5 October 2012

Committee Secretariat
Government Administration
Parliament Buildings
Wellington

SUBMISSION ON LOBBYING DISCLOSURE BILL

1. Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission on behalf of Maxim Institute.

2. We oppose the Bill, and submit that the Committee should recommend that it does not
pass.

3. We would like to be heard in support of this submission.

Executive summary

4. The basic problem with the Bill is that in attempting to create a “clear picture” of influence,
it covers an unreasonably wide range of communications. The requirements imposed on
these communications would stifle democratic speech on the sorts of issues where it is
absolutely crucial that MPs are able to hear from the people they represent. This will
undermine the public’s trust and confidence.

5. Further, the Bill would not even achieve the level of transparency it aims for, because the
“targets of lobbying” are narrowly defined and because of a number of drafting issues and
anomalies. These factors would also undermine public trust and confidence in the
scheme created by the Bill.

6. There are two relevant principles for assessing the Bill: it is crucial for healthy, vibrant
democracy for people to be able to communicate with their elected representatives and
public decision-makers; and public trust and confidence in democracy is fundamental and
can be damaged by improper influence on decision-makers.

7. The Bill is an inadequate expression of these principles. The wide definition of “lobbying
activity,” the requirement to be registered as a lobbyist, the significant penalties for
lobbying without registration, and the narrowly defined “targets of lobbying” create four
main problems with the Bill in principle:

a. The Bill creates a privileged class of people with greater rights to speak to MPs—
registered lobbyists;
b. The Bill would chill essential democratic speech;
c. Only those who are well-resourced will be able to cope with the regime;
d. Some influential lobbying activity will not be covered, creating loopholes.

8. The Bill is therefore wrong in principle and should be rejected.

9. If it does proceed, it will at least require amendment to fix a number of anomalies and
(presumably) unintended consequences. We discuss these amendments in the second
half of our submission, along with some ideas for more significant changes that would
reduce the Bill’s burden.

10. However, we consider that as long as the current objective of the Bill is retained, it
remains inconsistent with democratic principle and should be rejected.

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11. Statements that the Bill is a “starting point” only and will be amended suggest that
submitters are being asked to hit a moving target that they cannot see. This is frustrating
and does not uphold the integrity of the democratic legislative process.

The basic problem with the Bill

12. The Bill is intended as a transparency measure that promotes trust and confidence, “in
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the integrity and impartiality of democracy and political decision making.”

13. More specifically, the intention behind the Bill is apparently “to be able to see the range of
organisations that have been communicating with MPs and Ministers in an attempt to
influence public policy.” The Bill’s sponsor has expressed concern about amendments to
the Bill’s scope that would reduce its coverage and therefore “would not give a clear
2
picture of influence.”

14. The problem is that this sweeping intention has created a Bill that covers an unreasonably
wide range of communications. This would stifle democratic speech on the sorts of issues
where it is absolutely crucial that MPs are able to hear from the people who elected them.
This will undermine the public’s trust and confidence.

15. Further, the Bill would not even achieve the level of transparency it aims for, because the
“targets of lobbying” are narrowly defined and because of a number of drafting issues and
anomalies. These issues would also undermine public trust and confidence in the scheme
created by the Bill.

16. To see what is at stake with the Bill, we will first consider the principles relevant to it.

Relevant principles: free speech, and trust and confidence

17. We submit that there are two major principles involved.

18. The first is that it is crucial for healthy, vibrant democracy for people to be able to
communicate with their elected representatives and public decision-makers. MPs
shouldn't be mere conduits of public sentiment, but it is vital that they are connected to
those they are elected to serve. We should encourage open communication about public
issues, so that MPs can hear from the full range of individuals and groups who want to
comment on those issues. This is one reason why free speech is often regarded as "the
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lifeblood of democracy." Lobbying—understood generally as communications with
elected representatives and public decision-makers about laws, regulations, policies,
funding and contracts—is one important form of communication, though of course not the
only one. Nevertheless, as this Bill's sponsor points out, lobbying is a valid and valuable
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activity.

