Quine

QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND
FOUNDATIONALISM IN PHILOSOPHY
BY
OKPALA, MICHAEL IFEANYICHUKWU
(DI/648)
BEING A LONG ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, DOMINICAN INSTITUTE,
(AFFILIATED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN), IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A
BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY
SAMONDA, IBADAN
JUNE, 2018
1
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the Long Essay entitled: QUINE’S THEORY OF
ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND FOUNDATIONALISM IN
PHILOSOPHY, submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Dominican Institute,
Ibadan, for the award of a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy by the University of Ibadan,
is an original research carried out by Okpala, Michael Ifeanyichukwu DI/648 and
supervised by me.
DATE…………………… SIGN………………………..
SUPERVISOR
Dr. Chika Mba
Lecturer, Dominican Institute.
2
APPROVAL
This Research Report has been approved for the Department of Philosophy,
Dominican Institute, Ibadan.
By
………………………………………………. ………………………….
Rev. Fr. Dr. Joseph T. Ekong, O.P. Date
(Head of Department of Philosophy)
3
DEDICATION
To
The Mother Thrice Admirable, Queen and Victress of Schoenstatt, who has gratuitous ly
granted me profound maternal guidance and comfort throughout these years. She has
shown me that She has a special love for me. Dearest Mother you love me and I know
it; I love you and you know it too.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I give the greatest share of my gratitude to God who, in Jesus Christ through the
Holy Spirit has been guiding me all these years. I also thank the Blessed Mother, the
Mother Thrice Admirable, Queen and Victress of Schoenstatt who guides, guards and
comforts me in her soothing intercession.
I appreciate the immense paternal contributions of my supervisor, Dr. Chika
Mba whose stockpile of intellectual resources I was privileged to tap from. I also thank
the entire academic community of the Dominican Institute, and, the University of
Ibadan.
My unalloyed gratitude also goes to my biological family. I thank my beloved
parents Mr. & Mrs. Aloysius and Maureen Okpala. Their sustaining love brought me
into this world and taught me that success is a fruit of the torture of hard work and the
sincerity of purpose. My thanks also go to my darling siblings- Doodo, Aku baby and
Kelly. I love you all. I remember also Aunties Rose Oranusi, Adamma Ubasineke,
Chinwe Igboanugo, Uncle Samtos Igboanugo and all my relatives especially the
unmentioned. I cherish you all. You are part of my history.
I also sincerely extend my gratitude to the Secular Institute of the Schoenstatt
Fathers Community. Their spiritual, financial and formative generosity is a source of
encouragement to me. My appreciation particularly goes to all my formators especially
the Rector of Students, Rev. Fr. Dr. Charles Ozioko, Spiritual Director, Rev. Fr.
Nichodemus Okenwa. I also extend my gratitude to my erstwhile Rector and Spiritua l
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Director, Frs. Reginald Ibe and Claudius Uwaoma respectively. Also to Frs. Juan Pablo
Catoggio and Pablo Pol. You all are an inspiration to me.
To some of my Schoenstatt friends who dedicate a lot of energy and time in
praying for and supporting me even without necessarily meeting me in person,
especially Mrs. Marianne Komek (USA) and Mrs. Teodula Vazquez (USA). To my
close friend, Lady Mrs. Rufina Njideka Okeke, you are simply good. In like manner, I
want to thank some close friends whose support make me ever indebted- Frs. Kingsle y
Njoku, Victor Eleba, Joseph Enyiaka, George Nwachukwu, and Raymond Odo, Isch.
This vote of thanks would be incomplete if I do not recognise the painstaking
contributions of those who proofread this work. I thank on this note, Collins Nwafor,
Rev. Fr. Dr. Charles Ozioko, Paulinus Ekpunobi, Rev. Fr. Michael Konye (Poland),
and Steve-Mario Udofia.
To all the brothers in the Schoenstatt Fathers Student Community, Nigeria,
especially the St. Luke’s Group (Kingsley, Darlington, John-Paul, John-Collins and
Justice), Njoku Mac-Donald, Justice Orieukwu and Jean Bosco Habonimana. I love you
all. You are all my friends and my brothers.
To all others who because of the limited number of pages, I have not mentio ned
their names, I recognise you all. You are all in my heart. I love and cherish you forever.
Okpala, Michael Ifeanyichukwu,
December 3rd 2017.
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ABSTRACT
Quine’s theory of ontological relativity holds that in the realm of discourse, there are
several ways of painting and picturing reality, where each picture of reality could go
for an acceptable or likely picture of how things are. In defending ontological relativity,
Quine moves against foundationalism in Philosophy. He seems to follow the notions of
relativism, pragmatism and libertarianism which virtually all post-modernist
philosophers are enamoured of.
In trying to undercut foundations, Quine’s theory implicitly posits background theory
as an epistemic-determining foundation which is fulfilled on the premises of naturalised
epistemology. Again, while he sought to pattern naturalised epistemology after the
methodology of the natural sciences, the foundational nature of the natural sciences also
stare it at the face. This essay deploys critical analysis to argue that contra Quine and
some scholars like Richard Rorty, Quine’s theory does not imply the demise of
foundationalism, for foundations are indispensable for progress, rather, it provides a
framework for re-working and re-defining foundationalism along new lines. If this be
so understood, then false assumptions about Quine’s programme would be dispensed
with, and, the hope of an epistemology that guides knowledge acquisition, would be
reached.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page……………………………………………………………………………….i
Certification……………………………………………………………...……………ii
Approval………………………………………………………………………...……iii
Dedication…………………………………………………………………………….iv
Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………..v
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………vii
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION…………………………………1
1.1.Background to the Study…………………………………………………………..1
1.2.Statement of the Problem………………………………………………………….3
1.3.Objectives of the Study……………………………………………………………3
1.4.Relevance of the Study……………………………………………………………4
1.5.Thesis of the Study………………………………………………………………...5
1.6.Conceptual Clarifications…………………………………………………………5
1.7.Literature Review…………………………………………………………………7
CHAPTER TWO: INFLUENCES ON QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL
RELATIVITY……………………………………………………………………….11
2.1. Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects…………………………………………..11
2.2. Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Descriptions……………………………………...14
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2.3.Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Language Game…………………………………………16
2.4.Rudolf Carnap’s Reductionism…………………………………………………..19
2.5.John Dewey’s Behaviourism…………………………………………………….22
2.6.Chapter Evaluation………………………………………………………………24
CHAPTER THREE: QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY:
AN EXPOSITION…………………………………………………………………..25
3.1. Quine’s Theory of Ontological Relativity………………………………………25
3.1.1. Ontology……………………………………………………………….25
3.1.2. Relativity………………………………………………………………32
3.2. Pillars of Quine’s Theory of Ontological Relativity……………………………...35
3.2.1. Language………………………………………………………………35
3.2.2. Logic…………………………………………………………………...37
3.2.3. Behaviourism…………………………………………………………..38
3.2.4. Naturalism……………………………………………………………..39
3.2.5. Relativism……………………………………………………………...40
3.2.6. Pragmatism…………………………………………………………….41
3.2.7. Holism…………………………………………………………………42
3.3. Chapter Evaluation………………………………………………………………43
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CHAPTER FOUR: QUINE AND FOUNDATIONALISM IN PHILOSOPHY
...............................................................................................................................…...44
4.1. Ontological Relativity and Indeterminacy of Translation……………………….44
4.2. Naturalised Epistemology as a Foundationalist Programme…………………….50
4.2.1 The Challenge of Scepticism to Knowledge…………………………...51
4.2.2. Traditional Foundationalist response to Scepticism…………………...53
4.2.3. Naturalised Epistemology……………………………………………..55
4.2.4. Quine’s Reasons for Naturalising Epistemology…………………......58
4.2.5. Naturalised Epistemology: A Foundationalist Programme…………...59
4.3. Chapter Evaluation………………………………………………………………65
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………66
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….72
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1.Background to the Study
Life is copiously filled with intriguing problems and perplexing issues that spur
the restive human mind to incessant cogitations. One of such is the problem of the
interplay between knowledge, the linguist, language and the world. Quine’s theory of
ontological relativity is an attempt to demonstrate how these forces ought to interplay.
Quine’s theory is a follow up to his demythologistic intent in his “Two Dogmas
of Empiricism.”1 The first dogma is of more importance to us as it grounds Quine’s
later ontological relativity argument. The first dogma avers that there is a cleavage
between analytic and synthetic truths. This analytic-synthetic distinction which was
more pronounced in Kant, stirred the dogmatic disavowal of Quine who saw the
distinction as a cancerous myth, of which philosophy must be demythologised. Quine
denied the existence of any distinction whatever on the basis that meaning is of more
importance to us than naming, and meaning is a product of human articulation. And if
this is the case, any two things can be synonymous in meaning but not in name, since,
the same people who made the analytic what it is, can as well decide to make it
synthetic. Corroborating this he says: “any statement (whether synthetic or analytic)
1 By demythologistic we mean that Quine considered the long held distinction between analytic and
synthetic statements as a traditional (mythical) story bereft of the truth -conduciveness that the
experiential realm affords. Because it is a mere story bereft of any truth-worthiness character, Quine
sought to show that in experience, this distinction is false and cannot hold. It is this demonstration of the
experiential falsity of this trend that makes us consider Quine’s submissions as demythologistic.
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can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in
the system.”2
The denial of this distinction launched Quine’s claim that there is neither any
exclusively sacrosanct worldview nor is there any eternal realm where people inspect
to be able to rightly picture reality. This further made him look to language as assuming
a central and primal place in our discourse, which for him, provides us with the outline
of reality that is humanly possible. On the basis of Quine’s commitment to language as
the ultimate purveyor of reference in epistemic matters, Quine is famously known to
opine that it is language (and the linguistic user) that determines ontology. 3 Ontology
is then relative to background theories.
Quine’s assumption fuelled his further thesis that traditional epistemolo gy
which adopted a serious foundationalistic temper pursues a lost and ignominious cause.
This is because for him, it neither sufficiently addresses the sceptical-epistemic problem
nor does it afford us human knowledge. It can only best afford us a transient romance
with knowledge. Thus, he proposed Naturalised Epistemology, which is both a
fulfillment and a culmination of ontological relativity.
2 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, p. 43.

