Sesbreno v CA GR 117438

GR 117438, Legal Ethics, Sesbreno v CA, Sesbreno v CA case digest, Sesbreno v CA GR

117438

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, attorney’s fees

FACTS:

Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement
and backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno.
The employees and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorney’s fees and 20%
as expenses taken from their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees and
ordered the Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties in April 1979. The former employees waived their right
to reinstatement among others. The Province of Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning
employees through Atty. Sesbreno as “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.” The amount
represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten
employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed to pay Atty.
Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from their back salaries. The lower court issued two orders, with
which petitioner complied, requiring him to release P10,000.00 to each of the ten private
respondents and to retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining to the latter out of the
P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial court fixed the attorney’s fees a total
of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. However, trial court modified the award after noting
that petitioner’s attorney’s lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have been only
50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services
but was even further reduced to 20%.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded
to petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services
signed by private respondents

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the
parties 6 authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the employees’ back salaries only. The
trial court, however, fixed the lawyer’s fee on the basis of all monies to be awarded to private
respondents. Fifty per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the
provincial government, according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not
to say, contrary to the contract of professional services. What a lawyer may charge and receive
as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation
in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the
contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable
unconscionable. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally
recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. if the attorney’s
fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. Quantum meruit,
meaning “as much as he deserves,” is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s
professional fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court averred that in balancing the
allocation of the monetary award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be
allocated among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the
practice of law a commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It would, verily be ironic if
the counsel whom they had hired to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of the
total amount collectible by these employees. 20% is a fair settlement.

Petition is DENIED

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806 April 7, 2014

(Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BORROMEO R. BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ALAMINOS
CITY, PANGASINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, then presided by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante
(Bustamante). Judge Bustamante retired on November 6, 2010.

Considering the impending retirement of Judge Bustamante, a judicial audit of the MTCC was
conducted on September 21, 2010 by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
In a Memorandum1 dated October 6, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Bautista
Villanueva (Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante of the initial audit findings that, as of audit
date, there were 35 cases for decision (21 of which were already beyond the reglementary
period) and 23 cases with pending incidents for resolution (19 of which were already beyond the
reglementary period) in Judge Bustamante’s court. At the end of his Memorandum, DCA
Villanueva gave Judge Bustamante the following directives:

1. EXPLAIN in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof your failure to: [a] decide within
the reglementary period Civil Case Nos. 1847, 1870, 1937, 1978, 2056 and 2205, LRC Nos. 28,
65 and 70, and Criminal Case Nos. 5428, 6468, 6469, 6558, 7222, 7721, 8163, 8390, 8395,
8654, 9022 and 9288; and, [b] resolve the incidents in Civil Case Nos. 1668 and 2132, Criminal
Case Nos. 8004, 8005, 8006, 8580, 9015, 9016, 9190, 9191, 9196, 9232 and 9235;

2. DECIDE with dispatch the cases enumerated in item (I) above, and to SUBMIT copies of the
decisions to this Office within three (3) days after your compulsory retirement; and

3. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents for resolution in the cases enumerated in item (II) above,
and to SUBMIT copies of the resolution to this Office within the same period indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph.2

Judge Bustamante submitted a letter3 dated November 8, 2010,4 addressed to DCA Villanueva,
in which he explained:

I have the honor to inform you that I have decided all the cases, Civil, LRC and Criminal Cases
submitted before my last day in office on November 5, 2010 except Civil Cases Nos. 1937
(Bustillo vs. Sps. Rabago) and 2056 (Cale vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of TSN taken when I
was not yet the Presiding Judge. I found out that there is [a] need to retake the testimonies of the
witness concerned so as to attain substantial justice.

As to why I failed to decide the said cases within the reglementary period, it was because of the
volume of work in this court. As it was noticed by the Auditors when they came over to audit, I
have already started deciding with drafts attached to the records but I was overtaken by more
pressing matters that I have to take immediate attention, like urgent motions, motions to dismiss,
motions to quash, approval of bails. All of these are in addition to my trial duties.

