NOTES IN LEGAL ETHICS

THE LAWYER’S OATH: I, ________________________, of ___________________________, do

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this
obligation voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.

DEFINITION OF TERMS:

1. LEGAL PROFESSION – group of men and women pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service (note: three elements of Legal Profession - (a)
organization, (b) learning, and (c) spirit of public service).

2. LEGAL ETHICS – embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should
govern the conduct of every Bar member; branch of moral science that treats of the
duties which a lawyer owes to the Court, his client, his Colleagues, and the Public; is
embodied in the Constitution, rules of Court, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons
of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special laws.

3. PRACTICE OF LAW – any activity in and out of court which requires the application of
laws, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R.
No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991).

4. TITULO DE ABOGADO – not mere possession of academic degree of LLB but

membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law.

5. BAR and BENCH – Bar refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors;
collectively, the members of the legal profession. Bench denotes the whole body of
judges (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition).

6. LAWYER – general term for a person trained in law and authorized to advice or
represent others in legal matters; a person licensed to practice law (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 6th edition).

7. TRIAL LAWYER – one who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or
boards.

8. PRACTISING LAWYER – one who is engaged in the practice of law.

9. CLIENT – one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice or for purposes of
prosecuting or defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee.
10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW – class of persons who are by license, officers of the court
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.

11. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO – a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court who by reason
of experience and ability, may adequately defend the accused. He is normally
appointed to represent one who is indigent in a criminal case.

12. ATTORNEY AD HOC – one named or appointed by the court to defend an absentee
defendant in the suit in which the appointment is made.

13. ATTORNEY OF RECORD – one whose name must appear somewhere in permanent
records or files of the case, or on the pleading or some instrument filed in the case or on
the appearance docket.

14. OF COUNSEL – an associate attorney or employee of law offices.

15. AMICUS CURIAE – “friend of the court”. He is a person with strong interest in or views
on the subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may petition the court
for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a
rationale consistent with its own views. Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in
appeals concerning matters of a broad public interest like civil rights.

16. AMICI PAR EXCELLENCE – Bar associations which appear in court as friends to expound
in some matters of law for the information of the court.

17. BAR ASSOCIATION – is an association of members of the legal profession like the IBP
where membership is integrated and compulsory.

18. ADVOCATE – one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or court.

19. BARRATRY – offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or otherwise
except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so; the
act of fomenting suit among individuals and offering legal services to one of them for
monetary motives.

20. AMBULANCE CHASING – figuratively, lawyer’s act of chasing the ambulance chasing
the victim of an accident for the purpose of talking to him or his relatives and offering his
legal services to file a case against the person who caused the accident; a lawyer who
haunts hospitals and visits the home of afflicted persistently offering his legal services on
contingent fee.

21. ATTORNEY’S FEES – reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services
he has rendered to a client; indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party to the prevailing party in litigation.

22. GENERAL RETAINER – fee/s intended to secure services for future legal problems.

23. SPECIAL RETAINER – fee/s paid for the engagement in a particular case.
24. CONTINGENT CONTRACT – an agreement whereby the fee, usually a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered, is made to depend on the success of the action.

25. CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT – an agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay

expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights; is against public policy especially
where the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his won expense in consideration
of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.

26. RETAINING LIEN – attorney’s lien over the property of the client held by the lawyer to
apply to his claims upon due notice to the client.

27. CHARGING LIEN – a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments; a lawyer causes a statement of his claim of such
lien to be entered upon the records of the court that rendered judgment or issuing
execution with written notice to the client and adverse party (Rule 138, S3c. 37, Rules of
Court).

28. GENERAL APPEARANCE – one that is done by a lawyer for any act except to question
the court’s jurisdiction.

29. SPECIAL APPEARANCE – one solely intended to question the court’s jurisdiction.

30. SUSPENSION – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s privilege to practice his profession

for a certain period or for an indefinite period of time.

31. DISBARMENT – the act of the Supreme Court in withdrawing from an attorney the
privilege to practice law.

32. REINSTATEMENT – restoration to a disbarred lawyer of the privilege to practice;

readmission to the membership in the Bar.

33. JUDICIAL ETHICS – branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper
conduct to be observed by all judges and magistrates in trying and deciding
controversies brought to them for adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative of
impartiality, integrity, competence, independence and freedom from improprieties. The
freedom from improprieties must be observed even in the judge’s private life.

34. COURT – a board or other tribunal which decides a litigation or contest.

35. JUDGE – a public officer who by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. A
public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in accordance with law.

36. DE JURE JUDGE – one who is exercising the office of judge as a matter of right; an
officer of a court who has been duly and legally elected or appointed.

37. DE FACTO JUDGE – an officer who is not lawfully invested with all of the powers and
duties conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right.

38. COURT STAFF – includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.
39. JUDGE’S FAMILY – includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, and any other
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, or person who is a companion
or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.

REQUIREMENTS FOR BAR CANDIDATE: - (i) Philippine citizen; (ii) Philippine resident; (iii) at
least 21 years of age; (iv) must be of good moral character; (v) must not have been
charged of a crime involving moral turpitude; and (vi) must have met the required
educational requirements (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION INTO THE BAR: (1) must meet all academic requirements; (2)
pass the bar exam; (3) oath-taking before the Supreme Court, (4) signing of the
Attorney’s Roll and issuance of certificate of membership from Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court (must be in good standing).

DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF A LAWYER (Four-Fold Duty to the Court, to the Public, to the Bar
and to his Client): (a) maintain allegiance to the Republic and support the Constitution
and obey the laws; (b) observe and maintain respect due to courts and their officers; (c)
counsel or maintain such actions/proceedings only as appears to him to be just and
defenses as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law; (d) employ means only
consistent with truth and honor and never to mislead the judge; (e) maintain inviolate
the confidence and preserve the client’s secrets; (f) abstain from all offensive personality
and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party/witness unless
required by the justice of the cause he is charged with; (g) not to encourage suit/delay
any man’s cause for corrupt motive; (h) not to reject the cause of defenceless/oppressed
for any personal consideration; (i) to present every defense permitted by the law by all
fair and honourable means, in the defense of a person accused of a crime regardless
of his personal opinion as to the accused’s guilt, so that due process may be ensured
(Rule 138, Sec. 20, Rules of Court).

PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW – General Rule: Any person admitted as a

member of the Bar in good and regular standing is entitled to practice of law. Exceptions
– (a) person representing himself or a friend in the MTC (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court);
(b) in criminal proceedings in a municipal court in a locality where a licensed member of
the bar is not available (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court); (c) person representing himself
in the RTC (Sec. 33, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (d) persons authorized to represent the
government in a case (Sec. 133, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (e) complainant himself or
union representatives in labor cases (Labor Code); (f) law students who have completed
3rd year law and enrolled in a recognized law school’s Supreme Court-approved legal
education program to represent indigent clients, provided that, such appearance if
before the RTC should be accompanied at all times by a supervising lawyer (Rule 138-A).

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW – (a) Judges
and other officials or employees of Superior courts (Rule 138, Sec. 35, Rules of Court); (b)
Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor General; (c) Government
Prosecutors; (d) President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants
(Art. VII, Sec. 13, Constitution); (e) Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX-A, Sec.
2, Constitution); (f) Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. XI, Sec. 8[2]); (g) Governors, city
and municipal mayors (Ra. 7160, Sec. 90); and (h) those who by special law are
prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESTRICTED RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW: (a) personal appearance as
counsel by Members of Congress before any court, electoral tribunal or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Constitution); (b) Sanggunian members
may practice their legal profession provided that they shall not (i) not appear in court in
any civil case where the local government or any governmental office, agency or
instrumentality is the adverse party; (ii) appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein
an national or local government officer/employee is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office; (iii) collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which they are officials; and (iv) use
property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the government’s interest (RA7160); (c) a retired justice or judge
receiving pension from the government cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which
the government or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in a criminal
case wherein an officer/employee of the government is accused of an offense in relation
to his office (RA 910, Sec. 1).

GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL: (a) client pursues an illegal or immoral course
of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; (b) client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of the canons and rules; (c) his inability to work with co-counsel
will not promote the best interest of the client; (d) the mental and physical condition of
the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; (e) client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office; and (g) other similar
cases (Rule 22.01, CPR).

INSTANCES WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT DESPITE WRITTEN CONTRACT
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – (1) when stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of what the law
expressly provides; (2) when the attorney is guilty of fraud or bad faith against the client;
(3) when counsel’s services were worthless because of his negligence; (4) when the
contract of employment is illegal; (5) when counsel served adverse interest, unless he
acted with consent of both parties.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY’S FEES (Rule 20.01, CPR) – (a) time spent and
extent and services rendered and required; (b) novelty and difficulty of question
involved; (c) importance of subject matter; (d) skill demanded of lawyer; (e) customary
charges for similar services and IBP schedule of fees; (f) probability of losing other
compensation; (g) amount involved in the controversy and benefits resulting from the
service; (h) contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) character of employment
whether occasional or established; (j) the lawyer’s professional standing.

