MEMES AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION

Robert Ward-Penny
University of Warwick
R.M.Ward-Penny(at)warwick.ac.uk

The theme of reproduction is frequently central to sociological narratives of

education. Analyses such as Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) have argued that education
plays a critical role in the reproduction of social stratification, and work such as
Noyes (2004) contains evidence of reproduction at the level of individuals, in
particular demonstrating that new mathematics teachers have a tendency to replicate
many of the values and strategies that they themselves observed as learners. The field
of memetics draws upon such evidence and analyses but goes further, suggesting that
it is useful instead to contemplate reproduction at the level of ideas. In this way,
memetics offers a novel and challenging framework with which to consider the
interplay of thoughts and behaviours in the mathematics classroom.

What is a ‘Meme’?

The term ‘meme’ was first coined by the evolutionary biologist Richard
Dawkins in 1976 to describe a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. The
term was chosen so as to evoke a deliberate parallel with biological genes: “just as
genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms
or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to
brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation” (Dawkins 1989,
p.192). A simple example of meme is therefore a ‘catchy’ tune; for when a tune
frequently repeats in an individual’s mind, they frequently end up singing it, whistling
it, or even overtly discussing it. Each of these behaviours leads to other people
becoming aware of the tune, and thus facilitates propagation. In a manner reminiscent
of biological natural selection, the ‘catchiest’ tunes tend to spread faster, wider and
last for longer in the public consciousness.
More developed examples can be drawn from a wide range of fields of interest
to the sociologist. Lynch (1996) offers the Amish religious taboo against modern farm
machinery as an example of a self-perpetuating ‘thought contagion’ (pp.1-2).
Possession of the taboo gives rise to a greater need for manual labour which is met by
taboo holders having large numbers of children. In this way the taboo is passed onto a
large number of descendants and continues to spread and replicate. Dawkins, Lynch
and other writers in the field have gone on to argue that many beliefs about religious
observance, sexual practices and other social norms can be understood in this way.
Equally, stories from folklore and urban legends can be considered mimetically, as
can advertisements. These are often presented in a style that aids memorisation and
encourages the listener to perpetuate their spread. Many slogans and jingles compete
to be held in an individual’s memory, but only the most memorable will survive.
Memes can also manifest explicitly through physical behaviours, whenever an
individual sees a physical display or achievement which they are keen to emulate;
Dawkins here offers as examples “clothes fashions, (and) ways of making pots or
building arches” (1989, p.192). Indeed, it might even be suggested that mathematics

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itself could be considered as a collection of memes, or a memeplex, since
mathematical behaviours are observed and imitated by successive chains of learners.
This is an intriguing notion, although it invokes the question as to whether Dawkins’
qualifier that imitation takes place in a ‘broad sense’ includes instances of reading,
writing and direct instruction. Blackmore (2000, p.28) argues that this is indeed the
case: “we may not wish to count these as forms of imitation, but I would argue that
they build on the ability to imitate and could not occur without it.”
Dawkins’ criteria that imitation happens in a ‘broad sense’ is perhaps both
potently interdisciplinary and problematically vague; Blackmore (1994, p.42) notes,
“it is all too easy to get carried away with enthusiasm and to think of everything as a
meme.” In order to narrow the focus of discussion, and thus facilitate an initial
exploration of the concept of a meme as it might apply to mathematics education, this
paper will adopt the following criteria: that in order for an idea to qualify as a meme,
or at least a successful one, it must be possible to argue that possession of this idea
encourages behaviour which in turn leads to an increased propensity for others to
adopt or reinforce a form of the same idea. In this way the processes of imitation and
replication remain intrinsic to the concept of ‘meme’.

Memes about Mathematics

The concept of a meme as outlined above has a wide range of application

within the mathematics classroom. For instance, it could be argued that the popular
algebra mnemonic “swap sides swap sign” qualifies as a very successful meme. The
limited but immediate achievement that often results from following this rule
encourages the initial transmission of the phrase from teacher to pupil and subsequent
supporting transmission between peers, whilst the alliterative composition aids both
the retention and accurate replication of the meme. This meme is similar in many
ways to certain fashionable weight-loss memes, where short-term advantage acts as a
potent motivator for spreading a meme, and succinct but unusual instructions
encourage the individual to accurately retain their own copy.
Beyond simple examples such as mnemonics, the meme concept also calls for
a consideration of the wider ideas that operate within the teaching and learning of
mathematics. In particular, might some of the observed behaviours within the
mathematics classroom be understood as being consequent of the replication
processes of competing memes? In order to begin to answer this question it is
necessary to start by considering the beliefs which surround mathematics.
Whilst the public perception of mathematics is both fluid and diverse, it is
apparent that a number of dominant and identifiable beliefs about mathematics exist at
present. Research such as that of Lim and Ernest (2000) has demonstrated that many
of these beliefs relate to either the nature or the characteristics of mathematics. The
first of these categories includes perceptions of mathematics as a toolkit, a problem-
solving tool or an absolute body of truth, whilst the second includes beliefs such as
‘mathematics is difficult’, or that ‘mathematics is only for clever people’. Of course,
such ideas are neither uniform nor discrete; at an individual level beliefs might consist
of vague understandings or well-formed arguments, and a person’s opinions are also
likely to be both interdependent and multifaceted. However, there is enough
homogeneity in recorded responses to identify trends and categories that suggest the
existence, in a phenomenological sense at least, of certain ideas that concern
mathematics and the learning of mathematics.

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 To argue that any of these ideas could indeed be considered as memes, it is
necessary next to identify channels through which their reproduction might occur.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) differentiate between three types of channels of
memetic transmission: vertical, horizontal and oblique.

Vertical Transmission

There is a considerable amount of evidence for the vertical transmission

between parents and children of ideas relating to mathematics education. For
example, Chouinard, Karsenti and Roy (2007) explored the influence of social agents
on pupils’ developing beliefs and found that whilst teachers’ actions influenced pupils’
beliefs about their own competence, it was the pupils’ perception of parental support
that best explained measured variables relating to the value of mathematics. This
relationship can be explained by memetic mechanisms. If a parent sees the study of
mathematics as valuable, they are likely to take a greater interest in their child’s
attainment and effort in mathematics, paying more attention to achievements and
reports when compared to other subjects. A pupil will interpret this effort and
conclude similarly that the study of mathematics must be valuable. Conversely, if a
parent sees mathematics as abstractly ‘hard’, they might be more forgiving if their
child has low levels of attainment in the subject, and encourage their child to adopt a
similar attitude through well-trod discourse such as “I was never any good at maths
when I was at school.” There is also some evidence for subconscious replication; for
instance Else-Quest, Hyde and Hejmadi (2008) found that the emotions of mothers
and 11 year-old children were closely correlated when they were solving mathematics
problems together.
There is further a growing body of evidence that suggests that parents hold
and pass on specific gender-related memes about their children’s mathematical
performance, centred on the tenet that mathematics is predominantly a male pursuit.
For instance, Herbert and Stipek (2005) report on an experiment that suggested not
only that parents typically underestimate girls’ mathematical performance, but also
that this bias is passed down to their children at an early age; the parents’ judgements
of their children’s competence were shown to be strong predictors for their children’s
self-evaluations. This result is consonant with older research; for instance Yee and
Eccles (1988) found that parents attributed male child success in mathematics to talent
and female child success in mathematics to effort. They argued that this could
influence children’s emergent identities as mathematicians: “talent is a stable attribute
whilst effort is an unstable one… while both are seen as important reasons for math
success, that parents rate their relative importance differently for boys and girls may
contribute… indirectly to the inferences that their children develop regarding their
own math talent” (p.330). Gender stereotyping has also been shown to be perpetuated
in discussions between parents and children about course selection (Tenenbaum,
2008). It is highly likely, then, that certain memes do indeed propagate through
parent-child interactions.
Vertical transmission of memes can also be argued to occur between teachers
and pupils, with a teacher’s view about mathematics being inculcated in their pupils
through the pupils’ interpretation of intermediary behaviours. If all mathematical
pedagogy rests, however loosely, on a philosophy of mathematics (Thom, 1973) then
the manner in which a teacher presents the subject inevitably betrays this philosophy,
and in turn suggests to the pupils how they might position themselves with respect to
the subject (Ernest, 2008). For instance, if a teacher believes mathematics to be a

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valuable real-world problem-solving tool, then they are likely to favour explanations
and tasks that are contextualised and have clear relevance. Conversely, a teacher with
a formalist philosophy of mathematics might present a mathematical technique as a
‘game’ that has intrinsic value (Hersh, 1979; Lerman, 1983). Consistent, repeated
exposure to either of these approaches would inevitably colour pupils’ perceptions,
encouraging them to arrive at the same philosophical position, and thus adopt the
same memes as their teachers. Whenever this happens, memetic reproduction has
occurred. Lim and Ernest (2000) observe that peoples’ images of mathematics are
closely related to their images of learning mathematics; this offers further support for
the influence of pedagogy on learners’ wider perception of mathematics.