I have to work as early as 7:30 o’clock in the morning, and sometimes at 7:00 o’clock, with the
desire to finish everything on time. I burned my candle at night just [to] comply with my duties
within the time frame but because of human frailties, I failed to do so on time because as I said[,]
of the volume of work in this court. But nonetheless I have decided all the cases submitted for
decision before I retired except, as above stated, Civil Cases Nos. 1737 and 2056 because of the
reasons already stated.

Judge Bustamante further accounted for the cases with incidents for resolution, as follows:

In Civil Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 1668 and 2132.
However, the motion to dismiss by defendant Celeste in Civil Case No. 2222, considering the
opposition of the plaintiff because of their counterclaim, I believed the motion needs further
hearing, hence, the motion was not resolved. Similarly, the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
2254 needs further hearing, and if no order setting the motion for hearing, it may be an oversight
because of the submission of several cases for decision almost at the same time.

In Criminal Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Crim. Cases Nos. 9015 & 9016
(People vs. Paltep vda. De Perio) and Crim. Cases Nos. 9148 & 9149 (People vs. Anselmo, Jr.)
while Crim. Case No. 9196 was set for further hearing.

On the motion to suspend proceedings in Crim. Cases Nos. 9190 & 9191, it may have been an
oversight because these cases are the off-shoots of Civil Case No. 2222 and pre-trial conference
for the marking of documentary evidence has been subsequently set but the counsel for the
accused failed to appear.

The motion to dismiss in Crim. Cases Nos. 8615, 8616 & 8617, was not resolved because of the
prayer of the parties in open court for them to await the resolution of the civil cases they filed
before the Regional Trial Court, as they are working for the settlement of these civil cases, which
may have [an] effect in these cases.

The other incidents were set for hearing so that the court could judiciously resolve the matter. 5

In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to the OCA copies of the decisions
and resolutions he referred to in his letter.

The OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated March 24, 2011, reporting viz:

(1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33
cases decided by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were
already beyond the reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided
beyond the reglementary period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due
dates (ranging from 1 year and 8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10
were decided within a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months
beyond the due dates).

(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his court,
all of which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5 days to
3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending
incidents in his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing; (b)
there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending before other courts; and (c)
oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the
pending incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until the related
cases before other courts have already been decided.

Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases and
resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge Borromeo R.

Bustamante, formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be
FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.

In a Resolution7 dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter.

Judge Bustamante wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating that although he already
retired from the service on November 6, 2010, he has yet to receive his retirement benefits
(except for his accumulated leave credits), because of the pendency of the instant administrative
matter against him. Consequently, Judge Bustamante prayed that the administrative matter be
resolved soonest so he could already receive his retirement benefits or that his retirement
benefits be released but a certain amount commensurate to the fine that the Court might impose
be withheld.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of
the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the
ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to
provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their
cases.8

The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge
must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar9:

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges must decide all cases within three
months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City, the Court held that:

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is
submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading,
brief or memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative
sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance
therewith.
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Javellana, the Court held that:

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension
granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend
promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law and
the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide cases
within 90 days from submission.

Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity,
competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more
efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to
negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay
that have long plagued our courts.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.
(Citation omitted.)

This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the constitutionally
prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives
the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of
seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute.10

A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should
instead persevere in its implementation.11 Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not
valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. 12 The Court usually
allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial
courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally
granted.13 But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the
Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.1âwphi1

Equally unacceptable for the Court is Judge Bustamante’s explanation that he failed to decide
Civil Case Nos. 1937 and 2056 because of the lack of Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN).
These two cases were allegedly heard when he was not yet the presiding judge of the MTCC.
Relevant herein is the ruling of the Court in Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan14:

The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself. In Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided
that "A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the
parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall
commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court
requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
the last memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of
transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for
deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge
in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same." x x x (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

The OCA reported that contrary to his claim, Judge Bustamante substantially heard Civil Case
Nos. 1937 and 2056, until the two cases were submitted for decision on November 20, 2009 and
February 27, 2010, respectively. Even if it were true that the two cases were heard by the
previous presiding judge of the MTCC, there is no showing that from the time the cases had
been submitted for decision until Judge Bustamante’s retirement on November 6, 2010, Judge
Bustamante made an effort to have the TSN completed. Although technically, the 90-day period
would have started to run only upon the completion of the TSN, the Court finds Judge
Bustamante’s lack of effort to have the TSN completed as the root cause for the delay in deciding
the two cases.

