigeria fully supports
a process that takes into account all these elements because, that is what can lead
to a United States of Africa, which will endure and which will make Africa strong
and ready for the future.32

Nigeria therefore opted again for what it called a gradual incrementalism towards the formation
of the continental regional integration project. This persuasive argument put forward by Nigeria
was more than convincing to other member states of the OAU. President Olusegun Obasanjo in
the home town of Muammar Ghaddafi, Sirte Libya in 1999, persuaded his colleagues during the
OAU Summit to accept the concept of African Union at a critical time when African leaders were
divided over the idea of a United States of Africa (USA) which Ghaddafi had envisaged will be a
replica of the United States of America (USA). Obasanjo also persuaded his colleagues to move
31
Shinkaye, Kayode, ‘Nigeria and the African Union’, in Akinterinwa, Bola A. (ed) Nigeria and the Development of
the African Union, opp.cit. pp.86
32
Lamido Sule’s Intervention during Extra-Ordinary Session of OAU Council of Ministers, Tripoli, Libya May
2000, quoted in Shinkaye, Kayode, opp.cit. pp.90-91

19
forward by beginning to implement the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community
(AEC) as a lead up to the African Union. Shinkaye, notes that the first draft of the Heads of
State’s decision was hand written by President Olusegun Obasanjo and handed over to Nigerian
representatives at the drafting committee meeting 33. President Olusegun also participated actively
in the preparatory meetings as a member of the inner cycle with countries such as South Africa,
Libya, Mali, and Algeria. Also noteworthy, was the fact that Nigeria, in collaboration with South
Africa played very critical roles in the passage of the Constitutive Act at the 2000 Lome AU
Summit. This, Nigeria achieved by calling for it to be adopted through acclamation. As agreed
by African leaders at the Sirte meeting in 1999, the Constitutive Act was to be tabled for further
discussion in 2001. During the 36th OAU summit in Lomé (Togo) in July 2000, 25 member
states, excluding Nigeria, ratified the draft AU Constitutive Act. 34 The provisions of Article 28 of
the Act, stipulated that the AU will come into effect exactly 30 days after the 36th instrument of
ratification (representing two-thirds of OAU member states) has been deposited at the OAU
secretariat.35 It was the submission of Nigeria’s instrument of ratification that brought the AU to
being. The public launch of the AU as the successor to the OAU occurred 9 th July 2002 at the
summit of OAU Heads of State and Government held in Durban, South Africa. A confirmation of
Nigeria’s role in shaping the African Union was that her views were clearly reflected in the
Constitutive Act which the Heads of State and Government adopted in Lome in July 2000 and
the Rules of Procedure and Statutes of the Key Organs of the African Union, which were adopted
at Durban in 2002.

Nigeria’s Commitment to African Unity and the Future of the AU

In a speech delivered by President Olusegun Obasanjo titled ‘Triumph of African Unity’, at the
National Seminar on African Union in Abuja, on 15th May, 2001, he said that:
33
Shinkaiye, J.K. ‘Nigeria’s Role in Shaping the African Union”, in The African Union and The Challenges of
Cooperation and Integration, Proceedings of the National Seminar organised by the Ministry of Cooperation and
Integration in Africa, Abuja, 14-15 May 2001 (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2002). pp. 17-18.
34
The countries that ratified the Draft Constitutive Act of the African Union at the Lome Summit of July 2000
include Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Niger, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo and Zambia. The countries that did
not ratify the document are Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Republic of Guinea, Mauritius, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda
and Zimbabwe.
35
Shinkaiye, J.K. ‘Nigeria’s Role in Shaping the African Union”, Opp.cit, pp. 17-18.

20
 The road to freedom and unity has been long and tortuous, but the dream has been
kept alive like a flickering candlelight in a dark night of hopelessness. It is a great
testimony to the resilience and perseverance of the peoples of this great continent,
that neither wars, nor conflicts, and diseases, nor excruciating poverty can
discourage us from pursuing the great endeavour of African unity of our
continent. Nigeria has always shared this Pan-African vision. Nigeria has always
worked for its achievement. Nigeria has always been prepared to commit men and
resources for the realisation of this great objective. Nigeria remains committed to
the pursuit of this noble goal of African freedom and unity.36

While it is undisputable that Nigeria has continued to make necessary sacrifices to the realisation
of African freedom and unity, what is not clear is whether other African countries recognise and
acknowledge her contributions. At the same time, the future of the AU is discussed here against
the background of critical challenges facing the AU, and Nigeria’s commitments to addressing
these challenges, both in the present and possibly in the future.

