 Bermejo Vs Barrios

ZALDIVAR, J.:

These two cases, being interrelated, are decided together.

These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, rendered on June 3, 1964, dismissing two petitions
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction: one filed by petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo against City Judge Isidro Barrios and
City Fiscal Quirico Abela of Roxas City, docketed as Special Civil Case No. V-2721; and the other filed by petitioner Jovita Carmorin
against the same respondents, docketed as Special Civil Case No. V-2723.

In G.R. No. L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" (her identity at the time was unknown) were charged in the city court
of Roxas City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of falsification of public or official document in an information filed by the city fiscal. It
was alleged in the information that on or about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused, being private individuals,
conspired and confederated together and mutually helped each other, and willfully and feloniously prepared and executed a document
consisting of an amended petition for habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M. Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin, petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales
and Wilfredo Bernales, respondents", which petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia "Doe" placed her thumbmark over the name
"Jovita Carmorin", which petition was subscribed and sworn to by the two accused before the Clerk of Court, and filed in the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2669, thus the two accused stated and made it appear in the amended
petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of the petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita
Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia
Carmorin.

Relying on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted by him and that he had examined the
witnesses under oath before filing the information, the City Judge, Hon. Isidro O. Barrios, issued, on August 24, 1963, an order for the
arrest of accused Bermejo. To prevent his incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information alleging in substance: (1) that the information did not charge an
offense because the amended petition for habeas corpus (in Special Proceeding No. V-2669 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz),
allegedly falsified, is not a document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and that in a
previous judgment of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus proceedings it was declared that the thumbmark in the
amended petition was that of Jovita Carmorin; and (2) that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the warrant
issued for his arrest was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the same without first examining the witnesses under oath and in the form
of searching questions and answers as required under Republic Act 3828.

The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash, contending that the petition for habeas corpus is a public document; that the
provisions of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to municipal judges and not to city judges; and that the principle of res judicata, or
conclusiveness of judgment, cannot be invoked by the accused. After Bermejo had filed a supplement to his motion to quash and a
reply to the city fiscal's opposition, respondent City Judge, on October 5, 1963, issued an order denying the motion to quash.

On October 14, 1963, Bermejo filed his motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Capiz, naming as respondents City
Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela, contending that City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion in filing an
information against him without conducting the proper preliminary investigation, and that the City Judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash, raising practically the same issues that he raised in the motion to quash before the city court,
and praying that respondent City Judge be enjoined from hearing the criminal case against him during the pendency of the special civil
action in the Court of First Instance.

In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela with perjury, on August 23, 1963, in the
same city court of Roxas City (Criminal Case No. 4452) for allegedly having "subscribed and swore to an affidavit ... that she was really
the one who signed with her thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin ... the amended petition for habeas corpus ... when in truth and in fact, as
she very well knew, she had not done such act of signing with her thumbmark said petition and it was another person, who signed with
a thumbmark said petition as Jovita Carmorin ... ." The city fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary investigation in
accordance with law before filing the information.

On the basis of the certification by the city fiscal that he had conducted the proper preliminary investigation, respondent City Judge
Barrios issued an order for the arrest of accused Carmorin. After posting a bond, said accused, thru her counsel, Atty. Pedro M.
Bermejo (the same person accused in the falsification case), filed a motion to quash the information, alleging substantially, that the
court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person because the warrant of arrest issued for her arrest was improvidently issued, the
respondent City Judge having issued the same without examining the witnesses personally in the form of searching questions and
answers in violation of "Republic Act 3828, and that no offense was committed by the accused because it had already been declared by
the Court of First Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing in the
petition for habeas corpus was the true thumbmark of accused Carmorin.
After the city fiscal has filed his opposition to the motion to quash, and the accused, her reply, on October 15, 1963, City Judge Barrios
issued an order denying the motion to quash. Carmorin's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she likewise filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, also naming as respondents City Judge
Barrios and City Fiscal Abella, imputing abuse of discretion on the part of City Fiscal Abella in filing an information against her without
conducting the proper preliminary investigation, and on the part of respondent Judge Barrios in denying her motion to quash, raising the
same questions raised by her in her motion to quash before the city court and also praying that respondent City Judge be enjoined from
hearing the case pending decision of the special civil action.

On November 22, 1963, respondent city fiscal filed answers to the two petitions, admitting some of the allegations in the petitions, and
denying others; and setting up the affirmative defense that the orders of respondent City Judge in the criminal cases against the two
petitioners cannot be the subject of the petitions for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of First Instance of Capiz because the city
court of Roxas City issued said orders in the exercise oaf its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, so that the
latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before it, pursuant to Section 87, paragraph (e)
of Republic Act 296, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 3828.

Herein petitioners filed their replies to respondents' answers, asserting that the Court of First Instance of Capiz has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the two cases for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. After the parties had filed their memoranda in
support of their respective contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the court, the Court of First Instance of Capiz issued an order, on
January 6, 1964, declaring that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and the court set the hearing of the two cases for January 24, 1964.

During the hearing of the two cases, which was held jointly, Atty. Bermejo appeared and testified in his behalf and in behalf of his co-
accused Carmorin, while Fiscal Quirico Abella testified for the prosecution. Thereafter, the parties filed their memoranda. On June 3,
1964, the Court of First Instance of Capiz rendered a decision dismissing the two petitions, without pronouncement as to costs. Their
joint motion for reconsideration having been denied, herein petitioners brought the present appeals to this Court.

Before resolving the questions posed in these appeals, We consider it necessary to rule on the matter regarding the jurisdiction of the
Court of First instance of Capiz to take cognizance of the two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction — a question that was properly raised by the respondents in the court below, although this question is not now raised in the
appeals. We hold that the Court of First Instance of Capiz erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions. Section 6 of Republic Act
3828, amending Section 87, paragraph (c) of the Judiciary Act. of 1948, provides in part, as follows:

Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of municipal courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more
than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the district judge, shall have
like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.

All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with justices of the peace of capitals and municipal court judges
shall be tried and decided on the merits by the respective justices of the peace or municipal judges. Proceedings had
shall be recorded and decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as
the case may be.1

The crime of falsification of a public or official document by a private individual, of which petitioner Bermejo is charged in the city court
of Roxas City in Criminal Case No. 4451, is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while the crime of
perjury of which petitioner Carmorin is charged in Criminal Case No. 4452 before the city court of Roxas City is punishable with arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.2Undoubtedly, these two cases fall within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the city court of Roxas City and the Court of First Instance of Capiz. This Court, interpreting the aforequoted provision of
Republic Act 3828, ruled that "[w]here the municipal court (city court of Manila) has taken cognizance of a criminal case in its
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, appeal must be taken direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; and
where the Court of First Instance has taken cognizance of such appeal in its appellate jurisdiction and refused to elevate the case to the
Court of Appeals, said Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction.3 And this rule applies even if the order is not a judgment on the
merits because in cases of this nature the Court of First Instance exercises no supervisory jurisdiction over the city court, and having
concurrent jurisdiction the city court acts with "like jurisdiction" as the Court of First Instance. 4 It is Our view, therefore, that the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723, now appealed to this Court, is null and void because
said court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of those cases. The two special civil actions against the City Judge and the City Fiscal
of Roxas City should have been filed with the Court of Appeals in aid of the latter's appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals from the
decision or order of the city court. We note, however, that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz is correct insofar as it had
dismissed the two petitions in question.

Be that as it may, however, We believe that the error of the petitioners in filing their petitions for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz and the error of the latter court in taking cognizance of those petitions
should not deter Us from ruling on the questions raised in the present appeals. The record shows that these proceedings have been
pending for more than six years, and were We to remand these cases to the courts below so the petitions for certiorari should be
brought up to the Court of Appeals, our action would only cause further delay.
We shall, therefore, decide whether herein petitioners are right in assailing the correctness or legality of the proceedings in the city
court of Roxas City in connection with the two criminal cases filed against them, as they now contend in the present appeals.

While petitioners maintain in the court below that the City Fiscal of Roxas City has no power to initiate the investigation of cases without
a previous complaint by an offended party, they now admit in their brief that under the existing laws he can commence such preliminary
inquiry.5 Nevertheless, petitioner Bermejo contends that before the city fiscal can conduct such preliminary investigation, there must be
a violation of the law, and in the instant case he avers that there was no violation of law. Basis of his argument is that the petition
for habeas corpus not being a document as contemplated in Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the city fiscal is precluded from
conducting the preliminary investigation, much less from filing the information, because Bermejo could not be prosecuted for
falsification of the alleged public or official document.

The contention of Bermejo is untenable. In the case of U.S. v. Orera,6 a "document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly
authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In U.S. v. Asensi,7 this Court held that any instrument
authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with the solemnities required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule
123 of the old Rules of Court,8 enumerates the following as public writings:

(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public
officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.