INSTANCES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ON QUANTUM MERUIT (“as much as he deserves”) – (a)

no express contract for attorney’s fees; (b) court determines fees stipulated in the
contract to be unconscionable or unreasonable; (c) contract for attorney’s fees is void
due to purely formal matters or defects in the execution; (d) counsel’s inability, for
justifiable cause, to finish the case to its conclusion; (e) when lawyer and client disregard
the contract for attorney’s fees; (f) charging of fees beyond what is fixed by law.

OBJECTIVES OF DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION – (a) Compel attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his client; (b) remove from the profession, a person whose misconduct has
proved him UNFIT to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney; (c) punish lawyer although not so much as to safeguard the
administration of justice; (d) set as an example or warning for other members of the Bar;
(e) safeguard the administration of justice from incompetence and dishonesty of lawyers;
(f) protect the public.

NATURE OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS – being sui generis (class by itself), it has the
following characteristics: (a) neither civil or criminal; (b) double jeopardy cannot be
availed of in a disbarment proceeding against a lawyer as such a lawyer who is
convicted like for falsification cannot claim double jeopardy; (c) can be initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and can be initiated without a complainant; (d)
can proceed regardless of the interest or lack thereof, if facts proven warrant; (e)
imprescriptible and as such the ordinary statues of limitations have no application to
disbarment proceedings however, unexplained delay in filing of an administrative case
creates suspicion over the motives of the complainant; (f) conducted confidentially
being confidential in nature until its final determination; (g) it is itself due process of law;
(h) whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that
may be enforced in another action like reconveyance or damages;

GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT (Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court) – (a) Deceit; (b)
Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (c) Grossly immoral conduct; (d)
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) Violation of the Oath of Office; (f)
Wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (g) Corrupt or Wilful
appearance as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES – (a) Justices of the Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court – natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 40 years of age, 15 years in the
practice of law [Section 7(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution]; (b) judges of lower courts
– natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 35 (for RTC) and 30 (for MTC) years of age, 10 years
(for RTC) and 5 years (for MTC) in the practice of law [Section 7(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution].

INSTANCES OF MANDATORY INHIBITION OF JUDGES – (a) judge’s actual bias/prejudice

concerning a party or personal knowledge of dispute evidentiary facts concerning
proceedings; (b) judge previously served as a lawyer or a material witness in the matter
in controversy; (c) judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in
the outcome of the matter in controversy; (d) judge served as executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of
the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein; (e) judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review; (f)
judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6th civil degree or
to counsel within the 4th civil degree; or (g) judge knows that his or her spouse or child has
a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

RE: APPLICATION FOR BAR ADMISSION (VICENTE CHING), BM#914, 10/1/1999 – Vicente
Ching passed the 1998 Bar Exam but was prohibited from taking his oath due to a
“citizenship” issue having been born on April 11, 1964 to a Chinese father and Filipino
mother. Despite, his oath of allegiance and affidavit of citizenship executed in 1999,
Supreme Court denied his motion to take the lawyer’s oath reasoning that, when he was
born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution which required a legitimate
child of a Filipino mother and an alien father to follow the latter’s citizenship, unless
electing Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14years that lapsed from the time he reached the
age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly beyond the contemplation of the requiring of electing “upon reaching the age
of majority”.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE VS. EDWIN RANA, BM#1036, 6/10/2003 – Respondent, a 2000
Bar exam passer was precluded from signing the Attorney’s Roll because of a complaint
charging him of appearing as counsel for a local candidate before the Municipal Board
of Canvassers prior to his oath-taking in May 2001. In denying him admission into the Bar,
the Supreme Court held that, before one is admitted to the Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. A bar candidate who is
morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations. Respondent
was engaged in law practice when he appeared before the canvassing board without
being a member of the Bar. It is the signing in the Attorney’s Rolls that makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that Respondent passed the bar exams is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become a lawyer, Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely, his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by the Supreme Court and his signature in the
Attorney’s Roll.

ROMULO VILLA VS. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ET AL., BM#674, 6/14/2005 – Junel Ama, was
one of the members of Aquila Legis Fraternity implicated and charged for the death of
“Lenny” Villa. Despite passing the bar in 1992, Junel was not allowed to take his lawyer’s
oath. He later petitioned to be admitted to the Bar when his conviction for homicide
through conspiracy was set aside by the Court of Appeals finding him only liable for
physical injuries and sentencing him to 20-days imprisonment. Supreme Court admitted
him into the practice of law reasoning that the crime for which he was convicted was
only slight physical injuries, a light offense which cannot be considered a grave violation
of the moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility or revenge
– a crime certainly not involving moral turpitude.

SOLIMAN SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, AC#4749, 1/20/2000 – Respondent
who last paid his IBP membership dues in 1992 subsequently failed to indicate his IBP
number in his pleadings and used at times the same IBP number for the years 1995, 1996
and 1997. Supreme Court rejected Respondent’s claim that he honestly thought that he
was exempted from payment of IBP dues being a senior citizen and being engaging in
limited law practice only as he was principally into farming. Rule 139-A, Section 9 requires
every member of the IBP to pay annual dues. Non-payment of such dues may warrant
suspension or removal from the Attorney’s Roll pursuant to Section 10 of the same rule.
Respondent can engage in law practice only by paying his dues, and it does not matter
that his practice is “limited”. Further, exemption from taxation of senior citizens does not
include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.
PETITION TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, Petitioner, BM#1678,
12/17/2007 – Petitioner, a Philippine Bar member migrated to Canada and became a
citizen thereof. Pursuant to RA9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003),
Petitioner reacquired Filipino citizenship and petitioned the Supreme Court to allow him
to resume his law practice. In readmitting Petitioner, Supreme Court held that, Philippine
citizenship lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but later
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225, is deemed never to have been lost. However, although
deemed never to have terminated his Bar membership, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues. Hence, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from the Supreme
Court authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) updating and payment in full of the annual
IBP membership; (b) payment of professional tax; (c) completion of at least 36 credit
hours of mandatory continuing legal education; and (d) retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, AC#3405, 6/29/1998 – Respondent,

while engaged as a teacher had an illicit relationship with his 17-year old student with
whom he later lived after abandoning his family. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent
reasoning that, good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every
member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral
integrity, the privilege to practice law may be withdrawn. Immoral conduct is conduct
so wilful, flagrant or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Such conduct, must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. VS. ATTY. RICHARD FUNK, AC#9094, 8/15/2012 – Hocorma
Foundation hired Respondent’s legal services in connection with, among others, the
transfer of one of the properties subject of several suits and over which same property he
later instituted a suit in behalf of Mabalacat Insttitute without the foundation’s written
consent. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law reasoning that
a lawyer owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of
their relationship, sound policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith
and honest intention on the erring lawyer’s part does not make it inoperative. The reason
for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client’s doings, whether
documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust
and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship.

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. RODOLFO GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011 – Respondent

accepted Complainant’s engagement and wrote in her behalf a demand letter to Ms.
Koa for dishonored checks. Subsequently, he filed a motion for consolidation and
appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa in the estafa and BP22 cases filed against her by
Complainant. The latter charged this as representation of conflicting interests. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent from law practice holding that, a lawyer-client relationship
can exist despite close friendship. This relationship was established the moment
Complainant sought Respondent’s legal advice regarding the dishonored
checks. Respondent confirmed this relationship by drafting the demand letter and
referring to Complainant therein as “my client”. The fact that the demand letter was not
utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that Complainant hired another lawyer is of no
moment. Non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate Respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying
with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests (Canon 15) which
prohibition attaches from the establishment of attorney-client relationship extending
beyond its duration. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste. In the course of the relationship, the lawyer learns facts connected with the client’s
case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers must not only keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also avoid appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

SPS. VIRGILO & ANGELINA ARANDA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10 –
Respondent failed to notify Complainants who were here clients in a civil case of the
scheduled hearing which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Later,
Respondent took no steps, or at the very least, informed his clients of the adverse decision
rendered which became final and executory. Respondent claimed that he did not have
Complainants’ contact number or address and that the clients were the ones remiss in
making a follow up of their case’s status. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from
law practice citing amongst others, his duty of fidelity to his client’s cause (Canon 17)
and his duty to serve his client with competence (Canon 18), mindful not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him (Rule 18.03). It is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his
clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant
communication with each other. While communication is a shared responsibility
between counsel and client, it is counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status
of their case and the court orders issued. He simply cannot wait for his clients to make an
inquiry about the development in their case. Close coordination between counsel and
client is necessary for them to adequate prepare for the case, as well as to effectively
monitor the progress of the case.

DOLORES VDA. DE FAJARDO VS. ATTY. REXIE BUGARING, AC#5113, 10/7/2004 –

Complainant engaged Respondent to handle two cases affecting inherited land. When
asked about his fees, Respondent said, “huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon, para ko na
kayong nanay o lola”. After the cases were settled, Complainant offered Respondent
P100k but he rejected. Years later, Complainant learned that her property had been
attached by Respondent after he filed a civil case for sum of money against her.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that, the proper time to deal with the
issue of professional fees is upon commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent should have determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees
when he was first retained by Complainant. Such prudence would have spared the Court
this controversy over a lawyer’s compensation, a suit that should be avoided except to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. While, a lawyer is entitled to the court’s protection
against any attempt on the client’s part to escape payment of legitimate attorney’s fees,
such protection however must not be sought at the expense of truth. Complete candor
or honesty is expected from lawyers, particularly when they appear and plead before
the courts for their own causes against former clients.

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD VS. ATTY. GODWIN VALDEZ, AC#7902, 9/20/2008 – After receipt
of about P900K to represent Complainant, a Dutch national, in several cases filed by and
against him, Respondent failed to give any update as to the case status, he also failed
to enter his appearance in some cases. Respondent also failed to inform Complainant
of the arraignment dates in the criminal cases against him and even failed to mention
that he was entitled to prepare counter-affidavits. Warrants for Complainants arrests
were subsequently issued for his non-attendance. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent
holding that, he had indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of Bar
members. He did not only neglect his client’s case, he abandoned his client and left him
without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause. A lawyer is bound to serve his client with competence and diligence. A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ VS. ATTY. MANUEL SAN JOSE, AC#3569, 2/23/2007 – Respondent
was paid to file an unlawful detainer suit. When he did not file the case, Complainant
demanded for the return of her documents. Due to non-compliance by Respondent, the
case prescribed. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. A lawyer engaged to
represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with
utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence and he
should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the interest of his client.
An attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.

LUCILA S. BARBUCO VS. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, AC#5092, 8/11/2004 –

Complainant hired Respondent to appeal her case to the Court of Appeals. Later, she
learned that her appeal had been dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief.
Respondent claimed that he timely filed the appeal only that he was late in filing the
required brief because he was physically incapacitated for several days due to a
vehicular incident. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court reasoned that,
Respondent’s conduct relative to the belated filing of the appellant’s brief falls below
the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client’s
cause. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period constitutes inexcusable
negligence. That Respondent was suffered physical injuries from a vehicular accident
cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a
member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. He could have asked any of his
partners in the law office to file the brief or, at least, to seek extension of time to file such
pleading.

FERNANDO MARTIN PENA VS. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO, AC#7298, 6/25/2007 – His demand
for separation pay for his client in an illegal dismissal case having been rejected by the
Complainant, Respondent wrote threatening to file criminal cases for tax evasion and
falsification against Complainant. Respondent alleged that the disbarment complaint
against him should be dismissed for want of certification against forum-shopping.
Supreme Court held that, as to the necessity of a certification against forum shopping to
a disbarment complaint, the filing of multiple suits and conflicting decisions rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by
the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the IBP upon verified complaint of any person,
thus, if the complainant fails to attach a certification against forum shopping the
pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease. Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent that, while a lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law, his duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice – his client’s success is wholly subordinate and his conduct
must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The writing of demand letters is
standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, but, the letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay containing as it did a threat to file retaliatory charges
against Complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim.

ALEX ONG VS. ATTY. ELPIDIO UNTO, AC#2417, 2/6/2002 – For failing to heed his demand
letters seeking child support for his client, Respondent filed criminal cases against
Complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and Anti-
Dummy Law plus administrative cases before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the
Commission on Immigration and the Office of the Solicitor General. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent reasoning that, Canon 19 requires a lawyer to employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and not to present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper
advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent had not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling of his client’s legal affairs. He tried to coerce
Complainant to comply with his demand letter by threatening to file various charges
against the latter. After non-compliance, he made good his threat and filed a string of
criminal and administrative cases – this act is malicious as the cases filed did not have
any bearing or connection to his client’s cause.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. VS. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO MIJARES III, AC#8380, 11/20/09 –
Respondent was disbarred for failing to turn over certain papers which he supposedly
secured for Complainant after the latter had paid him P500k to Respondent as facilitation
and processing expenses for the titling of a certain property. Supreme Court held that,
“every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance his client’s interest such that
he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted
to him”. A lawyer’s conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional
ethics.

NICANOR GONZALES VS. MIGUEL SABACAJAN 249 SCRA 276 – Respondent held
Complainants’ owner’s copies of land titles purportedly. Despite demand, Respondent
refused to surrender to Complainants said titles claiming that he was holding them in
behalf of a client to whom Complainants were supposedly indebted. In suspending
Respondent, the Supreme Court posited that, if complainant did have alleged monetary
obligations with his client, that did not warrant Respondent’s summarily confiscating their
titles since there was no showing in the records that the same were given as collateral or
any court order authorizing Respondent to take custody of said title. A lawyer shall
impress upon his client the need for compliance with laws and principles of fairness.
ATTY. RICARDO SALOMON, JR. VS. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL, AC#7820, 9/12/2008 – Upon his
own undertaking, Respondent (who was counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case) took
possession of Complainant’s two vehicles which were attached. Complainant claimed
that, several times, one of the cars was used by unauthorized persons and the other car
was destroyed in a fire while parked in Respondent’s residence. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. A writ of attachment issues to prevent defendant from disposing
of attached properties to secure satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by
the plaintiff. When attached objects are destroyed then the attached properties would
necessarily be of no value and attachment would be for naught. A lawyer should refrain
from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage
of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Thus, money of the client or collected for
the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be
commingled with his own or be used by him.

REYNARIA BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ANORLITO ALVERO, AC#8159, 4/23/10 – Respondent

received P300k from Complainant to be used to redeem the latter’s rights as tenant of a
ricefield. Respondent told Complainant that he would deposit the money in court
because the creditor refused to accept it. Later, Complainant found out that
Respondent was losing a lot in cockfights and no judicial deposit was made.
Complainant demanded for the return of his money but Respondent failed to comply.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. When a lawyer received money from the client
for a particular purpose, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for that purpose. If he does not use the money for the intended
purpose, he must promptly return the money to his client.

MELVIN D. SMALL VS. ATTY. JERRY BANARES, AC#7021, 2/21/2007 – Respondent received
money for acceptance and filing fees. Despite Complainant constant follow-up as to the
status of the cases, Respondent merely answered that he was still preparing the
documents. Months passed, Respondent failed to present any document prompting
Complainant to demand for a full refund. Respondent failed to comply. In suspending
Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, “every lawyer holds in trust moneys of his client
that may come into his possession. Further, he should account for all money received
from the client and deliver funds of the client upon demand. Respondent received
money and since he failed to render any legal service to Complainant, he should have
promptly accounted for and returned the money, but he failed to do so.

CLETO DOCENA VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, SR., AC#2387, 9/10/1998 – Respondent
asked for P10k to post a bond to stay the execution of a decision in a civil case pending
appeal. After favorable judgment in the appeal, Complainant went to court to withdraw
his bond only to discover that no such bond was posted, much less required. Supreme
Court disbarred Respondent. While the amount involved may be small, the nature of the
transgression calls for a heavier penalty. The Code mandates that, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but must also be
possessed at all times in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity. If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also,
by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. By extorting money from his client
through deceit and misrepresentation, Respondent reduced the law profession to a level
so base, so low and dishonorable and most contemptible.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON VS. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, AC#6116, 8/1/2012 – After
failing to pay Complainant the agreed commission for a case referral, Respondent wrote
informing Complainant that the client would shoulder payment of the commission
because he agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees. Respondent was suspended from law
practice. The Supreme Court held that, practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon of the Code
which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the
case at bar.

MANUEL CAMACHO VS. ATTY LUIS PANGULAYAN, ET. AL., AC#4807, 3/22/2000 –
Complainant who represented expelled students in a civil case against the school
complained that the latter’s lawyer secured the dismissal of said complaint by brokering
a deal with the students allowing them readmission into the school without
Complainant’s presence or knowledge. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court
held that Canon 9 provides that, “a lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may
tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to
advise him as to the law”.