Horizontal and Oblique Transmission

There is perhaps less empirical evidence that supports the transmission of

ideas about mathematics horizontally, or between peers. However there is vast extant
literature concerning the wider subject of peer relationships and interactions, and in
particular it has been demonstrated that pupils consciously and tactically vary their
efforts in response to perceived peer norms (Juvonen and Murdock, 1995). This
observation supports the notion that peer perception, together with concerns about
self-esteem, could promulgate a thorough horizontal transmission of certain memes
which concern affective aspects of learning mathematics. For instance, consider the
meme ‘maths is hard’. If a pupil is struggling with classroom mathematics and holds
an entity view of intelligence (Dweck, 2000), it is in their own self-interest first to
adopt this meme themselves, then to behave in a way that convinces others of its
veracity; for if mathematics is abstractly difficult, then lower levels of achievement
can be tolerated without necessitating a challenge to the pupil’s sense of self-worth.
This could lead to a cycle of reduced effort and lowered attainment. Conversely, if a
pupil is performing highly in mathematics, then they too might benefit from spreading
the ‘maths is hard’ meme to their peers through their behaviour, as this stance
compounds their existing achievement, albeit with a potential for related social
disadvantage through claiming a marker of superiority.
The third channel of memetic spread, oblique transmission, could be argued
here to include the influence of the media on its audience. Picker and Berry (2000)
contend that the media is a particularly salient influence on pupils’ images of
mathematics: “as far as the pupil is concerned, mathematicians are invisible.
Stereotypes have filled this void” (p.87). Unfortunately, although Furinghetti (1993)
notes that images from outside the community of mathematicians can portray
mathematics as a “synonym for truth, integrity and justice” (p. 36) it is also true that
mathematics is often presented in some media as highly abstract practice that is
dominated by males, and which can even act as a path to madness (Schoffer, 2002). It
is outside the scope of this paper to examine comprehensively the media profile of
mathematics, but it is enough to note that media presentations of mathematics,
however peripheral, might serve both to propagate new memes and to reinforce
existing memes that have been previously established through vertical and horizontal
modes of transmission.

Advantages of a Memetic Analysis

The examples and evidence offered above make the outline of an argument
which holds that definite ideas exist regarding the practice of mathematics; ideas