19. The second is that public trust and confidence in democracy is fundamental. This trust
and confidence may be damaged if it seems that some people or groups are able to
improperly influence elected representatives and public decision-makers. This may
occur—that is, improper influence may be suspected—if it appears that those
representatives and decision-makers are not making their decisions for the common good,
in service of us all, but rather for someone's private financial gain or for power or pure
political advantage. Transparency measures are one way in which the public can have
some confidence that improper influence is not occurring, or that it will be detected if it
does. They allow the public to see—or at least, to question—whether public powers have
been used for the common good, or for other reasons in response to pressure or
persuasion. For example, rules requiring political donations to be disclosed allow us to
ask whether those donations purchased any particular advantage.

1
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, Explanatory Note.
2
H. Walker, speech on the First Reading of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill, New Zealand Parliamentary
Debates (Hansard) vol. 682, page 3959, 25 July 2012.
3
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, per Lord Steyn.
4
H. Walker, speech on the First Reading of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill.

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20. The question is whether this particular Bill gives effect to these principles in an
appropriate way, and is workable. For the reasons that follow, we submit that it does not,
and is not.

The definition of “lobbying activity”

21. To begin with, we have to understand what triggers the Bill. The trigger is the definition of
“lobbying activity.” Anyone involved in lobbying activity must register as a lobbyist, file
quarterly returns of lobbying, and comply with the Lobbying Code of Conduct. It is an
offence to engage in lobbying activity without being registered.

22. Lobbying activity occurs where someone “undertakes” to communicate with a “public
office holder” (an MP or his or her staff, including Ministers and their staff) about specified
matters, and receives “payment” to do so. Broadly, these specified matters are: the
development of law; the passage of a Bill; the making or alteration of regulations; the
development or cancellation of Government policy or programmes; the award of
Government financial benefits like funding; and the award of Government contracts.
Lobbying activity also occurs where someone undertakes to arrange a meeting with a
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public office holder and another person, and is paid to do so.

23. Lobbying activity does not include oral or written submissions to Parliament or Select
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Committees, or mere requests for information.

24. This is an extremely broad definition. For now, we will leave aside anomalies in the
definition (these are discussed later). We note that a wide range of communications will
be captured by the definition. It would include “classic” cases of lobbying, such as closed
door meetings with members of large, organised and well-resourced groups making
formal representations about proposed legislation, or cases where professional consultant
lobbying firms are involved. But it would go much wider than that.

25. For example, it would include an employee of a small business emailing an MP to provide
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the business’ thoughts on a proposed law or policy. It could also include someone who
helps a family member communicate their views on a Government policy to an MP, if any
associated expenses are covered by the family member they are helping (“payment”
means “money or anything of value”).

26. This definition is so wide that it is unreasonable by itself. Not only that, the Bill is an
inadequate expression of the principles we identified earlier because: it is coupled with
the requirement to be a registered lobbyist before engaging in “lobbying activity;” there
are significant penalties for lobbying without registration; and the “targets of lobbying” are
narrowly defined. All these things mean there are four main problems with the Bill in
principle:

a. The Bill creates a privileged class of people with greater rights to speak to MPs—
registered lobbyists;
b. The Bill would chill essential democratic speech;
c. Only those who are well-resourced will be able to cope with the regime;
d. Some influential lobbying activity will not be covered, creating loopholes.

The Bill creates a privileged class who can communicate with MPs

27. The Bill would create a privileged class of people with greater rights to speak to MPs—
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registered lobbyists.

5
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 7(2).
6
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 7(5).
7
C. Finlayson, Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the
Lobbying Disclosure Bill (Wellington: House of Representatives, 2012), paragraph 19.
8
We are grateful to Graeme Edgeler for this point.

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28. This is because only registered lobbyists would have the right to:

a. speak to MPs about the passage of laws, the making of policy, the amendment of
regulations, and the other specified matters;
b. in anything other than a purely personal capacity; and
c. receive some form of compensation for their time and efforts.
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29. This is because lobbying activity, without being a registered lobbyist, is an offence.
Individuals could be fined up to $10,000, and companies and organisations could be fined
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up to $20,000.

30. This would effectively disenfranchise large numbers of New Zealanders, such as the
small business owner who wants to tell their MP about the impact of Government policy
on their business. He or she would not be able to have that conversation without first
registering as a lobbyist or hiring one, both courses of action that may well be beyond him
or her. By contrast, the large business owner with the resources to engage a lobbying firm
will be much more easily able to have the same conversation. Of course, in theory there
is nothing to stop the small business owner from registering or hiring a lobbyist, but
practically it seems likely that he or she will not be able to have the same conversations
as those with greater resources or a better understanding of the lobbying regime.

