JAIME U. GOSIACO, vs.

LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA

Bouncing Checks Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Pleadings and Practice; Criminal Law;
Under the amended rules on bouncing checks, the previous option to directly pursue the
civil liability against the corporation that incurred the obligation is no longer that clear.—
With the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability attaching to the
bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue the civil liability against
the person who incurred the civil obligation—the corporation itself—is no longer that clear. In
theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg.22 should not
affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied institution
concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation.

Same; Same; Same.—Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil
liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for
the amount represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from
the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the
civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the
consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The
confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each.

Same; Same; Same; The civil action impliedly instituted in the Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 action is only the civil liability of the signatory and not that of the corporation.—If we
conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action that
is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the signatory, and not
that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action against the signatory and
that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows that the actions involving
these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective standards and merits. In
the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had
signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank account,
while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation itself is valid
and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed independently and
simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other.

Same; Same; Court’s two (2) prevailing concerns regarding the amended rule on
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.—There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the
corporation be pursued even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First,
the possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that should not
be permitted. Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the amount of the
check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend with that possibility through this case.
Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best we refer the matter to the Committee on Rules
for the formulation of proper guidelines to prevent that possibility.

Same; Same.—The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22
case and the civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress
if the plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based on the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and the civil action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option to file
two separate cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the corporation
could evidently be pursued through the civil action alone.
 Same; Same; Equity; Prescription; As a matter of equity, petitioner should be
exempted from paying filing fees in an action versus the corporation. The period of
prescription to file such action should run from the finality of the decision.—In petitioner’s
particular case, considering the previous legal confusion on whether he is authorized to file the
civil case against ASB, he should, as a matter of equity, be exempted from paying the filing fees
based on the amount of the checks should he pursue the civil action against ASB. In a similar
vein and for a similar reason, we likewise find that petitioner should not be barred by
prescription should he file the civil action as the period should not run from the date the checks
were issued but from the date this decision attains finality. The courts should not be bound
strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result.

DISHONORED due to a STOP

 HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE PALMA BURGOS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
JOHNNY CO y YU,

Criminal Law; Two aspects of a criminal case, the civil and the criminal.—A criminal
case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is borne of the principle that
every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The civil action, in which the offended party is
the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant, is deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Same; The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid
multiplicity of suits.—The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended
party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.

Same; When the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground
of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil
action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be
determined on mere preponderance of evidence.—When the trial court acquits the accused
or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under
such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended
party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of
his claim for civil liability.

Same; Only the state through its appellate counsel, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the Court
of Appeals (CA) or the Supreme Court.—The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense,
is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and,
if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of
the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the
state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right
and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.

Same; The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused
that defends on conviction by final judgement.—The question of granting bail to the accused
is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of
conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that
depends on conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned.
Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his
absence.
 STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., vs.ARNOLD CUARESMA and JERRY B.
CUARESMA,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; The essence of forum shopping is
the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum,
seeking another and possibly a favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari.—Prefatorily, We address the issue of forum shopping in
saying that the essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly a favorable opinion in
another suit other than by appeal or special civil action forcertiorari. It is the act of filing multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. However, as the RTC already
mentioned, there exists no forum shopping herein for the filing of the instant suit is expressly
allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action filed by respondents.

Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.—In civil
cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the
defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.

Same; Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases; Preponderance of

evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or
“greater weight of the credible evidence.”—Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. The reason for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence.

Same; Same; Traffic Accident Investigation Report; For the Traffic Accident Investigation
Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following
requisites must be present: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.— As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report 44. cannot be given probative weight. Section 44 of Rule 130 provides:
SEC. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Moreover, for the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report to be admissible asprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
the following requisites must be present: x x x (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or
by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in
the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

Civil Law; Subrogation; Subrogation is ultimately the substitution of one person in the
place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or
securities.—It bears stressing, as the courts below have explained, that subrogation is
ultimately the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim
or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or
claim, including its remedies or securities. The rights to which the subrogee succeeds are the
same as, but not greater than, those of the person for whom he is substituted, that is, he cannot
acquire any claim, security or remedy the subrogor did not have. In other words, a subrogee
cannot succeed to a right not possessed by the subrogor. A subrogee, in effect, steps into the
shoes of the insured and can recover only if the insured likewise could have recovered.