3 Peter Hylton, Quine, p. 299.
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1.2.Statement of the Problem
Quine’s displeasure with any foundationalist spirit seems to be at the basis of
his theses. In his theory of ontological relativity he avers that absolute meaning
determination and extrapolation of meaning from one context to another is illegitima te
and inadmissible. This anti-foundationalist ambition, gained epistemic fulfillment in
his naturalised epistemology, according to which, epistemology is to be modelled after
the methodology of the natural sciences which sees foundationalism as an unnatura l
aspiration. This fact has led a host of scholars like Richard Rorty to interpret Quine’s
submissions as anti-foundationalist. But this, we think and we shall show, is not the
case.
1.3.Aims and Objectives of the Study
This essay has set as its task the following goals.
1. To examine some of the personages that influenced Quine’s arrival at his theory
of ontological relativity, so as to understand how and why Quine arrived at his
theory.
2. To understand the focal point of Quine’s theory of ontological relativity via an
understanding of what ontology and relativity means for him.
3. To show the relationship that exists between Quine’s theory of ontologic a l
relativity and his indeterminacy thesis, and how this relationship is to be
properly viewed and understood.
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4. To repudiate the basis of Quine’s anti-foundationalist naturalised epistemolo gy,
and to hence, on the basis of this repudiation, make a case for the necessary
foundationalistic nature of any progressive pursuit, under the branch of which,
naturalised epistemology falls.
1.4.Relevance of the Study
By examining the relevant thoughts of some of the personages that influe nced
Quine’s assumption of his theory of ontological relativity, it presents us with where he
got what and how he arrived at what. Furthermore, by exposing Quine’s theory of
ontological relativity, we come to savour the flavour of his distinct understanding of
ontology and relativity, and what he means by the relativity of ontology. We also come
to understand some of the foundational pillars of his theory and how he integrated these
pillars.
By highlighting the crucial relationship between ontological relativity and
indeterminacy of translation, we understand the colossal misconception that often
presents them as identical, rather than a problem-solution related thing. And, by plotting
the thought development of naturalised epistemology, we glean why traditiona l
epistemology is conceived by Quine as problematic, inadequate, futile and unnatura l.
We also come to see that Quine’s naturalised epistemology which fulfills his
ontological relativity does not negate the position of foundational epistemology, but is
only another version of foundationalism found in new lines.
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1.5.Thesis of the Study
This essay argues that Quine’s theory of ontological relativity is not really an
anti-foundationalist philosophy. It further argues that Quine’s proposal of naturalised
epistemology is an attempt at consolidating the gains of ontological relativity, and that
this alternative option of naturalised epistemology, far from being an anti-
foundationalist philosophy, is foundationalistic, at least, on the basis of the background
theories themselves and the very nature of the natural sciences which Quine thinks,
naturalised epistemology is to be modelled after.
1.6.Conceptual Clarifications
The key concepts in this essay are: Background theory, Ontological Relativity,
Foundationalism and Naturalised Epistemology. Quine uses ‘background theory’
interchangeably with ‘background language’, that is, they mean the same thing. 4 For
Quine, background theory is a focus-giving perspective that determines and models our
perception of theories, objects, ideas and events. It is the conventional background that
we lean unto to be able to determine meaning, given his view of the untenability of
absolute meaning determination. In like manner, with Donald Davidson, background
theory could be conceived as a conceptual scheme. It is in line with Quine’s thoughts,
because for Davidson, conceptual schemes are ways of organising experience; are
4 Although background theory is used more than background language.
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systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; and are points of view
from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. 5
Quine argues for ontological relativity in the second chapter of his Ontological
Relativity and other Essays (1969). Flowing from his denial of any distinction between
analytic and synthetic statements in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, and his
observation of the ubiquity of indeterminacy that befogs any real meaningf ul
translation, Quine thought that the best way to make ‘all that there is’ (that is, ontology)
meaningful is to understand that ‘all that there is’ is simply ‘all we say that there is’,
and on this basis relativise ontology to background theories.
Foundationalism is a traditional standpoint in epistemology which avers that
there exists apodeictic truths whose truth-worthiness are necessarily arrived at and
which are indispensable for conferring epistemic justification on any other belief or
held truth. Quine thought that since it is experience that makes and unmakes the so-
called analytic or synthetic statements, and indeterminacy of translation is rife, the trend
of foundationalism is simply an unnatural aspiration which ought to be expunged. This,
we disagree with on the grounds that while his propositions betray his strand, an
excision of foundationalism will make epistemology and progress strange bedfellows.
Thus, epistemic pursuit must cohabit with foundations if epistemology is to be
progressive.
5 Donald Davidson, An Inquiry into Truth and Interpretation, p. 183.
16
For Quine, naturalised epistemology is the patterning of the epistemologic a l
pursuit after the methodology and spirit of the natural sciences. In Quine’s thesis,
naturalised epistemology is first patterned after the spirit of his theory of ontologic a l
relativity before being further patterned after the spirit and methodology of the natural
sciences. Ontological relativity assumes an anti-foundationalist spirit and then
extrapolates it to the naturalised epistemology which fulfils its ambitions. It is this
presumed anti-foundationalism that invokes the thesis of this essay.
1.7.Literature Review
W.V.O. Quine in his work, “On What There Is” in From a Logical Point of
View (1963), avers that language is crucial both in conveying what we know and in
determining the existence of what is. Ontology is entirely a linguistic commitment. And
for this reason, ontology is not merely ‘what there is’ but ‘all we say there is’. 6 The
importance of this work is hinged on the fact that here we see Quine’s linguistic turn
which confers central activity on language. This further guides his anti-foundationa list
programme.
In his work, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in From a Logical Point of View
(1963), Quine opines that it is folly to create a distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements since it is experience that makes and unmakes verdicts. He also
discountenances empirical reductionism since the sensible cannot account for all that
6 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, p. 1.
17
exists. He thus proposes a philosophy which debunks any standpoint that holds any
given worldview as sacrosanct. This work is crucial as Quine’s denial of any distinc tio n
between analytic and synthetic statements precursors his ontological relativity. 7
In Two ways of Paradox and other essays (1966), Quine expresses the centrality
of language in science, avowing that science can neither progress without language nor
aspire to linguistic neutrality. This work is important as it further sheds more light on
his linguistic-humanistic temper; one that is displeased with any tincture of
foundationalism.8
In Ontological Relativity and other essays (1969), Quine makes a case for the
absence of any prior philosophy and the inadmissibility of absolute meaning
determination, on the grounds that given the ubiquity of indeterminacy of translatio n
and inscrutability of reference, ontology can best be made meaningful only when
relativised to background theories.9 This work is our primary text as here Quine makes
his argument clearly.
In “Naturalised Epistemology” in Ontological Relativity and other essays
(1969), Quine makes a case for doing away with traditional epistemology which favours
foundationalism. He asseverates that the traditional epistemology’s dream for attaining
foundationalism is unachievable. We should then, rather settle for naturalised
epistemology which is linguistic, naturalistic and humanistic other than dream for an
7 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, pp. 20-46.
8 W.V. Quine, The ways of Paradox and other Essays, p. 235.
9 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 49.
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‘oughtness’ that the human categories cannot attain. 10 This work is salient as Quine’s
theory of ontological relativity is fulfilled on the premises of this proposal.
From “Philosophical progress in language theory” (1970), Quine asserts that
progress in the realm of epistemic acquisition can hold sway only when the
indispensability of language is emphasized and lived. Thus, more concern should be
channelled on how language is used since an imperfect use of language will always
produce an imperfect communication of what we claim to know. 11 This work is
important as here, Quine reemphasizes his linguistic philosophy.
Richard Rorty in his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) reached
the conclusion that Quine’s linguistic turn leads to the rejection of the traditional view
that there exists basic truths that are non-inferentially given. If this is the case as it is
the case says Rorty, epistemology is defeated and demised. 12 This work is important
because while Rorty interprets Quine this way, this thesis avers that foundationalism is
only reinstated although with a novel approach.
Quine in his book Theories and Things (1981) tries to clarify the place of
language in philosophy and epistemology. Since “language is tied to meaning”, he
posits that “meaning…is a worthy object of philosophical and scientific clarifica tio n
and analysis, and…it is ill-suited for use as an instrument of philosophical and scientific
10 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp. 82-83.

11 W.V. Quine, “Philosophical Progress in Language Theory” in Metaphilosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, (January,
1970), p. 3.
12 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 170-180.
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clarification and analysis.”13 This work is important as it further clarifies the place of
language and the role of meaning in his thought.
Stephen Read in his article “Quine’s private language” (1983), critiques Quine’s
theory of ontological relativity as nothing but a husked proposition of private
language.14 He avers that if the individual is the ultimate purveyor of meaning and the
storehouse of ultimate referential stimulation, then, he/she alone understands what
he/she refers to, and if this is the case, mutuality would be discountenanced by
language.15 This work is important as it presents a very impassable implication of
Quine’s theory in the area of language.
Ilham Dilman in his book Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience: A
Philosophical Critique (1984), makes vivid his claim that how things stand is not a
matter of language but an extra-linguistic affair.16 Language is then not a determina nt
of ontology which is prior, but merely communicates it. This position is quite great as
it comes close to the thesis of our work only that it did not go further to proffer
arguments as to why Quine’s position does not amount to an anti-foundatio na l
epistemology. In recti-revising Quine’s presumed anti-foundational philosophy, these
selected literatures and a host of others will be significa nt and relevant.
13 W.V.O. Quine, Theories and Things, p. 185.

14 Stephen Read, “Quine’s Private Language” in Ratio, Vol. XXV, No. 1, (June, 1983), p. 53. The thrust
of the private language argument is that a language that is understandable by only one single individual
is incoherent. It was introduced by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations.
15 Stephen Read, “Quine’s Private Language” in Ratio, p. 50.
16 Ilham Dilman, Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience: A Philosophical Critique, p. 3.
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CHAPTER TWO
INFLUENCES ON QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY
This chapter examines the background and influences on Quine’s theory of
ontological relativity. Quine’s theory of ontological relativity is a consequence of his
discovery that indeterminacy pervades every area of our attempt to reach objective
knowledge, and since this is the case, the best we can do to make ontologies meaningf ul
is to relativise our ontologies to background theories. 17 Thus, the thrust of Quine’s
theory is that ontology is relative. Here, we turn to some of the ideas and philosophe rs
that influenced Quine.
2.1. Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects
Quine’s conception of language received inspiration from Alexius Meinong,
who, writing in his “Theory of Objects”, avers that we cannot talk about nothing but
something because, even that nothing, by its very definition, and in the final analys is,
would amount to something. He writes: “If I say, ‘Blue does not exist,’ I am thinking
just of blue, and not at all of a presentation and the capacities it may have. It is as if the
blue must have being in the first place, before we can raise the question of its being
(Sein) or non-being (Nichtsein).”18 Again, Meinong opines that, “in order to deny A, I
must first assume the being of A. What I refer to, so far as the being of A is concerned,
17W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp.35 & 45.
18Alexius Meinong, “Über Gegenstandstheorie” in Meinong 1904a,Trans l. as “The Theory of
Objects” in Roderick M. Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, p.83.
21
is thus something which is to a certain extent only a claimant to being.”19 According to
him, our confusion with regard to ontology, reference and meaning, stems from our
conception of terms like ‘Being’, ‘Becoming’ and ‘non-Being’ which he respectively
identifies as existence (Sein), subsistence (Sosein) and non-existence (Nichtsein).20 In
other words, for Meinong, we cannot speak of the inconceivable, the conceivable is
what is spoken of, and what is spoken of, must at least have being in our cognitio n.
Thus, since only the existent is conceivable, whatever is conceivable, exists.
Meinong’s influence on Quine is observed in Quine’s discountenancing of the
possibility of talking about nothing. Quine says that:
Suppose now that two philosophers, McX and I,

differ over ontology. Suppose McX maintains there
is something which I maintain there is not…I canno t
admit that there are some things which McX
countenances and I do not, for in admitting that there
are such things I should be contradicting my own
rejection of them…Nonbeing must in some sense
be…21
For Meinong, the question of existence should be separate from that of non-existe nce,
because, the very way we speak commits us to ontology. This is captured thus: “Pegasus
19 Alexius Meinong, “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, p.85.

20 Alexius Meinong, “Theory of Objects” in Referring Ed. By Linsky L., p. 85.
21 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, pp.1-2.
22
must be because, otherwise, it would be nonsense to say even that Pegasus is not.” 22
Furthermore, Quine avers that McX by a similar reductio ad absurdum thought pattern
could persuade himself of the existence of a flying horse of flesh and blood in a spatio -
temporal region. Pressed for further details, he will say that a flying horse of flesh and
blood is an idea in human minds. Hence, there is the pantheon and the pantheon-idea.
While the former is physical and visible, the latter is mental and invisible. 23
Quine, having seen that in language, we use terms that do not have relevance
to physical objects, and since physical objects are not all that language is concerned
with, it follows that physical objects are not the only existent reality. And on the basis
of this, Quine further holds that “to be is to be the value of a variable”24 and “to be
assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.”25
It is therefore, for Quine, language that determines ontology. However, if we may ask:
though non-physical entities could exist, is it their communicability or existence that is
dependent on language?
22 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p.2.

23
2.2. Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Descriptions
Another important figure that exerted a pool of influence on Quine is Bertrand
Russell. Russell was fed up with Meinong’s impossible objects, 26 and this led to his
“Theory of Descriptions” which was to correctively react to the flaws he found in
Meinong’s submissions. Russell maintains that such phrases as ‘the present King of
France’, which apparently are found not to denote a real individual, do, nevertheless,
denote an individual, but an unreal (perhaps a fictional) one. This Russellian convictio n
is grounded in the conviction that one of the major causes of confusion is our
entanglement in the traditional illusory belief that every name denotes an object.
Addressing Meinong’s theory Russell writes:
This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting

phrase as standing for an object. Thus ‘the present King of
France’, ‘the round square’, etc., are supposed to be genuine
objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but
nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself
a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects,
admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is
contended, for example, that the present King of France
exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is
round, and also not round, etc...27
26 W.V.O. Quine, Theories and Things, p.75.