31. The likely result is that MPs will hear from a smaller range of people than they otherwise
would, reducing participation in democracy about issues of public importance.

The Bill would chill essential democratic speech

32. A chilling effect is like a shadow cast by the law. It occurs when people hold back from
speaking because they are uncertain about their legal obligations and fear breaking the
law and being punished, or when it is simply too hard or too resource-intensive to
communicate in the approved way.

33. What they were going to say may have been prohibited or regulated by the law. But it
may also have been speech that would have been permitted and unregulated, but that
simply never takes place because it is too hard for people to work out their obligations
and, if necessary, comply with them.

34. We submit that the Bill is likely to have a chilling effect on speech that is essential for
democracy. This is because: it covers a wide range of communications with MPs;
registration is required before those communications happen; and there are significant
penalties for getting it wrong. The Bill would require a degree of familiarity with the law
and with contact with MPs that most New Zealanders simply do not have. As a result, it
seems likely that many people will decide that it is too hard or too risky to communicate
with an MP over an issue they care about.

35. The Attorney-General has raised the same concern. He notes that the Bill would limit
freedom of expression, and that, “[s]ome people may be dissuaded from expressing
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themselves because of the implications of the Bill.” He concludes that the Bill is
inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to an unjustifiable extent. One of his
reasons is that the Bill goes “well beyond” what is necessary to achieve goals of
transparency, and therefore “risks creating a chilling effect for average New Zealanders
who may fear criminal sanctions for merely communicating with a Member of Parliament
on behalf of their business in relation to government policy. This would be an
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unacceptable limit on a core element of freedom of expression.”

9
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 19(2).
10
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 19(3).
11
C. Finlayson, Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, paragraph 12.
12
C. Finlayson, Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, para 21.

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 Only those who are well-resourced will be able to cope with the regime

36. The Bill will make it hard for the little guy. Because there are serious penalties for getting
it wrong, people will need to take time and care with the registration and compliance
requirements. The time and care required will be most easily taken by those who are well-
endowed with financial, human or organisational resources. The small charity or business
will struggle. Given the sponsor’s expressed concern that, “the reality remains that some
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people have a better chance of being heard than others,” this is something of a paradox.

37. Again, MPs will probably hear from a smaller range of voices than if the Bill is rejected.

Some influential lobbying activity will not be covered

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38. As others have said, the “targets of lobbying” are narrowly defined.

39. To begin with, the definition focuses on paid lobbying. However, significant influence
could be wielded by unpaid lobbyists. For example, the volunteer patron of a charity with
good political contacts may have much more influence on Government policy than a paid
lobbyist.

40. It also seems odd that someone seeking “a policy change for their own private benefit,”
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who is not being paid by anyone to do so, is not treated as a lobbyist by the Bill.

41. Attempts to lobby public servants are not defined as “lobbying activities” as they are not
“public office holders.” However, public servants have an important role in proposing,
formulating and implementing law and policy. Attempts to influence public servants could
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be quite significant, but the Bill leaves them out.

42. Lobbying by certain people is exempted—MPs, some public servants, members of local
authorities and their staff, and representatives of other governments can all lobby MPs
without being subject to the Bill’s regulation. However, lobbying by each of these groups
could be a significant influence.

43. Each of these exemptions creates a loophole and could have unintended negative
consequences. For example, professional lobbyists may shift their efforts to focus on
public servants, or volunteer lobbyists—perhaps those wealthy enough to donate their
time and cover their own expenses—may end up with disproportionate influence.

The Bill is wrong in principle and should be rejected

44. Despite the sponor’s good intentions, the Bill does not give appropriate effect to the two
principles we outlined at the beginning of this submission.

45. First, it will not enhance public communication with MPs. On the contrary, it will
significantly reduce communication about exactly the sorts of issues that should receive
public input. The breadth of communications covered and the likely chilling effect will
result in MPs being insulated from communication with the public. This is dangerous for
democracy.

46. Second, it will not promote public trust and confidence in democracy. On the contrary, it
seems likely to promote cynicism and distrust. The narrow coverage of lobbying targets
creates an uneven playing field and would undermine confidence that the
communications that are reported are a reasonable picture of lobbying activity. The
chilling effect, and awareness of a regime that only the well-resourced can cope with, will

13
H. Walker, speech on the First Reading of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill.
14
G. Richards, Lifting the Lid on Lobbying (NZ Lawyer, 1 June 2012).
15
G. Richards, Lifting the Lid on Lobbying.
16
G. Richards, Lifting the Lid on Lobbying.

