THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CO. vs.

DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS

FACTS:

Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended
in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a
promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the promissory note, respondents
Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly installments of
P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. As respondents defaulted on their monthly
installments, the full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the
promissory note, which led to petitioner filing the case.

During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented photocopy of the duplicate original of
the promissory note as Exhibit A. As the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner
instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and
marked as Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it
was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. The trial court initially
admitted into evidence Exhibit E. Said promissory note was eventually discovered by petitioner to be
delivered to respondents.

Trial court eventually ruled to exclude Exhibit E. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Exhibit E (or the photocopy of the promissory note) should be admitted as evidence

HELD:

The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As
quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document
is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner, had it been given the opportunity
by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A was in the
possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.

This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in
question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note
sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present
the original of said note.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL VS. NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioners engaged the services of private respondent Melencia Asegurado as a packaging clerk. During
the term of private respondent’s employment, she incurred frequent counts of tardiness and
unauthorized absences, which led to issuances of warnings, suspensions without pay, and eventually
termination of services. According to petitioner, private respondent’s dismissal from service was
brought on by her supposed exhaustion of the allowable sick and vacation leaves per month constituting
gross and habitual neglect of duty according to company policy. The foregoing state of affairs prompted
private respondent to file a case for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.

Labor Arbiter declared private respondent to be illegally dismissed and ordered petitioner to pay
backwages and other dues. CA ruled in favour of NLRC, citing that petitioners failure to adduce in
evidence a copy of the contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent proof of evidence of
such document embodying the flouted rule, the appellate court, along with the labor arbiter and the
NLRC, was unable to make a categorical finding on the issue of whether or not the private respondents
accumulated absences and/or tardiness were, indeed, in violation of petitioner companys rules and
regulations. Further, as to the allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of 1991
to 1995, the appellate court likewise held that the non-presentation of the Daily Time Records (DTRs) for
said period was a grave error.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were required to submit a copy of company policy as evidence

HELD:

Ironically, though petitioners referred to their company policies, they never presented a copy of these in
evidence except in their Motion for Reconsideration too late in the day. Being the basis of the charge
against private respondent, it is without doubt the best evidence available to substantiate the
allegations. The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of
fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior evidence in its place (or none at all save for mere allegation), the presumption naturally arises
that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and
defeat. By failing to prove the existence of the company rules in due time, i.e., non-presentation of an
authenticated copy, unarguably the best evidence, casts skepticism on the factual basis of the charge of
violation thereof; arguably, therefore, it cannot be said that the assailed conduct can be considered
gross neglect of duty.

It is indeed true that administrative agencies, like the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural liberty must not be
interpreted to mean an unfettered license to put forth assertions without at least presenting tangible
proof to back them up. Otherwise, such assertions would just be allegations, and allegations are not
evidence. What is involved here transcends mere procedural technicality and concerns the more
paramount principles and requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed at the altar of
expediency. Upon this principle, the failure to present a copy of the supposed Company Policy to prove
the allegation of their existence must be seen and taken for what they are inadmissible hearsay. Mere
allegation or assertion, by any stretch of reasoning, cannot be considered substantial evidence of their
existence and of the subsequent violation complained of.

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.

FACTS:

MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation
(Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract).
MCMP failed to pay its rental fees, forcing Monark to file a suit for collection of money.

During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior
Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one
retained by Monark, while the other was given to MCMP. He further testified that Monark’s copy had
been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a
photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to
search for the original copy.

RTC ruled in favour of Monark, ordering MCMP to pay the rental fees. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monark’s photocopy of the Contract can be admitted as evidence in spite of loss of the
original

HELD:

Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the contents of a lost document:

"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has
been lost ordestroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
 may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the

document is inthe custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as
in the case of its loss."

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered
into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it
to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for
and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its
failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section
6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, butit also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP
under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced."

GOV. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS:

Dolores and Carmen Martinez, claiming to be owners of a parcel of land, alleged that they were in
possession thereof for about twenty-five years, having acquired them by donation from Maria Sarlabus,
and that their predecessors in interest had had possession of the same for at least three years prior to
said donation. When the case came up for trial, Julio Salvador, through his attorney, entered his
appearance and claimed title to said lots, alleging that he was in actual possession thereof, and that his
predecessors in interest had been in possession before him for at least fourteen years.

