I- PPRACTICE OF LAW DEFINED
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
1. Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
2.PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA
G.R No L-19450
FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged
SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the
Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de
oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same
case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having
entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of
the the Secretary of Justice. Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec.
32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys
from practicing.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule
138, revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the
case at bar, who is a relative.
3. MAURICIO ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
BAR MATTER NO. 553
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according
to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot
afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint
against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisement.
Comp iled by: Merzy 1
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The
Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no
matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation
and family law. A battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys backs up these
specialists.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the
jurisprudence in the US, which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of
Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the
public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether
such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such
practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The
services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice
of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal
Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote
divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law
which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has
a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
PRACTICE OF LAW CONCEPTS
4. MAELOTISEA GARRIDO VS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO
A.C NO. 6593
Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a
supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her
husband was having an affair with a woman other than his wife and
already had a child with her; and the same information was confirmed
when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons
mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given
yielded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been
married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their conjugal
home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since
failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they postulated
that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed
immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1,
Rule 1.01.
Issue:
Comp iled by: Merzy 2
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of
Canon 1, Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the
offense being supposedly committed when they were not lawyers?
Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed
by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or moral. In the present case,
the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E.Garrido and
Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Furthermore, the contention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition
precedent to admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and V
alencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good example
in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they violated the
law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, not
only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by themselves,
without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal
responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that
Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two
other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral
values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the
country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.
5. A.C NO. 5830
MARY D. MALECDAN VS. ATTY. PERCIVAL PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW
KOLLIN
Facts:
Hence, Mary D. Malecdan filed a Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty.
Matthew P. Kollin, for acts committed in violation of the lawyer’s oath. On
November 25, 1999, Mary D. Malecdan (complainant) entered into a deed of sale
with the Spouses Washington and Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in
Baguio City, where the money received by Eliza Fanged as full and final payment
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
was deposited in the account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante who was then counsel
for the latter. The complainant later found out, however, that the said lot was the
subject of a controversy between the former owners and the Fanged Spouses.
When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza
Fanged, the latter, through her new counsel respondent Atty.Kollin, filed a
complaint for rescission of the contract. Later, the parties entered into a
compromise settlement. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with
Motion, it was Atty. Pekas who signed as counsel for Eliza Fanged. And as counsel
for Eliza Fanged, he also signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999.
The money was then transferred to the respective accounts as prayed for in the
compromise settlement. When the complainant’s duly authorized representative
Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused
to do so, on the pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter.
Hence, Mary D. Malecdan filed a Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty.
Matthew P. Kollin, for acts committed in violation of the lawyer’s oath. The IBP
Board of Governors passed a resolution, finding respondent Atty. Kollin guilty of
dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to respondent Atty.
Pekas. Atty. Kollin will be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years,
while the complaint against Atty. Pekas was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pekas and Atty. Kollin are guilty of acts in violation of the
lawyer’s oath.
Held: Yes, Atty. Pekas and Atty. Kolin are guilty of acts in violation of the lawyer’s
oath. It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a
mere incident of the practice of law, the primary purpose of which is to render
public service. 26 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all
members of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law.
Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 27 A lawyer is expected, at all
times, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. In this case, the amount
which the respondents took for themselves as attorney’s fees belonged to a third
person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in
fact, an adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which
was in fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of contract, and, if
respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself.
Comp iled by: Merzy 3
Thus, the respondents could not, without a claiming party’s knowledge, apply the
amount for themselves as attorney’s fees. If there was someone liable for the
respondents’ attorney’s fees, it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said
that there was a real "compromise" as to the manner in which the amount of
P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the complainant was not present when the
said agreement was made.
6. A.C. No. 7902 : September 30, 2008 T
ORBEN B. OVERGAARD, v ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ,
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of
law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct.
The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in compliance with a
Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations
under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant’s requests for a
report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands
for return of the money paid to him. The respondent also did not inform him that
he was entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to answer the complaint for Other
Light Threats. Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained
to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, allegingthat the respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, to whom the instant disciplinary case
was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, foundthe respondent
guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, andRule
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29,
2008,he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three (3)years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-126, dated March 6,2008, approved the recommendation of
Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the complainantto return the
PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from receipt of the notice.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law
Ruling:
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed multiple violations of the canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The acts of the respondent constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the bar. The
practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good
moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether
they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty, including suspension and disbarment. The respondent demonstrated not
only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but
also a wanton disregard for his duties as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of
the bar, such as the respondent, betray not only the trust of their client, but also
public trust. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the
responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the
privilege to practice law.
7. PACE v. DIAZ
A.C No. 10134
Full text
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C.
Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty.
Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).1
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the
Judiciary held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6
to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all
the money matters of PACE.
Comp iled by: Merzy 4
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule
was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
national convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of
officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, "A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
but she was not elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, conduct."
2007,the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved
Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner
for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation
Fernandez recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of
report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to
merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to
the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June
submit the liquidation reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He
20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board
also took note that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made
Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past
by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention.10 As to the sufficiency
treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE
and completeness of these reports, this would be better resolvedthrough an audit
for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4
rather than in disbarment proceedings.1âwphi1 Besides, Commissioner Fernandez
did not consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of any connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she should be
Liquidation for the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment
said convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; case.11
that the net proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and
entirely deposited to PACE accounts;"5 that she also filed the Statement of
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections
Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May 22, 2007; that the report,
even though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore
together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita
disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was
Amisola and witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-
the "certificate of candidacy," was never offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a
election as PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already
lawyer, knew that her bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she
filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil,
would not beable to assume office if she won.13
Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the ₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not
rest with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous board of directors;
and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never
and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong. sponsored the appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the
approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the Board of
Directors. Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the
the passage of the questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a
said term-end bonus.8
lawyer.14

Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner
protagonists were directed to submit their respective position papers. Thereafter,
Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.15
the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June
21, 2013, granting the complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand

Legal Prof Case Digests 2018 Comp iled by: Merzy 5

set asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for
one (1) year.17
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of
PACE funds;(ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the
Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable actions18
committed by Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended
Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a
privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show
that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all
their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the
legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations
with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They
are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients.19 Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted
only to those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach
at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.20
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that
profession which society entrusts with the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate
and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good
moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of this noble profession.21
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-
election, including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not
by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and
her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of
PACE officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the
Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to
be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
8. A.C No. 790
AM NO. 2266 HERMINIO NORIEGA VS. ATTY EMMANUEL SISON
FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison
as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to
engage in the private practice of law; yet Noriega alleged that Sison has created
another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in
private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the
same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself
out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing
in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never represented himself
deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in
the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty.
Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction
when the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept
and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were sent to “Atty.
Manuel Sison”,
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by
evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison.
There is no evidence that Sison has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral
conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order
Comp iled by: Merzy 6
of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and
without attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not suspend members of the bar. Section 28, 29 and 30 of the Rule 138 of the Revised
constitute private practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary Rules of Court are applicable in the case at bar. Disciplinary proceedings involve
gain for his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends. no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against him. the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
9. ALFREDO C. TAJAN
in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own
vs.
motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao
may investigate into the conduct of its own officers.
,
Facts:
Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own
motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney,
. In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the
when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any
authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear
attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show
Administrative Case No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated
that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an
against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated December 5,
officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an
1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was required by respondent
attorney. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 8 of Rule 139 refers
Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended
to complaints referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in
from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in
suspension proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance,
court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false. At the
because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them
hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety
the power to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to another and final
of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one for disbarment,
investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer. On
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the
the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and the statement of the
subject matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit
facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the
himself from hearing the administrative case in view of the latter's conflicting
Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such
positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time. The oral motion was denied.
order revoking or extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his
Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to
office as such, as the facts warrant." WHEREFORE, the present petition is denied,
hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys
and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court is ordered
because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme
dissolved, with costs against petitioner
Court and not in courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming
arguendo
that courts of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 10. Director of Religious affairs v. Bayot
139 of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the
complaint. Petition is bereft of merit. When it appears by acts of misconduct that A.C no. L-1117
he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to
continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing
privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to th
marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also

Legal Prof Case Digests 2018 Comp iled by: Merzy 7

makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and
that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the
ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted
the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act
again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
“the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he
caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency
and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad,
the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
11. PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF SURNAME SYCIP
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO
Full text
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners
of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who
had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article
1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last
paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of
the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as
part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of
the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the
legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to
the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a
profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended
by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the
name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of
the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international
law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at
least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
Comp iled by: Merzy 8
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this
Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of
including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter
was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm
designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law
firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting
thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to
be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A.
Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of
Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now
being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name
"Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of
the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no
reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City
to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C.
D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the
personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed
which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility
of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by
the Court.
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their
partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name,
which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their
names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership
must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be
living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil
Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain
of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the
heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their
lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law
firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of
an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old
firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased
partners.
Comp iled by: Merzy 9
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title
IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals
with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name
of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a
hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members.
Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial
partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.
9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to
carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will
of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends
or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a
firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such
skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no
provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as
an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed
by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a
mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated
that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to
business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey
of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern
Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, —
no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means
of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession
from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients. 13
Comp iled by: Merzy 10
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature
of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when
such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of
petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names
have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more
of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained
by local custom and not where by custom this purports to
Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner
and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who
was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit.,
supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished
name appearing in a firm title.
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use
of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so
because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733)
which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York
Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if
none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the
practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar
Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names
of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and
the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the
matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the
practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.
19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of
a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting
herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean
that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Comp iled by: Merzy 11
Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with
the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom
or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our
civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall
not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of
justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public
service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of
powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think
of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and
farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order
each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by
law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition
with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service
of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling
equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession
even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which
the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that
they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the
public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to
drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been
partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
12. Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
A.C. No. 6672
Facts: Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services
alleging that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients to transfer legal representation to Tolentino with the promise of financial
assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Linsangan
presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano convinced
him to sever his lawyer-client relations with Linsangan and use Tolentino’s services
instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00. Further, Linsangan’s calling card
was also attached wherein it appeared that aside from legal services, financial
assistance was offered as well.
Issue: Whether Tolentino is guilty of misconduct
Held: Yes. The court adopted the IBP’s finding of unethical conduct, whereby it
found Tolentino to have encroached on the professional practice of Linsangan
violating Rule 8.02, which prohibits a lawyer from stealing another lawyer’s client
or induce the latter’s client to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services. Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending
venture with his clients as borrowers, Tolentino violated Rule 16.04 The court
further added that Tolentino violated Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provides “A
LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.” Hence, lawyers are prohibited from
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Moreover, Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides: Rule 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S
CAUSE. This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind
Comp iled by: Merzy 12
of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty. The calling card contained with the phrase financial assistance, was
clearly used to entice clients to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. Additionally, the court said that a
lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or
use of simple professional cards. Hence, Atty. Tolentino was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
13. SORIANO V. DIZON
A.C 6792
FACTS:
While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car
driven by herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the
latter stopped to make a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the
point that the respondent fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He
fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter pushed him out and sped off.
ISSUE:
WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.
RULING:
Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear
that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust
refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
14. In the matter of Pettion of Garcia Bosque for admission to practice
law in the Philippines
The cession of the Philippine Archipelago having been agreed upon by the parties
to the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the compulsory subjection of the
subjects of the ceding power to the new sovereign followed as a logical
consequence. The status of these subjects was not uniform, as in addition to the
natives there were others who were merely residents but who, equally with the
natives, had interests and rights inherent in the nationality of the territory. With
respect to these the special agreement contained in article 9 was established, by
virtue of which it was agreed to accord them the right of electing to leave the
country, thus freeing themselves of subjection to the new sovereign, or to
continue to reside in the territory, in which case the expiration of the term of
eighteen months without their making an express declaration of intention to retain
their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter, such persons thereby
becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the natives of
these Islands. The period of eighteen months began to run from the date of the
exchange of the ratifications of the treaty — that is to say, from April 11, 1899,
and expired on the corresponding day of October, 1900. The petitioner absented
himself from these Islands on May 30, 1899, and remained absent therefrom
during the whole period. It was in January, 1901, that he returned to these
Islands.