The Court is likewise unconvinced that the pending incidents in several cases were left
unresolved because of the need for further hearings in the same. The incidents were already
submitted for resolution and, as the OCA observed, Judge Bustamante only saw the need for
further hearings in said cases after the conduct of the judicial audit. In addition, Judge
Bustamante did not submit any order setting the cases for hearing.

Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’s explanations for his delay in deciding cases and/or
resolving pending incidents was oversight. A judge is responsible, not only for the dispensation
of justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court
services. Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions,
he should know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, especially those pending
for more than 90 days.15

There is no dispute that Judge Bustamante failed to decide cases and resolve pending incidents
within the reglementary period, and without authorized extension from the Court and valid reason
for such failure, Judge Bustamante is administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision or order.

Under the amendments to Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
or order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than
three months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00, but not more than ₱20,000.00.

Considering the significant number of cases and pending incidents left undecided/unresolved or
decided/resolved beyond the reglementary period by Judge Bustamante; as well as the fact that
Judge Bustamante had already retired and can no longer be dismissed or suspended, it is
appropriate to impose upon him a penalty of a fine amounting to ₱20,000.00, to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, former Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, GUILTY of undue delay in
rendering decisions and orders, and imposes upon him a FINE of ₱20,000.00, to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

DULANG vs. REGENCIA

AM No. MTJ-14-1841 – June 2, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe

FACTS:
On Feb. 2000, Gershon Dulang (complainant) filed an ejectment complaint before the MCTC
presided by Judge Mary Jocylen Regencia (respondent). On May 2009, complainant moved for
the resolution of the ejectment case given that the same had been filed as early as the year 2000.
However, notwithstanding the summary nature of the ejectment proceedings, respondent judge
rendered a judgment dismissing the ejectment case only on Feb. 2011, more than 11 years
after its filing.

Complainant then filed this administrative case against respondent judge.

ISSUE: WON Judge Regencio may be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision.

HELD: Yes. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

The prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication of duty
of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to
the prejudice of the litigants. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that “a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods” and echoed in Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
which provides that “judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”

In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is
governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the
submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. In
violation of this rule, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than two years later, and
failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus,
making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision

Penalty
Respondent judge was previously found administratively liable for gross inefficiency where she
was ordered to pay a fine and warned. Moreover, her length of service of more than 17 years
should be taken against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor. Hence, a fine of
P40,000 instead of suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for her misconduct.
A.M. No. P-13-3132 June 4, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL,
SARAN GANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case arose from the letter1 dated March 15, 2011 of Executive Judge Jaime L.
Infante (Judge Infante) of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, "Branch 38.
(RTC), addressed to complainant the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),2 inquiring about
the employment status of respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of the
said RTC since August 3, 1993. In the aforementioned letter, Judge Infante informed the OCA
that despite Ampong's dismissal from service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
dismissal was affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any official information or directive
from the OCA on the matter. As such, Ampong remains employed in the RTC and has been
continuously receiving all her monthly salary, benefits, allowances, and the like.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for
having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong
herself admitted to having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a
resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to such
dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating.
Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was
filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer
had any jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).4

On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal from
service on the ground that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled
against her and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on August 26, 2008,
the Court En Banc denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal
from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service Commission,
CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26, 2008 Decision).

Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which did
not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued to release her salaries
and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter notifying the OCA of such situation,
the FMO issued a Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June
2011, it had started to withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.8
In her Comment9 dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in
G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its
enforcement.10 Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any
jurisdiction over the case against her.11

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Memorandum12 dated March 27, 2013,the OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty
of Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed from the service on the
ground that she no longer possesses the appropriate eligibility required for her position, with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except accrued leave credits and with perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution.13

The OCA found that Ampong’s act of impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service
Eligibility Examination for Teachers for and on behalf of another person indeed constitutes
dishonesty, a grave offense which carries the corresponding penalty of dismissal from service. It
added that the fact that the offense was not connected with her office or was committed prior to
her appointment in the judiciary does not in any way exonerate her from administrative liability as
an employee of the court.14

Further, the OCA found that Ampong’s appointment as Court Interpreter III did not divest the
CSC of its inherent power to discipline employees from all branches and agencies of the
government in order to protect the integrity of the civil service. Consequently, the CSC could
validly impose the administrative penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it that of
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided. In this
relation, the OCA emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of her civil service
eligibility and, hence, could no longer hold the position of Court Interpreter III. 15

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from
her employment as Court Interpreter III of the RTC.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.