The African Union has undoubtedly made tangible gains since its launching in Durban, South
Africa in July 2002, as evidenced by the establishment of the organs of the union such as the
Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee, the
Pan African Parliament, the Commission, the African Court of Justice, the African Court on
Human Rights, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the Peace and Security Council. At the
same time, that does not suggest that the working of the continental organisation is without
challenges. An audit of the AU carried out by a 13 member high panel chaired by the former
executive secretary of United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Professor
Adebayo Adedeji had identified several challenges confronting the AU.37 These included
amongst others the issue of political will of the governments and peoples of Africa. Several
decisions taken in the past by leaders had yet to be implemented. Since the establishment of the

36
‘Triumph of African Unity’, Speech by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the National Seminar on African Union,
Abuja, 15 May, 2001, in U. Joy Ogwu and Alli, W.O, Years of Reconstruction: Selected Foreign Policy Speeches of
Olusegun Obasanjo, (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2007), pp.127-128.
37
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, during the Accra Summit in July, 2007 commissioned a
performance audit of the African Union’s capacity to realise the goal of political and economic integration. The 13
member high panel, chaired by the former executive secretary of UNECA, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, took about
three months (10 September to 18 December 2007) to complete its work and submitted a report of about 230 pages
to the 10th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, on 31 January, 2008. The findings of this
committee shed light on the inadequacies of the AU organs and institutions.

21
OAU in 1963, about 33 treaties had been approved. However, by 13 June 2007 only 18 had been
fully ratified. Since the establishment of the AU in 2002, 42 decisions and declarations were
made at the summits, yet only 21 had been fully or partly implemented. 38 Second is the issue of
funding of the AU.39 The panel noted that several member states were in arrears of their dues.
Five African countries namely Nigeria, South Africa, Libya, Algeria and Egypt pay about 75
percent of the AU budget, and they sometimes also delayed their payments 40. Three countries,
namely, Nigeria, Algeria and South Africa, were up to date in their payments as at 2007.

Performance of Member States on Assessed Contributions (as at December 2007)

Member States Number in Arrears
Those in arrears of one year and above 21
Those without arrears but that have not paid their 2007 25
assessed contributions
Those up to date with their contributions including the 9 (Nigeria, Zambia, Liberia, Ghana, South Africa,
2007 assessment Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Botswana, and Algeria)
Those that have made an advance payment 1 (Burkina Faso)
Those of the five who account for 75 percent of assessed 3 (Nigeria, Algeria and South Africa)
contributions (Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, and
Libya) who have paid their 2007 contributions

Source: The High Panel, Audit of the African Union, 2007, pp. 29

Another challenge identified by the Adedeji panel is at the level of leadership of the AU. The
panel observed that the relationship between the Commission President, the Vice-President and
the eight commissioners is dysfunctional, with overlaps in the portfolios, lines of authority and
liability and unclear and ill-defined goals.41 In addition, it pointed out that lack of adequate
leadership had caused tension between some commissioners and the teams around them. The
panel identified lack of supervision due to the repeated absence of Commissioners and low
morale posted in the staff. The audit made a series of recommendations to address these issues
including on the nomination of the Commissioners and Chairperson of the AU. Another major
38
Gueye, Ousseynou, AU Audit Report Finds Serious Inadequacies. (Online) available at
www.afrika.no/Detailed/15870.html (Accessed on March 10, 2008).
39
The High Level Panel, Audit of the African Union, (Online) Available at
www.obsafrique.eu/documents/AUDIT_REPORT.doc, 2008 (Accessed on 15th March, 2013), pp.107
40
Agubuzu, Lawrence O.C, The Evolution and Funding of the African Union (AU), in U. Joy Ogwu and Warisu O
Alli (eds.) AU and the Future of Africa, (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2008), pp.13-24
41
The High Level Panel, opp.cit. pp. XXI

22
challenge to the drive towards continental unity is the factor of external intervention. Africa is a
home of strategic minerals, energy and other natural resources. This endowment has continued to
attract various powers to the continent. Added to these is what Agubuzu referred to as the
challenge of development.42 The AU, unlike the OAU, which was founded in the 20 th century to
rid Africa of colonialism and apartheid, is founded in the 21 st century to rescue Africa from the
problems of underdevelopment, poverty and to place it on the path of sustainable growth
development. These challenges no doubt have grave implications for future of the AU. The AU
will only achieve its objective of promoting greater unity, cooperation and solidarity among
African leaders and peoples if these challenges are addressed.