27 Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting”, in Mind, New Series, vol.14, no.56, (Oct. 1905), pp.482-483.
24
From the above, it is clear that, for Russell, some phrases are meaningless in
that they purport to be denoting (or referring) yet, denoting nothing, for instance, the
present King of France.28 Phrases like this, Russell calls “pretentious phrases”. For him,
only proper names refer. And, it is through analysis that we know whether a sentence
contains a proper name or not. Since a phrase like, ‘the King of Nigeria is bald’ cannot
be assigned a truth function, it is therefore nonsensical. 29 Russell’s major thesis here is
that some names are deceitful, since we might meaningfully use seeming names without
supposing that there be the entities allegedly named, and surely that not all names refer
even as they purport to do.30
Quine, enamoured with the above, averred his acquiescence to Russell on the
possibility and existentiality of misleading names. Quine thought that we can very
easily involve ourselves in ontic commitments, by dispensing with names altogether in
favour of bound variables (for example, that there is something (bound variable) which
red houses and sunsets have in common). 31 Quine thus dispels the myth of naming by
offering an alternative account where the medium of ontological commitment is
expressed through the existential quantifiers rather than names. 32 This is because, for
him, “the use of alleged names is no criterion, for we can repudiate their namehood at
the drop of a hat…” and also that “names are, in fact, altogether immaterial to the
28 Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting”, Mind, p.479.

29 Nigeria does not have a king and as such there is no present king of Nigeria.
30 G.W. Fitch, Naming and Believing, p.120.
32 Kanti Lal Das et al (Ed.), Language and Ontology, p.35.
25
ontological issue…” because, “names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell has
shown that descriptions can be eliminated.” 33 The trick for accomplishing this
elimination he says is provided in its main lines, by Russell’s theory of descriptions. 34
We see here why Quine thinks that language necessarily precedes ontology. His
position is summarily that, if our traditional view holds that every name has an object,
and now, through Russell’s theory of descriptions, it is demonstrated that not every
name has an object of referent, it follows that language can proceed without names,
direct objects or extra-linguistic entities. From the above, it becomes lucid why Quine
places linguistic entities over the extra-linguistic and why he discountena nces
foundational epistemology involving non-inferentially basic statements as the state of
affairs. But then, does the fact that not all references of language are extra-linguistic
necessitate our doing away with names altogether?
2.3. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Language Game
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations was a great influence on Quine.
Wittgenstein in his earlier book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus presented us with a
picture theory of language where language serves as a representational system which
performs a pictorial function.35 He saw language’s function as that of picturing facts of
the world.36
33 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, p.12.

34 Bertrand Russell, “Theory of Descriptions”, in Referring Ed. L. Linsky, p.xvii.
35 Pasquale Frascolla, Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, p.17.
36 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Transl. G.E.M. Anscombe, no. 2.201,
p.41.
26
Subsequently, in Philosophical Investigations, he charted a different course and
begins to talk about language as playing diverse roles. Wittgenstein can be said to have
moved from his linguistic conception of absolute fixity in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, to the novel linguistic conception of relative heterogeneity in the
Philosophical Investigations. For him, there are many ways of determining meaning,
rather than a mono-referential path suggested by Russell. This later discovery is that
language performs different functions, plays different roles, and conforms to certain
rules and so on.37 This led him to propound a ‘use-theory of meaning’, wherein he sees
meaning as derivable from the ‘use’ to which words are put. For Wittgenstein, what
underlies our preference for the use of words is a background theory, out of which we
are mirroring the world thereby making it possible for us to use the same words
differently. He avowed that there is no fixed, holistic picture of language. All we have
are series of language-games, forming their discrete wholes. Each language game has
its own set of rules governing its meaningfulness. This idea of language necessitates
the idea of ‘form of life’. Form of life is the characteristic that informs the norms that
determine the reality of a given language game. 38 Each language game, as a form of
life, has its norms, rules, life-giving force, expectations and methods which are not also
fixed in finalistic ways.
37 Nuno Venturinha (Ed.), The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, p.189.
38 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp.8-9.
27
Hence, it is what human beings say is true and false that is true and false, and
how they agree in the language use that matter. Wittgenstein goes further to say that
there are countless uses of what we may call symbols, words and sentences, and this
multiplicity39 is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new
language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and
get forgotten.40 For Wittgenstein, the term “language-game” is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of
life.41 In other words, Wittgenstein’s submission is that what is important is to
understand that meaning is language-game dependent, and as such, there is no abstract
correspondence of proposition with states of affairs.
This notion of ‘language-games’ or ‘form of life’ finds semblance with Quine’s
ontological relativity. For just as the meaning of words are relative to language games,
so also ontology is relative to a background language (or theory). 42 This striking
similarity and influence gives us undeniable inklings as to why Quine’s theory of
Ontological Relativity denounces absolutes to conduce to relative conceptions. Quine,
like Wittgenstein, believes that, it is human beings that determine what there is and
adding a caveat, he says that, human beings express what there is, through language. 43
39 This multiplicity also further evinces that ‘words’, ‘symbols’, ‘sentences’ etc., do not serve the same
purpose in different language games.
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p.11.
41 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p.11.
42 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp. 60 & 64.
43 Christopher Hookway, Quine: Language, Experience and Reality, p.10.
28
This language use is contingent on the background theories and not on any absolute
term.
The above Wittgensteinian influence explains why Quine preferred a linguistic
approach which favours relativism, which in turn favours background theories, out of
which meaning is derived, and not the traditional epistemic approach which favours
absolute foundations. Again, are not the background theories themselves the foundatio n
out of which meaning is derived? And, at least, is it not the case that in every
background theory, there must exist supervening standards of reference, meaning and
use? Can standards be standards if they are indeterminate? 44
2.4. Rudolf Carnap’s Reductionism
Another major influence on Quine’s thoughts is Rudolf Carnap. Carnap was a
staunch member of the Vienna Circle who proposed the ‘verification theory of
meaning’. Quine sees the ‘verification theory of meaning’ as the view that, “the
meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it.” 45
Carnap, who Quine sees as a radical reductionist, set out in his book, The Logical
Structure of the World, to both assert the reducibility of science to terms of immed ia te
experience,46 and take serious steps towards its reduction. He set out to deconstruct our
epistemic leanings from its metaphysical ancestry, and hence, to reconstruct it on an
epistemic structure which places a great deal of emphasis on immediate experientia l
44 Godfrey O. Ozumba, Understanding the Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine, p. 25.

45 W.V.O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricis m’, From a Logical Point of View, p.37.
46 Asserting also the omnipotence of the empirical method and experiential-physicalistic confirmability.
29
verifiability. Carnap’s key thesis is that ontological questions are intelligible only
within a scientific framework for describing the world. Thus, he sought to establish a
physicalistic47 explanation of reality through a process of reductionism. In Carnap’s
words, “the evidence of the senses is… the evidence upon which all our other ways of
knowing material objects seems to be based.”48
Presupposing the system of his Principia Mathematica, Carnap wanted to
enlarge it so as to obtain a foundation, not only for logic and mathematics, but for the
entire body of human knowledge. He tried to reduce concepts, cognitions and
propositions to objects of knowledge that are variously regarded as ‘basic’,
‘fundamental’ or ‘given’49 by embarking upon a construction that would enable us to
translate all sentences about the world in terms of sense data or observation, plus logic
and set theory.50 Carnap’s aim is logical positivistic which also attempts to severe
metaphysical ‘postulations’, ‘filiations’ and ‘utterances’ as inhibitors and obfuscators
of the knowledge of the physical world. 51 For him, metaphysical propositions are
neither true nor false, because they assert nothing. They neither contain knowledge nor
do they contain error, but lie completely outside the field of knowledge, of theory, and
prominently outside the discussion of either truth or falsehood.52 Simply, it gives the
47 Physicalism holds statements to be cognitively significant if they can be reduced or evidentially related
to statements about physical states of affairs. Cf. Thomas Uebel, “Vienna Circle”, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
48 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, p.7.
49 Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, p.61.
50 Eve Gaudet, Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation , p.2.
51 Julius Rudolph Weinberg, An Examination of Logical Positivism, p.6.
52 Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, p. 29.
30
illusion of knowledge without actually giving any knowledge. This for Carnap is the
reason why he rejects it.53
Following his teacher and friend Rudolf Carnap, Quine is committed to a
revolutionary philosophical orientation that he calls “empiricism,” or “scientific
philosophy”,54 according to which it is only from within science that reality is to be
identified and described. The non-accomplishment of Carnap’s reductionistic intent
influenced Quine who uses the alleged failures of Carnap’s project to motivate an
alternative project and sees Carnap’s fractures as implying his assumptions. This led
Quine to become sceptical as to the possibility of having a physicalistic language that
is built out of basic statements. Quine’s reading of Carnap’s failure to mean that nothing
is foundationally determinate, fuelled his linguistic revolutionary revision. With Quine,
the corollary now is, if nothing is basic fundamentally, then it is language, (and by
extension, the linguist and background theories) that determine the basic. 55 Again, do
things not continue to existentially subsist, independent of our correct or incorrect
descriptions or expressions of them?
53 Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, p. 31.

54 W.V. Quine, (1949) “Aminadversions on the Notion of Meaning,” in W. V. Quine, Confessions of a
Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, p. 156.
55 W.V.O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricis m’, From a Logical Point of View, p.21.
31
2.5. John Dewey’s Behaviourism
John Dewey’s behaviourism marks, yet, another important influence on Quine’s
thoughts. In fact, it left a living legacy. Quine rightly interpreted Dewey, when he
averred that for Dewey, language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence
solely of other people’s overt behaviour under publicly recognisable circumstances.
Meanings are models of mental entities and they end up as grist for the behaviourist’s
mill.56 This means that we interpret things the way they affect us, and the way they
affect us in turn determines our behaviour, which ultimately determines meaning.
Dewey was explicit on this point when he averred that: “meaning is not indeed a psychic
existence; it is primarily a property of behaviour.”57 Going further, Dewey argues that
language is a communicative tool, 58 it is social,59 expressive, eventual and eventful60
and as such, in the presence of communication, all natural events become subject to
reconsideration, revision and re-adaptation, all in a bid to meet the requirements of
conversation, whether it be public discourse or that preliminary discourse termed
thinking. Events then turn into objects, things with meaning. They may be referred to
when they do not exist, and thus be operative among things distant in space and time,
through vicarious presence in a new medium. 61
56 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p.26.

57 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p.179.
58 Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, The Essential Dewey: Ethics, Logic, Psychology, p.58
59 J.E. Tiles, John Dewey: Political Theory and Social Practice, p.3.
60 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p.175
32
Dewey goes on to say that language constitutes the intelligibility of acts and
things, and the meaning of a thing is the sense it makes. 62 And since it is words that
convey the significant consequences of things, in a social situation, it is words that are
important as they release or animate the latent powers of things. 63
Quine’s privileging of the linguistic realm at the expense of the extra-linguistic,
draws a lot of strength from Dewey’s conception of language. In fact, in Quine’s
Ontological Relativity and other Essays, Dewey’s name and the fact that Quine loved
and cherished Dewey’s linguistic analysis is featured explicitly. With Dewey, meaning
is a property of behaviour and as behaviour changes, meaning is bound to change. 64
Simply put, what determines meaning is not the way things are but the overt behaviour
of people. And since language is dependent on behaviour, therefore, meaning is
dependent on language. Quine construed the unpredictable nature of behaviour to
ground his claim that meaning is both indeterminate and relative. Quine asseverates
following Dewey that there is no place for a prior philosophy. 65 And as such, there is
therefore no independent public reference that can be inter-subjectively inspected. This
is explicit in Quine’s own words where he defended Dewey’s behavioural philosophy
of language saying that “the inscrutability of reference is not inscrutability of a fact;
62 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p.179-180.

64 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp.179-180.
33
there is no fact of the matter.”66 We may also ask: does meaning which is socially
inculcated depend wholly on the unpredictable dictates of behaviour?
2.6. Chapter Evaluation
In this chapter, we examined the background influences that served as impetus
to Quine’s formulation of his theory of ontological relativity. As earlier said, the
fulcrum of Quine’s theory is that, since indeterminacy pervades every area of our
attempt to reach objective knowledge, the best we can do to make ontologies
meaningful is to relativise our ontologies to background theories. What we have only
is the rule of the thumb. Hence, there is no first philosophy and no vantage point. All
we do is like Neurath’s Mariner, trying to rebuild our epistemological theories plank by
plank, while staying afloat in the boat. 67 The next chapter shall expose Quine’s theory
of ontological relativity as well as the pillars of this theory.

67 W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, p.3.
34
CHAPTER THREE
QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY: AN EXPOSITION
3.1. Quine’s Theory of Ontological Relativity
Quine’s revolutionary theory of ‘ontological relativity’ is a composite of two
terms ‘Ontology’ and ‘Relativity’. These two terms make up his thesis that ontology is
relative. In this first section of this chapter, we shall critically examine these two terms
and after which provide a provisional definition of his theory.
3.1.1. Ontology
Ontology is a term derived from Latin word ‘ontologia’ which was coined by
scholastic writers in the seventeenth century to depict existence. 68 The term has since
assumed varied and perplexing meanings. Traditionally, following the distinction of
metaphysics into the two principal divisions of general metaphysics and special
metaphysics, ontology is seen as an aspect of General Metaphysics which is, on the
whole, concerned with the general nature of reality: with problems about abstract and
concrete being, the nature of particulars, the distinction between appearance and reality,
and the universal principles holding true of what has fundamental being. 69 This
conception of ontology makes ‘existence’ a term of unlimited application, and also
68 Godfrey O. Ozumba et al (Eds.), Critical Essays on Postmodernism, p.203.

69 Bruce Aune, Metaphysics: The Elements, p.11.
35
presents us with an infinite landscape of possible existent entities. We are therefore not
bound by the purview of the physical world, but all possible worlds are included in our
landscape.
There seems to be a shift from this traditional understanding to a linguistic- like
understanding of ontology, because, for Quine, ontology is a linguistic commitment. In
fact, for him, ontology is “all we say there is.”70 Quine has been concerned with two
closely allied questions: on the one hand he asks, to the existence of what kind of thing
does belief in a given theory commit us? And on the other hand he asks, what are the
relations between intensional and extensional logic? 71 His answer to the first question
is that “to be is to be the value of a variable.”72 Quine’s assertion shows that ontology
which connotes what there is, is to be properly conceived within the linguistic
framework rather than the extra-linguistic. This is so because, the existential realm
remains meaningless except when made meaningful through the communicative power
of language, for there is no way of presenting and communicating what exists
independently of language. Since, Quine argues that there is no a priori fixity in
things,73 we merely impose our linguistic interpretation on things depending on how
they make impressions on our sensory faculties.
70 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, pp.1-19.

71 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 157.
36
And to the second question, Quine says that intensional and extensional logics
involve the admission not merely of different but of incompatible types of entities. He
avers that there could be a way of accommodating them in the same logic, possibly by
reducing intensional attitudes to those of overt responses to external stimuli. 74
Quine speaks from the point of view of a largely indeterminable and ever-
unfolding range of linguistic possibilities, which aid us in painting varying pictures of
possible entities. And since the question of ‘what there is’ attracts the simple answer
‘everything’, we recognise the futility of setting bounds to existence. However, since
we cannot meaningfully talk about everything, Quine draws a cue from the logic of
language to illustrate how we ought to proceed in order that meaning may not be
obscured. Empirical observation shows that our linguistic commitment is both to the
physical and non-physical, in fact, physical things even constitute only a minimal part
of our language referral. Quine on the basis of the above position therefore says that
“pronouns are the basic media of reference…the variables of quantifica tio n
‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’ range over our whole ontology, whatever it may
be…”75
In quantificational logic which supplies the new outline of Quine’s discussio ns
on ontology, we have existential and universal quantifiers represented respectively as
(∃ X) and (U X). These determine the range of logical possibilities. For Quine, it is by
74 Mac-Intyre Alasdair, ‘Ontology’, in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, p.543.

37
adopting the structure of quantificational logic that the controversy which looms large
in our epistemological discourse will be assuaged. And by which, we will be able to
determine what ontology a given theory or form of discourse is committed to. A theor y
for Quine “is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables
of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the
theory be true.”76 For instance, with a class and the definitions for its membership, we
immediately know what should or should not come as a member of that class. 77 Thus,
in any given theory, we look to bound variables in connection with ontology. This
means that the adoption of ontology is matter of language and not vice versa. Making
this fact clear Quine says: “to whatever extent, the adoption of a system or scientific
theory may be said to be a matter of language, the same–but no more- may be said of
the adoption of an ontology.”78
This Quinean view of ontology as all we say there is, is fundamental to his entire
philosophical life. According to its premises too, in the linguistic framework, a prior
landscape of existent things is both unwarranted and forbidden. The concern rather of
our linguistic allegiance is the sundry landscape provided by language.
The major problem of ontology both as a concept and as a branch of
philosophical study has to do with the place of existence in the epistemic field. Carnap
76 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays, p.13-14

38
for instance,79 avers on the one hand that within a linguistic framework, external
existence questions (or claims) are meaningless metaphysical sentences, or in a more
charitable interpretation, linguistic proposals (or questions) advocating the adoption of
the language of things.80 On the other hand, internal existence questions (or claims) are
trivially true as merely having recorded certain linguistic decisions. 81 Thus, existence
questions are meaningless except as internal questions. 82 But Quine sees the language
of logic as being particularly helpful in addressing this Carnap-engineered conundrum.
Quine retorts by saying that Carnap’s special strictures against philosophical questions
of existence has lapsed in the face of existential quantifiers (∃ x) (x=a).83 This is
because, it is the existential quantifier not the ‘a’ that carries the existential import. 84
For Quine, the way we talk is logically reducible to the commitment to existentia l
quantifiers, and, we have moved now to the question of checking not on existence, but
on imputations of existence: on what a theory says exists. 85
The fear of the criterion for verification which confronts Carnap gives way in
the face of existential quantifiers. This is because for Quine, the only clear, true and
neutral criterion for determinacy in ontic matters, is the linguist’s (or philosopher’s) or
theory’s ontic commitments. Quine compendiously puts it thus: “An expression “a”
79 I will be very succinct here for the purposes of page limit. However, the subsequent citations will
complete the job.
80 Alex Orenstein, W.V. Quine, pp.63-64.
81 Alex Orenstein, W.V. Quine, pp.63-65.
82 Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 2nd Edn, p.208.
83 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp.91-96.
39
may occur in a theory, we saw, with or without purporting to name an object. What
clinches matters is rather the quantification “(∃ x) (x=a).” It is the existential quantifier,
not the “a” itself, that carries the existential import.”86
Here “x” is the bound variable and “a” is the name of the object which satisfies
the condition put forward by the theory and is required for the truth of the theory and is
among the values over which the bound variables range. 87 This is as far as a named
object is concerned. But then, there are existence sentences that do not have named
objects. Quine gave an example which is worth citing directly. He says: “the existence
sentence “There are unspecifiable real numbers” is true, and expressible as an
existential quantification; but the values of the variable that account for the truth of this
quantification are emphatically not objects with names.”88 Further, the above says
Quine, is another reason why quantified variables and not names, are what to look to
for the existential force of a theory.
For Quine, the apparatus of quantification (being a device for talking in general
of objects89 ) unequivocally commits us to the existence of entities. Thus, the way we
talk (not alleged) commits us to certain ontological existences. 90 When people speak,
they hold firmly to certain key notations which they guard jealously, and which they
are both committed to and ready to defend. This is akin to the Lakatosian hard core

89 W.V. O. Quine, Word and Object, p.242.
90 Robert L. Arrington and Hans -Johann Glock, Wittgenstein and Quine, p.196.
40
theory and its array of protective belts. 91 The question of existence for Quine is
therefore an imputation arising from the way we speak. 92
Since, there is no homogenous publicly fixed ‘the reality’ that is inspectable and
inter-subjectively verifiable by all, no language-neutral property called ‘existence’, and
no meaning discursive idea or objective that is not-dependent on language, then,
ontology is both dependent on language and the user. Variety is therefore the spice of
ontology93 and this shows why Quine declares that ontology can be multiply relative,
and multiply meaningless apart from a background theory. 94 This is so because, we are
“unable to say in absolute terms just what the objects are, we are sometimes unable
even to distinguish objectively between referential quantification and a substitutio na l
counterfeit.”95 But because even within a given background theory, there could be
meaning determination disparity, Quine further avers the double relativity of ontology,
that is to say, it is meaningful “….relative to the background theory, and… relative to
some choice of a manual of translation of the one theory into the other.”96
On the whole, ontology, same as meaning, are grists for the behaviourists’ mill.
In Quinean thoughts, ontology is therefore not all there is, but, all we say there is, and,
it is our express commitment to them that matter. Quine’s view about ontology presents
91 Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, p.133.
41
us with his displeasure about the traditional view of the determinateness of the
ontological landscape, and the certain knowableness of this landscape.
3.1.2. Relativity
Unlike ontology, relativity appears more straightforward and self-explanator y.
Relativity, provisionally, is the view that truth and falsity, right and wrong, standards
of reasoning, and procedures of justification are products of differing conventions and
frameworks of assessment, and that their authority is confined to the context giving rise
to them.97 Relativity by this definition is a quality something possesses which makes
the determination of its meaning dependent on a network of other things and meanings.
In which case, its meaning cannot be apprehended in complete isolation of other things.
This understanding of relativity presupposes the opposite of relativity which is the
“absolute.” While the determination of the meaning of relative things are dependent on
a network of other things, the absolute is complete in itself, needing nothing extraneous
for its completion.
For Quine, relativity means “that there is no absolute sense in speaking of the
ontology of a theory.”98 Hence, Quine asseverates that what makes sense is not to say,
absolute speaking, what the objects of a theory are, but, how one theory of an object is
97 Maria Baghramian and Adam J. Carter, “Relativism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.).
42
interpretable or reinterpretable in another.99 Furthermore, Quine goes on to say that
referential questions are nonsensical except relative to a background language or co-
ordinate system.100 This means that there are forms of relativity. For example, we can
speak of relativity in terms of background languages, theories, objects, variables,
portions of the universe, or conceptual frameworks. In this light, it is Quine’s major
thesis that we cannot acquire full interpretation of theories or require theories to be fully
interpreted, except in a relative sense.
In Quine’s contrast of the relative with the absolute, he makes a point clear,
namely, that it is our inherited paralyzed epistemological belief that makes us believe
that we can understand things in their absolute sense and not in a relative sense.101
Taking into account the contrast made in some two paragraphs between ‘the relative’
and ‘the absolute’, and using Quine’s own example, the sentence “Boston is bigger than
Roxbury” contains a relative term “bigger than”, where “than” or “exceeds” are true of
Boston with respect to Roxbury.102 The statement cannot therefore be understood in
isolation of either of the subjects, that is, Boston and Roxbury. Each needs the other to
bring about their completeness in semantic terms.

101 Steven L. Porter, Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and
Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism, p. 3.

102 W.V. O. Quine, Word and Object, p. 105.
43
Quine holds that ontology is massive and variant and does not yield to any rigid
scientific modelling.103 Ontology is therefore fleeting, complex and criss-crossing with
unimaginable variety and diversity, and as such, experience cannot provide the holistic
outlay of ontology, theories can only be better described from a relative standpoint. 104
Thus, we are never at any point sure of the eternal nature of things, 105 we only throw in
uncertain approximations and hence, paint a picture of reality from our point of view.
This makes it impossible for any point of view to have a privileged status which others
necessarily lack. Quine’s view shares a lot in common with the Anaxagorean avowal
that “things are not out from each other with an axe but everything is an inalienable part
of the whole.”106 The only axe for Quine capable of cutting things from the whole is
that of background theory.
Thus, Quine’s theory of ontological relativity is a linguistic epistemologic a l
theory which maintains that in the realm of discourse, there are several ways of painting
and picturing reality, where each picture of reality could go for an acceptable or likely
picture of how things are.107

104 Godfrey O. Ozumba, Understanding the Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine, pp. 54-56.
105 In fact, they are not evident to the resources of human cognition.
106 H. F. Cherniss, “The characteristics and effect of Pre-Socratic Philosophy” in Studies in Pre-Socratic
Philosophy, vol.1, pp.22-23.