JOSE C. SABERON VS. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, AC#6567, 4/16/2008 – Respondent as

counsel for a bank filed various pleading using abusive and offensive language hinting
that Complainant was merely blackmailing/coercing his client for financial gain.
Supreme Court imposed a fine with a warning on Respondent. The Code mandates for
a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel and, in his professional
dealings, refrain from using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in the pursuit of their duty to advance their clients’ interests. However, while a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, AC#5737, 10/25/2004 – Complainant

was a 4th year law student who personally instituted and appeared in cases in his own
behalf. In one case, Respondent who was the opposing party’s counsel remarked,
“Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”. The Supreme Court admonished Respondent
to be more circumspect in his performance of his duties as an officer of the court.
Respondent’s comment was intended to point out to the trial court that Complainant
was not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of Complainant’s appearance as the
judge in her order noted that Complainant was a lawyer. Such single outburst, though
uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant Respondent’s suspension or reproof.
It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. Respondent was reminded that Complainant is not precluded
from personally litigating his cases pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA VS. ATTY. ANA LUZ CRISTAL-TENORIO, AC#6290, 7/14/2004. –
Charged with assisting in the illegal law practice of Felicisimo Tenorio who was not a Bar
member, Respondent admitted that Felicisimo is named as a senior partner because of
investments in her law office. While the disbarment case was pending, Complainant
withdrew her complaint claiming that it was all a mere misunderstanding. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. An affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does not, in
any way, exonerate Respondent. A suspension/disbarment case may proceed
regardless of Complainant’s interest/lack of interest – such proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance and are solely for the public
welfare, that is, to prevent courts of justice from the official ministrations of person unfit to
practice in them. If the evidence on record warrants, respondent may be
suspended/disbarred despite complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of charges.
Respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. The lawyer’s duty to
prevent, or at the very least not assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control
of the Court.

FLORENCE MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO, AC#6148, 2/27/2004 –

Respondent married and fathered two children with Complainant by representing that
his previous marriage was void. Later, he abandoned Complainant and entered into a
third marriage with another woman. In his defense, Respondent presented the decree of
nullity of his marriage with Complainant and denied employing deception in marrying
her insisting that, despite her full knowledge of his prior marriage, Complainant dragged
him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her and her family’s reputation due to
her pregnancy. The Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning that, “while his
marriage to Complainant has been annulled by final judgment, this did not cleanse his
conduct of every tinge of impropriety”. Having lived with Complainant as husband and
wife while his first marriage was subsisting made him liable for concubinage – conduct
inconsistent with the good moral character required for continued right to practice law.
Such conduct imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.

WILSON CHAM VS. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, AC#7494, 6/27/2008 – Respondent leased an
apartment owned by Complainant’s company. Despite repeated demands, she failed
to settle her unpaid account and vacated the leased premises without notifying
Complainant. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice reasoning
that, “having incurred just debts, she had the moral and legal responsibility to settle them
when they became due”. Respondent’s abandonment of the leased premises to avoid
her obligations for rent and electric bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of
Canon1.
ISIDRA BARRIENTOS VS. ATTY. ELERIZZA LIBIRAN-METEORO, AC#6408, 8/31/2004 –
Respondent issued several checks in payment of a pre-existing debt. Due to their
dishonor, Complainant filed BP22. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held
that the issuance of checks later dishonoured for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows
a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows Respondent’s
remorseless attitude, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest
and order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has
taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, AC# 7136, 8/1/2007 –
Respondent, a married man cohabited with Irene, a married woman. In his defense,
Respondent posited that, his special friendship with Irene was low-profile and not
scandalous and that he did no damage to the institution of marriage as he was still civil
and in good terms with his own wife. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that
Respondent did not deny his adulterous relationship with Irene, what he denied was
having flaunted such relationship maintain that it was “low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families”. Respondent’s denial is a negative
pregnant – a denial with admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. The Rules of Court employs the term “grossly immoral
conduct” as a ground for disbarment and not “under scandalous circumstances” as
used in Art. 334 (concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code. While the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behaviour, it is not so with respect to the betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is deemed disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws.

ROSARIO MECARAL VS. ATTY. DANILO VASQUEZ, AC#8392, 6/29/10 – Complainant, who
was the secretary of Respondent, later became his lover and common-law wife.
Respondent brought Complainant to a religious cult which he headed up in the
mountains. There Respondent left her where she was tortured, brainwashed and drugged
and held in captivity until her mother and law officers rescued her. Supreme Court
disbarred Respondent holding that his acts of converting his secretary into a mistress,
contracting two marriages are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can
countenance. Further, Complainant’s subsequent detention and torture is gross
misconduct which only a beast may be able to do.

ALFREDO ROA VS. ATTY. JUAN MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 – In selling a piece of land,
Respondent issued, instead of a deed of sale, a temporary receipt and a certificate of land
occupancy assuring Complainant that he could already use the lot. When he could not
register the certificate with the Register of Deeds, Complainant confronted Respondent and
learned that the latter was not the property owner and the land was in fact subject of
pending litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. His credibility is highly
questionable – he even issued a bogus certificate of land occupancy to Complaint whose
only fault what that he did not know better. To the unlettered, said certificate could have
easily passed as document evidencing title. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 (not to engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct). Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not
confined to performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

RODRIGO MOLINA VS. ATTY. CEFERINO MAGAT, AC#1900, 6/13/2012 –Respondent was
counsel for an accused against whom Complainant filed a case for assault upon an
agent of a person in authority and breach of peace and resisting arrest. Respondent
move for quashal of said cases alleging double jeopardy as supposedly a similar case for
slight physical injuries had been filed against his client. The records revealed however
that no such case was filed by Molina. The latter claimed that the filing of the motion to
quash was in bad faith to mislead the court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from
the practice of law finding that, there was deliberate intent on his part to mislead the
court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double
jeopardy. He should not make any false and untruthful statement in his pleadings. If it
were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in
court, all he had to do was secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case
was filed.

PARALUMAN AFURONG VS. ATTY. ANGEL AQUINO, AC#1571, 9/23/1999 – To stay the
execution of a decision obtained by Complainant in an ejectment case he filed multiple
petitions and even a motion to postpone a scheduled hearing supposedly due to his
appearance in another case when there was actually none. Supreme Court suspended
Respondent. It is an attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings
only as appear to him to be just and such defences only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. Because the decision in the ejectment case had reached
finality and execution was being effected, Respondent should not have filed a petition
for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay
execution of judgment. Respondent likewise committed a falsehood when he stated in
his motion for postponement that he had to attend another hearing. He himself admitted
that he only included such statement in order to give more “force” to his motion. Such
act violates a lawyer’s duty to avoid concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer
is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO VS. ATTY. JAMES FLORIDO, AC#5624, 1/20/2004 –

Respondent went to the Complainant who was his estranged wife to demand custody
of their children supposedly based upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals granting
him temporary custody. Per certification from the Court of Appeals, no such resolution
had been issued. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, “candor and
fairness are demanded of every lawyer”. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel.

ATTY. JOSABETH ALONSO VS. ATTY. IBARO RELAMIDA, JR., AC#8481, 8/3/10 – Respondent
was counsel for the complainant in a labor case for constructive dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter ruling that there was voluntary resignation, dismissed the labor case. This decision
was sustained by the Supreme Court and became final and executor. Respondent filed
a second complaint for illegal dismissal based on the same cause. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere
words nor an empty formality. A lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice. Filing multiple petitions constitutes
abuse of court processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and
degrade the administration of justice punishable as contempt of court.
HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS VS. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, AC#6442, 10/21/2004 –
Respondent who was counsel for the protestee in an electoral protest before
Complainant filed a motion to withdraw as counsel citing heavy workload. After his
motion was granted, Respondent executed an affidavit saying that he really withdrew
from the case because Complainant pre-judged the case and even insinuated that
protestee would lose. This affidavit became the basis of protestee’s motion for inhibition
against Complainant. Supreme Court suspended Respondent holding that, “all
members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, ‘do no falsehood’
and ‘conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients’”. When Respondent
executed his affidavit retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel, he admitted
under oath his misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as a
lawyer and failed to abide by the Code. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal
requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact, this obligation to the bench for candor and
honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying one thing in his motion and another in his
subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate
punishment.

LIBIT VS. ATTY. EDELSON OLIVA 237 SCRA 375 – Respondent was charged with falsifying
the sheriff’s return of summons in a civil case where he was counsel for the plaintiff. In
disbarring Respondent, the Supreme Court held that he committed acts of misconduct
which warranted the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The practice of law
is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
and continue to possess the qualifications required by law. One of these requirements is
the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer’s first
duty is not to his client but to the courts as he is above all an officer of the court sworn to
assist the courts in rendering justice to all. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing in any in court.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN, JR. VS. ATTY. RIZALINO SIMBILLO, AC#5299, 8/19/2003 - Respondent
posted paid ads in two national newspapers advertising his services as an “annulment
expert at P48,000.00 within 4 to 6 months. He admitted to the ads but reasoned that there
was nothing wrong with such conduct. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. The
practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture and law advocacy is not capital that necessarily yields profits. Gaining
of a livelihood should be secondary consideration as duty to public service and to
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers. Solicitation of
legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must
be compatible with the legal profession’s dignity. If made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to lawyers and to the Bar. Use of simple signs stating the
name/s of the lawyer’s, the office and residence address and fields of practice as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Calling
cars are acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data
is likewise allowable.