Since the emergence of the AU, Nigeria has consistently pledged and honoured its commitment
to the success of the AU. Nigeria’s commitment to the AU is visible in its financial contributions
to the organisation. The AU’s funding challenges became more pronounced because the
organisation expanded its budgetary requirements to about five times higher than the OAU.
Nigeria remains one of the five major financiers of the AU operating budget, with Algeria,
Egypt, Libya and South Africa. According to Agubuzu, each of the five major contributing
countries contributed US$14.4 million towards the organisation’s operating budget. 43 By 2012,
these contributions were put at US$16.7million.

Nigeria has consistently played a prominent role in the area of peace and security in Africa.
Following the ratification of the protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in
December 2003, the PSC became fully operational on 16 March 2004 as the AU organ mandated
to address peace and security in Africa. In this capacity as the pioneer chairman of the council,
President Olusegun Obasanjo mediated in the Darfur crisis in western Sudan. During August
2004, the AU PSC under Obasanjo’s leadership convened peace talks in Abuja between the
government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur. This round of negotiations led to the adoption of the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May 2006. Nigeria has also made commitments to the
promotion and consolidation of democracy, good governance and human rights in Africa. Nigeria
did not only ratify the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and
42
Agubuzu, Lawrence O.C, The Evolution and Funding of the African Union (AU), opp.cit. pp.21
43
Agubuzu, Lawrence O.C, The Evolution and Funding of the African Union (AU), opp.cit. pp.22

23
subsequently deposited the instrument of ratification with the AU, but also demonstrated its
commitment to support democratisation in Africa. This Nigeria did by providing necessary
material and other support to the democratic and electoral processes in Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Niger and other African countries.44

In the area of continental economic development, Nigeria’s commitment to the AU has seen the
government playing a prominent role in initiation of the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) operating under the
AU. Nigeria’s role was not limited to the construction of the NEPAD. 45 Nigeria’s pivotal role is
evident from the commitment she has demonstrated in implementing the NEPAD agenda in the
form of sectoral reforms at the domestic level. Nigeria has not only provided the needed
leadership for the purpose of mobilising the rest of Africa at the continental level, but has
collaborated with other leading countries in the continent and facilitated the engagement of the
larger international community to partner with Africa under the NEPAD arrangement. Nigeria
also played pivotal role in the conceptualisation and adoption of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). Nigeria was among the first five countries to accede to the APRM at the
sixth meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee held in
Abuja on 9th March, 2003 (APRM Country Review Report No 8). The adoption of the MOU
establishing the APRM in Abuja was a reflection of Nigeria’s leading role. 46 Nigeria was the 8th
country to be peer reviewed. The report of the African peer review panel's country review on
Nigeria was launched within the country on December 17, 2009. As at 2008, Nigeria had
contributed USD $2,350,000 to the continental Mechanism.47

Nigeria’s commitment to the AU is also demonstrated in the maturity with which she handles the
big power politics at the AU. A case in point is the struggle for the Chair of AU Commission

44
Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka, ‘Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts’, Lecture Series on African
Security, (Swedish Defence Research Agency-FOI and the Nordic Africa Institute-NAI, 2012), pp.1-19
45
Aluko-Olokun, I (2005) The Role of Nigeria in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), in
Akinterinwa, B.A (ed) Nigeria and the Development of the African Union, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers Ltd. Pp.162-
173
46
Jinadu, L. A., The African Peer Review Process in Nigeria, (Johannesburg: Open Society Initiative for West Africa
–OSIWA and Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project -AfriMAP, 2008), pp. 3
47
Zenawi, APRM Country Review Report No 8, opp.cit., pp.III

24
between Jean Ping of Gabon and former Home Affairs Minister of South Africa, Dr Nkosazana
Dlamini Zuma. Nigeria opposed South Africa’s nomination of its home affairs minister,
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the Chair of the AU Commission at the 19 th Ordinary Session in
Addis Ababa held 15 – 16 July 2012. This followed the electoral deadlock experienced during
the 18th Summit of the AU held from January 23-30, 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, won the post in the
fourth round with 37 votes, and replaced Mr. Jean Ping of Gabon. Nigeria maintained that its
opposition of the South African candidate was based on a principle long established that major
funders of the Union should not aspire to this position. It appears that South Africa jettisoned this
‘gentleman’s agreement’, implying that South Africa has now moved its leadership aspirations in
the continent to the next level. However, some viewed the elections rather as a power
contestation between Nigeria and South Africa. Whilst South Africa argued that it did not act
against the AU rules, Nigeria and several other countries thought otherwise. Nigeria has argued
that the divergence of views at that time was neither a rivalry between major powers in Africa
nor was the election outcome a failure of Nigeria’s diplomacy. Nigeria maintains that in
strengthening the unity of the members of the AU, the big powers should avoid actions that could
be interpreted by smaller and medium states in the continent as domineering.