The same principle also obtains in the United States, that "defendant's pleadings and papers, which were involved in civil actions and
which were in custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk of superior court in which action was pending, were 'public documents' and
were within scope of subject matter of statute making alteration of court records an offense."9 Considering that the petition for habeas
corpus (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of one Soterania Carmorin, and that
said petition was duly subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court Leopoldo B. Dorado and filed with the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, forming, therefore, a part of the court records in said proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official
document as contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot say that he
committed no crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he connived or conspired with a certain Julia "Doe" in
falsifying said petition by making it appear that Jovita Carmorin placed her thumbmark therein when in fact she did not do so.

Petitioner Bermejo likewise complains that notwithstanding his request to be present at the preliminary investigation, the same was
conducted in his absence or behind his back thus denying him his day in court. We find however, in the record — and the court a
quo so found too — that on March 11, 1963, a subpoena was issued to Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo requiring him to appear at the office of
the city fiscal of Roxas City on March 14, 1963 in an investigation. This subpoena was received by Bermejo on March 12, 1963, and on
the same day he sent a letter to the city fiscal, which was received by the latter in the afternoon of the same day, requesting that the
investigation be postponed to March 19, 1963 because he Bermejo had to attend to another case which was scheduled to be heard on
the same date. The city fiscal acceded to his request, but because the fiscal's office failed to notify him of the hearing on March 19,
1963, Bermejo was not present when the investigation was conducted on that day. The preliminary investigation was conducted on the
very day requested by Bermejo, and after finding that there was a prima faciecase the city fiscal filed the information against him on
August 22, 1963.

It appears, therefore, that while the city fiscal failed to notify petitioner Bermejo that his request for postponement was granted, which
should have been done, it can also be said that Bermejo was not entirely blameless if the preliminary investigation was conducted in his
absence. It was he himself who set the date of the investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not bother to come on the
date he fixed. Neither did he try to find out what action the city fiscal had taken on his request for postponement, on any day before the
date of the hearing set by him, although he is living in Roxas City where the city fiscal holds his office. Moreover, the information was
filed five months later, and this petitioner never inquired, at least as to the status of his case. This behavior of petitioner cannot merit
Our approval. It is obvious that he failed to employ the standard of care or reasonable diligence that is expected of him. His
unwarranted absence on the day of the hearing which he himself requested, coupled with his seeming indifference or unconcern about
his case, is a clear indication that he was guilty of gross negligence in the protection of his rights. If he did not have his day in court, it
was because of his own negligence. If he was really interested to attend the investigation, as he now pretends, he should have taken
pains to communicate with the city fiscal. This Court had ruled that in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to
be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard. 10 Since petitioner Bermejo was afforded the
opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation but did not take advantage of it, he has no one to blame but himself. Anyway, said
petitioner's rights can still be amply protected in the regular trial of the case against him in the city court where he can cross examine
the witnesses and present his evidence. 11

Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify petitioners, but had conducted the preliminary investigations ex parte, their
rights to due process could not have been violated for they are not entitled as of right to preliminary investigation. The numerous
authorities 12 supporting this view are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules
of Court invoked by them has no application in their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964
while the preliminary investigations conducted by the city fiscal were conducted in 1963. 13 The Rules of Court are not penal statutes,
and they cannot be given retroactive effect. 14
Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did not abuse his discretion in conducting the preliminary investigations and
that he filed the informations against herein petitioners in accordance with law, there is, therefore, no merit in the assertion of petitioners
that the warrants of arrest issued for their arrest were illegal. Besides, granting arguendo that the orders of arrest were tainted with
irregularity, still the posting by petitioners of their bail bonds amounted to a waiver of the effect of said defects.

There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued. Section 87 of the Judiciary Act as
amended by Republic Act 3828 requires that the Municipal Judge issuing the same,personally, examine under oath
the witnesses, and by searching questions and answers which are to be reduced to writing. Here, instead of
searching questions and answers, we have only the affidavits of respondent and her one witness. Moreover, said
affidavits were sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest.

However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner constitutes a waiver of the irregularity attending her arrest. Besides, by
her other personal appearances before the municipal court and the court a quo, petitioner voluntarily submitted
herself to the court's jurisdiction. Hence, the absence of preliminary examination becomes moot already, the court
having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and could therefore proceed with the preliminary
investigation proper." (Doce v. Branch II, Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., supra; Luna v. Plaza, L-27511,
November 29, 1968).

The other point raised by petitioners in their contention that the respondent City Judge abused his discretion in denying their motion to
quash is that there was a judicial declaration in the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark
appearing in the petition was the genuine thumbmark of Jovita Carmorin, and that pronouncement is now conclusive so that they
cannot be prosecuted for falsification or perjury, as the case may be. This particular question should rather be submitted and threshed
out in the city court during the trial. The record of the habeas corpus proceeding is not before Us, and We have no means of knowing
what actually transpired in that proceeding. The proper determination of this question will involve not only the introduction and
consideration of evidence, but also calls for a detailed inquiry on the principle of estoppel by, or conclusiveness of, judgment.

Also devoid of merit is the other error pointed to by petitioners with respect to the alleged admission by respondents that they acted
illegally, capriciously, or in excess of jurisdiction. A cursory examination of their answers would reveal that what was admitted by
respondent was the fact of the filing by petitioners of their pleadings, but not the allegations contained therein, for, as shown in the
record, respondents have staunchly defended their acts and insisted that their actuations are legal or in accordance with law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 is set
aside for having been rendered by the court without jurisdiction, and the instant appeals are dismissed. We declare that the warrants of
arrests issued, and the informations filed, in Criminal Cases Nos. 4451 and 4452 of the City Court of Roxas City, are in accordance with
law, and these cases should be remanded to the City Court of Roxas City for trial on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.

 PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., vs. EMILY ROSE GO KO, doing business under the name and style of "KD
SURPLUS" and KIDDY LIM CHAO

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. comes to this Court via this appeal by certiorari, challenging the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed its original action for certiorari for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Respondents Emily Rose Go Ko and Kiddy Lim Chao filed a complaint against petitioner for Annulment/Reformation of Chattel
Mortgage, Annulment of Restructuring Agreement, Fixing of Correct Principal, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The complaint was raffled to Branch 5 of said court, presided by
Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr.

The trial court, by Order of February 16, 2000, granted respondent’s prayer for preliminary injunction. Petitioner, which received a copy
of the Order on February 18, 2000, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2000. The motion was denied by Order of May 22,
2000 on the ground that the lifting of the injunction would have rendered one of the substantive issues of the case moot and academic.
Notice of the Order dated May 22, 2000 was received by counsel for petitioner on June 2, 2000.

On July 31, 2000, or fifty-nine (59) days after receipt of the Order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.1 Petitioner claimed that therein public respondent Judge Gako acted with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the injunction
notwithstanding respondents’ non-entitlement thereto, effectively disposing of the main case without trial, and not holding that the
complaint was filed merely to preempt petitioner’s filing of a case for replevin.

By Resolution of August 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals, following Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which had incorporated the
amendment introduced by this Court’s Circular No. 39-98 effective September 1, 1998, the relevant portion of which reads:
Sec. 4. Where and when petition to be filed.

xxx

If the petitioner has filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the
period herein affixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition [for Certiorari, Prohibition, or
Mandamus] within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except of the most compelling reason and in no case exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Underscoring supplied),

dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. 2

Thus the appellate court held:

In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the assailed order of February 16, 2000 on February 18, 2000. Thirteen (13) days after,
or on March 2, 2000, a motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner. Receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was on
June 2, 2000. Thirteen (13) days having been consumed, petitioner had a remaining period of forty seven (47) days within which to file
the petition for review reckoned from June 2, 2000, or until July 19, 2000. The petition having been filed only on July 31, 2000 is
therefore filed twelve (12) days beyond the reglementary period. Rule 65 is an extraordinary relief that is open so long as it is availed of
within the prescribed period. (Underscoring supplied)

On September 1, 2000, Sec. 4 of Rule 65 was amended anew, by this Court’s A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, FURTHER AMENDING
SECTION 4 RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE this time reverting to the old rule that the 60-day period of filing a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 was to be reckoned from the date of receipt of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the assailed order or motion for new trial. The rule, as thus amended, now states:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner, which received on September 7, 2000 a copy of the appellate court’s August 23, 2000 Resolution dismissing its petition, filed
a motion for reconsideration thereof on September 21, 2000. No mention was made of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.

By Resolution of June 6, 2001,3 the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. No mention was also made by it
about A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.

Petitioner now questions the August 23, 2000 and June 6, 2001 resolutions of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the amendment
of Section 4, Rule 65 effected by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC should have been retroactively applied to its petition, it not having been finally
disposed of at the time the amendment became effective.