PEDRO LINSANGAN VS. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, AC#6672, 9/4/09 – Respondent

solicited Complainant’s client by persistently texting and calling them to transfer legal
representation with promises of financial aid and expeditious collection of claims.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. Lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business. Lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares as the contrary would commercialize the legal practice, degrade
the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every Bar member is called. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutions malpractice – a ground for disbarment.

MANUEL VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. BEBE TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – Supreme Court
warned Respondent that, an agreement like the one supposedly forged between him
and Complainant for the latter to receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s fees for every
judicially-approved corporate rehabilitation plan prepared by the Complainant, is
violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing a lawyer from dividing or agreeing to divide fees for
legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.

Respondent owned what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company

which was in reality a vehicle for Respondent to procure professional employment,
specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposing that should the
prospective client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal services
related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank proves that Respondent violated Rule
2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. In
suspending Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a lawyer is not prohibited from
engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises though when the
business is of such nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one
that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer,
or that can be used as a cloak for indirectly solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of
such a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as practice of law.

ATTY. JULITO VITRIOLO, ET. AL. VS. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, AC#4984, 4/1/2003 – Respondent
who was the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher
Education was charged with solicitation of money from various applicants for correction
of names pending before her office. In disbarring Respondent, the Supreme Court ruled
that, “generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a Bar member for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by the Court
as a Bar member. Respondent’s misconduct as a CHED lawyer is of such a character as
to affect her qualification as a Bar member. As a lawyer, she ought to have known that
it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration
for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

DAN JOEL V. LIM VS. ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA, AC#5438, 3/10/2004 – Respondent
who was the chief of the NLRC-Public Assistance Center purportedly demanded money
from Complainants to in settlement of labor cases purportedly filed by their employees
and even threatened to close their businesses and put them in jail if they refused to settle.
Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning that, if a lawyer’s misconduct in the
discharge of official duties as a government official is of such character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a Bar
member on such ground. Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to
be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

WILFREDO M. CATU VS. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738, 2/19/2008 – Respondent,
as barangay captain presided over the Lupon conciliatin proceedings over a land
dispute and later entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the
subsequent ejectment case instituted involving the same parties. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent from law practice reasoning that, while Sec. 90 of the Local
Government Code subjected certain elective local officials to the proscription to
practice their profession, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and
members of the sangguniang baragay, however, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the the Secretary of DILG before he entered his
appearance as counsel pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
Non-compliance therewith constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer to obey the
laws.

AURELIO M. SIERRA, VS. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, ET. AL., A.C. No. 7549, 8/29/2008 – Complainant
charged Respondent who were all city prosecutors with dereliction of duty and gross
ignorance of the law for not requiring the parties in certain criminal cases instituted by
Complainant to simultaneously appear during preliminary investigation. Supreme Court
dismissed the complaint holding that, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court does not require a
confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted
through submission of affidavits and supporting documents through exchange of
pleadings.

ANGEL BAUTISTA VS. ATTY. RAMON GONZALES 182 SCRA 151 – Respondent accepted a
civil case on contingency basis at 50% of the value of the litigated property. After
termination of the engagement, Respondent transferred to himself ½ of the property
subject of litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. In executing a document
transferring ½ of the subject properties to himself, Respondent violated the law expressly
prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any
litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession (Art. 1491, CC). While a
lawyer may in good faith advance litigation expenses, the same should be the subject
of reimbursement. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expense
proceedings to enforce the client’s right is CHAMPERTOUS. Such an agreement is against
public policy, especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry out the
action at his own expenses of some bargain to have part of the thing in litigation.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM LAW PRACTICE IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G.
MAQUERA, BM#793, 7/30/2004 – Atty. Maquera who was admitted to the Philipppine Bar
was later admitted to law practice in Guam. The Superior Court of Guam suspended him
from practicing in Guam due to misconduct for acquiring his client’s property as
payment for his legal services. The Guam court transmitted certified copies of his
suspension to the Philippine Supreme Court. May a Philippine Bar member be
suspended/disbarred for an infraction for which he has been suspended/disbarred from
law practice in a foreign country? Disbarment/suspension of a Philippine Bar member by
a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action constitutes a ground for disbarment/suspension from law practice in the
Philippines. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment/suspension.

CRISTINO CALUB VS. ATTY. ABRAHAM SULLER, AC#1474, 1/28/2000 – A lawyer, under the
pretext of borrowing a blade, went to his neighbor’s house and raped her. Due to
reasonable doubt however he was acquitted. He argued that such acquittal should
warrant the dismissal of the disbarment case against him. In disbarring Atty. Suller, the
Supreme Court reasoned that acquittal due to prosecution’s failure to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is not determinative of the administrative case. The privilege
to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and equally important, morally.

MAXIMO DUMADAG VS. ATTY. ERNESTO LUMAYA, AC#2614, 6/29/2000 – Suspended

indefinitely from law practice, Respondent filed various pleadings including a petition to
lift his suspension seeking among others, clarification as to the exact term of his suspension
considering he was already 62 years of age and the lack of law practitioners in their
locality. Later he wrote the Chief Justice again imploring but also chiding the Court for
‘slumbering’ on acting on his petition although still insisting his innocence. Instead of lifting
his suspension, the Supreme Court fixed his period of suspension at 10 years. The insolence
of Respondent’s remonstrations that the Court was sleeping on its job in acting on his
case not only underscores his callous disregard of the myriad administrative and judicial
travails the Court has to contend with as the Court of Last Resort, it also betrays his
absolute lack of appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures undertaken by
the Court to cope with these concerns. Needless to state, such presumptuousness is only
too deserving of rebuke. Indefiniteness of Respondent’s suspension, far from being cruel
or degrading or inhuman has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration
of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands – that sanction has the effect of
giving Respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt
and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate
repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting
standards of conduct rightly demanded from every Bar member and officer of the courts.
LIGAYA MANIAGO VS. ATTY. LOURDES DE DIOS, AC#7472, 3/30/10 – Respondent who had
been suspended for 6 months from law practice was charged of violating the order of
her suspension by service as counsel for a Japanese national. In dismissing the petition
against Respondent, the Supreme Court noted that Respondent had already served her
prior 6-months suspension and had written a manifestation to the Court of such fact. To
be sure, the Supreme Court laid the following guidelines in relation to resumption of
practice following full service of suspension, to wit: (a) the suspended lawyer must first
present proof of his compliance by submitting certifications from the IBP and Executive
Judge that he has indeed desisted from law practice during the period of suspension; (b)
thereafter, the Court, after evaluation and upon favorable recommendation from the
Office of the Bar Confidant, will issue a resolution lifting the suspension order and allow
him to resume his practice. It was only unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked
with regards to Respondent’s prior suspension.

CARLOS REYES VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, AC#5835, 8/10/10 – Suspended for an
aggregate period of 2 ½ years as a result of four administrative cases, Respondent
petitioned the Supreme Court for reinstatement as a member in good standing of the
Bar and to be allowed to practice law. Supreme Court granted Respondent’s
application for reinstatement effective upon his submission to the Court of a sworn
statement that: (a) he has completely served the four suspension orders imposed on him
successively; (b) he desisted from the law practice during the period of suspension; (c)
he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the court in the
previous administrative cases; (d) he has furnished copies of his sworn statement to the
IBP and the Executive Judge.

LEONARD RICHARDS VS. PATRICIO ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10 – In 1987, Respondent was
disbarred for grave professional misconduct and ordered to reimburse P16,000 to
Complainant. The latter wrote the Court several times to report non-payment by
Respondent. Respondent then sought readmission to the Bar in 1996, claiming that he
had consigned the money with the Court’s cashier. According to Respondent, his
belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the order to reimburse was due to his inability
to locate complainant. Supreme Court denied Respondent’s petition and the a later
petition in 2010 reasoning that, Respondent’s justification flimsy as it is, considering that
Complainant’s address was readily available with the Court what with the numerous
letters reporting Respondent’s non-compliance, glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of
his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by
displaying a lack of candor towards the Court. By taking his sweet time to effect
reimbursement of the P16,000.00 – and through consignation with this Court at that - he
sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders of this Court could be
treated with disdain or impunity.

FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO VS. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO, AC#6368, 6/13/2012 –
Complainants charged that Respondent with a certain “Magat” enticed them to pay
money supposedly to expedite titling of their property without having performed the task
for which he was engaged. The Supreme Court found untenable Respondent’s defense
of prescription – that the complaint was filed two years after the supposed deceit was
committed. Administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of
considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.

ELPIDIO TIONG VS. ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011 –Complainant

confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair with his wife when
he overheard, through the extension phone, Respondent say “I Love You” to
Complainant’s wife. Later, and in the presence of their spouses, Respondent and
Complainant’s wife admitted their amorous affair and then and there, executed an
affidavit before a notary public attesting to their illicit and seeking their respective
spouses’ forgiveness. This affidavit signed by Complainant, Respondent and their spouses
provided that no criminal or legal action would be taken against the offending parties.
Despite such stipulation, Complainant sought for the disbarment of Respondent who
interposed the defense of pardon. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the
practice of law holding that his act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession.
Undeniably, this illicit relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct
warranting disciplinary action from the Court. A case for suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended
to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the respondent’s acts as a
husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. Hence, the affidavit, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance,
cannot have the effect of abating the proceedings.

GRACE M. ANACTA VS. ATTY. EDUARDO RESURRECCION, AC#9074, 8/14/2012 –

Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had
already filed a petition for annulment of marriage on Complainant’s behalf after receipt
of P42,000.00. He went to the extent of presenting to Complainant a supposed copy of
the petition duly filed with the court. Later, Complainant found out from the court that
no such petition was filed. Finding Respondent guilty of deceit and gross misconduct, the
Supreme Court suspended him from law practice reasoning that, there is no ironclad rule
that disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct.
The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

Anent the issue of whether Respondent should be directed to return the money he
received from Complainant, this case is the opportune time to harmonize the Court’s
ruling on this matter. When the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and
moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of
whether respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be
deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. In this case, it is clear that Respondent
violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when he withheld the amount of
P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after
complainant demanded its return. He must be therefore directed to return the same.

RODOLFO ESPINOSA VS. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011 – Respondent

purported advised that Complainant and his wife could live separately and dissolve their
marriage, preparing for that purpose, a “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. Respondent
claimed that, it was not her but a part-time office staff who notarized the document. In
suspending Respondent from law practice and being a notary public, the Supreme Court
held that, extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void and a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.In preparing and
notarizing a void document, Respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 (duty not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful). Respondent knew fully that the
Kasunduan has no legal effect and is against public policy. Even granting arguendo that,
it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Respondent’s
negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is personally responsible for the
entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.

TAN TIONG BIO VS. ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES, AC#6634, 8/23/2007 – Respondent was
duly commissioned as a notary public for Quezon City but notarized a deed of sale in
Pasig City. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court reasoned that, while seemingly
appearing to be a harmless incident, Respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a
place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of
malpractice of law and falsification. Respondent by performing through the years
notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized indulged in deliberate falsehood.
By such malpractice as a notary public, Respondent violated Canon 7 directing every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

JESSICA UY VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL SAÑO, AC#6505, 9/11/2008 – For notarizing documents
despite expiration of his notarial commission, Supreme Court suspended Respondent
holding that, practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show they posses, and continue to possess, qualifications required by law for
conferment of such privilege. A lawyer’s act of notarizing without the requisite
commission therefor is reprehensible constituting as it does, not only malpractice but also
the crime of falsification of public documents. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest converting a private
document into a public document making it admissible in evidence without further proof
of authenticity. As such, only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries
public. Respondent’s reliance upon his aide’s representation that his commission had
been renewed shows disregard of the requirements for issuance of a notarial commission.

DOLORES DELA CRUZ VS. ATTY. JOSE DIMAANO, JR., AC#7781, 9/12/2008 – Respondent
notarized a deed which allowed Navarro (Complainant’s sister) full ownership over the
estate of their deceased parents. Complainant’s signature on this deed was forged and
Complainant did not even appear before Respondent. Supreme Court gave no
credence to Respondent’s defense that he simply relied upon Navarro’s representations
because they had been long time neighbours and he believed she would not lie to him.
Supreme Court held that notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and
notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals
who executed it and personally appeared before them to attest to the truth of what are
stated therein, otherwise, notaries public would not be able to verify the genuineness of
the signatures and whether the document is the party’s free act or deed. Notaries public
are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has
acknowledged and presented the proper residence certificate.

LORENZO BRENNISEN VS. ATTY. RAMON CONTAWI, AC#7481, 4/24/2012 – Complainant,

being a US resident, entrusted the administration of his land along with its title to
Respondent. Via a spurious Special Power of Attorney, Respondent mortgaged and
subsequently sold the subject property to Roberto Ho. Supreme Court suspended
Respondent for violating Canon 1 for disposing his client’s property without his knowledge
or consent and partaking of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. Respondent’s
contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially-
incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he
was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged.

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO VS. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011 – Respondent is
charged with dishonesty and violation of the Notarial Law for notarizing a deed of
donation allegedly executed by Complainant’s husband (Atty. Alfredo Linco) in favor of
his illegitimate minor child, despite Respondent’s knowledge that affiant died a day prior
to notarization. Respondent claimed affiant, whom he meet prior to his demise, asked
him to notarize the deed of donation which affiant signed in Respondent’s presence.
Since Respondent did not have his notarial register, he told affiant to bring the deed to
his office anytime for notarization. Hence, despite knowledge of death, Respondent
notarized the deed to accommodate a colleague. The Supreme Court suspended
Respondent from law practice and being a notary public finding that, affiant’s previous
personal appearance before Respondent does not justify the notarization of the deed
due to affiant’s absence on the day of notarization. The rule requires Respondent not to
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to its contents and
truthfulness. Further, in the notarial acknowledgment, Respondent attested to affiant’s
personal appearance before him on the day of notarization, yet, affiant clearly could
not have appeared as he already died a day before. Clearly, Respondent made a false
statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath
as a lawyer.

CORAZON NEVADA VS. ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012 – Complainant is

the principal stockholder of a hotel where One in Jesus Christ Church holds its services.
Respondent and Complainant being both church members, became friends.
Respondent took advantage of their friendship by failing to deliver the P90,000 rental
deposit paid, after Respondent represented himself as hotel administrator and entered
into a lease contract with Jung Chul for office space in the hotel. Complainant also
entrusted to Respondent several jewelries intended for sale. Respondent however, failed
to return the proceeds of the sale or the unsold articles to Complainant. In suspending
Respondent from law practice and being a notary public, the Supreme Court held that,
he was guilty of misrepresentation, when he made it appear that he was authorized to
enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada when, in fact, he was not. For failing
to return or remitting proceeds of the sale, upon demand, he also breached his duty to
hold in trust property belonging to his client (Canon 16, Rule 16.03). Moreover,
Respondent’s act of affixing his signature above the printed name “Edwin Nevada”,
without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the lease contract. Thus, his act
of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of the Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of
the Notarial Rules.

HON. JULIETA DECENA VS. JUDGE NILO MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-02-1669, 4/14/2004 –

During a municipal session wherein the revocation of two resolution granting authority to
permit a cockpit was being deliberate, Respondent whose nephew was one of such
cockpit operators, heckled and interruption the session by hurling accusatory remarks
and insults toward the municipal official. Respondent claimed that he was merely present
during the council session in his private capacity as a taxpayer. In imposing a fine on
Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, he should be reminded that his judicial identity
does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when
garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority
and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. A judge’s official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. As such, he should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

SALVADOR SISON VS. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., AM#RTJ-03-1771, 5/27/2004 –

Respondent ordered Complainant who was an MMDA traffic enforcer to appear in his
court and explain why he issued a traffic ticket to Respondent’s son even if the latter had
introduced himself to be a son of a judge. For failure to appear and explain, Respondent
cited Complainant in contempt, ordered him arrested and only discharged him after
admitting before Respondent that he made a mistake. Supreme Court dismissed
Respondent from the service. Initially, he appeared to be justified in holding Complainant
for contempt due to the latter’s refusal to comply with his order. However, Complainant
was not a party to any pending cases. What triggered the contempt charge was the
traffic incident involving Respondent’s son – this being a personal matter involving his son,
Respondent should have refrained from ordering Complainant’s arrest and detention. A
judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

CARLOS DIONISIO VS. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999 – Respondent

posted an ad in the court bulletin board for “attractive waitresses and personable waiters
for the family-owned restaurant. He even interviewed some applicants in his court. A
news ad accepting such applicants even listed the address of his court. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. His conduct constitutes involvement in private business and
improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family business. Judges must not
allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their judicial tasks by other
lawful enterprises.

ZENAIDA BESO VS. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN, AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000 – Respondent

was a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita. He solemnized Complainant’s marriage in his
residence in Calbayog City. In imposing a fine on Respondent, the Supreme Court held
that, a person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live
and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of
their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. Considering
that Respondent’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Calbayog City.

SALVADOR RUIZ VS. JUDGE AGELIO BRINGAS, AM#MTJ-00-1266, 4/6/2000 – In a hearing

before Respondent, Complainant who was the fiscal got into a verbal exchange with
Respondent after Complainant requested time to submit his recommendation to an
accused’s guilty plea. Respondent directed that it be put on record that Complainant
does not know how to compute the proper penalty and that he even took the bar three
times. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. The duty to maintain respect for the
court’s dignity applies to members of the Bar and bench alike. A judge should be
courteous both in conduct and language especially to those appearing before him. He
can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients and
the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing or tyrannical. He should refrain from
conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets courtesy.

RUFINO CASIMIRO VS. JUDGE OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ, AM#MTJ-04-1525, 1/29/2004 – After

the dismissal of the criminal case against Complainant, Respondent failed to return the
cash bond posted. Respondent only later issued a check to refund Complainant’s cash
bond. Per SC Circular No. 50-95, all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other
fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court concerned,
upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, in the name of the court, with
its Clerk of Court and the Executive Judge as authorized signatories. While there is no
direct and hard evidence that Respondent made personal use of the cash bond, his
wife’s issuance of her personal check to Complainant in the amount of the cash bond,
indicates so. By his actuations then, Respondent placed his honesty and integrity under
serious doubt. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of such in all
activities.

ENGRACIO DIALO, JR. VS. JUDGE MARIANO MACIAS, AM#RTJ-04-1859, 7/13/2004 –

Complainant and a companion, who were both witness in the administrative case for
immorality filed against Respondent by his wife. On their way to Manila for the hearing of
the administrative case, they were arrested and detained by police reports based upon
Respondent’s report that they were would-be assassin. During the pendency of the
administrative case against Respondent for oppression, Complainant withdrew his
complaint. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Complainant’s withdrawal/disavowal of
the contents of his administrative complaint does not necessarily warrant its dismissal.
Administrative actions cannot depend on complainant’s will/pleasure who may, for his
own reasons, condone what may be detestable. Desistance cannot divest the Court of
its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent because
public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the
judiciary. By respondent’s act of requesting for complainant’s and his companion’s
warrantless arrest, he violated complainant’s constitutional right, an act which partakes
of the nature of oppression, defined as an “act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction,
domination or excessive use of authority.”
ATTY. GLORIA LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU VS. JUDGE RAPHAEL B. YRASTORZA, A.M. No. RTJ-
03-1793, 2/5/2004 – When Complainant asked for a resetting, Respondent cut her off
saying, “Do not give me so many excuses x x x I don’t care who you are! x x x You can
file one thousand administrative cases against me. I don’t care”. In another case,
Respondent scolded Complainant for failure to file pre-trial brief. Subsequently, when
pre-trial was conducted and Complainant was absent due to another engagement,
Respondent ordered Complainant’s client to produce the original documents in five
minutes or the case would be dismissed. Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent. Mere
desistance on Complainant’s part does not warrant dismissal of an administrative
complaint against any member of the bench and the judiciary. Court’s interest in the
judiciary’s affairs is a paramount concern that knows no bounds. Upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal and becomes the visible representation
of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. The tenor of Respondent’s statement can
easily instill in the minds of those who heard them that as a judge he is above the law.
Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting Complainant in open court and cutting her off
in mid-sentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard of
his duty be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct
proceedings in court with fitting dignity and decorum.

HEINZ R. HECK VS. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, AM#RTJ-01-1657, 2/23/2004 – Prior to his
appointment as RTC judge, Respondent supposedly violated the notarial law by
notarizing documents in 1980 to 1984 without being commissioned as notary public. May
a retired judge disciplined for notarizing documents without the necessary commission
more than 20 years ago? Supreme Court fined Respondent. A judge may be disciplined
for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law. Thus, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Respondent is being
charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. Even then,
though Respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a
member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme
Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

RODRIGO Q. TUGOT VS. JUDGE MAMERTO COLIFLORES, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1332, 2/16/2004
– Respondent dismissed an ejectment case wherein Complainant was one of the
plaintiffs. The latter appealed the dismissal but were advised to re-file their notice of
appeal because the records transmitted to the appellate court did not have a notice of
appeal. As it turned out, the notice of appeal was not lost but was simply misplaced in
Respondent’s office. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Courts exist to dispense and
promote justice. Realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the
intellectual, moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve
as judges. Misplacement of the notice of appeal indicates gross negligence. Respondent
should have been more prudent in determining the cause of its temporary loss, which
caused unnecessary inconvenience to Complainant, whose right to appeal was
affected. As administrative officers of the courts, judges should organize and supervise
court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. He should adopt
a system of records management, so that files are kept intact despite the temporary
absence of the person primarily responsible for their custody.
ELENA R. ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1539, 4/14/2004 –
Having declared Complainant and her co-defendants in a civil collection suit in default,
Respondent proceeded with plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence and thereafter,
rendered judgment in plaintiff’s favour. rendered judgment in a civil case Complainant
alleged that she was not furnished various pleading and orders including plaintiff’s
motion to declare defendants in default and the order granting the same. Supreme
Court fined Respondent. Rule 9, Sec. (a) of the Rules on Civil Procedure requires that “a
party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take
part in the trial”. So, even when a defendant is already declared in default, he is entitled
to notice of subsequent proceedings. Respondent’s failure to comply with the
elementary dictates of procedural rules constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The Code is explicit in its mandate that, “a judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence”. Competence is the mark of a good judge.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his own fellowmen,
the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he
sits in, to be proficient in the law.
SPS. RODOLFO & SYLVIA CABICO VS. JUDGE EVELYN DIMACULANGAN-QUERIJERO,
AM#RTJ-02-1735, 4/27/2007 – Respondent dismissed a criminal case for rape on ground
of full payment of civil liability and disinterest to prosecute, despite the manifestation in
court that Complainants who were the parents of the 17-year old victim would not settle
and their refusal to sign the affidavit of desistance. Supreme Court fined Respondent.
Respondent dismissed the criminal case after the accused had paid their individual civil
liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law because payment of
civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability. When a law or rule is basic, a judge owes
it to his office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. As an
advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to keep
abreast with and be proficient in the interpretations of our laws. Having accepted the
exalted position of a judge, Respondent owes the public and the court she sits in
proficiency in the law.

MARISSA MONDALA VS. JUDGE REBECCA MARIANO, AM#RTJ-06-2010, 1/25/2007 –

Respondent supposedly misrepresented in her report of pending cases that a decision
had already been rendered in a certain case when in fact, it was still with Complainant
(legal researcher) for research and drafting. Respondent claimed mere oversight and
not misrepresentation, i.e., at the time the monthly report was made, a decision had
actually been prepared. Supreme Court fined Respondent. A decision in a civil case is
rendered only upon the signing by the judge who penned the same and upon filing with
the clerk of court. A draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the
same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. Under Sec. 1,
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges ought to ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
GIDEON JUSON VS. JUDGE VICENTE MONDRAGON, AM#MTJ-07-1685, 10/3/2007 –
Respondent purportedly delayed for over three year in resolving Complainant’s motion
to intervene in a civil case for recovery of a land. Respondent admitted the delays citing
failing health due to a stroke and his load of supervising three courts at a time as causes
therefor. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rules prescribing time within which certain
acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. Judicial office exacts nothing less than faithful observance
of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties. Section 15(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be
decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision
or resolution. His failing health, as an excuse for the delay hardly merits serious
consideration. Even if he was stricken by an illness hampering his due performance of his
duties, it was incumbent upon him to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide
the cases assigned to him. As to his additional work in supervising three courts at a time,
such will not exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored.
Respondent should have know that if his caseload, additional assignments or
designations, health reasons or other facts prevented the timely disposition of his pending
cases, all he had to do was simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to
dispose of his cases.

CONRADO LADIGON VS. JUDGE RIXON GARONG, AM#MTJ-08-1712, 8/20/2008 –

Respondent used his title as “judge” and his court’s official stationary in writing a letter-
complaint to the Chairman of the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA about
the surreptitious manner of the incorporation of the Banard Kelly Memorial United
Methodist Church, singling out Complainant to be part of the deception. Admitting that
he used his court’s letterhead and signed his letter using the word “judge”, Respondent
reasoned that he merely used an ordinary bond paper and typed thereon his court’s
station “to indicate the return or inside address”. Supreme Court admonished
Respondent. What is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”. Respondent’s transgression was
not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in
considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. Use of
a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances
of the use – the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of “impropriety”
or “appearance of impropriety”. Respondent crossed the line of propriety when he used
his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation of church rules and,
possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to a foreign
reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of official recognition
or notice of the reported violation.

JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11 –

Complainant and her co-party litigants filed a motion to inhibit Respondent. During the
hearing for said motion, Respondent became emotional, forced Complainant to testify
without counsel, demanding a public apology, relentlessly interrogating her and finally
ordering her detained for direct contempt finding her in direct contempt until she
divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the court but not exceeding 30 days.
Supreme Court fined Respondent. No amount of rationalization can reconcile the limit of
the 10-day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court with the 30-day maximum period of imprisonment fixed by Respondent. By virtue
of his office, Respondent knows or should have known this so basic a rule. The glaringly
clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring error which was made even
more flagrant by the fact that Respondent was actually detained for 19 days. Failure to
follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to gross
ignorance of the law.