The commitment to, as well as extra burden borne by Nigeria, towards the continental unity
project, may not be shared officially by all African states. Nigeria, for reasons of history,
geography and resource endowments, both material and human, has always seen its destiny as
inextricably linked to that of the African continent. With a population of over 140 million
(National Populations Census, 2006), one out of every 5 Africans is a Nigerian; Nigeria is also
the second largest economy in Africa and is one of the most endowed with huge resources in the
continent. Consequently, despite numerous criticism and even reviews and considerations of the
country’s foreign policy positions in the past, it has never fully separated its national interests
from its role within the continent. Nigeria has indeed remained committed to ensuring the future
of African unity and freedom. Even so, many questions have been asked about the benefits or
gains for Nigeria. Asobie48 notes that despite Nigeria’s role in bringing together the pre-OAU

48
Asobie, H. Assisi, ‘Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2010: An Overview’, in Eze, Osita C. (ed) Beyond 50 Years of
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
2010), pp.1-34

25
rivalry with the triumph of its functional approach and subsequent formation of the OAU, it was
questionable whether other African states did recognise and acknowledge Nigeria’s contributions
in this regard. This is reflected in the fact that it took a full decade before a Nigerian leader was
accorded the honour of serving as the Chairman of the OAU. The first three chairmen were:
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (25 May, 1963-17 July, 1964); President Gamal Abdel Nasser
of Egypt (July 17, 1964-21 October, 1965); President Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana (21 October,
1965-24 February, 1966). When Nkrumah was overthrown, General Joseph Arthur Ankrah
served his remaining tenure. General Yakubu Gowon was the first Nigerian Head of State to
serve as Chairman of OAU (27 May, 1973-12 June, 1974).

Another issue worth noting here is that while Nigeria contributes money, troops and manpower
towards the continental project, the impression that Nigeria sometimes gets is that it is only
recognised when it is required to make such contributions. When decisions are made, it is the
principle of one-man, one-vote that prevails and the equality of smaller nations is insisted upon. 49
What this sometimes amount to is the tyranny of small states plays out in decision making at the
AU fora and Nigeria does not always get what she deserves. Even though the principle of one-
man, one-vote is the norm in organisations such as the AU, such organisations have other ways
of compensating members that bear the additional burden. What is however clear, is that, there
will never be such a time when Nigeria will be adequately rewarded for her contributions and
roles. It is in Nigeria’s overall interest that in making African more united, free, stronger and
secured it is also to its own benefits. The future of the AU certainly depends on the commitment
of all the member states to the continental unity project, but at the same it entails all members
states working together to overcome the contradictions and challenges carried over by the AU
from the OAU.

Concluding Remarks
We have attempted an examination of Nigeria’s role in the establishment of the OAU and later its
transformation to the AU. We argued that two paths to African unity were canvassed in the
process of formation of OAU: a direct political unification or a federalist approach; and an
indirect, functional cooperation approach. At the end, Nigeria’s position triumphed and the
49
Shinkaye, Kayode, ‘Nigeria and the African Union’, Opp.cit., pp. 93

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functionalist approach was endorsed. Nigeria was to play a similar role again in the politics and
diplomatic processes that led to the transformation of the OAU to AU. From the various
arguments in this article, it is clear that the OAU/AU remains strong on Nigeria’s foreign policy
agenda. The pursuit of the objective of promotion of African integration and support for African
unity was taken seriously by successive Nigerian governments- both the military and civilian.
Nigeria’s African unity project had several dimensions, including the forging of a common
African diplomatic front, the promotion of economic integration at regional level; and the
building of a pan-African security framework for the defence of African states and promotion of
peace. From the analysis, it is also clear that the AU is faced with various challenges, which are
surmountable. The article concludes on the note that while Nigeria has remained committed to
the development of the AU, it is also clear that Nigeria’s efforts must be recognised,
acknowledged, compensated and complimented by other African countries, who should also
demonstrate unreserved commitment to the development of the AU.

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