The issue in this petition has been squarely resolved in the case of Narzoles v. NLRC.4 It will suffice for this Court to repeat the ruling
therein. Parenthetically, respondents candidly "admit that they cannot take a contrary stand" in resolving the petition at in accordance
with this Court’s ruling in Narzoles.5

There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on September 1, 1998, were already
in force, and therefore applicable when petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense. No vested rights attach to
procedural laws. Consequently, the CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98, correctly deducted the 16 days (the fifteenth day was a
Sunday) it took for petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60 day reglementary period. As petitioners only had the
remaining period of 44 days from 19 October 1998, when it received a copy of the resolution denying reconsideration, to file the petition
for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998 was nine (9) days too late.

Petitioners, however, claim exception to the retroactive application of Circular No. 39-98 since it would work injustice to them. We do
not deem it necessary to rule on this contention in view of further amendments to Section 4, Rule 65.

The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for
late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a
fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the
amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court
deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration
to file a petition for certiorari. Earlier this year, the Court resolved, in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65 to read
as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.

The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation.

In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only be described as curative in nature, and the
principles governing curative statutes are applicable.

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are
intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence
by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute
was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.

Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," its retroactive application cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this
Court on 17 December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative
Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that the substantive aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the
livelihood, of petitioner-employees.6 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 23, 2000 and June 6, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby
vacated, and the case is hereby REMANDED to it for appropriate action in line with the foregoing discussion.

 AURORA B. GO, Petitioner, vs. ELMER SUNBANUN,* GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN and RICHARD
SUNBANUN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 168240 February 9, 2011

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the administration of justice, it shall be retroactively
applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality.

For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the certiorari petition filed by herein
petitioner Aurora Go (Aurora), prompting her to file before us this petition for review on certiorari. Aurora now calls for liberality in the
application of the procedural rules in the hope that she would eventually be given a chance to be heard by the CA after the trial court
denied her prayer for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

Factual Antecedents

In November 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang (Sang), and Yiu-Go Employment
Agency (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-25778, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu, Branch 58.1 The respondents claimed that the spouses occupied the ground floor portion of their house in 68-F General
Junquera Street, Cebu City under a one-year lease contract and had used the premises as the business office of Yiu-Go Employment
Agency. This allegedly increased the risk of loss by fire, and thus a breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the
respondents made which described the property as residential type. 2

Only Aurora filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counter-Claim.3 In her answer, Aurora averred that they already left the
premises sometime in 2001and that during the entirety of their stay, they used the leased floor as a private residence and as a lodging
house. She denied that their employment agency held office there. She also pointed out that the lease contract was terminated when
the one-year term expired in July 1996, and that she was not privy to the contracts of insurance since she was not informed of the
contracts’ existence. To her, whether the house was used as a business office or as a lodging house was immaterial as there was no
increased risk of fire either way. Aurora demanded actual damages as she claimed that she works in Hong Kong on a no-work-no-pay
basis and the suit would result in spending airfare and lost earnings.

After the respondents concluded their presentation of evidence, Aurora moved on October 28, 2002 that her testimony be taken by
deposition upon written interrogatories, as she was unsure as to when she could come home to the Philippines considering that her
work schedule as a court interpreter in Hong Kong is erratic. She averred that arrangements have already been made with the
Philippine consulate in Hong Kong to take her deposition. 4 Over the objection of the respondents, the RTC granted Aurora’s motion on
November 21, 2002.5 However, Aurora’s deposition was taken only on January 28, 2004 6 after her follow-up letter dated November 7,
2003 to the Philippine consulate.7

Before this deposition was taken, the RTC in its December 1, 2003 Order8 already deemed the defendants to have waived their right to
present their evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution since more than a year had elapsed from the date the RTC
granted Aurora’s motion to have her testimony be taken by deposition. Again, only Aurora moved for reconsideration 9 and prayed that
the December 1, 2003 Order be recalled and instead admit the deposition. She attributed the delay of her deposition-taking to the
consulate’s fault, as she was passed from one officer to another or no officer was available.

On January 26, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment 10 finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs.11 The trial court disregarded her two-page transcript of deposition when it received the same on March 5,
2004.12

Aurora’s former counsel of record, Atty. Jude Henritz R. Ycong (Atty. Ycong), belatedly discovered about this adverse judgment when
he received from respondents’ counsel a Motion to Direct Issuance of Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution13 on March 16, 2004. It
turned out that although he had already previously informed the court of his new office address, the court mistakenly sent the January
26, 2004 Decision to his former office address. 14He raised this in his opposition to the motion filed by the respondents. 15 Finding this
point meritorious, the court denied respondents’ motion, ruling that the judgment against Aurora has not yet attained finality as the 15-
day period to appeal, counted from March 16, 2004, has not yet lapsed.16

Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration 17 on March 31, 2004, the last day to file her appeal. The court in its April 27, 2004
Order18 denied said motion.

Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial on May 6, 2004, thus giving his client a day left to file her appeal. Explaining that Aurora has
been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was running for the position of town mayor in Calubian, Leyte 19 and that he and
his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by
filing an extension of 15 days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal.20

Atty. Ycong thereafter filed the Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2004.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its May 12, 2004 Order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal, viz:

While there are rulings of the Supreme Court declaring that the period to appeal is not extendible, there are also instances when it
allowed appeals to be perfected despite their filing out of time. x x x

In the instant case, the delay is due to defendant-Go’s running for an elective post. Such is no excuse.

In other words, contrary to the belief of this court that Aurora Go had been and is out of the country, she in fact is in the Philippines.
Consequently, she could have the time to confer with her counsels in order to prepare for her appeal.

Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Notice of Appeal is hereby
declared filed out of time.

SO ORDERED.21

Aurora sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC on June 10, 2004. 22

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Filing her petition for certiorari with the CA by way of registered mail on August 13, 2004, 23 Aurora claimed that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in refusing to relax the period for filing the notice of appeal. She contended that her situation is enough reason to grant her
prayer. She averred that she could not just leave the campaign trail just to discuss matters with her lawyer about her case as she was
busy in Leyte at the homestretch of the campaign period.
However, the CA on December 8, 2004, dismissed the petition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85897) for being procedurally flawed, viz:

1) The Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one petitioner without a Special Power of
Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing her to represent the two (2) other petitioners;

2) The Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks explanation why
service of the petition with this Court was not done personally (Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court);

3) Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers;

4) Certified true [sic] copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached to the petition is a mere photocopy of a
certified true copy;

5) The following copies of pleadings and other relevant documents referred to in the petition which would support the
allegations therein are not attached:

a) Complaint; and,

b) Answer.24

Invoking the liberal construction of procedural rules, petitioner Aurora asked for reconsideration 25 with the following justifications:

1) A certification/verification of one of a number of principal parties is sufficient compliance. Although her certiorari petition
named her, her spouse, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency, as ‘petitioners,’ her co-defendants were not held liable in the lower
court. It is only she who is interested in filing the certiorari petition for her to be able to appeal, hence her lone signature.

2) Anent the lack of explanation of why personal service to the CA was not resorted to, Aurora averred that it was redundant to
explain why registered mail was used considering the distance between Cebu, where she is based, and the CA in Manila.

3) The professional tax receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt numbers were inadvertently
overlooked. However, the defect was cured when Atty. Ycong included the numbers when he subsequently filed on October
14, 2004 his Notice of Change of Address26 with the CA.

4) Questioned in the certiorari are the May 12 and June 10, 2004 Orders that denied Aurora’s prayer for an extension of time
to file her notice of appeal. Requiring her to additionally append to the CA petition the certified true copies of the January 26,
2004 RTC Decision (i.e., the decision on the merits of the case), the complaint, and the answer was not necessary as these
documents are not relevant and material to the issue to be resolved.

Finding Aurora’s reasoning unacceptable, the CA insisted on a strict observance of the rules in its April 8, 2005 Resolution:

As to the first ground, petitioners merely disagree with the deficiency which occasioned the outright dismissal of their petition without
even curing the said defect. Suffice it to say here that the petition itself contains more than one petitioner. No less than the Supreme
Court pronounced in Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman that where there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or
petition signed by only [sic] of the parties is defective unless he/she is authorized by his co-parties. x x x

xxxx

The reason why petitioners’ petition was dismissed based on the second defect was because the said petition lacks explanation why
service of the petition with this Court was not done personally, not much for having filed the same by registered mail. In other words, the
dismissal was not due to the fact that the petition was filed by registered mail, but because of the failure to explain why the personal
service was not resorted to. Then again, petitioners did not even bother to cure such defect.

Anent the third ground, counsel for petitioners posits that his failure to indicate in the petition for certiorari his PTR and IBP numbers
was cured by his succeeding Notice of Change Address filed with this Court. However, a closer of [sic] examination of the same reveals
that the same was only filed on October 14, 2004 or some two (2) months after the petition for certiorari was filed on August 13, 2004. If
it was really the intention of counsel for petitioners to cure such defect, he could have done it immediately after filing the petition. Had it
not been due to the filing of the notice of change of address, We doubt if petitioners would have cured such defect.