As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had already held Ampong
administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil
Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:

The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the
procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure
the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other
anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination." [Ampong]
impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By
intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve
dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." [Ampong’s]
dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note
that [Ampong] should not have been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made
aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may,
[Ampong’s] present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty
she deserves.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).

Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the same
case, viz.:

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control,
supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the
right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine
of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts
and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil
service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the
necessary charges before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this
Court validated.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial employees who
also impersonated civil service examinees.1âwphi1 As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the
necessary charges before the OCA because respondents were judicial employees. Finding
respondents guilty of dishonesty and meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that
"respondents’ machinations reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to
maintain their positions as public servants and employees of the judiciary."

Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil
Service Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed
the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner
was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the
civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised
PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or
dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of
the administrative reach of the Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.17 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law,"18 Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal.
Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should
be enforced in its full course. In line with Section 58(a)19 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement
benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same.

To clarify, however, despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should
nevertheless been titled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the
aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of the same. It is
a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled
to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of
fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior
to their dismissal.20

It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work
thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong
failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore,
deserve to remain with the Judiciary.21

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent Sarah P. Ampong, Court
Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the
ground of Dishonesty. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits are forfeited except
accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARAH P. AMPONG

Facts:

Sometime in 1994, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) instituted an administrative case against
Respondent Sarah P. Ampong, Court Interpreter III of RTC Sarangani, for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonate or
taken 1991 the Civil Service Eligibility Exam for Teachers on behalf on one Evelyn B. Decir.
Ampong admitted such allegation, hence, the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from
service. Ampong moved for a reconsideration and appealed to the CA but both were denied and
her dismissal from service was affirmed.

Notwithstanding the said decision, the Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court
Administration (OCA), which did not receive any official directive regarding Respondent’s
dismissal, continued to release the latter’s salaries.

But when Judge Infante, judge of the RTC where Respondent works informed OCA about such
dismissal, the latter filed a Memorandum that it started withholding the salaries of Ampong.
Respondent prayed that the Court revisit its ruling and reiterated that the OCA and not CSC has
the jurisdiction over the matter.

OCA recommended for Ampong’s dismissal for her acts constituted dishonesty. OCA also avers
that the CSC has an inherent power to discipline employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent had been dismissed from her employment?

RULING: The Court held YES.

RATIO:

By intentionally practicing a deception, the act undeniably involves dishonesty.

The court defined dishonesty as “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. Respondent’s
dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee.

Moreover, pursuant to the “doctrine of immutability of judgment”, “a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law”.

It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an employee of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her private dealings to
preserve the court’s good name and standing.

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON vs. GARAY AND PNB

G.R. No. 179914
June 16, 2014

FACTS: Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon were the owners of a property which they
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and
sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder. A Certificate
of Sale was issued in PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds. The
one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property. On
February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB. On April 14, 2005,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of PNB. On the same date,
PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed to
make the required down payment. On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance
of a Writ of Possession before the RTC. Respondent Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order
granting the Petition and issued a Writ of Possession in favor of PNB. On July 10, 2005, spouses
Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that
Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Respondent Judge hereby held in
abeyance the Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession

RULING: Yes. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court. A debtor has
one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within
which to redeem his property. During the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may
possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court,
upon the posting of a bond. But after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to
consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. And once title is
consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court. Questions regarding the
regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to
oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these
must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale. The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the
issuance of a writ ofpossession. In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when
PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property
had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr.
to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.

Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, we
find none of these recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim
that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to
possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject
property as a matter of right.

I. Short Title: NPC-DAMA v. NPC

II. Full Title: NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) versus National
Power Corporation (NPC) – G.R. No. 156208, September 26, 2006, C.J. Panganiban
III. Statement of Facts:

On June 8, 2001, Republic Act No. 9136 or the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001” (EPIRA Law) was approved and signed by President Macapagal-Arroyo. It provides a
framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, specifically (1) the privatization of
the assets of NPC, (2) the transition to the desired competitive structure, and (3) the definition of
the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities. Thus, under such law,
a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was constituted.