From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it is evident that he elected to take
the first of the two courses open to him under his right of option. Neither the
Government nor the courts can place any other construction upon the facts above
related. Having left the islands he had no occasion to make any declaration of his
intention to preserve his Spanish nationality, which he carried with him on his
departure. This nationality could be forfeited only by a continued residence in the
ceded territory and a failure to make a declaration of intention to preserve it within
the term fixed therefor. The conditions which gave rise to the presumptive change
of nationality were residence and the lapse of eighteen months without express
declaration to the contrary; these two conditions not being fulfilled there was no
change of national status. Neither by the Government of Spain nor by that of the
United States could the petitioner be regarded as a Filipino subject. By absenting
himself from the territory he continued to be a Spaniard.
To native-born subjects of the territory no such right of option was accorded; it
was expressly refused them upon the rejection by the American Commissioners of
the proposition in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded territories made by the
Comp iled by: Merzy 13
Spanish Commissioners in Annex No. 1 to the twenty-second protocol. (Conference
of December 10, 1898.) The native subject could not evade the power of the new
sovereign by withdrawing from the Islands, nor while continuing to reside therein
make declaration of his intention to preserve the Spanish nationality enjoyed under
the former sovereign. Neither the Government of the United States nor that of
Spain can consider them as other than Filipino subjects. This is expressly stated by
the Spanish Government in article 1 of its royal decree of May 11, 1901.
The dates fixed by the treaty by which the sovereignty of one nation is ceded to
another are of the highest importance, they being part of the contract, and are not
within the control of the subjects as are those relating to their individual rights by
reason of the fact that the political rights of the contracting nations themselves are
the subject of the agreement. It is for this reason that the Government of Spain in
the royal decree above cited has always taken the dates fixed in the treaty of Paris
as the starting point, and, moreover, expressly declares therein that persons who
are natives or residents of the ceded or relinquished territories can not, in their
relations with the Government or authorities of such territories, lay claim to
Spanish nationality preserved or recovered by virtue of said decree, except with
the consent of such Government, or under treaty stipulations. (Art. 5.) The
Government and courts of these Islands should not act with less circumspection in
the matter, and invade the sovereign rights of Spain by giving the presumptive
nationality established by Article IX of the treaty of Paris an extent not warranted
by the conditions upon which it depends, to wit, residence coupled with failure to
make an express declaration to the contrary. The ordinary provisions of local laws
in their normal operation with regard to the effect of absence upon the retention
of a residence or domicile can not therefore be relied upon, nor the presumption
as to the intention of an absentee recognized by civil codes and international
treaties, although the most general and almost the only proof allowed by statute
as evidence of an intention to preserve a residence or domicile in a country is the
maintenance of a dwelling or commercial establishment therein, upon which point,
as also upon the fact that the petitioner became a member of the bar of Barcelona
upon his arrival in that city, we made no decision, not regarding it as of any
moment in view of the conclusions above expressed. The fact is that one is not to
be regarded as having submitted to the new sovereign by the mere failure to make
an express declaration, inasmuch as without a residence de facto the declaration is
of no significance, having been established for the express purpose of overcoming
the effect of a continued residence, an act which in itself implies subjection to the
new sovereign by giving rise to the presumption of waiver of Spanish nationality
and the adoption of that of the territory.
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
The petitioner can not, therefore, be considered to have lost his Spanish
nationality by reason of his residence in the territory after the 11th of October,
1900, and his failure to make declaration of his intention to preserve it within the
period agreed upon by the high contracting parties to the treaty of Paris, and to
have adopted the nationality of the native subjects under the presumption arising
from the conditions expressed. He can only acquire it through voluntary
renunciation of his present nationality by seeking to become naturalized in these
Islands; but upon this matter this court can decide nothing, there having been no
legislation upon the subject up to the present.
The status of the petitioner with respect to the new sovereignty of the territory
having been defined, it remains to determine the question raised as to whether
Spanish subjects resident therein constitute an intermediate class between other
foreign residents and the native of the country in whose behalf some specially
favorable conditions have been stipulated. Upon this point no proposition was
made, even incidentally, nor was any reference made to it in the discussions which
preceded the treaty of Paris. The American Commissioners, referring to Spanish
subjects, natives of Spain, simply said: "Such persons have the fullest right to
dispose of their property and remove from the territory or remain therein to
continue to be Spanish subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory."
(Memorandum annexed to Protocol No. 22.) "They shall also have the right to
carry on their industry, commerce, and profession, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners." (Art. 9 of the treaty of Paris.)
The laws applicable to other foreigners were, prior to that treaty, the Law of
Foreigners for the Ultramarine Provinces of July 4, 1870, and article 27 of the Civil
Code. The first of these laws in its thirty-ninth article authorized all foreigners to
engage in any kind of industry in the Spanish ultramarine provinces subject to the
laws prevailing therein, and to practice any profession for which the laws did not
require a diploma of proficiency granted by the Spanish authorities. No one can
doubt that the legal profession is one of those for the practice of which the law
required a diploma of proficiency granted by the Spanish authorities. The second
law cited provides that foreigners in Spain shall enjoy the rights which the civil
laws accord to Spaniards, subject to the provisions of article 2 of the constitution
of the State. Article 2 of the constitution of 1876 establishes the same restriction
or limitation as the law of foreigners. Hence if other foreigners could not then
engage in the practice of law, and by the express prohibition of the Code of Civil
Procedure in force can not do so at the present time, neither can Spanish subjects
do so, they being in every respect upon the same footing as other foreigners.
Comp iled by: Merzy 14
If, then, the petitioner upon his departure from these Islands on May 30, 1899, did
not take with him the nationality or the native inhabitants impressed by the treaty
of Paris, which had been in force from the 11th of April of the same year; if he
departed as a Spaniard and continued to be a Spaniard, by taking the first course
left open by the right of option stipulated in the treaty of Paris, without being
affected by the presumptive nationality of the territory arising from the fact of
residence and the lapse of the time fixed; if he had not elected to adopt this
nationality of the territory by express declaration within the same period; if after
the expiration of that period it is expressly provided that the right of option shall
no longer be available, and that the only course is naturalization, as to which
subject upon equal footing with other foreign residents he can not practice the
legal profession under the law either prior or subsequent to the treaty of Paris, it is
evident that this court can not regard the petitioner as possessed of the
qualifications alleged.
The new petition presented by him for admission to the bar of these Islands must
therefore be denied, and it is so ordered.
15.Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540
SCRA 424
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced
law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for
his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that
no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law
is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This
is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:
 the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
16. In Re: Diosdado Gutierrez
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco
in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after
serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the
President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime.
Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by
reason of the latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is
without a doubt, such a crime.
Comp iled by: Merzy 15
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he
was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It
merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must
be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon
(which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his
official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his
being purged from the profession.
17. Re: Petition of Al Argosino
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful
bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing
which caused the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation
rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was
sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a
probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He took the
bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition
to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of
law averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he
spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit
him to the practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the
STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who
are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court
upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members,
keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and
the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the
court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become
a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals
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who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino
for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of
the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign
the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal profession
18. LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner vs. QUINCIANO VAILOCES,
Full text
his concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine
bar.
It appears that as member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public,
Vailoces, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus.
Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the
will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently, the
probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying
probate to the will. This decision became final. On the basis of this decision a
criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and
the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental where, after trial, they were found guilty and convicted. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to Vailoces but
modified it with regard to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsified of public document defined
and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1 day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessories of the law, fine and costs. This sentence having become final,
Vailoces began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the
offended party instituted the present disbarment proceedings.
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered
against him in the criminal case but contends that the same is based on
insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the charge being merely motivated by sheer
vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein complainant, and that to give
course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy.
Comp iled by: Merzy 16
He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this
section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. 1
Among the examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice Moran
are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage. 2 The crime of which
respondent was convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of
this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals.
Hence such crime involves moral turpitude. Indeed it is well-settled that
"embezzlement, forgery, robbery, swindling are crimes, which denote moral
turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked
on as involving moral turpitude" (53 C.J.S., 1206).
It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to
disbarment under Section 26, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on his
part much as we sympathize with him to dispute now the sufficiency of his
conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a
closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which
we are concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of
a crime involving moral turpitude. As this Court well said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The review of respondent’s conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not
only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary
to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of
the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved,
himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." (In the Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957).
The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime
which resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the
Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in double
jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only be availed of when he is placed in
the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included
therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is
intended "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil., 588), and its purpose is "to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence" (In re McDougall, 3 Phil., 77).
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to
this effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of
attorneys.
19. Sebastian v. Calis
Facts:
Sometime in November 1992, one Marilou Sebastian, herein complainant, was
referred to Atty. Dorotheo Calis, herein respondent, for the latter to process all the
documents needed for the former to travel to the United States of America with
the
consideration of P150,000.00. With the respondent’s promise to return the
complainant’s
money if there would be trouble with the documents for her travel. In 4 separate
payments, complainant paid the entire consideration receiving, however, only 3
receipts for the payments. Respondent, Calis, provided the complainant with
spurious documents which resulted for complainant to be detained in Changi
Prisons upon arrival in Singapore and thereafter, the complainant was deported
back to the Philippines
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the respondent promised to secure new travel
documents for the complainant. However, the complainant opted to demand for
the return of her money. Calis made partial payments of 15,000, 6000, and 5000
to the complainant but was unreachable when the complainant demanded for the
rest of the payment. Calis also failed to attend the hearings with the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) despite being issued
summons and being required to answer or comment on the complaint. Therewith,
the IBP recommended the disbarment of herein respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Comp iled by: Merzy 17
Whether or not Atty. Dorotheo Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which thereby constitutes his disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
carrying with it the condition of continuous good moral character. The gross
misconduct of a lawyer subjects him unfit to practice law..Canon 1, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In the case at bar,
Calis guaranteed to secure all the necessary documents for
Sebastian’s travel to the United States with the promise to return the mon
ey if anything goes wrong with her travel. Calis’s acts of giving the complainant
spurious documents constitutes deception and unlawful conduct on his part.
Adding to it is respondent’s
refusal to honor the summons of the IBP which reflects his unprofessional conduct.
Thecourt views Calis’s conduct and continuance in service as a threat to the
administration of
justice. Therefore, Calis is deemed disbarred and is ordered to immediately return
the rest
of the complainant’s money.
20. IN THE MATTER OF IBP
JUNE 29, 1988
Full text
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of
the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the
Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain
the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration
of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16,
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties
were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments
relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission
on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of
any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of
Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the
views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that
body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample
Comp iled by: Merzy 18
material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of
Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to
do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and
the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through
their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of
integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law
reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of
the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible
for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of
Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical
judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the
disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges
and prosecuting officers;
Comp iled by: Merzy 19
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack
competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the
country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum
fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-
wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine
Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent
part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's
inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar
will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State, the
administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Comp iled by: Merzy 20
— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and
just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action;
but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized
body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and
just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized
body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual
dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay
dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled
financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of
the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession
has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the
Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to
integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does
not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for
regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated
Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is
that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that
might result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on
any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views
be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote
measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or
adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Comp iled by: Merzy 21
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry
us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance
of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral.
The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and
the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of
the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by
proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and
discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have
been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all
lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is
a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better
and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the
Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and
(9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of
the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its
affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of
Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration
experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where
the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen;
on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and
vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official
statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national
poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have
turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of
Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or
1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar
association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions
and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar
integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who
cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per
cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All these
clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this
time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
Comp iled by: Merzy 22
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.
21. In re: Edillion
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court
139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension
for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and
to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed
to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership
fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one
of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues
and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of
the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is
not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus
the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
22. Santos v. Llamas
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a
number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data
(date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal
259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997.
Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. He
likewise admit that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least
for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings
were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and
that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such
as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing
in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years
and therefore liable for his actions.
Comp iled by: Merzy 23
Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing
to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen.
HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01
which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual
dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal
of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or
not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is
true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
a. GOOD REGULAR STANDING
b. REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
23. Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, June 29, 1998
FACTS:
Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty.
Dominador Nunag, for his alleged affair with Gina Espita who happens to be a
former studentof the respondent back when Ms. Espita was a first-year college
student. Finally, inthe most recent case filed by Mrs. Nunag, the complainant had
her seven childrensign the appeal for disbarment of Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag
presented as evidencethe pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita together, love
letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie Espita, the brother of Ms. Espita and the source of
the
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of the children of Atty. And
Mrs Nunag. In the proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been engaged in an affair with Ms
.Espita, and being live-in partners, have had two children with the latter.
Atty. Nunag denied the allegations by presenting Argumentum ad Misericordia.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Narag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against
him?