On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner Standard
Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B.
3
Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City. Consequently, the damage on the vehicle
driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of which was borne by petitioner. Cham then executed a Release of
Claim in favor of petitioner subrogating the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims, demands, and
rights of action on account of the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a consequence of the accident from
4 5
any person liable thereto. Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter dated April 15, 2004 addressed
to respondents, demanded the payment of the sum spent on repairing the vehicle driven by Cham.

6
Meanwhile, on August 10, 2004, an Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City charging Cham of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property docketed
as Criminal Case No. 020256. During the pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008, petitioner, claiming that
7
respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner, filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money with the MeTC of Manila against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 184854, demanding
payment of the sum of P256,643.26 representing the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.

Respondents, however, were declared in default on December 12, 2008 for failure to file their responsive
8
pleading to petitioner's Complaint despite several opportunities granted by the MeTC of Manila. As a result,
petitioner was allowed to present its evidence exparte.

Finding that petitioner sufficiently proved its claims by preponderance of evidence, the MeTC ruled in favor
of petitioner in its Decision9 dated January 8, 2010,

The RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC in its Decision10 dated September 17, 2010. Contrary to
the findings of the MeTC, the RTC found that not only were there inconsistencies in the evidence presented
by petitioner as to its corporate identity as well as the amount of the supposed cost of indemnification, but
petitioner also failed to sufficiently prove that the proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's
vehicle was respondents' fault or negligence. In addition, on respondents' argument that the instant case
must be consolidated with the prior criminal suit they filed against Cham, the RTC disagreed and ruled that
criminal and civil cases can proceed independently.11 cralawlawlibrary

On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is insufficient to support its
averment of negligence. Consequently, it affirmed the RTC's Decision and further denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration in its Resolution12 dated January 16, 2012.

Hence, the present petition.

Prefatorily, We address the issue of forum shopping in saying that the essence of forum shopping is the
filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and
14
possibly a favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It is
the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
15
or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. However, as the RTC already
mentioned, there exists no forum shopping herein for the filing of the instant suit is expressly allowed to
proceed independently of the criminal action filed by respondents.

16
In the similar case of Casupanan v. Laroya, wherein as a result of a vehicular accident, a party involved
therein filed a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against the other party,
who, in turn, filed a civil suit against the party instituting the criminal action, We held that the party filing
the separate civil action cannot be liable for forum shopping in the following wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx However, there is no forum shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules
expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised
Penal Code, while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
These articles on culpa aquiliana read: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of
evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the
private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke
these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity)
expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action." (Italics supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil
action.

xxxx

The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action." (Italics supplied)
xxxx
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.

Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the
accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant
in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for
malicious prosecution. At that time, the Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the
prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications
thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of
the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the criminal case is
terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court
explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only
unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.

Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the
lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states
that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates
the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently
of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.17chanrobleslaw

On the basis of the foregoing decision, therefore, petitioner, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, the
accused in the criminal case instituted by respondents, cannot be guilty of forum shopping for its separate
civil action is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action involved herein.

It must be noted, however, that notwithstanding the allowance of the instant petition to proceed
independently of the criminal action, the claims of petitioner cannot be sustained in the absence of
satisfactory evidence proving its right thereto.

In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defense offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been
18
given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. cralawlawlibrary

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of
the credible evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
19
which is offered in opposition thereto. The reason for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
20
evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence. cralawlawlibrary

To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented testimonies of its assured and its
Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's
insurance policy with petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses. As aptly ruled by the RTC and
the CA, however, the evidence presented by petitioner failed to preponderantly establish negligence on the
part of the respondents.
 SAMSON CHING, petitioner, vs. CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Actions; Criminal Procedure; Civil Liability; The civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature;
and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which
the accused is acquitted.—In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 370 (1999), the Court
enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based
on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code—
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages
in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of
acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.

Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The appeal period accorded to the accused should also
be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the decision—
the period to appeal granted to the offended party is the same as that granted to the
accused.—Following the long recognized rule that “the appeal period accorded to the accused
should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the
decision,” the period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to the
accused. With petitioner Ching’s timely filing of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect
of the CA’s decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil
liability of respondent Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal. In order for the petition to prosper,
however, it must establish that the judgment of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under
any of the three categories enumerated in Salazarand Sapiera, to wit: (a) where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) where the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

Burden of Proof; It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party
who makes the allegations—et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum
naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit (The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him
who denies; since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof).—It
is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—
Et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio
nulla sit(The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of
things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof). In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of
the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules
of Court offers the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence: SEC.
1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.—In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Interests; Under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, “no interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing.”—The Court agrees with the CA that the daily payments
made by respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 cannot be considered as interest
payments only. Even respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments that she made to
Nuguid were for the interests due. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, no interests could be
properly collected in the loan transactions between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao
because there was no stipulation therefor in writing. To reiterate, under Article 1956 of the Civil
Code, “no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.”

Same; Estoppel; Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or
one that is against public policy—clearly, the collection of interests without any
stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.—Neither could respondent Nicdao be
considered to be estopped from denying the validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give
validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy. Clearly, the
collection of interests without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
Consequently, the daily payments made by respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00
were properly considered by the CA as applying to the principal amount of her loan obligations.
Sec 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions
 LUCILLE DOMINGO, vs. MERLINDA COLINA

Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil action.―The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Moreover, the second paragraph
of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that: In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall
state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Same; Due Process; Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.―Where a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending her rights and interests,
but simply, whether she had the opportunity to present her side of the controversy.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or
quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage.―Equally settled is the rule that no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. For her failure to timely invoke her right to present
evidence, petitioner is already estopped.
 ELIZALDE S. CO, vs. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Independent Civil Actions; The last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC) applies to civil actions to claim civil
liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or
filed separately from the criminal action.—The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if
the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section
2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil
action separately from the criminal action; hence, its title “When separate civil action is
suspended.” Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil
liability ex delicto. This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that, that “[e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Each criminal act gives rise to two
liabilities: one criminal and one civil.

Same; Same; Same; Modes by Which Civil Liability Ex Delicto May be Enforced.—Our
procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil liability ex delicto may be enforced: (1)
through a civil action that is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action; (2) through a civil
action that is filed separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon reservation of the
right to file it separately in the criminal action. The offended party may also choose to waive the
civil action. This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delictodoes not affect its nature, as may
be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC, which
states: Section 2. Contents of the judgment.—x x x In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall
state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Same; Same; Same; The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry
with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately
from the criminal action.—The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it
the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may
arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the
accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus
now proceed to determine if Co’s claim falls under any of these three situations.

Criminal Law; Libel; In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged

communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made
or published with actual malice or malice in fact — the knowledge that the statement is
false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.—Jurisprudence
supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
1 (1999), we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the
press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. In Guingguing v. Court of
Appeals, 471 SCRA 196 (2005), we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are
likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the
prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made or published with actual
malice or malice in fact — the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard
as to whether or not it was true. In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that
privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in
law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.

Facts:
The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner,
Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a
contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was... behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:
(a)
Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of
warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;
(b)
Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San
Francisco dredging project, and;
(c)
Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the project
to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.
Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC.[6] Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his
right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous... remarks against him.[7]
Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public
duty.
In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging
project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases,... Muñoz claimed that the dismissal
did not disprove the truth of his statements.
He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters... of public interest and are, thus,
privileged. Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed to do.
RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution
established the elements of libel.
In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held
that Muñoz' statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as privileged...
communication.
In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of libel
as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and P297,699.00 for
litigation expense.[11] Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.
he CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and
Muñoz' statements were protected as privileged communication under the first paragraph of
Article 354 of the RPC.
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public
interest.[14] Hence, the CA... reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel
charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish the existence of actual malice.
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect
of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz' right against double jeopardy. Hence, he
claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
(ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action.[15] He also claims that the civil liability of an accused
may be appealed in case of acquittal.[16]
The Respondent's Arguments
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the
offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the... present petition to
enforce the civil liability.
Issues:
whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce
the accused's civil liability; and... whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from
the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.
Ruling:
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accused's civil liability.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from... which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,[28] the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a
party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as
it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,... the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of
the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may
appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal by the CA.
The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not... reserve
his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is... a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex... delicto: (a) if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the... crime of which the accused is acquitted.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication.
In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime.
The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;[31] this... is referred to as malice in
law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations
were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the
imputation is true and published with good intention and... justifiable motive.
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354
of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(1)... a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty;[33] and
(2)... a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other... act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the
libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were fair...
comments.
Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving
that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this
respect.
In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution to
prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the crime, no
civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present... petition.
There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

CATERPILLAR, INC., , vs. MANOLO P. SAMSON

Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; The determination of probable cause to charge a

person in court for a criminal offense is exclusively lodged in the Executive Branch of
the government, through the Department of Justice (DOJ).—The determination of probable
cause to charge a person in court for a criminal offense is exclusively lodged in the Executive
Branch of the Government, through the Department of Justice. Initially, the determination is
done by the investigating public prosecutor, and on review by the Secretary of Justice or his
duly authorized subordinate.

Same; Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.—We note, to begin
with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City,
was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A common
element of all such cases for unfair competition — civil and criminal — was fraud. Under Article
33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be
brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution.

Prejudicial Questions; A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot
be considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal cases for unfair competition.—A civil action for damages and cancellation of
trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in
the criminal cases for unfair competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issues to be determined in the
criminal case. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily
be determinative of the criminal case.

Same; The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111,
Rules of Court, to wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.—
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to
wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Probable Cause; Certiorari; The courts could intervene in the determination of

probable cause only through the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, not by appeal through the petition for review under Rule 43.—The courts
could intervene in the determination of probable cause only through the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal through the petition for review
under Rule 43. Thus, the CA could not reverse or undo the findings and conclusions on
probable cause by the Secretary of Justice except upon clear demonstration of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Secretary of Justice.

Same; Probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court consists in
such facts and circumstances as would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the accused may probably be guilty thereof.—Probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information in court consists in such facts and circumstances as would
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused may probably
be guilty thereof. The determination of probable cause lies solely within the sound discretion of
the investigating public prosecutor after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
 Same; By the nature of his office, the public prosecutor cannot be compelled to file a
criminal information in court if he is not convinced of the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced for a finding of probable cause.—It is a sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering with the determination of what constitutes sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of the accused. Thus, it is imperative that by the
nature of his office, the public prosecutor cannot be compelled to file a criminal information in
court if he is not convinced of the sufficiency of the evidence adduced for a finding of probable
cause. Neither can he be precluded from filing an information if he is convinced of the merits of
the case.

FACTS

Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal complaints for unfair competition in the
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Caterpillar commenced a civil action against Samson and his business entities, with the IPO
as a nominal party[10] – for Unfair Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
DOJ... recommending that Samson be criminally charged with unfair competition
On January 17 and 22, 2002, Samson filed a petitions for review with the Office of the
Secretary of Justice to appeal the joint resolutions
Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC granted Samson's Motion to Suspend Arraignment, and
suspended the arraignment and all other proceedings
From the foregoing, this Court believes that there exists a prejudicial question since the
determination of who is really the lawful or registered user of the trademark
"CATERPILLAR" will ultimately determine whether or not the instant criminal action shall
proceed.
Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, Acting Justice Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
reversed and set aside the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Lim in I.S. No. 2001-042 to
2001-067, and directed the Chief State Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the criminal
informations filed against Samson in cour
Aggrieved, Caterpillar assailed the order of Judge Lerma for the withdrawal of Criminal
Cases Nos. 02-240 to 02-2432003 by petition for certiorari in the CA on October 16, 2003,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79937,[36] and the CA ultimately granted the petition for
certiorari,... the CA dismissed Caterpillar's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 75526
August 2002
Consequently, on the basis of the search warrants issued by the various courts, Caterpillar
again instituted criminal complaints in the DOJ... dismissing the complaint upon finding that
there was no probable cause to charge Samson with unfair competition
Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint t... the CA denied due course to
Caterpillar's petition for review
Issues:
in suspending the criminal proceedings on account of a prejudicial question... there was no
probable cause to charge Samson with unfair competition.
Ruling:
We note, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in
the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark,
while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson for
unfair competition.
A common element of all such cases for unfair competition – civil and criminal – was fraud.
Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
In view of its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 did not operate as
a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-02-108043-44.
Secondly, a civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a
prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair
competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear
not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil[56] action will necessarily be determinative
of the criminal case.
An action for the cancellation of trademark like Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 is a remedy
available to a person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a
mark.[60] On the other hand, the criminal actions for unfair competition (Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-02-108043-44) involved the determination of whether or not Samson had given his goods
the general appearance of the goods of Caterpillar, with the intent to deceive the public or
defraud Caterpillar as his competitor.[61] In the suit for the cancellation of trademark, the
issue of lawful registration should necessarily be determined, but registration was not a
consideration necessary in unfair competition.[62] Indeed, unfair competition is committed if
the effect of the act is "to pass off to the public the goods of one man as the goods of
another;"[63] it is independent of registration. As fittingly put in R.F. & Alexander & Co. v.
Ang,[64] "one may be declared unfair competitor even if his competing trade-mark is
registered."
Clearly, the determination of the lawful ownership of the trademark in the civil action was
not determinative of whether or not the criminal actions for unfair competition shall proceed
against Samson.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,, vs. DOMINGO PANITERCE

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Death of the Accused; The death of the accused during
the pendency of his appeal extinguishes his criminal liabilities as well as his civil
liabilities solely arising from said crime or crimes.—Paniterce’s death on August 22, 2009,
during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liabilities for the rape and
acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but also his civil liabilities solely arising
from or based on said crimes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA

Criminal Law; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Appellant’s

death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability.—At the outset, we declare that
because of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no further
need to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has the effect of extinguishing
his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 89. How criminal
liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the
convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
about:newtabtherefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.—In 1994, this Court, in People v.
Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994), reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We
concluded that “[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.” We also ruled that “if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not
on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation
upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.”

Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability; The civil action which may thereafter be instituted
against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new
provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against
his estate in Rules 86 and 87.—Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for
claims under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation
other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the
PAO as the “legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of
representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,” the current Rules, pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994), require the private offended party,
or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the
estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176,
as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a
preponderance of evidence. The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the
estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of
Rule 3 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Lumantas v. Calapiz, 713 SCRA 337 (2014), the Supreme
Court (SC) declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence.—In Lumantas v. Calapiz, 713 SCRA
337 (2014), this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is
based on Article 29 of the Civil Code: Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a
criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
 RUEL TUANO y HERNANDEZ, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Death of a Party; Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of
Court provides that the counsel is duty-bound to report the death of a party to the
court.—Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the counsel is duty-bound to
report the death of a party to the court, thus: RULE 3 Filing and Service of Pleadings,
Judgments and Other Paper . . . . SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a party
to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litemfor the minor heirs. The court shall
forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court
may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor
or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and
on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

Same; Same; Same; Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly
applied more often in civil actions for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule that
the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of his or her client
also properly applies in criminal actions.—Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court
is directly applied more often in civil actions for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule
that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of his or her client also
properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature of the action, courts cannot be
expected to assume the death of the party without the counsel’s proper manifestation.
Furthermore, the rules presume that “the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position
than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his [or her] client[.]” As
officers of the court and as protectors of the legal interests of their clients, counsels have a duty
to properly act in case of their clients’ death by notifying the Court of this development.
Counsels for accused were grossly remiss in this duty. Accused died on March 1, 2015.
However, his counsels continued to file pleadings on his behalf, including a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Reply dated September 16, 2015 and a Reply dated September 22, 2015. It was
only through the July 15, 2016 letter of the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections did this
Court find out that accused had already died — one (1) year, four (4) months, and 15 days after
its occurrence.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
provides that “[a] lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations
with paying clients.”—This Court notes that accused was represented by the Public Attorney’s
Office. Notwithstanding their heavy case workload and the free legal assistance they provide to
indigents and low-income persons, however, counsels from the Public Attorney’s Office are still
obliged to pursue their cases with competence and diligence. This is consistent with their
commitment to public service. Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “[a] lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall
observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.”

Same; Same; Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly

states that “a lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the
profession.”—Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly states that “a lawyer
shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with
the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.” Counsels for accused have
shown inefficiency in the performance of their duties. Relying on their representations in their
pleadings, this Court was led to believe that the criminal action against accused subsisted.
Consequently, this Court issued a resolution even after accused’s death. Had counsels for
accused informed this Court earlier of the death of their client, this Court would have been
saved precious time, effort, and resources, which could have been devoted to other pending
cases that call for this Court’s resolution and judgment. Likewise, the parties need not have filed
the pleadings calling for the resolution of accused’s Motion for Reconsideration. Given these
circumstances, counsels for accused are directed to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them in light of their failure to inform this Court of accused’s death.

Criminal Law; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; The death
of accused extinguishes his criminal liability; Likewise, the civil liability of the accused
arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death.—This Court resolves to
set aside its June 27, 2016 Resolution and dismiss this case. The death of accused extinguishes
his criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 89. How
criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death
of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.] Likewise, the
civil liability of the accused arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death.
In People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994): 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” 2. Corollarily, the claim for
civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) . . . . e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil
liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3) of Republic Act
No. 9165 before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for having in his possession one (1) heat-
1
sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams of shabu. chanrobleslaw

2
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court convicted accused in the Decision dated May 4, 2010.

APPEAL si accused

17
On June 27, 2016, this Court issued the Resolution reconsidering its June 23, 2014 unsigned
Resolution. This Court acquitted accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

On July 22, 2016, this Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections a
20
letter dated July 15, 2016 informing this Court that accused died on March 1, 2015, prior to the issuance of
this Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution. A certified machine copy of accused's Death Certificate was attached
21
to the letter. chanrobleslaw

This Court notes that counsels for accused should have informed this Court of the death of their client.

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the counsel is duty-bound to report the death of a
party to the court

Consequently, this Court issued a resolution even after accused's death. Had counsels for accused
informed this Court earlier of the death of their client, this Court would have been saved precious time,
effort, and resources, which could have been devoted to other pending cases that call for this Court's
resolution and judgment. Likewise, the parties need not have filed the pleadings calling for the resolution of
accused's Motion for Reconsideration.

This Court resolves to set aside its June 27, 2016 Resolution and dismiss this case.

The death of accused extinguishes his criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]

Likewise, the civil liability of the accused arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his
31
death. In People v. Bayotas:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.32 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

33
In People v. Paras, this Court rendered judgment in a criminal case without being informed earlier
that the accused had already passed away. Premised on the principle that the death of the accused
extinguishes his criminal liability, the Court set aside its decision and dismissed the criminal case.

Considering accused's death pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, the
34
criminal action must be dismissed since there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. chanrobleslaw

Therefore, when accused died on March 1, 2015 during the pendency of his appeal and prior to this Court's
Resolution dated June 27, 2016, his criminal liability has already been extinguished. From that point on, the
criminal action had no defendant upon which the action is based.

This Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution had become ineffectual and must be set aside. Likewise, the criminal
action must be dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

 vs .ARIEL LAYAG,

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final

Judgments; In Bigler v. People, 785 SCRA 479 (2016), the Supreme Court (SC) explained
that it has the power to relax the doctrine of immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there
exists a special or compelling circumstance warranting the same.—The Court is
constrained to reopen the case despite the finality of the August 3, 2015 Resolution. In Bigler v.
People, 785 SCRA 479 (2016), the Court explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine of
immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists a special or compelling circumstance
warranting the same, viz.: Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment,
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless,
the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the court has the power
and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice
considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Criminal Law; Criminal Liability; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the accused.—Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Layag’s death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the
accused, to wit: Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is
totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.

Same; Civil Liability; Separate Civil Actions; Layag’s civil liability in connection with his
acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case,
AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by
law and procedural rules.—Upon Layag’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that
Layag’s civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on
sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate
of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Ariel Layag (Layag) was charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Qualified Rape by
Sexual Intercourse, two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness.

4
Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment dated October 14, 2015 declaring that the
5
aforesaid Resolution had already become final and executory. However, the Court received a Letter dated
July 18, 2016 from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of accused appellant on July 30, 2015,
6
as evidenced by the Certificate of Death attached thereto.
 In this case, Layag's death which occurred prior to the promulgation of the Resolution dated August 3,
2015 - a matter which the Court was belatedly informed of - clearly shows that there indeed exists a specfal
or compelling circumstance warranting the re-examination of the case despite its finality.

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Layag's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx
Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the
recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA,
may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the
estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

VINCENT E. OMICTIN, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division)

and GEORGE I. LAGOS,

Actions; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Words and Phrases; A prejudicial

question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.—A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. Here, the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now
pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts
that are intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based. Ultimately, the
resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence
of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner before the RTC of
Makati. As correctly stated by the CA, one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender: The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under
subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as follows: 1. That money, goods, or other personal
property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; 2. That there
be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; 3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and 4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Corporation Law; If the supposed authority of the person
making a demand on behalf of the corporation is found to be defective, it is as if
no demand was ever made, and the prosecution for estafa against the person
upon whom the demand was made cannot prosper.—Since the alleged offended party is
Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the
authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Private respondent is
challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case pending before
the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of petitioner
is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa
cannot prosper.

Same; Same; Same; The mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver
or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give rise to a civil
action and does not constitute the crime of estafa.—The mere failure to return the thing
received for safekeeping or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could
only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa. This is because the
crime is committed by misappropriating or converting money or goods received by the offender
under a lawful transaction.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.—
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues raised by petitioner
particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question
regarding the supposed authority of the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company, are
proper subjects for the determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in
this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred to
the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not
been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong. Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect
of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. The court cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining
technical and intricate matters of fact.