On February 27, 2002, in pursuant of the EPIRA Law, the Energy Restructuring Steering
Committee (Restructuring Committee) was created by the Secretary of the Department of Energy
to enact the first and second provisions stated above.
 On November 18, 2002, the Restructuring Committee proposed a guideline to the NPB
which was modified and passed by the latter through Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125. Said Resolutions provide that (1) all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January
31, 2003 and (2) the NPC personnel shall be entitled to separation benefits.

IV. Statement of the Case

Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction which assails the validity of the NPB Resolutions
by maintaining that no quorum existed during the NPB Resolutions meeting.

Petitioners argue that of the seven persons present in the meeting, only three are NPB
members. The remaining four are merely representatives of other NPB members not present in
the said meeting thus, rendering the said Resolutions void.

V. Issue

Whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted.

VI. Ruling

No, it was not. The legislature is the one who vested the power to exercise judgment and
discretion in running the affairs to the NPB. Discretion means a power or right conferred to them
by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment
and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.

Hence, the court held that the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as
members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions because it is
their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.

There are also exemptions to the general rule. It was also held in the case of Binamira v.
Garrucho that:

“An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to

another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he
was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and unless given the power to substitute another in his
place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to
another”.

And in the case of American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents:

“A delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints

to assist him in his functions…only when judgment and discretion
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law…so long
as it is the legally authorized official who makes the final decision
through the use of his own personal judgment”.

In the case at bar, however, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different
executive departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing
the assailed Resolution.
 VII. Dispositive Portion

Wherefore, National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are
declared VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT

A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.*

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT
Facts: Atty. Juvy Malit had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall
that falsely named Mercedita de Jesus as its absolute and registered owner, despite Malit’s
knowledge as a consultant of the Bataan LGU. Because of this, the mortagee sued Mercedita for
perjury and collection of sum of money.
Malit was also alleged to notarize a lease agreement without the signature of the lessees, and a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which was still covered by the period within which it
could not be alienated.
Malit filed her comment. After the rejoinder, Mercedita filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
submission of additional evidence which contained 10 files which showed more violations on
Malit’s end.
The IBP Commissioner recommended the revocation of Malit’s notarial commission for two years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved this, but modified the suspension to one
year. Malit filed two MRs and maintained that the additional documents were inadmissible for
violating sec. 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Malit is guilty of violating the CPR
Held: Yes.
Notary Public; Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement
or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal
on it, the Supreme Court (SC) must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate.—Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the
mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate
mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Same; A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.—A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who
personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.
Notarized Documents; Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making
it admissible in evidence with The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in
the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit suspended from practice of law for one (1) year for
violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility as well
as her oath as notary public. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is immediately revoked and
is perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.

FACTS: The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and
Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients
Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson. Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports
attached to the Complaint as the “Alabang Boys”) were the accused in cases filed by PDEA for
the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs.
In a Joint Inquest Resolution, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause. Because of
the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of
the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up” allegedly
prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House Committee on Illegal
Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings.
It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his
three clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then
Secretary Raul Gonzales. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers
Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. He had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead
and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano
contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the
said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a
government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action
had been filed by Dante Jimenez.
DEFENSE: Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet,
âif the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited. In any case,
respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore
remained “a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all.” The Investigating Commissioner noted
that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted
the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of “feeding” the
draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official.
Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the
same or any similar action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Verano should be suspended for violating CPR.

HELD: Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation
to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months. The Court may conduct its own investigation into charges
against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it.
Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. The affidavit of
withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven
xxx. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. Canon 13 states that a
lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts
of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice
sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing, the following statements were established as respondent’s
admission that:
1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending
before the latter; and
2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite
being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of expediting the case.
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought
to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. The primary duty of lawyers is not to their
clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate.
The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the
law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer,
even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. Zeal and
persistence in advancing a clientâs cause must always be within the bounds of the law.
Rule 1.02 states: A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Further, according to Rule 15.06, a lawyer
shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body. The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer to impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.