Federica Basaglia,

Dipartimento di Studi
Umanistici (Filosofia),
Università degli Studi di
Ferrara

Obligations to the Self and Obligations to Animals

For Immanuel Kant, humans have moral obligations only to other human beings or to

themselves. However, when we treat animals in a violent and cruel way, we weaken our

ability to feel compassion – a crucial natural disposition in our moral life – and gradually

eradicate it completely. Respect for animal sensitivity and gratitude towards animals for

assistance in carrying out strenuous work for us are, first of all, perfect duties to ourselves

and, secondly, indirect duties to animals (“in Ansehung der Tiere”, Tugendlehre, TL AA 06:

443 10-25). In my view, Kant’s theory represents a compelling option for the justification of

a coherent and rigorous animal ethics, the potential of which has not been fully appreciated

yet. The Kantian argument for the existence of duties to animals is able to justify very strict

moral obligations towards animals, for example, with respect to the prohibition of animal

testing in case there are alternative methods (TL AA 06: 443 16-25). Moreover, because of its

anthropocentric and logocentric character, Kant’s argument is immune to most of the

objections raised against the major animal ethics theories: the importance of sensitivity and

compassion in the justification of moral obligations (used against utilitarianism and

compassion ethics); the problematic determination of the relevant characteristics for the

assignment of moral status (used against Tom Regan´s rights-ethics); or the essential

reference to human interests in deriving moral obligations (central to contractualism). Finally,

Kant’s ethics does not confer moral rights on animals, nor does it claim that direct obligations

to animals exist; hence it is immune to the objection that these moral notions cannot be

applied to animals.

However, the Kantian argument for duties towards animals encounters a serious problem:

whether it is possible to justify moral duties to oneself. My paper focuses on this issue.

Most contemporary philosophers think that there are no duties to the self. The problematic

element of this concept is the coincidence of the legislating subject and the object of the
moral obligation in the same person. For one could then object to the existence of duties to

the self claiming that, if the legislating subject and the object of moral obligations are one and

the same individual, the person could anytime free herself from the moral obligations she has

set herself to have (M.G. Singer 1959 and 1975).

According to Kant, however, far from being contradictory, the coincidence between subject

and object of moral obligations points to the ground of validity for each and every type of

moral duty: the moral autonomy of the rational being (MS AA 06:417.25-418.3). Some

contemporary authors agree. They claim that the notion of duty towards the self is of central

importance for our moral conception: without it moral characteristics such as autonomy and

categoricity would not be conceivable (Tiedemann 2007 and Timmermann 2006). In saying

this they are inspired by Kant, but at the same time they dismiss the metaphysical

presuppositions of Kant’s concept of autonomy (MS AA 06: 418.14-23). In the contemporary

debate, moral autonomy is thus understood as the capacity for self-legislation: the capacity to

set for oneself, independently of external influences, moral principles and laws.

In my opinion, however, this concept of autonomy does not allow us to answer convincingly

the objection mentioned above. This is because contemporary authors do not render explicit

and, accordingly, do not justify a crucial element in their conception of duties to oneself: the

reference to the intrinsic value of the rational being as a moral object. Without this notion in

place, a person can in principle cancel the moral obligation to herself any time.

The idea that the rational being has an intrinsic and absolute value that must be respected in

all circumstances, is not problematic for Kant and is central to his ethics (Grundlegung zur

Metaphysik der Sitten GMS AA 04:429.10-12 and GMS AA 04:394.32-34, 421.24-425.13).

On the other hand, the question of whether intrinsic and absolute value can be attributed to

human beings – in other words, whether there is such a thing as human dignity – is a

controversial topic in contemporary ethical discussion.