EMINENT DOMAIN
1. G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998 prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record).
MUNICIPALITY OF
PARAÑAQUE, petitioner,vs. V.M. REALTY
CORPORATION, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the
Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize
an expropriation of private property through a
mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The
Local Government Code expressly and clearly
requires an ordinance or a local law for the
purpose. A resolution that merely expresses
the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal
Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the
principle of res judicata does not bar
subsequent proceedings for the expropriation
of the same property when all the legal
requirements for its valid exercise are
complied with.
Statement of the Case
These principles are applied by this Court in
resolving this petition for review
on certiorari of the July 22, 1996 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals 2 in CA GR CV No.
48048, which affirmed in toto 3 the Regional
Trial Court's August 9, 1994 Resolution. 4 The
trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as
follows:
The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain is not disputed. However,
such right may be exercised only pursuant to
an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A No. 7160). In the
instant case, there is no such ordinance
passed by the Municipal Council of
Parañaque enabling the Municipality, thru its
Chief Executive, to exercise the power of
eminent domain. The complaint, therefore,
states no cause of action.
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action,
the same is barred by a prior judgment. On
September 29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a
complaint for expropriation involving the same
parcels of land which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26,
record). Said case was dismissed with
The order of dismissal was not appealed,
hence, the same became final. The plaintiff
can not be allowed to pursue the present
action without violating the principle of [r]es
[j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No.
17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation,
the doctrine of res judicata still applies
because the judgment in said case (C.C. No.
17939) is conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio
vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The
herein defendant is the successor-in-interest
of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown
by the "Deed of Assignment Exchange"
executed on June 13, 1990.
WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for
reconsideration is hereby granted. The order
dated February 4, 1994 is vacated and set
aside.
This case is hereby dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the Municipality of
Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a
combined area of about 10,000 square
meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio,
Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700.
Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of
the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing
project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this
stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to
its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577,
Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to
enter into a negotiated sale of the property
with private respondent, which the latter did
not accept. 10
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and
substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 134, issued an Order dated January
10, 1994, 11 giving it due course. Acting on
petitioner's motion, said court issued an Order
dated February 4, 1994, 12 authorizing
petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of
an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair
market value based on its current tax
declaration.
On February 21, 1994, private respondent
filed its Answer containing affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim, 13 alleging in the
main that (a) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On
private respondent's motion, its Answer was
treated as a motion to dismiss. 14 On March
24, 1991, 15 petitioner filed its opposition,
stressing that the trial court's Order dated
February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section
19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res
judicata was not applicable.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9,
1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4,
1994 Order and dismissing the case.
Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and
transfer of venue were denied by the trial
court in a Resolution dated December 2,
1994. 17 Petitioner then appealed to
Respondent Court, raising the following
issues:
1. Whether or not the Resolution of the
Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95,
Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of
the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A.
7180 [sic] in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.
2. Whether or not the complaint in this case
states no cause of action.
3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the
literal observance to the rule of procedure
resulted in technicality standing in the way of
substantial justice.
4. Whether or not the principle of res
judicata is applicable to the present case. 18
As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.
Respondent Court, in its assailed Resolution
promulgated on January 8, 1997, 19 denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit.
Hence, this appeal. 20
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two
issues, viz.:
1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal
council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for
dismissal of case is not applicable when
public interest is primarily involved. 21
The Court's Ruling The petition is not
meritorious.
First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved
by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case "substantially
complies with the requirements of the
law" 22 because the terms "ordinance" and
"resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose
of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to
initiate the expropriation proceedings in court
in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain." 23 Petitioner seeks to bolster this
contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, which provides. "If
the LGU fails to acquire a private property for
 EMINENT DOMAIN
public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of
the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive
to initiate expropriation
proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent
domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise
thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter's control and
restraints, imposed "through the law
conferring the power or in other
legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA
7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of
eminent domain, also lays down the
parameters for its exercise. It provides as
follows:
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government
unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless
a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of
the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the
amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must
concur before an LGU can exercise the power
of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised
for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was
not accepted. 27
In the case at bar, the local chief executive
sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the
municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of
Appeals 28 to show that a resolution may
suffice to support the exercise of eminent
domain by an LGU. 29 This case, however, is
not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local
Government Code, which had provided that a
mere resolution would enable an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA
7160, 31 the present Local Government Code
which was already in force when the
Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly
required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner's
insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An
ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently — a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
 EMINENT DOMAIN
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members. 33
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to
exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to
its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the
instant case, there is no reason to depart from
this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance
is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain
necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the
people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in
the legislative language — from "resolution"
under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160
— demands a strict construction. "No species
of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution
and laws more sedulously, than the right to
the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land
of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtful interpretation." 36
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced,
because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself,
surely prevails over said rule which merely
seeks to implement it. 37 It is axiomatic that the
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Besides, what
the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere
oversight in the wording of the implementing
rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also
requires that, in exercising the power of
eminent domain, the chief executive of the
LGU act pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the
policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides that "territorial
and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy." It merely upholds the law as
worded in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is
created by law and all its powers and rights
are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no
power to amend or act beyond the authority
given and the limitations imposed on it by law.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent
domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not
eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the
delegation, and thus partakes only of a share
in eminent domain. 38 Indeed, "the national
legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it." 39
Complaint Does Not
State a Cause of Action
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court,
petitioner argues that its Sangguniang
Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11,
1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-
35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of
its mayor regarding the subject
expropriation. 40
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first
place, petitioner merely alleged the existence
of such an ordinance, but it did not present
any certified true copy thereof. In the second
place, petitioner did not raise this point before
this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private
respondent, and only in passing. 41 In any
event, this allegation does not cure the
inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for
expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It
is hornbook doctrine that
. . . in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a
 EMINENT DOMAIN
cause of action, the question submitted before
the court for determination is the sufficiency of
the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether
those allegations are true or not is beside the
point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted
by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting
them to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint? 42
The fact that there is no cause of action is
evident from the face of the Complaint for
expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance
authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of
cause of action. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial court's Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the
requisites for the application of res
judicata are present in this case. There is a
previous final judgment on the merits in a prior
expropriation case involving identical
interests, subject matter and cause of action,
which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the
principle of res judicata, which finds
application in generally all cases and
proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the
State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain,
as an inherent power of the State, dictates
that the right to exercise the power be
absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata. The scope of
eminent domain is plenary and, like police
power, can "reach every form of property
which the State might need for public
use." 46 "All separate interests of individuals in
property are held of the government under this
tacit agreement or implied reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the
eminent domain, the highest and most exact
idea of property, remains in the government,
or in the aggregate body of the people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to
resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires
it." 47 Thus, the State or its authorized agent
cannot be forever barred from exercising
said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not
denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific
issues decided in a previous case. For
example, a final judgment dismissing an
expropriation suit on the ground that there
was no prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue; it cannot, however,
bar the State or its agent from thereafter
complying with this requirement, as prescribed
by law, and subsequently exercising its power
of eminent domain over the same
property. 48 By the same token, our ruling that
petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power
of eminent domain through a mere resolution
will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement
and, for that matter, all others are properly
complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of
reasoning, the same is also true of the
principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs.
De Knecht, 49 the Court ruled that the power of
the State or its agent to exercise eminent
domain is not diminished by the mere fact that
a prior final judgment over the property to be
expropriated has become the law of the case
as to the parties. The State or its authorized
agent may still subsequently exercise its right
to expropriate the same property, once all
legal requirements are complied with. To rule
otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also clearly
defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED
without prejudice to petitioner's proper
exercise of its power of eminent domain over
subject property. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
2. G.R. No. 150640 March 22, 2007
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, rep. by BARANGAY CAPTAIN
ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III,
and PATRICIA SINDAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Expropriation, if misused or abused, would
trench on the property rights of individuals
without due process of law.
The Case
For review before the Court in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 are the May 30, 2001
Decision1 and October 26, 2001 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), reversing and
setting aside the August 2, 1990 Order3 of the
San Fernando, Pampanga Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 43. The CA Resolution
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the May 30, 2001 Decision and in effect,
the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s
Complaint for eminent domain.
The Facts
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution
passed by the barangay council, petitioner
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain
Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for
eminent domain against respondents spouses
Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the
registered owners of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R.
The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 6756 and raffled to the San Fernando,
Pampanga RTC, Branch 43. Petitioner sought
to convert a portion of respondents’ land into
Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road. The alleged
public purposes sought to be served by the
expropriation were stated in Barangay
Resolution No. 6, as follows:
WHEREAS, said parcels of land shall be
used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder
road for the agricultural and other products of
the residents, and just as inlet for their basic
needs;
WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take
a long circuitous dirt road before they can
reach the concrete provincial road, entailing
so much time, effort and money, not to
mention possible damage and/or spilage [sic]
on the products consigned to or coming from,
the market outside the barangay; and
WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet
road, shall contribute greatly to the general
welfare of the people residing therein social,
cultural and health among other things, beside
economic.4
Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property
was the most practical and nearest way to the
municipal road. Pending the resolution of the
case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an
amount equivalent to the fair market value of
the property.5
On the other hand, respondents stated that
they owned the 27,000- square meter
property, a portion of which is the subject of
this case. In their Memorandum,6 they alleged
that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II
Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix David
and his wife. Prior to the filing of the
expropriation case, said subdivision was
linked to MacArthur Highway through a
pathway across the land of a certain Torres
family. Long before the passage of the
barangay resolution, the wives of the
subdivision owner and the barangay captain,
who were known to be agents of the
subdivision, had proposed buying a right-of-
way for the subdivision across a portion of
respondents’ property. These prospective
buyers, however, never returned after learning
of the price which the respondents ascribed to
their property.
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of
their property was for private use, that is, for
the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II
Subdivision. They contended that petitioner
 EMINENT DOMAIN
deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II
Subdivision and, instead, stated that the
expropriation was for the benefit of the
residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal
the fact that the access road being proposed
to be built across the respondents’ land was to
serve a privately owned subdivision and those
who would purchase the lots of said
subdivision. They also pointed out that under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the
subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a
feeder road to the subdivision residents.7
After trial, the court a quo ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
premises duly considered, the herein plaintiff
is hereby declared as having a lawful right to
take the property hereinabove described and
sought to be condemned for the public
purpose or use as aforestated, upon payment
of just compensation to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the Complaint in this
[sic] expropriation proceedings.
Upon the entry of this Order of Condemnation,
let three (3) competent and disinterested
persons be appointed as Commissioners to
ascertain and report to the Court the just
compensation for the property condemned.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Upon respondents’ appeal, the CA held:
We are convinced that it is the duty of the
subdivision owner to provide the right of way
needed by residents of Davsan II Subdivision
as provided for in Section 29 of P.D. 957.
Records show that Purok Paraiso, which is
supposed to benefit from this [sic]
expropriation proceedings is in reality Davsan
II Subdivision as per the testimony of Ruben
Palo, plaintiff’s own witness (TSN, p. 12,
December 115, 1986) [sic]. Appellants
correctly stated that:
"The act of Bo. Sindalan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, in effect relieved the owners of
Davsan II Subdivision of spending their own
private funds for acquiring a right of way and
constructing the required access road to the
subdivision. It spent public funds for such
private purpose and deprived herein
defendants-appellants of their property for an
ostensible public purpose x x x."
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Complaint for Eminent
Domain is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
The Issues
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1)
allegedly violating its power of eminent
domain, (2) finding that the expropriation of
the property is not for public use but for a
privately owned subdivision, (3) finding that
there was no payment of just compensation,
and (4) failing to accord respect to the findings
of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue
in this case is whether the proposed exercise
of the power of eminent domain would be for a
public purpose.
1awphi 1.nét
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the
power of the nation or a sovereign state to
take, or to authorize the taking of, private
property for a public use without the owner’s
consent, conditioned upon payment of just
compensation."10 It is acknowledged as "an
inherent political right, founded on a common
necessity and interest of appropriating the
property of individual members of the
community to the great necessities of the
whole community."11
1ªvv phi 1.nét
The exercise of the power of eminent domain
is constrained by two constitutional provisions:
(1) that private property shall not be taken for
 EMINENT DOMAIN
public use without just compensation under
Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that
no person shall be deprived of his/her life,
liberty, or property without due process of law
under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of
"public use" and the term is susceptible of
myriad meanings depending on diverse
situations. The limited meaning attached to
"public use" is "use by the public" or "public
employment," that "a duty must devolve on
the person or corporation holding property
appropriated by right of eminent domain to
furnish the public with the use intended, and
that there must be a right on the part of the
public, or some portion of it, or some public or
quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to
use the property after it is condemned."12 The
more generally accepted view sees "public
use" as "public advantage, convenience, or
benefit, and that anything which tends to
enlarge the resources, increase the industrial
energies, and promote the productive power
of any considerable number of the inhabitants
of a section of the state, or which leads to the
growth of towns and the creation of new
resources for the employment of capital and
labor, [which] contributes to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community."13 In this jurisdiction, "public use"
is defined as "whatever is beneficially
employed for the community."14
It is settled that the public nature of the
prospective exercise of expropriation cannot
depend on the "numerical count of those to be
served or the smallness or largeness of the
community to be benefited."15 The number of
people is not determinative of whether or not it
constitutes public use, provided the use is
exercisable in common and is not limited to
particular individuals.16 Thus, the first essential
requirement for a valid exercise of eminent
domain is for the expropriator to prove that the
expropriation is for a public use.
In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court
explicated that expropriation ends with an
order of condemnation declaring "that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation."17
Another vital requisite for a valid
condemnation is the payment of just
compensation to the property owner. In the
recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals,18 just
compensation has been defined as "the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator," and that the
gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain
but the owner’s loss. In order for the payment
to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full,
and ample. Not only must the payment be fair
and correctly determined, but also, the Court
in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine
Export Processing Zone stressed that the
payment should be made within a "reasonable
time" from the taking of the property.19 It
succinctly explained that without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just" inasmuch as the property owner is being
made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of the land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with the loss. Thus, once just
compensation is finally determined, the
expropriator must immediately pay the amount
to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing
Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per
annum shall be imposed on the final
compensation until paid.20 Thus, any further
delay in the payment will result in the
imposition of 12% interest per annum.
However, in the recent case of Republic v.
Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that "where
the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their
property."21
Since the individual stands to lose the
property by compulsion of the law, the
expropriation authority should not further
prejudice the owner’s rights by delaying
payment of just compensation. To obviate any
possibility of delay in the payment, the
expropriator should already make available, at
the time of the filing of the expropriation
complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal
valuation or the fair market value of the
 EMINENT DOMAIN
property per tax declaration whichever is
higher.
The delayed payment of just compensation in
numerous cases results from lack of funds or
the time spent in the determination of the
legality of the expropriation and/or the fair
valuation of the property, and could result in
dismay, disappointment, bitterness, and even
rancor on the part of the lot owners. It is not
uncommon for the expropriator to take
possession of the condemned property upon
deposit of a small amount equal to the
assessed value of the land per tax declaration
and then challenge the valuation fixed by the
trial court resulting in an "expropriate now, pay
later" situation. In the event the expropriating
agency questions the reasonability of the
compensation fixed by the trial court before
the appellate court, then the latter may, upon
motion, use its sound discretion to order the
payment to the lot owner of the amount equal
to the valuation of the property, as proposed
by the condemnor during the proceedings
before the commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, subject to the final
valuation of the land. This way, the damage
and prejudice to the property owner would be
considerably pared down.
On due process, it is likewise basic under the
Constitution that the property owner must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
on the issues of public use and just
compensation and to present objections to
and claims on them.22 It is settled that taking
of property for a private use or without just
compensation is a deprivation of property
without due process of law.23 Moreover, it has
to be emphasized that taking of private
property without filing any complaint before a
court of law under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court or existing laws is patently felonious,
confiscatory, and unconstitutional. Judicial
notice can be taken of some instances
wherein some government agencies or
corporations peremptorily took possession of
private properties and usurped the owner’s
real rights for their immediate use without first
instituting the required court action. Running
roughshod over the property rights of
individuals is a clear and gross breach of the
constitutional guarantee of due process, which
should not be countenanced in a society
where the rule of law holds sway.
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent
domain as an inherent power of sovereignty
similar to police power and taxation. As a
basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay
is clothed with the authority to provide
barangay roads and other facilities for public
use and welfare. Petitioner relied on the
following cases which held a liberal view of
the term "public use" in recognition of the
evolving concept of the power of eminent
domain: Seña v. Manila Railroad
Co.; Philippine Columbian Association v.
Panis; Sumulong v. Guerrero; Province of
Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals;
and Manosca v. Court of Appeals.24
Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is
not at issue. The legal question in this petition,
however, is whether the taking of the land was
for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, it is basic that
the taking of private property must be for a
public purpose. A corollary issue is whether
private property can be taken by law from one
person and given to another in the guise of
public purpose.
In this regard, the petition must fail.
Petitioner alleges that there are at least 80
houses in the place and about 400 persons
will be benefited with the use of a barangay
road. The trial court believed that the
expropriation "will not benefit only the
residents of the subdivision, but also the
residents of Sitio or Purok Paraiso and the
residents of the entire Barangay of Sindalan x
x x."25 The trial court held that the subdivision
is covered by Sitio or Purok Paraiso which is a
part or parcel of Barangay Sindalan. However,
this finding was not supported by evidence.
On the contrary, it is Sitio Paraiso which is
within Davsan II Subdivision based on the
testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Ruben
Palo, as follows:
Atty. Mangiliman: Mr. Palo, you said that you
have been residing at Sitio Paraiso since
 EMINENT DOMAIN
1973, is this Sitio Paraiso within the Davson
[sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Mangiliman: And before you purchased
that or at the time you purchased it in 1972, I
am referring to the lot where you are now
residing, the Davson [sic] Subdivision did not
provide for a road linking from the subdivision
to the barrio road, am I correct?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And despite [sic] of that you
purchased a lot inside Davson [sic]
Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not demand from
the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision that
he should provide a road linking from the
subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: No, sir, because I know they will
provide for the road.
Atty. Mangiliman: And when you said that they
will provide for that road, you mean to tell us
that it is the developer of Davson [sic]
Subdivision who will provide a road linking
from the subdivision to the barrio road of
Sindalan?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Now, Mr. Witness, you will
agree with me that the proposed road which
will connect from Davson [sic] Subdivision to
the barrio road of Sindalan would benefit
mainly the lot buyers and home owners of
Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And you also agree with me
that there is no portion of Davson [sic]
Subdivision which is devoted to the production
of agricultural products?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: When the road which is the
subject of this case and sought to be
expropriated has not yet been opened and
before a Writ of Possession was issued by the
Court to place the plaintiff in this case in
possession, the residents of Davson [sic]
Subdivision have other way in going to the
barrio road?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: In that case Mr. Witness,
how do you negotiate or go out of the
subdivision in going to the barrio?
Witness: We passed to the lot own [sic] by Mr.
Torres which is near the subdivision in going
to the barrio road, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not complain to the
owner/developer of the subdivision that he
should provide for a road linking to [sic] his
subdivision to the barrio road because there is
no available exit from the said subdivision to
the barrio road?
Witness: We have been telling that and he
was promising that there will be a road, sir.26
Firstly, based on the foregoing transcript, the
intended feeder road sought to serve the
residents of the subdivision only. It has not
been shown that the other residents of
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando,
Pampanga will be benefited by the
contemplated road to be constructed on the
lot of respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III
and Patricia Sindayan. While the number of
people who use or can use the property is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes
public use or purpose, the factual milieu of the
case reveals that the intended use of
respondents’ lot is confined solely to the
Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not
exercisable in common.27 Worse, the
expropriation will actually benefit the
subdivision’s owner who will be able to
 EMINENT DOMAIN
circumvent his commitment to provide road
access to the subdivision in conjunction with
his development permit and license to sell
from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, and also be relieved of spending his
own funds for a right-of-way. In this factual
setting, the Davsan II Subdivision
homeowners are able to go to the barrio road
by passing through the lot of a certain Torres
family. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is
that the expropriation of respondents’ lot is for
the actual benefit of the Davsan II Subdivision
owner, with incidental benefit to the
subdivision homeowners.
The intended expropriation of private property
for the benefit of a private individual is clearly
proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it
should be for public use or purpose. In
Charles River Bridge v. Warren, the limitation
on expropriation was underscored, hence:
Although the sovereign power in free
government may appropriate all property,
public as well as private, for public purposes,
making compensation therefore; yet it has
never been understood, at least never in our
republic, that the sovereign power can take
the private property of A and give it to B by the
right of eminent domain; or that it can take it at
all, except for public purposes; or that it can
take it for public purposes, without the duty
and responsibility of ordering compensation
for the sacrifice of the private property of one,
for the good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642)
(emphasis supplied).28
US case law also points out that a member of
the public cannot acquire a certain private
easement by means of expropriation for being
unconstitutional, because "even if every
member of the public should acquire the
easement, it would remain a bundle of private
easements."29
Secondly, a compelling reason for the
rejection of the expropriation is expressed in
Section 29, PD 957, which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The
owner or developer of a subdivision without
access to any existing public road or street
must secure a right of way to a public road or
street and such right of way must be
developed and maintained according to the
requirement of the government authorities
concerned.
Considering that the residents who need a
feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is
the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision
owner to acquire a right-of-way for them.
However, the failure of the subdivision owner
to provide an access road does not shift the
burden to petitioner. To deprive respondents
of their property instead of compelling the
subdivision owner to comply with his
obligation under the law is an abuse of the
power of eminent domain and is patently
illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be
justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.
Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a
public purpose. In this proposed
condemnation, government funds would be
employed for the benefit of a private individual
without any legal mooring. In criminal law, this
would constitute malversation.
Lastly, the facts tend to show that the
petitioner’s proper remedy is to require the
Davsan II Subdivision owner to file a
complaint for establishment of the easement
of right-of-way under Articles 649 to 656 of the
Civil Code. Respondents must be granted the
opportunity to show that their lot is not a
servient estate. Plainly, petitioner’s resort to
expropriation is an improper cause of action.
One last word: the power of eminent domain
can only be exercised for public use and with
just compensation. Taking an individual’s
private property is a deprivation which can
only be justified by a higher good—which is
public use—and can only be counterbalanced
by just compensation. Without these
safeguards, the taking of property would not
only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void,
but would also constitute a gross and
condemnable transgression of an individual’s
basic right to property as well.
For this reason, courts should be more vigilant
in protecting the rights of the property owner
 EMINENT DOMAIN
and must perform a more thorough and
diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose
behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is
called for in resolving complaints for
condemnation, such that when a serious
doubt arises regarding the supposed public
use of property, the doubt should be resolved
in favor of the property owner and against the
State.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001
Decision and the October 26, 2001 Resolution
of the CA, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
3. G.R. No. 135042 September 23, 1999
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Br. 15; and NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, respondents,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Expropriation proceedings are governed by
revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997.
Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule
are deemed reversed or modified. Specifically,
(1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the
responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent
domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of
possession once the plaintiff deposits an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said
Rule, without need of a hearing to determine
the provisional sum to be deposited; and (3) a
final order of expropriation may not be issued
prior to a full hearing and resolution of the
objections and defenses of the property
owner.
The Case
Before us is a Petition under Rule 45,
challenging the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 promulgated February 27, 1998 and
its Resolution promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-
GR SP-46002, which (1) dismissed the action
for certiorari and preliminary injunction filed by
Robern Development Corporation ("Robern" for
brevity); and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders
(dated August 13, 1997; September 11, 1997;
and November 5, 1997) and the Writ of
Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
in Civil Case No. 25356-97.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 2
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs
against the petitioner.
In its assailed Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied reconsideration in this
manner: 3
There being no compelling reason to modify,
reverse or reconsider the Decision rendered in
the case dated February 27, 1998[;] the
Motion for Reconsideration posted by
petitioner on March 23, 1998 is DENIED, it
appearing further that the arguments raised
therein were already considered and passed
upon in the aforesaid Decision.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed.
1. Robern is the registered owner of a parcel
of land with an area of about 17,746.50
square meters, which the National Power
Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to
expropriate. The property forms part of a
proposed low-cost housing project in
Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.
2. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for
Eminent Domain against Robern. 4 Instead of
filing an answer, petitioner countered with a
Motion to Dismiss,5 alleging (a) that the
Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not
showing that the action bore the approval of the
NPC board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S.
Cañete, who signed the verification and
 EMINENT DOMAIN
certification in the Complaint, was not the
president, the general manager or an officer
specifically authorized under the NPC charter
(RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to be
expropriated was improper, as it had already
been intended for use in a low-cost housing
project, a public purpose within the
contemplation of law; and the choice was also
arbitrary, as there were similar properties
available within the area.1âwphi1.nêt
3. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC
filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Possession based on Presidential Decree No.
42. On July 9, 1997, NPC deposited
P6,121.20 at the Philippine National Bank,
Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB Savings
Account No. 385-560728-9. 6
4. In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this
wise:
This refers to the motion to dismiss. The
issues raised are matters that should be dealt
with during the trial proper. Suffice it to say
that [NPC] has the privilege as a utility to use
the power of eminent domain.
The motion is denied for lack of merit. The
pre-trial conference shall be on August 27,
1997 at 2:30 P.M. 7
5. On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that (a)
the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could
be resolved without trial, as they could be readily
appreciated on the face of the Complaint
itself vis-à-vis the applicable provisions of law on
the matter; and (b) the grounds relied upon for
dismissing the Complaint did not require
evidence aliunde.
6. On September 11, 1997, the trial court
denied the Motion. as follows:
The . . . motion [of the petitioner] for
reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
Finding the . . . motion [of NPC] to be
meritorious[,] let a writ of possession issue. 8
7. On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
September 11, 1997, arguing among others that
Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually
"amended" when Cañete was allowed to verify
and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in
regard to the Complaint for expropriation filed by
NPC.
8. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion
for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to
Implement the Writ of Possession.
9. On September 19, 1997, in spite of
petitioner's opposition, the trial court issued a
Writ of Possession as follows:
WHEREAS, the applicant National Power
Corporation in the above-titled case has
presented to this Court a petition praying for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession of the
affected property of the . . . Robern
Development Corporation, described
hereinbelow, as follows:
TCT No. Total Area in Area Affected in
Square Meter Square Meter
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50
—————— —————
TOTAL — 97,371.00 17,746.50 —
Total affected area
WHEREAS, on September 11, 1997 the court
issued an Order granting the issuance of a
Writ of Possession in favor of the . . . National
Power Corporation for the immediate
 EMINENT DOMAIN
possession and control of the parcels of land
owned by the [petitioner] as aforestated for
the construction Mantanao-New-Loon 138 KV
Transmission Line Project to be undertaken
by the petitioner affecting 17,746.50 sq. m. of
the 97,371.00 sq. meters as shown above.
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby
commanded to place [NPC] in possession and
control of the affected property consisting
17,746.50 [s]quare [m]eters of the total area of
97,371.00 square meters described above
and to eject therefrom all adverse occupants,
Robern Development Corporation and [all
other] persons . . . claiming under it. 9
10. On November 5, 1997, before counsel for
the petitioner received any order from the trial
court directing the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, NPC occupied the disputed
property.
11. In a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA), Robern assailed the Writ on
the following grounds: (a) patent on the face
of the complaint were its jurisdictional defect,
prematurity and noncompliance with RA 6395;
and (b) the issuance of the Writ of Possession
was irregular, arbitrary and unconstitutional,
as the trial court had yet to fix the "appropriate
value for purposes of taking or entering upon
the property to be expropriated."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on
the following grounds.
First, the verification and certification of the
Complaint by someone other than the
president or the general manager of NPC was
not a fatal jurisdictional defect. It was enough
to allege that the expropriating body had the
right of eminent domain. The issues of
whether the expropriation was properly
authorized by the board of directors and
whether Cañete's verification and certification
of the Complaint was likewise authorized were
evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after
the reception of evidence.
Second, whether the disputed property could
still be expropriated even if it had already
been intended to be used in a low-cost
housing project and whether the choice of that
lot was arbitrary and erroneous, given the
availability of similar properties in the area,
were factual issues that would entail
presentation of evidence by both parties.
Third, the allegation in the Complaint that
NPC sought to acquire an easement of right-
of-way through the disputed property did not
preclude its expropriation. Section 3-A of the
NPC charter allowed the power company to
acquire an easement of right-of-way or even
the land itself if the servitude would injure the
land.
Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession
was proper in view of NPC's compliance with
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine
National Bank an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the disputed property.
Fifth, certiorari was not the proper remedy, as
the Order sustaining the right to expropriate
the property was not final and could still be
appealed by the aggrieved party. The
availability of appeal ruled out certiorari.
Hence, this Petition. 10
The Issues
In their Memorandum, 11 petitioner raises the
following issues: 12
I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED
ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE
DATED SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 DIRECTING
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
POSSESSION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
HIGHLY IRREGULAR, ARBITRARY, AND
DESPOTIC.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT
FILED IN THE INSTANT CASE IS
DISMISSIBLE ON ITS FACE FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION, BEING FLAWED WITH
PREMATURITY, AND VIOLATIVE OF RA
6395.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS MADE A FINDING NOT BORNE
OUT BY THE COMPLAINT, THUS IT
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF
THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS
ARBITRARY.
Simply stated, the petition raises the following
issues:
1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the
Complaint?
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued,
considering that the trial court had not
conducted any hearing on the amount to be
deposited?
This Court's Ruling
The Court of Appeals was correct in its
rulings, but in the interest of substantial
justice, the petitioner should be given an
opportunity to file its answer.
First Issue:
Grounds for Dismissal
Jurisdiction
Petitioner contends that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case
because, first, Atty. Cañete who signed the
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was neither the president nor the
general manager of NPC; and second, under
Section 15-A of RA 6395, only the NPC chief
legal counsel, under the supervision of the
Office of the Solicitor General is authorized to
handle legal matters affecting the government
power corporation. On the other hand, NPC
argues that Cañete, as its regional legal
counsel in Mindanao, is authorized to prepare
the Complaint on its behalf.
We find the disputed verification and
certification to be sufficient in form.
Verification is intended to assure that the
allegations therein have been prepared in
good faith or are true and correct, not mere
speculations. 13 Generally, lack of verification is
merely a formal defect that is neither
jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not
divest the trial court of
jurisdiction. 14 The trial court may order the
correction of the pleading or act on the
unverified pleading, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the rule may be dispensed with in order to
serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs
the "plaintiff or principal party" to attest under
oath that (1) no action or claim involving the
same issues have been filed or commenced in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and that, to the best of the plaintiff's
knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending; (2) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of its
present status shall be made; and (3) if it
should be learned that the same or a similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending,
the plaintiff shall report this fact to the court
where the complaint or initiatory pleading was
filed. 15 This rule is rooted in the principle that a
party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different forums, as
this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial
procedure. 16Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
which came before the 1997 Rules of Court, is
deemed mandatory but not jurisdictional, as
jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the
action is conferred by law. 17
In this case, the questioned verification stated
that Atty. Cañete was the acting regional legal
counsel of NPC at the Mindanao Regional
Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a
retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel
and officer, whose basic function was to prepare
legal pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao
in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the
Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in
the best position to verify the truthfulness and
the correctness of the allegations in the
Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As
internal legal counsel, he was also in the best
position to know and to certify if an action for
expropriation had already been filed and
pending with the courts.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Besides, Atty. Cañete was not the only
signatory to the Complaint; he was joined by
Comie P. Doromal, OIC-assistant general
counsel; and Catherine J. Pablo — both of the
NPC Litigation & Land and Land Rights
Department. They all signed on behalf of the
solicitor general in accordance with the NPC
charter. 18 Their signatures prove that the NPC
general counsel and the solicitor general
approved the filing of the Complaint for
expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in
holding that the Complaint was not dismissible
on its face, simply because the person who had
signed the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping was not the president or the
general manager of NPC.
Legal Standing and Condition Precedent
Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal
standing to file the expropriation case,
because the Complaint did not allege that its
board of directors had authorized its filing. It
added that under Section 6, RA 6395, only the
board was vested with the corporate power to
sue and be sued.
The National Power Corporation explains that,
like other corporate officers and employees
whose functions are defined by the board,
Atty. Cañete is authorized to file the
expropriation case. Even if he is not the
general counsel, he has residual authority to
prepare, verify and certify the Complaint for
expropriation.
We rule for the private respondent. Rule 67,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 1. The complaint. — The right of
eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall state
with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be expropriated, and join
as defendants all persons owning or claiming
to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far as
practicable, the separate interest of each
defendant. . . . . .
The foregoing Rule does not require that the
Complaint be expressly approved by the
board of directors of a corporation. In any
event, such authorization is a factual issue
that can be threshed out during the trial. As
held by the appellate court, "the issue of
whether or not the expropriation proceedings
[were] authorized by the Board of Directors or
that those who signed the complaint [were]
authorized representatives are evidentiary in
character determinable only in [the] trial
proper."
Prematurity of the Complaint
The same ruling applies to the argument
alleging prematurity of the Complaint.
Petitioner's insistence that NPC must secure
the approval of the provincial board and the
municipal council is unfounded. Section 3(j),
RA 6395, merely requires that the Complaint
be filed in the same manner as an
expropriation case of the national, the
provincial or the municipal government. At
bottom, all that is needed is compliance with
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and
the prevailing jurisprudence on expropriation.
Defenses and Objections
Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be
dismissed, because the subject property was
already committed to be used in a low-cost
housing project. Besides, there were other
available properties in the area. Finally, the
Complaint allegedly sought only an easement
of a right-of-way, not essentially an
expropriation.
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this
case is premised on the old rule. Before the
1997 amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67
allowed a defendant "in lieu of an answer, [to]
present in a single motion to dismiss or for
other appropriate relief, all of his objections
and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take
his property . . . ." A motion to dismiss was not
governed by Rule 15 which covered ordinary
motions. Such motion was the required
responsive pleading that took the place of an
answer and put in issue the plaintiffs right to
expropriate the defendant's property. 19 Any
relevant and material fact could be raised as a
defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as
that which tended to show that (1) the exercise
 EMINENT DOMAIN
of the power to condemn was unauthorized, or
(2) there was cause for not taking defendant's
property for the purpose alleged in the petition,
or (3) the purpose for the taking was not public
in character. 20
This old rule found basis in the constitutional
provisions on the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, which were deemed to be for
the protection of the individual property owner
against the aggressions of the
government. 21 Under the old rule, the hearing of
the motion and the presentation of evidence
followed.
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure no longer requires such
extraordinary motion to dismiss. Instead it
provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. — . . . .
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of
or the allegations in the complaint, or any
objection or defense to the taking of his
property, he shall serve his answer within the
time stated in the summons. The answer shall
specifically designate or identify the property
in which he claims to have an interest, state
the nature and extent of the interest claimed,
and adduce all his objections and defenses to
the taking of his property. . . . . .
In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz
D. Regalado writes that the old Rule was a "bit
confusing as the previous holdings under that
former provision also allowed the filing of
another motion to dismiss, as that is
understood in Rule 16, to raise additionally the
preliminary objections authorized by that
Rule." Further, an answer, which is now
required, gives more leeway. First, even if it
still applies the omnibus motion rule, it allows
amendments to be made within ten days from
its filing. 22 Second, the failure to file an answer
does not produce all the disastrous
consequences of default in ordinary civil actions,
because the defendant may still present
evidence as to just compensation. 23
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had already taken
effect. Statutes regulating procedure in the
courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time those statutes were
passed. 24 New court rules apply to proceedings
that take place after the date of their
effectivity. 25 On April 8, 1997, the Court en
bancissued a Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803,
declaring that the revisions in the Rules of Court
were to become effective on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, does not consider as grounds for a
motion to dismiss the allotment of the disputed
land for another public purpose or the petition
for a mere easement of right-of-way in the
complaint for expropriation. The grounds for
dismissal are exclusive to those specifically
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, and an action can be dismissed only
on a ground authorized by this provision. 26
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner
are affirmative defenses that should be alleged
in an answer, since they require presentation of
evidence aliunde. 27 Section 3 of Rule 67
provides that "if a defendant has any objection to
the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his
property," he should include them in his answer.
Naturally, these issues will have to be fully
ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing. It
would be precipitate to dismiss the Complaint on
such grounds as claimed by the petitioner.
Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss
constitutes a denial of due process if, from a
consideration of the pleadings, it appears that
there are issues that cannot be decided without
a trial of the case on the
merits. 28
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken
effect when this case arose, we believe that in
the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner
should be given an opportunity to file its answer
to the Complaint for expropriation in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Order of Condemnation
The Court will now tackle the validity of the
trial court's assailed Order of August 13, 1997,
which Respondent Court affirmed in this wise:
 EMINENT DOMAIN
. . . . The denial of Robern's Motion to Dismiss
[is tantamount] to a confirmation or a
determination of the authority of NPC to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the case. Under Section 4 of
the present Rule 67, 1997 Rules, supra, an
order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property is a final one and may be appealed
by any aggrieved party (Municipality of Biñan
v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 [1989]). . . . . . 29
We clarify. Founded on common necessity and
interest, eminent domain is the inherent right of
the stare (and of those entities to which the
power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn
private property to public use upon payment of
just compensation. It may appear to be harsh
and encompassing, but judicial review limits the
exercise of eminent domain to the following
areas of concern: (1) the adequacy of the
compensation, (2) the necessity of the taking,
and (3) the public-use character of the purpose
of the taking. 30
If there are objections and defenses that require
the presentation of evidence and the hearing of
arguments, the trial court should not immediately
issue an order of expropriation. This is clearly
implied in Section 4 of Rule 67, which mandates
that "[i]f the objections to and the defenses
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated, for
the public use or purpose described in the
complaint. . . . ."
The Court of Appeals ruled that there were
issues that required presentation of evidence
during the trial proper; namely, whether the
expropriation proceeding was authorized by
the NPC board of directors, whether the
property to be expropriated was already
devoted to public use, and whether the choice
of the property was arbitrary and erroneous in
view of the other properties available in the
area. The necessity of the taking and the
public character of the purpose of the
expropriation were still in issue and pending
resolution by the trial court. To these we add
the issue of whether the "taking" of the
disputed property would require only an
easement of right-of-way or would perpetually
deprive Robern of its proprietary rights.
Therefore, the trial court should not have
issued the assailed Order of Expropriation
which foreclosed any further objection to the
NPC's right to expropriate and to the public
purpose of the expropriation, leaving the
matter of just compensation as the only
remaining substantial issue.
The nullity of the Order was glaring. While the
trial court correctly denied the Motion to
Dismiss, as the issues raised by the petitioner
should be dealt with during the trial proper, it
nonetheless ruled that NPC had "the privilege
as a [public] utility to use the power of eminent
domain."
Second Issue
Requisite of a Writ of Possession
Petitioner objects to the issuance of the Writ
of Possession for being "highly irregular,
arbitrary and despotic," because the Motion to
Dismiss was yet to be resolved. It stresses
that there was no hearing on the correct
amount of just compensation for the taking of
the disputed property, as required in Panes
v. Visayas State College of Agriculture. 31 We
cannot uphold this contention.
There is no prohibition against a procedure
whereby immediate possession of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings may be
taken, provided always that due provision is
made to secure the prompt adjudication and
payment of just compensation to the
owners. 32 However, the requirements for
authorizing immediate entry in expropriation
proceedings have changed.
To start with, in Manila Railroad Company
v. Paredes, 33 the Court held that the railway
corporation had the right to enter and possess
the land involved in condemnation proceedings
under Section 1, Act No. 1592, 34 immediately
upon the filing of a deposit fixed by order of the
court.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
The Rules of Court of 1964 35 sanctioned this
procedure as follows:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with National or Provincial Treasurer. — Upon
the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real
or personal property involved if he deposits
with the National or Provincial Treasurer its
value, as provisionally and promptly
ascertained and fixed by the court having
jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by
such treasurer subject to the orders and final
disposition of the court. . . . . . (emphasis
ours.)
Subsequently, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree
No. 42 and its companion decrees, which
removed the court's discretion in determining
the amount of the provisional value of the land
to be expropriated and fixed the provisional
deposit at its assessed value for taxation
purposes. Hearings was not required; only
notice to the owner of the property sought to
be condemned. 1âwphi1.nêt
On the issue of the immediate possession, PD
42 (Authorizing The Plaintiff In Eminent
Domain Proceedings To Take Possession Of
The Property Involved Upon Depositing The
Assessed Value, For Purposes of Taxation)
provided:
WHEREAS, the existing procedure for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is not
expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff to
take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved as soon as possible, when
needed for public purposes;
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]hat, upon filing in the proper court of the
complaint in eminent domain proceedings or
at anytime thereafter, and after due notice to
the defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the
Philippine National Bank, . . . an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, to be held
by said bank subject to the orders and final
disposition of the court.
The provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court and of any other existing law contrary to
or inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Paragraph 3 of PD No. 1224 (Defining The
Policy On The Expropriation Of Private
Property for Socialized Housing Upon
Payment Of Just Compensation) also
authorized immediate takeover of the property
in this manner:
3. Upon the filing of the petition for
expropriation and the deposit of the amount of
just compensation as provided for herein, the
Government, or its authorized agency or
entity, shall immediately have possession,
control and disposition of the real property and
the improvements thereon even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance or
the higher courts.
Where the "taking" was for "socialized
housing," Section 3, PD 1259 (Amending
Paragraphs 1, 2, And 3 Of PD No. 1224
Further Defining The Policy On The
Expropriation Of Private Property For
Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just
Compensation), amending the above-quoted
paragraph, provided:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation
and the deposit of the amount of the just
compensation provided for in Section 2
hereof, the Government, or its authorized
agency or entity, shall immediately have
possession, control and disposition of the real
property and the improvements thereon even
pending resolution of the issues that may be
raised whether before the Court of First
Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations or the
higher courts.
Similarly, Section 1, PD No. 1313 (Further
Amending Paragraph 3 Of Presidential
Decree No. 1224 As Amended By Presidential
Decree No. 1259, Defining The Policy On The
Expropriation Of Private Property For
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just
Compensation), amending paragraph 3 of PD
1224, decreed:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation
and the deposit in the Philippine National
Bank at its main office or any of its branches
of the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the just compensation provided for in
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1259, the
government, or its authorized agency or entity,
shall immediately have possession, control
and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon with the power of
demolition, if necessary, even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance,
Court of Agrarian Relations, or the higher
Courts.
In this connection, we also quote Section 7 of
PD No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban Land
Reform In The Philippines And Providing For
The Implementing Machinery Thereof), which
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation
and the deposit in the Philippine National
Bank at its main office or any of its branches
of the amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%)
of the declared assessment value in 1975, the
Government, or its authorized agency or entity
shall immediately have possession, control
and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon with the power of
demolition, if necessary, even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance,
Court of Agrarian Relations, or the higher
Courts.
Finally, PD 1533 (Establishing A Uniform
Basis For Determining Just Compensation
And The Amount Of Deposit For Immediate
Possession Of The Property Involved In
Eminent Domain Proceedings) mandated the
deposit of only ten percent (10%) of the
assessed value of the private property being
sought to be expropriated, after fixing the just
compensation for it at a value not exceeding
that declared by the owner or determined by
the assessor, whichever is lower. Section 2
thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Upon the filing of the petition for
expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine
National Bank at its main office or any of its
branches of an amount equivalent to ten per
cent (10%) of the amount of compensation
provided in Section 1 hereof, the government
or its authorized instrumentality agency or
entity shall be entitled to immediate
possession, control and disposition of the real
property and the improvements thereon,
including the power of demolition if necessary,
notwithstanding the pendency of the issues
before the courts.
Accordingly, in San Diego
v. Valdellon, 36 Municipality of Daet v. Court of
Appeals, 37 and Haguisan v. Emilia, 38 the Court
reversed itself and ruled that Section 2, Rule 67
of the 1964 Rules, was repealed by Presidential
Decree No. 42. The judicial duty of ascertaining
and fixing the provisional value of the property
was done away with, because the hearing on the
matter had not been "expeditious enough to
enable the plaintiff to take possession of the
property involved as soon as possible, when
needed for public purpose." 39
In Daet, the Court clarified that the provisional
value of the land did not necessarily represent
the true and correct one but only tentatively
served as the basis for immediate occupancy by
the condemnor. The just compensation for the
property continued to be based on its current
and fair market value, not on its assessed value
which constituted only a percentage of its
current fair market value.
However, these rulings were abandoned
in Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Dulay, 40 because "[t]he method of
ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitute[d] impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It
tend[ed] to render this Court inutile in a matter
which under the Constitution [was] reserved to it
for final determination." The Court added:
We return to older and more sound
precedents. This Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
 EMINENT DOMAIN
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.
(See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not
be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of
the decreed compensation.
In Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of
Appeals, 41 the Court reaffirmed the
unconstitutionality of the presidential decrees
that fixed the just compensation in an
expropriation case at the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or by
the assessor, whichever was lower.
More precisely, Panes v. Visayas State
College of Agriculture 42 ruled that the judicial
determination of just compensation included the
determination of the provisional deposit. In that
case, the Court invalidated the Writ of
Possession because of lack of hearing on the
provisional deposit, as required under then
Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules. In the light
of the declared unconstitutionality of PD Nos. 76,
1533 and 42, insofar as they sanctioned
executive determination of just compensation,
any right to immediate possession of the
property must be firmly grounded on valid
compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997
Rules; that is, the value of the subject property,
as provisionally and promptly ascertained and
fixed by the court that has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, must be deposited with the
national or the provincial treasurer. 43
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
revised Section 2 of Rule 67 and clearly reverted
to the San Diego, Daet and Haguisan rulings.
Section 2 now reads:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with government depositary. — Upon the filing
of the complaint or at any time thereafter and
after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the
orders of the court. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
After such deposit is made the court shall
order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of
the property involved and promptly submit a
report thereof to the court with service of
copies to the parties. [Emphasis ours.]
In the present case, although the Complaint
for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997,
the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus,
the issuance of the Writ is covered by the
1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules
are given immediate effect and are applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the
time they are passed; new court rules apply to
proceedings that take place after the date of
their effectivity. 44Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the
prevailing and governing law in this case. 45
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's
issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes
ministerial, once the provisional compensation
mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus,
in the instant case the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
NPC's Motion for the issuance of the Writ,
despite the absence of hearing on the amount of
the provisional deposit.
The Court nonetheless hastens to add that PD
1533 is not being revived.
Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules,
the provisional deposit should be in an
amount equivalent to the full assessed value
of the property to be condemned, not merely
ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional
deposit of NPC is insufficient. Since it seeks to
expropriate portions, not the whole, of four
parcels of land owned by Robern, the
provisional deposit should be computed on
 EMINENT DOMAIN
the basis of the Tax Declarations of the
property: 46
TCT No. Total Area Area Affected Assessed
Provisional
in Sq. M. in Sq. M. Value Deposit
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00 P4,250.00
P1,257.32
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00 8,960.00
1,903.10
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00 18,910.00
2,144.39
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50 18,450.00
3,619.28
————— ————— —————
TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 P8,924.09
Hence, the amount of the provisional deposit
should be increased in order to conform to the
requirement that it should be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property. In the interest
of justice, NPC should in the meantime pay
Robern reasonable rental, to be fixed by the
trial court in its final decision, for the use and
occupation of the disputed property from the
date of entry until the deposit of the full
assessed value of the property, as mandated
by Rule 67.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP-46002 are AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a
period of ten days from the finality of this
Decision within which to file its answer, in
accordance with Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Court; (2) NPC shall deposit, also within ten
days from the finality if this Decision, the full
amount required under the aforecited Rule;
and (3) the trial court shall, in its final decision,
fix the rental for the use and the occupation of
the disputed property, from the date of NPC's
entry until its deposit of the full amount
required under the 1997 Rules. No costs. 1âwphi 1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 176625
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., and the HEIRS
OF ROSARIO MERCADO, namely, VICENTE
LOZADA, MARIO M. LOZADA, MARCIA L.
GODINEZ, VIRGINIA L. FLORES,
BERNARDO LOZADA, JR., DOLORES
GACASAN, SOCORRO CAFARO and
ROSARIO LOZADA, represented by MARCIA
LOZADA GODINEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse, annul, and set aside the
Decision1 dated February 28, 2006 and the
Resolution2 dated February 7, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu City), Twentieth
Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65796.
The antecedent facts and proceedings are as
follows:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042
(Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square
meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu
City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to
expropriation proceedings, initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case
was filed with the then Court of First Instance
 EMINENT DOMAIN
of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil
Case No. R-1881.
As early as 1947, the lots were already
occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned
over to the Surplus Property Commission, the
Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport
Corporation and then to the CAA.
During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada,
Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozada’s name.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair
market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at ₱3.00
per square meter, with consequential
damages by way of legal interest computed
from November 16, 1947—the time when the
lot was first occupied by the airport. Lozada
received the amount of ₱3,018.00 by way of
payment.
The affected landowners appealed. Pending
appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO),
formerly CAA, proposed a compromise
settlement whereby the owners of the lots
affected by the expropriation proceedings
would either not appeal or withdraw their
respective appeals in consideration of a
commitment that the expropriated lots would
be resold at the price they were expropriated
in the event that the ATO would abandon the
Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established
policy involving similar cases. Because of this
promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and
registered in the name of the Republic under
TCT No. 25057.
The projected improvement and expansion
plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was
not pursued.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted
then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr.,
requesting to repurchase the lots, as per
previous agreement. The CAA replied that
there might still be a need for the Lahug
Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3
airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance
that "should this Office dispose and resell the
properties which may be found to be no longer
necessary as an airport, then the policy of this
Office is to give priority to the former owners
subject to the approval of the President."
On November 29, 1989, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to
the Department of Transportation, directing
the transfer of general aviation operations of
the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International
Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such
transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport.
Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the
Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6958, entitled "An Act Creating the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority,
Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan
International Airport and the Lahug Airport to
the Authority, Vesting the Authority with Power
to Administer and Operate the Mactan
International Airport and the Lahug Airport,
and For Other Purposes."
From the date of the institution of the
expropriation proceedings up to the present,
the public purpose of the said expropriation
(expansion of the airport) was never actually
initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead,
the old airport was converted into a
commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the
site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay
Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion
thereof was occupied by squatters.3 The old
airport was converted into what is now known
as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area. 1avv phi 1
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a
complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
18823 and was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City. The
complaint substantially alleged as follows:
(a) Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada
were the registered owners of Lot No. 88
covered by TCT No. 9045;
 EMINENT DOMAIN
(b) In the early 1960’s, the Republic
sought to acquire by expropriation Lot
No. 88, among others, in connection
with its program for the improvement
and expansion of the Lahug Airport;
(c) A decision was rendered by the
Court of First Instance in favor of the
Government and against the land
owners, among whom was Bernardo
Lozada, Sr. appealed therefrom;
(d) During the pendency of the appeal,
the parties entered into a compromise
settlement to the effect that the
subject property would be resold to
the original owner at the same price
when it was expropriated in the event
that the Government abandons the
Lahug Airport;
(e) Title to Lot No. 88 was
subsequently transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines (TCT No.
25057);
(f) The projected expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport did
not materialize;
(g) Plaintiffs sought to repurchase
their property from then CAA Director
Vicente Rivera. The latter replied by
giving as assurance that priority would
be given to the previous owners,
subject to the approval of the
President, should CAA decide to
dispose of the properties;
(h) On November 29, 1989, then
President Corazon C. Aquino, through
a Memorandum to the Department of
Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), directed the transfer of
general aviation operations at the
Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority;
(i) Since the public purpose for the
expropriation no longer exists, the
property must be returned to the
plaintiffs.4
In their Answer, petitioners asked for the
immediate dismissal of the complaint. They
specifically denied that the Government had
made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to
respondents in the event that the property
would no longer be needed for airport
operations. Petitioners instead asserted that
the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were,
therefore, not entitled to recover the
expropriated property notwithstanding non-
use or abandonment thereof.
After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the
parties stipulated on the following set of facts:
(1) The lot involved is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042
of the Banilad Estate, situated in the City of
Cebu, containing an area of One Thousand
Seventeen (1,017) square meters, more or
less;
(2) The property was expropriated among
several other properties in Lahug in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of a
Decision dated December 29, 1961 of the CFI
of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-1881;
(3) The public purpose for which the property
was expropriated was for the purpose of the
Lahug Airport;
(4) After the expansion, the property was
transferred in the name of MCIAA; [and]
(5) On November 29, 1989, then President
Corazon C. Aquino directed the Department of
Transportation and Communication to transfer
general aviation operations of the Lahug
Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority and to close the Lahug
Airport after such transfer[.]5
During trial, respondents presented Bernardo
Lozada, Sr. as their lone witness, while
petitioners presented their own witness,
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
legal assistant Michael Bacarisas.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its
Decision, disposing as follows:
 EMINENT DOMAIN
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and the
heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M.
Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores,
Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan,
Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada,
represented by their attorney-in-fact Marcia
Lozada Godinez, and against defendants
Cebu-Mactan International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO):
1. ordering MCIAA and ATO to restore to
plaintiffs the possession and ownership of
their land, Lot No. 88 Psd-821 (SWO-23803),
upon payment of the expropriation price to
plaintiffs; and
2. ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the
transfer of the Certificate of Title from
defendant[s] to plaintiffs on Lot No. [88],
cancelling TCT No. 20357 in the name of
defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on
the same lot in the name of Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr. and the heirs of Rosario Mercado,
namely: Vicente M. Lozada, Mario M. Lozada,
Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores,
Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan,
Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to
the CA. After the filing of the necessary
appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed
Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying
petitioners’ appeal and affirming in toto the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was,
likewise, denied in the questioned CA
Resolution dated February 7, 2007.
Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the
respondents utterly failed to prove that there
was a repurchase agreement or compromise
settlement between them and the
Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case
No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional,
giving title in fee simple to the Republic; and
(3) the respondents’ claim of verbal
assurances from government officials violates
the Statute of Frauds.
The petition should be denied.
Petitioners anchor their claim to the
controverted property on the supposition that
the Decision in the pertinent expropriation
proceedings did not provide for the condition
that should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for
the expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted
or abandoned, the property would revert to
respondents, being its former owners.
Petitioners cite, in support of this position,
Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,7 which
declared that the Government acquires only
such rights in expropriated parcels of land as
may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties—
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property
shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If x x x land is
expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that
the city can only use it for a public street, then,
of course, when the city abandons its use as a
public street, it returns to the former owner,
unless there is some statutory provision to the
contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however,
the decree of expropriation gives to the entity
a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, or municipality, and in that case the
non-user does not have the effect of defeating
the title acquired by the expropriation
proceedings. x x x.
When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase,
the former owner retains no right in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the
land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner. x x x.8
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this
Court had ruled otherwise in Heirs of Timoteo
Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority,9 thus—
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to
our attention a significant and telling portion in
the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
validating our discernment that the
expropriation by the predecessors of
respondent was ordered under the running
impression that Lahug Airport would continue
in operation—
As for the public purpose of the expropriation
proceeding, it cannot now be doubted.
Although Mactan Airport is being constructed,
it does not take away the actual usefulness
and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is
handling the air traffic both civilian and
military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and
Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the
North and Manila. Then, no evidence was
adduced to show how soon is the Mactan
Airport to be placed in operation and whether
the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately
thereafter. It is up to the other departments of
the Government to determine said matters.
The Court cannot substitute its judgment for
those of the said departments or agencies. In
the absence of such showing, the Court will
presume that the Lahug Airport will continue
to be in operation (emphasis supplied).
While in the trial in Civil Case No. R-1881 [we]
could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise of
eminent domain regardless of the survival of
Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision
chose not to do so but instead prefixed its
finding of public purpose upon its
understanding that "Lahug Airport will
continue to be in operation." Verily, these
meaningful statements in the body of the
Decision warrant the conclusion that the
expropriated properties would remain to be so
until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was
no longer "in operation." This inference further
implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug
Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the
expropriated lots were not being used for any
airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis
the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as
between the State and their former owners,
petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted;
and (b) the foregoing unmistakable
declarations in the body of the Decision
should merge with and become an intrinsic
part of the fallo thereof which under the
premises is clearly inadequate since the
dispositive portion is not in accord with the
findings as contained in the body thereof.10
Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
should be read in its entirety, wherein it is
apparent that the acquisition by the Republic
of the expropriated lots was subject to the
condition that the Lahug Airport would
continue its operation. The condition not
having materialized because the airport had
been abandoned, the former owner should
then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated
property.11
On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit
our ruling in Fery, which involved an
expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of
land to be used as a site for a public market.
Instead of putting up a public market,
respondent Cabanatuan constructed
residential houses for lease on the area.
Claiming that the municipality lost its right to
the property taken since it did not pursue its
public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the
former owner of the lots expropriated, sought
to recover his properties. However, as he had
admitted that, in 1915, respondent
Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the
lands in question, judgment was rendered in
favor of the municipality, following American
jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne
v. Lake Shore & M.S. RY. Co.,12 McConihay v.
Theodore Wright,13 and Reichling v. Covington
Lumber Co.,14 all uniformly holding that the
transfer to a third party of the expropriated
real property, which necessarily resulted in the
abandonment of the particular public purpose
for which the property was taken, is not a
ground for the recovery of the same by its
previous owner, the title of the expropriating
agency being one of fee simple.
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to
our now sacredly held constitutional right that
private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.15 It is well
 EMINENT DOMAIN
settled that the taking of private property by
the Government’s power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1)
that it is for a particular public purpose; and
(2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake
of the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to
keep the property expropriated.16
More particularly, with respect to the element
of public use, the expropriator should commit
to use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter
desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic
flaw, as it would lack one indispensable
element for the proper exercise of the power
of eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law,
and the judgment would violate the property
owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly
hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government’s exercise of
its power of eminent domain, is always subject
to the condition that the property be devoted
to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or
intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and
is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return
of the amount of just compensation received.
In such a case, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain has become improper for lack
of the required factual justification.17
Even without the foregoing declaration, in the
instant case, on the question of whether
respondents were able to establish the
existence of an oral compromise agreement
that entitled them to repurchase Lot No. 88
should the operations of the Lahug Airport be
abandoned, we rule in the affirmative.
It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch
57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this
factual issue and have declared, in no
uncertain terms, that a compromise
agreement was, in fact, entered into between
the Government and respondents, with the
former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the
latter if the improvement and expansion of the
Lahug Airport would not be pursued. In
affirming the factual finding of the RTC to this
effect, the CA declared—
Lozada’s testimony is cogent. An
octogenarian widower-retiree and a resident
of Moon Park, California since 1974, he
testified that government representatives
verbally promised him and his late wife while
the expropriation proceedings were on-going
that the government shall return the property if
the purpose for the expropriation no longer
exists. This promise was made at the
premises of the airport. As far as he could
remember, there were no expropriation
proceedings against his property in 1952
because the first notice of expropriation he
received was in 1962. Based on the promise,
he did not hire a lawyer. Lozada was firm that
he was promised that the lot would be
reverted to him once the public use of the lot
ceases. He made it clear that the verbal
promise was made in Lahug with other lot
owners before the 1961 decision was handed
down, though he could not name the
government representatives who made the
promise. It was just a verbal promise;
nevertheless, it is binding. The fact that he
could not supply the necessary details for the
establishment of his assertions during cross-
examination, but that "When it will not be used
as intended, it will be returned back, we just
believed in the government," does not
dismantle the credibility and truthfulness of his
allegation. This Court notes that he was 89
years old when he testified in November 1997
for an incident which happened decades ago.
Still, he is a competent witness capable of
perceiving and making his perception known.
The minor lapses are immaterial. The decision
of the competency of a witness rests primarily
with the trial judge and must not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is clear that it was
erroneous. The objection to his competency
must be made before he has given any
 EMINENT DOMAIN
testimony or as soon as the incompetency
becomes apparent. Though Lozada is not part
of the compromise agreement,18 he
nevertheless adduced sufficient evidence to
support his claim.19
As correctly found by the CA, unlike in Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals,20 cited by petitioners, where
respondent therein offered testimonies which
were hearsay in nature, the testimony of
Lozada was based on personal knowledge as
the assurance from the government was
personally made to him. His testimony on
cross-examination destroyed neither his
credibility as a witness nor the truthfulness of
his words.
Verily, factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive on this Court and may
not be reviewed. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates
only questions of law and not of fact.21 Not one
of the exceptions to this rule is present in this
case to warrant a reversal of such findings.
As regards the position of petitioners that
respondents’ testimonial evidence violates the
Statute of Frauds, suffice it to state that the
Statute of Frauds operates only with respect
to executory contracts, and does not apply to
contracts which have been completely or
partially performed, the rationale thereof being
as follows:
In executory contracts there is a wide field for
fraud because unless they be in writing there
is no palpable evidence of the intention of the
contracting parties. The statute has precisely
been enacted to prevent fraud. However, if a
contract has been totally or partially
performed, the exclusion of parol evidence
would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would
enable the defendant to keep the benefits
already delivered by him from the transaction
in litigation, and, at the same time, evade the
obligations, responsibilities or liabilities
assumed or contracted by him thereby.22
In this case, the Statute of Frauds, invoked by
petitioners to bar the claim of respondents for
the reacquisition of Lot No. 88, cannot apply,
the oral compromise settlement having been
partially performed. By reason of such
assurance made in their favor, respondents
relied on the same by not pursuing their
appeal before the CA. Moreover, contrary to
the claim of petitioners, the fact of Lozada’s
eventual conformity to the appraisal of Lot No.
88 and his seeking the correction of a clerical
error in the judgment as to the true area of Lot
No. 88 do not conclusively establish that
respondents absolutely parted with their
property. To our mind, these acts were simply
meant to cooperate with the government,
particularly because of the oral promise made
to them.
The right of respondents to repurchase Lot
No. 88 may be enforced based on a
constructive trust constituted on the property
held by the government in favor of the former.
On this note, our ruling in Heirs of Timoteo
Moreno is instructive, viz.:
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is
correct in stating that one would not find an
express statement in the Decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the
[condemned] lot would return to [the
landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right
to repurchase the same if the purpose for
which it was expropriated is ended or
abandoned or if the property was to be used
other than as the Lahug Airport." This
omission notwithstanding, and while the
inclusion of this pronouncement in the
judgment of condemnation would have been
ideal, such precision is not absolutely
necessary nor is it fatal to the cause of
petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or
repurchase of the condemned properties of
petitioners could be readily justified as the
manifest legal effect or consequence of the
trial court’s underlying presumption that
"Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation"
when it granted the complaint for eminent
domain and the airport discontinued its
activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a
constructive trust, one that is akin to the
implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the
Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of
 EMINENT DOMAIN
property is made in order to secure the
performance of an obligation of the grantor
toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is
established. If the fulfillment of the obligation
is offered by the grantor when it becomes due,
he may demand the reconveyance of the
property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners
conveyed Lots No. 916 and 920 to the
government with the latter obliging itself to use
the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport;
failing to keep its bargain, the government can
be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the
parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners
would be denied the use of their properties
upon a state of affairs that was not conceived
nor contemplated when the expropriation was
authorized.
Although the symmetry between the instant
case and the situation contemplated by Art.
1454 is not perfect, the provision is
undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by
an expert on the law of trusts: "The only
problem of great importance in the field of
constructive trust is to decide whether in the
numerous and varying fact situations
presented to the courts there is a wrongful
holding of property and hence a threatened
unjust enrichment of the defendant."
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which
are bound by no unyielding formula when they
are used by courts as devices to remedy any
situation in which the holder of legal title may
not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest.
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is
temporary and passive in which the trustee’s
sole duty is to transfer the title and possession
over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of
course, the "wronged party seeking the aid of
a court of equity in establishing a constructive
trust must himself do equity." Accordingly, the
court will exercise its discretion in deciding
what acts are required of the plaintiff-
beneficiary as conditions precedent to
obtaining such decree and has the obligation
to reimburse the trustee the consideration
received from the latter just as the plaintiff-
beneficiary would if he proceeded on the
theory of rescission. In the good judgment of
the court, the trustee may also be paid the
necessary expenses he may have incurred in
sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary
value of his services in managing the property
to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will
secure a benefit from his acts.
The rights and obligations between the
constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this
case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over
Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art.
1190 of the Civil Code, "When the conditions
have for their purpose the extinguishment of
an obligation to give, the parties, upon the
fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to
each other what they have received x x x In
case of the loss, deterioration or improvement
of the thing, the provisions which, with respect
to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding
article shall be applied to the party who is
bound to return x x x."23
On the matter of the repurchase price, while
petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot No. 88
to respondents, the latter must return to the
former what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of the
property, plus legal interest to be computed
from default, which in this case runs from the
time petitioners comply with their obligation to
respondents.
Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the
necessary expenses they may have incurred
in maintaining Lot No. 88, as well as the
monetary value of their services in managing
it to the extent that respondents were
benefited thereby.
Following Article 118724 of the Civil Code,
petitioners may keep whatever income or
fruits they may have obtained from Lot No. 88,
and respondents need not account for the
interests that the amounts they received as
just compensation may have earned in the
meantime.
In accordance with Article 119025 of the Civil
Code vis-à-vis Article 1189, which provides
that "(i)f a thing is improved by its nature, or
by time, the improvement shall inure to the
benefit of the creditor x x x," respondents, as
creditors, do not have to pay, as part of the
 EMINENT DOMAIN
process of restitution, the appreciation in
value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural
consequence of nature and time.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
February 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the October 22, 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
87, Cebu City, and its February 7, 2007
Resolution are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to return to
petitioners the just compensation they
received for the expropriation of Lot No. 88,
plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be
computed from the time petitioners comply
with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to
them;
2. Respondents are ORDERED to pay
petitioners the necessary expenses the latter
incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, plus the
monetary value of their services to the extent
that respondents were benefited thereby;
3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever
fruits and income they may have obtained
from Lot No. 88; and
4. Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep
whatever interests the amounts they received
as just compensation may have earned in the
meantime, as well as the appreciation in value
of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence
of nature and time;
In light of the foregoing modifications, the
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, only for the
purpose of receiving evidence on the amounts
that respondents will have to pay petitioners in
accordance with this Court’s decision. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
5. G.R. No. L-40587 February 27, 1976
PEDRO ARCE and CARMEN BARRICA DE
ARCE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MELECIO A. GENATO,
Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, and the
MUNICIPALITY OF BALIANGAO, PROVINCE
OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
Rosendo P. Bandal, Alaric P. Acosta and
Florante P. Acosta for petitioners.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vicente M. Blanco
for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is
whether the order of respondent Judge in an
expropriation case allowing the other
respondent, the Municipality of Baliangao of
Misamis Occidental, to take immediate
possession of the parcel of land sought to be
condemned for the beautification of its public
plaza, without a prior hearing to determine the
necessity for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, is vitiated by jurisdictional
defect, for at the very least, so petitioners
would allege, it amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion. It is not disputed that in issuing
such order, respondent Judge relied on
Presidential Decree No. 42 issued on the 9th
of November, 1972.1 The question as thus
posed does not occasion any difficulty as to
the answer to be given. This petition for
certiorari must fail, there being no showing
that compliance with the Presidential Decree,
which under the Transitory Provisions is
deemed a part of the law of the land 2 Would
be characterized as either an act in excess-of
jurisdiction or a grave abuse of discretion. So
we rule.
The relevant facts, not controverted, disclose
the filing of a civil case for expropriation by
respondent Municipality of Baliangao with
respondent Judge, covering a parcel of land
needed for the beautification and expansion of
its public plaza .3 Subsequently, in reliance on
Presidential Decree No. 42, respondent
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Municipality sought immediate
possession. 4 One of the petitioners, Carmen
Barrica joined by another defendant, Maria
Bueno Vda. de Barrica in their answer raised
the issue of lack of urgent necessity for
respondent to take immediate possession,
alleging that one-third of the public plaza,
more or less, being leased and occupied by
private third parties, could be utilized for its
beautification program. 5 It was at this-stage
that respondent Judge ordered that the other
petitioner, Pedro Arce, be impleaded as a
party defendant, the complaint to be amended
for that purpose, the motion to take immediate
possession of the property being held in
abeyance while the affirmative defense of lack
of necessity was being considered. 6 It was so
amended to include petitioner Pedro Arce as a
party defendant. 7 Then, on March 19, 1975,
respondent Municipality in a pleading asked
respondent Judge to rule on its motion to take
immediate possession of the property. 8 In the
answer to the amended complaint of the same
date, petitioners reiterated their defense of
absence of any showing or urgent public
necessity and further maintained that the
deposit with the Philippine National Bank was
not only based on the wrong assessment but
also did not show that it was made in
connection with the expropriation
case. 9 Respondent Municipality filed a
manifestation showing that the deposit with
the PNB was for the expropriation
case. 10 There was a motion on the part of
petitioners to postpone consideration of the
motion to take immediate ion but it was to no
avail. Respondent Judge issued an order
allowing the plaintiff to e immediate
possession of the premises.11 That is the order
challenged in this petition as constituting an
act in excess of his jurisdiction with grave
abuse of discretion, there being no preliminary
hearing conducted to determine whether or
not there was an urgent public necessity for
respondent Municipality of Baliangao to take
immediate possession of the property sought
to be expropriated. 12
The petition, as noted at the outset, lacks
merit.
1. Presidential Decree No. 42 speaks
categorically. It is thereby decreed. and
ordered "as part of the law of the land that,
filing in the proper court of the complaint in
eminent .domain proceedings or at anytime
thereafter, and after due notice to the
defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to take
or enter upon the possession of the teal
property involved if he deposits with the
Philippine National Bank, in its main office or
any of its branches or agencies, an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be her by
said bank subject to the orders and final
disposition of the court." The decree, issued
on November 9, 1972, was to "take effect
immediately." It is beyond question that such a
decree is included within the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution. So it is therein
expressly provided: "All proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even
after lifting of martial law -or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly
and explicitly modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly. 13 Deference to it,
as is to be expected, has been accorded by
this court. 14 The task, therefore, of assailing a
lower court order in compliance therewith,
made a part of the law of the land by the
Constitution itself, is one attended with
extreme difficulty.
That is why on its face, the weakness of the
petition is rather apparent.
2. Nonetheless, petitioners did attempt to
extricate itself from its highly untenable
position. This it did by relying on the judicial
doctrine that a municipal corporation like
respondent Municipality must show the
necessity for expropriation. It could not very
well deny that the expansion and
beautification of a public park comes definitely
under the category of public use as required
by the Constitution. As a mar of law, from the
leading case of Visayan Refining Comomy v.
Camus, 15 a 1919 decision, it has been
undoubted that as long as the owner 6f the
private property to be expropriated is awarded
 EMINENT DOMAIN
just compensation and that it is for public use,
that specific constitutional provisions intended
find his protection has been satisfied. It is true
that in J.M. Tuason and Company v. Land
Tenure Administration, 16 it was likewise held
that there may be on instances w ere the
condemnation could not of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal
protection. 17
There is nothing either in the petition itself or
in the .9 memorandum subsequently
submitted that would raise any of the above
constitutional questions. What is claimed is
that there must be a showing of necessity for
such condemnation and that it was not done
in this case. In support of such a view,
reliance is placed on City of Manila v. Arellano
Law Colleges. 18 That doctrine itself is b on the
earlier case of City of Manila N Chinese
Community of Manila, 19 all like Camus a 1919
decision. As could be discerned, however, in
the Arelio Law Colleges decision, it was the
antiquarian view of Blackstone with its
sanctification of the right to one's estate on
which such an observation was based. As did
appear in his Commentaries: "So great is the
regard of the law for private property that it will
not authorize the least violation of it, even for
the public good, unless there exists a very
great necessity thereof.' Even the most
cursory glance at such well-nigh absolutist
concept of p property would show its obsolete
character at least for Philippine constitutional
law. It cannot survive the test of the 1935
Constitution with its mandates on social
justice and protection to labor. 20 What is more,
the present Constitution pays even less heed
to the claims of property-and rightly so. After
stating that the State shill promote social
justice, it continues: "Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits." 21 If there is
any need for explicit confirmation of what was
set forth in Presidential Decree No. 42, the
above provision supplies it. Moreover, that is
merely to accord to what of late has been the
consistent course of decisions of this Court
whenever property rights are press
unduly. 22 The statement, therefore, that there
could be discerned a constitutional objection
to a lower court applying a Presidential
Decree, when it leaves no doubt that a
grantee of the power of eminent domain need
not 'prove the necessity for the expropriation,
carries its own refutation.
WHEREFORE; the petition is dismissed for
lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.
6. G.R. No. 137537 January 28,
2000
SMI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH through the NATIONAL
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an eminent domain proceeding, a motion to
dismiss filed under Rule 67 prior to the 1997
amendments partakes of the nature of an
answer. Hence, its allegations of facts must
be proven. On the other hand, under the 1997
Rules, upon the government's deposit of an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property, a writ of possession shall be
issued by the trial court without need of any
hearing as to the amount to be deposited.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the August 14,
1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-
GR SP No. 44618; and its February 10, 1999
Resolution3 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
In the assailed Decision, the CA ruled that the
trial judge acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case
No. Q-96-28894. It disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, public respondent having
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order of dismissal of the
complaint, said order is NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE.
Branch 225 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate
Civil Case No. Q-96-28894 to its docket and
conduct proceedings and render judgment
thereon in accordance with the Rules of Court
and the law.4
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the
undisputed facts as follows:
On September 20, 1996, the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Department of
Health thru the National Children's Hospital
filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against
SMI Development Corporation for the purpose
of expropriating three (3) parcels of land with
a total area of 1,158 sq. m. (the properties)
belonging to said corporation which are
adjacent to the premises of the hospital.
After summons was served on the defendant,
the plaintiff filed on October 23, 1996 an Ex-
Parte Motion for the Issuance of Order and
Writ of Possession, after it deposited
P3,126,000.00 representing "the aggregate
assessed value for taxation purposes of the
property subject of the complaint" at
P2,700.00 per sq. m.
By Order of October 30, 1996, Branch 225 of
the Quezon City RTC set the plaintiffs motion
for hearing on December 11, 1996.
In November 1996, the defendant filed a
Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the
plaintiffs Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Order and Writ of Possession. In its Motion to
Dismiss, the defendant alleged that the
complaint lacked or had insufficient cause of
action; that the taking of the property would
not serve the purpose for which it was
intended; that the plaintiff failed to negotiate
with it for the purchase of the property which
"reflects against the urgency and necessity" of
the plaintiffs need of the property and implies
lack of intention to pay its true and fair market
value; and that [the] necessity to expropriate
the property is negated by the fact that less
than a kilometer from the plaintiffs premises
was the Quezon Institute which is "presently
not put to its optimum use" and is a better
place for putting up the "frontline services for
which the property is needed with less costs
and less prejudice to private rights.
In its Opposition to the plaintiffs Motion for
Issuance of Order and Writ of Possession, the
defendant alleged that, among others, no
urgency and necessity existed for the plaintiff
to take possession of the property; that
immediate possession upon mere deposit of
the amount purportedly representing the
aggregate assessed value of the property, if
authorized by P.D. 42, is offensive to the due
process clause of the Constitution, hence,
said decree is unconstitutional, and at any
rate Sec. 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
still governs the procedure for ascertaining
just compensation, even on a provisional
basis, as held in the case of Ignacio
v. Guerrero, 150 SCRA 369 promulgated on
May 29, 1987, hence, the courts must
determine provisionally the fair market value
of the property and require the deposit thereof
prior to allowing the plaintiff to acquire
possession.5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
(prior the 1997 amendments), the Court of
Appeals held that (1) petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss filed with the trial court took the place
of an answer, and (2) it was not an ordinary
motion to dismiss within the contemplation of
Rules 15 and 16. It also held that the grounds
stated therein, with the exception of lack of
cause of action, were not those enumerated in
Rule 16. As the said Motion partook of the
nature of a pleading, the trial judge thus acted
in excess of jurisdiction in granting it without
having received any evidence beforehand
from either of the parties.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
In any case, even if the said Motion to Dismiss
were considered as such within the
contemplation of Rule 16, the trial court would
still be deemed to have acted in excess of its
jurisdiction, since the only ground alleged,
among those enumerated under Rule 16, was
lack of cause of action. It was therefore
outside public respondent's jurisdiction to
grant the Motion on the basis of
"uncontroverted and undisputed factual and
legal allegations relating to the issue of
necessity for the expropriation,"6 when the only
issue that ought to have been resolved was
whether or not the allegations of the
Complaint had stated a cause of action.
Hence, this recourse.7
Issues
Petitioner submits, for the consideration of this
Court, the following assignment of errors:
A. Whether or not the remedy of certiorari is
proper in case of the dismissal of the
complaint for expropriation[;]
B. Whether or not the court a quo's resolution
of the "motion to dismiss" without receiving
the evidence of both parties on the merits of
the case was correct[;]
C. Whether or not the complaint states a
cause of action[; and]
D. Whether or not the honorable Court of
Appeals committed grave error when it
annulled and reversed the order of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 225) of Quezon
City.8
In addition, this Court will take up the solicitor
general's request for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Propriety of Certiorari
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
erred in allowing respondent's Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, arguing that the proper remedy was an
ordinary appeal. It stresses that certiorari is
available only when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, "when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require."9
True, certiorari may not be resorted to when
appeal is available as a remedy. However, it is
equally true that this Court has allowed the
issuance of a writ of certiorari when appeal
does not provide a speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Indeed,
in PNB v. Sayo,10 this Court has ruled that the
"availability of an appeal does not foreclose
recourse to the ordinary remedies
of certiorari or prohibition where appeal is not
adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient." In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,11 this
Court also held that "certiorari may be availed
of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate
and insufficient." The determination as to what
exactly constitutes a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion
and depends on the particular circumstances
of each case.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals did
not commit any reversible error in allowing the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the government.
The respondent was able to prove, to the CA's
satisfaction, that appeal from the trial court
Decision would not constitute a speedy and
 EMINENT DOMAIN
adequate remedy, thus necessitating the
resort to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65. In its Petition
before the CA, respondent cited the services
which the hospital provided and its urgent
need to expand to be able to continue
providing quality tertiary heath care to the
ever-increasing population of its indigent
patients. In short, the public interest involved
and the urgency to provide medical facilities
were enough justifications for respondent's
resort to certiorari.
Substantive Issues:
Dismissal Without Prior Evidence, and Lack of
Cause of Action
In granting petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found "it difficult to
understand why the [respondent] had to
invade [petitioner's] property instead of looking
into the possibility of increasing its
floors."12 The RTC further stated that "as
correctly pointed out by the [petitioner], the
[respondent hospital's] so-called frontline
services could be [done] by expanding
vertically or increasing the floors of its
building. The [trial] court is of the opinion that
a vertical expansion of [respondent's] building
would be more reasonable and practical. In
this way, the [respondent] would be able to
save time and money."13 The RTC upheld "the
allegation of the defendant . . . that less than a
kilometer away from the plaintiff's building lies
the Quezon Institute (QI), which, despite its
vast area, has not been put to its maximum
use by the government."14
The CA correctly observed, however, that the
trial judge should not have granted the Motion
to Dismiss based on these grounds, without
first receiving evidence from the parties.
Obviously, the RTC's February 12, 1997
Resolution treated petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss as one falling under Section 3 of Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, rather than as an
ordinary one, since the grounds relied upon
were not those enumerated in Section 1, Rule
1615 of the Rules of Court.16
Sec. 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (prior the
1997 amendments) provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Defenses and Objections. — Within
the time specified in the summons, each
defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present
in a single motion to dismiss or for other
appropriate relief, all of his objections and
defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
property for the use or purpose specified in
the complaint. All such objections and
defenses not so presented are waived. A copy
of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff's
attorney of record and filed with the court with
the proof of service.17
Under the above rule, petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss partakes of the nature of an answer
to respondent's Complaint for eminent
domain. Without proof as to their truthfulness
and veracity, the allegations in the Motion
cannot be deemed proven. Hence, the CA
was correct in holding that the trial judge
should not have decided it based solely on the
unsubstantiated allegations therein.
Lack of Cause of Action
Although petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
alleged lack of cause of action, the trial judge
made no ruling on this ground. Hence, the CA
committed no reversible error in not lengthily
discussing such ground. Only the matters
contained in the decision below and raised as
issues may be reviewed on appeal.18
In any event, we hold that the Complaint
stated a cause of action for eminent domain.
The necessity for taking petitioner's property
for public use upon payment of just
compensation was alleged in the said
Complaint. The allegation stressing that the
property would be used to improve the
delivery of health services satisfied the
requirements of necessity and public use.
Needless to state, respondent has the burden
of proving the elements of eminent domain
during the continuation of the proceedings in
the trial court, and the petitioner the right to
rebut such proof.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Citing Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of
Appeals,19 petitioner insists that before eminent
domain may be exercised by the state, there
must be a showing of prior unsuccessful
negotiation with the owner of the property to
be expropriated.
This contention is not correct. As pointed out
by the solicitor general, the current effective
law on delegated authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain is found in Section
12, Book III of the Revised Administrative
Code, which provides:
Sec. 12. Power of Eminent Domain — The
President shall determine when it is necessary
or advantageous to exercise the power of
eminent domain in behalf of the National
Government, and direct the Solicitor General,
whenever he deems the action advisable, to
institute expropriation proceedings in the
proper court.
The foregoing provision does not require prior
unsuccessful negotiation as a condition
precedent for the exercise of eminent domain.
In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of
Appeals, the President chose to prescribe this
condition as an additional requirement
instead. In the instant case, however, no such
voluntary restriction was imposed.
Additional Issue:
Issuance of Writ of Possession Justified
This Court deems meritorious the request of
the solicitor general for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction.20 This
request was filed on December 22, 1999;
hence, the 1997 Rules apply.
In Robern Development Corporation v. Judge
Quitain,21 the Court stated:
In the present case, although the Complaint
for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997,
the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus,
the issuance of the Writ is covered by the
1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules
are given immediate effect and are applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the
time they are passed; new court rules apply to
proceedings that take place after the date of
their effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the
prevailing and governing law in this case.
Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
states:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with authorized government depositary. —
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter, and after due notice to the
defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real
or personal property involved if he deposits
with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation to be
held by such bank subject to the orders of the
court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless
in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit
of a certificate of deposit in a government
bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized
government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall
be provisionally ascertained and the amount
to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the
court.
After such deposit is made the court shall
order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of
the property involved and promptly submit a
report thereof to the court with service of
copies to the parties.
Under the foregoing Section, the Republic is
entitled to a writ of possession, once the
provisional compensation mentioned therein is
deposited. We refer again to Robern for
authority:
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's
issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes
ministerial, once the provisional compensation
mentioned in the 1997 Rules is deposited.22
 EMINENT DOMAIN
In the present case, an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the land has already
been deposited. This fact is not contested and
is readily shown by a certification23 letter
issued by the Philippine National Bank stating
that the Department of Health-National
Children's Hospital has already deposited
P3,126,600 representing the assessed value
of the property mentioned in Civil Case No. Q-
96-28894.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Moreover, the Court grants the
Republic's request for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. The court of
origin is hereby directed to issue a writ of
possession to enable the Republic of the
Philippines to provisionally enter and take
possession of petitioner's property, which is
the subject of the condemnation proceedings
in Civil Case No. Q-96-28894. Costs against
petitioner.
1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
7. G.R. No. 175983 April 16, 2009
METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT
(MCWD), Petitioner,
vs.
J. KING AND SONS COMPANY,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is a Rule 45 petition1 which seeks
the reversal of the decision2 and resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
00810. The Court of Appeals’ decision
nullified the orders4 and the writ of
possession5 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 23, allowing
petitioner to take possession of respondent’s
property.
Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is
a government-owned and controlled
corporation created pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its
purposes are to acquire, install, improve,
maintain and operate water supply and
distribution systems within the boundaries of
the District.6
Petitioner wanted to acquire a five (5)-square
meter lot occupied by its production well. The
lot is part of respondent’s property covered by
TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu
City. Petitioner initiated negotiations7 with
respondent J. King and Sons Company, Inc.
for the voluntary sale of the latter’s property.
Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioner’s
proposal. After the negotiations had failed,
petitioner pursuant to its charter8 initiated
expropriation proceedings through Board
Resolution No. 015-20049 which was duly
approved by the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA).10 On 10 November
2004, petitioner filed a complaint11 to
expropriate the five (5)-square meter portion
of respondent’s property.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner filed a
motion12 for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner wanted to tender the
amount to respondent during a rescheduled
hearing which petitioner’s counsel had failed
to attend.13 Petitioner deposited14 with the
Clerk of Court the amount of ₱17,500.00
equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of
the current zonal value of the property which
the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at
₱3,500.00 per square meter.15 Subsequently,
the trial court granted the motion16 and issued
the writ of possession.17 Respondent moved
for reconsideration but the motion was
denied.18
Respondent filed a petition19 for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. It
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals
 EMINENT DOMAIN
granted.20 Thus, petitioner was not able to
gain entry to the lot.21
On 26 July 2006, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision22 granting
respondent’s petition. It ruled that the board
resolution which authorized the filing of the
expropriation complaint lacked exactitude and
particularity which made it invalid; that there
was no genuine necessity for the
expropriation of the five (5)-square meter lot
and; that the reliance on Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8974 in fixing the value of the property
contravenes the judicial determination of just
compensation. Petitioner moved23 for
reconsideration but the motion was rejected.24
Hence, this petition.
The issues raised by petitioner can be
summarized as follows:
1. Whether there was sufficient authority from
the petitioner’s board of directors to institute
the expropriation complaint; and
2. Whether the procedure in obtaining a writ of
possession was properly observed.
Eminent domain is the right of the state to
acquire private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation.25 The power of
eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty
being essential to the existence of the State
and inherent in government. Its exercise is
proscribed by only two Constitutional
requirements: first, that there must be just
compensation, and second, that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law26 .
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the
power to expropriate pertains to the
legislature. However, Congress may, as in
fact it often does, delegate the exercise of the
power to government agencies, public officials
and quasi-public entities. Petitioner is one of
the numerous government offices so
empowered. Under its charter, P.D. No. 198,
as amended,27 petitioner is explicitly granted
the power of eminent domain.
On 7 November 2000, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 8974, entitled "An Act To Facilitate The
Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location
For National Government Infrastructure
Projects And For Other Purposes." Section 2
thereof defines national government projects
as follows:
Sec. 2. National Government Projects.—The
term "national government projects" shall refer
to all national government infrastructure,
engineering works and service contracts,
including projects undertaken by government-
owned and -controlled corporations, all
projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise
known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Law, and other related and necessary
activities, such as site acquisition, supply
and/or installation of equipment and materials,
implementation, construction, completion,
operation, maintenance, improvement, repair
and rehabilitation, regardless of source of
funding." (emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 8974 includes projects undertaken
by government owned and controlled
corporations,28 such as petitioner. Moreover,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 8974 explicitly includes water supply,
sewerage, and waste management facilities
among the national government projects
covered by the law.29 It is beyond question,
therefore, that R.A. No. 8974 applies to the
expropriation subject of this case.
The Court of Appeals held that the board
resolution authorizing the expropriation lacked
exactitude and particularity. It described the
board resolution as akin to a general warrant
in criminal law and as such declared it invalid.
Respondent reiterates the same argument in
its comment and adds that petitioner’s
exercise of the power of eminent domain was
not reviewed by the LWUA.
A corporation does not have powers beyond
those expressly conferred upon it by its
enabling law. Petitioner’s charter provides that
it has the powers, rights and privileges given
to private corporations under existing laws, in
addition to the powers granted in it.30 All the
powers, privileges, and duties of the district
 EMINENT DOMAIN
shall be exercised and performed by and
through the board and that any executive,
administrative or ministerial power may be
delegated and redelegated by the board to
any of its officers or agents for such
purpose.31 Being a corporation, petitioner can
exercise its powers only through its board of
directors.
For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent
domain, two requirements should be met,
namely: first, its board of directors passed a
resolution authorizing the expropriation, and;
second, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain was subjected to review by the
LWUA. In this case, petitioner’s board of
directors approved on 27 February 2004,
Board Resolution No. 015-200432 authorizing
its general manager to file expropriation and
other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review
and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of
a complaint for the expropriation of
respondent’s lot. Specifically, the LWUA
through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora,
wrote petitioner’s manager, Armando H.