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which, when adopted by an individual, often lead to behaviours which in turn
encourage others to adopt a similar idea. However, reproductive mechanisms have
long been a feature of sociological readings of the mathematics classroom, and it is
thus necessary to ask what advantages and new insights a memetic approach might
offer a researcher. The developing and contested nature of memetics as a field (see for
example Aunger, 2000) precludes a full answer to this question, but three promising
arguments can be advanced at this stage.
First, a memetic model of classroom interactions motivates a holistic approach
which includes many different social actors and multiple potential channels of
reproduction. In particular, it allows recognition of the fact that separate social actors
may be motivated to act in significantly different ways by the same fundamental
meme. Various behaviours of teachers, pupils and even parents may stem from the
possession of similar ideas about the teaching and learning of mathematics, and thus
may together enable further proliferation of the same memes.
For example, it has been noted above how a formalist reading of mathematics
as an abstract game which permits only certain logical moves can influence a
teacher’s choice of pedagogic strategy (Lerman, 1983). Whilst such a strategy might
involve resources such as card-matching activities, on-screen quizzes or jigsaw
puzzles, possession of the meme will ensure that the correct use and manipulation of
symbols and syntax will remain central to the presentation of mathematical activity,
and through exposure and reinforcement the pupils will likely develop a similar
perception of mathematics; in this case the formalist meme has spread vertically. A
pupil who possesses this same meme may, however, consequently develop a
depersonalised view of mathematics as a discipline, and thus there is a risk of an
emergent quiet disaffection (Nardi and Steward, 2003). The pupil’s consequent
withdrawal from active learning strategies is likely to be recognised and perhaps
questioned by their peers; in some cases there is mutual support and emulation, and
thus also arguably horizontal transmission of the formalist meme. In this way the
efforts of the teacher and the lack of effort on the part of these pupils are superficially
contradictory but profoundly connected. This is not to say that puzzle or matching
activities are harmful or that they are in and of themselves a cause of disaffection;
instead it suggests that memes may serve as a common causative factor which could
offer valuable insight to readings of classroom dynamics.
Further, a holistic perspective arguably addresses some of the bias implicit in
other accounts of classroom interactions. This advantage stems in part from a
redistribution of agency in the analysis. It is proper to note, however, that this is
perhaps philosophically problematic. On the one hand, Dawkins holds that whilst both
genes and memes behave as if they were purposeful (1989, p.196), this is only an
illusion of agency which we adopt in order to facilitate discussion and circumvent
clumsy patterns of speech. Conversely, other writers propose that this illusion is in
fact closer to ontological truth, and that memes in fact offer a valuable window onto
the nature of human consciousness itself (for example Blackmore, 1999). Again, these
issues lie outside of the scope of this paper, but without endorsing either side of this
argument, it is sufficient to note here that the location of agency with memes directs
our attention to both individuals and institutions, as both contribute to the
reproductive process. In this way, a memetic approach has some resonance with
aspects of poststructuralist sociology.
A second advantage of a memetic approach is that it recognises explicitly that
social actors are not always fully conscious of the forces that shape their behaviour
and decisions. Writers such as Bibby (2009) have noted that analyses of pedagogy and

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mathematical relationships tend to valorise conscious processes whilst rendering
unconscious workings as insignificant. Conceptualising a scenario in terms of memes,
which often remain unvoiced or disguised, might serve partially to redress this
balance without resorting to a full psychoanalytic approach. This is particularly
relevant when considering psychological issues such as stereotype threat. Research
that shows that attainment is lowered when learners are exposed to pejorative ideas
about the mathematical capabilities of their own gender or race (Beilock, Rydell and
McConnell, 2007; Aronson, Lustina, Good and Keough, 1999) could be easily
interpreted as evidence of how memes might influence cognising individuals at a
subconscious level.
Finally, the framework of memetics encourages researchers to explore
familiar questions in mathematics education from a new perspective. Instead of asking
what beliefs people hold about mathematics, memetics begins with specific, identified
beliefs and asks why these have been so successful at replicating; rather than asking
how people acquire ideas, it asks how ideas acquire people (Lynch, 1996, pp.17-8).
Memetic reproduction is thus centred on selection and competition. A consideration of
the ‘motivational advantage’ associated with each meme – that is, the benefit the
learner obtains by accepting this meme over others – forces a re-evaluation of the
conditions of the learning environments which underlie these gains. If memes with
negative messages about mathematics are as widespread as some reports suggest, then
which aspects of the current educational environment have allowed them to
proliferate so readily?

A Memetic Model of Conflict in the Classroom

As a brief example, consider a hypothetical classroom and the meme

‘mathematics is a difficult subject, accessible only to the clever elite’. If a teacher
holds this meme they are prone to expect, at least on a subconscious level, that not all
of their pupils will be able to fully engage with the subject matter. Conversely, the
teacher will label those pupils that do achieve consistently highly as mathematically
able.
If a low-achieving pupil in this classroom holds the same meme as their
teacher, they will see their low achievement as an indication that continued effort is
pointless, and will most likely gradually withdraw active learning behaviours.
Although this can lead to superficial conflict and disruptions in terms of their conduct,
the teacher is unlikely to address this issue at its fundamental root; their own,
consonant beliefs mean that the relegation of some pupils within most groups is not
only tolerated but tacitly expected. By way of contrast, if a high-achieving pupil holds
the same meme as this teacher, their achievements are likely to feed into a positive
academic self-concept. Perhaps ironically, both sets of pupils benefit from subscribing
to the same belief as their teacher; the high-achiever is labelled as ‘special’, whilst the
low-achiever is given a framework with which to understand, and perhaps excuse,
their difficulties.
This is of course a fragile caricature of a real mathematics classroom, albeit
one that will resonate with many peoples’ experience. Despite its simplicity, however,
it demonstrates how a memetic approach can both unify different social actors’
motivations and recognise subconscious aspects. Note that, in this situation,
possession of this meme by the pupil and the teacher encourages behaviour that might
not only lead to memetic reproduction in other individuals, but also mutually supports
and strengthens the meme in the minds of the two main actors. Further consolidation