OCA VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO LEONIDA, AM#RTJ-09-2198, 1/18/11 – Per judicial
audit and inventory conducted when Respondent availed of optional retirement, the
Office of the Court Administrator determined that Respondent failed to decide 102
criminal cases and 43 civil cases as well as to resolved motions in 10 civil cases. Supreme
Court fined Respondent. A judge’s failure to decide a case within the reglementary
period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for
delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right
to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it
undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary lowering its standards and
bringing it to disrepute. The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial
robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them. As frontline
officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity.
They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This
is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public
reposed on them and the institution they represent.

OCA VS. JUDGE BENJAMIN ESTRADA, AM#RTJ-09-2173, 1/18/11 – In the review of the
monthly report of cases from MTCC Malaybalay, Bukidnon, the OCA noted that
Respondent issued orders dismissing certain cases even when he was no longer the judge
of said court having been promoted to the RTC. Likewise the RTC Executive Judge (Bacal)
issued similar orders affecting certain MTCC cases. Both judges admitted the acts
claiming that they did not intend to violate the law, acting as they did out of their desire
to uphold the accused’s right to liberty in the cases they took cognizance of. Both judges
were fined by the Supreme Court. Their shared intention to uphold the accused’s right to
liberty cannot justify their action in excess of their authority in violation of existing
regulations. The vacuum in a first level court (MTC) due to the absence of a presiding
judge is not remedied by a take-over of the duties of the still-to-be appointed or
designated judge for that court, which is what they did. Instead of allowing Respondent
and herself to act on pending MTCC cases, the RTC Executive Judge should have
designated a municipal judge within her area of supervision to act on the pending cases.

IMELDA MARCOS VS. JUDGE FERNANDO PAMINTUAN, AM#RTJ-07-2062, 1/18/11 – In 1996,

then Judge Reyes issued an order which later became final and executor releasing the
Golden Buddha status in custodial egis to the heirs of Rogelio Roxas. In implementing said
order, Respondent in his May 2006 Order added a statement to the effect that the
Golden Buddha in the court’s custody was a “fake or mere replica”. Having been
previously warned and punished for various infraction, Respondent was dismissed from
the service by the Supreme Court. While judges like any other citizen are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. It is axiomatic that when
a judgment is final and executor, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no
longer be modified in ay respect either by the court which rendered it or even by the
Supreme Court. It is inexcusable for Respondent to have overlooked such basic legal
principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the
public to be well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and
procedural rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if
one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

ATTY. NORLINDA DESCALLAR VS. HON. REINERIO RAMAS, AM#RTJ-06-2015, 12/15/10 – For
omitting to reflect his absences in his May and June 2005 Certificates of Service, Supreme
Court FINED Respondent for dishonesty. Respondent admitted he reported for work
intermittently or did not report at all, after his Order that he had to temporarily stop
working due to the death threats he receiving in relation to a decision he made over an
electoral protest case. Indeed, there may be threats to his life as alleged in his order but
such threats do not justify cessation from performing judicial functions. Threats are
concomitant peril in public office especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide
and determine sensitive issues that normally generate or provoke reprisals from losing
litigants. This is a consequence that a judge should be prepared of. Their exalted position
entails a great responsibility unyielding to one’s personal convenience. Respondent is
presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial
Conduct - a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and
diligence (Canon 3), a judge be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence (Rule 3.01), and a judge to observe high standards of public service and
fidelity at all times (Rule 3.09). Respondent irrefragably failed to observe these standards
by making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.

GAUDENCIO PANTILO III VS. JUDGE VICTOR CANOY, AM#RTJ-11-2262, 2/9/11 – Supreme
Court FINED Respondent for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and
appearance of impropriety for verbally ordering the release of the accused in a criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide even when no information was yet
filed. Respondent also granted accused’s motion to release his impounded vehicle
despite said motion despite violation of the 3-day notice rule. In his defense, Respondent
invoked accused’s constitutional right to bail which supposedly did not require that a
person be charged in court before one could apply for it. While, It is settled that an
accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail, herein-complaint focused
on the manner of accused’s release from detention. In sum, there was no written
application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or
municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release
order. While Respondent insisted that such may be considered as “constructive bail,”
there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules
of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of
another.
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11 – In a
hearing on a motion for inhibition filed by Complainant relative to a suit pending before
Respondent, the latter forced Complainant to take the stand, then and there,
demanded a public apology and relentlessly interrogated her till Respondent issued an
order finding Complainant guilty of direct contempt and ordered her detention until she
divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the Court but not to exceed 30 days.
Supreme Court FINED Respondent reasoning that, no amount of rationalization can
reconcile the limit of the 10-day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court with the 30-day (maximum period of) imprisonment that
Respondent fixed in his order. By virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should have
known this so basic a rule. The glaring clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to commit a
glaring error, which was made even more flagrant by the fact that Complainant was
actually imprisoned for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed by
law and the rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. By accepting the exalted
position of a judge, Respondent ought to have been familiar with the legal norms and
precepts as well as the procedural rules.

DANIEL SEVILLA VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO LINDO, AM#MTJ-08-1714, 2/9/11 – Complainant

charged that Respondent repeated reset the hearing of the BP22 case he filed so as to
force him to enter into a compromise agreement evident from Respondent’s comment
to him that, “Mr. Sevilla, ang hirap mo namang pakiusapan. Konting pera lang yan.
Bahala ka maghintay sa wala.” In imposing a FINE on Respondent, Supreme Court held
that, a trial judge who allows, or abets, or tolerates numerous unreasonable
postponements of the trial, whether out of inefficiency or indolence, or out of bias
towards a party, is administratively liable. Postponement of a hearing in a civil/criminal
case may at times be unavoidable, the Court however, disallows undue/unnecessary
postponements of court hearings, simply because they cause unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice and, thus, undermine the people’s faith in the Judiciary, aside
from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. Thus, the Court
has enjoined for postponements and resettings to be allowed only upon meritorious
grounds. The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater
reason to prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, the prompt resolution of which has
been ensured by their being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure – a rule
precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of
cases. Respondent flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of both of Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer justice impartially and
without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which required him as a
trial judge “to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that
justice delayed is often justice denied.”

LYDELLE CONQUILLA VS. JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11 –

Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and ignorance
of the law for conducting a preliminary investigation and finding probable cause therein
to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme Court SUSPENDED Respondent,
reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such preliminary investigation directly
contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005), amending Rules 112 and
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The latter removed the conduct of
preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts and making it incumbent
upon them to forward the records of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for preliminary
investigation. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon 3) to the due
performance of judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their
office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules and
should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.

ELADIO PERFECTO VS. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO ESIDERA, AM-RTJ-11-2270, 1/31/11 –

Respondent was charged with soliciting and receiving money from a fiscal and a private
practitioner supposedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration and barangay
fiesta. In her answer, Respondent brushed off the affidavit of Fiscal Ching who witnessed
the solicitation, claiming that the fiscal who was a former law student to whom she gave
a 3-grade because her ‘codigo’ was still inserted in the examination booklet, is of
“dubious personality” with a “narcissistic personality disorder”. FINED for impropriety and
conduct unbecoming, the Supreme Court held that, use of acerbic words was uncalled
for considering Respondent’s status. Further, her act of soliciting (under the guise of a
religious cause) betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of
understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem
and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the
impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a
private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money
through her charismatic group for religious purposes. A judge must be like Caesar’s wife
- above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in
prudence and discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the
performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never
trite to caution Respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action,
keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant
observation.

FLORENDA TOBIAS VS. JUDGE MANUEL LIMSIACO, AM-MTJ-09-1734, 1-19-11 –

Complainant who charged Respondent with corruption for allegedly offering
“package deals” to litigants, claimed that the court stenographer informed her
sister that Respondent required P30,000 to provide counsel, prepare pleadings
and ensure a favorable decision in an ejectment case. Respondent did not
personally accept the initial payment of P10,000 but admitted to talking with
Complainant’s sister, recommending a lawyer and subsequently preparing a
motion for counsel to withdraw. Fined for gross misconduct, the Supreme Court
held that, although the alleged offer of package deals by Respondent to litigants
was unsubstantiated, it was improper for Respondent to talk to prospective
litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases. The act of
preparing the motion for counsel to withdraw is likewise improper and unethical.
The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity
of his office. Said acts of Respondent violate Sec. 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Sec. 2
of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

ANTONINO MONTICALBO V. JUDGE CRESENTE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11 – In

admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals
with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his
order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of available legal resources reveals that no
such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Further, Supreme Court
docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.” and, it cannot be considered a CA
case because the respondent was the “Court of Appeals.” This was counter to the
standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying Respondent’s
judicial position. A judge must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.” While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof
that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official duties.

Compiled, digested and prepared by:

ATTY. ROMEO A. REYES, JR.