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BY CHARLES J. MOZINA & DOUGLAS C.

MOODY

I EEE I NDUSTRY A PPLI CA TI ONS MA GA ZI NE • MA R|A PR 2003 • WWW.I EEE.ORG/I A S


The ADVANTAGES of DIGITAL
versus ELECTROMECHANICAL RELAYING
for mill generator upgrade projects.

E
LECTRICAL GENERATION AT PAPER in Maryland, USA, where 1960-vintage electromechanical
mills is becoming an increasingly critical as- relays were replaced with modern digital protection. This
set and should be well protected from faults, article points out the advantages of this technology versus
system upsets and abnormal operating con- conventional electromechanical protection and also dis-
ditions. The loss of a major generating unit for an extended cusses the unique application considerations in applying
period would result in very costly replacement power and re- digital protection.
pair costs for any paper mill. This article presents the reasons Background
why mill generator owners should consider upgrading the Contrary to popular belief, generators do experience short
electrical protection of their generators to meet today’s stan- circuits and abnormal electrical conditions. In many cases,
dards. It specifically outlines the risks assumed in protection equipment damage due to these events can be reduced or
areas where 20-year-old (and older) generator protection is prevented by proper generator protection. As generators
inadequate. The article relates the experience of completed become older, the likelihood for failure increases as insula-
protection upgrade projects at MeadWestvaco’s Luke Mill tion begins to deteriorate. Generators, unlike some other 37
1077-2618/03/$17.00©2003 IEEE
power system components, need to be Significant improvements in protec-
protected not only from short circuits, tion using multifunction digital relays
but also from abnormal operating condi- ELECTRICAL are described in the first sections of this
tions. Examples of such abnormal condi-
tions are overexcitation, loss-of-field,
GENERATION AT article. The protection system improve-
ments applied by Luke Mill are discussed
and unbalanced currents. When sub- PAPER MILLS IS in detail with several benefits to mill
jected to these conditions, damage or generation operations noted. The process
complete failure can occur within sec- BECOMING AN of upgrading generator protection af-
onds, thus requiring automatic detec- forded an excellent learning experience
tion and tripping. INCREASINGLY for mill personnel in understanding the
In the late 1980s, the IEEE Power Sys- protection scheme, both from an engi-
tem Relay Committee first issued CRITICAL ASSET. neering and operations standpoint. The
ANSI/IEEE C37.102, the guide for the new Luke Mill generator relays are lo-
protection of synchronous generators [1]. cated a considerable distance from the
Most of the recommended practices applicable to indus- plant control room. The communications capabilities of
trial-sized generators have been incorporated in the latest re- the newly installed relays were used to remotely display re-
vision of The IEEE Buff Book [2]. These industry guides lay data to the control room for rapid operator analysis.
outline current recommended practices for the protection of
generators and document the substantial changes that have Areas of Protection Upgrade
occurred in generator protection over the last 20 years. These on Older Mill Generators
changes fall into three broad categories: improved sensitiv- The areas of upgrade on generator protection that is 20
ity, new protection areas, and special protection applica- years old or more fall into three broad categories:
tions. These are the key functional areas that need to be n Improved sensitivity and reduction of damage in
addressed when developing an upgrade program to bring protection areas where older relaying does not pro-
generator protection up to current industry standards. vide the level of detection required. Examples of pro-
The protection at the Luke Mill is a typical example of tection in this area are the following:
generator protection installed in the 1960s, employing n stator ground and ground differential protection
electromechanical relays that remained basically un- n field ground fault protection
changed since they were commissioned decades ago. The
I EEE I NDUSTRY A PPLI CA TI ONS MA GA ZI NE • MA R|A PR 2003 • WWW.I EEE.ORG/I A S

n dual-level loss-of-field protection


aging protection system provided minimal alarming with n negative sequence (unbalanced current) protec-
trip data limited to relay flags that could be hastily reset tion
with a total loss of critical relay tripping information. n sensitive overexcitation protection.
Planned generator breaker upgrade projects for two n New or additional protection in areas that 20 years ago
13.8-kV, 40-MVA generators afforded the opportunity to were not perceived to be a problem but operating expe-
economically install microprocessor-based digital relaying riences have since proved otherwise. These areas are:
and move to modern generator protection. The upgrade on n inadvertent generator energizing
the first unit was completed in 1996, and the second unit n sequential tripping
was completed in 2001. n oscillographic monitoring.

n Application considerations of multifunctional digi-


Igen Isystem tal relays that are unique to generators.