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of such views could also be drawn from the discourses present in textbooks, the
organisation of the school (for example, setting practices), and the similar actions and
reactions of the pupil’s peers.
The model presented above could be extended by questioning what might
happen if our theoretical teacher and pupil held different memes. Such a situation
could result in an intractable conflict of aims, but it is also possible that the stronger
meme (or at least the meme which is most strongly enabled through the established
power relations) would subdue the weaker one, and the respective party would change
their mind. There is a potential parallel here with the conflicts envisioned by Skemp
(1976) in his discussion of different types of understanding; there is also potentially a
shift in unspoken behavioural and didactic contracts. However, a full
conceptualisation of social interactions as a product of meme transmission and
competition is perhaps more subtle. The examples offered above have all been crude,
and centred on a single meme. Genuine interactions would involve complex
memeplexes, with sets of inter-related ideas acting in combination. A more authentic
situation might involve the ‘mathematics is difficult’ idea being tempered and
enhanced by other memes, perhaps ‘algebra is hard’ or ‘I am not any good with
numbers’. These memes would in turn be supported by memes encoding broader
beliefs about intelligence, such as an incremental or fixed model of intelligence
(Dweck, 2000). It is possible to speculate that one of the reasons that issues such as
the debate about the nature of intelligence are so important in mathematics education
(Lee, 2009) is that their corresponding memes are in some sense foundational,
supporting a plethora of other related memes.

The Value of the Meme as an Idea in Mathematics Education

The idea of the meme is potentially a fruitful one, and it has the promise to
give rise to many research questions within mathematics education. However, there
are a number of outstanding issues which deserve consideration. First, there is not a
single agreed definition of a meme, or uniform agreement on what would constitute a
properly academic memetic analysis (Aunger, 2000). This disagreement, together with
practical limitations which frustrate a reductionist engagement with the concept, leads
to a second issue: it would be challenging to construct an ethical empirical test which
directly measured the memetic relationships proposed above; further, if no test exists
which could disprove the existence of memes, then memetics would merely qualify as
a pseudo-science under Popperian criteria. Additional theoretical issues might also
arise when connecting memetics to wider theories of mathematical learning. On the
one hand, the mentalist conceptualisation of the meme as a notional mental entity is
perhaps most consonant with constructivism as a learning theory. However, the
central focus on the transmission of ideas is perhaps more comfortably resonant with
behaviourism; a constructivist approach would at the very least demand a re-
evaluation of what is meant by accurate replication in memetic propagation.
Despite these concerns, even if we only accept the idea of a meme as a
philosophical abstraction, it gives rise to a complementary reading of the teaching and
learning of mathematics which has many potential benefits: a more holistic
perspective on classroom dynamics, recognition of the potential role of the
subconscious and a fresh perspective on well-trod questions. It also suggests new
ways in which attitudes and beliefs towards mathematics and the learning of
mathematics might be memetically engineered, or improved. One approach would be

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to actively spread memorable memes that promote the public understanding and
awareness of mathematics, such as “mathematics is the science of patterns” (Devlin,
1997). Another would be to actively support the promotion of memes in the
mathematics classroom which encourage resilient learning behaviours. Potentially
injurious ideas such as the notion that there is always ‘one right way’ to solve a
mathematics problem, or that speed is paramount in mental calculation might be
subverted by memes which extolled the merit of sustained effort, and recognised the
place of making mistakes in mathematical learning (Johnston-Wilder and Lee, 2010).
A final strategy would be to recognise that modern modes of communication mean
that horizontal and oblique transmission may overtake vertical transmission as
dominant channels of memetic spread, then to take advantage of this shift, using
media channels such as the internet to promote the practice and appreciation of
mathematics.
None of these approaches are novel; however, an appreciation of memetics
may inform them in a fresh and productive way. In the meantime we might all benefit
from recognising in a new way that the mathematics classroom is full of ideas, and
thus move towards a mapping of our own mathematical memeplexes.

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Robert Ward-Penny holds an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded
studentship at the University of Warwick Institute of Education.

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