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Tye Vagueness 1990
Tye Vagueness 1990
Vague Objects
Author(s): Michael Tye
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 99, No. 396 (Oct., 1990), pp. 535-557
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255019 .
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2. Is theworlditselfprecise?
The claimthatvaguenessis notto be foundin theworldis primafacie
veryperplexing. Consider,forexample,thestatements 'Therearemoun-
tainsin California'
and 'Some mountains areeasierto climbthanothers'.
Thesestatements aresurelytrue.Moreovertheirtruthcertainly appearsto
requirethattherebe vagueobjects,namelymountains and the stateof
California.Admittedly grammatical formis sometimes misleading. Stillit
is veryhardto see howtheabovestatements can be reconstructed so as to
avoidquantificationovermountains and,in theformer case,reference to
California.
Thereis a proposal(knownas supervaluationism) thatis oftentakento
avoidvagueobjectsand thatpermitsvaguesentencesto retaina logical
formcloselyrelatedto theirgrammatical form.'0Accordingto this
proposal,a vaguesentenceP is trueif,and onlyif,P is trueunderall
(eligible)waysofmaking P completelyprecise." So, forexample,a vague
singularsentenceis truejustin case,undereacheligibleprecisification of
itscomponent vagueterms, thepreciseobjectreferred tobyitssubjecthas
the precise propertyexpressedby its predicate.Similarly,a vague
quantified sentence,forexample,(]x)Fx, is truejustin case,undereach
ofF, thereis at leastone preciseobjectwhichhas
eligibleprecisification
10 For a clearpresentation of supervaluationism, see Kit Fine, 'Vagueness,Truth,and Logic',
Synthese, I975, pp. 265-300.
1l The following objectionto supervaluationism (as stated)mightbe raised:Considerthesentence
'Smithis bald'. If thissentenceis trueif,and onlyif,it is trueunderall (eligible)waysofmakingit
completely precise,thenit is trueonlyifit is trueunderthemostextreme (eligible)wayofmakingit
completely precise.It followsthenthat'Smithis bald' is trueonlyifSmithhas no hairwhatsoever,
i.e.,thatif'Smithis bald' is truethenSmithis completely hairless(assumingforsimplicity that'bald'
is theonlyvaguetermin thesentence).This is evidently false.So theabovesupervaluationist view
mustbe rejected. This objectioncontainsa nonsequitur. No eligible of'bald' canexclude
precisification
fromitsextension anypeopleto whom'bald' clearlyappliespriorto precisification. So, 'without any
hairwhatsoever' is notan eligibleprecisification
of'bald'. So, theclaimthat'Smithis bald' is trueonly
ifitis trueunderthemostextreme doesnotentailthatitis trueonlyifSmithis
eligibleprecisification
completely hairless.
3. The soritesparadoxes
fromvaguenessin somecentralexpres-
Soritesparadoxesare generated
sion. Consider,for example,the followingargumentwhichallegedly
derivesfromEubulides:
(i) A manwithno hairson his head is bald.
(2) n,ifa manwithn hairson hisheadis baldthena
For anynumber,
manwithn+ i hairson his head is bald.
So,
(3) A manwitha millionhairson his head is bald.
The conclusion is derivedfromthepremisses via a millionapplicationsof
modusponensand universalinstantiation. Now premiss(i) is certainly
trueand theconclusion, (3), is certainly
false.Therefore, premiss(2) iS
false.Therefore, thereis an n suchthata manwithn hairson hisheadis
bald and a manwithn+ i hairson his head is notbald. Therefore, the
predicate'bald' is precise,contrary to appearances.And whatis truein
this one case is trueby parallelreasoningforany predicatewhichis
ordinarily classified
as 'vague'.
An argument alongthe samelinescan be givento showthatMount
Everestis notvague.Here is theargument: SupposethatL is a straight
pathextending frominsideEverestthrough theearthto New YorkCity.
SupposealsothatEverestis vague,as is ordinarily assumed.Thenitis not
thecase thatthereis a verytiny,precisechunkofmatterwhichlies on L
withinEverest'sboundaries and whichtouchesanothersuchchunkwhich
lieson L outside.So, foranytwoverytiny,precisechunksofmatter that
lie on L andthattouchoneanother, ifoneis insideEverestthentheother
is too.So, byan appropriately extendedsequenceofmodusponenssteps,
itfollowsthata verytiny,precisechunkofmatter lyingwithinNew York
Cityis insideEverest.So Everestis not vague(or alternatively Everest
does notexist).
16 E.g., PeterUnger,'There Are No Ordinary Things',Synthese,I979, pp. II7-54; Samuel
I979, pp. I55-73.
Wheeler,'On That Whichis Not', Synthese,
T F T T IF TTT T IF T I F
I I I I IF T II T II I I I
F T F FFF TI TTT F I T
4. fromIdentity
The Argument
This argument, in itsoriginalform,is due to GarethEvans.33According
toEvans,thethesisthattheworldcontainsvagueobjectsorthattheworld
mightcontainsuch objectsrestsin partupon the thesisthatidentity
statements are sometimes vague.Evansmaintains thatthislatterthesisis
false.For supposethat'a' and 'b' are singulartermsand that'a= b' is
in truth-value.
indefinite Then,ifwe let '7' symbolize the
'indefinitely',
followingis true:
(I7) V(a=b).
(20) 'xiV (x = a)', so that
ascribesto b theproperty
(I 8) X' [V (x=a)] b
is also true.Now surelywe have
(i9) r V (a=a)
and hence
(20
_- _'
[ . 7 (x = A) a.1