Power
Improved Sensitivity and Reduced Damage
G
System
Stator Grounding and
Ground Differential Protection
Isystem
When a generator stator ground fault is detected by protec-
tive relays, the generator is shut down by tripping the gener-
ator breaker, field breaker, and turbine. The system
contribution to the fault will immediately be removed when
Current the generator breaker trips, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
Igen current ground decay generator stator ground current, however, will continue to
flow after the tripping. The generator short-circuit current
cannot be “turned off” instantaneously because of the stored
energy in the rotating machine. The flow of damaging gen-
erator fault current will continue for several seconds after the
Time (s)
0 generator has been tripped. This long decay time results in
the vast majority of the damage occurring after tripping [3].
Generator Reducing the decay time is very difficult; however, reducing
Breaker Trips
1 the fault current during the generator “coast-down” can be
done. As machines get older, the possibility of stator ground
38 Generator ground-fault relay. faults increase. Reducing the damage, therefore, becomes a
major objective. Recent high Utility System
costs and long outages of mill gen-
erators have caused engineers to R
ponder the problem of reducing
Typically
ground fault damage during gen- 200-400 A A
erator coast-down. The most To Other
promising solution is called hy- Bus Sections
brid generator grounding. Industrial System Bus
B
In mill applications, generators
are directly connected to a bus that
services the local load. Figure 2 il-
lustrates this type of configuration.
Hybrid grounding can be typically Mill Load
applied to these types of generators.
The generator is both high- and
low-resistance grounded. Under 87G
normal operating conditions, both
generator ground sources are oper-
ated in parallel. For ground faults G
on the mill system, the ground fault
contribution from the generator
will typically be almost entirely
from the low-resistance (200-400 51G
A) source. This provides the re-
Ground
quired level of system ground cur- Interrupting
59N
rent for proper mill ground relay Device R Typically
operation, allowing the generator to 200-400 A
supply the mill load when the util-
ity system is unavailable (breakers

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High-Resistance Low-Resistance
A and B open). When there is a Ground Ground
ground fault in the generator stator (Typically Less
Than 10 A) 2
windings or associated bus connec-
tion to the generator breaker, the Hybrid generator grounding.
ground differential (87G) will oper-
ate to initiate a unit shutdown. As
part of the generator tripping, the ground interruption de-
vice in series with the low resistance path is tripped, typi-
cally reducing ground current to below the 10-A level. This 3I0
greatly reduces stator ground fault damage during the gen-
erator coast-down. This is a relatively new idea and was re-
cently implemented on one of the two Luke Mill generators. 87
See [3] for more details on hybrid grounding. 87 (−3IO)INcos0
G
Mill generators are generally grounded through a resis-
tor in the generator neutral as described above. Sensitive
detection of stator ground faults can be substantially in-
creased through the addition of an 87G ground differential
relay that uses a product approach utilizing the following
equation. The relay operating characteristic is: G

I OPP = (−31 O )I N cos Θ,


IN

where
n −31 O is the residual current from the bus side CTs
n I N especially, electronic is the generator neutral cur- 87 - Generator
Differential
rent 51 87G - Generator
n Θ is the phase angle between the currents. G Ground Differential
The scheme is illustrated in Figure 3. The use of digital 51G - Neutral Overcurrent
R
technology allows the scheme to be applied using the nor-
mal complement of generator CTs without the need for aux- 3
iliary CTs. The 87G was an upgrade area on the Luke Mill
generators that previously had only 87-phase differential Sensitive stator ground fault protection. 39
protection. This change substantially im- chine. These unbalanced fluxes produce
proved stator ground fault sensitivity. unbalanced magnetic forces that result in
A MORE SECURE machine vibration. A field ground fault
Field Ground Fault Detection
The field circuit of a generator is an un-
FIELD GROUND also produces rotor iron heating from the
short-circuit currents. The tripping prac-
grounded (typically 600 V) dc system, as RELAY IS tices within the industry for field ground
shown in Figure 4. A single field ground relaying are not well established. Some
fault will generally not affect the opera- DESIRABLE IF users trip while others prefer to alarm,
tion of a generator, nor will it produce thereby risking a second ground fault
any immediate damaging effects. How- AUTOMATIC and major damage before the first ground
ever, the probability of a second ground is cleared.
fault occurring is greater after the first TRIPPING IS The existing practice within the in-
ground fault has established a ground
reference. When a second ground fault BEING dustry has been to use dc voltage relaying
to detect field ground faults. These volt-
occurs, a portion of the field winding
will be short-circuited, thereby produc-
CONSIDERED. age schemes have been prone to false op-
eration—especially during start-up.
ing unbalanced air-gap fluxes in the ma- Unit operators routinely reset the alarm
and continue with start-up procedures. If
a persistent alarm occurred, operators attempted to locate
Brush the problem.
Field
A more secure field ground relay is desirable if auto-
matic tripping is being considered. Such a relay is shown in
Figure 5 and uses an injection principle. This principle has
been widely used in Europe with great success, but, until
recently, it was not available in a multifunction relay. As il-
lustrated in Figure 5, a 15-V square wave signal is injected
Exciter Field into the field through a coupling network. The return sig-
Breaker nal waveform is modified due to field winding capacitance.
The injection frequency setting is adjusted (0.1 to 1.0 Hz)
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to compensate for field winding capacitance. From the in-


put and return voltage signals, the relay calculates the field
insulation resistance.
The injection scheme provides a major improvement
Grounding
Brush over traditional voltage schemes in terms of both sensitivity
Brush
as well as security. In addition, digital relays can provide
4 real-time monitoring of field insulation resistance, so deteri-
oration with time can be monitored. The scheme can also de-
Basic generator field circuit. tect grounds on an offline generator, allowing the operator
to determine if the field circuitry is
free of a ground before start-up.
Digital This 64F protection was an upgrade
Protective
Relay area on the Luke Mill generators.
An added benefit of the injection
Processor scheme described above is that it
operates at a low voltage (15 V)
compared to the scheme it replaced
(120 V), thus improving operator
Field Ground
Detection Coupling safety when changing brushes with
Injected Network the unit online.
Signal R +
C
Squarewave Gen. Dual-Level
Generator R − Rotor Loss-of-Field Protection
C R
Partial or total loss-of-field on a
Return synchronous generator is detri-
Measuring Signal mental to both the generator and
Circuit Ground the power system to which it is
connected. The condition must
Machine
Frame be quickly detected and the gen-
Ground 5
erator isolated from the system to
avoid generator damage. When
40 Field ground protection using an injection voltage signal. the generator loses its field, it op-
erates as an induction generator, causing rotor heating. where
A loss-of-field condition that is not detected can have a n K is the constant depending on generator design and
devastating impact on the mill system by causing a loss size
of reactive power support as well as creating a substan- n t is the time in seconds
tial reactive power drain. If this is not quickly detected n I2 is the root-mean-square (rms) value of a negative
on large generators, this condition can trigger a mill sequence current per unit of generator rating.
voltage collapse. The continuous unbalanced current capability of a gen-
The most widely applied method for detecting a gener- erator is defined in [5] and shown in Table 1. For open-con-
ator loss-of-field is the use of an impedance measuring re- ductor or open-breaker pole conditions, the negative
lay. The loss-of-field relay
measures the impedance as viewed +X
from the machine terminals, and it
operates when the impedance falls
inside the circular characteristic. −X′d Heavy Load
The relay ohmic characteristic is  Light Load
−R 2 +R
offset from the origin by one-half
of the direct axis transient
reactance ( X ′d 2) to prevent Impedance Trajectory
1.0 p.u.
misoperation during system dis- on Loss-of-Field
turbances and other fault condi- Xd
tions. The diameter of the circle is
adjusted to be equal to the direct
axis synchronous generator
reactance. A time delay is used to
provide security against false Machine Capabitlity
trippings on stable power swings. Minimum Exciter Limit
This time delay increases the oper-
−X 6
ating time of the relay, which
means that the Mvars drawn by the Modern loss-of-field using two-zone offset impedance method.

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generator persist for a longer time,
making the mill system more sus-
ceptible to severe voltage dips. Many users have upgraded
to modern two-zone impedance relays to enhance protec- Retaining
tion. This scheme is shown in Figure 6. The inner Ring
small-impedance circle is set to trip with only a few cycles Wedge
Locking
delay and is within the impedance locus trajectory for most Ring
loss-of-field events. The fast operation of the inner imped-
ance unit quickly detects a loss-of-field condition. This Field
was an upgrade area on the Luke Mill generators, where the Winding
fast tripping by the inner circle characteristics prevented a
mill shutdown, which is described in later in this article.

