War, Sociology of

E. Kiser, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral

Sciences, 2001
1 Causes of War: The Interstate System
Most studies of war that take the interstate system as the unit of
analysis begin with assumptions from the ‘realist’ paradigm. States are
seen as unitary actors, and their actions are explained in terms of
structural characteristics of the system. The most important feature of
the interstate system is that it is anarchic. Unlike politics within states,
relations between states take place in a Hobbesian ‘state of nature.’
Since an anarchic system is one in which all states constantly face
actual or potential threats, their main goal is security. Security can
only be achieved in such a system by maintaining power. In realist
theories, the distribution of power in the interstate system is the
main determinant of the frequency of war.
Although all realist theories agree on the importance of power
distribution in determining war, they disagree about which types of
power distributions make war more likely. Balance-of-power theories
(Morgenthau 1967) suggest that an equal distribution of power in the
system facilitates peace and that unequal power distributions lead to
war. They argue that parity deters all states from aggression and that
an unequal power distribution will generally result in the strong using
force against the weak. When one state begins to gain a
preponderance of power in the system, a coalition of weaker states
will form to maintain their security by blocking the further expansion of
the powerful state. The coalitions that formed against Louis XIV,
Napoleon and Hitler seem to fit this pattern.
Hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1981) suggests exactly the
opposite, that unequal power in the system produces peace and that
parity results in war. When one state has hegemony in the world
system, it has both the incentive and the means to maintain order in
the system. It is not necessary for the most powerful state to fight
wars, since their objectives can be achieved in less costly ways, and it
is not rational for other states to challenge a hegemon with
overwhelming power. For example, the periods of British and US
hegemony were relatively peaceful and World Wars I and II occurred
during intervening periods in which power was more equally
distributed. A related attempt to explain great-power war is power
transition theory (Organski 1968). Power transition theory suggests
that differential rates of economic growth create situations in which
rising states rapidly catch up with the hegemonic state in the system,
and that this change in relative power leads to war.
Debates about power transitions and hegemonic stability are of much
more than theoretical interest in the contemporary world. Although the
demise of the USSR has left the USA as an unchallenged military
hegemon, its economic superiority is being challenged by
the European Union and emerging Asian states (Japan in the short
run, perhaps China in the long run). If power transition and hegemonic
stability theories are correct, this shift of economic power could lead to
great power wars in the near future.
Another ongoing debate about systemic causes of war concerns the
effects of long cycles of economic expansion and contraction. Some
scholars argue that economic contraction will increase war, since the
increased scarcity of resources will lead to more conflict. Others have
suggested the opposite: major wars will be more frequent during
periods of economic expansion because only then will states have the
resources necessary to fight. Goldstein's (1988) research suggests
that economic expansion tends to increase the severity of great-power
wars but that economic cycles have no effect on the frequency of war.
One significant change in the last half of the twentieth century which
will require substantial revisions in realist systemic theories of war is
the development and increasing power of transnational organizations
(such as the United Nations), since their assumption that the interstate
system is anarchical may no longer be valid. If the military power of
the United Nations continues to grow, it could become more and more
effective at preventing wars and suppressing them quickly when they
do start. Of course, it remains to be seen whether powerful existing
states will choose to cede more power to such institutions.
Theoretical debates about the systemic causes of war have not been
resolved, in part because the results of empirical research have been
inconclusive. Each theory can point to specific cases that seem to fit
its predictions, but each must also admit to many cases that it cannot
explain. Part of the problem is that systemic theories have not
incorporated causal factors at lower levels of analysis, such as internal
economic and political characteristics of states. Since the effects of
system-level factors on war are not direct but are always mediated by
the internal political economy of states and the decisions made by
individual leaders, complete theories of the causes of war must
include these factors as well.