HELD:
Atty. Narag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of
evidence presented against him, but instead, presented an argument to pity.
He is, by order of the honorable court, being disbarred by virtue of The Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides Rule 1.01:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
24. 2014 CASE
FACTS
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative complaint
for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she accused of
having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision,
which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined that the
respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he abandoned his family in
order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out that the respondent had breached
the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the legal profession. A
Motion for the Re–opening of the Administrative Investigation, or in the
Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the respondent on August
25, 1998. He averred that he was denied due process of law during the
administrative investigation as he was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his
behalf and adduce additional vital documentary evidence. On November 29, 2013,
Comp iled by: Merzy 24
the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar. The
respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his
wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and their
children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their residence in
Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated affidavit prepared by his
son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the respondent’s claim.
The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years already and that
he has been punished enough. He alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak
and wracked with debilitating osteo–arthritic pains. That he has very limited
mobility due to his arthritis and his right knee injury. He further claimed that he
enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command where he now holds the rank
of Lieutenant Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in
various rescue, relief and recovery missions. The respondent likewise submitted
the various recommendations, testimonials and affidavits in support of his petition
for readmission.
Issue:
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or
not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s
reentry as a counselor at law.
HELD:
The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the
practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had
already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make him inept for the
practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent, while still legally married
to Julieta, is still living with his paramour – the woman for whose sake he
abandoned his family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet
learned from his prior misgivings. That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and
their children would likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondent’s plea. It
is noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed
to evidence the forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to
Julieta and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had
likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the
respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still committing
a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife.
Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all
his properties to his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not be
demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
the respondent from later on executing another last will and testament of a
different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession. In fine, the
Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his
transgressions and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his
reinstatement to the legal profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who
continue to display unassailable character.
25. B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from
taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa.
15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687
for Less Serious Physical Injuries. The above-mentioned cases arose from an
incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling
has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is
proper and shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing
on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions
upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s
Comp iled by: Merzy 25
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the
same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
26. A.C NO. 10179 ONG VS. DELOS SANTOS
FACTS:
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was instroduced to respondent Atty.
William Delos Santos by Sherrif Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila. After several calls and personal transactions between them. Ong and
Delos Santos became friends. In time, according to Atty. Ong, Delos Santos asked
him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To
reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Delos Santos
bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of
Delos Santos financial stability, Ong handed him on January 29, 2008 the amount
of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metronak check No. 0110268 postdated
February 29, 2008.
However, the check was dishonored when it was presented for the reason that the
account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. When efforts to
collect remained futile, Ong filed criminal suit for estafa and for violation of BP Blg.
22 against Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint.
ISSUE:
By issuing the worthless check, did Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
Every lawyer is an officer of the court. He has the duty and responsibility to
maintain his good moral character. In this regard, good moral character ins not
only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law but is a
continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine
Bar. The court demands of him to remain a competent, honourable and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that
puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
27. G.R No 1542017 Ferdinand Cruz vs. Alberto Mina
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The
petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance
as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-
lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz
appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal
case. However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission
for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the
Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court,
where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the
bar.
SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OF APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Contempt of Court (Rules of Court 71, Sec 3)
28. PAFLU V. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY
G.R No. L-23959
Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case
No. 72 ULP Iloilo in the Court of Industrial Relations. The complainants were
Comp iled by: Merzy 26
represented by Cipriano Cid & Associates thru Atty. ANastacio Pacis and Quentin
Muning, a non-lawyer. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favour of
the complainants; a portion of that order granted respondent Quentin
Muning, a non-lawyer atto rney’s fees for professional service. Thus a petition
was filed seeking review of the order made by the Court of Industrial Relations in
Case No. 72-ULP Iloilo.
Issue:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?
RULING:
Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent
Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU and he cannot
therefore, recover attorney’s fees. Public policy demands that legal work in
representation of party litigants should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications for the protection of the courts, clients and
the public. The permission of a non-lawyer to represent a party litigant in court
does not by itself entitle the representation to compensation. For Section 24 Rule
138, of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s
Agreement as to Fees –An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services
imports the existence of an attorney
-client relationship as a condition for recovery of attorney’s fees.
29. CIOCON-REER V. LUBAO
A.M OCA IPI NO. 09-3210-RT
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY
30. A.M No. P-220 Julio Zeta vs. Felicisimo Malinao
Felicisimo Malinao , Court interpreter was charged with, illegally appearing in
court, grave misconduct in office, falsification, and violation of civil service. It was
alleged that Mr. Malinao appeared in the municipal court of his town , in
Zumarraga, Talalora and Sta Rita as an attorney when he is not an attorney. It
was alleged that he instigated persons telling them to commit crimes and tells
them not to be afraid since he has influence over judges. He is unfaithfully filing
his time record. Even when he has been out practicing in the municipal courts, he
would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent days. It
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
was also alleged that he violated civil service law which prohibited a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without
permission from the Department Head.
ISSUE:
IS THE RESPONDENT AS COURT INTERPRETER ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW?
HELD:
NO. Only members of the bar are allowed to practice law. The fact that
respondent court interpreter appeared a number of times as counsel
indicates that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice; and his appearance as
counsel, without being a member. The appearance as counsel in various
municipal courts by a court interpreter, without prior permission of his
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, and the
falsification of his daily time record to make it appear therein that he was
present in his office when in fact he was not, are grave offenses which
warrant his separation from the service. Respondent Felicisimo Malinao is
dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance,
CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar, with prejudice to reemployment in the
judicial branch of the government.
31. A.M No. 2266 Herminio Noriega vs. Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison
FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison
as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to
engage in the private practice of law; yet Noriega alleged that Sison has created
another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in
private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the
same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself
out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing
in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never represented himself
deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in
the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty.
Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction
when the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept
Comp iled by: Merzy 27
and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were sent to “Atty.
Manuel Sison”,
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable and shall be disbar?
HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by
evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison.
There is no evidence that Sison has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral
conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order
of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case
without attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not
constitute private practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary
gain for his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends.
Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend
should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against him.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND OTHER FORMS OF DISCIPLINE
32. A.M NO. 139 ELMO S. ABAD ATTY PROCOPIO BELTRAN VS. ELMO S. ABAD
FACTS:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., President of the
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association,Inc.,of practicing law without having been
previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. Respondent Abad’s circumstances, which
he has narrated, do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right
to practice law. He should fulfill the two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
HELD:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to the Court
within ten (10) days from notice, failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment. The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt
of court. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances, which he has
narrated, do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to
practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming
a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19,
Rules of Court.)
33. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401
FACTS:
Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual harassment. The
records show that the respondent rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his
hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private
part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not
merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s action constitutes gross immoral conduct which
would result on his suspension?
They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency. Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then
a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and
by the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath
as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he
thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of
his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Facts:
Complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of respondents
Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato
G.Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly
falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry
of Deeds in Quezon City. In their sworn complaint for disbarment, the complainants
narrated that they inherited from their parents a residential lot. They found out
upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that their previous
annotations were cancelled based on a letter request filed by Atty. Tolentino as
well as the RTC’s order granting the Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
Comp iled by: Merzy 28

ISSUE: WON the actions of Atty Tolentino warrants his disbarment?
Held:
Yes! A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Verily, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under
Rule 1.01, Canon1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In 1914, a lawyer named Salvador Laguda filed a petition before the Iloilo CFI
recommending that he is appointing Cesareo Durban as his procurador
judicial (legal representative). The judge of the CFI approved the petition. The
authority granted to Durban, a non-lawyer, is limited to the following: appear in
matters signed and presented by Laguda with his own signature and when the
latter should send the said Durban to attend to such matters; that the said Durban
should have no authority to make contracts to represent any person in any justice
court; that all contracts and appearances should be made by Laguda, and that the
latter could send Durban to represent him in courts; and finally that said Durban
should not collect any sum for any service.
In one instance however, Durban agreed to represent one Eustaquia Montage in
litigating her claim over a P20.00 worth parcel of land. Durban charged for
appearance fees; he even won the case. Montage paid Durban a total of P50.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Durban engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
1919, says:
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in the occupation of
appearing for or defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without
being first authorized for that purpose by the judge of the Court of First Instance.
Durban acted beyond the authority granted him; he was likewise in violation of the
provision of Act 1919.
34.CAMPUGAN V. TOLENTINO
A.C NO. 8261& 8725
Facts:
Complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of respondents
Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G.
Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly
falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens
in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Held:
A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Verily, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code
not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe
these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to
disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
35. THE UNITED STATES vs. CESAREO DURBAN
G.R. No. L-12510 August 27, 1917
Comp iled by: Merzy 29
In 1914, a lawyer named Salvador Laguda filed a petition before the Iloilo CFI
recommending that he is appointing Cesareo Durban as his procurador judicial
(legal representative). The judge of the CFI approved the petition. The authority
granted to Durban, a non-lawyer, is limited to the following: appear in matters
signed and presented by Laguda with his own signature and when the latter
should send the said Durban to attend to such matters; that the said Durban
should have no authority to make contracts to represent any person in any justice
court; that all contracts and appearances should be made by Laguda, and that the
latter could send Durban to represent him in courts; and finally that said Durban
should not collect any sum for any service.
In one instance however, Durban agreed to represent one Eustaquia Montage in
litigating her claim over a P20.00 worth parcel of land. Durban charged for
appearance fees; he even won the case. Montage paid Durban a total of P50.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Durban engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
1919, says:
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in the occupation of
appearing for or defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without
being first authorized for that purpose by the judge of the Court of First Instance.
Durban acted beyond the authority granted him; he was likewise in violation of the
provision above.
36. RENE P. RAMOS, vs.MOISES R. RADA,
A.M. No. 202 July 22, 1975
FULL TEXT
Moises R. Rada a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
Branch II, is charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII,
which provides as follows:
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department:
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government:....
From the respondent Rada's letters of explanation and their annexes, dated
December 16, 1973 and June 27, 1974, respectively, and the letter and its
annexes, dated August 12, 1974, filed by the complainant Rene P. Ramos, by way
of rejoinder to Rada's explanation, undisputed fundamental facts emerge that
justify us in dispensing with a full-blown investigation of this administrative case.
The respondent Rada receives a monthly salary of P267.75. On December 15,
1972 he was extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation, thru
its president, Jimmy Tang, as representative to manage and supervise real
properties situated in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation.
Rada accepted the appointment and discharged his duties as administrator. The
administrative complaint against Rada was filed with the Department of Justice on
October 3, 1973. He requested permission to accept the appointment on October
27, 1973. It is not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties of the
position of administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger; nor has it
been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.
Indubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting
government employees from engaging directly in a private business, vocation or
profession or being connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department. But, indubitably, also, his private business connection has not
resulted in any prejudice to the Government service. Thus, his violation of the rule
— the lack of prior permission is a technical one, and he should be meted no more
than the minimum imposable penalty, which is reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that
his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such being his
situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive
endeavor to augment his income, and to award a premium for slothfulness if he
were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private
Comp iled by: Merzy 30
undertaking outside of office hours and without foreseeable detriment to the
Government service. His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not
be terminated, but he must secure a written permission from the Executive Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, who is hereby authorized to
grant or revoke such permission, under such terms and conditions as will
safeguard the best interests of the service, in general, and the court, in particular.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Moises R. Rada is adjudged guilty of a technical
violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, for which he is hereby
reprimanded. He may however apply, if he so desires, for permission to resume his
business connection with the corporation, in the manner above indicated.
37. OMICO MINING v. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS
FACTS:
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, filed with said court a complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. N-1963 and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Judge Amador
T. Vallejos, against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G.
Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as President and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging two (2) causes of action. Served
with the corresponding summons and copies of the complaint, the petitioners, as
defendants therein, on June 10, 1973 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
two grounds, namely: (1) improper venue, in that the case was filed in Cavite
where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth being that he is a resident of Quezon
City where he has his permanent family home; and, as to the second cause of
action, the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and
defendants was entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should
have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to the stock
certificates, the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the
contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the
plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation, the same is illegal, void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of
the Court of First Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar.
ISSUES
The first issue to be resolved here is whether the respondent Judge acted without
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or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the
defendants in default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering
judgment thereon.
HELD: With regard to the first issue, Respondents contend that the motion to
dismiss the complaint is a "useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing
incorporated therein is addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to the party concerned,
that is, the plaintiff or his counsel, as required by the rules. We do not agree. As
copied verbatim above, the notice of hearing states the time and place of hearing,
and a copy thereof was sent through registered mail seven (7) days before the
date set for the hearing of the motion but actually received by plaintiff's counsel
one (1) day before said date, as per certification of the Quezon City Post Office.
To Our mind, what is decisive here is that plaintiff had sufficient notice of the time
and place of the hearing of the motion to dismiss. We have said in Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Bath Construction and Company,[19] "unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the court would have no way to determine
whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which
he may file his reply or opposition." In the Matusa case, We said that granting that
the notice is defective for failure to specify the exact date when the motion to
dismiss should be heard, the Court, in taking cognizance of the motion on the date
set for the hearing thereof, cured whatever iota of defect such a pleading may
have had, especially if it is taken into account that upon receipt of the motion to
dismiss, plaintiff was properly notified of the existence of said pleading.[20] Indeed,
We declared that there may be cases where the attendance of certain
circumstances "may be considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse
literal application of the pertinent rules violated."[21] The case at bar is such an
instance, because private respondent had sufficient notice of the place, time and
date when the motion to dismiss was to be heard.
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the default order, judgment and writ of
execution rendered by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 are hereby
set aside, and the respondent Judge is ordered to hear and decide the motion to
dismiss the complaint, taking into account Our foregoing opinion. The temporary
restraining order is made permanent, with costs against private respondent.
Comp iled by: Merzy 31
 38. Puyat vs De Guzman
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Acero
(Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a
quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25
May 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a
member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de
Guzman (from May 25-31 ’79) to have the parties confer with each other,
Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected
arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to
anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared,
Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed
an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as
a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in
effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question the
Commissioner’s action.
Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may
intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI)
of the Constitution.
Held:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the
stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself
as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the
constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a
work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be
done indirectly.
40. ABETO V. GARCESA
Full text
In a verified complaint dated 19 October 1988 and received by the Office of the
Court Administrator on 18 November 1988, the complainant charges the
respondent with having misrepresented himself as a full-fledged lawyer and having
acted as one of the authorized representatives of the complainant and his co-
complainants in labor cases filed with Regional Arbitration Branch VI of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of Bacolod City despite the fact that
he is a court employee.
Then Deputy Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro referred the complaint to the
respondent through the Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City and required him to comment thereon.
In his Comment/Explanation, the respondent admits having assisted the
complainants in the aforementioned labor cases; denies having misrepresented
himself as a lawyer; and explained the nature of the assistance he had given to
the complainants. According to him, when he first met complainant Abeto in
December 1986, he frankly informed the latter that he is only a court employee
and that he is only assisting or helping Mr. Arturo Ronquillo, for at that time no
lawyer dared to assist the complainants in filing their cases. This Arturo Ronquillo
is the Vice President of the Workers Amalgamated Union of the Philippines (WAUP)
whose assistance was sought by complainant Abeto and the other complainants in
the labor cases for the filing and prosecution of their cases. The respondent
further alleges that the instant complaint arose out of ill-feeling and is designed to
malign and destroy his name and reputation as a court employee. He manifests,
however, that "in the event that his good motives and intentions in helping the
poor and downtrodden workers/employees of BISCOM Central would be
considered not in consonance with Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated September
4, 1986 issued by the Executive Department and is prohibited by Administrative
Circular No. 5 issued by the Supreme Court, Manila, then [he] will readily and
obediently submit to the sound discretion of the Honorable Supreme Court."
Comp iled by: Merzy 32
On 28 August 1989, then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernad submitted a
memorandum recommending that the complaint against the respondent for
misrepresentation be dismissed, but that he be advised to heed the Civil Service
Rules and this Court's memorandum circular prohibiting government employees
from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession without permission
from this Court.
In his Letter-Petition dated 11 July 1995, the respondent asked for an early
resolution of this case, which he considers baseless as it is but an offshoot of a
petty misunderstanding between him and the complainant. He also invited the
attention of this Court to the complainant's affidavit of desistance and letter to the
Court requesting that this case be dismissed. He later submitted the said affidavit
and letter.
In the resolution of 18 September 1995, this Court directed the Office of the Court
Administrator to reevaluate this case and to submit a report thereon.
On 13 October 1995, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted a
Memorandum, duly approved by the Court Administrator, wherein she made the
following findings and conclusion:
It is worth mentioning here Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules which provides that:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department:
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage, in outside activities, the time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer or member of the board of directors.
Moreover in Administrative Circular No. 5 dated 4 October 1988 the Court
expressed the view that
The entire time of Judiciary officials and
employees must be devoted to government
service to insure efficient and speedy
administration of justice considering the
express prohibition in the Rules of Court and
the nature of their work which requires them
to serve with the highest degree of efficiency
and responsibility, in order to maintain public
confidence in the Judiciary.
These circumstances obtaining, we believe that the stenographer
Garcesa merits at the very least a reprimand for engaging in a
limited law practice. (emphasis supplied)
She then recommends:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended
that the penalty of REPRIMAND be imposed on Manuel Garcesa,
Stenographer Reporter, RTC, Branch 45, Bacolod City for failure
to heed the abovequoted Civil Service rule and the Supreme
Court Administrative Circular which prohibits government
employees from engaging in any private business, vocation, or
profession without permission from the Court.
We agree with the recommendation of Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño.
Indeed, per Annex "A" of the complaint, the respondent and one Arturo Ronquillo
signed as "Authorized Representatives" of the complainants in an Ex-Parte Formal
Manifestation dated 11 August 1988 in the following labor cases: RAB VI Cases
Nos. 0272-86, 0304-86, 01-0067-87, 06-0295-87, and 04-0202-87. And in his
Comment/Explanation, he admitted having given or extended "casual assistance"
to Mr. Arturo Ronquillo in the filing and prosecution of the said cases. His
justification therefor — to help the poor and downtrodden workers of BISCOM
Central — will not absolve him from administrative liability for the violation of
Comp iled by: Merzy 33
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules and of the rulings of this
Court in Valdez and in Rabanal which were incorporated in Administrative Circular
No. 5 of 4 October 1988.
He could not, however, be liable for unauthorized practice of law, since there is no
convincing evidence that he misrepresented himself as a lawyer. Moreover, his
appearance was in his capacity as one of the representatives of the complainants
in the labor cases and not as a lawyer. Under Section 6, Rule IV of the Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC in force at that time, a non-lawyer may appear
before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter if he represents himself as a party to the
case, represents an organization or its members, or is a duly accredited member of
a free legal aid staff of the Department of Labor and Employment or of any other
legal aid office accredited by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
Neither could he be liable under Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated 4 September
1986 of the Office of the President declaring that the authority to grant permission
to any official or employee to engage in outside activities shall be granted by the
head of the ministry (department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Said Memorandum Circular No. 17 was
declared by this Court inapplicable to officials or employees of the courts. Thus, in
its Administrative Circular No. 5 dated 4 October 1988, this Court stated:
However, in its En Banc resolution dated October 1, 1987,
denying the request of Atty. Froilan L. Valdez of the Office of
Associate Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, to be
commissioned as a Notary Public, the Court expressed the view
that the provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the
Executive Department are not applicable to officials or
employees of the courts considering the express prohibition in
the Rules of Court and the nature of their work which requires
them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and
responsibility, in order to maintain public confidence in the
Judiciary. The same policy was adopted in Administrative Matter
No. 88-6-002-SC, June 21, 1988, where the court denied the
request of Ms. Esther C. Rabanal, Technical Assistant II, Leave
Section, Office of the Administrative Services of this Court, to
work as an insurance agent after office hours including
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. Indeed, the entire time of
Judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
government service to insure efficient and speedy administration
of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, all officials and employees of the Judiciary are hereby enjoined
from being commissioned as insurance agents or from engaging in any such
related activities, and, to immediately desist therefrom if presently engaged
thereat.
This prohibition is directed against "moonlighting," which amounts to malfeasance
in office (Biyaheros Mart Livelihood Association, Inc. vs. Cabusao, 232 SCRA 707
[1994]).
WHEREFORE, for malfeasance in office consisting in the violation of Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules and of the rulings of this Court of 1
October 1987 in the case of Atty. Froilan L. Valdez and of 21 June 1988 in the case
of Ms. Esther C. Rabanal embodied in Administrative Circular No. 5 dated 4
October 1988, respondent MANUEL GARCESA is hereby REPRIMANDED and
warned that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
42. BUSILAC BUILDERS INC V. JUDGE AGUILAR
Facts:
Romeo Camarillo, president of Busilac Builders, Inc., entered into an agreement
with spouses Anatalio and Pacita Ramos for the sale
of 3 parcels of land situated at Laoag City to him. Titles to Lot 2 and Lot 3 were
immediately transferred in his name. With respect
to Lot 1 only its physical possession was transferred because the spouses Ramos
failed to execute the necessary deed of conveyance
therefor despite Camarillo's repeated demands.
Camarillo instituted an action against the spouses Ramos before the RTC of Laoag
City. He discovered that out of the total area of
426 square meters comprising the entirety of Lot 1, the spouses Ramos sold 300
square meters thereof to: Esperanza Tumaneng,
Comp iled by: Merzy 34
100 square meters; Victoria Balcanao, 100 square meters; and to Aguilar, who was
then a prosecutor, another 100 square meters.
Prosecutor Aguilar was appointed presiding judge of RTC of Laoag City where said
civil case was then pending. He proceeded to hear
the case and issued an Order dismissing the same.
The Register of Deeds of Laoag issued Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of
Judge Aguilar covering the 100-square meter
portion of Lot 1 earlier sold to him.
Judge Aguilar, together with the other co-owners of Lot 1, removed the concrete
posts and barbed wires installed thereat by
Camarillo. Camarillo filed a complaint against Judge Aguilar and the other co-
owners of Lot 1. As among the defendants in that case, Judge Aguilar appeared in
at least 2 hearings and therein manifested that "for purposes of pleadings he is
represented by counsel but for purposes of appearing in court, he appears for
himself." In a related development, Judge Aguilar issued a search warrant against
Camarillo upon application of the CIDG Laoag City. Pursuant
to the search warrant, several firearms and ammunitions were seized by police
operatives from the custody and possession of
Camarillo. Upon the foregoing, Busilac Builders, Inc. and its president Romeo
Camarillo filed an administrative complaint against the Judge Aguilar. The Court
referred the administrative case to the CA. The Investigating Justice recommended
that Aguilar be fined in the amount of P4,000.00 and warned that a repetition of
the same acts will be dealt with more severely.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Aguilar’s act of appearing as counsel for himself is a form of
private practice?
Ruling:
The Court held that Aguilar's appearances as counsel for himself in the previous
hearings constitutes an isolated court appearance.
It must be noted that Aguilar also appeared in that case as one of the defendants
therein, and that another counsel prepared and
represented him in the pleadings. Aguilar's act of asking permission from the
Supreme Court to appear as counsel for himself shows
no trace of malice and bad faith on his part.
Aguilar’s appearance on two occasions is not conclusive and determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. Essentially,
the term "private practice of law" implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the
Legal Prof Case Digests 2018
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of said services. Clearly, then, the isolated instances when the
respondent judge appeared as counsel for himself in do
not constitute the "private practice" of the legal profession as contemplated by
law.
43. ABELLA V. CRUZABRA
Facts:
Complainant Felipe E. Abella filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
against respondent Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra. In his affidavit-complaint,
complainant charged respondent with engaging in private practice of law while
employed in the government service.
Respondent was appointed at the Register of Deeds of General Santos City.
During her term of office, she applied for a notarial commission and notarized 3,
000 documents. These acts were performed by respondent, without obtaining a
permission from the Secretary of Justice.
Respondent invoke good faith as her defense. Respondent insists that she
cannot be punish because she was given permission by her senior officer to
notarize. In fact, one of the agreement in her appointment letter was that she will
not imposed charges on papers from their office that needs notarization. Moreover,
respondent argued that she is new in the legal profession and she does know the
intricacies thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent's act merits disciplinary action.
Ruling:
Yes, as per Civil Service rules, the authority to grant permission to any official or
employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance
with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
Comp iled by: Merzy 35
time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside
of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided,
finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of
his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer or member of the board of directors",

Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems
necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the
various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.

It is clear in this case that when respondent filed her petition for commission as
a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the
DOJ. Respondent’s superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization
because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the
Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that
written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum
Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.

Thus, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
engaging in the private practice of profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a
light offense punishable by reprimand.

Wherefore, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial

practice without the written authority from the Secretary of the Department of
Justice, and accordingly we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

Legal Prof Case Digests 2018 Comp iled by: Merzy 36