A Volatile History: Pakistan, USA and the Cold War

(1947-1991)

Khadija Laghari

1517115

International Relations

Social Sciences

Bilal Zubedi

SZABIST Karachi Campus

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………… 3
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………....4
REASEARCH METHOLODY……………………………………………………7
LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………………….9
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS…………………………………………………20
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………30
LIMITATIONS…………………………………………………………………….34
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY…………………………………………………34
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………….35

2
Abstract

The foreign policies of both Pakistan and the United States will always diverge, to

follow independent channels of interests. Harmony has never been important for their

relationship. The United States, a global superpower and Pakistan, a regional middle

power, extends its involvement in Central Asia and southwest Asia, has always been a

‘blue-eyed baby’ for the Americans to look over the Communist bloc in the East. The

relationship between the two has been of an inconsistent, unpredictable and volatile

nature. This study aims at finding out the many reasons for the bipolarity in this

relationship mainly focusing on the Cold War. The Cold War was a very crucial

period for the United States as it looked for allies all over the world to defeat the

cause of communism. Pakistan fell under the orbit of the West and joined the Western

alliance. With the help of this research paper, a deep understanding will be developed

to explain this relationship further.

3
Introduction

Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has been the most popular of its kind. A

word used to describe this relationship is inconsistent. There were many ups and

downs because of convergence and divergence of national interests, which switched

friendship to friction in no time. Pakistan earned the title of the ‘most allied ally’ of

the US in 1980s, 1950s and soon following the September 11th attacks of 2001.

Pakistan solely depended on the US for economic and military assistance.

This study will analyze the many decades of US-Pakistan relations and the dynamics

of inconsistency as the main feature of the relationship. It traces Pakistan’s weak

security and economic conditions and the formulation of its foreign policies under

many different eras focusing mainly on the Cold war and the post cold war period.

Since the end of the colonial rule of the Subcontinent, the Foreign Policy of Pakistan

has largely been driven by ideological and geopolitical concerns. Located between the

Middle East and South Asia, relatively closer to the Soviet Union and Europe,

Pakistan emerged as a crossroad between the Persian Gulf, East Asia and the West.

The great potential that Pakistan has, unfortunately was never fulfilled. Ranging from

many territorial disputes with India, to weak regional trade and political turmoil have

put the country in a very vulnerable position.

Following the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the state was a very weak one and

lacked major economic resources. With India bordering it to its east, defense was not

one of the strongest suits of the country. The US at this time, welcomed Pakistan to

4
the changing world order with the Cold War spreading to every corner of the world.

Pakistan chose to side the US instead of the Soviet Union in order to eradicate

communism from the region. Pakistan was an ideal location for the US as it bordered

Afghanistan and had northern linkages to the Soviet Union. The US bloc was soon

joined, as it also required security and economic assistance at the time of its birth. The

SEATO was joined in 1945 following the CENTO in 1955. The relationship has

extended from diplomatic exchanges to a very close relationship in 1950. Both the

nations have entered into a “Client-Patron” relationship, which was based on military

and economic power. Pakistan has been dependent on US for the security it

desperately needs for its borders with India and Afghanistan. Pakistan was therefore

bound to serve the security interests of US in South Asia and was unable to exercise

its autonomy for pursuing its own interests especially during the wars with India. The

early years experienced great friction between Pakistan and US because of many

reasons but four important reasons are explained in this study.

The US foreign policy had a global reach with many implications. The Cold War had

just begun and containing communism was the priority of the US. China and Japan

were also on the agenda of the US and it had no interest in the South Asian region.

Many US policy makers were under the impression the Britain would play a major

role in South Asia. Pakistan, a Muslim State, was more inclined towards Arab States.

Pakistan also wished to keep out of the big powers conflict creating a policy of

neutrality and good will under Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. During the early

days of 1947, Pakistan barely survived. Deprivation of military assets as well as being

economically unstable, it was in a war with India over Kashmir. It was a desperate

time for Pakistan and it soon requested an economic and military aid package from

5
the US. Both the sides were working hand in glove with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan

against their fight for self-determination in 1980, which was a new era in the Pak-US

amity. At the same time, Pakistan started its pursuance of the nuclear weapons

program. By the end of the cold war, the nuclear weapons program had moved ahead

at full steam which led the Pak-US friendship to a ‘disastrous, decade long tailspin.’

(Markey, 2013)

The focus of this paper will answer the following questions:

 What were the main reasons behind the US to bring Pakistan under its orbit?

 What were the different reasons for Pakistan to join the Western alliance

during the Cold War and what shaped the Foreign Policy of Pakistan with

reference to the United States?

 How can the different aspects of this relationship be explained and what have

both the sides gained from this relationship?

 How did the advent of the Cold War affect the relationship Pakistan and the

United States had to this day?

Following are the propositions of this research:

 To determine why the US brought Pakistan under its orbit.

 To determine why Pakistan joined the Western Alliance during the Cold War

and what shaped the Foreign Policy of Pakistan during the time.

 To identify the different aspects of this relationship and the consequences of

this relationship to Pakistan and the US.

6
Research Methodology

Purpose of Research

The relationship between Pakistan and The United States has never been consistent.

There were many ups and downs during different periods. Friendship was turned into

friction because of the decades of divergence and convergence of national interests.

Diplomatic exchanges from the early periods of 1940s turned to a relationship of a

closer proximity in 1950 and onwards. Pakistan solely depended on the United States

for defense against India and Afghanistan. The US depended on Pakistan to join the

Western Alliance against the communist threat that was prevailing all over the world

during the Cold War. The US wanted to establish bases in Pakistan in order to

overlook Soviet Russia. Pakistan since its birth was an instable nation, which was in a

desperate need for aid and assistance from the US. Hence, Pakistan was in a position

to serve the United States even under extremely difficult circumstances. This study

will analyze the evolution of US- Pak relations and the elements of inconsistency as a

glaring feature of the relationship. It will describe Pakistan as a weaker state pursuing

its economic interests and security. The cold war era and the expected future path of

relationship is extensively outlined.

Method of Research

Research Design

Philosophy: Interpretivism

Approach Adopted: Deductive

Strategies: Exploratory

Choices: Qualitative

Time Horizon: Cross sectional

7
Techniques and Procedures: Typology and Logical Analysis

Measurement and Instrument Selection

Primary research will be conducted by interviewing experts who have held

government posts in the foreign services on the subject. Secondary research will be

conducted through books, Google Scholar, HEC digital library, articles and

newspapers.

Population: Due to an unavailability of an official sampling frame, experts will be

identified by means of the snowball sampling technique.

Sample and Sampling Method: Given Snowball sampling, the sample size will be

determined as in when data collection for the purpose will be initiated.

Themes of Research: Cold War, United States of America, Pakistan, Foreign Policy

of United States, Foreign Policy of Pakistan.

Data Analysis: Typologies, data analysis will be used to get a clearer picture of the

Pakistan US relationship. Already available material online in addition to the

selection of books will be elaborated and explained to conduct this study.

Research Ethics: Anonymity and confidentiality will be maintained in order to

conduct the interviews if demanded by the interviewees. All sources were cited

properly and fair usage guidelines were used. Relevant sources were used to build a

data analysis in order to conduct a literature review.

8
Literature Review

History was made in Karachi with the United States extending a diplomatic

recognition to newly created Muslim State of Pakistan. It was officially the only

foreign power to send its delegates to the diplomatic exchanges that took place

between both the countries (Khan, 1990) The United States advocated Pakistan’s

membership in the United Nations and the Far Eastern Commission including other

international organizations. The years following the independence of Pakistan, the

relationship with the US was cordial but not close. The circumstances of both the

nations were very different; Pakistan was struggling with its birth, which had been

difficult for the nation because of its hostility with India. The United States at the

same time was involved in a Cold War with the Soviet Union and it wanted to

eradicate communism all over the world. Japan and Europe were the main focus of

American Foreign Policy. (Khan, 1990)

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were also introduced by America the

same year in order to contain communism better. This was a plan initiated by America

to provide financial aid to Europe and the rest of the countries, which fell under the

economic strain of the Second World War. ‘Exactly one year later, in June 1948, the

United States Senate, in the Vandenburg Resolution, went on record as favoring the

association of the United States with regional and other collective “defense

agreements” in pursuance of this policy’. (Mahmud, 1991) Pakistan had insisted for a

Marshall Plan that suited the needs of the South Asian region (Haqqani, 2013)

Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, spoke in one of his interviews

about a special package that the United States should initiate like the Marshall Plan in

9
order to benefit Pakistan. Pakistan, a newly created state, was in a desperate need of

assistance from America for the smooth running of its government. However Pakistan

announced its policy of “non alignment” which made Washington question providing

aid and assistance to Pakistan. The geo-strategic location of Pakistan made it a region

of extreme importance (Sultana, 2013) for the United States, as it was closely

bordered with the Soviet Union through Afghanistan. The geographical position of

Pakistan situated the country in the Middle East and South East Asia. It was closely

aligned with the Middle East to the Persian Gulf, Tibet Sinkiang and the Central

Asian Republics of the Soviet Union on the western side and to Tibet and Southern

China, and the whole of Indo China on the eastern side. The strategic importance of

Pakistan was motivated by foreign interests and became a gateway for the state to join

the Anglo-American bloc. This relationship remained very uncertain until 1950.

Liaquat Ali Khan had visited the United States, which followed agreements on

economics, defense and cultural exchanges.

The Eisenhower administration was a turning point in the US-Pakistan relationship.

The countries decided to enter into a mutual alliance for reasons different to both. The

Mutual Defense Agreement was signed in May 1954, following the Baghdad Pact in

1955, now known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Eisenhower administration began to look at

candidates in Asia, willing to serve as ‘garrison states’ and found an available client,

Pakistan. (Mahmud, 1991) Pakistan thus managed to earn the title of the “most allied

ally” of the United States in Asia. Pakistan allowed the United States to set up a

surveillance and communication facility near Peshawar in July 1959. Pakistan

officially supported the West in the foreign policy of containment of Communism. A

10
large amount of economic and military assistance was granted to Pakistan, which

helped make it a stronger and more stable state. The alliance was indeed satisfactory

to both parties in the short run.

January 1961 started a year, which cooled down relations between Pakistan and the

Unites States. President John F. Kennedy saw China as a greater threat than the Soviet

Union. ‘After the change of administration in 1961, Washington’s interest in Pakistan

cooled noticeably and verbal assurances of American protection came increasingly to

be substituted for military hardware’ (Kissinger, 2011) An event in May 1960, which

involved an American U-2 spy plane being shot down in the Soviet Union, caused a

strain in its relationship with the US. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the

President of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969 analyzed the cost-benefit ratio of the

Pakistan-US alliance after the United States had provided India with military aid due

to its border clashes with China. Islamabad began to mend fences with the Soviet

Union and China. The year 1965 started a relationship of deeper understandings

between China and Pakistan. This was as irritating to the United States as providing

military aid to India was for Pakistan. ‘Pakistan and the US appeared in each others

eyes to have failed the loyalty test’. (Khan, 1990)

Large amounts of military and economic assistance were granted to Pakistan until the

1965 Indo-Pakistani War, because of which the US suspended arms shipment to India

and Pakistan. The US placed an embargo on Pakistan until the War in 1971 and was

not lifted until 1975. There was an imbalance of power in the subcontinent and the

insecurity over Kashmir growing each day, led India and Pakistan to go to war against

one another. (Khan, 1990) Pakistan at the time expected the US to choose a side and

11
provide unlimited supplies of military hardware and training in order for Pakistan to

win the war against India. Pakistan received diplomatic support from Britain and the

United States over Kashmir in the United Nations, but neither extended their NATO

or CENTO commitments in the case of war with India. (Cohen, 2010) However, the

US chose to show neutrality and suspended the shipment of weapons until further

notice. The same embargo was imposed upon India, but the country did not feel as

desperate and dependent on US shipment as did Pakistan. Pakistan abolished the US

communication facility near Peshawar in 1968. It entered into an alliance with the US

with an ulterior motive; to receive weapons and gain political support in order to

balance the its larger neighbor, India (Cohen, 2010)

Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969 and General Mohammad Yahya Khan came to

power. President Nixon visited Pakistan in 1969 as a part of his twelve-country tour

of Asia and this was an opportunity Pakistan got to discuss the terms of the alliance.

Media reports stated that the agenda behind Nixon’s trip was to provide a completion

of ‘an agreement providing Pakistan with arms and US with bases in Pakistan’

(Haqqani, 2013) The State Department instructed Nixon to avoid any talk about

military aid in specific terms but when Nixon visited Karachi he realized that one of

the most important subject that the Pakistani’s hoped to discuss was military aid; the

other being their commitment to fight communism. Nixon liked the spirit of anti-

communism in Pakistan, which he did not receive in India. On his return to

Washington, Richard Nixon told the National Security Council (NSC) that Pakistan

was a country he would do anything for as the people of Pakistan had fewer

complexes than the people of India. (Haqqani, 2013)

12
Henry Kissinger visited China via Islamabad in 1971which made way for a Sino-US

détente with Pakistan receiving full credit and being widely recognized for making

this alliance possible. However, this Pak-US amity was short lived as the 1971 War,

which resulted in Pakistan’s partition, followed a major breach in the Pakistan-US

relationship. (Cohen, 2010) The Bangladesh Movement gained widespread popularity

in the US. After the war had ended, the new Pakistani leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto felt

betrayed by the US. Bhutto soon followed policies that were to decrease the

dependence of the US. The foreign policy under the regime of Bhutto followed many

directions. Diplomatically, he wanted to revitalize the Islamic identity of Pakistan by

creating stronger ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Islamic countries. Pakistan

became an important member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

made in 1969, and repeatedly called for help against India. ‘Bhutto also stressed

Pakistan’s non-aligned and developing credentials, calling his new policy

‘bilateralism’, which implied neutrality in the cold war.’ (Cohen, 2010) Pakistan

withdrew from SEATO and military exchanges with the West almost ended. Pakistan

became a member of the Nonaligned Movement.

Former policies were changed and Bhutto started a secret nuclear program, which his

predecessors had rejected in favor of US economic and military aid. This program

started in mid 1972 and was continued by General Zia ul Haq after Bhutto’s

execution. India tested its nuclear weapon in 1974 and Pakistan was simply reacting

to this event; strategic experts in Pakistan had explained that, they could probe and

provoke India without escalating into an event where the bomb would actually be

used in case of a large-scale war. This was thought right by Pakistan, as regional

politics were shaped by this assumption too. Pakistan could not easily get away with

13
this, as there was a price to be paid. The new nuclear program outlined Pakistan’s

relation with the West.

Pakistan’s withdrawal from international organizations led India to act as the

preeminent powerhouse in South Asia. Pakistan at the same time tried to reorient its

foreign policy and tried to improve relations with the ‘Third World’ a term introduced

during the Cold War referring to developing countries. Its ties with Iran and Turkey

began to improve to compensate its loss of support from the United States. (Khan,

1990) Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited America in 1975 to get the arms embargo placed on

Pakistan in 1965 lifted. This trip proved to be successful as the embargo was lifted but

Washington ignored the Indian nuclear test and gave assistance to India. An

agreement was signed by Pakistan in March 1976 with France for purchasing a

nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in order to offset the Indian nuclear superiority.

Washington reacted strongly against this transaction under the policy of non-

proliferation. (Khan, 1990)

This uncertainty in the relationship between the Islamabad and Washington explained

the vested interests of the two countries. The expectations and outcomes were very

different; Pakistan required US assistance in order to feel a sense of superiority with

India and the US wanted Pakistan as a gateway between the West and Soviet Russia.

It was also a situation where Pakistan and the US shared a ‘client-patron relationship’,

with Pakistan now being an ‘Estranged Client’. (Khan, 1990)

Jimmy Carter took office in 1979 as the new President of the United States. The focus

of the new president was on nuclear non-proliferation. The Carter Administration not

14
only forced Pakistan into abandoning its nuclear program but also forced France for

suspending its agreement it made with Pakistan on the sale of the nuclear processing

plant. In order to carry out the non-proliferation act, the US Congress passed the

Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Pakistan was the first country

under which a decision was to be taken, the second being India.

The Soviet intervention of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran brought about a new

wave in the US foreign policy towards Pakistan in 1979. The Soviet intervention

created a two-front security situation for Pakistan in the East and the West. Pakistan

had to face instability within the country and outside it due to an internal political

threat from one its provinces NWFP, which is now referred to as Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan shared borders with Afghanistan. Due to these

unfavorable conditions, the US needed Pakistan to act as a front line state because of

its strategic importance and President Carter informed Zia ul Haq that Washington

was keen on reestablishing the bilateral security agreement of 1959 to strengthen their

forces against a communist threat. The US government lent $400 million of economic

and military aid to Pakistan. General Zia ul Haq famously called this deal ‘peanuts’

and said ‘Pakistan will not barter its security for $400 million .. the assistance must be

commensurate with the size of the threat’ (Khan, 1990)

The Reagan administration brought about many changes to the US Foreign Policy.

However, the basis of the foreign policy remained the same, Ronald Reagan the

President of the United States in 1981, had three objectives in South Asia:

1. To contain Soviet Russia

15
 2. To less Indian dependence on the Soviet Union

3. Nuclear non-proliferation

(Khan, 1990)

The Reagan administration tried to foster deeper relations with Pakistan and adopted a

more sympathetic attitude towards Islamabad. An agreement of $3.2 billion was

signed in 1981, which was prolonged for 6 years. In April 1986, even thought the 6

year period was not still over, another contract was extended towards Pakistan with

military assistance amounting $4.2 billion for the period 1988-1993. This package

included the purchasing of the game-changing aircraft F-16 by Pakistan. The main

reason behind this revision of ties was because the US wanted to find an ally in

Southwest Asia to protect its strategic objectives in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

As far as the security of Pakistan was concerned, Pakistan obtained many

sophisticated and advanced US arsenal, which gave it an edge over India. The foreign

policy of Pakistan also experienced a pattern of stability and strength as it was allied

with a superpower. Assistance from the US also helped Pakistan to settle its economic

problems and bear the influx of Afghan refugees.

As the Afghan War was one of the most important objectives of the US Foreign

Policy, the nuclear issue still remained as important as it had been a few years ago. Dr

Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani scientist who worked to make Pakistan’s nuclear

program a success stated that ‘Pakistan had succeeded in enriching Uranium to

weapons grade’ (Khan, 1990) This stirred resentment in the US Foreign Policy

towards Pakistan. President Reagan mentioning the concern over Pakistan’s nuclear

16
program sent a letter to General Zia in 1984. He explained that the nuclear issue is

undermining the goals they are trying to achieve and halting the progress they have

been able to make so far. A group led by Larry Pressler, in the US Senate expressed a

deep concern over the transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to South

Asia. The US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment in 1985, which meant that

there was presidential certification required for any kind of assistance to Pakistan that

it did not possess a nuclear device. The Reagan and Bush administrations provided

certification to the Congress from 1985to 1989.

Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan by 1989, which meant that the US had

achieved its goals and eradicated communism from the region. This changed the

global environment from bipolarity to a transitional period. The new international

system placed the US on a sole power pedestal and Pakistan a front-line state. The

role of Pakistan was not as important as it used to be, but the country was now looked

at with hostility as spreading instability in the region and being a ‘nuclear

troublemaker’ (Khan, 1990) President George W Bush, the successor of Ronald

Reagan refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. It was under

this backdrop that all military assistance promised in 1987 was cut off and the

delivery of the F-16s suspended, even though Pakistan had already paid for them.

Therefore, from the perspective of Pakistan, the legacy it has maintained with the US

has been tilted towards negativity rather than optimism. There has always remained a

sense of distrust and extreme bitterness from Pakistan, as it believed that the country

has been treated unfairly. Some of the most important grievances Islamabad had with

Washington, which have not only shaped the policies of the time, but also shaped

17
future pathways of the relationship. Some of them include Washington’s refusal to

help Pakistan in the war with India in 1965, the United States discarding Pakistan

soon after the end of the Afghan War and the discrimination the US showed in the

wake of the nuclear issue.

The US played a major role in the formulation of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy during the

Cold War and the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It was the first test

case for Pakistan as a frontline ally of the United States. The relationship between

Pakistan and the US has been described as ‘a tale of exaggerated expectations, broken

promises, and a disastrous misunderstanding’ (Sunawar Coutto, 2015). It is a very

bipolar relationship, which took different turns in different points in time. Both the

states looked to develop cordial relations by economic and military means but often

faced times where one mistrusted the other. As Haqqani states, the US has had

expectations very different to why Islamabad had agreed to accept in the first place.

As a result, Pakistan has been disappointed by the US at the fact that it does not share

the same fears towards India. Washington expected Pakistan to join its fights against

terrorism and Communism rather than keep providing Pakistan economic and military

assistance for its hostility towards India. Moreover, the September 11th attacks helped

revive the amity the two states once shared. Relations on the war against terror were

strengthened and Pakistan earned the title of a ‘major non NATO ally’ as well as

securing a ‘special relationship’. The war on terror however, looked like an unending

situation. The future of Afghanistan and the Taliban, along with Pakistan’s security

fears with India, have different approaches from US and Pakistan.

18
‘The US sought to subordinate Pakistan rather than propose a foreign policy that

could endanger mutual gains and foster understanding. As in the Cold War, India

remains the most valuable diplomatic prize of the region, which reduces Pakistan’s

bargaining power vis-à-vis the US. This is a bitter reality and both the US and

Pakistan have been a part of the problem and not a part of the solution

simultaneously’. (Coutto, 2015)

Pakistan and the US have very different versions of the history they have shared.

Some truth lies in the fact that America used Pakistan when it suited its own agenda

and conveniently tossed it away when it felt the need to. Since its independence from

British India, the US often viewed Pakistan as means to other ends even if that meant

fighting terrorism or communism. As long as Pakistan proved itself useful, it enjoyed

generous attention and assistance from America. The spigot was soon turned off when

Pakistan was unhelpful. On the contrary there are often many complains about the US

not acting as a true friend to Pakistan, when it truth, Pakistan has also used the US at

times when it needed to. The Pakistani military saw the US as a means to balance

against India. At times when the US did not seem beneficial to Pakistan, it turned

elsewhere, to its neighbor China, or even a nuclear weapons program. Both the sides

have thus failed to establish a relationship that would serve beyond the instant

demands of the day.

19
Discussion and Analysis

Pakistan’s approach to negotiations with the United States is determined by

three important factors. The most important factor is Pakistan’s concept of the

United States place in the world, including their point of view of the United States

and the (volatile) history of US-Pakistan relations. The negotiation pattern of

Pakistan towards the United States intends to set the terms of bilateral relations

between the two. Their styles and the degrees of authority are very different;

Pakistan negotiates with the United States beginning from a common geopolitical

framework. The dynamics of this framework are such that Pakistan has to escape

from being overshadowed by its larger neighbor, India, perceived often as an

existential threat. This serious sense of insecurity has led Pakistan to look for

outside “balancers”. Therefore, this was the original reason for Pakistan to seek

close relations with the United States. Along with this, another important

predominant thought in a common Pakistanis mind is the mistrust towards the

United States. The second most important factor in Pakistan’s negotiating style

with the United States is Pakistan’s culture. Most Pakistani officials who deal

with the Americans are global and Western elites. The bonds formed during

these meetings are personal and there is a hierarchy present in these

relationships with the less powerful trying to turn weakness into strength. The

third major factor in the negotiating style between Washington and Islamabad is

the structure of Pakistan’s political and governmental style and its divided

power; the military has played an outsized role. These elements put together,

produce an approach we can call “the art of the guilt trip”. Important

negotiations take place with Pakistan placing an obligation upon the Americans

20
or a fear that failure to honor Pakistan’s requests will lead to consequences for

the United States.

The United State’s interest in Pakistan was strongly influenced by geography.

Pakistan offered a close reach to the Soviet Union, which as a result began the

US-PAK cold war alliance in the 1950s. Pakistan also acted as a proxy state

between the Soviet led communist aggression and the Islamic neighbor of

Pakistan, Afghanistan. There have been other factors that also shaped

Washington’s interest in Pakistan; the United States regard for the Pakistan

Military, the concern for social and economic development of a large Third

World country, its insecurity over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and its role in

maintaining neutrality in a large Muslim world. It is also fair to say that had

Pakistan been located elsewhere, it would not have been as great a focus for

American attention as it had become.

There were many instances where Pakistan gained military support in the terms

of arms from the United States so that they could be used against India. Pakistan

also looked for support from the UN and explained that it was owed to them

because of the alliance they had formed with the US. However quiet surprisingly,

the US played an evenhanded policy in South Asia after war had erupted

between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Pakistan expected unconditional

support from the US but the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations saw this

as a great chance to repair broken ties with India. Feeling betrayed by the US,

Pakistan decided to look elsewhere for support and not solely depend on

Washington, mainly towards Communist China and Soviet Russia.

Another war started between the two heavily armed neighbors in 1965, when

Pakistan declared another war over Kashmir using the arms US had provided

21
Pakistan in order to contain communism. Washington cut off arms shipments

and suspended economic assistance to Pakistan. The same action was taken

against India, with a slighter effect knowing how dependent Pakistan was on the

United States shipment of aid. The war of 1965 ended the disheveled alliance.

Pakistan thought the American’s were bound to help them and show the same

kind of aggression towards India and the American’s were furious at Pakistan

using the weapons provided by them to counter India aggression. The pattern of

differing US and Pakistani motives in a period of prolonged and intense

collaboration repeated itself to a lesser degree in the 1980s, when Washington

enlisted Islamabad as a vital ‘frontline state’ in its effort to force the Soviet’s out

of Afghanistan. This security restoration gave Pakistan a better prominence in

American Cold War strategy that it enjoyed before, even during the heady times

of the 1950s when Pakistan had gained a prominent position in Washington only

for a short amount of time, in 1971, when it facilitated the Nixon-Kissinger

opening to China. Pakistan also received the support of the United States during

the war over East Pakistan in 1971. Despite this pro Pakistan stance, Washington

did not save the country from a humiliating defeat and dismemberment.

Pakistanis were convinced that the United States could not be trusted on to

provide assistance when the decks were not in Pakistan’s favor.

The war soon followed a negative character of the US-Pak relations. Nuclear

ambitions displayed by Pakistan, the return of martial law under General Zia in

1977, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, violations of human rights, failure

to stop the destruction of the American embassy, and other major developments

stood out prominently in the assessment by the United States.

22
Alliance Politics and Pakistan

The Cold War brought about with it, two identified geostrategic locations; ‘the

Trade Dependent Maritime World’ or the ‘Western bloc’ made by the United

States and the ‘Eurasian Continental World’ or the ‘Heartland’ which consisted of

the ‘Pivot Area’ led by Soviet Russia. When Pakistan became an independent

state in 1947, the Truman Doctrine had been proclaimed, as relations between

the Western and Eastern blocs were tense. Pakistan, placed in a key geopolitical

position, could not have remained unaffected by the bipolarized world. In the

first place, the political elite of Pakistan, compromising of the feudal and

commercial classes including the military and bureaucracy were always fond of

the West. Those conducting everyday affairs had gone to the West for higher

education. The elites also believed that their position to hold onto power would

be more secure with the assistance from the West, namely the United States.

These were also the people who were fluent in the English language, which made

them connect to the Western World in a way that they could not have connected

with the East. Secondly, the economy of Pakistan, during the days of the British,

had been aligned with the West, which made any sudden transformation

impossible. At independence, Pakistan became a member of the British

Commonwealth of Nations.

To understand the early Foreign Policy years of Pakistan, it is important that we

take into consideration, the security threats of the state. The most obvious

security threat came from Pakistan’s larger neighbor, India. Pakistan had to face

23
hostile Indian actions soon after partition. Kathiawar was forcibly annexed by

Indian forces which was a region originally given to Pakistan. India also

successfully accessed Jammu and Kashmir by manipulation. Coal supply was

discontinued and Pakistan’s share in the cash balances was withheld. There was

a large number of Muslim migrants in Pakistan as the Indian Government had

failed to protect the livelihood of those Muslims. Pakistan had fought the

Kashmir was in 1948 and during the 1950s, had to face the Indian troops on its

borders. There was a looming threat to Pakistan from the Northwest too where

irredentist claims were made by Afghanistan. In November 1944, hoping that the

British would soon return back, Kabul expressed a leaning towards the

Northwest Frontier as a part of Afghanistan or gaining independence.

However, facing security problems right from its formation, Pakistan searched

for friends and was more enthusiastic to find them in the Western bloc. Trading

partners in the West made it easy to supply consumer goods at competitive

prices as per requirement and opened a market for Pakistani raw materials.

Thirdly, as Britain and the United States were one of the permanent members of

the United Nations along with having the most important say, Pakistan thought it

would have an edge over the Kashmir dispute with India. As the Eastern bloc had

still not recovered from the aftermath of the Second World War, the Western

bloc, United States had the means to provide economic and military assistance to

Pakistan. The decolonization of the subcontinent had also failed to bring about

any immediate changes in the Soviet opinion even though the Soviet Union held

strong beliefs about nations that were previously Western colonies, the attitude

of the Soviets was somewhat cool.

24
There are mainly two types of alliances found; bandwagoning and balancing. A

bandwagoning alliance means an alliance made out of choice, to maximize

benefits and if benefits are not fulfilled, those entering the alliance will

automatically leave it. A balancing alliance on the other hand is created on the

basis of a mutual enemy; this alliance remains active as long as the enemy is

shared and existential. There is no need for a formal agreement as such, but just

an understanding that both sides face a threat. Pakistan’s alliances with the West

were not only one type of these alliances mentioned above, but both are many

different occasions. It initially started of as bandwagoning as CENTO and SEATO

were joined to oppose Communism, in exchange of heavy military and economic

funding. The alliance had not proved to be strong enough as it did not prevent

Pakistan into seeking a close association with China to gain support against

India. The United States however soon realized that China was not a bigger

threat than the Soviet Union was and moved into an alliance with Beijing

facilitated by Pakistan. the Soviet sought an alliance with India meantime, much

stronger, providing economic and military support, as well as a veto in the UN.

For Pakistan, what started as bandwagoning, wound up as a strategic alliance

with China, focused against India. The United States never saw New Delhi as a

strategic threat, as did Pakistan and China. China eventually appreciated

Pakistan as breaking away from the West as it had always seen India as the

‘catspaw of the West’ (Pakistan and the Cold War, Cohen 2008)

The irony here, lies in the fact that Pakistan did not play a balancing role during

its years of CENTO and SEATO membership, but just after it had left it. As the

Americans have often viewed it, Pakistan was never an ally against China though

25
it did serve as a virtue when Pakistan bridged the gap between China and the

United States. Islamabad ever since, has claimed Washingtons support for this

role in the Cold War. This Cold War did not have as great an impact as after

formal alliances were broken and the Cold War moved towards India.

An Ailing Alliance

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States was not only limited to

the two states, but affected the whole world order in some way or the other. The

four features of this relationship are its partial nature, its asymmetry, its non-

congruence and its perceptual distortion.

The security relations between Washington and Islamabad are partial; for each

states, there are other more important states, which overlap their interests. For

example, the United States viewed the Soviet Union as more important than

Pakistan itself. On the other hand, for Pakistan, India demanded more attention

than did the United States. The key joint interests between the two states cannot

match the relationship between the United States and Britain or even India and

Pakistan. The security relations between the United States and Pakistan can also

be called asymmetrical. This relationship has been more important to Pakistan

right from the time of independence from British India, than it was to the United

States. The latter can withdraw from the region with minimal loss to no loss. For

Pakistan however, it is difficult to withdraw. Its very survival depended on the

United States; Pakistan could face destruction while the United States would only

be slightly inconvenienced. The security interests of the two states are also non-

congruent. On the Pakistani side, the military, economic and even the political

26
support provided by the United States is important in a range of military and

diplomatic fronts. The American side however uses Pakistan’s geopolitical

position to counter Soviet Russia. Both the states have other interests too, which

do not synchronize. Views on the Middle East, human rights and many other

subjects differ greatly. Their views on the Soviet Union also differed at one point

in time. This relationship is burdened heavily by distortion, miscommunication

and misperception. American’s see Pakistan as a nation of ‘Little brown brothers’

and religious fanatics. Pakistani’s see the American’s as omnipotent beings too

involved in their own affairs.

The absence of dialogue between India and Pakistan and the presence of a grave

threat between the two neighbors, justified Pakistan’s heavy military and

economic demands. A breakdown was submitted to the State Department for

Pakistan’s requirement; $700 million for agricultural development, $700 million

for industrial development, $510 million for building and equipping defense

services. The United States stopped all purchases of weapons after Pakistan and

India went into war with one another, and Pakistan used the weapons provided

by the United States. In the middle of political musical chairs in Pakistan, the

United States was concerned with an arms race between Pakistan and India.

There are two different schools of thought of Pakistan’s foreign policy in this

period. One school of thought believes that the Americans had played a very

generous role in providing for Pakistan and Pakistan was unreasonable to expect

more. It is also believed under this opinion that if US aid contributed towards the

defense budget of Pakistan, western tilt was worthwhile. The second school of

27
thought believes that Pakistan was paving dangerous paths for itself by believing

that the United States was in alliance with Pakistan against all potential threats.

The aid was military in nature and it was all that Pakistan received in the first

decade, which was simply provided to Pakistan to keep it sympathetic to

American interests.

Had Jinnah been less persistent, the Indian National Congress more considerate

or the British responsible in fulfilling their obligation, Pakistan would never have

become a part of the politics of the Cold War, not would it have suffered any of

the consequences. The state born on August 14th had many structural problems

from division between the east and the west to major economic tear down

because of the partition. Jinnah had died early and powerful groups n West

Pakistan proposed an alternative vision for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The

Indians were openly hostile to the new state and the only other option left for

Pakistan was to turn to outward allies.

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States can be best described

as ‘A Marriage of Inconvenience’. The relationship has been tense because of

many reasons; the national interests of the two nations have converged, mainly

for geopolitical reasons. Other vital areas where the interests of the two states

collide are counterterrorism, religious extremism, nuclear weapons and missile

proliferation. The end of the Cold War changed the world in many ways, with

28
many affects still haunting nations that were heavily involved, like the Unites

States, including nations that played background roles, like Pakistan. The 9/11

attacks made it possible for Pakistan to make amends after the two nations

thought it impossible to negotiate on mutual terms. Pakistan succeeded in

becoming a ‘reliable ally’ to the United States on the War on Terror, banning

many terrorist organizations and condemning their activities. The Unites States

had also often been weary of the Islamic identity of Pakistan, which boiled inside

Pakistan during General Zia Ul Haq’s military regime. This has been viewed as

the cause of the spread of terrorism all over the world. However, another

important factor that shaped the future of this relationship was the creation of

the Nuclear Weapon by Pakistan. The arms race between India and Pakistan was

thought to escalate to the point of the future use of nuclear weapons. The Cold

War and the arms race made it possible for Pakistan to be self-reliant which also

gave rise to anti American sentiment. These are concerns which have casted a

deep shadow on the relationship of the two countries to date.

Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan is not just a

relationship, but the story of Pakistan still talked about in every nook and corner.

Pakistan, the youngest country amongst its neighbors, was a country created and

imagined half way; its initial years were that of East Pakistan and West Pakistan

till 1971. An organic relationship had not been present with the mass of the

population and the idea of Pakistan. The state that was created on August 14th

1947 had deep-rooted structural problems. It was a state between the East and

29
West, its economy was affected very badly because of the partition, and the

major political movement of Pakistan, Muslim League, had deep roots in what

had become Pakistan. The Indians were openly hostile to this new state and the

only option left for Pakistan to offset India power was to turn towards allies

outside of South Asia, towards the West, namely Britain and the United States.

Over a course of some years, this relationship has been of bitter engagement

following withdrawal. America turned towards Pakistan during the 1950s when

India chose to stay non aligned, and Pakistan, a state desperate for support from

the outside, reciprocated keenly. Pakistan, formed under an Islamic ideology,

obviously showed a natural immunity towards Communism, as Communists

believe in the progressivism of society rather than a divine being. Pakistan was a

Muslim country and strategically very close to the two great Communist states,

China and the Soviet Union. Joining CENTO and SEATO, gave Pakistan a military

edge towards India. Pakistan was often thought to act as a model for the rest of

the Islamic World according to Washington, even though no other Muslim state

agreed to this. Pakistan emphasized Islamic origins and anti Israeli credentials.

Iran and other Arab states looked down upon Pakistan and Afghanistan was too

skeptical of Pakistan to regard it as a model for the rest of the world.

The early 1960s however frayed the US-Pakistan alliance when Pakistan turned

towards China for assistance, while meantime India was backed by the United

States in its war with China. America failed to mediate the Kashmir dispute; the

alliance almost became redundant only to be reconciled slightly after

Washington showed gratitude for Pakistan when it facilitated the opening to

30
China. The two countries soon became indifferent towards the alliance, only

paying careful attention to economic and military assistance. The early 1970s

however shattered Pakistani pride with the loss of East Pakistan, as the West did

not stop India from dismantling it, and neither did China come to the aid of

Pakistan. Pakistani insecurity grew so high that the years followed the creation

of the nuclear program that further followed with sanctions towards Pakistan by

the Carter administration. American foreign policy took a complete change just

some time later when Pakistan expressed deep concern for America over anti-

Soviet operations in Afghanistan. This relationship now took another turn; a turn

preferred by the American ambassadors in Pakistan, checking off the interests

they had attempted to advance, such as containing the nuclear program,

supporting the Afghan mujahidin, guiding Pakistan to a democratic political

order and averting Pakistan-India crisis. When decisions had to be made, priority

was given to sustain Pakistan’s help in the war against the Soviet Union. The list

however showed that the urgent often drove out the important, but also that

what is ‘important’ is a term very subjective and relevant; what may be

important to the United States might not be important to Pakistan and vice versa.

The religious fervor of radical Islamists was somewhat appreciated by the

Reagan administration as they were thought to be the best defense against the

Soviets in Afghanistan. A few years later, the Clinton administration focused on

the anti nuclearisation of Pakistan along with the Taliban-Osama bin Laden

nexus. This complex history depicts a lot of important features of the US-

Pakistan relationship as shown during the Cold War.

31
1) The alliance had many phases and was discontinuous, driven over the

side of the Americans largely by geographic calculations amidst the Cold

War and later to aid military allies in the war against terrorism. However,

for Pakistan this was very different; the state wanted to acquire security

in order to stand strong in front of India.

2) Military aid proved to be beneficial to the army of Pakistan, but the nature

of this aid was inconsistent. Military officials in Pakistan grew skeptical of

the Americans.

3) Pakistan received economic aid abundantly by America and most of its

social and economic growth took place during periods of maximum aid

flow. The consequences were ambiguous. The assistance was never

conditioned on serious social and economic reform. Pakistan did not have

any relevant role models either, as did Taiwan and South Korea.

4) The most pernicious and enduring consequence for Pakistan’s deep

association with the Western allies during the Cold War, most

significantly during its second and third phases, has been the conversion

of Pakistani self images from being a strong, staunch and reliable

moderate Muslim ally of the West, to being the victim, a state that had to

suffer heavily on behalf of the West, and which has not been atoned for its

suffering. It can be said that Pakistan was used, abused and discarded

when the West pleased it to be. This is the central theme now in the

relationship between Washington and Islamabad. This was the reason

that the relationship was so deeply wounded; future negotiations also

seemed almost impossible.

32
Using and discarding Pakistan began with Pakistan’s disappointment and ill

treatment as a CENTO and SEATO member. Pakistan was abandoned many at

times without a reasonable justification. This also includes a false history of

American response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, and a reminder that Pakistan

was treated unfairly, denied economic access as well as military after the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan. This narrative is not only to feed the American guilt but

is based on a highly selective interpretation of facts. It is believed to be too late

for Pakistanis and Americans as well as important countries such as India, to

agree to a more acute understanding of the hardships of the past that are being

carried forward into what can be called a troubling future.

33
Limitations

 This study has some limitations within which the findings need to be

interpreted carefully. First, as in most history cases, the studies accessed

were historical except for two recent papers on this topic. Digital libraries

for example Jstor, Reseachgate and the Academia, had papers published

from the 1980s to the early 2000s.

 Many research papers were published in universities from the United

States, which is why they were tilting more towards the opinion of the

West.

 Secondary data was used, primary data like for example interviews could

not be conducted, which would have made the findings of this paper rich.

 The focus of this paper is from 1947 to 1991, which is a very broad

timeframe. Thus it deeply focuses on what happened during these years

and the future of the US-Pak relationship is vaguely explained.

Reliability and Validity

To ensure the credibility of the data obtained for this paper, triangulation was

used and sources were cross-checked to make sure the right information was

being put into the paper. The readers can transfer the findings of this research to

other contexts. The results of the study are generalizable and the readers can

34
apply them appropriately. The consistency in which the results could be

repeated and similar findings could be found is present in the paper. Other

researchers, who may want to replicate the study, the findings of the paper will

remain the same. There is a unique perspective brought to the topic by this

research and no biases are found.

35
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