Paredes, a letter dated 28 February
200533 authorizing petitioner to file the
expropriation case "against the owner of the
five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A
covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to
Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended."
The letter not only explicitly debunks
respondent’s claim that there was no
authorization from LWUA but it also identifies
the lot sought to be expropriated with
sufficient particularity.
It is settled that the validity of a complaint may
be questioned immediately upon its filing
through a motion to dismiss or raised
thereafter as an affirmative defense. However,
there is no need to further belabor the issue
since it is established that petitioner has the
legal capacity to institute the expropriation
complaint.
Anent the second issue involving the issuance
of a writ of possession, a discussion on the
various stages in an expropriation proceeding
is necessary.
The general rule is that upon filing of the
expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the
right to take or enter into possession of the
real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation. An
exception to this procedure is provided by
R.A. No. 897434 . It requires the payment of
one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal
value of the property to be expropriated to
entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.
In an expropriation proceeding there are two
stages, first, is the determination of the validity
of the expropriation, and second is the
determination of just compensation.35 In Tan v.
Republic,36 we explained the two (2) stages in
an expropriation proceeding to wit:
(1) Determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
with condemnation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon
payment of just compensation. An order of
expropriation is final. An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, as it
finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the courts on the
merits. The order of expropriation would also
be a final one for after its issuance, no
objection to the right of condemnation shall be
heard. The order of expropriation may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby by
filing a record on appeal.
(2) Determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be
taken with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the
just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before the court and findings of the
commissioners would likewise be a final one,
as it would leave nothing more to be done by
the court regarding the issue. A second and
separate appeal may be taken from this order
fixing the just compensation.37
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Thus, the determination of the necessity of the
expropriation is a justiciable question which
can only be resolved during the first stage of
an expropriation proceeding. Respondent’s
claim that the expropriated property is too
small to be considered for public use can only
be resolved during that stage.
Further, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 runs counter to the
express mandate of Section 2 of Rule 67.38 It
held that the law undermined the principle that
the determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. However, this Court has
already settled the issue. In Republic v.
Gingoyon,39 this Court held that:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to
supersede the system of deposit under Rule
67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in
cases involving national government
infrastructure projects.
xxx
It likewise bears noting that the appropriate
standard of just compensation is a substantive
matter. It is well within the province of the
legislature to fix the standard, which it did
through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974.
Specifically, this prescribes the new standards
in determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases relating
to national government infrastructure projects,
as well as the manner of payment thereof.
At the same time, Section 14 of the
Implementing Rules recognizes the continued
applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects
when it provides "all matters regarding
defenses and objections to the complaint,
issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting
claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the
parties, and such other incidents affecting the
complaint shall be resolved under the
provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.40
R.A. No. 8974 does not take away from the
courts the power to judicially determine the
amount of just compensation. The law merely
sets the minimum price of the property as the
provisional value. Thus,
the amount of just compensation must still be
determined by the courts according to the
standards set forth in Section 541 of R.A. No.
8974.
R.A. No. 8974 provides a different scheme for
the obtention of a writ of possession. The law
does not require a deposit with a government
bank; instead it requires the government to
immediately pay the property owner.42 The
provisional character of this payment means
that it is not yet final, yet, sufficient under the
law to entitle the Government to the writ of
possession over the expropriated
property.43 The provisional payment is a
prerequisite44and a trigger45 for the issuance of
the writ of possession. In Gingoyon,46 we held
that:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to
supersede the system of deposit under Rule
67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in
cases involving national government
infrastructure projects.47
xxx
Rep. Act. No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing
the requirement of immediate prepayment,
and no amount of statutory deconstruction can
evade such requisite. It enshrines a new
approach towards eminent domain that
reconciles the inherent unease attending
expropriation proceedings with a position of
fundamental equity. While expropriation
proceedings have always demanded just
compensation in exchange for private
property, the previous deposit requirement
impeded immediate compensation to the
private owner, especially in cases wherein the
determination of the final amount of
compensation would prove highly disputed.
Under the new modality prescribed by Rep.
Act. No. 8974, the private owner sees
immediate monetary recompense, with the
same degree of speed as the taking of his/her
property.481av vphi1
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Petitioner was supposed to tender the
provisional payment directly to respondent
during a hearing which it had failed to attend.
Petitioner, then, deposited the provisional
payment with the court. The trial court did not
commit an error in accepting the deposit and
in issuing the writ of possession. The deposit
of the provisional amount with the court is
equivalent to payment.
Indeed, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is
emphatic to the effect that "upon compliance
with the guidelines…the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency
an order to take possession of the property
and start the implementation of the
project."49 Under this statutory provision, when
the government, its agencies or government-
owned and controlled corporations, make the
required provisional payment, the trial court
has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v.
PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority,50 we held that:
Upon compliance with the requirements, a
petitioner in an expropriation case…is entitled
to a writ of possession as a matter of right and
it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial
court to forthwith issue the writ of possession.
No hearing is required and the court neither
exercises its discretion or judgment in
determining the amount of the provisional
value of the properties to be expropriated as
the legislature has fixed the amount under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974.51 (emphasis ours)
It is mandatory on the trial court’s part to issue
the writ of possession and on the sheriff’s part
to deliver possession of respondent’s property
to petitioner pursuant to the writ.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated 26 July 2006 and Resolution dated 28
September 2006 are REVERSED. The
ORDERS of the Regional Trial Court dated 01
April 2005 and 9 May 2005 are hereby
REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is
further DIRECTED to immediately REMIT the
amount of ₱17,500.00 to respondent and to
REQUIRE the sheriff to implement the writ of
possession. The case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
8. G.R. No. 146886 April 30, 2003
DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, petitioner,
vs.
BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA,
LAGUNA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the
jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless
of the value of the subject property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the January 10, 2001 Decision and the
February 5, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals2 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 61088. The
dispositive part of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit."3
The assailed Resolution4 denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents are summarized by
the CA as follows:
"At the root of this present [P]etition is the
controversy surrounding the two (2)
[C]omplaints for eminent domain which were
filed by herein respondent for the purpose of
expropriating a ONE HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land,
otherwise known as Lot 4381-D situated in
Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna and
 EMINENT DOMAIN
owned by herein petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383605 of the Registry
of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner
acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit
Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale which was executed by and
between the former and the latter on October
7, 1996.
"The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3648 and entitled
'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A.
Reblara, Eugenia Almazan & Devorah E.
Bardillon,' was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna ('MTC')
on February 23, 1998, following the failure of
Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with
herein petitioner on the purchase offer of
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P200,000.00). The expropriation of Lot 4381-
D was being pursued in view of providing
Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the
use and benefit of its constituents.
"On March 5, 1999, the MTC issued an order
dismissing Civil Case No. 3648 'for lack of
interest' for failure of the [respondent] and its
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC, in
its Order dated May 3, 1999, denied
[respondent's] [M]otion for [R]econsideration
thereof.
"The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2845-99-C and
entitled 'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v.
Devorah E. Bardillon' was filed before Branch
37 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna ('RTC') on October 18, 1999. This
[C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of
the said Lot 4381-D for the erection of a multi-
purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner,
by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this
[C]omplaint by alleging in the main that it
violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that
[respondent's] cause of action is barred by
prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res
judicata.
"On January 21, 2000, [the] Judge issued an
order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
holding that the MTC which ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no
jurisdiction over the said expropriation
proceeding.
"With the subsequent approval of Municipal
Ordinance No. 2000-261 on July 10, 2000,
and the submission thereof in compliance with
[the] Judge's Order dated June 9, 2000
requiring herein respondent to produce the
authority for the expropriation through the
Municipal Council of Calamba, Laguna, the
assailed Order dated August 4, 2000 was
issued in favor of Barangay Masili x x x and,
on August 16, 2000, the corresponding order
for the issuance of the [W]rit of
[P]ossession over Lot 4381-D."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba,
Laguna (Branch 37)6 did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders. It ruled that the second Complaint for
eminent domain (Civil Case No. 2845-99-C)
was not barred by res judicata. The reason is
that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which
dismissed the first Complaint for eminent
domain (Civil Case No. 3648), had no
jurisdiction over the action.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the
following issues for our consideration:
"A. Whether or not, the Honorable
Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it denied and dismissed petitioner's
appeal;
"B. Whether or not, the Honorable
Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it did not pass upon and
consider the pending Motion for
Reconsideration which was not resolved by
the Regional Trial Court before issuing the
questioned Orders of 4 and 16 August 2000;
 EMINENT DOMAIN
"C. Whether or not, the Honorable
Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in taking the total amount of the
assessed value of the land and building to
confer jurisdiction to the court a quo;
"D. Whether or not, the Honorable
Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ignoring the fact that there is an
existing multi-purpose hall erected in the land
owned by Eugenia Almazan which should be
subject of expropriation; and
"E. Whether or not, the Honorable
Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to consider the issue of
forum shopping committed by Respondent
Masili."8
Simply put, the issues are as follows: (1)
whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
expropriation case; (2) whether the dismissal
of that case before the MTC constituted res
judicata; (3) whether the CA erred when it
ignored the issue of entry upon the premises;
and (4) whether respondent is guilty of forum
shopping.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction Over Expropriation
Petitioner claims that, since the value of the
land is only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction
over the case.9
On the other hand, the appellate court held
that the assessed value of the property was
P28,960.10 Thus, the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the expropriation
proceedings, because the amount involved
was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount
cognizable by MTCs.
An expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals
with the exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take property for public
use.11 As such, it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be filed with the
regional trial courts.12
This was explained by the Court in Barangay
San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor:13
"It should be stressed that
the primary consideration in an expropriation
suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence, the courts determine the authority of
the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due
process. In the main, the subject of an
expropriation suit is the government's exercise
of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
"True, the value of the property to be
expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,
for the court is duty-bound to determine the
just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only
after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation."
"Verily, the Court held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Zurbano that 'condemnation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance,' the forerunners of
the regional trial courts. The said case was
decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to
RTCs, provided that courts of first instance
had original jurisdiction over 'all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation.' The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not
intended to change these jurisprudential
precedents.14
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value
of the land, because the subject of the action
is the government's exercise of eminent
domain — a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Second Issue:
Res Judicata
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Petitioner claims that the MTC's dismissal of
the first Complaint for eminent domain was
with prejudice, since there was no indication
to the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She
contends that the filing of the second
Complaint before the RTC should therefore be
dismissed on account of res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter
adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or
settled by judgment.15 It provides that a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.16
The following are the requisites of res
judicata: (1) the former judgment must be
final; (2) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there is — between the first and the
second actions — an identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action.17
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over
expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application even if the Order
of dismissal may have been an adjudication
on the merits.
Third Issue:
Legality of Entry Into Premises
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it
ignored the RTC's Writ of Possession over her
property, issued despite the pending Motion
for Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing
the Complaint. We are not persuaded.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of
possession in an expropriation case are
expressly and specifically governed by
Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.18 On the part of local government
units, expropriation is also governed by
Section 19 of the Local Government
Code.19 Accordingly, in expropriation
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing
immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of
a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance; and (2) the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair
market value of the property to be
expropriated based on its current tax
declaration.20
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of
Possession in favor of respondent after it had
filed the Complaint for expropriation and
deposited the amount required was proper,
because it had complied with the foregoing
requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation
is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in
the course of the expropriation proceedings. If
petitioner objects to the necessity of the
takeover of her property, she should say so in
her Answer to the Complaint.21 The RTC has
the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine
necessity for it.22
Fourth Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioner claims that respondent is guilty of
forum shopping, because it scouted for
another forum after obtaining an unfavorable
Decision from the MTC.
The test for determining the presence of forum
shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present in two or more pending
cases, such that a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another.23
Be it noted that the earlier case lodged with
the MTC had already been dismissed when
the Complaint was filed before the RTC. Even
granting arguendo that both cases were still
pending, a final judgment in the MTC case will
not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since
the former had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio
Morales, JJ ., concur.
9. G.R. No. 129079 December 2, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by the Department of Trade
and Industry, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding
Judge of RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20;
and HELENA Z. BENITEZ, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Executive Order No. 1035 1 (EO 1035) was
enacted to facilitate government acquisition of
private property to be used for infrastructure
or other development projects. Under Section
7 thereof, it is the ministerial duty of courts to
issue a writ of possession within five days
from the time the government deposits 10
percent of just compensation payable.
Moreover, such writ cannot be nullified by an
adverse decision in an ejectment proceeding
involving the same property and the same
parties.
Statement of the Case
This principium is used by this Court in
resolving this petition for certiorari under Rule
65 assailing the Orders dated July 26,
19962 and February 20, 1997, 3 promulgated
by the Regional Trial Court 4 of Imus, Cavite
Civil Case No. 1277-96. The first ruling
quashed the May 21, 1996 writ of possession
issued earlier, pursuant to EO 1035, and the
second denied petitioner's plea for
reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as narrated in the solicitor general's
Memorandum, are as follows:
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the
registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas,
Cavite covered [by] TCT No. 14701 containing
an area of Four Hundred Eighty Three
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty One
(483,331) square meters more or less.
Sometime in September 1982, the Philippine
Government, through the Philippine Human
Resources Development Center (PHRDC for
short), an agency under the then Ministry of
Human Settlements, negotiated with the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of
the establishment of the ASEAN Human
Resources Development Project in the
Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs
of the proposed project was Program III
(Construction Manpower Development) which
involved the establishment of a Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC for
short), an agency now under the Department
of Trade and Industry.
On March 30, 1983, PHRDC and private
respondent Helena Z. Benitez (BENITEZ for
short), signed a Memorandum of Agreement
(Annex 'C', Petition) which provides, among
others, [that] BENITEZ "undertakes to lease
within the period of twenty (20) years and/or
sell a portion of that property (which is no less
than ten-hectares)" in favor of PHRDC "which
likewise agrees to lease" within period of
twenty (20) years and/or buy said property
site".
On September 22, 1983, the Philippine
Women's University (PWU for short) and
BENITEZ granted a permit to PHRDC "to
occupy and use" the land in question and "to
undertake land development, electrical and
road network installations and other related
works necessary to attain its objectives . . .".
Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took possession
of the property and erected buildings and
other related facilities necessary for its
operations.
Accordingly, in December 1983, PWU entered
into a purported contract of lease with PHRDC
on a ten (10)-hectare piece of land which
stipulated, among other things, a rental of
 EMINENT DOMAIN
P200,000.00 per annum for an initial term of
four (4) years from January 1, 1984 to
January 1, 1988, with an option granted to
PHRDC to renew the lease, upon agreement
of both parties, "for a further period up to, but
not exceeding twenty (20) years from the
expiration of the initial term hereof . . .".
PWU entered into the aforesaid lease
contract, dated December 3, 1983, purporting
to be the donee of the property involved in a
deed of donation executed by BENITEZ in its
favor; which deed of donation, however, was
executed only in December 1984, much later
than the execution of the lease contract.
After the expiration of the lease contract on
January 1, 1988, negotiations began on the
purchase of the property in question on a plain
offer of BENITEZ to sell the same. In her letter
of 21 August 1989, BENITEZ advised the
PHRDC, through its General Manager Mr.
Juvenal Catajoy, to "pursue the successful
completion of the sale of the subject 7-hectare
property within 30 days from August 31, 1989
at the agreed price of P70.00 per square
meter".
Again, in BENITEZ' letter of February 4, 1991,
she stated the position of the University
regarding the negotiated sale of the 7-hectare
property in Dasmariñas, Cavite' and
"confirme(d) that the agreed purchase price in
1989 [was] P70.00 per sq. m. . . .".
In view of the agreement on the sale of the
land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale with BENITEZ, as vendor, and
PHRDC and CMDF, as vendees, duly
represented by then Undersecretary Gloria M.
Arroyo, for the signature of BENITEZ.
Subsequently, BENITEZ and PHRDC,
represented by PHRDC General Manager
Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed that the payment
of "rentals for the Dasmariñas lot [would]
cease effective July 1, 1989 in view of on-
going negotiations for the eventual sale of the
lot".
However, for reasons known only to her,
BENITEZ did not sign the Deed of Absolute
Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell
the lot in question.
Thereafter, in a letter dated August 15, 1995,
BENITEZ and PWU demanded from PHRDC
the payment of rentals and to vacate the
premises within 30 days from notice. It later
filed an unlawful detainer suit against
petitioner.
Falling to acquire the properly involved
through negotiated sale, petitioner through the
Department of Trade and Industry, to which
CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for
Eminent Domain, pursuant to be provisions of
Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25,
1985.
In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Makati
Avenue Branch, in favor of defendant, Seven
Hundred Eight Thousand Four Hundred
Ninety Pesos (P708,490.00) an amount
equivalent to the provisional value of the land
sought to be expropriated.
On May 16, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
On May 24, 1996 respondent Judge issued an
Order (Annex 'D', Petition) granting petitioner's
Motion for issuance of a Writ of Possession.
In compliance with the Order of May 24, 1996,
the Clerk of Court issued a Writ of Possession
(Annex 'E', Petition) which the Sheriff duly
implemented.
Private respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1996
. . . which petitioner opposed.
On July 26, 1996, respondent Judge issued
the assailed Order (Annex 'A', Petition) the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is
granted. Accordingly, the Order dated May 24,
1996 is hereby set aside and reconsidered.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
The Writ of Possession issued in consonance
therewith is hereby quashed.
On August 21, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration (Annex 'F', Petition) of the
above Order. Private respondent filed an
Opposition (Annex 'G', Petition) thereto.