Negative Sequence
(Unbalanced Current) Protection
There are a number of system conditions that can cause un-
balanced three-phase currents in a generator. These system
conditions produce negative sequence components of cur-
rent that induce a double-frequency (120 Hz) current on 7
the surface of the rotor. The skin effect of the double-fre-
Unbalance currents in the rotor surface.
quency rotor current causes it to be forced into the rotor
surface, causing excessive rotor temperatures in a very short
time. The general flow of this current in a cylindrical ma-
chine rotor is shown in Figure 7. The current flows across TABLE 1. CONTINUOUS UNBALANCED CURRENT
the metal-to-metal contact of the retaining rings to the ro- CAPABILITY OF A GENERATOR.
tor forging wedges. Because of the skin effect, only a very
small portion of this current flows in the field windings. Type of Generator: Permissible I2
Excessive negative sequence heating beyond rotor thermal Cylindrical rotor (percent of stator rating)
limits results in failure. These limits are based on the fol- Indirectly cooled 10
lowing equation, for a given generator:
Directly cooled
8
K = I t,
2 to 960 MVA
2 41
sequence relay is usually the only protection. The low mag- sensitivity. Thus, these relays will provide no protection for
nitude of negative sequence currents created by this type of open-phase or open-generator breaker pole conditions that
event (typically 10-33% of stator rating) prevents other are frequent negative-sequence events within the industry.
fault relays from providing protections. For electrome- The sensitivity of negative-sequence static or digital relays
chanical negative sequence relays, the minimum pickup is required. Almost all generators that are over 20 years old
can be set to only about 60% of the stator-rated current are protected with electromechanical negative-sequence
relays, which make this an important upgrade area. This
was an upgrade area on the Luke Mill generators.

Sensitive Overexcitation Volts-per-Hertz Protection


CT Overexcitation, or volts-per-hertz, relaying is used to protect
50
generators from excessive magnetic-flux density levels. High
flux-density levels result from an overexcitation of the genera-
tor. At high flux levels, the magnetic iron paths designed to
carry the normal flux saturate and flux begins to flow in leak-
age paths not designed to carry it. These resulting fields are
27
proportional to voltage and inversely proportional to fre-
quency. Hence, high flux-density levels (and overexcitation)
will result from overvoltage, underfrequency, or a combina-
tion of both. Although overexcitation protection has been
recommended by manufacturers for many years, it is not in-
stalled on many mill generators that rely solely on overvoltage
protection. ANSI/IEEE Standard C50.13 has established
VT
1.05% (generator base voltage) volts-per-hertz limits for con-
tinuous operation. For values above these levels, generators
have short-time operating limits.
Damage due to excessive volts-per-hertz operation most
frequently occurs when the unit is offline prior to synchro-
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GEN nization. The potential for overexcitation of the generator


dramatically increases if the operators manually prepare
the unit for synchronization. This is particularly true if the
overexcitation alarms are inadequate or if the voltage trans-
former (VT) has an open circuit due to an improper connec-
tion. Modern digital relays provide improved protection
using both definite-time as well as inverse-time character-
istics to closely match the short-time overexcitation char-
acteristics of a generator. Volts-per-hertz protection was
added to the Luke Mill generators, and it immediately paid
dividends by detecting a recurring volts-per-hertz condi-
R tion during generator shutdown.