Considering the foregoing, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised by petitioners.

x x x x27
The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Believing that her case should not have been dismissed for procedural

defects, Aurora assails the December 8, 2004 and April 8, 2005 Resolutions of the CA, reiterating to this Court that she deserves to be
accorded the chance to prove to the CA that the RTC had unfairly denied her motion for extension of time to file her notice of appeal.

On the other hand, respondents defend the stance of the CA, insisting that perfection of an appeal is jurisdictional and mandatory; and
that the circumstances do not justify granting Aurora leniency in the application of the procedural rules. Moreover, ever since she filed
her motion for reconsideration on the RTC’s January 26, 2004 Decision, she had in the interim sufficient time to think about the next
legal action to take before the trial court issued its order of denial on April 27, 2004.

Issue

The sole question to resolve is whether the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA may be relaxed in the interest of justice.

Our Ruling

The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification on non-forum shopping are
not necessary.

In filing a certiorari petition, one aggrieved by a court’s judgment, order or resolution must verify his/her petition and must also attach a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping.28 In dismissing Aurora’s petition, the CA cited as one of its grounds the lack of signatures or
authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Such signatures,
however, may be dispensed with as these parties are not involved in the petition. Although the caption in Aurora’s petition before the
CA erroneously included Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency as petitioners, its contents reveal that it is solely Aurora who is the
‘person aggrieved,’ as she is the one who assailed before the CA the RTC’s Order that denied her notice of appeal and, hence, she
should be the one who should sign the petition. Notably, Aurora is the only one held liable by the trial court for damages and thus is the
one interested in filing an appeal and in elevating the case to the CA. Moreover, only Aurora filed her answer before the RTC while
Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency did not file any.

Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the Complaint and Answer not fatal.

Another ground cited by the CA was the non-submission of the certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision as well as the
failure to attach copies of the complaint and answer in Aurora’s petition.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission of a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject of the petition as well as the submission of copies of all pleadings and documents relevant to the petition. "The initial
determination of what pleadings, documents or order are relevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. [Should the CA
opine that additional documents must be submitted together with the petition, it may] (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of
[Section 3,] Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents, or order
within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings,
documents or order within a fixed period."29 We emphasize that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached,
but only those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of
discretion.30

Thus, we agree with the petitioner that the CA required pleadings

immaterial to the issue presented before it. The questioned subject of certiorari does not touch upon the substantive merits of the suit
for damages against Aurora but actually involves the refusal of the trial court to entertain her notice of appeal due to late filing. The
complaint and answer are not indispensable at all in the resolution of this issue, the contents of which are already summarized in the
January 26, 2004 Decision attached to the petition. Furthermore, since Aurora’s petition assails the May 12 and June 10, 2004 Orders
of the RTC, it is the certified true copies of these orders that are required to be attached to the petition. On the other hand, photocopy of
the January 26, 2004 Decision will suffice, as this document is material and pertinent to the petition.

Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers not fatal.

The failure of petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and IBP numbers for the year
2004 was obviously an oversight. A perusal of the records of the case would show that counsel had duly paid the required dues for that
year and that his PTR and IBP receipt numbers are indicated in the pleadings he had filed with the RTC. 31 Although he omitted to
indicate the numbers on Aurora’s CA petition, the same numbers were nevertheless stated on his Notice of Change of Address, around
two months before the appellate court issued the questioned December 8, 2004 Resolution.
Rules on perfecting appeals must be strictly complied with; liberal application available only under exceptional circumstances.

Whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of service. Under Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation why
the pleading was not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Petitioner should
be aware that a court, in reasonably exercising discretionary power to dismiss a petition that violated the rule on written explanation for
resorting to modes other than personal service, also has to take into account another factor, i.e., the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. 32 For this reason, we do not find any grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising
its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.

Indeed, judicial notice may be taken that personal service is impracticable considering the distance between Cebu and Manila, and that
Musa v. Amor33 supports Aurora’s argument that a written explanation why service was not done personally might have been
superfluous considering the evident distance between the appellate court and the place where the petition was posted. It must be
emphasized, however, that provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and
are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations.34 In the case at bar, the reason behind the filing of an
extension of time to file her notice of appeal was not per se, a compelling and a highly exceptional one. Just as it is the lawyer’s duty to
safeguard her client’s interest, it is the responsibility of the client to make herself available to her counsel and open the lines of
communication, even during the busy election period, for their discussions of legal options. She is obliged to be vigilant in fighting for
her cause and in protecting her rights. It is Aurora's duty, "as a client, to be in touch with [her] counsel so as to be constantly posted
about the case. [She] is mandated to inquire from [her] counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot
expect that all [she] has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case." 35 Additionally, "motions for extension are not
granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension
or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for." 36

In spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v. Court of Appeals will be applied to her benefit

Aurora had almost lost her statutory privilege to appeal, but in view of our ruling on Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 37we shall grant
Aurora’s petition.1avvphi1

In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of
his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. We said:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. 38 (Emphasis supplied.)

"[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no
vested rights in the rules of procedure."39 Neypes, which we rendered in September 2005, has been applied retroactively to a number
of cases40 wherein the original period to appeal had already lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Aurora’s
situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the amendment of the procedural rules.

The denial of Aurora’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s January 26, 2004 decision was received by her former counsel on
May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the fresh period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21,
2004 to file her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85897 dated
December 8, 2004 and April 8, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 58,
dated May 12 and June 10, 2004 that denied Aurora Go’s notice of appeal are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 58 is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal dated May 11, 2004.

 FIRST AQUA SUGAR TRADERS, INC. and CBN INTERNATIONAL(HK) CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,1 Respondent.

G.R. No. 154034 February 5, 2007

CORONA, J.:
Petitioners First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. and CBN International Corporation were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 99-9302 filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57.3 Respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands was the defendant in that case.

On October 16, 2000, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint. 4 Petitioners received a copy of the
judgment on October 27, 2000. Hence, they had fifteen days to file a notice of appeal.5 Instead, on November 6, 2000, or 10 days after,
they opted to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the order dated January 30, 2001.6

Petitioners claim they received a copy of the January 30, 2001 order on February 16, 2001 and that they filed a notice of appeal7 on the
same day.

On February 19, 2001, the trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal on the premise that the same was filed within the
prescribed period.8

Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion to declare the October 16, 2000 judgment final alleging that petitioners’ notice of appeal
was filed out of time. According to respondent, the January 30, 2001 order was sent to the address of petitioners’ counsel and was
received there by a certain Lenie Quilatan on February 9, 2001. Hence, petitioners had only five days9 left to file the notice of appeal
counted from February 9, 2001, or until February 14, 2001. Thus, the February 16, 2001 filing was out of time. 10

Petitioners disputed respondent’s allegation and maintained their position that the reckoning point of the remaining 5-day period should
be the date of their actual receipt which was February 16, 2001. 11 They claimed that Quilatan, who allegedly received the January 30,
2001 order on February 9, 2001, was not in any way connected to them or their counsel.

On March 30, 2001, the trial court ruled for the respondents.

… the Registred Letter No. B-341 sent by the Court to R.Z. Francisco and Associates was duly delivered and received by Lenie
Quilatan, an authorized representative, on February 9, 2001. It is therefore not true that the receipt of the Order denying the motion for
reconsideration [was] on February 16, 2001 but rather it was on February 9, 2001, thus making the appeal interposed to have been filed
out of time.12

On certiorari, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding and dismissed the petition. 13 The motion for reconsideration was
denied.14 Hence this recourse.

The only issue before us is whether the notice of appeal was filed on time.1awphi1.net

The actual date of receipt of the notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration dated January 30, 2001 is a factual issue which the
trial court and the Court of Appeals have already ruled on. Accordingly, this Court, not being a trier of facts 15 and having no reason to
reverse the said finding, holds that the date of receipt of the January 30, 2001 order was February 9, 2001.

However, we disagree with the lower courts’ finding that the notice of appeal was filed late. In the recent case of Neypes v. Court of
Appeals,16 we stated that:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (emphasis ours)

In the light of this decision, a party litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision
or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. 17Being procedural in nature, Neypes is
deemed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its effectivity and is thus retroactive in that sense and to
that extent.18

Petitioners’ notice of appeal filed on February 16, 2001 was therefore well-within the fresh period of fifteen days from the date of their
receipt of the January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64230
is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

 Resident Marine Mammals Of The Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46),
which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water
situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.2

The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin
respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain
international and municipal laws.3

Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to
nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46;
and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration
Project.4

ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria
Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known
as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an
unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter
to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.5

Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-
governmental organization, established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial),
Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk
of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.

Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L.
Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the
Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and
existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine
agent of JAPEX.

In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios
(Labios), in their capacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively.6

On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies
included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted
geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. 7

On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. 8

From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling
covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's underwater composition.9

JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine
waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, 10 JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An
Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes." 11

On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board 12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-
001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.

On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters,
near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.16

It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both
dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution.

On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike17 its name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In support of its motion, it submitted the branch office application of JAPEX, 18 wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly identified.
SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS's motion on the ground that it was premature, it was pro-forma, and
it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS admitted that "it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other
exploration activities in Tañon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that it would be premature to drop SOS
as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case; and that it was "convenient" for SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its name
from the parties when what it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to join it in its motion to enable proper substitution. At
this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a co-
respondent or as a substitute for its parent company, JAPEX. 19

On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.

On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested20 that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to Strike with Motion to Implead filed by
petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771.

On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation 21 that they were not objecting to SOS's Motion to Strike as it was not
JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did not file any comment at all.

Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given ample chance and opportunity to answer the
issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the September
23, 2008 Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527, and which required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. The February 7, 2012 Resolution 22 reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and
Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No.
181527 (Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.). - The Court Resolved to direct the
Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the resolution dated September 23, 2008 to the following parties and counsel, together with this
resolution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Aristeo O. Cariño 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
Counsel for Respondent
146 Valero Street
Supply
Oilfield Services, Inc. Salcedo Village, Makati City

JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre

146 Valero Street
Salcedo Village, Makati City

JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 19th Floor Pearlbank Centre

c/o Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. 146 Valero Street
Nicolas-Suchianco Salcedo Village, Makati City

Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. Suite 2404 Discovery Centre

Nicolas-Suchianco 25 ADB Avenue
Resident Agent of JAPEX Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Philippines Ltd.
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on February 23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX
Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Admit 23 its Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH
requested to be clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the
case, as it has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities in the Tañon Strait way
back in 2008, rendering this case moot.

On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of Time25 to file its Memorandum. It stated
that since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX
PH then asked for an additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some time to consider its Motion for Clarification.

On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution 26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification. This Court,
addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification, held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX Philippines. Ltd.
as a real party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines,
Ltd.'s allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX
Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business
transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the
party impleaded in this case.

Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign
corporation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. — The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent
to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such corporation file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who must be a resident of the Philippines,
on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation,
and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers
of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as
follows:

"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its being granted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time said corporation shall cease to transact
business in the Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any summons or other legal processes
may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising out of any business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of
any summons or other legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall have the
same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers of the corporation at its home office."

Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commission
shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or
principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall complete such service. All
expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the party at whose instance the service is made.

In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in writing the Securities and
Exchange Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is to receive summons or legal processes that may be
served in all actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have been prosecuted in the name of
JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had been receiving the various resolutions
from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return Cards signed by its representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension of time to file its memorandum, and was
given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within which to comply with the submission. 27

Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this Court for an additional thirty days to file its
Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. It justified its request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued
past its requested deadline for filing, which was on April 21, 2012. 28

On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file its Memorandum and dispensed with such
filing.

Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda,29 and public respondents had earlier filed a Manifestation30 that they
were adopting their Comment dated March 31, 2008 as their memorandum, this Court submitted the case for
decision.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Petitioners' Allegations

Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent.
They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk
could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also known
as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." 31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of
"fish kill"32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private
respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the
issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.

In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch
and lack of public consultations or discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it
alleges that during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point
where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE.33 It also agrees in the
allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and
private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the
Environmental Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations. 34 It further claims that
despite several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in Taflon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait
Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.35

Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations

Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal
standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions; that the
ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to
furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive
relief. They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had
been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008. 36

ISSUES
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No.
180771:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION;

II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTES;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED EXPLOITATION FOR OIL AND NATURAL GAS
AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
INSTRUMENTS; AND

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE AND ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL
AND PROPER.37

Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our consideration:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS DOE AND JAPEX SHOULD
BE NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORATION CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS
LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY PASSED EXPRESSLY FOR THE PURPOSE;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED
SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION GRANTED TO PETITIONERS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) FOR SUCH AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TANON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE CONFORMED TO LAW AND EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
MATTER.

V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO FURNISH PETITIONERS WITH
COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TANON STRAIT OIL EXPLORATION PROJECT.38

In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two
primary issues:

I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and

II. Main Issue: Legality of Sendee Contract No. 46.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, this Court makes clear that the '"moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under the following exceptions:

1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;

3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 39

In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated petitions as almost all of the
foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and
livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions are capable of
repetition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Procedural Issues

Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound
that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.42

For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they
have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards
of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public
trust doctrine.43

Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise
of epistolary jurisdiction.44

In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties
in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-
party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or
the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit
some of them were still unborn.45

As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that they are
representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real
parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case. 46

Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent any proof that former President Arroyo had
disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own.47

The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of
a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.48

The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before courts of law is not new
in the field of animal rights and environmental law. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States
case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton,49wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal standing,
opined:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed
environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled,
defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage, x x x.

Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The
corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary
corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable
causes.

So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air
that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it
sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are
dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it.
Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—
must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the
need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be
either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real
party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions

Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties
in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-
party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or
the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal
except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given
legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring
actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for
failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal
theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current
trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.

Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit
any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.52 (Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
commented:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their
cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional
rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the
doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been
consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure."54

Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission55 held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent, x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet
unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned."56Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.57

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards
are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner

Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the
following reasons, which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacañang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as
an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect
Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking
her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official relations
with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political law. 58cralawlawlibrary
This is incorrect.

Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a
defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a
party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her
through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as
such would be a denial of due process.

Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient
to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention." 59

Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off
the title of this case.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46

Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis

Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution

Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and
financial assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same provision. 61 The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos62 laid down the guidelines for a valid service contract, one of which is that there must exist a general
law for oil exploration before a service contract may be entered into by the Government. The petitioners posit that the service contract
in La Bugal is presumed to have complied with the requisites of (a) legislative enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution (such as Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b)
presidential notification. The petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining contracts under Republic Act No.
7942, does not apply in this case.63 The petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which
enunciate new policies concerning the environment. 64 In addition, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our natural resources,65 and
paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial Technical Assistance Agreements.66

The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46 does not violate Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right
to Filipinos, are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge
on the FIDEC's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources. 67

Ruling of the Court

On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve
its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution. (Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we
held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that
decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973
Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Summation of the ConCom Deliberations

At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:

In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance.

They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.

It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.

Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during
the marital law regime. In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety
measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This
provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60 percent of which is owned by such citizens — the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.

This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of
minerals and petroleum resources.

The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be considered adequate and reasonable. But some of
them, having more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for them, the provision would permit aliens to exploit
and benefit from the nation's natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.

In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the entire body. They sounded off their individual opinions,
openly enunciated their philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's viewpoint was heard.

In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony — including paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign
corporations as an exception to the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article — was resoundingly approved by a
vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.

Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service Contracts with Safeguards

From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred
to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations
acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service
contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and
operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises
control and supervision over the entire operation.68cralawlawlibrary
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the
exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La
Bugal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject
to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and
requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an
opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. 69cralawlawlibrary
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements
of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos
to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private
resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government. 70

Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done expressly by Congress. For instance,
Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the Local Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a number of laws, including
a specific provision in Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive
Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or
concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act
No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections
2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69,
70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been expressly repealed, it had been impliedly
repealed. As we held in Villareña v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that
when laws are in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper
Mining Corporation,72 we said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature
should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must
be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
(Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. 73 This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on
Elections74 expounding on this point, pronounced:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit,
rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, x x
x. (Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing
the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract
for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS 75 area.

2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress

While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.

As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to
those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of
positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties, x x x.
(Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S.
Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-
Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres,77 we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
political agency and its limit in this wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere
formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the
framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime." 78 Thus, they are not just mere
formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in
an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the concept of a
"constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,79 held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is
a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
This power cannot be taken lightly.

In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts
are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the
President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These
service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the
present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed
and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's
approval for the execution of any contract under said statute, as shown in the following provision:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. - Every contract herein authorized shall, subject to the approval of the
President, be executed by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public notice pre-qualification and public bidding or
concluded through negotiations. In case bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted or the bids submitted are rejected by the
Petroleum Board for being disadvantageous to the Government, the contract may be concluded through negotiation.

In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum operations, any of the following alternative procedures may be
resorted to by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President [.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the aforementioned provision of
Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate official has been authorized by the President
to enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently approved
of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 9147 or the Wildlife Resources Conservation
and Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which allows the exploration of
protected areas for the purpose of information-gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. The said
petitioners further claim that SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects the
rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters, with the exception being limited only to research and survey
activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, the gathering of information must be
in accordance with a DENR-approved program, and the exploitation and utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a general
law passed by Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR-approved program nor a general law passed by
Congress, the seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all done illegally. 81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46 infringes on
its right to the preferential use of the communal fishing waters as it is denied free access within the prohibited zone, in violation not only
of the Fisheries Code but also of the 1987 Constitutional provisions on subsistence fisherfolk and social justice. 82 Furthermore, the
FIDEC believes that the provisions in Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal waters, should be
deemed to have been rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and Republic Act No. 7160, which reiterate the
social justice provisions of the Constitution.83

The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section 14 of the NIPAS Act is a more particular
provision and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by the more general prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They
aver that Section 14, under which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption to Section 27.84

Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147, the public
respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the exploration of minerals, which as defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
exclude energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal energy. Thus, since SC-46
involves oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply. 85

The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does
not violate the rule on preferential use of municipal waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project
area, contrary to the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of the declining fish catch to the seismic
surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded. They claim that according to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish
catch data, the reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to destructive fishing practices. 86

Ruling of the Court

On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws

Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative of the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still
rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts
involving not only the Tañon Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that SC-46 is in violation of several laws,
including international ones, their arguments focus primarily on the protected status of the Tañon Strait, thus this Court will concentrate
on those laws that pertain particularly to the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape.

