PENERA V.
COMELEC (A) The Court�s 11 September 2009 Decision
G.R. 181613
11 September 2009
FACTS:
The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A.
Penera (Penera) as a candidate for mayor of the
Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for
unlawfully engaging in election campaign before the
start of the campaign period for the 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections, in
violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code). The COMELEC found that
Penera and her party-mates, after filing their
Certificates of Candidacy, conducted a motorcade
through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,
aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners
bearing their names and pictures and the municipal
positions for which they were seeking election, one of
which trucks had a sound system that broadcast their
intent to run in the 2007 elections. COMELEC
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He
emphasized that under Section 15 of Republic Act
8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system for the process of voting,
counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections), as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now
considered a candidate only at the start of the
campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign
or partisan political activity because there is no
candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not
be disqualified for premature campaigning because
the motorcade took place outside the campaign
period � when Penera was not yet
a �candidate.� Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of
R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, has
practically made it impossible to commit premature
campaigning at any time, and has, thus, effectively
repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court to nullify the disqualification. She
argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to
warrant the COMELEC�s ruling. She maintained that
the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and
the supporters merely joined her and the other
candidates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for
engaging in election campaign or partisan political
activity outside the campaign period.
HELD:
Granting Penera�s motion for reconsideration, the
Supreme Court En Banc held that Penera did not
engage in premature campaigning and should, thus,
not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The
Court said �
(or �the assailed Decision�) considered a person
who files a certificate of candidacy already
a �candidate� even before the start of the campaign
period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which
states that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the
start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts
become unlawful as to a candidate is when the
campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election
offense only for acts done during the campaign
period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon
the start of the campaign period. Before the start of
the campaign period, such election offenses cannot
be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has
no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining
the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial
measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of
R.A. 8436, as amended, does not provide that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted
only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither
does the law state that partisan political acts done by
a candidate before the campaign period are
temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the
start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as
envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal
act and curtails freedom of expression and speech,
would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly
state that campaigning before the start of the
campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision
asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law
that any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not
declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act
is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to
declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state
that �any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period.� The only inescapable and logical
result is that the same acts, if done before the start of
the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court�s 11 September 2009 Decision also
reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16
November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground
that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. This
ground was based on the deliberations of the
legislators who explained that the early deadline for
filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was
set only to afford time to prepare the machine-
readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the
existing election periods, such that one who files his
certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will
still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine
into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436
that a person who files his certificate of candidacy
shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the
campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no
person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early
deadline required by the automated election system
would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign
period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that
this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed
Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law.
Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory �reversing
Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said
provision.
CANICOSA V. COMELEC
GR No. 120318
5 December 1997
FACTS:
Ricardo “Boy” Canicosa and Severino Lajara were
candidates for Mayor in Calamba, Laguna during the
8 May 1995 elections. Lajara was proclaimed winner
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
On 15 May Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare
Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because
of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies.
However, the COMELEC en bancdismissed the
petition on the ground that the allegations therein did
not justify a declaration of failure of election.
ISSUE:
W/N a COMELEC division should have first heard the
petition before deciding on it en banc on a motion for
reconsideration.
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IX-C applies only when the
COMELEC acts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely
exercises purely administrative functions. Moreover, it
is expressly provided in Rule 27, Section 7 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers
shall have a right to appeal to the COMELEC en
banc. Questions as to whether elections have been
held or whether certain returns were falsified or
manufactured and therefore should be excluded from
the canvass do not involve the right to vote. Such
questions are properly within the administrative
jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon
directly by the COMELEC en banc without having to
pass through any of its divisions.
DOCTRINE:
There are only three instances where a failure of
election may be declared: namely:
(a) The election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes;
(b) The election in any polling place has
been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes; or
(c) After the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of
voters involves the right to vote which is not within the
power and authority of COMELEC to rule upon. The
determination of whether one has the right to vote is a
justiciable issue properly cognizable by our regular
courts.
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to
hear and decide cases first by Division and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the
COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional.
The COMELEC exercises direct and immediate
supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. Its
power to direct supervision and control includes the
power to review, modify, or set aside any act of such
national and local officials. It exercises immediate
supervision over the members of the boards of
election inspectors and canvassers. Its statutory
power of supervision and control includes the power
to revise, reverse, or set aside the action of the
boards, as well as to do what the boards should have
done, even if questions relative thereto have not been
elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power
includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by
itself such steps or actions as may be required
pursuant to law.
ONG v ALEGRE (Pre Election Remedies)
1. Ong and Alegre were candidates who filed COC
for mayor of San Vicente in the 2004 elections.
Ong was then the incumbent mayor.
2. Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office
a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and
Cancel the COC of Francis Ong.
3. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the
three-consecutive term rule. Francis having,
according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998,
and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as Mayor and discharged the
duties thereof for three consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections. Hence, Ong
must be disqualified from running in the 2004
elections.
4. First Division of COMELEC rendered in 2004 a
resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre,
rationalizing that Francis might have indeed fully
served the mayoral terms but the mayoral term
however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be
considered his because he was not duly elected
thereto.
5. But the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch 41
has voided Ong’s election for the 1998 term
when it held that Alegre was the "legally elected
Mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San
Vicente, Camarines Norte."
ISSUE: W/N Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule even though the
“legally elected mayor” was supposed to be Alegre.
HELD:
1. Affirmative. Ong is disqualified as even if the
COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally
elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was
without effect as the declaration only took place
AFTER the expiration of the contested office.
2. Ong’s assumption of office from 1998 to 2001
constitutes the full term served in contemplation
of the 3-term limit rule.
3. Requisites for 3 Term Limit Rule to apply:
a. Official concerned has been elected for 3
consecutive terms in the SAME local post
b. He has fully served 3 consecutive terms
4. Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor. There was no
interruption or break in the continuity of Ong’s
service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
SWS v COMELEC (Election Propaganda)
1. Petitioner SWS and Kamahalan Publishing Corp.
(publisher of Manila Standard) states that it
wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. KPC also intends to publish
election survey results up to the last day of
elections on May 14, 2001.
2. RA 3636 Section 5.4 dated Mar 1, 2001 states:
a. Surveys affecting national candidates shall
not be published 15 days before an
election
b. Surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published 7 days before an election
3. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding
of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of
their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?
Ruling: NO
1. The Court held that Section 5.4 is invalid
because
a. It imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression
b. It is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period
c. The governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other
than suppression of freedom of expression.
2. The prohibition in 5.4 cannot be justified merely
on the ground that is only for a limited period and
it is only incidental. The prohibition may only be
for a limited time but the curtailment of the right of
expression is direct, absolute, and substantial.
3. Section 5.4 also fails to meet the criterion of the
 O’Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not
greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest.
4. Praiseworthy the aims of Section 5.4 may be
(e.g. prevention of “Dagdag-bawas” cheating or
junking of weak candidates) they cannot be
attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right
of expression.
5. It has been held that "[mere] legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.”
FPJ v GMA (Post Election Remedies)
1. In the 2004 election, GMA was proclaimed the
duly elected President. The second-placer in the
elections, FPJ, filed an election protest before the
Electoral Tribunal in July 2004.
2. When the Protestant died in Dec 2004, his
widow, Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene
as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She
claims that there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband to
ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.
3. GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased
candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is
personal and not a property that passes on to the
heirs. GMA also contends that under the Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and
3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest
the election of the president.
Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the
protestant who died during the pendency of the
latter’s protest case?
Held: NO
1. Only 2 persons (2nd and 3rd highest placers) may
contest the election. Rule 14 (Election Protest):
Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received
the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
2. Court has ruled that a “Public Office” is personal
to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to heirs upon death. Here, court
has denied substitution by wife/heirs. BUT while
the right to public office is personal and
exclusive, an “Election Protest” is not.
3. An election protest is not purely personal and
exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee,
hence, substitution and intervention is allowed
but only by a real party in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment. The protestant’s widow
is not a real party in interest to this election
protest. Since in this case, no real parties such
as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004
elections, have come forward to intervene, or to
be substituted for the deceased protestant, the
petition must be dismissed.
4. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to
the office of President but rather stresses that it is
with the “paramount public interest” in mind that
she desires “to pursue the process” commenced
by her late husband. However, nobility of
intention is not the point of reference in
determining whether a person may intervene in
an election protest.
5. In such intervention, the interest which allows a
person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter
of litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest,
Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit
from the outcome should it be determined that
the declared president did not truly get the
highest number of votes.
FAELNAR v PEOPLE (Election Offenses)
1. Eugenio Faelnar filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of barangay chairman during the
1997-barangay elections in Cebu.
2. One day after filing such certificate (April 9), a
basketball tourney was slated “2nd Jing- Jing
Faelnar’s Cup” which lasted until April 30, 1997.
This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering
against petitioner and Gillamac filed by Antonio
Luy. It was alleged that is was a form of
electioneering (campaign outside campaign
period) as there were streamers bearing the
name of the petitioner in the venue, name was
repeatedly mentioned in the microphone, it was
widely published in the local newspaper, and a
raffle sponsored by Gillamac was held with home
appliances as prize. It constituted an election
 offense.
3. Initially, COMELEC en banc in a Resolution
(973040) resolved to dismiss the filing of the case Lucman v. COMELEC
in the RTC. Antonio Luy moved for
reconsideration prompting COMELEC to proceed
with the filing of the case against petitioner.
Petitioner moved to quash on the basis that FACTS:
previous dismissal of COMELEC en banc was
immediately final and executory and that Luy’s
Petitioner Bairansalam Laut Lucman and private
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
(973040) was prohibited pleading under respondent Mosama M. Pandi were mayoralty
Commission’s rules of procedure. candidates in Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, during
the May 10, 2004 elections.

Issue: W/N the MR of Luy is allowed in Election

Offenses
Private respondent objected to the inclusion of ten
election returns, although only six of these are
subjects of the present controversy, to wit
HELD: YES (Petition DENIED)

1. A Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in

election offense cases and there is no question
that what is involved is a resolution of COMELEC
en banc in an election offense. Hence, MR of
such is allowed under Rules of Procedure.
2. Rule 13 Section 1 (COMELEC’s Rules of
Procedure): The following pleadings are not
allowed…. (d) MR of en banc ruling, resolution,
orders, or decision EXCEPT in election offense
cases.
3. COMELEC en banc is the one that determines
the existence of probable cause in an election
offense. But it may also be delegated to the State
Prosecutor of to the Provincial/City Fiscal but
may still be reviewed by the COMELEC.
4. Rule 64 (Rules of Court):
a. Section 2: A judgment or final order or
resolution by the COMELEC and COA
may be brought by the aggrieved party to
SC except as provided….
b. Section 3: Petition shall be filed within 30
days from notice of resolution sought to be
reviewed.
5. The grounds relied upon by petitioner are
directed at the validity of Resolution (973040).
The petitioner prays that such is null and void.
The petition is nothing but an attempt to
circumvent a final resolution of COMELEC. The
petitioner’s remedy was to seek its annulment by
way of a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 64 Sec 2. In the case, no such petition was
ever filed. The present petition to set aside the
orders of RTC denying its motion to quash and
MR was filed more than a year after Resolution
(973040) was promulgated. The Resolution is
now final and binding upon parties.
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner
as the winning candidate, as shown in the Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for Municipal Offices, signed on May 19,
2004.[3] Petitioner won over private respondent by a
margin of 16 votes.
Private respondent filed with Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) an appeal from the ruling of
the Board, docketed as SPC 04-184, alleging massive
fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the
elections, e.g., force, threat and intimidation were
employed on the voters, double voting, substitution of
voters, snatching of ballots, padding of ballots and
existence of flying voters.[4] Private respondent also
contended that the contested election returns should
have been excluded from the canvass, and that the
Board was precipitate in proclaiming petitioner as the
winning candidate, as private respondent has
manifested on record that he is intending to appeal
the Board’s ruling.[5] Private respondent admits that
the exclusion of the contested returns is a ground for
election protest, but he also argues that the
COMELEC may go beyond the face of the returns to
determine whether the elections in the precincts
involved are a sham.
Petitioner filed his Comment and/or Answer to the
appeal, arguing that the grounds relied upon by
private respondent are not proper in a pre-
proclamation controversy but in an election protest.

ISSUE:
Whether the appeal from the Board of Canvassers to
the COMELEC (First Division) interjected by private
respondent makes a case for a pre-proclamation
controversy
HELD:
NO, The proceedings in a pre-proclamation
controversy are summary in nature .[23] Issues such as
fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process,
the resolution of which would compel or necessitate
the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns
which appear to be prima facie regular, on their face,
are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy.
Such issues should be posed and resolved in a
regular election protest, which is within the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
The padding of the List of Voters may constitute fraud,
or that the Board of Election Inspectors may have
fraudulently conspired in its preparation, would not be
a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy
either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are
asserted, the proper course of action is an election
protest.
Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism
are proper grounds in an election contest but may not
as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election
and to disenfranchise the greater number of the
electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a
relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be
carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of
the innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud
and terrorism
DOCTRINE:
Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines a
pre-proclamation controversy as “any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board
of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns
SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy. - The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board
of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns
are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in
the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof
as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of
this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared
under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates. The foregoing
enumeration is restrictive and exclusive
Cipriano vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the SK for the
SK elections. And on the date of the elections, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 cancelling the
certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the
SK elections, including petitioners. Also, alleging that
they are not registered voters in the barangay where
they intended to run.
But, petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to
vote and her name was not deleted from the official
list of candidates. Petitioner won and took her oath of
office.
The petitioner, after learning of Resolution No.
5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that a
certificate of candidacy may only be denied due
course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by
any registered candidate for the same position
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due
process when the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
5363 canceling her certificate of candidacy. She
claims that the resolution was intended to oust her
from her position as SK Chairman without any
appropriate action and proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its
resolution by invoking its administrative power to
enforce and administer election laws. Thus, in the
exercise of such power, it may motu proprio deny or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who
are found to be unqualified for the position they are
seeking. The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801
governing the conduct of the Barangay and SK
elections in two newspapers of general circulation is
sufficient notice to the candidates regarding the
Commission’s administrative inquiry into their
certificates of candidacy.
Issue:
May the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power
to enforce and administer election laws, look into the
qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate
of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the
qualifications prescribed by law?
Ruling:
No. The Commission may not, by itself, without
the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a
candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76
of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and
acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of
election inspectors under the succeeding section shall
have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
The duty of the COMELEC to give due course
to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
ministerial in character. While the Commission may
look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not
go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is
thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said
body
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allows any person to file before the
COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any
material representation therein is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.
Further, the denial of due course or
cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not
within the administrative powers of the Commission,
but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.
Benito vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were two
(2) of eight (8) candidates vying for the position of
municipal mayor in Calanogas, lanao del Sur during
the May 11, 1998 elections. The election in the first
three (3), namely precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A are
the subject of BENITO's petition to declare failure of
elections filed before the respondent
COMELEC.1âwphi1.nêt
On the day of the election, voting started
peacefully at the polling place. Shortly before noon,
however, it was interrupted when some thirty(30)
armed men appeared at the school premises and
fired shots into the air. Petitioner alleged that the
ballot boxes and other election materials were taken
to the municipal hall by the military forces providing
security. From then on, the voting allegedly never
resumed, even when voters who had not yet cast their
ballots returned to their respective polling places after
the lawless elements had left.
However, private respondent avers that
voting in fact resumed when the armed men left at
about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. There were no
further untoward incidents until voting closed at 3:00
o'clock. As proof, private respondent submitted a
"Final Incident Report”.
After counting, these results emerged:
Petitioner filed petition to declare failure of election
and to call a special elections in precincts 15A,
6A/6A1 and 17A He also filed a separate petition for
the annulment of the proclamation of private
respondent.

Comelec denied Benito’s petition and confirmed the

CANDIDATE proclamation of the private respondent.
NO. OF VOTES

Issue: W/N the Comelec erred in denying Benito’s

petition to declare a failure of election?
Ibrahim Pagayawan 927
Ruling:

No, there are two (2) pre-conditions must

exist before a failure of election may be declared,
Zaipal Benito 879
thus: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or
precincts due to force majeure, violence or terrorism;
and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to
affect the results of the election. The cause of such
Amoran Macaborod 524 failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or
on the day of the election.

Of all the five precincts whose elections were

Jabbar Maruhom held in Disimban Elementary School, petitioner Benito
(no data available)
claimed only three precincts failed to function therein.

SC held that the COMELEC did not gravely

Private respondent won over petitioner by forty-eight
(48) votes and was proclaimed as Mayor of
Calanogas
On the other hand, the total votes cast for the three
(3) excluded precincts numbered forty-one (41) only,
which is broken down as follows:
abuse its discretion in denying BENITO's petition to
declare a failure to election and to call a special
election. It is indeed odd that petitioner singles out
only precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A as the subjects
of his petition when there were two (2) other precincts
in the same school. Likewise, he never objected to
the inclusion of the two (2) other precincts during the
canvassing and counting of votes.

PRECINCT NO. OF REGISTERED VOTES VOTES CAST

15A 177 1

6A/6A1 225 19

17A 188 21

TOTAL 590 41
 In a sense, petitioner equates failure of
elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis
the number of registered voters in the subject election
precincts. However,
There is failure of elections only when the
will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be
ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable,
the same must as far as possible be respected.
SEMA vs COMELEC
Facts:
Muslimin Sema and Rodel Mañara were two
(2) of the eleven (11) candidates for city mayor of
Cotabato City during the May 11, 1998 elections.
During the canvassing of the election returns
from the three hundred sixty-two (362) precincts of
Cotabato City by the City Board of Canvassers
(CBC), numerous petitions for exclusion of election
returns were filed. Sema objected to thirty (30)
election returns and filed a petition for exclusion of
such returns on the ground that the same contained
material defects, were allegedly tampered with or
falsified, prepared under duress, threat, coercion, and
intimidation, or substituted with fraudulent ones.
On May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order
dismissing 13 of the 30 petitions for exclusion filed
including that of Sema. Sema did not appeal from
these orders within the reglementary period,
consequently, the same already became final.
However, the CBC issued another order on May 29,
1998, this time granting Sema’s petitions for exclusion
of 30 election returns, among which were the 28
election returns already ordered included for canvass.
Manara questioned the order, the composition
of the CBC, the legality of its proceedings and the
capacity of the board to act fairly and judiciously.
On May 31, 1998, Sema and the other winning
candidates for the City of Cotabato were proclaimed
by the CBC.
On June 2, 1998, Mañara filed his written
notice of appeal with the CBC and subsequently to
Comelec questioning the exclusion of the thirty (30)
election returns which he claimed to be illegal and
petition for annulment of the proclamation of Sema.
On June 29, 1998, COMELEC issued an order
that Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
dated May 31, 1998 issued by the City Board of
Canvassers of Cotabato City is HEREBY
SUSPENDED. Sema is directed to cease and desist
from taking his oath of office as City Mayor and/or
from discharging the functions of said office.
Despite the above order of the COMELEC,
Sema assumed the office of the city mayor of
Cotabato and commenced to discharge the functions
of said office.
Sema filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
directing the COMELEC to desist from enforcing the
questioned order. Sema allege that the evidence
submitted by the private respondent before the
Comelec proved beyond doubt that his appeal was
filed out of time and that he failed to comply with the
requirements of a pre-proclamation controversy.
Issue: Whether or not the proclamation of Sema is
null and void?
Ruling:
The party adversely affected by a ruling of the
board must take an appeal within three (3) days from
the date of the ruling. In this case, the facts would
suggest that the CBC adjourned its proceedings on
May 30 and 31, 1998 without making any ruling on
Mañara’s objections to the CBC’s proceedings. When
Mañara filed his appeal in it cannot be correctly
argued that the 3-day period set by law for its
submission had expired because the CBC never ruled
on his objections to the board’s proceedings. The
failure or refusal of the CBC to rule on Mañara’s
objections should not prevent his right to elevate the
matter to the COMELEC for proper review.
The failure of the Board to discharge this obligation
should not in any way prejudice Mañara’s right to
elevate the matter to this Commission on appeal.
It is clear that the CBC acted without authority
when it issued its May 29, 1998 ruling. Consequently,
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered the questioned resolution of October 18,
1999 denying due course for allegedly having been
filed out of time and affirming the proclamation of
Sema as Mayor of Cotabato City and the resolution of
January 2, 2000 denying Mañara’s motion for
reconsideration of the October 18, 1999 resolution.
 Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null
and void as it was based on an incomplete canvass.
An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the
basis of a valid proclamation. A proclamation made
where the contested returns set aside will affect the
result of the election and the board of canvassers
proceeded to proclaim without the authority from the
COMELEC is null and void.
Tan v. COMELEC
November 20, 2006
FACTS
Abdusakur M. Tan and Basaron Burahan were the
gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates,
respectively, of Sulu Province in the May 10, 2004
national and local elections. On May 17, 2004,
petitioners, together with other local candidates for
congressman, mayor, and vice-mayor, filed with the
COMELEC four (4) Petitions for Declaration of Failure
of Elections in the towns of Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil,
and Panamao, all of Sulu Province
Tan and Burahan alleged systematic fraud, terrorism,
illegal schemes, and machinations allegedly
perpetrated by private respondents and their
supporters resulting in massive disenfranchisement of
voters. Petitioners submitted various affidavits and
photographs to substantiate their allegations
COMELEC Second Division, acting on the Petitions
for Declaration of Failure of Elections, issued its May
17, 2004 Order suspending the proclamation of the
winning gubernatorial candidate of Sulu, but lifted the
suspension three (3) days later
On May 24, 2004, COMELEC directed the concerned
boards of canvassers to suspend their proceedings
and to refrain from proclaiming any winning
candidate.
on the same day that the COMELEC First Division
issued the said Order, private respondent Benjamin
Loong was proclaimed the winning governor of Sulu
and he assumed office. This prompted petitioner Tan
to file a Petition for Annulment of the Proclamation
with the COMELEC First Division
COMELEC First Division issued an Order which
granted the petition and annulled the proclamation of
respondent Loong as governor of Sulu Province
on July 19, 2004, respondent Yusop H. Jikiri filed
before the COMELEC a Petition of ProtestAd
Cautelam, docketed as EPC No. 2004-66
praying, inter alia, for the recount or revision of the
ballots cast and the examination of election returns in
four (4) municipalities of Sulu, namely, Luuk, Tongkil,
Maimbung, and Parang
OMELEC en banc, through its October 18, 2004 Joint
Resolution, dismissed all five (5) petitions filed on
May 17, 2004 to declare a failure of elections. This
prompted respondent Jikiri to immediately convert his
petition ad cautelam into a regular election protest
which was granted by the COMELEC First Division in
an Order
COMELEC en banc ruled that there was no failure of
election in the subject municipalities of Sulu. It
reasoned that it could only exercise the extraordinary
remedy of declaring a failure of election in the three
instances mentioned in Carlos v. Angeles, in relation
to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. and
Section 4 of RA 7166, which in gist are: (1) the
election is not held, (2) the election is suspended, or
(3) the election results in a failure to elect. COMELEC
held that none of the grounds relied upon by
petitioners fall under any of the three instances
justifying a declaration of failure of election
While the authenticity and integrity of the election
returns from the municipalities of Luuk and Panamao
were questioned by petitioner Tan, those of
Maimbung and Tongkil were left undisturbed
throughout the preparation, transmission, custody,
and canvass of the returns. Petitioners alleged that
fraud and terrorism took place in Luuk and Panamao
because voters were forced to affix their signatures
and thumbprints; and the ballots in Luuk and
Panamao were filled out by respondents’ poll
watchers and supporters.
Citing Grand Alliance for Democracy v.
COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc ruled that the
grounds raised by petitioners were best ventilated in
an election protest.
The COMELEC did not give credence to petitioners’
evidence in support of their allegations of fraud and
terrorism since their evidence consisted mainly of
affidavits executed by their own poll watchers. The
Commission considered the affidavits self-serving and
insufficient to annul the results of the election.
Besides, it pointed out that petitioners presented only
a single affidavit of an alleged disenfranchised voter.
Thus, on October 18, 2004, the COMELEC, through a
Joint Resolution, dismissed the petitions for lack of
merit.
However, the Joint Resolution was not concurred in
by COMELEC Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain who
signed it with a note: "DISSENTING. DISSENTING
OPINION TO FOLLOW." Subsequently,
Commissioner Sadain submitted his Dissenting
Opinion on November 23, 2004 or 36 days after the
joint resolution was issued. The Commissioner opined
that there was failure of elections as the voters were
allegedly not sufficiently informed about the change
and transfer of polling places (clustering of precincts)
approved by the COMELEC en banc on May 9, 2004
or on the eve of the May 10, 2004 elections.
Commissioner Sadain citedHassan v.
COMELEC and Basher v. COMELEC which held
that insufficient notice of the change of date and
venue deprived voters of the opportunity to participate
in the elections.
This basis of Commissioner Sadain’s Dissenting
Opinion, however, was not raised by the petitioners in
their May 17, 2004 petitions (for declaration of failure
of elections) before the COMELEC.
The Sadain Dissenting Opinion was released on
November 23, 2004, and a copy of the opinion was
served on petitioners’ counsel on November 24, 2004.
Petitioners filed the instant petition in G.R. Nos.
166143-47 on December 13, 2004, 19 days after they
received a copy of the Sadain Dissenting Opinion,
and 53 days after they received a copy of the October
18, 2004 Joint Resolution.
After the dismissal of the petitions to declare failure of
elections on October 18, 2004 and the conversion of
respondent Jikiri’s protest ad cautelam to a regular
election protest on October 28, 2004, petitioner
Benjamin T. Loong filed on November 8, 2004 his
Answer with Motion to Dismiss and/or with Counter
Protest. Petitioner Loong anchored his motion to
dismiss on the ground that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an election protest
filed out of time.
On December 14, 2004, the COMELEC First Division
issued the first assailed Order denying petitioner
Loong’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the protest was
not filed out of time as there were still pending pre-
proclamation cases before it, the result of which could
affect Loong’s motion. It further held that it did not
matter that these pre-proclamation cases were not
filed by respondent Jikiri but by another candidate,
Abdusakur M. Tan, as Section 248 of the Omnibus
Election Code does not require that the petition to
annul or suspend the proclamation be filed by the
protestant. Thus, the COMELEC First Division
concluded that these pending pre-proclamation cases
would not prevent respondent Jikiri from converting
his protest ad cautelam into a regular one, and which
fact would not preclude the Commission from
deciding the election protest case. After all, the
COMELEC First Division noted that pre-proclamation
controversies and election protest cases have
different causes of action, and thus, could proceed
independently. Finally, the COMELEC First Division
directed the concerned parties to take the appropriate
steps to address the financial and personnel
requirements for the protest and counter-protest
proceedings.
Subsequently, petitioner Loong’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied through the second
assailed February 7, 2005 Order which directed
COMELEC field personnel to comply with the
directives of the December 14, 2004 Order. However,
in a subsequent order, the COMELEC First Division
stayed the implementation of these directives pending
resolution of the instant petition in G.R. No. 166891.
Meanwhile, on March 18, 2005, the COMELEC First
Division’s dismissal of the appeal filed by petitioner
Abdusakur M. Tan in SPA Nos. 04-163, 04-164, and
04-165 for the exclusion of certificates of
canvass, rendered moot and academic the issue on
the annulment of the proclamation of Benjamin Loong
as governor of Sulu.
ISSUES
1. Whether [or not] the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the
consolidated petitions despite the evident massive
disenfranchisement of the voters.
2. Whether [or not] the proclamation of the
respondents, albeit patently null and void, bars the
filing of the instant petitions for declaration of failure of
elections.
HELD
1. No. There is no evidence of massive
disenfranchisement. Factual findings of the
COMELEC which has the expertise in the
enforcement and administration of all election laws
and regulations are binding on the Court
2. No. There is no failure of elections.
Doctrine: Instances to justify failure of elections gives
(3) instances;
1. The election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases
2. The election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
3. after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes
Finally, there is failure of election only if the will of the
electorate is muted and cannot be ascertained. If the
will of the people is determinable, the same must be
respected as much as possible
Malaluan v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996
Hermosisima, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Luis Malaluan and Joseph Evangelista were
both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of
Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized
National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992.
Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor. But Malaluan
filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64
out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality.
The trial court declared Malaluan as the duly elected
municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. The
lower court found Evangelista liable not only for
Malaluan’s protest expenses but also for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Except for
moral damages, the decision was affirmed by the
Comelec when it found Malaluan liable for attorney’s
fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned
salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to
April, 1995. Is Evangelista entitled, in particular, to
unearned salary and other emoluments appurtenant
to the position of mayor during the above period?
HELD:
As a general rule, notwithstanding his
subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest,
an elective official who has been proclaimed by the
Comelec as winner in an electoral contest and who
assumed office and entered into the performance of
the duties of that office, is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances legally
provided for the position. Nevertheless, if the
defendant, directly or indirectly, had committed
unlawful or tortious acts which led to and resulted in
his proclamation as senator-elect, when in truth and in
fact he was not so elected, he would be answerable
for damages. In that event the salary, fees and
emoluments received by or paid to him during his
illegal incumbency would be a proper item of
recoverable damage.
In this case, the award of salaries and other
emoluments to Evangelista is improper. Malaluan was
not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who
undertakes to act officially without any color of right,
Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective office
under color of election thereto. Malaluan is a de facto
officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the
office and had discharged the duties pertaining
thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments
of the office.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; THE
FACT THAT A CANDIDATE PROCLAIMED HAS
ASSUMED OFFICE DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE
COMELEC OF ITS AUTHORITY TO ANNUL ANY
CANVASS AND ILLEGAL PROCLAMATION.
AMPATUAN, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et al.
[G.R. No. 149803, January 31, 2002]
PARDO, J:
FACTS: Petitioners and respondents were
candidates for the provincial elective positions in the
province of Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001
election. Petitioner Ampatuan and respondent
Candao contended for the position of governor. The
slate of Ampatuan emerged as winners as per
election returns.
On May 23, 2001, respondents filed a
petition with the Comelec for the annulment of
election results and/or declaration of failure of
elections in several municipalities in the province of
Maguindanao. They claimed that the ballots were
filled-up en masse by a few persons the night before
election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes,
official ballots and other election paraphernalia were
not delivered at all.
On May 25, 2001, the Comelec issued an
order suspending the proclamation of the winning
candidates for congressman of the second district,
governor, vice-governor and board members of
Maguindanao. It was however lifted by Comelec on
June 14, 2001 in response to the petition filed by the
petitioners on May 30, 2001.Consequently, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
petitioners winners.
On June 16, 2001, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition to set aside the Comelec
order dated June 14, 2001, and preliminary injunction
to suspend the effects of the proclamation of the
petitioners. Meantime, petitioners assumed their
respective offices on June 30, 2001. On July 17,
2001, the Court resolved to deny respondents'
petition.
Petitioners' assumption into office
notwithstanding, on July 26, 2001, the Comelec
ordered the consolidation of respondents' petition for
declaration of failure of elections with SPA Nos. 01-
244, 01-332, 01-360, 01-388 and 01-390. The
COMELEC further ordered a random technical
examination on four to seven precincts per
municipality on the thumb-marks and signatures of
the voters who voted and affixed in their voter's
registration records, and forthwith directed the
production of relevant election documents in these
municipalities.
On August 28, 2001, the Comelec issued
another order directing the continuation of the hearing
and disposition of the consolidated SPAs on the
failure of elections and other incidents related thereto.
It likewise ordered the continuation of the technical
examination of election documents as authorized in
the July 26, 2001 order.
On September 26, 2001, petitioners filed the
present petition. They claimed that by virtue of their
proclamation pursuant to the June 14, 2001 order
issued by the Comelec, the proper remedy available
to respondents was not a petition for declaration of
failure of elections but an election protest. The former
is heard summarily while the latter involves a full-
blown trial. Petitioners argued that the manner by
which the technical examination is to be conducted
would defeat the summary nature of a petition for
declaration of failure of elections.
On October 22, 2001, the Comelec issued
an order suspending the implementation of the two (2)
assailed orders. However, on November 13, 2001,
the Comelec issued another order lifting the
suspension. On November 20, 2001, the Supreme
Court issued a temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections was
divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide
respondents' petition for declaration of failure of
elections after petitioners had been proclaimed.
HELD: NO. Petitioners submit that by virtue of
their proclamation as winners, the only remedy left for
private respondents is to file an election protest, in
which case, original jurisdiction lies with the regular
courts. In Loong v. Commission on Elections, the
court ruled that "a pre-proclamation controversy is not
the same as an action for annulment of election
results, or failure of elections." These two remedies
were more specifically distinguished in this wise:
"While, however, the Comelec is restricted,
in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the
election returns on their face and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is duty
bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism,
violence, and other analogous causes in actions for
annulment of election results or for declaration of
failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code
denominates the same. Thus, the Comelec, in the
case of actions for annulment of election results or
declaration of failure of elections, may conduct
technical examination of election documents and
compare and analyze voters' signatures and
thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the
elections had indeed been free, honest and clean."
The fact that a candidate proclaimed has
assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its
authority to annul any canvass and illegal
proclamation. Respondents' allegation of massive
fraud and terrorism that attended the May 14, 2001
election in the affected municipalities cannot be taken
lightly as to warrant the dismissal of their petition by
the Comelec on the simple pretext that petitioners had
been proclaimed winners.
Elucidating on the concept of failure of
election, the Court held that: " . . . before Comelec
can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a
failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there
was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a
failure to elect; and second, the votes cast would
affect the result of the election. In Loong vs.
Commission on Elections, this Court added that the
cause of such failure of election should have been
any of the following: force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases."
Petitioners: Emilio M.R. Osmeña, candidate for Pres.
of the Phil. and Pablo P. Garcia, running governor of
Cebu Province.
 This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a
reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of
charge print space or air time for the campaign or
other political purposes except to COMELEC.
 In a previous case, National Press Club v.
COMELEC, it has been held that §11(b) of R.A. No.
6646 is valid against claims that it abridged
freedom of speech and of the press.
 The petitioners are claiming that since the ruling on
NPC v. COMELEC, “the ban on political advertising
has not only failed to level the playing field, [but]
actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the
poor candidate[s]” by depriving them of a medium
which they can afford to pay for while their more
affluent rivals can always resort to other means of
reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies,
parades and handbills.
 Petitioner’s contention is that, contrary to the
holding in NPC, §11(b) works to the disadvantage
of candidates who do not have enough resources to
wage a campaign outside of mass media. Their
financial ability to sustain a long drawn-out
campaign, using means other than the mass media
to communicate with voters, cannot be doubted.
 §11(b) mandates the COMELEC to procure and
itself allocate to the candidates space and time in
the media. There is no suppression of political ads
but only a regulation of the time and manner of
advertising.
 Comelec Space- space procured by the
commission in atleast one newspaper of general
circulation, in the absence of which shall be done in
any other magazine or periodical in the said
province or city where candidates can announce
their candidacy allocated equally and impartially,
free of charge.
 Comelec Time- radio and television time procured
by the commission to be allocated equally and
impartially, free of charge amongst the candidates
within the are of coverage of all radio and television
stations.
 In Justice Feliciano’s opinion of the court in NPC,
he stated that the law’s concern is not with the
message or content of the ad but with ensuring
media equality between the candidates with “deep
pockets” and those with less resources.
 This law was part of a package of electoral reforms
adopted in 1987.
 In this law, there was no total ban on political ads,
much less restriction on the content of the speech.
Given the fact that print space and air time can be
controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the
disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a
substantial or legitimate governmental interest
justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution.
 Section 4. The Commission may,
during the election period, supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of
communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.
 The provision in question does not suppress
political ads. It only prohibits the sale or donation of
print space and air time to candidates but require
the COMELEC to procure space and time in the
mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the
candidates.
 Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in
the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by
the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give
 all candidates equal time and space for the purpose
of ensuring “free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.”
ISSUE: does §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibit freedom
of speech and of the press as indicated in Art.
III sec. 4 and 7 of the Constitution?
 This is an original action filed before the SC acting
as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
 Miriam Defensor-Santiago (DS) ran for presidency
in the 1992 National Elections. She lost, but filed
this present protest against the winner, Pres. FV
Ramos.
 Subsequently however, she ran for Senator in the
1995 Senatorial elections where she won.
 She assumed office as Senator in 1995.

HELD: NO. It does not prohibit freedom of speech ISSUE:

and of the press, as its main purpose is to
1. W/N the electoral protest was abandoned by the
regulate. Any restriction on speech is only
protestant when she got elected as Senator?
incidental, and is no more than what is
necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting
equality of opportunity in the use of mass HELD: Yes. Her actions with filing her certificate of
media for political advertising. candidacy without any qualification, condition or
reservation, her inability to comply with conditions set
 Democratic reforms should be seen for what they by PET, and upon her acceptance of the senatorial
are: genuine efforts to enhance the political process
seat, it affirmed her withdrawal from the said protest.
rather than infringements on freedom of expression.
 The statutory provision involved in this case is part
of the reform measures adopted in 197 in the
aftermath of EDSA.
 A reform-minded Congress passed bills, which  In accordance to the constitution doctrine that a
were consolidated, into what is now R.A. No. 6646 public office is a public trust, when she filed her
with near unanimity. certificate of candidacy, she already entered into a
political contract with the electorate that if elected,
she would assume the office of Senator, discharge
its functions and serve her constituency as such for
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS
the term for which she was elected.

MARUHOM V. COMELEC

Petitioner: Jamela Salic Maruhom (Maruhom)

Respondent: Mohammadali “Mericano” A. Abinal (Abinal)

 Maruhom and Abinal are both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, for the the
14 May 2007 national and local elections.
 On April 1, 2007, Abinal filed a Petition for Disqualification and to Cancel the Certifiate of Candidacy (COC) of
Maruhom under Sec. 78 of BP blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
 Abinal alleged that Maruhom
o Is a double registrant. Maruhom supposedly registered first in Marawi and only after 3 days, she registered
in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration;
o Made false representations on both of her registrations.; and
She supposedly indicated that 1) she was registered in 2
different cities, 2) that she placed different birth dates,
and 3) she indicated different names on her COCs
o Made false material representation in her COC.
 Maruhom answered that she was qualified to run as municipal mayor of Marantao. She further added that a
candidate could only be disqualified for a ground provided by law, and there was no law declaring double
registration as a ground for disqualification.

ISSUES:

1. W/N COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they declared
petitioner a double registrant?

2. W/N COMELEC’s decision to declare petitioner a double registrant valid?

HELD:

1. NO. the case is well within the jurisdiction of COMELEC as provided for under Sec. 78 of the OEC.
The Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
 Under Sec. 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a ground for the
denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that
affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC.
 It is within the competence of COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to
material facts was made in the COC.
 If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, COMELEC is empowered
to deny due course to or cancel the COC.
 Upon cancellation of his/her COC, the person is not treated as a candidate, as if such person
never filed a COC.

2. YES. Given that when she filed in Marantao without cancelling her prior registration to Marawi, she cannot
be considered a registered voter in Marantao. Since she claimed to be one in her COC, she made a false
representation.
 Material facts with regards to under Sec. 78 of the OEC:
• Candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a
registered voter.
 An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery
of the electoral process by falsely representing himself.