44
3.2. Pillars of Quine’s Theory of Ontological Relativity
Quine holds that the concern of epistemology should change from its traditiona l
role of seeking out certain knowledge based on certain foundations to a new role of
determining ontology from the prescriptions of language. It is on these grounds that we
can confidently say that a language controlled epistemology, behaviourism, naturalis m,
logic, pragmatism, relativism and holism, are the foundational pillars of Quine’s theory
of ontological relativity.
3.2.1. Language
One may ask: why does Quine place such emphasis on language? Quine’s
linguistic theory was very much influenced by the general developments that were
taking place in science, geometry, mathematics and so on. He discovered that the nature
of language used in these different endeavours differs while purporting to serve the
same function, namely, that of conveying meaning and serving as the determinant of
acceptable usage. More problematic was the concern that the objects of discourse of
these different endeavours vary very widely. 108 As such, it became difficult to
categorically state which objects properly constituted the objects of language. This
development, as it were, aborted our earlier inherited penchant for seeing language as
merely picturing external existent facts or objects.
108 This can also be found in his “gavagai” example in Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp.30-
35.
45
It was this providential development that made Quine to begin to see differe nt
endeavours as merely dependent on linguistic frameworks. He held that there are as
many linguistic frameworks as there are different ways of organizing the data of
experience.109 It was this apparent and prevalent plurality of existent linguistic
frameworks that made Quine engage in a pronounced feud with the inherited-traditio na l
view that attributes to language the role of merely picturing state of already-exis ting
affairs.
It was on the basis of the above also that Quine became exasperated with the
conventional idea that confers instrumental passivity on language rather than creative
activity. This then prompted his conclusion that language determines ontology and not
vice versa.110 With Quine, ontology should not be understood as existing within the
realm of concrete objects of existence or states of affairs, but as subsisting within the
realm of linguistic states of affairs, and posterior to language. However, Quine’s
proposal of a new relationship between ontology and language as against the traditiona l
presents us with a question: Is Quine’s reversal of the trend that puts ontology before
language to be applied selectively or universally?
109 Jose Luis Bermudez, Thinking without Words, p.70. For instance, we have the language of sense data,
which is a different linguistic framework from physicalistic language. While the former talks about sense
impressions, the latter talks about physical objects. Science also has it s own linguistic framework where
we talk about ‘mass’, ‘energy’, ‘force’ and so on, in geometry we have objects like ‘points’, ‘curves’,
‘surfaces’ et cetera, and in mathematics, we have objects like ‘numbers’, ‘infinitesimals’, ‘sets’ and
others. Logic is not any different, in logic we have different properties like ‘validity’, ‘truth -value’ and
so on.
110 Michele Marsonet, Science, Reality, and Language, p.39.
46
3.2.2. Logic
Quine’s major reason for opting for logic is that while the use of a word does
not guarantee a referential import, the language of logic is explicit and unambiguo us.
Buttressing the fact that the use of a word does not guarantee a referential import he
says:
the word “dog” may be used as a proper name of an

animal species, but it may also be used merely as a
general term true of each of various individuals and
naming no one object at all; so the presence of the
word is of itself no evidence that species are being
assumed as objects.111
For Quine, what clinches matters is rather the quantification “(∃ x) (x=a).” It is
the existential quantifier, not the “a” itself, that carries the existential import. 112 The
quantifier shows our expression of the fact that our theory is committed to the existence
of the object mentioned. This boils down to the fact that existence is non-existent unless
we are committed to it. Since it is not the “a”, the object of reference that matters, but
our commitment to it, we may ask: is it commitment that precedes existence or vice
versa? Can what is nothing have a place in our discourse?

47
3.2.3. Behaviourism
The term behaviourism has assumed multidimensional and multifaceted forms
and undergone a number of transformation. The version of behaviourism that is relevant
to Quine’s theory is psychological behaviourism. Psychological Behaviourism was
proposed by Arthur W. Staats who argues that personality consists of a set of learned
behavioural patterns, acquired through the interaction between an individual’s biology,
environment, cognition, and emotion. 113 According this version of behaviourism, overt
behavioural episodes would suffice to fully explain our inner psychical states. The
simplicity of science demands that the inner workings of the mind be suppressed and
that what should be done is to relate directly with the features of the environment and
overt behaviour.114
Quine on his part was influenced by Dewey’s behaviourism. He accepts with
Dewey that meaning is not a psychic existence, but is primarily a property of
behaviour.115 It was this assumption that led to Quine’s aversion for mental states and
what he refers to as naïve natural objectification, in which he says that “a theory of
mind can gain clarity and substance ... from a better understanding of the workings of
language, whereas little understanding of the working of language is to be hoped for in
mentalistic terms.”116 Again he says: “having construed behavioural dispositions in turn
113 Arthur W. Staats, Behavior and Personality: Psychological Behaviorism, p.51.

114 Charles Taylor, “Psychological Behaviourism” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edited by P. Edwards,
vol. 6, p. 518.
116 W. V. Quine, “Mind and Verbal Dispositions” in Mind and Language Ed. by Samuel Guttenplan,
p.84.
48
as physiological states, I end up with the so called identity theory of mind: mental states
are states of the body.”117 Quine adopted this approach because he thinks that the
traditional epistemological approach was ineffective in grappling with the
philosophical problems of meaning, reference and truth. Again we may ask: If what
goes on in the mind is removed, how then can we account for mental events (like the
feeling of pain, having of desire, and activities of consciousness like willing, thinking,
et cetera) which are obvious to us?
3.2.4. Naturalism
Naturalism can be defined as a system of thought which holds that all
phenomena can be (and are to be) explained within the categories of natural laws and
causes.118 Furthermore, naturalism seeks to show that the understanding of nature must
be carried out by means that are explainable in naturalistic terms. On naturalism, Quine
says: “for naturalism the question whether two expressions are alike or unlike in
meaning has no determinate answer, known or unknown, except insofar as the answer
is settled in principle by people’s speech dispositions, known or unknown.”119 Quine
sees naturalism as the view that recommends the “abandonment of the goal of a first
philosophy prior to natural science”120 , which further involves a “readiness to see
philosophy as natural science trained upon itself and permitted free use of scientific
117 W. V. Quine, “Mind and Verbal Dispositions” in Mind and Language, p. 94.
118 Amy Orr-Ewing, Is believing in God irrational?, p.68.
120 W.V. O. Quine, Theories and Things, p.67.
49
findings”121 and lastly, recognizes that “…it is within science itself, and not in some
prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.”122 On the whole, in
naturalism, Quine recommends the pursuit of philosophical issues from within the
available resources of the empirical sciences themselves.
For Quine, our epistemic commitment must be naturalistic, in which case, it
must recognize that there is no prior given ordering of things, and all we do is to simply
interpret things as they appear to us. But some questions arise here: Do the variatio ns
in interpretation and observation suffice to claim that a public world of some sort does
not exist? In science we organize natural phenomena into regularities which we treat as
laws. If we do not have known regularities, how do we begin to do our categorizatio ns
and assortment into kinds as we do in science?
3.2.5. Relativism
Relativism for Quine differs from foundationalism. Unlike foundationalis m,
relativism denies the existence of a standard criterion which in an absolute way places
some propositions as self-evident or non-inferentially basic. All propositions for
relativism are equally probable except when relativised to a background theory. For
Quine, the question of ontology simply makes no sense until we get to something
recognisable as quantification, or perhaps as a relative clause, with pronouns as
potential variables.123 The point at issue here is whether bodies can be known and

123 Roger F. Gibson (Ed.), Quintessence: Basic readings from the philosophy of W.V. Quine, p.299.
50
whether there exists any regularity with them. If Quine would accept the preceding
sentence, where lies the insistence on relativism?
3.2.6. Pragmatism
Pragmatism was originally developed as a theory of meaning by Sanders Pierce.
Unlike Pierce’s and William James’ submissions, pragmatism received a careful and
thorough-going reformulation into what John Dewey called instrumentalism, that is, a
theory of the general forms of conception and reasoning. 124 For Quine, pragmatism is
seen from the light of instrumentalism, that is, ability to serve the desired purpose.
He integrates pragmatism into his theory of ontological relativity. For him, since
on semantic grounds, there are many conceptions of reality, pragmatic consideratio ns
are therefore inevitable in the choice of our conceptual scheme. For example, the
physicalistic conceptual scheme is chosen on the grounds of its supposed simplicity and
ability to yield to intersubjective verification. But it lacks the virtue of continuity which
poses the question of whether things continue to perdure even when not perceived. This
inadequacy prompts another conceptual scheme namely, the phenomenalistic, which
conceives sense-data as offering a better explanation as to the nature of things. But this
scheme also has its limitations, that of being essentially private. Quine therefore
concludes that it is meaningless to inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual
scheme as a mirror of reality.125 Hence, “our standard for appraising basic changes of
124 H.S. Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism, p.169.
51
conceptual scheme must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a
pragmatic standard”126 , based on the knowledge that our cognitive needs and aims
differ. Again, we may also ask, does the plurality of conceptions of reality by that fact
render determinateness an impossible venture?
3.2.7. Holism
For Quine, ‘what there is’ receives both ontic and epistemic being (as well as
relevance) within the province of language alone. And, since language is the product
and reflex of converse with others, language presupposes an organised group to which
people belong and from whom they have acquired their habits of speech. Language is
therefore a relationship.127 This relationship gives rise to our conventional cultural and
scientific concept and belief systems, and it is these that Quine calls background theory.
The multiplicity of belief systems presupposes the multiplicity of background theories
too. And thus, in this line, Quine says, ontology is relative to background theory. In
which case the ontological and epistemological status of things make sense only within
a background theory. Meaning is therefore background theory dependent.
Quine’s holism is principally that it makes no sense to inquire about the absolute
reality of an object, or the absolute meaning of a statement. 128 A proposition cannot be
empirically tested and shown to be true or false without referring to intersubjective prior
128 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp. 50, 52, 53, 60 & 67.
52
deep background assumptions and beliefs in the basal meta- language matrix.129 Truth-
conduciveness is therefore background theory specific, and as such, absolute
determination of truth-conduciveness is inadmissible and extrapolation of truth-
conduciveness from one background theory to another is both illegitimate and a farce.
But then also, can any truth determination be bereft of a determinate take-off point?
In this chapter, we engaged in an analysis of what ontology and relativity means
for Quine. The theory is quite revolutionary, although its tenets have been felt partially
already in the history of philosophy prior to Quine’s arrival. We have also been able to
examine what we consider as the foundational pillars of Quine’s theory namely:
language, logic, behaviourism, naturalism, relativism, pragmatism and holism. These
are the pillars of Quine’s thesis and they give us strong insights as what constitutes the
kernel of his theory. With these done, the next chapter shall examine the relations hip
between Quine’s theory of ontological relativity, indeterminacy of translation and
naturalised epistemology.
129 Carol C. Gould (Ed.), Constructivism and Practice: Toward a Historical Epistemology, p.62.
53
CHAPTER FOUR
QUINE AND FOUNDATIONALISM IN PHILOSOPHY
This chapter examines the relationship between Quine’s theory of ontologic a l
relativity, his Indeterminacy Thesis and Naturalised Epistemology. On the one hand,
while the indeterminacy thesis poses the problem of epistemic ‘unknowability’,
ontological relativity attempts to solve this problem through the thesis of relative
epistemic ‘knowability’. And on the other hand, given the intention of Quine’s
ontological relativity, Naturalised Epistemology is a fulfilment of the former’s ideals.
To achieve our set goal, this chapter shall be divided into two sections. The first
section will examine the relationship between Quine’s theory and Indeterminacy of
Translation, and the second section will argue that Naturalised Epistemology, far from
being anti-foundationalist, is a foundationalist programme.
4.1. Ontological Relativity and Indeterminacy of Translation
Indeterminacy of translation is a consequence of Quine’s linguistic philosophy.
Quine is concerned with the central position which language occupies in one’s
knowledge and interpretation of natural phenomena. A look at the dynamics of
language makes us discover that human creativity and approximations are very rife in
language.130 Quine also observed that talk about things have become talk about the
world, which informs his avowal that ontology is a linguistic commitment. 131 If