On February 20, 1997, respondent Judge
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
(Annex 'B', Petition).5
The foregoing narration of the facts was not
contradicted by private respondent. 6 Not
satisfied by the court a quo's rulings, petitioner
thus elevated the matter to this Court.7
The Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits that
"[t]he only legal issue raised in the petition is
whether or not respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when he quashed
the writ of possession which he had previously
issued. 8 Put differently, the issue is whether
the respondent judge may quash a writ of
possession on the ground that the
expropriating government agency is already
occupying the property sought to be
expropriated.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Issuance of Writ of Possession:
A Duty Mandated by Law
It is undisputed that the expropriation
proceeding in the case at bar involves a
development project covered by EO 1035.
The site, which is being used by the Philippine
Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), is sought to be expropriated for the
establishment and operation of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Human Resources Development
Project of the Philippines, a component of
which is the Construction Manpower
Development Center (CMDC), an agency now
under the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). Plainly, the respondent judge is
required to issue a writ of possession in favor
of petitioner, pursuant to Section 7 of EO
1035, which reads:
Sec 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree
in negotiation of the sale of the land as
provided in the preceding section, the
government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned shall have
authority to immediately institute expropriation
proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor
General, as the case may be. The just
compensation to be paid for the property
acquired through expropriation shall be in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. No.
1533. Courts shall give priority to the
adjudication of cases on expropriation and
shall immediately issue the necessary writ of
possession upon deposit by the government
implementing agency/instrumentality
concerned of an amount equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the amount of just
compensation provided under P.D. No.
1533; Provided, That the period within which
said writ of possession shall be issued shall in
no case extend beyond five (5) days from the
date such deposit was made.
Under this statutory provision, when the
government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the trial court has a
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.
We note that the respondent judge indeed
issued such writ in favor of petitioner, aptly
stating:
There being a deposit made by the plaintiff
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the
amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to
the assessed value of the property subject
matter hereof based on defendant's 1990 tax
declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to
defendant as landowner has been effected,
the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession
is hereby GRANTED. Forthwith, let a Writ of
Possession be issued ordering the Sheriff to
place plaintiff in possession of the property
involved in this case. 9
Writ of Possession Necessary
 EMINENT DOMAIN
As previously mentioned, the trial court
reversed itself by later issuing an Order
quashing the writ of possession, reasoning as
follows:
While this Court fully agrees with the plaintiff
that it is entitled to be placed in possession of
the property subject of the Complaint at once,
the position of the parties in the case at bar is
different. For, plaintiff admitted that it is
already in possession of subject premises.
Such being the case, it is obvious that
plaintiff's purpose in securing a writ of
possession is only to utilize it as leverage in
the ejectment suit filed against it by defendant
Benitez wherein the issue is possession. 10
In denying the motion for reconsideration of
said Order, the respondent judge reiterated
his position, adding that "the present case is
different from the ordinary action for eminent
domain because prior to the filing of this case,
there was already an ejectment suit instituted
against plaintiff-corporation." 11 Agreeing with
the trial court, private respondent contends
that "the writ of possession is warranted only
in cases where the party seeking [it] is nor yet
in possession [of] the property sought to be
expropriated." 12
Private respondent underscores Section 2,
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
which in part states that "the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation . . . . 13 She also points out that since
Presidential Decree (PD) 42 provides that the
"plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter
upon the possession of the real property
involved," the writ of possession it requires to
be issued "is not to maintain possession but
intended for the purpose of taking or entering
possession." 14
The Court is not persuaded. The expropriation
of real property does not include mere
physical entry or occupation of land. Although
eminent domain usually involves a taking of
title, there may also be compensable taking of
only some, not all, of the property interests in
the bundle of rights that constitute
ownership. 15
In the instant case, it is manifest that the
petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial
to public interest, seeks to realize the same
through its power of eminent domain. In
exercising this power, petitioner intended to
acquire not only physical possession but also
the legal right to possess and ultimately to
own the subject property. Hence, its mere
physical entry and occupation of the property
fall short of the taking of title, which includes
all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property. Its actual
occupation, which renders academic the need
for it to enter, does not by itself include its
acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Its
right to possess did not attend its initial
physical possession of the property because
the lease, which had authorized said
possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted
not merely possession de facto but
possession de jure as well.
What will happen if the required writ of
possession is not issued? This question
becomes very important because the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where private
respondent sued petitioner for unlawful
detainer, has rendered a decision ordering
petitioner to vacate the property. 16 It would be
circuitous, if not legally absurd, for this Court
to require petitioner to first vacate the property
in view of the adverse judgement in the
unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards,
order the trial court to issue in petitioner's
favor a writ of possession pursuant to the
expropriation proceedings. Such a scenario is
a bureaucratic waste of precious time and
resources. This precisely is the sort of
pernicious and unreasonable delay of
government infrastructure or development
projects, which EO 1035 intended to address
by requiring the immediate issuance of a writ
of possession. Ineludibly, said writ is both
necessary and practical, because mere
physical possession that is gained by entering
the property is not equivalent to expropriating
it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or
even the right to possess, the expropriated
property.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Citing J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 17 and Cuatico v. Court of
Appeals, 18 private respondent further submits
that "the eminent domain case, much less the
writ of possession, cannot be entertained to
defeat the ejectment case." 19
Such argument is untenable. It is well-settled
that eminent domain is an inherent power of
the State that need not be granted even by
the fundamental law." 20 Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, in mandating that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation," merely imposes a
limit on the government's exercise of this
power and provides a measure of protection
to the individual's right to property. 21 Thus,
in J. M. Tuason & Co. and Cuatico, the Court
merely enforced the constitutional limitation
regarding the payment of just compensation.
Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not
prevail over the State's power of eminent
domain.
We note that in the present case, petitioner
has deposited not just the 10 percent required
under EO 1035, but the whole amount of the
just compensation that private respondent is
entitled to. Thus, we are unable to find any
legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of petitioner. Precisely,
the purpose of instituting expropriation
proceedings is to prevent petitioner from being
ejected from the subject property; otherwise,
the above-mentioned absurd and circuitous
rulings would arise.
Assailed Orders Tainted by
Grave Abuse of Discretion
It is clear that, in quashing the writ of
possession, respondent judge violated EO
1035 on the quaint and whimsical ground that
petitioner was already in actual possession of
the property. 22 His assailed Orders dated July
26, 1996 and February 20, 1997 are therefore
void for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and
the assailed Orders dated July 26, 1996 and
February 20, 1997 are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. 230144
THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1dated October
26, 2016 and the Resolution2 dated February
22, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.
R. CV No. 104234, which reversed and set
aside the Order dated August 28, 2014 of
Branch 60, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City, Pampanga, in Civil Case No.
03-11226.
The Facts
Respondent Bases Conversion and
Development Authority ("BCDA") was created
as a government corporation on March 13,
1992 by virtue of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA
7227). It is tasked mainly to manage the Clark
and Subic military reservations/camps and
their extensions and to adopt and implement a
comprehensive development plan for their
conversion into productive uses, with a view to
promoting the economic and social
development of the country (Section 4, RA
7227). Among the powers expressly granted
to it is the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain (Section 5[k]).3
On November 21, 2003, BCDA filed a
complaint against herein petitioner The Manila
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Banking Corporation ("TMBC") and Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas ("BSP"), seeking to
expropriate a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308513-
R of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga,
registered in the name of TMBC with a total
area of Ten Million Two Hundred Forty
Thousand square meters (10,240,000 sq.m.)
situated in Barangay Dolores, Municipality of
Porac, Province of Pampanga ("Subject
Property"). The area to be affected by
expropriation was estimated to be One
Hundred Eighty-Six Thousand Three Hundred
Fifty-Five square meters (186,355 sq.m.),
more or less.4 BCDA also alleged that the
subject property was classified as agricultural
land and had the zonal value of P30 per
square meter at the time of filing of the
complaint.5
According to BCDA, the subject property was
being expropriated to pave the way for the
implementation of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac
Expressway (SCTEX) Project of the national
government. The SCTEX Project was
supposed to provide the shortest, direct and
efficient link among vital development areas in
Central Luzon, more specifically among three
prime economic zones (Subic Bay Special
Economic Zone in Zambales, Clark Special
Economic Zone in Pampanga and the
Hacienda Luisita Industrial Park in Tarlac) and
significantly alleviate the worsening traffic
condition of the North Luzon Expressway.
BCDA further claimed that "the government
will suffer immense and irreparable damage if
this project will not proceed as scheduled by
reason of the failure to negotiate with
supposed owner after diligent efforts to do
so."6
BCDA prayed for the issuance of a writ of
possession upon payment to the landowner of
an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of
the subject property based on the current
zonal valuation, pursuant to Section 4(a) of
RA 7227, and thereafter, an order of
expropriation requiring the defendants to
answer within the time specified in the
summons and authorizing BCDA to take the
property sought to be expropriated for public
purpose as stated in the complaint.7
Prior to the filing of the complaint on June 21,
1999, it appears that the property was the
subject of a Dacion En Pago Con Pacto de
Retro agreement between TMBC and the
Central Bank Board of Liquidators ("CB-
BOL"). Pursuant to a revised repayment plan,
TMBC delivered several properties in
settlement of the balance of its debt to CB-
BOL amounting to ₱2,265,953,378.83. On
December 20, 2000, CB-BOL assigned all its
rights and interests under
the Dacion agreement in favor of the BSP.
Thus, BSP sought the release of 100% of the
value of the property based on the current
zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue ("BIR"), in accordance with Section
2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure.
TMBC opposed the motion and the issue was
submitted for resolution at the trial during the
pre-trial conference.8
Records also reveal that a Final Offer to Buy
dated October 9, 2003 was sent by BCDA to
TMBC, whereby BCDA offered the price of
P75 per square meter for the subject
property.9
On January 22, 2004, BCDA deposited the
amount of Five Million Five Hundred Ninety
Thousand and Six Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱5,590,650) before the Office of the Clerk of
Court of Angeles, Pampanga. This amount
was equivalent to the value of the actual
affected area of the subject property based on
the then current zonal valuation provided by
the BIR.10
The trial court issued a writ of possession on
March 11, 2004 and the subject property was
placed in the possession of BCDA on June
10, 2004.11
BCDA filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental
Complaint, manifesting the reduction of the
area to be taken from the original 186,355
sq.m. to One Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand
Three Hundred Fifty-Five square meters
(166,355 sq.m.) due to the realignment of the
expressway. On April 11, 2007, BCDA further
amended its complaint by adding an area of
Six Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Four
square meters (6,744 sq.m.), making the total
affected area of the subject property as One
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Hundred Seventy-Three Thousand Fifty-Nine
square meters (173,059 sq.m.).12
In its Answer, TMBC contended that the
offered price of ₱30 per square meter is way
below the fair market value of the subject
property. It pointed out that the subject
property's value lies in the fact that it is the
only remaining compact area of its size and
nature within the Province of Pampanga; the
proposed project would cut the property into
two by the construction of fences on both
sides thereby rendering inaccessible one side
to the other and its value would substantially
depreciate. Just compensation should, thus,
include expected depreciation of the
remaining areas.13
In its Order dated April 29, 2005, the RTC
declared that BCDA has clearly established its
lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated for public use or purpose
described in the complaint upon the payment
of just compensation. After termination of pre-
trial, the parties were ordered to submit their
nominations for the commissioners who will
assist the trial court in arriving at the just
compensation for the subject property.14
Meanwhile, TMBC filed a motion to release
payment which was opposed by BSP.
Subsequently, they agreed for the release of
the entire amount (initial payment of BCDA) to
TMBC to be deposited by the latter in an
escrow account with BSP, without prejudice to
the eventual determination of the just
compensation, and who between BSP and
TMBC is entitled to the expropriation
proceeds. On June 19, 2008, the RTC denied
TMBC's motion for release of payment for
being premature as there is still a need to
determine who between TMBC and BSP is
entitled to the proceeds of the property.
However, pursuant to the RTC's Order dated
March 12, 2009, TMBC's motion for
reconsideration was granted and the amount
of Five Million Three Hundred Sixty-Six
Thousand and Ten Pesos (Php5,366,010.00)
was released in favor of TMBC and was
thereafter deposited in an escrow account
with BSP pursuant to their compromise
agreement.15
On August 14, 2009, the RTC conducted an
ocular inspection of the subject property in the
presence of counsels for TMBC and BCDA,
and the nominee-appraiser of BCDA, Mr.
Alberto Murillo, Jr. ("Mr. Murillo"), then City
Assessor of Angeles City, Pampanga. On
September 24, 2009, TMBC filed a motion to
set a second ocular inspection stating that the
joint nominee of TMBC and BSP, Engr. Jose
L. Ocampo ("Engr. Ocampo"), was unable to
attend the ocular inspection. Said motion was
granted by the trial court and a second ocular
inspection was conducted on December 3,
2009, this time attended by counsels for
BCDA and Manila Bank, and Engr. Ocampo.16
Mr. Murillo submitted to the court his report on
August 19, 2009. TMBC moved to set aside
the said report on grounds that it was filed
even before he took his oath of office and that
he failed to notify TMBC and BSP, nor were
there hearings conducted for reception of
evidence to aid him in reaching a fair,
unbiased and comprehensive report on the
fair market value of the property. In its
comment, BCDA manifested that another
report will just be submitted, adding that there
is no necessity for Mr. Murillo to conduct any
hearing since what was submitted is his
individual report and TMBC's commissioner
should submit his own recommendation and
the matter of just compensation will be left to
the discretion of the court. TMBC insisted that
an order directing Mr. Murillo to re-submit his
Commissioner's Report would be greatly
prejudicial as he had already shown bias in
this case, failed to apply any basic standards
of his office, and never accorded the parties
an equal opportunity to be heard.17
Meanwhile, Engr. Ocampo requested to
withdraw as commissioner on account of his
deteriorating health. He was replaced by Engr.
Roger F. Tolosa, Jr. ("Engr. Tolosa"), who
was nominated by both TMBC and BSP. In its
Order dated June 30, 2011, the RTC resolved
to: (1) set aside Mr. Murillo's report dated
August 18, 2009; (2) appoint Engr. Tolosa as
Commissioner vice Engr. Ocampo; (3) appoint
the Municipal Assessor of Porac, Pampanga
as Commissioner in this case; (4) direct Engr.
Tolosa and the Municipal Assessor to take
their oath of office; and (5) direct the three
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Commissioners, parties and their counsels to
conduct an ocular inspection on August 9,
2011 and submit their respective reports
within 30 days. Municipal Assessor Myrna V.
Lumanlan declined her appointment and
instead recommended Engr. Glen I.
Lansangan ("Engr. Lansangan"), Municipal
Planning and Development Officer of Porac,
Pampanga.18
The final group of Commissioners consisted of
Mr. Murillo, Engr. Tolosa, and Engr.
Lansangan. On October 6, 2011, they took
their respective oaths of office.19
On October 6, 2011, the scheduled ocular
inspection proceeded with the attendance of
the counsel/representative from BCDA,
TMBC, BSP, and the three Commissioners.
As directed, the parties submitted their
respective documentary evidence to the
Commissioners.20
The Commissioners did not come up with a
group report, but made individual reports after
their ocular inspection and they received the
documents submitted by the parties.21
Engr. Tolosa submitted his Report dated
November 2, 2011 where he concluded that:
Based on our investigation and analysis of all
relevant facts and as supported by the
accompanying narrative report, it is our
opinion that the Market Value (for Just
Compensation) of the land appraised as of
October 6, 2011 is Php388 per square meter
and is represented in the amount of SIXTY-
SEVEN MILLION, ONE HUNDRED FORTY-
SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-
TWO (PhP67,146,892) PESOS subject to the
attached limiting conditions.22
For his part, Engr. Lansangan made this
recommendation in his Report:
Inspection and Valuation
We have personally inspected the property on
October 6, 2011 and arriving at a reasonable
valuation, I have researched price information
from reputable sources and also giving
consideration to the:
a. Highest and best use at the property; and
b. Zoning and current land usage in the
locality
In view of the foregoing, it is of the opinion of
the Commissioner that the Fair Market Value
of the affected property is Three Hundred Fifty
Pesos (Php 350.00) per square meter.23
On the other hand, the Report of Mr. Murillo
dated October 24, 2011 stated that-
Still I maintained my appraisal at Thirty Pesos
per square meter (₱30.00/sq.m.) based at the
time of taking. It is my honest opinion that the
Thirty Pesos per square meter (₱30.00/sq.m.)
be paid as just compensation to the owner. It
is reasonable and fair enough to both parties
concerned considering that they are only
agricultural lands which have a lower value
than industrial or commercial lots. Besides it is
the general public who will benefit from the
use of the SCTEX and not the government.
It is therefore recommended that the
appraised value of Thirty Pesos per square
meter (₱30.00/sq.m.) be approved as basis
for the payment of just compensation of the
above mentioned property owner.24
During the hearings, the three Commissioners
testified and the parties presented their
respective evidence. After the formal offer of
evidence and submission of the parties'
respective memorandum, the case was
submitted for decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Decision25 dated September 4, 2012, the
RTC ordered respondent BCDA to pay
petitioner TMBC the amount of ₱250 per
square meter as just compensation for the
property taken. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders
judgment ordering the plaintiff to pay the
 EMINENT DOMAIN
defendants, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Pesos Per Square Meter (Php. 250.00/ per sq.
m.), or a total of Thirty Seven Million Eight
Hundred Ninety Eight Thousand and Seven
Hundred Forty Pesos (Php. 37,898,740.00)
representing the principal balance on the just
compensation due on the taking of a total
affected area of One Hundred Seventy Three
Thousand Fifty Nine Square Meters (173,059
sq. m.) that is covered by TCT 671482- R and
TCT 671484- R; both derived from the mother
title- TCT 308513- R in the name of Manila
Banking Corporation; plus twelve [percent]
(12%) interest per annum, from November 21,
2003 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.26
Respondent BCDA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration27 dated November 21, 2012.