CFI Iloilo denied the claim of Carmen and Dolores Martinez and adjudicating said lots to Julio Salvador,
on the ground that, in the opinion of the court, it was proved that the Martinez sisters had sold said land
to one named Domenech and that the latter, in return, sold it to Julio Salvador, who could, therefore, be
considered owner of the disputed lots.

The Martinez sisters alleged that CFI erred in admitting the copy of the record of a supposed document
of sale presented by the oppositor Julio Salvador, in support of his claim of title without the
disappearance or loss of the original document having been previously proved.

Juan Madrenas Soler, attorney in fact of Julio Salvador, who was away in Spain during the trial, testified:
That Julio Salvador gave him certain papers referring to the land in question and that he looked among
them for the document of the sale executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech but
did not find it; that the made investigations concerning said document, having interviewed the notary
public Mr. Yulo, because he remembered that when Salvador left for Spain he told the witness that the
documents concerning the case had been in Yulo's possession, who informed him that the Martinez
sisters had been looking for the same documents having asked him about them, to which he answered
that he remembered having returned those papers to Domenech and that he did not have them, not
having found them, when he had looked for them, but that, according to Mr. Yulo himself, a copy of
them was in some archive in Manila. No attempt appears to have been made to present as witnesses
said notary and the persons who must have seen the signing of the document, nor was it shown that
said document had been lost.

ISSUE:

Whether or not secondary evidence can be admitted

HELD:

Section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The written acts of record of the acts of the
sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals and of public officers, legislative, judicial, and
executive of the Philippine Islands, or of the United States, or of any States of the United States or of a
foreign country, and public records kept in the Philippine Islands of private writings are public writings. A
copy of a public writing, duly certified to be a true copy thereof, is admissible evidence in like cases and
in like effect as the original writing

The appellee understands that as the copy of a public writing duly certified to be a true copy has the
same effects as the original, according to section 299, such a copy, as a public writing, is included in the
exception of section 321 of the same Code, which provides that secondary evidence of the contents of a
document cannot be admitted without the requirement of said section having been complied with, as
already explained in the preceding paragraphs."

PAYLAGO VS. JARABE

FACTS:

Two deeds of sale were executed by the heirs of Vidal and Florentino Lacatan in favour of spouses
Romeo Paylago and Rosario Dimaandal over two portions of a parcel of land. By virtue of registration of
the two deeds of sale, a new title was issued in favour of the spouses. However, it was found out during
a subsequent survey that a portion of the land was occupied by respondent Ines Jarabe. This led to an
action for recovery of possession by the spouses.

During trial, it was discovered that portion of land was purchased by Hilario Jarabe, late husband of
defendant-respondent, from one Apolonio Lacatan, which sale is evidenced by an unregistered deed of
sale; that Apolonio Lacatan, in turn, bought the same from Anselmo Lacatan (the father of Vidal and
Florentino Lacatan). The first deed of sale, also unregistered, executed by Anselmo Lacatan in favor of
Apolonio Lacatan was lost during the Japanese occupation.
Trial court ruled that petitioner-spouses were not buyers in good faith and declared respondent to be
the owner of disputed portion of the land. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unregistered deed of sale can be admitted as evidence in spite of the loss /
destruction of the original document

HELD:

As observed by this Supreme Court, "the destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person
knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who
has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost." And "it is not even necessary to prove its loss beyond all
possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient, and this may be shown by a bona
fide and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to be found."

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION INC. vs. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner WIDORA filed an application for registration of title over a parcel of land, which respondent
Ortigas & Company opposes on the ground that the said land belongs to them. During trial proceedings,
the parties presented their respective evidences, including a copy of a decree which Ortigas presented
as the original cannot be found. Ortigas also submitted other secondary evidence such as the survey
plan and the testimony of the surveyor.

Trial court ruled in favour of WIDORA, but CA ruled in favour of Ortigas, on the ground that “the mere
fact that the original copy of Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or
produced, does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653
was not issued.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not secondary evidence by Ortigas should be admitted

HELD:

Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original
writing and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the
possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice. Private respondent
has not shown compliance with the above requisites which would justify the admission of the secondary
evidence used and erroneously relied upon by respondent court.

Undoubtedly, the evidence (i.e., plan submitted by respondent Ortigas, testimony of its surveyor and
OCT 351) adduced by private respondent to prove the contents of Decree 1425 and admitted by
respondent court is merely secondary and should not have been admitted in the first place.
HEIRS OF TEODORO DE LA CRUZ vs. CA

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages against private respondents Madrid involving
a parcel of land. In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their
predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers, in a deed of sale executed on
May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the
property. However, sometime in October 1986, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents
managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the said land.

During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost.
Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit A, a photo copy of the purported original
carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction.

Trial court rendered Exhibit A as inadmissible, dismissing the case.

CA ruled otherwise, saying that respondents’ failure to object the evidence counts as a waiver and
therefore ruling the admissibility of the copy of the deed of sale. However, CA still dismissed the case on
the ground of no probative value to support the allegation of the sale.

In their present petition, petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit A were a mere photo copy of the
original carbon copy, they had presented other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the
existence of the sale. First, the testimony of the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, who acknowledged the
due execution of the deed of sale. Second, their long possession of the land in question, bolstered by
the construction of various improvements gives rise to the disputable presumption of ownership.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the secondary evidence can be admitted

HELD:

It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or
counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document
itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.

Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit A was presented private respondents failed, not
only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution.
Forthwith, upon private respondents failure to object to Exhibit A when it was presented, the same
becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit A is admitted in evidence, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be
determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence
should not be confused with its probative value.

As earlier stated, Exhibit A was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of
sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as
to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit A, the contents were based on an
alleged carbon original which petitioners predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to
check his own files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other
words, Atty. Tabangays failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit A unreliable.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. VALENCIA

FACTS:

Not satisfied that the entries made by Valencia in his SALN were reflective of his actual net worth,
Napoleon P. Guenero (Guerrero), Intelligence Officer V of the Department of Finance, filed a
complaint/motion for Subpoena/Subpoena Duces Tecum. In his complaint, Guerrero alleged that
Valencia maintained two (2) US dollar time deposit accounts with the Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC). The first account with the amount of US$2,013,248.80 was covered by Certificate No. 962460,
while the second, with the amount of US$1,812,165.38, was covered by Certificate No. 962461.
According to Guerrero, these huge amounts were "the actual fruits of his illegal transactions and
activities of as an employee of the Bureau of Customs." In support of his allegation that Valencia
maintained these accounts, Guerrero attached two (2) Letters of Agreement placing the two US dollar
time deposit accounts under the custody of FEBTC and authorizing said bank to apply the proceeds of
the accounts to the forward contracts entered into by Valencia and FEBTC.

he complaint also alleged that from the credit card billings of his Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
Mastercard, it could be inferred that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle.

Valencia denied that he had been maintaining the two US dollar time deposits pointing out that the
Letters of Agreement did not even bear his signature. Thus, the agreements were mere scraps of paper
with no probative value.

Ernesto N. Olaguer (Olaguer), the Service Manager of BPI in charge of the records of all deposit
accounts, submitted an affidavit stating that "[d]espite diligent efforts, and given the limited information
on the US Dollar Time deposits, wherein only the number of the time deposit certificates and the
amount were specified, [he was] not able to locate any time deposit records belonging to Manuel P.
Valencia, Jr."

Office of the Ombudsman declared Valencia to be dismissed for Dishonesty. However, CA ruled in favour
of Valencia. CA cited that “The genuineness and authenticity of the evidence against petitioner is
grievously suspicious in view of the fact that the photocopies of the Letters of Agreement of petitioner's
alleged time deposits with then Far East Bank and Trust Company and petitioner's alleged BPI
Mastercard transactions are not certified as true copies by the responsible officer in custody of the
originals thereof.” The CA also cited that “aside from the certified true copies of petitioner's Statements
of Assets and Liabilities (SALs), the pieces of evidence presented by respondent have no probative value
for being mere photocopies. As such photocopies, as earlier averted to, they are incompetent pieces of
evidence unworthy of any probative value.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was substantial evidence to charge Valencia for dishonesty
HELD:

Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a finding
of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.

It should be noted that other than the SALNs of Valencia, the evidence of the prosecution consists of
photocopies of 1] the unsigned letters of agreement alluding to Valencia's dollar time deposit accounts;
and 2] the monthly statements of the BPJ Mastercard transactions of Valencia.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. This presupposes, however, that the
evidence proferred is admissible under the rules. With respect to photocopied private documents, the
rule is that before it can be considered admissible in evidence, its due execution or genuineness should
be first shown. Failing in this, the photocopies are inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no
probative value.

As the records bear out, the due execution and genuineness of the photocopied letters of agreement
and monthly statements of the BPJ Mastercard transactions of Valencia were never verified and
confirmed. The basic rule is that these photocopied private documents are secondary evidence which
are inadmissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the originals.

As to the US dollar deposits, the Ombudsman did try to verify them. On August 27, 2004, however, as
earlier stated, Olaguer, the Service Manager of BPI in charge of the records of all deposit accounts,
stated in his affidavit that "[d]espite diligent efforts, and given the limited information on the US Dollar
Time deposits, wherein only the number of the time deposit certificates and the amount were specified,
[he was] not able to locate any time deposit records belonging to Manuel P. Valencia, Jr."

DIOSO vs. TOMAS ET AL.

FACTS:

After buying a portion of land from Encarnacion Javel, petitioners want to construct a new house with a
right of way, claiming that they were entitled thereto under the Pinanumpaang Salaysay executed
between respondent Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel. When the respondents refused to give
them the right of way, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and/or easement of right of
way.

The trial court, in ruling in favour of respondents, noted that the petitioners presented only a photocopy
or machine copy of the purported document, and, during the trial, failed to lay the foundation or
prepare the basis for the admission of secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof.

CA affirmed the ruling. Petitioners filed motion for new trial upon discovering new evidence thru a
found Tax Declaration containing an annotation of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, but CA denied the same.
ISSUE:

Whether or not their secondary evidence may be admitted even with the newly-discovered evidence
thru the Tax Declaration

HELD:

The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or unavailability of the original document is thus
warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of the original; (2) loss
and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not
due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.15 Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.16

Admittedly, in this case, the original document of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was not presented during
trial. However, the petitioners presented a photocopy thereof, as well as testimonial evidence to prove
its due execution and the loss or unavailability of the original document. Specifically, the existence and
due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was established by Yldeso, one of the petitioners'
witnesses, who testified that he was one of the witnesses to the execution thereof and that his
signature appears thereon

Clearly then, since there was proof of the due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, and that,
despite earnest efforts on their part, the petitioners could not produce the original thereof, the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said document was justified.
Furthermore, contrary to the trial court's findings, the petitioners had sufficiently laid down the basis for
the introduction of secondary evidence.

The rule on the admission of secondary evidence provides that the contents of the original document
may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the
recollection of the witnesses, in the order stated. The trial court and the CA, therefore, erred in denying
the admission of a photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, when the same may be properly
considered as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof.

CONDE vs. CA

FACTS:

Margarita Conde, Bernardo Conde and the petitioner Dominga Conde, as heirs of Santiago Conde, sold
with right of repurchase, within ten (10) years from said date, a parcel of agricultural land to Casimira
Pasagui, married to Pio Altera (hereinafter referred to as the Alteras). This sale is referred to as The
"Pacto de Retro Sale".

Private respondent Paciente Cordero, son-in-law of the Alteras, signed a document called
MEMORANDUM OF REPURCHASE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND SOLD WITH REPURCHASE WHICH
DOCUMENT GOT LOST, which said that “That the document of SALE WITH THE RIGHT OF REPURCHASE
got lost in spite of the diligent efforts to locate the same which was lost during the war.” Also, the
document said that “Because it is about time to repurchase the land, I have allowed the representative
of Dominga Conde, Bernardo Conde and Margarita Conde in the name of EUSEBIO AMARILLE to
repurchase the same.”

The pacto de retro document was eventually found.

Pio Altera sold the disputed lot to the spouses Ramon Conde and Catalina T. Conde, who are also private
respondents herein. Their relationship to petitioner does not appear from the records. Nor has the
document of sale been exhibited.

Petitioner filed a civil action for declaration of ownership over the disputed land. Petitioner's evidence is
that Paciente Cordero signed the Memorandum of Repurchase in representation of his father-in-law Pio
Altera, who was seriously sick on that occasion. Private respondents, for their part, adduced evidence
that Paciente Cordero signed the document of repurchase merely to show that he had no objection to
the repurchase.

Trial court ruled to dismiss petitioner’s case. CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not parol evidence given by the respondents can be admitted.

HELD:

There is nothing in the document of repurchase to show that Paciente Cordero had signed the same
merely to indicate that he had no objection to petitioner's right of repurchase. Besides, he would have
had no personality to object. To uphold his oral testimony on that point, would be a departure from the
parol evidence rule and would defeat the purpose for which the doctrine is intended.

“The purpose of the rule is to give stability to written agreements, and to remove the temptation and
possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol evidence was admissible.”