131 Hans-Johann Glock, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality, p. 7.
54
language commits us to ontology immediately, and there is an inextricable link between
linguistic use and the user’s creativity, could the world then be a creation of human
beings by this mere fact?
Indeterminacy ordinarily means something that is vague, indefinite and unfixed
and, translation means the act of making meaning, ideas, intentions and references of
words, sentences et cetera conveyable from one language to another with minimum or
no loss of meaning. Translation further involves moving from a language in which the
meaning belongs to another language with the aim of establishing the same meaning in
the later without loss. However, translation could be from a known language to another
known language. It could also be from an unknown language to a known one. It is
precisely in the second sense of translation that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis consists.
Quine’s indeterminacy thesis is built on two pragmatic observations of
Quine.132 The first has it that “the totality of the speaker’s dispositions to verbal
behaviour remains invariant…”133 This means that one’s verbal behaviour or the way
we say a thing may remain the same even when we are saying different things. In the
same vein, our behavioural mannerisms may alter even while saying the same thing.
The second observation has it that the correlation of sentences or words to inner
responses is a cultural affair.134 In which case, language is not in all cases culturally
132 We consider them pragmatic observations because they are vividly experienced in daily living.
133 W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, p. 27.
134 Culture here means a given language grouping with conventionally known standards of meaning,
reference and truth.
55
neutral. For example, the way we key our sentences in Igbo Language and that in
English Language might be similar, but, at the same time, the inward response and inner
appreciation at times differ. When in Igbo language we see a rabbit, the non-verbal
stimulation may both in Igbo and English necessitate the words ‘lee oke oyibo na
aganu’ and ‘there goes a rabbit’ respectively. But at the same time, the Englis h
language user may be simply concerned with the mere literal presence of the rabbit,
while the Igbo language user will most likely be focused on the spiritual implication of
the rabbit’s appearance. And in both languages, the stimulation and utterance take same
dimension but not same signification. These illustrate Quine’s avowal that the
experiential strata is language group dependent. And in this line, he declares that the
“manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all
compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one
another.”135
According to Quine, indeterminacy is more enounced when the translation takes
place in a situation where there exist no dictionaries or interpreters to mediate in the
translation of an exotic language into our own language. And in this situation, “all the
objective data he (that is, the linguist) has to go on are the forces that he sees impinging
on the native’s surfaces and the observable behaviour, vocal and otherwise, of the
native.”136 In this case, the linguist is confronted with an unrestricted range of

56
possibilities in reaching the real meaning of the native. 137 In this case too, a lot of
impressions struggle for recognition. Quine calls this “radical translation”, because, we
are dealing with “translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people.” 138
However, Quine also recognises that this above sort of task is not in practice undertaken
in its extreme form because of the existence of a chain of interpreters who make the
task of translation less onerous, and who can be easily recruited even amidst margina l
persons from the darkest archipelago. 139
According to Quine, because of the presence of extraneous incidents, it is
herculean (and in fact impossible) at any point in time to say assuredly that the
translation, in whichever way, ultimately captures the meaning of the verbal behaviour
under examination.140 While nodding may indicate affirmation and approval in one
cultural milieu, the same nodding may designate denial and disapproval in another.
Furthermore, Quine maintains that though indeterminacy is likely to be minimised in
the case of ostension (pointing), it is still not totally obliterated because of the proble m
of deferred ostension.141 One may be pointing at a gauge, not to show a gauge, but to
show that there is a gasoline.142 This is what deferred ostension is all about. This also
presupposes Quine’s view of the inscrutability of reference which is at the heart of
137 These possibilities often present themselves with equal force.

141 Deferred ostension is a phenomenon experienced in the linguistic-behavioural milieu, and it indicates
the existential possibility of pointing to one thing and meaning another thing.
57
indeterminacy of translation, according to which “the trouble is that whenever we point
to different parts of the rabbit, even sometimes screening the rest of the rabbit, we are
pointing also each time to the rabbit.”143
What then is the relationship between Quine’s theory of ontological relativity
and his submission of the unavoidable existentiality of indeterminacy of translation?
Ontological relativity does not assume the same concern as the indeterminac y
thesis. Quine’s theory of ontological relativity opines that given the indeterminacy of
translation, it can be overcome through the relativisation of our ontology to background
theories. For Quine, we are not concerned as such with whether we can be mistaken
about what the native is saying when he/she utters the word ‘gavagai’. Whether gavagai
means ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit stage’ or ‘undetached rabbit part’ is not the concern of this
theory, but that meaning can be reached only in the light of a background theory which
on the whole necessitates the contextualisation of ontology.144 Thus, while
indeterminacy thrives on the absence of an existing manual, ontological relativity
thrives on the existence of background theories. 145 And since they are not
interchangeable salva-veritate146 , they are not synonymous.147

145 Among which we choose the one that best appeals to us, perhaps, on the qualities of simplicity,
directness and proximity to reality approximation.

146 That is, without affecting their truth-value.
58
Indeterminacy of translation stems from not having offhandedly, the totality of
speech dispositions of that native. Ontological relativity similarly is necessitated by the
fact that we have only a fragmented view of reality. The impossibility of a holistic
outlay of reality,148 makes relativistic conceptions and talks meaningful and the sole
alternative. This means that while ontological relativity is necessitated by the ubiquity
of the existence of the problem of indeterminacy of translation, it transcends it as a
solution by proposing the relativisation of ontology to background theory. 149
The thin difference is that, while indeterminacy of translation presupposes
epistemic ‘unknowability’, ontological relativity carries the import of relative epistemic
‘knowability’. This difference is quite delicate but fundamental in helping us
understand Quine’s hopefulness that the programme of naturalising epistemology is
possible as against the view that Quine’s theory is a reductio-ad-absurdum of
behaviourism, which leads to referential scepticism and private language. 150
148 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp. 35, 47, 50, 51 & 60.
150 Edward S. Shirley, “Quine and Referential Scepticism”, in The Journal of Critical Analysis, vol. 8,
no. 2, (1980), p. 29 and W.V. Quine, “Indeterminacy of Translation Again”, The Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 84, no. 1, (January, 1987), pp. 5-8. While that of Shirley is a rebuttal, that of Quine is a clarificatory
response.
59
4.2. Naturalised Epistemology as a Foundationalist Programme
In Chapter Three of his book Ontological Relativity and other Essays, Quine
prospects the framework of his project of naturalising epistemology. The thrust of this
project is that traditional epistemology’s goal of searching for an apodeictic foundatio n
upon which our epistemic edifice can be built, is futile, illegitimate, and spells doom
for the epistemic enterprise on the grounds that knowledge must be compatible with
our status as natural creatures. Quine’s theory of ontological relativity constitutes the
foundational impetus that gives rise to his proposal of naturalized epistemology. This
work argues that naturalised epistemology anchored in the thesis of ontologic a l
relativity, does not conduce to an anti-foundationalist philosophy, but is better
understood as foundationalism along new lines.
According to the premises of traditional epistemology, the arrival at epistemic
certitude ought to be the goal of our epistemic commitment. 151 But then, the quest for
certainty became a matter of concern as a result of the challenge of the sceptics who
held that nothing could be known with certainty, and since knowledge is hinged on
certainty, they denied any possible attainment of knowledge completely. 152
151 Richard Schantz (Ed.), What is Truth?, p. 286.

152 J.A.I. Bewaji, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge: A Pluri-cultural Approach, p. 86.
60
4.2.1. The Challenge of Scepticism to Knowledge
Scepticism is from the Greek word skeptikos meaning ‘inquirer’. This confir ms
the thesis of a renowned sceptic, Sextus Empiricus, who is of the view that a sceptic, is
neither one who believes in the discoverability or attainment of truth, nor one who
affirms the impossibility of truth apprehension, rather, one who is in search of the
truth.153 On the basis of the above, scepticism then is not necessarily the view that
knowledge is impossible, but is a philosophical attitude that expresses doubt as to the
possibility of having sure foundations for knowledge. 154 Since, the hallmark of
knowledge is certainty which presupposes permanence, if knowledge lacks this
character of certainty, then knowledge is impossible.
Scepticism is traceable to the pre-Socratic period evidenced in the likes of
Heraclitus who postulates the ever fluxation in things. That things are in constant flux,
for him, thus means that they cannot be known.155 Aside Heraclitus, there is the extreme
sceptical view expressed by Gorgias of Leontini. For him, nothing exists, and even if
things did exist, they could not be known, and even if by chance they were known, they
could not be communicated.156 This thesis of Gorgias gave rise to a sophistic scepticis m
which became no more cosmo-centric but homo-centric.157 We see this in the likes of
153 Sextus Empiricus, “Outline of Pyrrhonism”, Bk. 1, Ch. 4, No. 8, in Human Knowledge: Classical
Problems and Contemporary Approaches, Ed. by Paul K. Moser and Arnolf Vander Nat, p. 81. However,
the sustenance of this view is open to debate.
154 G.O. Ozumba, A Concise Introduction to Epistemology, p. 42.
155 Andrew J. Mason, Flow and Flux in Plato’s Philosophy, p. 3.
156 Garrett Thomson, Thales to Sextus: An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, p. 85.
157 Noah Lemon, Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, p. 131.
61
Protagoras who avows that man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that
they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.158
However, Pyrrho is acclaimed the father of scepticism and all variants of
scepticism have their origins from his views. From the views of Pyrrho expressed by
his pupil Timon, things are by nature equally indeterminable, admitting of neither
measurement nor discrimination. And for this reason, our sense experience and beliefs
are neither true nor false. Therefore, he says,
we ought not to put our trust in them, but be without beliefs,

disinclined to take a stand one way or the other; and we should be
steadfast in this attitude, saying about each thing individually that
it no more is than is not, than both is and is not, than neither is nor
is not. For those who are indeed disposed in this manner, there will
result first, a disinclination to make assertions… 159
From Pyrrho’s submissions, certainty in epistemic matters is impossible. The
sceptics, on the whole, argue that since experience is the ultimate source of knowledge,
and the senses are known to be deceptive (like the mirage example), we cannot reach
any measure of certainty in matters of knowledge. This challenge gave rise to the
attempt by some philosophers of the modern period to seriously seek for an indubitab le
foundation for knowledge. This is the thrust of foundationalism which responds to the
sceptics’ challenge by saying that knowledge is possible.
158 Ugo Zilioli, Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism: Plato’s Subtlest Enemy, p. 34.
159 Charlotte L. Staugh, Greek Skepticism: A Study in Epistemology, p. 17.
62
4.2.2. Traditional Foundationalist response to Scepticism
Foundationalism is the epistemological view which holds that there exists
privileged non-inferentially given and basic propositions whose truth and certainty can
be obtained through direct and unmediated experience, and which confer justifica tio n
upon all the other empirical propositions which are justified for a person. 160 This tenet
of foundationalism is called the traditional notion of grand-totalising narratives.
Scepticism prompted many philosophers to seek beliefs that are immune to
doubt, immune to revision, and by that, non-inferentially basic. This, in fact, was the
original intent of the Cartesian methodic doubt which gave rise to the cogito discovery,
namely, that certainty could be reached in knowledge. Although this ‘certitude -
condition-specifying’ attitude gained profound recognition in the likes of Rene
Descartes in the modern era, we could perceive its fragrance 161 already in the
Parmenidean proposition of stable reality, a reality that is one, permanent, fixed and
immutable. According to Parmenides, being is one, unchanging, full, and indeed a
complete plenum.162 And on this premise, the modern era preoccupation with
apodicticity can be seen. Again, in the likes of Plato, we find also an evident ‘certitude -
condition-specifying’ attitude in his theory of the forms. According to this theory, the
forms are immutable, permanent and the archetype of all things. 163 They constitute the
160 Michael R. DePaul, Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, p. 21.

161 A foundationalistic fragrance, which for Quine is a pungent odour.
162 Anthony Preus, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy VI: Before Plato, p. 108.
163 Arda Denkel, Object and Property, p. 8.
63
original basement of reality. Against the sceptics then, for Plato, while the sensible
things cannot be known because of their ephemerality, the forms can be known because
of their perdurable stability.164
The modern era saw a new dimension to the sceptical challenge with Descartes
who began his search for certitude in knowledge (and what could be held as indubitab le
knowledge) as a response to the sceptics who challenged the possibility of certitude in
knowledge claims. Descartes maintained in his Meditations that the fact of his
consciousness is one truth that cannot be doubted. 165 On this note, he insisted on a kind
of gnostic foundation on which to hinge his entire theory of knowledge. Through his
hyperbolical, systematic and methodic doubt, he proved the subjectivity of knowledge
claims through his famous and distinct dictum- Cogito-ergo-sum, which means ‘I think
therefore I exist (am)’.166 This fact of his being as a conscious and thinking substance
became the cornerstone and foundation for building all knowledge claims and a
specimen of indubitable knowledge. This Cartesian conclusion became the springboard
for the birth of a new epistemological conception thus, leaving epistemology with a
task of searching for foundations for knowledge and absolute certainty. 167 The foremost
task of foundationalist philosophers has since then been to respond to the sceptical
164 G.O. Ozumba, A Concise Introduction to Epistemology, pp. 95-96.