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 not inspire confidence, and nor will all the anomalies contained in the Bill (discussed
later).

47. As we noted earlier, the basic problem is that the objective of the Bill—identifying all
influence—is too broad. We therefore submit that the Bill should be rejected. Although its
sponsor has stated that it will be amended, we are not aware of any proposed
amendment that would fix the Bill’s problems of principle. (As an aside, we note that a
lobbying regime could have quite a different objective. For example, in the Australian
regime the objective is that Ministers should be able to tell who is lobbying them. That
regime therefore only applies to “third party or consultant lobbyists … It does not apply to
government relations staff employed in major companies or peak industry organisations
as the very nature of their employment means that it will be clear to ministers and others
17
whose interests they will be representing.” )

48. If, despite this, you do decide that the Bill should proceed, it will at least need amendment
to fix what appear to be a number of anomalies and unintended consequences. In what
follows, we discuss some potential amendments, and also some questions about the Bill’s
intended scope that we submit are relevant and may require further amendments.

Amending the definition of “lobbying activity”

49. We believe several amendments are required to the definition of “lobbying activity” if the
Bill proceeds.

50. First, lobbying activity can occur when someone “undertakes” to communicate with a
public office holder, even if no actual communication ever happens. The definition could
instead focus on actual communications made “in an effort” to influence decision-making,
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and not on a mere undertaking. This is what the Australian regime does.

51. Second, the definition is so wide that it will catch a professional translator who helps a
client communicate with an MP about any of the specified matters. Surely this is
unintended. This could be covered by an exemption that would apply to “members of
professions” and “service providers” when making “incidental” representations to MPs, as
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in the Australian regime.

52. Third, the definition could catch completely public statements, for example where a
representative of a student association shouts slogans about Government policy through
a megaphone at a protest rally in the presence of MPs, if he or she is in a paid position or
if the association is covering his or her related expenses. Similarly, a charity employee
posting about government policy on their organisation’s blog may arguably be covered, if
the blog could be read by MPs. Presumably the Bill is not directed at such overt
statements, which could be protected by an exemption for “statements made in a public
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forum,” as in the Australian regime.

53. Fourth, a secretary making an appointment with an MP on behalf of his or her boss is
treated as “lobbying activity.” Surely this is unintended. An exemption for meeting
requests and other purely administrative tasks is found in the US regime and would cover
a secretary arranging a meeting if no attempt to influence is included in the
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communication.

54. Finally, it seems unreasonable to treat someone as a lobbyist, and require them to
register and file returns, when it may be a very minor part of what they do.The definition

17
P. Purser, Lobbying Regimes: An outline, page 4; Lobbying Code of Conduct 2011 (Aus), clause 3.5.
18
Lobbying Code of Conduct 2011 (Aus), clause 3.4 (Aus).
19
Lobbying Code of Conduct 2011 (Aus), clause 3.5(f): “Lobbyist” does not include “members of
professions, such as doctors, lawyers or accountants, and other service providers, who make
occasional representations to Government on behalf of others in a way that is incidental to the provision
to them of their professional or other services.”
20
Lobbying Code of Conduct 2011 (Aus), clause 3.4.
21
P. Purser, Lobbying Regimes: An outline, page 18.

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 could exclude communications from someone if it is not a core part of their role to lobby.
The Canadian regime covers in-house lobbyists only where it is a “significant part” of their
22
duties to lobby on their employer’s behalf.

Questions about the definition of “lobbying activity”

Are in-house and personal lobbyists supposed to be covered?

55. As drafted, the definition clearly covers consultant lobbyists (like professional lobbying
firms).

56. It also seems to cover in-house lobbyists, because an employee who lobbies for their
employer would be “an individual … [undertaking to communicate] on behalf of any …
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company or firm or organisation.” We presume that covering in-house lobbyists is
intended, because otherwise organisations who wish to lobby will simply employ lobbyists
rather than engaging a lobbying firm. However, we have raised this question because the
Bill is not as clear as other regimes. For example, the Canadian regime refers explicitly to
24
“consultant lobbyists” and “in-house lobbyists” (and treats them differently).

57. It appears that an individual lobbying on their own behalf (that is, in a purely personal
capacity) would not be covered, but if this is the intention it would be useful to clarify this.
We raise this because it seems odd that someone lobbying over Government policy or
law for their own personal advantage should be exempted, especially when compared
with the owner of a small business who would be covered, and especially if the intention
is to capture a “clear picture” of influence.

Should there be an exemption for some organisations?

58. The Bill would cover any type of organisation that lobbies. It has been suggested that
some organisations should be exempted. The Supplementary Order Paper accompanying
the Bill would exempt groups pursuing “national, patriotic, religious, philanthropic,
charitable, scientific, artistic, social, professional, or sporting … or similar” purposes, and
also trade unions and labour organisations.

59. Again, if the intention is to gain a complete picture of all lobbying, then this distinction
seems problematic. Such groups could have significant influence, comparable to or
exceeding the companies, firms and other groups pursuing “commercial interests” who
would still be included.

60. It might be feasible to exempt registered charities, on the pragmatic basis that the
Charities Act only permits lobbying (“advocacy” in charities law) as an ancillary or
secondary purpose. The Australian regime exempts “charitable, religious and other
25
organisations or funds that are endorsed as deductible gift recipients.” But perhaps this
could equally well be captured by an exemption for someone where it is not a “significant”
part of their role to lobby, presuming such an exemption is desirable.

61. If some organisations are to be exempted, this should be on the basis of a principled
explanation. A distinction between commercial and other interests is not sufficient, in our
view. Thus we consider that the question about exempting some types of organisations
remains unanswered.

22
Lobbying Act 1985 (Can), section 7(1)(b). “Significant” means “20% or more in any one month”: P.
Purser, Lobbying Regimes: An outline (Wellington: Parliamentary Library, April 2012), page 7. A similar
rule is applied in the USA: “20% of the time [spent] in providing services … over a period of three
months”: P. Purser, Lobbying Regimes: An outline, page 17.
23
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 7(2), and this appears to be reinforced by clause 7(4).
24
Lobbying Act 1985 (Can), sections 5 and 7.
25
Lobbying Code of Conduct 2011 (Aus), clause 3.5(a).

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 Should there be an exemption for MPs’ constituency duties?

62. MPs note that they often hear from constituents who need their help, and that they
“effectively act as troubleshooters for people.” Chris Hipkins MP has stated that some of
their conversations with constituents would have to be disclosed “if this bill is
implemented in its present form. … far from improving our democratic system and
improving transparency around it, it would actually act as a deterrent for people to speak
to their members of Parliament about very legitimate things. There are some people who
come to speak to a member of Parliament who would not do so if it was going to
26
automatically become public that they did.”

63. An exemption that would cover communicating with an MP for such “constituency duties”
27
is suggested in the Supplementary Order Paper on the Bill. However, this could create
an unintended loophole, if it allowed a business to communicate with their local MP in a
way that would otherwise be regulated.

64. In the First Reading debate, Mr Hipkins expressed concern that the Bill would prevent
plumbers in his electorate from coming to see him about “the regulatory environment for
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plumbers.” Mr Hipkins’ concerns are well-justified, but it is hard to see why anyone or
any group should benefit from an exemption like this, given that talking to another MP—
perhaps one with specialist knowledge of the plumbing industry—would not be exempted.
A lot could also depend on who your local MP is. For example, this could be quite
significant for a business based in Helensville who would have the Prime Minister as their
local MP.

65. A further problem is that the proposed exemption would presumably only apply to
electorate MPs, and not to list MPs, as list MPs don’t have constituents in the usual
sense. But trying to include list MPs would undermine the entire scheme.

66. We are very sympathetic to the concerns raised by Mr Hipkins, but responding to these
concerns would require the Committee to develop a very carefully tailored exemption.

Other amendments required

67. If the Bill proceeds, we submit there are some other, specific amendments required.

68. Anyone registering as a lobbyist has to name any company or organisation they are
employed or contracted by, even if that company or organisation has no direct role in any
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lobbying that takes place, and even if such lobbying is not done on their behalf. We
cannot see any good reason for this; it is simply over-reaching. The Bill should be
amended so there is no requirement to name an organisation you are not acting for when
you register.

69. It is possible to commit the offence of lobbying while unregistered without any intention to
do so. The offence provision should be amended to introduce a “mens rea” element—that
is, a requirement that there be knowledge of, or recklessness over, lobbying while
30
unregistered before any offence is committed.