The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich
biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos
declared the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 - Declaring the Tañon Strait situated in
the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as
Tañon Strait Protected Seascape. During former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon Strait Commission
via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use of the resources in that area without threatening its marine life.
He followed this with Executive Order No. 177,87 wherein he included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a member of
the Tañon Strait Commission, to represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however, was subsequently abolished in 2002 by
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order No. 72.88

True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature," 89 Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common
ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and
animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. 90 It classifies and administers all the
designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure
sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. 91 The following
categories of protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. Strict nature reserve;

b. Natural park;

c. Natural monument;

d. Wildlife sanctuary;

e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;

f. Resource reserve;

g. Natural biotic areas; and

 h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government is a
signatory.92

Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and
biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation.

The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the category of Protected
Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious
interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle
and economic activity of this areas;93 thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent
preservation of its natural conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is
obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented. 95

The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any
person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first
securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. 96 Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper
management of environmentally critical areas,97 Proclamation No. 214698 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be
considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an area delineated as environmentally sensitive
such that significant environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it";99 thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact
on the environment,"100 is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages
on the environment.101 An EIA is described in detail as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project
(including cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also
includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to protect the
environment and the community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the project proponent and/or EIA
Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected area in
1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.

The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an ECC 103 and that SC-46 falls under the
exceptions in Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, due to the following reasons:

1) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;

2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy resources; and

3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least damage to surrounding areas. 104

We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.

Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management plan for
protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results
thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the
Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the
proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial action
when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.

SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict
nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources
and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with
a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President
for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the
purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt
from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court explained why a statute should be
construed as a whole:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each part
or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper
to confine the attention to the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a
process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular
definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always
be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context,
the nature of the subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who executed the contract, or of the body which enacted
or framed the statute or constitution, x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12;
instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected
areas.

The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated in Section 2 of the NIPAS Act, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the natural environment
particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement amd recognizing the critical importance
of protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with biologically unique
features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure
for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the
Constitution.

It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into
a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of this area is possible only through cooperation
among national government, local government and concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected
areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly
remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected
areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which
required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no such
environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys
were dona in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586, which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. - The President of the Philippines may, on his own
initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by his
proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.

For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said
critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of environmental
enhancement or protective measures against calamitous factors such as earthquakes, floods, water erosion and others, and (d)
perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this violation. The
following penalties are provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.

Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of the ECC
requirement:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership found violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms and
conditions in the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the standards, rules and regulations issued by the
National Environmental Protection Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the suspension or cancellation of his/its
certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the
discretion of the National Environmental Protection Council. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIPAS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section 21:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and regulations issued by the Department pursuant to this Act or
whoever is found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the preceding section shall be fined in the amount of
not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000), exclusive of the value of
the thing damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years, or both, as determined by
the court: Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the court, the offender shall be
required to restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages: Provided, further, that court shall order the eviction of the
offender from the land and the forfeiture in favor of the Government of all minerals, timber or any species collected or
removed including all equipment, devices and firearms used in connection therewith, and any construction or improvement
made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an association or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible
for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided, finally, that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties
consistent with this Act. (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources in the Tañon Strait
as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial
quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service
contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. 106Since
there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation
and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these consolidated
petitions.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

 DR. JOSEPH L. MALIXI, DR. EMELITA Q. FIRMACION, MARIETTA MENDOZA, AURORA AGUSTIN, NORA AGUILAR,
MA. THERESA M. BEFETEL, AND MYRNA NISAY, Petitioners, v. DR. GLORY V. BALTAZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the January 22, 2013 2 and
July 16, 20133 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 127252 and the October 17, 2011 Decision4 and July 17, 2012
Resolution5 of the Civil Service Commission be reversed and set aside.6 The Civil Service Commission dismissed the administrative
complaint of herein petitioners Dr. Jose L. Malixi (Dr. Malixi), Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion (Dr. Firmacion), Marietta Mendoza (Mendoza),
Aurora Agustin (Agustin), Nora Aguilar (Aguilar), Ma. Theresa M. Befetel (Befetel), and Myrna Nisay (Nisay) against herein respondent
Dr. Glory V. Baltazar (Baltazar) for violating the rule on forum shopping. 7 The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed
by petitioners on procedural grounds.8

In their Complaint9 dated December 15, 2010, petitioners prayed before the Civil Service Commission that respondent Dr. Baltazar be
held administratively liable for gross misconduct and that she be dismissed from service.10

Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital holding the following positions: Dr. Malixi was the Vice President of the
Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Bataan General Hospital, Dr. Firmacion was a Medical Specialist II, Mendoza and Agustin were both
Nurse III, Aguilar and Befetel were both Nurse II, and Nisay was a Nursing Attendant II. Meanwhile, Dr. Baltazar was the Officer-in-
Charge Chief of Bataan General Hospital.11

Petitioners alleged that sometime in May 2008, the Department of Health and the Province of Bataan entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement regarding the construction of Bataan General Hospital's three (3)-storey building. While this Memorandum was in effect, the
Department of Health, through then Secretary Francisco T. Duque (Duque), issued Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452,
appointing Dr. Baltazar as the hospital's Officer-in-Charge.12

According to petitioners, the Department of Health and the Province of Bataan entered into a Supplemental Memorandum. 13 One (1) of
the provisions stated that the parties agreed to give the supervision of the hospital to the Secretary of Health or "his duly authorized
representative with a minimum rank of Assistant Secretary[.]"14 A third Memorandum of Agreement was executed by the parties on
June 16, 2009, but the Department of Health refused to renew the agreement "due to a complaint already filed before the Honorable
Congresswoman Herminia Roman, and before the Department of Health." 15

In their Complaint, petitioners questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar's appointment and qualifications.16They alleged that her
appointment was "without any basis, experience[,] or expertise[.]" 17 They claimed that she was appointed only by virtue of an
endorsement of the Bataan Governor and without the prescribed Career Service Executive Board qualifications. 18 Thus, her
appointment violated Sections 8(1)(c), 8(2), 21(1), and 22 of Book V of the Administrative Code which provide:

SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires
examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
....

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.

(2) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels shall be through competitive examinations, which shall be open
to those inside and outside the service who meet the minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher level does not require
previous qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the third level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.

....

SECTION 21. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. — (1) Opportunity for government employment shall be open to all qualified
citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. Employees shall be selected on the
basis of fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the positions.
....

SECTION 22. Qualification Standards. — (1) A qualification standard expresses the minimum requirements for a class of positions in
terms of education, training and experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required for successful
performance. The degree of qualifications of an officer or employee shall be determined by the appointing authority on the basis of the
qualification standard for the particular position.

Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in the career service, as guides in
appointment and other personnel actions, in the adjudication of protested appointments, in determining training needs, and
as aid in the inspection and audit of the agencies' personnel work programs.

It shall be administered in such manner as to continually provide incentives to officers and employees towards professional growth and
foster the career system in the government service.