165 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 240.
166 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 240-241.
167 Rene Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol
II, John Cottingham et al (trans.), Part 1.
64
challenge by showing on the grounds of an arrival at a basic epistemic foundation, that
knowledge was possible.
This particular trend was the crux of Quine’s discountenance, as he saw it as
futile and unnatural, and through the raw material provided by his theory of ontologic a l
relativity, proposed the adoption of naturalised epistemology.
4.2.3. Naturalised Epistemology
For Quine, naturalised epistemology is the patterning of the epistemologic a l
pursuit after the methodology and spirit of science. Our epistemological enquiry in this
new setting, Quine argues, is to be concerned not with providing exemplars for science,
but with basing our construction or projection of the external world based on the
interaction between inputs from stimulations on our sensory surfaces and inputs arising
from our conceptual sovereignty.168 Here, epistemology is fixed in a new setting as a
component of natural science and as a chapter of psychology. Quine says that our object
in this new setting of epistemology is “studying how the human subject of our study
posits bodies and projects his physics from his data…”169 He further says in another
place that, “our liberated epistemologist ends up as an empirical psychologist,
scientifically investigating man’s acquisition of science.”170
In naturalising epistemology, Quine maintains that epistemology in the new
setting becomes enlightened because it no longer seeks solution to the sceptics’
168 W.V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 83.
169 W.V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 83.
170 W.V.O. Quine, Roots of Reference, p. 3.
65
challenge outside science but realises that the sceptics’ challenge springs from science
itself, and that in coping with it, we are free to use scientific knowledge.171 Quine sees
philosophy and science in the same boat, a boat which like Neurath’s boat, we could
rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. 172 Quine then, summarises the new goal of
the epistemologist thus:
He no longer dreams of a first philosophy, firmer than science, on

which science can be based; he is out to defend science from within,
against its self-doubts. His project becomes one of major scientific
and philosophical interest, moreover, even apart from protective
motives- even apart from any thought of a skeptical challenge. 173
Epistemology therefore for Quine, can make progress by adopting the scientific
attitude of continually rebuilding the framework of its conjectures and refutations on the
platform of sense experience (observation sentence) and theory. Quine’s proposal is
human, speculative, not feigning the impossible and pragmatic. In fact, for Quine,
naturalised epistemology is one in which the epistemic enterprise takes cognisance of
the limited powers of the human agent. This is corroborated by Barry Stroud and Alvin
Goldman. For Stroud, on the one hand, naturalised epistemology is the empirica l,
scientific study of human knowledge. 174 For Alvin Goldman, on the other hand,
“epistemology rules often seem to have been addressed to “ideal” cognizers, not human

174 Barry Stroud, “The significance of Naturalized Epistemology” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.
VI (1981), p. 455.
66
beings with limited information-processing resources.”175 Goldman therefore sees our
traditional epistemological posture as betraying the need to have a framework that will
play a regulative role in the sense of specifying that our cognitive endeavours must take
account of the power and limits of the human cognitive system. This, for Goldman, just
like for Quine too, requires attention to descriptive psychology. 176
The ‘ought’ then, as Goldman thinks, with Quine, should always imply ‘can’ in
our epistemological objectives so that we do not end up recommending procedures that
cognizers cannot attain.177 At this juncture, we are now faced with a poignant question:
What are Quine’s reasons for proposing the naturalisation of epistemology?
175 Alvin Goldman, “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition”, in The Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 75, no. 10, (Oct., 1978), p. 510.
176 Alvin Goldman, “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition”, p. 510.
177 Alvin Goldman, “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition”, p. 510.
67
4.2.4. Quine’s Reasons for Naturalising Epistemology
A host of reasons could be identified for Quine’s proposal of naturalis ing
epistemology, but we shall limit our exposition to three.
Firstly, Quine, influenced by the logical positivists, rejected the long-stand ing
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. 178 He avows that it is folly to seek
a boundary between the two, since any statement (whether synthetic or analytic) can be
held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the
system.179 It is experience that makes and unmakes verdicts, and as such, we can only
reach a hypothetical verdict in matters of knowledge. Now, it was conceived, as it were,
that the truths of analytic statements are the proper domain of philosophy, while those
truths of synthetic statements are the proper domain of empirical science. Therefore,
given Quine’s rejection of any cleavage between the both statements, consequently,
there should be no distinction between philosophy and science as well. 180
Secondly, the first gives rise to the second. Quine, after analysing the folly of
the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, proposed what he called an
“Empiricism without Dogmas.” This proposal is a rectificatory proposition that
concerns itself with debunking any standpoint that holds any given worldview as
178 While analytic statements are neces sarily true, that is, true by virtue of meaning without dependence
on experience, synthetic statements hold true by the fact of their contingency on factual experience.
179 W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-
Philosophical Essays, p. 43.

180 Joseph A. Effiong, “An Appraisal of Quine’s rejection of Traditional Epistemology” (Unpublished
B.A. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, Dominican Institute, Ibadan, June 2016), p. 54.
68
sacrosanct. For Quine, there is no view that possesses a privileged status which others
necessarily lack. On this grounds, one of Quine’s reasons for proposing the
naturalisation of epistemology was his disapproval of foundationalism, more precisely,
Cartesian foundationalism, which he saw as a lost cause. 181
Thirdly, still flowing from the first, given Quine’s denial of any possible
demarcation between science and philosophy, there is therefore no such thing as first
philosophy or a priori knowledge.182 Since all statements are revisable in empirica l
evidence, we should therefore let the empirical science investigate all these epistemic
questions. And on this note, he maintains the need for naturalising epistemology.
4.2.5. Naturalised Epistemology: A Foundationalist Programme
The aim of this section is to propose a re-reading of Quine’s proposal. While he
(and some critics) might have intended doing away with foundationalism, we aver that
foundationalism is indispensable in our epistemic pursuit, and on this basis, naturalised
epistemology is in fact a foundationalist programme.
Evidently, naturalised epistemology finds its strength in the theory of
ontological relativity. This is because Quine reached the conclusion that ontology is
relative after examining the inherited epistemological discourse (foundationalism), and
having surveyed the controversy that characterised it, he avers that there are always
181 W.V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 74. It was
a lost cause because perfect certainty in epistemological inquiry is not humanly attainable, and since
psychology demonstrates how people, practically and non -pretentiously, produce theoretical output from
sensory input, hence the need for naturalizing epistemology.
182 W.V.O. Quine, Roots of Reference, p. 3
69
many sides to a coin, and by that fact, no position is proven conclusively fixed, for any
theory (and whatever it is at all) “would…be relative to the structure of one’s
conceptual scheme or quality space.”183 This Quinean conviction led to the view that
our traditional epistemological view, by losing sight of the above state of affairs is both
pretentious and unrealistic. And to reconstruct a more realistic conception of reality,
naturalised epistemology became a viable option. On this note, Quine’s theory of
ontological relativity is related to naturalised epistemology, in that, it provides the basic
methodological assumptions upon which naturalised epistemology hinges and which
even necessitates its emergence. This is the thrust of the relationship between Quine’s
theory of ontological relativity and his view of naturalised epistemology. But a salient
point still needs to be made, namely, the foundationalistic nature of naturalised
epistemology. Let us move to argue this.
From the above, Quine’s theory of ontological relativity informs his naturalised
epistemology. Thus, once the foundationalistic nature of the latter is demonstrated, the
former will follow suit. We discover from analysis that Quine’s theory of ontologic a l
relativity owes a lot to background theory, because, ontology (all we say there is),
according to this theory, is relative to background theory. Background theory is also
applicable to epistemology in its natural setting, in that, it is within the foundation of a
background theory that meaning and epistemic pursuit finds its fulfilment. This then
183 W.V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and other Essays, p. 243.
70
becomes the basis for the new foundation. This facticity is then the launch pad for
further demonstrations of the foundationalistic nature of naturalised epistemo logy.
Ontological relativity holds that we can only in a relative sense talk
meaningfully about ontology.184 This means, as have been explained severally, that
there is no determinate public reality to which all humans have access to. All we do is
to map reality from different perspectives, where each perspective is given focus by the
relevant background theory on which we wish to interpret it. However, as attractive as
this may appear, it is experientially unappealing to aver that in discourse we describe
‘contentless’ concepts.185 We obviously cannot proceed in any meaning determinatio n
without conceptual primitives. If there is nothing basic in science, how come we talk
about intersubjectivity which is made possible through induction which Quine
considers a problem about the world?186 When we talk about human beings for instance,
there is something or thing(s) that human beings have in common which helps us
classify human beings as belonging to the same genus. And if things can be sorted out
as natural kinds, which experience evidences, we cannot proceed to sort anything
without a starting point. Sorting is an orderly work, and, chance cannot give birth to
order, for at least, the things to be sorted are fixed, and the idea that is intersubjective
that helps us sort them is also common. On this note, naturalised epistemology since it

186 W.V. O. Quine, “Natural Kinds” in Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 127.
71
maintains the patterning of the epistemic pursuit after the methodology of science,
cannot but be a foundationalist programme.
Quine’s naturalism (which is interconnected with his behaviourism) is another
source of a confusion that confers a foundationalistic character on naturalised
epistemology. Quine is of the view that “what the naturalist insists on is that, even in
the complex and obscure parts of language learning, the learner has no data to work
with but the overt behavior of other speakers.”187 This view discountenances what
Quine calls the “museum myth”. He deprecates the concept of museum myth thus:
“earlier linguistic theory operated in an uncritical mentalism. An irresponsib le
semantics prevailed, in which words were related to ideas much as labels are related to
the exhibits in a museum. To switch languages was to switch the labels.”188 The above
quotation helps us to grasp Quine’s view of naturalism and its link with behaviour is m,
namely, that both hold that our sensory receptors are the ultimate provider of evidence
for the ingredients of knowledge. 189 From this standpoint, we see a Quine who
deprecates as unhelpful the mental life. 190 But to hold this position and to surreptitious ly
cling to philosophical reasonings that are in themselves neither naturalistic nor even
behaviouristic betrays an anti-foundationalist stance.191 Philosophical reasonings,

188 W.V. Quine, “Philosophical Progress in Language Theory” in Metaphilosophy vol. 1, no. 1, (January
1970), p. 5.
190 W. V. Quine, “Mind and Verbal Dispositions” in Mind and Language, pp. 84 & 94.
72
though socialistically inculcated, are what guide our philosophical peregrination. And
they cannot be guides if they are not foundational and prior to the guided. On this note,
naturalised epistemology cannot be faithful to itself by coercively adopting an anti-
foundationalist temper. Naturalised Epistemology is therefore foundationalistic by its
very nature.
If naturalised epistemology must be patterned according to scientific schemes,
then this patterning must never be partial. Yes, there exists many possibilities as regards
the perspective of research in science, but, there is always a starting point. We find out
that from Thomas Kuhn in his ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’, scientific
progress is hinged on paradigm change. When a more suitable paradigm arrives, the
previous stale one gives way.192 Just like it was since held that atoms were indivisib le
until the discovery of its divisibility into protons, electrons and neutrons. In like
manner, the geocentric conception of the world gave rise to the more plausib le
discovery of the heliocentric nature of the world. But something is clear. In each of
these times, there was always a foundation. Yes, at some point in time, the foundatio ns
could change at the arrival of a better theory. The truth that is to be gleaned from the
progress and methodology in science is that at every instance, a better scientific theory
cannot be sought in the absence of an existing foundation. It is this existing foundatio n
that gives impetus to any search for another. Although, in science, there may not be
192 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd Edition, p. 85.
73
everlasting foundations and foundations may change by time, the absence of
foundations deadens scientific-truth pursuit. Since naturalised epistemology is to
emulate the methodology of science, then it must take the necessity of foundations into
account. And on this note, naturalised epistemology cannot but be a foundationa list
programme.
Jean Piaget in his Insights and Illusions of Philosophy contends that the field of
contemporary science is essentially open and remains free to include any new problems
that it wishes or is able to, as long as it can find methods for dealing with them. 193
However, he also appositely maintains that,
scientific epistemology is, however, much less advanced because

its major studies have only been undertaken fairly recently by
investigators concerned with other studies without their being able
to concentrate exclusively on epistemological analysis. This is
especially the case because to carry out an effective
epistemological investigation almost necessarily presupposes
interdisciplinary collaboration.194
From the above quotation, interdisciplinary collaboration cannot thrive
‘foundationlessly’. Following Piaget’s avowal, epistemology progresses if it imbibes
the scientific character of interdisciplinary relationship, and interdisciplinarity cannot
hold without guiding principles. These guiding principles are ‘foundational interactio n
guiding principles.’ This is a salient and impassable characteristic of the scientific
193 Jean Piaget, Insights and Illusions of Philosophy Transl. by Wolfe Mays, p. 40.
194 Jean Piaget, Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, p. 76.
74
discipline. And on this note, naturalised epistemology, insofar as it is to be patterned
after the scientific discipline, is a foundationalist enterprise.
We have in the first section of this chapter, been able to examine the Quinean
concept of indeterminacy of translation, and, the points of convergence and divergence
of the Quinean principles of ontological relativity and indeterminacy of translation.
In the second section of this chapter, we aimed at arguing for naturalized
epistemology as a foundationalist programme. Foundationalism, which appears to be
Quine’s nightmare, was given birth to by scepticism but proposed unnatural and
superhuman requirements. Quine then saw as germane, the need to propose a way out,
and this he did in proposing naturalised epistemology. And herein, we modified the
structure of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Naturalised Epistemology, then, far from
being an arbitrary and certainty bereft programme, is one that is purposeful and
foundationalist.
Thus, since the sceptical challenge gained root because it, bearing in mind the
certainty character of knowledge, asked a question: Is knowledge possible? And the
traditional epistemologist gave a pseudo-answer, Yes. With naturalised epistemolo gy,
the right answer to that question is, Yes, but the answer does not stop at Yes, it goes
further to say that the sort of knowledge that is possible is natural, humanistic and
linguistic types of knowledge.
75
CONCLUSION
The existence of foundations is essential for the growth of any discipline at all
especially epistemology. Since Quine’s theory of ontological relativity is a linguistic -
epistemological theory and finds its consummation in his novelly proposed naturalised
epistemology, we saw it as apposite to make a case for the foundationalistic nature of
naturalised epistemology. We saw Quine’s theory as providing a framework for the
working of foundationalism along new lines other than a total departure from
foundationalism.
To achieve this, in Chapter One we gave a general introduction highlighting the
background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, relevance
of the study and thesis of the study. We further clarified some basic concepts and
reviewed some germane literature that we considered necessary for achieving our set-
goal.
In Chapter Two, we examined the relevant thoughts of some of the personages that
were influential to Quine’s assumption of his theory of ontological relativity, like the
thoughts of Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects, Bertrand Russell’s theory of
descriptions, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language games, Rudolf Carnap’s reductionis m,
and John Dewey’s behaviourism.
In Chapter Three, we attempted an exposition of what Quine understands by ontology
(all we say there is) and relativity (the shift from anything absolute or prior), and, gave
a provisional definition of Quine’s theory of ontological relativity. We also tried to
76
examine some of the foundational pillars that constitute the kernel of Quine’s theory of
ontological relativity.
In the Chapter Four, on the one hand, we tried to establish the relationship between
Quine’s theory of ontological relativity and his indeterminacy thesis and on the other
hand, make a case for the foundational character of naturalised epistemology on the
grounds that it fulfils ontological relativity’s aspirations.
However, Quine’s theory has been criticised from a variety of fronts. In fact,
the way his thoughts are aligned makes it easy to criticize him. One of the most veritable
critiques is that Quine’s theory of ontological relativity would consequently conduce to
a private language which would inevitably confer bleakness on its theses and spell
gloom for the epistemic sphere. Ilham Dilman says, “a language in which we could
never say what is true is no language at all.”195 The ‘what is true’ that Dilman means
here is the truth confirmable within intersubjective conversations. The other wise, says
Dilman, would evoke the thesis that only the speaker of the language knows what he/she
means.196 If this abounds, the conversational and social nature of language (which
Quine wholeheartedly champions 197 ) would be victimised, and if the conversational and
social nature of language is thus exploited, Quine would be championing two
incompatible theories of language without knowing it. 198 And where, according to the
195 Ilham Dilman, Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience: A Philosop hical Critique, p. 28.
196 Ilham Dilman, Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience: A Philosophical Critique , pp. 28-31.
197 W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, pp. 26-27.
77
private language implication, there are no common grounds for determining what is
true between the speaker and the hearer, then, language transmutes from being
communicational to being gibberish.
Godfrey Ozumba argues that the presence of a full-blown indeterminacy and a
private language consequence, and its attendant mayhems, are quite potent in deflating
Quine’s theory of ontological relativity. If indeterminacy, says Ozumba, is ultimate ly
the case, which means that the individual is the sole decider of meaning, then, we cannot
even arrive at a background theory that will serve as a ‘focus-giving’ platform for our
ontological landscapes,199 since, a background theory is a fruit of intersubjective
agreement, and is a conventional standard for meaning determination. Background
theories are conventional standards which guide intersubjective conversations and are
a fruit of intersubjective conversations too. If then we cannot arrive at a background
theory, and the background theory relativisation is the fulcrum of Quine’s theory of
ontological relativity, then, either the theory is to be re-worked, re-defined or
anathematised.
Furthermore, a relativity principle that is intolerant is unfair, unjust, untrue to
itself and lacks affective praxis. Quine’s theory would have escaped this critique if his
theory tolerantly accommodates those who might prefer an absolute or foundationalistic
approach to reality. Quine cannot employ his theory of ontological relativity to propose
78
a relativity principle, and at the same time intolerantly build this relativity principle on
an absolute principle. On this note, Quine inadvertently prescribes an absolute princip le
while intending to espouse a relativity principle. This is a perfect recipe for disaster!
More so, it would then be unhealthy and disturbing to confer the character of
truth on all individual accounts of reality simply because one wants to achieve
relativism, pragmatism and epistemological libertarianism. And since both langua ge
and reality are shown to be sometimes fraught with uncertainties, how do we know
what is true if we cannot access its truth on (and from) an intersubjective framework?
Quine’s position is veritably foundationalistic in that Quine departed from
apodeictic basicality to arrive at the basicality of background theories which is another
kind of foundationalism. In fact, Quine himself proves that background theory (or
language) is a foundation when he says that “…thus launching a regress; and we need
the background language to regress into.”200 Foundationalism cannot thus be merely
reduced to the infelicities of traditional foundationalism.201
Thus, Quine mainly succeeded in telling us how foundationalism should be new-set,
namely, within the linguistic milieu that is naturalistic, and within the naturalistic
surrounding that is humanistic.
200W.V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 49.

201Patrick Akunne, “Richard Rorty and the Death of Epistemology”, in Ibadan Dominican Studies: A
Dialogue of Faith, Reason and Science, Ed. Joseph T. Ekong, Vol.1, No. 1, (January, 2015), p. 142.
79
However, Quine is to be revered for the systematicity and interconnected ness
of his works and thoughts. The different things Quine argues for stand together and give
each other mutual support. Ilham Dilman who devoted a book to a critique of Quine’s
thoughts even says that “Quine’s thought is certainly a well defended fortress. You
cannot easily reject any one thing he asserts without questioning much of the rest of
what he says. To be able to construct such a fortress obviously takes ingenuity. Quine
is undoubtedly a very clever thinker.”202
Worthy of commendation, Quine’s theses warns of the need to be
circumspective of the possible gradual adoption of an imperialistic temperament. Barry
Hallen well captures this when he avers, adopting Quine’s thoughts, that the western
conferral of the appellative ‘pre-logical mentality’ on Africans, could be the creation of
a pre-logical translation.203 Hallen then says: “One who is persuaded by the possibility
of indeterminacy would prefer to be more flexible, more open to the possibilities of
misrepresentation, approximation by translation, especially on the level of abstract
thought.”204
On the whole, the traditional definition of foundationalism is misconce ived
when conceived in terms of absolute certainty. With Quine’s theory of ontologic a l
relativity, any theory makes meaning only when mirrored through a background theory.
This means that the foundation upon which meaning can be or take off at all, is from
202 Ilham Dilman, Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience: A Philosophical Critique , p. vii.
203 Barry Hallen, African Philosophy: The Analytic Approach, p. 137.
204 Barry Hallen, African Philosophy: The Analytic Approach, p. 137.
80
the background theory. Since this theory may only be relevant to a given community,
it can only provide such certainty as the members of the community have been made to
accept. Foundationalism thus continues along new lines and provides the framework
for this new position which is foundational epistemology naturalised.
These facts may suppose that there be scholarly work on a contemporary re-
definition of foundationalism. Should foundationalism remain within the confines of
traditional foundationalism? Or could we, as we have so far demonstrated, now define
foundationalism as the epistemological view that meaning and truth determination is
context specific, and, these contexts possess a foundational character for a given group
of people based on preference, choice or affinity?
81
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QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND

OKPALA, MICHAEL IFEANYICHUKWU

BEING A LONG ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, DOMINICAN INSTITUTE,

(AFFILIATED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN), IN PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A

BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY

This is to certify that the Long Essay entitled: QUINE’S THEORY OF

ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND FOUNDATIONALISM IN

PHILOSOPHY, submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Dominican Institute,

is an original research carried out by Okpala, Michael Ifeanyichukwu DI/648 and

Dr. Chika Mba

Lecturer, Dominican Institute.

Dominican Institute, Ibadan.

Rev. Fr. Dr. Joseph T. Ekong, O.P. Date

(Head of Department of Philosophy)

it; I love you and you know it too.

comforts me in her soothing intercession.

I appreciate the immense paternal contributions of my supervisor, Dr. Chika

My unalloyed gratitude also goes to my biological family. I thank my beloved

unmentioned. I cherish you all. You are part of my history.

I also sincerely extend my gratitude to the Secular Institute of the Schoenstatt

Fathers Community. Their spiritual, financial and formative generosity is a source of

encouragement to me. My appreciation particularly goes to all my formators especially

Nichodemus Okenwa. I also extend my gratitude to my erstwhile Rector and Spiritua l

Catoggio and Pablo Pol. You all are an inspiration to me.

To some of my Schoenstatt friends who dedicate a lot of energy and time in

praying for and supporting me even without necessarily meeting me in person,

This vote of thanks would be incomplete if I do not recognise the painstaking

and Steve-Mario Udofia.

To all the brothers in the Schoenstatt Fathers Student Community, Nigeria,

all. You are all my friends and my brothers.

Okpala, Michael Ifeanyichukwu,

December 3rd 2017.

Quine moves against foundationalism in Philosophy. He seems to follow the notions of

relativism, pragmatism and libertarianism which virtually all post-modernist

philosophers are enamoured of.

In trying to undercut foundations, Quine’s theory implicitly posits background theory

as an epistemic-determining foundation which is fulfilled on the premises of naturalised

epistemology. Again, while he sought to pattern naturalised epistemology after the

foundationalism, for foundations are indispensable for progress, rather, it provides a

so understood, then false assumptions about Quine’s programme would be dispensed

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION…………………………………1

1.1.Background to the Study…………………………………………………………..1

1.2.Statement of the Problem………………………………………………………….3

1.3.Objectives of the Study……………………………………………………………3

1.4.Relevance of the Study……………………………………………………………4

1.5.Thesis of the Study………………………………………………………………...5

CHAPTER TWO: INFLUENCES ON QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL

2.1. Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects…………………………………………..11

2.2. Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Descriptions……………………………………...14

2.4.Rudolf Carnap’s Reductionism…………………………………………………..19

2.5.John Dewey’s Behaviourism…………………………………………………….22

CHAPTER THREE: QUINE’S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY:

3.1. Quine’s Theory of Ontological Relativity………………………………………25

3.2. Pillars of Quine’s Theory of Ontological Relativity……………………………...35

3.3. Chapter Evaluation………………………………………………………………43

4.1. Ontological Relativity and Indeterminacy of Translation……………………….44

4.2. Naturalised Epistemology as a Foundationalist Programme…………………….50