70. The Auditor-General is given sweeping powers to suspend or remove people from the
31
lobbying register—such an action may be done at his or her “absolute discretion.”
Because lobbying is a criminal offence without registration—so that someone
deregistered or suspended loses important rights to speak—such sweeping powers are

26
C. Hipkins, speech on the First Reading of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill.
27
Supplementary Order Paper 76, proposed clause 7(5)(c).
28
C. Hipkins, speech on the First Reading of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill.
29
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 6(3)(b).
30
We are grateful for Graeme Edgeler for this point.
31
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 11(3).

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 unjustified. For example, the Bill should at least stipulate that someone is to be given a
32
reasonable opportunity to be heard before any such decision is made.

71. It seems strange that it is not an offence to file a false return of lobbying, though we
acknowledge that this would presumably constitute a breach of the Code and would be
grounds for suspension or removal from the Register. Nevertheless, we suggest that
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knowingly or recklessly filing a false return of lobbying activity should be an offence.

72. Someone who lobbies must be registered first. This would make it easy for someone to
inadvertantly breach the law, only realising later that something they said was a lobbying
activity by which time an offence has already been committed. The Canadian and US
regimes allow registration to occur within a reasonable time after a lobbying conversation
34
took place. A similar allowance should be made in the Bill.

73. The Auditor-General is given the power to develop the Lobbyist’s Code of Conduct and to
35
administer and enforce it. This raises separation of powers concerns. We submit that
the task of writing the Code should be given to someone else.

74. Given the importance of the activity regulated by the Code, Parliamentary oversight will
be important. To enhance this, the Bill should be amended so that the Code is not
36
excluded from the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989.

Possible amendments to reduce the Bill’s burden

75. Finally, if the Bill proceeds, we submit that there are some more significant amendments
you should consider that would do more than merely tidy up anomalies. They are:

a. scrapping the registration requirement, and only requiring reporting of lobbying

conversations. This would modify the concern about a privileged class of
communicators expressed earlier, though it would not remove it (those with sufficient
resources to handle the compliance burden would effectively remain a privileged
class) and would not remove the chilling effect;
b. putting the onus on MPs receiving lobbying communications to disclose them, rather
than on those communicating with them. MPs could be given extra resources to
achieve this. However, this could also have a chilling effect if it led to MPs being
reluctant to discuss issues with the public;
c. restricting the definition of “lobbying activity” to communications directed to Ministers
and their staff, as they are the key decision-makers in a way that other MPs are not.
However, this may not add much to the provisions of the Official Information Act that
enable the public to request a Minister’s diary.

Conclusion

76. We believe that the Bill is a poor expression of core democratic principle, and should be
rejected. By its very nature, it will prevent essential democratic speech, and will
undermine public trust and confidence. However, if it does proceed, a number of
amendments are required to fix anomalies, and more significant amendments should be
considered to reduce the burden created by the Bill.

77. Finally, we note that if any substantial amendments are to be made, further consultation
should take place on the revised Bill before it proceeds. As a submitter, it is rather

32
As in the Canadian regime: “Before finding that a person has breached the Code, the Commissioner
shall give the person a reasonable opportunity to present their views to the Commissioner.” Lobbying
Act 1985 (Can), section 10.4(5).
33
We are grateful to Graeme Edgeler for this point.
34
P. Purser, Lobbying Regimes: An outline, pages 9, 18.
35
We are grateful to Graeme Edgeler for this point.
36
See Lobbying Disclosure Bill, clause 13(4). We are grateful to Graeme Edgeler for this point.

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frustrating to hear that, “the bill as drafted is a starting point only.” While acknowledging
that the point of the Select Committee process is to allow for appropriate amendments to
be made, comments like this one suggest that submitters are being asked to hit a moving
target that they cannot even see. This does not uphold the integrity of the democratic
legislative process.

78. Thank you again for the opportunity to make this submission.

Yours sincerely
MAXIM INSTITUTE

Alex Penk
Acting CEO

Phone: (09) 627 3261

Mobile: 021 249 2494
Email: alex.penk@maxim.org.nz

37
H. Walker, Lobbying for transparency, 21 September 2012, available at
http://blog.greens.org.nz/2012/09/21/lobbying-for-transparency/ (accessed 26 September 2012)

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