(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards shall be the responsibility of the department or
agency, with the assistance and approval of the Civil Service Commission and in consultation with the Wage and Position Classification
Office.19 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Petitioners pointed out that Dr. Baltazar's appointment was by virtue of a secondment pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement. Her
third year as Officer-in-Charge via secondment already violated the law for failing to comply with the required qualification
standards.20 Granting that there was compliance, secondment that exceeds one (1) year is subject to the Civil Service Commission's
approval under Section 9(a),21 Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Department of
Health Administrative Order No. 46, series of 2001. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999 likewise
provides that the contract of secondment should be submitted to the Commission within 30 days from its execution. A year after Dr.
Baltazar's secondment, the Commission did not issue any authority for her to continue to hold office as Officer-in-Charge of the
hospital. Hence, her assumption without the required authority was deemed illegal. 22

Petitioners averred that the non-renewal of the Memorandum of Agreement by the Department of Health rendered her appointment
ineffective. Her holding of the position after this non-renewal was already illegal.23

In addition to Dr. Baltazar's alleged invalid appointment and lack of qualifications, petitioners contended that she committed several
abusive and malevolent acts detrimental to Bataan General Hospital's officers and employees. 24 She authorized the collection of fees
for the insertion and removal of intravenous fluids and fees for the Nurse Station without any legal basis.25 She also caused the removal
from payroll of an employee, who, up to the filing of the Complaint, had yet to receive remuneration, hazard pay, subsistence, and other
allowances.26

Petitioners likewise alleged that Dr. Baltazar manipulated the creation of the Selection and Promotion Board to give her control over the
personnel's employment and promotion. She also disregarded the next-in-line rule when it comes to appointment and promotion of
employees.27

Furthermore, Dr. Baltazar allegedly employed two (2) doctors as contractual employees who were paid P20,000.00 but worked only half
the time rendered by an employee-doctor of Bataan General Hospital. Lastly, petitioners claimed that Dr. Baltazar allowed her doctor
siblings to accommodate private patients while expressly prohibiting other doctors to do the same. 28

On October 17, 2011, the Civil Service Commission rendered a Decision 29 dismissing the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping.
The Civil Service Commission found that all elements of forum shopping were present in the case and that petitioners' letter dated
September 7, 2010 filed with the Department of Health contained the same allegations against Dr. Baltazar and sought for the same
relief Finally, the judgment by the Department of Health would result to res judicata in the case before the Civil Service Commission. It
also noted that another case was pending before the Office of the Ombudsman in relation to the alleged removal of an employee in the
hospital's payroll.30

Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission resolved the issue of Dr. Baltazar's appointment "[f]or clarificatory purposes[.]" 31 It held that
Dr. Baltazar was not appointed as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General Hospital but was merely seconded to the position. Section 6 of
the Civil Service Commission Circular No. 40, series of 1998, only requires that seconded employees occupy a "professional, technical
and scientific position[.]"32

The Civil Service Commission added that the approval requirement for secondments that exceed one (1) year was already amended by
Civil Service Commission Circular No. 06-1165.33 The new circular merely required that the Memorandum of Agreement or the
secondment contract be submitted to the Commission "for records purposes[.]" 34 Failure to submit within 30 days from the execution of
the agreement or contract will only make the secondment in effect 30 days before the submission date. 35

On the alleged violation of the next-in-line rule, the Civil Service Commission held that "[e]mployees holding positions next-in-rank to
the vacated position do not enjoy any vested right thereto for purposes of promotion." 36 Seniority will only be considered if the
candidates possess the same qualifications.37

The dispositive portion of the Civil Service Commission Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the complaint of Dr. Joseph L. Malixi, Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion, Marietta Mendoza, Aurora Agustin, Nora Aguilar, Ma.
Theresa M. Befetel and Myrna Nisay against Dr. Glory V. Baltazar for Dishonesty; Misconduct; Oppression; Violation of Existing Civil
Service Law and Rules or Reasonable Office Regulations; and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Being
Notoriously Undesirable is hereby DISMISSED for violation of the rule against forum-shopping.38 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners moved for reconsideration and argued that the letter before the Department of Health was simply a request to meet the
Secretary, and not a Complaint. Furthermore, the letter before the Department of Health and the Complaint before the Civil Service
Commission did not contain the same parties or seek the same relief. 39

On July 17, 2012, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a Resolution 40 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. It held that it was
the Department of Health that considered petitioners' letter as their complaint, and not the Civil Service Commission. Moreover, the
Department of Health already exercised jurisdiction over the case when it required Dr. Baltazar to comment on the letter-complaint.41

Petitioners elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.

On January 22, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued a Minute Resolution, 42 dismissing the appeal:

The petition is DISMISSED in view of the following:

1. the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not
indicated;
2. the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere photocopies;
3. petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not indicated; and
4. there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities. 43

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 16, 2013 Minute Resolution. 44

On September 4, 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Review45 against Dr. Baltazar before this Court. They pray for the reversal of the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals and of the Decision and Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. 46

Petitioners maintain that they indicated the important dates in their appeal before the Court of Appeals and that they attached certified
true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. 47 However, they admit that they failed to indicate the date of their counsel's
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance and to provide proof of "competent evidence of identities." 48

Petitioners also deny that they committed forum shopping. The alleged Complaint sent to the Department of Health was a mere letter
stating the employees' grievances and objections to the illegalities and violations committed by respondent. It was a mere request for
the Department of Health Secretary to tackle the issues and investigate the concerns in the hospital's management. This letter was not
intended to serve as a formal Complaint. They request that this Court set aside the issue on forum shopping and that the case be
resolved on its merits.49

On January 14, 2014, respondent filed her Comment50 and prayed for the dismissal of the petition. She argues that the procedural
infirmities of petitioners' appeal are fatal to their case. 51

On February 27, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply.52 They reiterated their request for the relaxation of procedural rules and the
resolution of the case based on its merits. They also disclosed that Civil Service Commission Chairman Duque, who signed the October
17, 2011 Decision, was formerly the Department of Health Secretary who seconded respondent as Bataan General Hospital's Officer-
in-Charge. Lastly, petitioners added that their letter to the Department of Health was not a Complaint since it was not assigned a case
number.53

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition based on procedural
grounds.

Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. The importance of procedural rules in the adjudication of disputes has
been reiterated in numerous cases.54 In Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.:55

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective
law is important in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to provide for a system under which suitors may be
heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a gun. 56

Moreover, in Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co., Inc,. et al. v. Sanchez, et al.: 57

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established
primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system. 58

In this case, the Court of Appeals pointed out four (4) procedural infirmities:

1. the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not
indicated;
2. the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere photocopies;
3. petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not indicated; and
4. there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities. 59

Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing their case nor are they fabricated out of thin
air. Every section in the Rules of Court and every issuance of this Court with respect to procedural rules are promulgated with the
objective of a more efficient judicial system.

On the first procedural rule that petitioners allegedly failed to comply with, this Court explained the rationale of the requisite material
dates in Lapid v. Judge Laurea:60

There are three material dates that must he stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed;
and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received . . . As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply
with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the
requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, thus:

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its
timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to
be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and
whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated . . .

Moreover, as reiterated in Mabuhay vs. NLRC, . . . "As a rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and
executory."61 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

On the second procedural rule, this Court discussed the necessity of certified true copies in Pinakamasarap Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission:62

There is a sound reason behind this policy and it is to ensure that the copy of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed is a faithful
reproduction of the original so that the reviewing court would have a definitive basis in its determination of whether the court, body or
tribunal which rendered the assailed judgment or order committed grave abuse of discretion. 63 (Citation omitted)

On the third procedural rule, this Court clarified the importance of complying with the required MCLE information in Intestate Estate of
Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari:64

The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to
ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhanc[ing] the standards of the practice of law."65

Lastly, proofs of competent evidence of identities are required to ensure "that the allegations are true and correct and not a product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith."66

II

Time and again, this Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice. 67

In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,68 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Petition for Review for failure to state the date he received the
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the date he filed his Motion for Reconsideration. 69 This Court held:
[F]ailure to state the material dates is not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his receipt, i.e., 9 May 2006, of the RTC
Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion for Reconsideration is duly alleged in his Petition. In the recent case of Great
Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in
the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court
of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration. The other material dates may be
gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident.

....

Accordingly, the parties are now given the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims and defenses brushing aside technicalities
in order to truly ascertain the merits of this case. Indeed, judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the
mere mandate of technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case. In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:

The court has [the] discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The
"discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause
of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every
party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable
plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules
of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.70 (Citations omitted)

In Barroga v. Data Center College of the Philippines, et al., 71 petitioner likewise failed to state in his Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals the date he received the assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission and the date he filed his
Partial Motion for Reconsideration.72 This Court held that "this omission is not at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in
petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration[.]" 73 This Court, citing Acaylar, further held:

In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the
records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is
the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar, petitioner has duly complied with this
rule.

....

The Court has time and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure and not to override substantial
justice. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. The CA thus should not have outrightly
dismissed petitioner's petition based on these procedural lapses.74 (Citations omitted)

In Paras v. Judge Baldado,75 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari on purely procedural grounds. It found
that petitioners failed to attach the required certified true copy of the assailed Regional Trial Court Order in their petition.76 This Court
set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals and held:

[T]he records reveal that duplicate original copies of the said RTC orders were in fact attached to one of the seven copies of the petition
filed with the Court of Appeals; moreover, copies of the same orders, this time accomplished by the clerk of court, were submitted by
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the requirement and the
Court of Appeals should have given the petition due course.

"Cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than
on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better." 77 (Citations omitted)

In Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan,78 petitioner also failed to attach certified true copies of the assailed decisions of the
Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor Relations Commission in their petition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on procedural grounds; but this Court, upon review, decided the case on its merits. 79 This Court held:

[I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules
of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve substantial
issues raised by the parties.
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so
doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice,
and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice must be avoided.80 (Citations omitted)

In Manila Electric Company v. Gala,81 respondent sought for the denial of petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court
for allegedly violating procedural rules. Among the grounds that respondent relied upon was the failure of petitioner's counsels to state
in the petition their updated MCLE certificate numbers. 82 This Court brushed aside the technical infirmity and held:

We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
provided due process is duly observed. In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give
due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC
and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, "the application of technical
rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice." 83 (Citations omitted)

In Doble, Jr. v. ABB, Inc.,84 this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari due to the failure
of petitioner's counsel to provide information regarding his MCLE compliance. 85 Citing People v. Arrojado,86 this Court held:

On point is People v. Arrojado where it was held that the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of
issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case:

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her
pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated
January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the
failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no
longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the
lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

Granted that the Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA on October 29, 2013 even before the effectivity of En Banc Resolution
dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922, it bears to stress that petitioner's counsel later submitted Receipts of
Attendance in the MCLE Lecture Series for his MCLE Compliance IV on March 3, 2014 and the Certificate of Compliance albeit on
January 26, 2015. Hence, the CA erred in issuing the assailed November 28, 2014 Resolution denying Doble's motion for
reconsideration, there being no more reason not to reinstate the petition for certiorari based on procedural defects which have already
been corrected. Needless to state, liberal construction of procedural rules is the norm to effect substantial justice, and litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.87 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Zaulda,88 one (1) of the grounds cited by the Court of Appeals to support its dismissal of the Petition for
Review was petitioners' failure to provide competent evidence of identities on the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping.89 On this point, this Court held:

As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records show that he proved his identity before the
notary public through the presentation of his Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12, as amended, provides:

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual
based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such
as but not limited to, passport, driver's license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance,
police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, PhilHealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's
book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the National Council for
the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent identification cards recognized in the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA,
attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it Thus, the CA's dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on
the affiant's identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping was without clear basis.

Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-attachment thereof would not render the
petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely
the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to
provide an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act on the
pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that
the ends of justice may be served . . .

....

Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement, the rule is that courts should not be so strict
about procedural lapses which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule
is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits
and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free
from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De La Cruz, where the verification was marred only by a glitch in the evidence of the identity of the affiant, the
Court was of the considered view that, in the interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and should not defeat the petition.

The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of
technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review
of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 90 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club,91 respondent prayed for this Court's outright denial of the Petition for Review due to
petitioner's failure to provide competent evidence of identity in the verification page. 92 This Court brushed aside this technicality and
held:

Contrary to Uniwide's claim, the records of the case show that the petition's verification page contains Trajano's competent evidence of
identity, specifically, Passport No. XX041470. Trajano's failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his competent
evidence of identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush aside in the interest of substantial justice. This Court has,
in proper instances, relaxed the application of the Rules of Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance with it. In these
cases, we have held that the rules of procedure should not be applied in a very technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it
had been enacted, i.e., to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases. We maintain this ruling in this procedural aspect of
this case.93 (Citations omitted)

Despite the number of cases wherein this Court relaxed the application of procedural rules, this Court has repeatedly reminded litigants
that:

[T]he bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed." The Court reiterates that rules of procedure . . . "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. . . . The reason for rules of this nature is because
the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice . . . . Such
rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions." Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the
Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases."94 (Citations omitted)

Circumstances that may merit the relaxation of procedural rules are enumerated in Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla,95 citing Sanchez v.
Court of Appeals:96
In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to
procedure, enumerating the elements for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 97

In Republic v. Dagondon,98 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration of the
trial court decision.99 The Court of Appeals held that the trial court decision "could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of
finality and immutability of judgments."100 This Court relaxed its application of the doctrine on immutability of judgment and held:

The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not designed to be an inflexible tool to excuse
and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice.

....

[A] departure from the doctrine is warranted since its strict application would, in effect, circumvent and undermine the stability of the
Torrens System of land registration adopted in this jurisdiction. Relatedly, it bears stressing that the subject matter of the instant
controversy, i.e., Lot 84, is a sizeable parcel of real property. More importantly, petitioner had adequately presented a strong and
meritorious case.

Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its prerogative to suspend procedural rules and to
resolve the present controversy according to its merits.101 (Citations omitted)

In People v. Layag,102 this Court likewise relaxed the rule on immutability of judgment due to a special or compelling circumstance. This
Court held that the death of accused-appellant is a compelling circumstance that warrants a re-examination of the criminal case.103

In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Yeung,104 petitioner belatedly filed its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals.105 Nonetheless, this Court gave due course to the Petition for Review and held:

[W]e find the delay of 7 days, due to the withdrawal of the petitioner's counsel during the reglementary period of filing an MR, excusable
in light of the merits of the case. Records show that the petitioner immediately engaged the services of a new lawyer to replace its
former counsel and petitioned the CA to extend the period of filing an MR due to lack of material time to review the case. There is no
showing that the withdrawal of its counsel was a contrived reason or an orchestrated act to delay the proceedings; the failure to file an
MR within the reglementary period of 15 days was also not entirely the petitioner's fault, as it was not in control of its former counsel's
acts.

Moreover, after a review of the contentions and the submissions of the parties, we agree that suspension of the technical rules of
procedure is warranted in this case in view of the CA's erroneous application of legal principles and the substantial merits of the case. If
the petition would be dismissed on technical grounds and without due consideration of its merits, the registered owner of the property
shall, in effect, be barred from taking possession, thus allowing the absurd and unfair situation where the owner cannot exercise its right
of ownership. This, the Court should not allow. In order to prevent the resulting inequity that might arise from the outright denial of this
recourse – that is, the virtual affirmance of the writ's denial to the detriment of the petitioner's right of ownership – we give due course to
this petition despite the late filing of the petitioner's MR before the CA. 106 (Emphasis in the original)

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,107 petitioner failed to file its appellant's brief within the extended period
granted by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. 108 This Court reversed the dismissal and
held:

Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner's appeal is denied due course, a government institution could
lose a great deal of money ever a mere technicality. Obviously, such an appeal is far from being merely frivolous or dilatory.

....

Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of
justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the rules'
primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of
the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.109 (Citations omitted)

In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,110 respondents prayed for the denial of the petition on the ground that
petitioner failed to file 12 copies of its brief, in violation of Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. 111 This Court dismissed the technical
defect and held:
We have ruled that when non-compliance with the Rules was not intended for delay or did not result in prejudice to the adverse party,
dismissal of appeal on mere technicalities — in cases where appeal is a matter of right — may be stayed, in the exercise of the court's
equity jurisdiction. It does not appear that respondents were unduly prejudiced by petitioner's nonfeasance. Neither has it been shown
that such failure was intentional.112(Citation omitted)

III

Due to compelling circumstances in this case, this Court opts for a liberal application of procedural rules. First, Department Personnel
Order No. 2008-1452,113 which designated respondent as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General Hospital, was signed by then
Department of Health Secretary Duque. Duque was also the signatory in the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement, 114 the undated
Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement,115 and the June 16, 2009 Memorandum of Agreement, 116 which were the bases of
respondent's secondment. Duque was later appointed as Civil Service Commission Chairman and signed the October 17, 2011
Decision and the July 17, 2012 Resolution of the Civil Service Commission, dismissing the complaint against respondent. Clearly, a
conflict of interest existed when the public officer authorizing the secondment of respondent was also the same person dismissing the
complaint questioning respondent's secondment.

Second, resolving the merits of the case would "give more efficacy to the constitutional mandate on the accountability of public officers
and employees[.]"117 In Executive Judge Paredes v. Moreno,118 this Court found respondent "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service"119 for his continued absence of almost three (3) months.120 This Court held:

His misconduct is prejudicial to the service. Although a mere employee/laborer in the City Court of Manila, respondent is as much duty-
bound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency as all other public officers and employees . . .
We find respondent's shortcomings to warrant a sanction to serve as deterrent not only to him but also to other court employees who
shall commit the same or any and all forms of official misconduct which undermine the people's faith in their fitness for public service.121

Furthermore, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court of Appeals should avoid dismissal of cases based merely on technical
grounds. Judicial economy requires the prosecution of cases "with the least cost to the parties" 122 and to the courts' time, effort, and
resources.123

IV

On a final note, this Court clarifies the concept of forum shopping.

Forum shopping is generally judicial. It exists:

[W]henever a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court." It has also been defined as "an act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the
efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and
trifles with and mocks judicial processes.124 (Citations omitted)

The test to determine whether or not forum shopping was committed was explained in Dy, et al. v. Yu, et al.:125

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the clement of litis
pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party's commencement of a judicial remedy identical to
one which already exists (either pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed.126 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)

In Ligtas v. People,127 this Court reiterated that res judicata may also be applied to "decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings[.]" 128In Salazar v. De Leon,129 this Court further held;

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence
has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined
by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. . . It has been declared that whenever final
adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court,
upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already
mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as
courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense
to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.130 (Citations omitted)

Thus, forum shopping, in the concept of res judicata, is applicable to judgments or decisions of administrative agencies performing
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2013 and July 16, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR. SP No. 127252 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the
merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.