PEOPLE vs.

FRANCISCO

FACTS:

 Defendant Juan Francisco was previously arrested for the crime of robbery and was being held
as prisoner in a detention center.
 During a visit to his house, Juan Francisco stabbed both his wife and his child with a pair of
scissors, then stabbed himself. Francisco’s child died as a result, while he and his wife suffered
injury. Francisco declared that he stabbed his wife, his child, and himself because he is ashamed
of himself and he was accused by his father-in-law that he brought dishonour to the family of his
wife.
 Evidence was presented by the prosecution against Francisco, among them was the rebuttal
testimony of the wife
 Defense counsel attacked the admissibility of the rebuttal testimony of the wife, invoking the
provision of section 26 (d) of Rule 123 prohibiting the wife and the husband from testifying for
or against each other

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rebuttal testimony of the wife is admissible

HELD:

The Court ruled that the rebuttal testimony is admissible.

The purpose of having the marital disqualification is for a number of reasons: First, identity of interest;
second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard
the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which
rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
fourth, because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.

However, there are exceptions to the rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own
defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the
prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her
husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in
self-defense, not of course, against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a
defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence,
namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding
authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral and social sense, her
being believed by those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may read the
same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant child.

Upon the part of the prosecution, because he not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer,
but went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime
upon his wife. And upon the part of the wife, because of the reasons already set forth above. Hence, in
giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its aforesaid
natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband — himself exercising the very right
which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations — must be taken to have
waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would
have been available at the outset.

PEOPLE vs. CASTANEDA

FACTS:

 Private Respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged for the crime of Falsification of Public
Document by his wife Victoria Manaloto when the former forged the latter’s signature in
executing a deed of sale for a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses in favour of Ponciano Lacsamana
 Benjamin Manaloto moved to disqualify his wife as witness, invoking Rule 130, Sec. 20 of the
Revised Rules of Court

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons

cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein
enumerated.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife
for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the
other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

 Prosecution opposed, saying that the case falls under the exceptions, contending that it is a
"criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."
 Respondent Judge Castaneda granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifying for or against her husband

ISSUE:

Whether or not Victoria Manaloto can testify against her husband

HELD:
The Court sustains petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as
a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in
truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the
wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could
have been charged against said husband.

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the
person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation.

LEZAMA, ET AL. vs. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:

 Because of mismanagement by the spouses Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the
receivership of Jose Dineros. During the receivership proceedings, Marciano Roque brought an
action against the ice plant for collection of sum of money from an allegedly fictitious loan.
 Summons was served not on the receiver but to the spouses Lezamas, causing Roque to obtain
judgment by default against the company. Dineros files action against Roque and spouses
Lazama to annul the judgment on the ground of collusion between the spouses and Roque.
 During the hearing for annulment of judgment, Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to
Paquita Lezama to testify as a hostile witness. The spouses Lezama objected to the request,
invoking the marital disqualification rule under the Rules of Court
 The trial court granted the request.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paquita Lezama can testify as a witness

HELD:

The Court held that Lezama cannot testify as a witness.

Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and
will be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the
corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the
inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case
are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the
existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her
own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
husband.

Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife cannot be
examined "for or against her husband without his consent," it is further argued that "when husband and
wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or
against himself or herself alone," and his or her testimony could operate only against him.

Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine,
it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a
third person, and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge self or herself.

PEOPLE vs. QUIDATO

FACTS:

 Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide for killing his father, along with his
two cohorts Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita
 Bernardo’s wife, Gina Quidato, was presented by prosecution as a witness to the trial, who
testified that she overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house to get money
from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because she had fallen
asleep before 10:00 p.m.
 Bernardo objected to Gina’s testimony, arguing that it is against the marital disqualification rule
in the Rules of Court. The judge, acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed
said testimony only against accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gina Quidato’s testimony be admissible against her husband

HELD:

The Court ruled that Gina’s testimony is inadmissible.

As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could
testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's
case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise
of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital
disqualification rule.

ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ

FACTS:

 Susan Ramirez filed a criminal charge against Maximo Alvarez for the crime of arson.
 Esperanza Alvarez, Maximo’s estranged wife, was called to the witness stand to testify. In the
course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against Maximo, the latter showed uncontrolled
emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
 Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
 Trial court ruled to disqualify Esperanza from testifying on the ground of marital disqualification.
 CA reversed the ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can be disqualified from testifying as a witness

HELD:

The Court ruled that Esparanza cannot be disqualified as a witness.

Like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the
rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals,
which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto
almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.

ONG CHUA vs. CARR

FACTS:

 When Carr went to Zamboanga, he was advised by a lawyer, P. J. Moore to purchase the subject
lots from petitioner at P20,000. The lots were previously owned by spouses Henry E. Teck and
Magdalena Lim, from whom, Chua acquired the same.
 Carr, Moore, and Chua, all agreed that Carr should respect the right Teck and Lim to repurchase
the lots, that would expire in June, 1927.
  The first deed of sale drawn by Moore embodies the right of repurchase. Carr and Chua even
delivered to Moore, copies of the documents under which Teck and Lim acquired such right.
 But upon the drafting of the deed, Carr had no sufficient money to buy the lots, so he asked that
a loan in his favor in the amount of P6,500 be obtained on the Zamboanga Mutual Building and
Loan Association where Moore was the secretary.
 Carr and Moore agreed to remove the right of repurchase from the deed of sale since the loan
can only be obtained if it appears that Carr is the absolute owner. But Carr was to bear in mind
that the rights of Teck and Lim still existed. They told Chua that the right to repurchase by Lim
and Teck is protected.
 They also agreed that Moore should keep the deed and other documents until the expiration of
the right of repurchase.
 The deed was prepared and signed. But then the loan from the Zamboanga bank did not push
through because Chua obtained a loan from BPI at a lower interest rate. However, the deed was
never re-drafted to contain the right of repurchase.
 Moore kept the documents, but when he became sick, Carr forced him to deliver the same to
him, so the former did, after being molested by Carr.
 Carr immediately registered the deed.
 Teck offered to repurchase the property in question from Ong Chua who thereupon demanded
of Carr the reconveyance of the property. The latter refused to do so, claiming absolute title to
the property.
 Chua brought an action for reformation, alleging the abovementioned facts and that the
instrument be reformed in accordance therewith.
 In his answer, the defendant pleaded that the deed in question contained no stipulation as to
rights of repurchase.
 Carr died, and the administrator of his estate, Manuel Igual, was substituted as defendant.
 The court below ordered the reformation of the deed, Exhibit A, in accordance with the
plaintiff's demand, having received no evidence from the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether Chua should be permitted to testify, over the defendant's objections, to fact occurring prior to
the death of Carr

HELD:

Yes. The rule prohibiting parties to an action against an executor or administrator, or any representative
of the deceased person, upon a claim or demand against the deceased, from testifying as to any matter
of fact occurring before the latter’s death was never intended to serve as a shield for fraud.

In this case a number of credible witnesses testified to facts which conclusively showed that Carr's conduct
was tainted with fraud. The plaintiff did not take the witness stand until after the existence of fraud on
the part of Carr and been established beyond a doubt and not by a mere preponderance of evidence. In
these circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in not excluding the plaintiff's testimony.
LICHUACO vs. ATLANTIC GULF

FACTS:

 Richard Fitzsimmons, the president of Atlantic Gulf, a foreign corporation registered and
licensed to do business in the Philippines, held 1,000 shares of stock of which 545 had not been
fully paid for but were covered by promissory notes in favor of Atlantic Gulf.
 In 1941, P64,500.00 was credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said stocks
out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company.
 Under an agreement with Atlantic, should he die leaving the shares unpaid, Atlantic, at his
option, may either acquire said shares by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or
issue in favor of his estate the corresponding shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon.
 Fitzsimmons died and a proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted.
 Atlantic then filed a claim against the estate and offered to reacquire the shares sold to
Fitzsimmons upon return to the estate of the P64,500 paid thereon. The administrator, Marcial
Lichauco, however, denied the alleged indebtedness.
 During trial, Atlantic presented the testimonies of the chief accountant and assistant
accountant, and of the president and vice-president-treasurer of the corporation. The trial court
however refused to admit said testimonies on the ground of incompetency under the Dead
Man’s Statute, as the witnesses were not only stockholders and members of the Board of
Directors, but officers as well.

ISSUE:

Whether or not officers of a corporation, which is a party to an action against an administrator, are
disqualified from testifying under the Dead Man’s Statute

HELD:

The Court held that they are not disqualified.

To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers orstockholders of a
corporation would be equivalent to materially amending the statuteby judicial legislation.

The appellee admits in his brief in those states where the "dead man's statute" disqualifies only parties
to an action, officers and stockholders of the corporation, have been allowed to testify in favor of the
corporation, while in those states where "parties and persons interested in the outcome of the
litigation" are disqualified under the statute, officers and stockholders of the corporation have been
held to be incompetent to testify against the estate of a deceased person.

GO CHI GUN v. CO CHO

FACTS:
  Go Checo, a chinaman, died in Saigon, Indo Chino, leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines. The intestate left children by two marriages. Most of the children are minors.
 Each of his children received properties or cash amounting to P3,995.
 The project of partition is signed by one Joaquin A. Go Cuay as guardian ad litem of the minors
and was approved by the court
 Paulino Gocheco instituted guardianship proceedings for his minor brothers and sisters, and he
was appointed guardian for their persons and properties on May 20, 1916.
 Paulino Gocheco died on April 24, 1943. His eldest son instituted intestate proceedings.
However, PLAINTIFFS, the siblings of Paulino filed this action.
 PLAINTIFFS claim that Paulino, by fraudulent means, obtained the properties adjudicated to him
in the project of partition and so he acquired same in trust for their common benefit. Thus, they
prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Intestate proceedings.
 When the plaintiffs were called upon to testify to these supposed statements, counsel for the
defendants immediately objected on the ground that plaintiffs were incompetent to testify.
o The court allowed the testimony over the objection, holding that as the action is
brought against the defendants inn their personal capacity, and the claim is not directed
against the estate Paulino Gocheco but against the latter personally, the rule invoked is
not applicable
 CFI: Annulled the project of partition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Gocheco
 DEFENDANTS contend that the trial court erred allowing the plaintiffs to testify as to an alleged
fraudulent statement by the deceased Gocheco

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies of the plaintiffs as to the alleged statements of the deceased are within
the prohibition.

HELD:

The testimonies of the plaintiffs as to the alleged statements of the deceased to him are well within the
purpose and intent of the prohibition.

If persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased were allowed to testify as to the supposed
statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to
deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them.

The purpose of the law is to “guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco vs. Vianzon, 60 Phil., 698.)

While there is an EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, where the decedent had been guilty of fraud.The rule has
been adopted to promote justice and not to shield fraud. a. In the case at bar, there is NO PROOF OF
FRAUD.
Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the
other way; and as to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of
injustice and cruetly, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of
fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt.