TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS

1) PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito

Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as
father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants appellees.|||

[G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977]

FACTS: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally at CFI Quezon City for killing Agapito Elcano. At the
time of the occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and is already legally married. Reginald is still
living and gets subsistence with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground
that his acts were not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” Pedro Elcano
filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father, Marvin Hill. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss. The lower court granted the motion to dismiss; hence the present action

The motion to dismiss is based on the following grounds:

"1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule
III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
"2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
"3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage."

It was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants
of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
"Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.”

ISSUES:
1)Whether or not the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed.
2) Whether or not Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code can be applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally
married.
HELD:
1) NO. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
 Separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
  If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life
 To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. . Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
 In reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
2) YES. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
 While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor
(child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent
 Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.

2) CINCO vs CANONOY
FACTS: Cinco filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident because of the fault or negligence of Hilot involving his automobile
and Hilot's jeepney. After such, a criminal case was filed against the driver arising from the same
accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
Judge Canonoy of City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied and he elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court
of First Instance of Cebu with the allegation that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
CFI dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
a.) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil
action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action
is proper
b.) that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit
his claim for damages in the criminal case
c.) that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; d.) that
the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus.
Cinco filed a Petition for Review in SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.

HELD: The City Court erred in reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The civil
action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 is that arising from the criminal offense and not
the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31 is more appropriate in this case.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated.
The Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is hereby set aside.
City Court of Mandaue City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189

3) GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
FACTS: Private respondent Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
Petitioner alleged in said complaint that she is lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community and that she was a virgin before she began living with him as she never
had a boyfriend before; petitioner Baksh, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
Respondent courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year.
Petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage. Plaintiff's parents agreed to his proposal for him to marry their
daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in Bugallon. By reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors.
Thereafter, the parties started to live together in defendant’s apartment. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus.
Petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries.
During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing
of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages.
Respondent’s father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after petitioner-defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives
and friends to the forthcoming wedding.
RTC of Pangasinan:
The RTC, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of the private respondent. The petitioner
was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees.
Court of Appeals:
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court
promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling in favor of respondent
Gonzales, holding that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
this fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably
and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner argues that Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage
to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally
invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he
is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. Petitioner asseverates that even
if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances
of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.

ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

HELD: The court held that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong; however, damages
may be recovered based on Article 21 due to respondent’s fraud and deceit and wilful injury to
respondent’s honor and reputation.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, the Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
The Code Commission states that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept, while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept.
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New
Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
In the line with the purpose of Article 21, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission.
Instant petition is denied, with costs against petitioner

4) DULAY vs CA
FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. On
March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code cannot lie since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only
to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent
argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of
Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground
that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to
dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not
mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was
done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such
negligence are mere conclusions of law
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts
of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Thus, petitioners insist that
Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This
liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the
employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section
3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private
respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature
of the petitioner's cause of action.

HELD: An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing
Napoleon Dulay.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in
Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although
in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the
accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence
of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
 5) GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO
VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL,
respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35095. August 31, 1973.]

FACTS: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L.
Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned
and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-
trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference.

While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21 km, it collided
with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
driven by Pedro Tumala. Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization

Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving
in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car

RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law or
traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding

ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a
criminal action.

HELD: YES. Decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case.

 Essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil
Code are present, namely:

a) act or omission of the private respondents

b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger
bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car

c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision

d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault
or negligence of private respondents

e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties

 Violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
 Petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against
respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either
by conviction or acquittal of said accused.

 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.

 Petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article
33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to
do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal

6) NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990]
FACTS:
-Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo (Andamos for brevity) are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., (Missionaries for brevity) a religious corporation.
-Within the land of Missionaries, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded Andamos' land, endangered the lives of Andamos
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
-Andamos then filed before the RTC of Cavite a criminal action against against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of Missionaries, for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
-Another action was filed by Andamos against Missionaries, this time civil action for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
-Missionaries filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction
-Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land.
-RTC granted the motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action by Missionaries issued an order
suspending further hearings in the civil action until after judgment in the related criminal action on
the ground that Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that"criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action."
-On appeal, IAC affirmed the decision of RTC
-IAC also denied MR filed by Andamos
ISSUE:
Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that
the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
HELD:
YES. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of
a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury
or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.

7) TAYAG vs ALCANTARA
FACTS: Heirs of Tayag, Sr. filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac presided over by Judge
Alcantara, a complaint for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
and Romeo Villa. They alleged that while Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway,
he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Romeo Villa. As a result, he sustained
injuries which caused his instantaneous death. The bus was in a faster and greater speed than what
was reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without
due regards to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and
regulations;
The private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial on the ground that the criminal case
against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule Ill of
the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is
terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion and suspended the civil case.
The respondent Judge rendered a decision in Criminal Case, acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of
the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that the
petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the
criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions alleging that their cause of action is not based
on crime but on quasi-delict.
Respondent Judge issued an order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; however, the same was denied by respondent Judge.
Petitioners interposed a Petition for Certiorari to SC, claiming that the respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed
order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except
thru the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case

HELD: Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or commission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and
(4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties

The petitioners' cause of action is based on a quasi delict. As such, the acquittal of the driver is not a
bar to the prosecution of Civil Case for damages based on quasi-delict. Judge Alcantra acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case.
The order of dismissal is hereby set aside.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
 8) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
[G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984]
FACTS: The petitioners were charged with the crime of GRAVE COERCION committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:am, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province
of Camarines Norte, , the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia,
Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr.,
Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent
Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual
or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
CFI of Camarines Norte:
-found Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion imposes upon them to an imprisonment of FIVE (5)
months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; actual and compensatory damages of
P10,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law..
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.
-The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had
the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall
because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was
a nuisance per se.
Court of Appeals:
-reversed judgment in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but
they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual
damages.
- filed an MR contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results
in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
HELD: AFFIRMED.
- The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
-While acquitted they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
- When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
-There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering
that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings
where the accused was acquitted.
-if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a
conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt,
but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent
with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the
reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action,
and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the
prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and
(c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil
action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
-We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages
despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly
provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act
or omission.
-The two liabilities (criminal and civil) are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the
social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.