New or Additional Protection Areas


Inadvertent Generator Energizing
Inadvertent or accidental energizing of synchronous gener-
(a) ators has been a particular problem within the industry in
recent years. A number of machines have been damaged or,
in some cases, completely destroyed when they were acci-
50
dentally energized while offline. The frequency of these oc-
Overcurrent currences has prompted the industry to recommend that
I > p.u. the problem be addressed through dedicated protective re-
AND lay schemes. Operating errors, control-circuit malfunc-
Pickup tions, or a combination of these causes, have resulted in
27 Delay Output
Undervoltage* Contact generators becoming accidentally energized while offline.
V < p.u. Dropout
In industrial applications, the major cause of inadvertent
Delay energization of generators is the closing of the generator
breaker through the mechanical close/trip control at the
*On All Three Phases Simultaneously
breaker itself, thereby defeating the electrical interlocks.
(b) 8 Due to the severe limitation of conventional generator
relaying to detect inadvertent energizing, dedicated pro-
Inadvertent energizing protection. (a) Relay input. (b) Relay tection schemes have been developed and installed. Unlike
42 logic diagram. conventional protection schemes that provide protection
when equipment is in service, these the generator protection that instanta-
schemes provide protection when neously opens the generator breaker
equipment is out of service. One OSCILLOGRAPHIC and initiates generator shutdown when
method widely used to detect inadver-
tent energizing is the voltage-super-
INFORMATION a critical electrical fault occurs that
might cause serious damage to the gen-
vised overcurrent scheme shown in CAN POSITIVELY erator. Sequential tripping was added
Figure 8. An undervoltage element to the Luke Mill generators.
with adjustable pickup and dropout IDENTIFY THE
time delays supervises an instantaneous Oscillographic Monitoring
overcurrent relay. The undervoltage CAUSE OF A The monitoring of generators with
detectors automatically arm the over- oscillographs is very rare at industrial
current tripping when the generator is TRIPPING installations because it is thought that
taken offline. The undervoltage detec-
tor will disable the overcurrent relay INCIDENT. monitoring could not be economically
justified with “stand-alone” oscillo-
when the machine is returned to ser- graphs. However, with the advent of
vice. Great care should be taken when digital protective relays for generators,
implementing this protection, so that the dc tripping oscillograph and target information can be quickly ac-
power and relay input quantities to the scheme are not re- cessed from a remote location after a generator tripping to
moved when the generator is offline. determine if relay and circuit breaker operations were
When an offline generator is inadvertently energized,
it behaves as an induction motor and can be damaged
within seconds. During three-phase energization at a X1S
standstill, a rotating flux at synchronous frequency is in-
duced in the generator rotor. The resulting rotor current
is forced into paths in the rotor body, similar to those ro- I
tor current paths for negative-sequence stator currents
during generator single-phasing. Rapid rotor heating X2G
and damage to the rotor will occur. The machine imped-
ance during this high-slip interval is equivalent to the

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generator negative-sequence reactance. Figure 9 shows a ES
simplified equivalent circuit that can be used to calculate
the current and voltage associated with three-phase inad- EG
vertent energizing. Inadvertent energizing is an area that System
was upgraded on the Luke Mill generators. Voltage

Sequential Tripping
This method of shutting down a generator is used on
Where
steam generators to prevent overspeed when delayed trip- X1S System Positive Sequence Reactance
ping has no detrimental effect on the generating unit.
X2G Generator Negative Sequence Reactance
This generator tripping method was recommended by
generator manufacturers of steam turbines some years ago ES System Voltage
as a result of overspeed generator failures. The first de- EG Generator Terminal Voltage
vices tripped are the turbine valves. A reverse power relay
in series with the valves’ close position switches provides I Current
security against possible overspeed of the turbine by en- 9
suring that steam flows have been reduced below the
Inadvertent energizing equivalent circuit.
amount necessary to produce an
overspeeding condition before
the generator breaker is tripped.
For boiler or turbine mechanical Mechanical Devices
Trip Generator
“Turbine Tripped” Lockout
problems, this is the preferred Steam Valves Closed
Breakers
or
tripping mode since it prevents AND Auxilary
the overspeed of the machine. Fig- Relay Trip Field
ure 10 shows the block diagram Breaker
for sequential tripping. Generator Reverse Timer
On steam machines, reverse Power Relay (32)
power sensitivities of ½% or lower Time
of generator winding megawatt Delay
rating can occur, requiring a very 10
sensitive reverse of power relay.
This trip mode should not override Sequential tripping logic. 43
proper. Oscillographic information can overexcitation condition. Some method
positively identify the cause of a tripping of detection is required so that the af-
incident. This valuable information CONTRARY TO fected relay tripping can be blocked and
gives the mill engineer the necessary
data to keep machines offline for testing
POPULAR BELIEF, the voltage regulator transferred to
manual operation. Typically, protective
and inspection, when necessary, after an GENERATORS functions, such as 32, 40, and 51 V, are
electrical tripping incident or to return impacted and normally blocked when a
the unit to service with minimum delay. DO EXPERIENCE loss of potential is detected.
Oscillographic data provided key infor- On larger generators, it is common
mation in analyzing tripping events (de- SHORT CIRCUITS practice to use two sets of VTs in the gen-
scribed later in this article) on the Luke erator zone of protection. As shown in
Mill generators. AND Figure 11(a), the VTs are usually con-

Special Protection
ABNORMAL nected grounded wye-grounded wye and
normally have primary and secondary
Application Considerations ELECTRICAL fuses. These VTs are used to provide po-
tential for protective relays and the volt-
Voltage Transformer CONDITIONS. age regulator. If a fuse blows in the VT
Fuse Loss Protection circuits, the secondary voltages applied
Loss of the VT signal can occur due to a to the relays and voltage regulators will
number of causes, the most common be- be reduced in magnitude and shifted in
ing a VT fuse blowing. Other causes may be a wiring fail- phase angle. A voltage balance relay is used to detect this
ure, an opening in the draw-out assemblies, a contact loss of VT input.
opening due to corrosion, or a blown fuse due to screw- On many mill-sized generators, only one set of VTs is
driver shorts during online maintenance. This loss of a frequently provided. It is not possible to use a voltage bal-
VT signal can cause protective relay misoperations or ance relay unless a second set of VTs is added. Thus, many
generator voltage regulator runaway, leading to an mill generators do not have VT fuse-loss protection. A
modern digital method can be used in VT failure detection
where only one set of VTs are available. Figure 11(b) illus-
trates this method, which makes use of the relationships of
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GEN negative-sequence voltages and currents to detect a loss of


potential. When one VT signal is lost, the three-phase
VT voltages become unbalanced. Due to this imbalance, a neg-
ative-sequence voltage is produced. To distinguish this
R condition from a fault, negative-sequence currents are
checked. The presence of negative-sequence voltage in the
60 absence of negative-sequence current indicates a VT
open-phase condition rather than a fault. This type of VT
Voltage- fuse-loss detection was added on the Luke Mill generators
To Balance To upgrade project.
Protective Relay Voltage
Relay Regulator
Using Digital Technology
(a) to Implement an Upgrade Program
Multifunction digital relaying is an ideal and cost-effective
way to upgrade generator protection to current industry
GEN standards. Figure 12 shows a functional diagram of such a
relay. The upgrade functions (shaded) are shown in Figure
12. These functions, plus eight additional protection func-
R tions, are included in a single, compact, low-cost package
and can be installed in a fraction of the space and time re-
60 quired for discrete static or electromechanical relays. Addi-
tional features that make digital relays extremely flexible
for upgrade applications include the following:
n multiple programmable inputs and outputs
To
Protective n target and sequence of events storage in relay memory
Relay and n metering of all measured parameters
Voltage
Regulator n RS-232 and RS-485 ports and communications ca-
(b)
pability with central location
11 n continuous self-checking diagnostics
n built-in waveform capture/oscillography.
(a) Voltage balance relay. (b) Modern VT loss of potential A major concern in the application of multifunction
44 detection using digital relaying. digital relays for the protection of generators is that almost
all of the electrical protection, including Clearly, digital technology is reliable
both primary and backup, are embedded enough to protect generators. This is the
on a single digital hardware platform. CLEARLY, type of relaying used on all new genera-
How reliable are the multifunction digi-
tal generator relays? Failure statistics are
DIGITAL tors. On important generators, most us-
ers provide fully redundant systems to
carefully kept by most manufacturers so TECHNOLOGY have delineated primary and backup pro-
they can determine if there are any pat- tection. In most mill applications, be-
terns or specific component failures. One IS RELIABLE cause of the cost for the loss of a
major manufacturer’s data for a relay de- generator, users justify the dual relay ap-
sign sold since 1994 provides the follow- ENOUGH TO proach. Figure 12 illustrates the dual-re-
ing statistics: lay scheme that was installed on the Luke
n total relays in service:
PROTECT Mill generators.
3,281
n number of failures:
GENERATORS. Mill Case Studies of Generator
62 (1.9%) Protection Upgrade Benefits
n total in-service operating hours:
50,990,000 Description of Luke Mill
n mean time between failures (MTBF): 13.8-kV System One-Line
92 years. The Luke Mill system simplified one-line diagram is
All relay failures were detected by self-diagnostics that shown in Figure 13. Both the (50 MVA) utility ties and
operated as designed (the relay being automatically re- mill generators are normally in operation to supply the
moved from service without tripping the generator). total mill load of about 70 MW. The bus tie reactor is in

3-CT

52

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3-CT
To Bus Diff.
3-CT

3-CT Metering
Generator Protection (B)

VT VT
24 59 27 81
Generator Protection (A)
3-CT Exciter
81 27 59 24 50
+ BF
50 87
BF − G
87 64F Field

50 46 32 51V 60
40
FL
60 46 50
FL 40 51V 32 27
27 3-CT

87 3-CT
G 51G

1-CT 51G 87
Upgrade G
Function
R

12
Mill generator protection. 45
service with all sources energized to termining the cause of the disrup-
limit the system available fault cur- tion and in assessing any equipment
rents to within the interrupting ca- ABNORMAL damage involved can add hours to
pacity of the 1,000-MVA
switchgear. The reactor is bypassed
OPERATIONS re-energizing and returning to nor-
mal operations. Should either mill
when either utility tie or generator SEQUENCES CAN generator be involved, it is critical
is out of service to prevent excessive to assess the integrity of the unit and
reactor voltage drop to mill loads PRESENT SERIOUS perform any testing necessary before
should the loss of the second source reconnecting to the system. It is
occur on the same side of the reactor. INCIDENTS THAT critical to have good sequence of
With two reliable utility ties events and oscillographic data to re-
and two in-house generators, the REQUIRE ACCURATE view protective relay performance,
mill’s 13.8-kV system is normally
very stable, and major upset condi- EVENT DATA TO assess fault levels, and clear the ma-
chine of any damage. To proceed
tions are quite rare. Should they oc-
cur, however, such events can be
ASSESS AND otherwise risks restarting the unit
with possible increased damage and
very disruptive and costly to mill RESOLVE. extensive downtime.
production processes. Delays in de- Abnormal operations sequences
can also present serious incidents
that require accurate event data to
assess and resolve. In these cases,
#1 #2 oscillographic data from the relays
Transformer Utility Substation Transformer can provide objective, unbiased in-
50 MVA 50 MVA
put for revising operating proce-
APS 1 APS 2 dures and training. Even where
generation is not directly involved,
data from the digital generator re-
lays is valuable in determining
fault levels at other points in the
I EEE I NDUSTRY A PPLI CA TI ONS MA GA ZI NE • MA R|A PR 2003 • WWW.I EEE.ORG/I A S

system and to determine whether


other relaying has functioned
properly. An example of one such
#11 GEN #12 GEN incident is described below.
42 MVA 40 MVA
Cascading Event Resulting in
1-30 2-01 2-02 G-12
G-11
Syn Bus 2
Generator Loss-of-Field Tripping
Analysis of this cascading event
1-20 20-A 4-20 3-20 was greatly helped by the relay di-
agnostics. A turbine trip was fol-
Bus 4 Loads Bus 3 Loads
lowed by a breaker misoperation
leading to a loss-of-field tripping
13
of the generator. The event oc-
curred shortly after start-up with
Luke Mill one-line diagram. significant load on the unit when
the turbine oil-trip device failed,
closing the main stop valve. The
oil-trip solenoid linkage had worn
badly, causing failure. Reverse
power relaying picked up, but was
unable to trip. The operator
turned his initial attention to cor-
recting upsets to the mill steam
system. Upon realizing the main
Turbine Values Closed generator breaker had not trip-
ped, he mistakenly tripped the #1
utility tie (Breaker 1-30, Figure
13) instead. He followed by trip-
ping the field breaker about 7 s
Field Breaker Trip Relay Trip later. Detecting the loss-of-field
14
condition, the new relaying trip-
46 Loss-of-field oscillograph. ped the generator just in time to
avert a mill shutdown from under- shortcomings when compared to cur-
voltage from the reactive power upset. rent IEEE recommended genera-
Inputs to the two generator relays from MAJOR tor-protection practices. This article
the turbine stop valve, the field breaker,
and main breaker enabled exact times to
POWER-SYSTEM identifies these protection areas and
the risks of not addressing the short-
be obtained for the related events. Se- EVENTS ARE comings. It also points out the advan-
quence of events and oscillography cap- tages of using multifunction digital
tured by the new relays verify the RARE, YET DATA relaying to upgrade generator protec-
following: tion as a technology that offers many
n The relay event log showed multi- ANALYSIS IS advantages over older electromechani-
ple reverse power (32) pickups, cal relays. The completed upgrade pro-
however, the setting was too high CRITICAL TO ject at MeadWestvaco’s Luke Mill in
to time out to trip. For about 2
min after the turbine trip, the RETURNING THE Maryland provided a number of exam-
ples of these benefits in uncovering
generator motored with field,
supplying up to 25 Mvar to sup-
GENERATOR TO mill problems that, if they had gone
undetected, could have resulted in
port bus voltage after the acciden- SERVICE. costly mill shutdowns or damage to
tal loss of the incoming utility tie. mill generators.
The current can be seen to be 90°
lagging the voltage in the Figure
14 oscillograph. References
n When the field breaker opened, reactive power flow
[1] Guide for AC Generator Protection, ANSI/IEEE C37.102-1995.
reversed in 18 cycles and the generator drew in lead-
ing current rising to 800 A from the system to re-es-
tablish field, as shown in Figure 14. The unit was [2] Recommended Practices for the Protection and Coordination of Indus-
now motoring without field as an induction machine trial and Commercial Power Systems, ANSI/IEEE 242-2001.
and placing large reactive load on the mill system,
with the bus voltage sagging to about 11 kV when [3] B. Bailey, J. Bowen, G. Dalke, B. Douglas, J. Fischer, J.R. Jones, D.
generator tripping occurred.

I EEE I NDUSTRY A PPLI CA TI ONS MA GA ZI NE • MA R|A PR 2003 • WWW.I EEE.ORG/I A S


Love, C. Mozina, N. Nichols, C. Normand, L. Padden, A. Pierce, P.
n Fortunately, the new relaying tripped the unit on
Pillai, L. Powell, D. Shipp, N.T. Stringer, and R. Young, “Gounding
loss-of-field about 2 s after the field breaker opened.
Separate bus tie (Breaker 1-20, Figure 13) relay and ground fault protection of multiple generator installation on
data verified the tie was in overload and timing to medium-voltage industrial and commercial systems,” in Conf. Rec.
trip the bus for a total mill bus shutdown. IEEE IAS 2002 Annu. Meeting, vol. 3, pp. 1888-1895.
n Initially, the operator believed he had followed nor-
mal operating procedure and that the utility tie had [4] L.J. Powell, “The impact of system grounding practices on genera-
opened on overload from the loss of the generator.
tor fault damage,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Applicat., vol.37, pp. 218-222,
The relay data provided unbiased evidence to show
he had, in fact, misoperated and tripped the utility Jan./Feb. 2001.
tie breaker.
n Data from relay waveforms verified that when mo- [5] American National Standard for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Gen-
toring with and without field, the generator did not erators, ANSI/IEEE C50.13-1987.
exceed maximum rated Mvar loading per the capa-
bility curve. Motoring at no load (with field and
within rating) does not harm the generator, but long [6] Guide for AC Generator Ground Protection, ANSI/ IEEE
periods can overheat turbine blading. Loss-of-field is C37.l01-1993.
serious, as the rotor is not designed to handle the
large induced slip currents. This event was at no load [7] Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating
and tripped in 2 s, per the oscillographs shown in Plants, ANSI/IEEE C37.106-1987.
Figure 14. The decay of stator amps after the field
breaker opened is followed by the rise of reactive cur-
rent, which increased to 800 A (rated current is [8] Tutorial on the Protection of Synchronous Generators, IEEE 95TP 102.
1,787 A). Major power-system events involving mill
generation tend to be rare. Yet, should one occur, Charles J. Mozina (cmozina@beckwithelectric.com) is with
having data to analyze the incident is critical to re- Beckwith Electric Co., Inc., in Largo, Florida, USA. Douglas C.
turning the generator to service. Moody (dcmoody@meadvestvaco.com) is with MeadWestvaco
Corp. in Luke, Maryland, USA. Moody is a Senior Member of
Conclusions the IEEE, and Mozina is a Member of the IEEE. This article first
There are a number of functional protection areas on appeared in its original form at the 2002 IEEE IAS Pulp and
mill generators 20 years or older that have significant Paper Technical Conference.
47

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