However, petitioner pointed out that BCDA
failed to put a notice of hearing in its motion.
In an attempt to remedy this procedural
infirmity, BCDA file a Manifestation and
Motion on January 3, 2013, praying that the
motion be heard. This was opposed by TMBC
in a Comment/Opposition dated January 17,
2013.28
Nevertheless, the RTC issued an Order dated
July 26, 2013, reopening the case and
requiring the parties to submit judicial
affidavits to hear the case anew. TMBC
moved for the reconsideration of the July 26,
2013 Order and for the declaration that the
trial court's September 4, 2012 Decision be
declared final and executory.29
Without acting on TMBC' s motion for
reconsideration, the R TC granted BCDA's
motion for reconsideration in an Order30 dated
August 28, 2014 fixing the just compensation
at ₱190 per sq.m. The dispositive portion of
the August 28, 2014 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the motion for reconsideration is given due
course, the decision dated September 4, 2012
is hereby reconsidered[.] Judgment is hereby
rendered fixing the just compensation of the
subject lot at ₱190.00 per square meter or a
total of thirty two million eight hundred eighty
one thousand and two hundred ten pesos
(Php32,881,210.00)[.] Considering that five
million three hundred sixty six thousand and
ten pesos (Php5,366,010) had been deposited
as a condition for the issuance of writ of
possession on March 3, 2004, the plaintiff
Bases Conversion Development Authority is
directed to pay the balance of twenty seven
million five hundred fifteen thousand and two
hundred ten pesos (Php27,515,210.00) to
defendant the Manila Banking Corporation
which shall earn interest at the rate of
12% per annum or the prevailing rate of
interest whichever is lower from the time of
actual taking on November 23, 2003[.]
SO ORDERED.31
Respondent BCDA elevated the case to the
CA, seeking to reverse the RTC's
determination of just compensation and
imposition of 12% interest rate for the unpaid
balance of the just compensation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Pursuant to the Resolution dated July 18,
2016 issued by the CA, BSP was dropped as
a party from the title of the case after
submitting proof of the "Release and
Cancellation" executed by BSP in favor of
TMBC concerning the subject property.32
On October 26, 2016, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision, giving due course to the
petition and ruling in favor of respondent
BCDA. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Order dated August 28, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, Pampanga,
Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 03-11226 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Just compensation for the portions of the
property of The Manila Banking Corporation
consisting of 173,059 square meters,
expropriated by BCDA for the SCTEX Project,
is hereby fixed at Php75.00 per square meter,
or a total of Twelve Million Nine Hundred
Seventy Nine Thousand Four Hundred
 EMINENT DOMAIN
Twenty Five Pesos (Php12,979,425.00).
Since BCDA already deposited the amount of
Five Million Three Hundred Sixty Six
Thousand and Ten Pesos (Php5,366,010.00),
BCDA is DIRECTED to pay to TMBC the
balance of Seven Million Six Hundred Thirteen
Thousand Four Hundred Fifteen Pesos
(Php7,613,415.00), which shall earn interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from November
21, 2003 up to June 30, 2013, and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. Said
amount shall further earn interest at 6% per
annum from the date of the finality of this
Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.33
Petitioner TMBC's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied in the assailed Resolution dated
February 22, 2017.34
Hence, this petition.
The Petition
Petitioner TMBC claims that the CA's Decision
and Resolution are contrary to law and
prevailing jurisprudence.
First, the trial court's determination of just
compensation in its September 4, 2012
Decision and August 28, 2014 Order had legal
and factual basis which were existing at the
time of the taking of the property, contrary to
the pronouncement of the CA. TMBC
reiterated the pertinent portions of the RTC's
September 4, 2012 Decision, which relied on
factors such as character and utility of the
property, sales and holding prices of similar
land within the immediate vicinity, and the
highest and best use of the property, in
determining that P250 per square meter was
the appropriate just compensation for the
subject property at the time of its taking.
TMBC also argued that the August 28, 2014
Decision of the RTC was based on clear and
unequivocal reasons and used the
comparative approach in fixing the just
compensation at ₱190 per square meter.35
Second, TMBC asserts that the CA failed to
make a ruling on whether the September 4,
2012 Decision of the RTC was already final
and executory, considering that the motion for
reconsideration filed by BCDA was defective
as it did not contain any notice of hearing.
Since the motion for reconsideration was a
mere scrap of paper which did not toll the
running of the period to appeal, then the
RTC's September 4, 2012 Decision had
become final and executory.36
Third, TMBC argues that contrary to the CA's
observation, the RTC did not merely "solely
and primarily rely on the valuation made by
the DPWH Provincial Appraisal Committee." It
also finds error in the CA's pronouncement
that the trial court "should have given weight
to the actual and reliable data consisting of
the tax declarations, zonal valuation and
documentary evidence in the sales of the
SCTEX Project" since there are other factors
which must also be considered under the law
in determining Just compensation.37
TMBC cited Section 5 of Republic Act No.
897438 (RA 8974) which included the
standards for the courts to use in the
determination of just compensation. It argued
that the CA erred in fixing the just
compensation based on the selling prices in
deeds of absolute sale of similarly affected
landowners in the vicinity for the SCTEX
project and in disregarding factors such as
size of the property and the "highest and best
use of the land," as well as the appraisal of a
similar property in the area made by the
Provincial Appraisa1 Committee.39
Finally, TMBC finds error in the CA's
pronouncement that the award of interest of
6% per annum should be reckoned from July
1, 2013. Instead, it argues that considering the
case is not yet final and executory as the case
is still pending appeal, then the 12% interest
should continue to accrue, and the 6% interest
should only begin to accrue upon the finality of
judgment of this case.40
In compliance with this Court's July 3, 2017
Resolution,41 respondent BCDA filed its
Comment42 dated August 29, 2017. It argued
that the CA was correct in finding that the
RTC did not have factual and legal bases in
determining just compensation at ₱190.
 EMINENT DOMAIN
BCDA asserts that the CA considered all
applicable factors to this case in its
determination of just compensation.43 It further
contends that there was no need for the CA to
decide on the validity of its motion for
reconsideration since it was already rendered
moot and academic by the trial court's action
on the same.44
BCDA also refutes TMBC's argument that the
CA erred in not factoring in the "highest and
best use of the land," citing Republic of the
Philippines represented by the DPWH v.
Spouses Tan Song Bok, et al. 45 (Tan Song
Bokcase). It pointed out that unlike in the Tan
Song Bok case where there were no relevant
evidence for the court to determine just
compensation except for the highest and best
use of the land, BCDA presented other pieces
of evidence which were properly taken into
consideration by the CA, specifically, the
deeds of absolute sale executed with
landowners in Porac, Pampanga indicating a
value of P60 to P7 5 for parcels of land
adjacent and contiguous to the subject
property and similarly acquired for the SCTEX
Project.
BCDA further noted that the Tan Song Bok
case had already been superseded by the
case of Secretary of Public Works and
Highways, et al. v. Spouses
Tecson46 (Tecson case), where this Court
ruled that just compensation is determined by
considering the value of the property at the
time of actual taking.47
Relying on the Tecson case, BCDA argued
that the CA correctly ruled on the rate of
interest to be applied where the interest rate
shall be 12% for the period beginning
November 21, 2003 until June 30, 2013, and
6% from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.48
The Issues
Petitioner TMBC raised the following issues:
1. Whether respondent BCDA's Motion for
Reconsideration of the September 4, 2012
Decision of the RTC tolled the running of the
period to appeal the said decision.
2. Whether the CA erred in reversing and
setting aside the RTC's Decision and Order on
its determination of just compensation and
interest.
3. Whether the CA erred in awarding just
compensation at the rate of ₱75 per square
meter, instead of ₱250 per square meter as
originally ordered by the RTC in its September
4, 2012 Decision, or ₱190 per square meter
as reconsidered by the RTC in its August 28,
2014 Order.
4. Whether the CA was correct in imposing an
interest rate of 12% per annum from
November 21, 2003 up to June 30, 2013, and
6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
payment.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Failure to include a notice of hearing in a
motion for reconsideration is not fatal
where the other party was given the
opportunity to be heard
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
requires every motion to be set for hearing by
the applicant and to give notice of such
hearing to the other party at least three days
before the date of the hearing. Section 5 of
the same Rule mandates that the notice of
hearing should be addressed to all parties
concerned and should specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. Where a motion has no notice of
hearing, it is considered pro forma and does
not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.49
Nevertheless, this Court has relaxed
procedural rules when a rigid application of
these rules only hinders substantial
justice.50 The rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application especially on
 EMINENT DOMAIN
technical matters, which tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must
be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court
envisions this liberality. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from the
courts.51Yet, the relaxation of its rules is
subject to certain conditions and for liberality
to be applied, it must be assured that the
adverse party has been afforded the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings
filed in opposition to the motion.52
In the present case, the records reveal that
TMBC was given the opportunity to be heard
when it filed a comment/opposition to the
motion for reconsideration, assailing the same
and raising substantive arguments for its
dismissal.53 Moreover, the R TC went a step
further and directed the parties to submit
judicial affidavits of their witnesses with
documentary exhibits to substantiate their
respective positions.54 Clearly, the
requirements of procedural due process were
substantially complied with and such
compliance justified a departure from a literal
application of the rule on notice of hearing.
The Court of Appeals was correct in reversing
the trial court and in fixing the just
compensation at ₱75 per square meter
For the second and third issues raised by
petitioner, the Court shall discuss them jointly
considering they are closely interrelated.
In reversing and setting aside the trial court's
determination of just compensation, the CA
reviewed the reports submitted by the
commissioners, as well as the trial court's
September 4, 2012 Decision and the August
28, 2014 Order. The CA noted that while the
trial court based its first valuation on the
recommendations of the commissioners, it did
not give any explanation on how it arrived at
the amount of ₱250 per square meter. As for
the second valuation of Pl90, the CA observed
that the trial court gave more weight to two
documents included in Engr. Tolosa's Report,
specifically: 1) Resolution No. 12-2006 of the
DPWH Provincial Appraisal Committee which
fixed the just compensation of an expropriated
land for the Porac Mancatian Dike Project at
₱190 per square meter; and 2) Deed of
Absolute Sale between TMBC and DPWH
over the property taken in the area for the
price of ₱190 per square meter.55
We agree with the findings of the appellate
court.
Section 5 of RA 897 4 provides:
Section 5. Standards for the Assessment of
the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation
Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. - In order to
facilitate the determination of just
compensation, the court may consider, among
other well-established factors, the following
relevant standards:
(a) The classification and use for which the
property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the
land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in
the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation
for the removal and/or demolition of certain
improvements on the land and for the value of
improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration
and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the
ocular findings, oral as well as documentary
evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the
affected property owners to have sufficient
funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of
approximate areas as those required from
them by the government, and thereby
rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
There is no question that at the time of taking
of the subject property, it was classified as
 EMINENT DOMAIN
agricultural land, based on the records of the
Municipal Assessor's Office of Porac,
Pampanga.56 As observed by Mr. Murillo in his
Commissioner's Report, the subject property
consists of sugar land and sand deposits. He
further noted that while there were allegations
that the property was reclassified to industrial
land, there was no sign of industrial
development at the time of the ocular
inspection except for the construction of the
SCTEX project.57
We could not give any weight to Engr.
Lansangan's Report since he did not provide
any explanation for arriving at his
recommendation of P350 per square meter as
just compensation for the subject property,
except for his declaration that he arrived at the
same based on the price information he had
researched from reputable sources, as well as
the highest and best use of the property and
the zoning and current land usage in the
locality.58
During his testimony, Engr. Lansangan
clarified that his recommendation was based
on the reclassification of the property to
residential, commercial and industrial areas,
the BIR Zonal Valuation as industrial area with
assessed value of ₱200 per square meter,
and the value for residential area at ₱500 per
square meter, the average of which is ₱350
per square meter.59 However, Engr.
Lansangan's recommendation was erroneous
since it was established that the subject
property was not included in the area which
was reclassified by the
province.60 Furthermore, the reclassification
was made after the time of taking of the
subject property; thus, any change in
valuation as a result thereof would have no
bearing on the amount of just compensation.
As for Engr. Tolosa's Report, a review thereof
shows that his recommendation to set the just
compensation for the subject property at the
amount of ₱388 per square meter was mostly
based on the market approach, where the
value of the land is based on sales and
listings of comparable properties within the
vicinity.61 While this approach is an acceptable
basis to determine just compensation, We
note that the data gathered by Engr. Tolosa
on which he relied his recommendation were
based on current market values at the time of
the ocular inspection which was on October 6,
2011- almost eight years from the time of
taking of the subject property m November
2003.
In arriving at the amount of ₱250 per square
meter, the trial court relied on the eight DPWH
transactions of neighboring properties as
relevant market data on the actual value of the
subject property in November 2003.62 The R
TC failed to consider the nine Deeds of
Absolute Sale between BCDA and several
landowners for the sale of properties situated
in Barangay Dolores, Porac, Pampanga with
selling price ranging from ₱60 to ₱75 per
square meter, which were executed between
March 2004 and September 2008. The RTC
reasoned that the BCDA allegedly failed to
establish the proximity of these properties with
the subject property.63
As correctly observed by the CA, however, the
properties subject of the nine deeds of
absolute sale were directly contiguous and
adjacent to the subject property, to wit:
We hold that the RTC committed reversible
error for it is plainly obvious that the areas
expropriated for the SCTEX project are
contiguous and adjacent
properties. Specifically, the lands covered by
1âwphi1
no less than nine (9) Deeds of Absolute Sale
are all situated in Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Porac, Province of Pampanga.
BCDA' s offer to buy the subject property at
Php75.00 per square meter was the same
selling price of its neighboring properties
affected by the same infrastructure project.
Such price is also based on the following
factual considerations: (1) the nature of the
subject property as agricultural land with no
improvements ("no electricity, no road outlet
and not accessible to regular mode of
transportation"); (2) the zonal valuation by the
BIR (Php30.00 per square meter); and (3) tax
declarations ("Agricultural-Sugar") indicating
the total market value of the subject property
at Php27,400.92.64 (citations omitted)
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the
determination of just compensation must be
 EMINENT DOMAIN
based on reliable and actual data, as appropriate value of the property at the time it
explained in Republic of the Philippines v. C. was taken in November 2003.
C. Unson Company, Inc.,65 to wit:
The Court of Appeals committed no
In Republic v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel reversible error in modifying the interest
Corporation, the Court defined just rates to be imposed on the just
compensation "as the full and fair equivalent compensation
of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker's For the final issue raised by petitioner, it
gain, but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is argues that the award of interest of 6% per
used to intensify the meaning of the word annum as imposed under the BSP - Monetary
'compensation' and to convey thereby the idea Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of
that the equivalent to be rendered for the 2013, should only be reckoned from the date
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, of finality of judgment and not from July 1,
full, and ample. Such 'just'-ness of the 2013 as ruled by the CA.
compensation can only be attained by using
reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the Petitioner is mistaken.
value of the condemned property. Trial courts
are required to be more circumspect in its
In the landmark case of Eastern Shipping
evaluation of just compensation due the
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid
property owner, considering that eminent
down the guidelines regarding the manner of
domain cases involve the expenditure of
computing legal interest, particularly declaring
public funds."
that when judgments of the court awarding a
sum of money become final and executory,
The Court further stated in National Power the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per
Corporation v. Tuazon, that "[t]he annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
determination of just compensation in since this interim period is deemed to be by
expropriation cases is a function addressed to then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.66
the discretion of the courts, and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the
With the issuance of BSP-MB Circular No.
government. This judicial function has
799, Series of 2013, however, which became
constitutional raison d'etre; Article III of the
effective on July 1, 2013, in the absence of an
1987 Constitution mandates that no private
express stipulation as to the rate of interest
property shall be taken for public use without
that would govern the parties, the rate of legal
payment of just compensation." Legislative
interest for loans or forbearance of any
enactments, as well as executive issuances,
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed
fixing or providing for the method of computing
in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent
just compensation are tantamount to
(12%) per annum but shall now be six percent
impermissible encroachment on judicial
(6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013.
prerogatives. They are not binding on courts
Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per
and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in
annum legal interest shall apply only until
ascertaining the amount of just compensation.
June 30, 2013, and from July 1, 2013 the new
(citations omitted)
rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
the prevailing rate of interest when
Based on the foregoing, We find that the CA applicable.67
committed no reversible error in reversing and
setting aside the trial court's determination of
In the recent case of Secretary of the
just compensation and in fixing the just
Department of Public Works and Highways v.
compensation of the subject property at ₱75
Spouses Tecson,68 the Court explained:
per square meter. The CA, guided by the
standards set in RA 8974, took into
consideration the documentary evidence Lastly, from finality of the Court's Resolution
presented by the parties to determine the on reconsideration until full payment, the total
 EMINENT DOMAIN
amount due to respondents-movants shall
earn a straight six percent (6%) legal interest,
pursuant to Circular No. 799 and the case of
Nacar. Such interest is imposed by reason of
the Court's decision and takes the nature of a
judicial debt.

Clearly, the award of interest on the value of

the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full
payment is adequate compensation to
respondents movants for the deprivation of
their property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings. Such interest,
however meager or enormous it may be,
cannot be inequitable and unconscionable
because it resulted directly from the
application of law and jurisprdence-standards
that have taken into account fairness and
equity in setting the interest rates due for the
use or forbearance of money. Thus, adding
the interest computed to the market value of
the property at the time of taking signifies the
real, substantial, full and ample value of the
property. Verily, the same constitutes due
compliance with the constitutional mandate on
eminent domain and serves as a basic
measure of fairness.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the CA was

correct in imposing an interest on the just
compensation at the rate of 12% per
annum from November 21, 2003 up to June
30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated October 26, 2016 and the
Resolution dated February 22, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104234
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice