Calderini2008 RC Interventions

This article was downloaded by: [Laurentian University]
On: 09 September 2013, At: 02:42

Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
International Journal of Architectural

Heritage: Conservation, Analysis, and
Restoration
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uarc20
Use of Reinforced Concrete in

Preservation of Historic Buildings:
Conceptions and Misconceptions in the
Early 20th Century
a
Chiara Calderini
a
Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering,
University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
Published online: 08 Feb 2008.
To cite this article: Chiara Calderini (2008) Use of Reinforced Concrete in Preservation of
Historic Buildings: Conceptions and Misconceptions in the Early 20th Century, International
Journal of Architectural Heritage: Conservation, Analysis, and Restoration, 2:1, 25-59, DOI:
10.1080/15583050701533521
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15583050701533521
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
Downloaded by [Laurentian University] at 02:42 09 September 2013
International Journal of Architectural Heritage, 2: 25–59, 2008
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1558-3058 print / 1558-3066 online
DOI: 10.1080/15583050701533521
USE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE IN PRESERVATION

OF HISTORIC BUILDINGS: CONCEPTIONS
AND MISCONCEPTIONS IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY
Chiara Calderini
Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering,
University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
This article analyzes the cultural and technical reasons that led to the widespread use of
reinforced concrete in the restoration of monuments in the first half of the twentieth century
(1900–1945). The restoration theories of the epoch, affirming the concept of conservation
and recognisability of the interventions, supplied theoretical legitimacy for the new material.
The assertion of a new concept of safety, based on models and quantifiable parameters, and
its public recognition, led the state to attribute the responsibility for the safety of monumental
buildings to the new technical class of engineers. The affirmation of this technical class
coincided with the abandoning of the traditional art of building, but, at the same time, with
the abandoning of research into and experimentation on masonry structures. The lack of
knowledge that resulted from this, together with an unlimited confidence in new building
systems, were the basis for many of the interventions in reinforced concrete carried out in that
epoch. This article includes an analysis of the cultural and technical reasons that led to the
widespread use of reinforced concrete in restoration, a description of its technical evolution,
starting from the very first applications to appear at the great consolidations of the 1930s,
and, finally, a detailed analysis of two case studies (the tower of San Antonino in Piacenza
and the San Gaudenzio basilica in Novara). Particular reference is made to Italy.
KEY WORDS: reinforced concrete, restoration, strengthening techniques, retrofitting,

structural systems, construction history
It allows one to carry out consolidation that does not change either the aspect or
the construction system of buildings and that cannot throw any doubt on the
history of the monument. Is this not the aim that restoration must have?
— P. Paquet, La Conservation des Monuments d’Art e d’Histoire (1933, p. 199)
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this work is to analyze the cultural and technical reasons that
led to the widespread use of reinforced concrete in the restoration of monuments in the
first half of the twentieth century. Interest in this topic derives from the observation
that, in recent years, many criticisms have begun to be raised against the use of
reinforced concrete in restoration, criticisms of both a methodological and technical
nature. For some decades now the theories of restoration have tackled the problem of
Received 23 January 2007; accepted 25 June 2007.

Address correspondence to Chiara Calderini, Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural
Engineering, University of Genoa, Via Montallegro 1, 16145 Genoa, Italy. E-mail: chiara.calderini@unige.it
25
26 C. CALDERINI
reversibility of interventions, which can be satisfied with this material with great
difficulty. The test of time has begun to show the problems of durability of a material
that was initially believed to be ‘‘eternal.’’ Recent seismic events have highlighted
how, in many cases, the use of reinforced concrete has produced damage to build-
ings, probably greater than would have happened without its ‘‘contribution.’’ The
question discussed is whether the introduction of rigid elements and considerable
masses inside masonry buildings may alter their dynamic behavior. Unfortunately,
we do not have definitive answers to this point, because no systematic scientific study
has yet been made. The only information that one now has is qualitative and is
derived from the observation of seismic damage. In some cases there are technical
doubts concerning the effectiveness of the interventions. The example of ‘‘jackets’’
(i.e., the increasing of the masonry section by means of coatings in reinforced
concrete) is representative of this. The increase in section of a structural element
that has already undergone elastic and viscous deformations, does not produce any
effects unless there are variations of load.
The intention of this article is not to resolve doubts about the compatibility and
structural effectiveness of reinforced concrete in restoration. No opinion on the
interventions performed will be expressed. The aim is only to review a period of
restoration in a critical light, trying to understand why and how certain consolidation
interventions were carried out. The subject of the research, therefore, will not only be
the technical motivations, but also the ideologies, the decision-making processes, and
the economic and social motivations that led to the choices made. It was decided to
analyze the historical period from 1900 to about 1945 (the year that World War II
ended), to go back to the origins of a practice of interventions that typify the whole of
the twentieth century and that concerns, in a more or less consistent way, all European
countries. Particular reference will be made to Italy, the country, together with
France, in which reinforced concrete started to be used earliest and most widely in
restoration.
The article is subdivided into three parts. In the first part, the reasons that
legitimated the use of reinforced concrete are discussed. The question is analyzed
both from the point of view of the theories of restoration and from the point of view of
the engineering science. In the second part, the technical evolution that led from the
use of concrete at the start of the twentieth century as a binder for the consolidation of
masonry and ground, to the use of reinforced concrete as understood in modern terms,
is summarily analyzed. Finally, in the third part, two case studies of particular interest,
relative to the basilica of San Antonino in Piacenza and the basilica of San Gaudenzio
in Novara, are discussed.
2. THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: CULTURE AND TECHNIQUE

2.1. The Role of Restoration Theories
The restoration theories developed between the end of the nineteenth century
and the first thirty years of the twentieth century in Italy (which are usually given
the name of philological or scientific theories) played a fundamental role for the
use of reinforced concrete in the consolidation of monuments. Indeed, they pro-
vided the critical tools that not only led to accept, but also to encourage the use of
this material.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

REINFORCED CONCRETE IN PRESERVATION 27
The philological restoration theory, elaborated mainly by Camillo Boito, stated

the fundamental principle of ‘‘conservation’’ (Boito, 1893): historical buildings are a
‘‘document’’ or ‘‘stone archives’’ (Léon, 1933), rather than works of art; the objective
of restoration is, therefore, to guarantee their permanence in time ensuring their
historical authenticity. Two ideas relevant to the question derive from this principle:
• The conservation of a monument is a purely technical problem.
• Restoration interventions should be recognizable (falsification is not admitted).
2.1.1. The Conservation of a Monument is a Purely Technical Problem Camillo

Boito expressed this idea through the analogy of the restorer and the surgeon:
. . . the restorer’s art is like that of the surgeon. It would be better, and who doesn’t
see it?, if the fragile human body never needed probes, scalpels and knives; but not
everyone believes it is better to see a relative or friend die rather than cutting off a
finger or giving him a wooden leg. — Everything is reduced, therefore, in your
opinion, to keeping the monument standing, ensuring it a long life with the sup-
ports that science and practice suggest. Every other work becomes a fake in a public
monument.
— Camillo Boito, Questioni Pratiche di Belle Arti (1893, p. 11)
Gustavo Giovannoni, the most direct disciple of Boito, illustrating the theory of
scientific restoration, affirmed thirty years later:
The main goal of restoration is to preserve monuments: interventions of consolida-

tion and regular maintenance are therefore the salient points of the programme, the
most immediately useful, even though the effect is not brilliant.
— Gustavo Giovannoni Les Moyens Modernes de Construction Applique´s a
la Restauration des Monuments (1933, p. 63)
Structural and technical interventions are fully legitimated.
2.1.2. Restoration Interventions Should be Recognizable (Falsification is not

Admitted) Boito wrote a short poem to express this concept:
Serbare io devo ai vecchi monumenti I must preserve in old monuments
L’aspetto venerando e pittoresco The venerable and picturesque aspect
E se a scansare aggiunte o compimenti And if to avoid additions or extensions
Con tutto il buon volere non riesco With all good will I cannot manage
Fare devo cosı̀ che ognun discerna I must make sure everyone can see
Essere l’opera mia tutta moderna. That my work is all modern.
— Camillo Boito, Questioni Pratiche di Belle Arti (1893, p. 14)
In order to preserve the authenticity of the ‘‘document’’, each intervention carried out
on a monument should be easily recognizable. Modern materials and techniques stand
out, by their very nature, from the original construction; moreover, they are a clear
testimony of the epoch in which they were carried out. For these reasons, their use in
restoration interventions is fully legitimized.

28 C. CALDERINI
The effect of these two ideas was ‘‘orthopedic’’ interventions (this adjective is often
used with a positive meaning by the restorer of that epoch, see Lopez Otero 1933)
characterized by the introduction of new structural elements within or alongside histor-
ical masonry structures. Reinforced concrete was used to build ‘‘wooden legs’’ ‘‘(Boito,
1893, p. 11), ‘‘crutches’’ to keep monuments ‘‘on their feet’’ (Giberti, 1928, p. 19).’’
Given the prevalent technical nature of restoration interventions and the rele-
vance of their recognisability, the debate in the first thirty years of the twentieth
century was concentrated mainly on the visibility of interventions and on their
aesthetic nature. A pure philological approach would have suggested making con-
solidation interventions visible. However, making the inventions visible would have
altered the aesthetic and formal aspect of the consolidated monuments. In practice,
most restorers chose invisibility. Reinforced concrete, due to its nature as a poured
material, was particularly suitable to build invisible strengthening structures; this was
another reason for its success.

The modern scientific vision of restoration was defined and illustrated with great
clarity at the Athens International Conference for the Restoration of Monuments, held
in October 1931. The Athens Conference ratified the priority of the technical problem
and expressed trust and enthusiasm toward reinforced concrete. The Athens Charter
codified the legitimacy of this material in the preservation of monuments in its IV
point:
The experts have agreed on various communications relative to the use of modern
material for the consolidation of ancient buildings; and approve the judicious use
of all the resources of modern techniques, and more especially of reinforced
concrete. They express the opinion that ordinarily these means of reinforcement
must be disguised so as not to alter the aspect or character of the building to be
restored; and they recommend their use especially in cases in which they allow one
to preserve the elements on the spot avoiding the risks of destruction and
rebuilding.
— Athens Charter (1931, point IV)
2.2. The Role of Technique and Engineering Science

Two great earthquakes, which occurred at the start of the century in Italy, gave
the main technical impulse for widespread use of reinforced concrete in the restoration
of monuments.
The Messina earthquake of 1908 was a catastrophic event. It was particularly
significant not only for the tragic damage it produced but also because it occurred at a
crucial time in Italian and European technical history, in which the modern science of
engineers had reached a full maturity and the revolution of reinforced concrete was in
full swing. On this occasion, for the first time, the new technical class of engineers was
called on to tackle the problem of the safety of buildings on a large scale and with
regard to an exceptional event like an earthquake.Now, reinforced concrete, which
had been for almost two decades subject of research and experimentation, found its
first employment on a large scale. In the reconstruction of cities, it was used both for
the design of new buildings and for the consolidation of existing ones. Significantly,
most of the protagonists of restorations in reinforced concrete had experiences

connected in a more or less direct way with the 1908 earthquake (see Arturo Danusso,
the protagonist of par. 4.2, Barucci, 2004).
It is worth noting that the first Italian seismic regulations (Regio Decreto no. 193
del Aprile 18, 1909) were drawn up two years after Messina earthquake. This code,
pointing out the role of framed structures in earthquake resistant design and explicitly
suggesting reinforced concrete as a building material, played a relevant role for the use
of reinforced concrete in consolidation work. Title III of the code, relative to
‘‘Repairs’’ to ordinary buildings, among the various provisions states that:
Buildings damaged and not built with the framed or ‘‘baraccato’’ system, rising above
the ground floor . . . must be strengthened with stanchions in wood, iron or reinforced
concrete, fixed solidly into the foundations, continuous up to the top of the building
and bound to one another by tie-rods at the offset floor of foundation, and to those of
the roof and the eaves, in such way as to form a cage-like bracing.
—Regio Decreto no. 193 del 18 Aprile 1909, Title III, Article 33
For monumental buildings ‘‘the path to be followed for consolidation alone will be
established case by case’’ (Regio Decreto no.193 del 18 Aprile 1909, Title II, Article 31).
While the first works of rebuilding and repair of Messina earthquake were in
progress (in reality the consolidation of the monuments damaged was carried out over
at least the following two decades), yet another earthquake hit Southern Italy: that of
Sora (Frosinone) and Avezzano (L’Aquila) in Marsica, in 1915. The experiences and
the studies on the techniques of restoration carried out after 1908 were widely applied
following this earthquake. Ignazio Carlo Gavini, who designed some of the most
representative restorations of the 1920s (Pezzi, 2005), worked on the consolidation of
the buildings damaged by the Marsica earthquake and described its experience in a
1923 article, in which he wrote:
Now a new material has very successfully entered to become part of the technical
means available to the restorer and it is concrete in its many applications.
. . . Reinforced concrete may make the static solution of innumerable problems
easy, especially in earthquake zones, where Italian monuments have suffered most
damage. Our poor monuments which still retain the traces of repeated catastrophes
which we often see botched up by old restorers unable to defend them from repeated
earthquakes, today are able to regain their beauty and to live a long life.
— Ignazio Carlo Gavini, Il Cemento Armato nel Restauro dei Monumenti (1923,
p. 31–34)
Reinforced concrete owes its success to two main technical reasons:

Structural effectiveness
Plasticity (intended as capacity of the material to take different forms)
2.2.1. Structural Effectiveness The resistance to traction and bending actions

marks the difference between historical masonry and reinforced concrete. The new
system of resistance is thus useful:
. . . in giving compactness to crumbling walls (with injections of liquid concrete), in

creating organs able to resist the bending and shearing actions . . ., in rigidly

30 C. CALDERINI
connecting the various parts of a building (with tie rods or with an elastic frame-
work), etc. . . .
— Gustavo Giovannoni, La Conferenza di Atene per il Restauro dei
Monumenti (1932, p. 411)
Moreover, reinforced concrete is considered as the technique that best responds to the
criterion of the ‘‘best performance with the least material’’ (Lopez Otero, 1933, p. 189),
deemed as decisive in restoration because it allows to make the reinforcement elements
almost invisible.
2.2.2. Plasticity (Intended as Capacity of the Material to Take Different

Forms) Reinforced concrete, ‘‘ . . . has the enormous advantages of plasticity,
due to its nature as a poured material’’ (Giovannoni, 1933, p. 182). Plasticity is deemed
useful in restoration work because: it allows one to easily link the new reinforcing
structure to the ancient structures (Giovannoni, 1931); it allows one to build invisible
structures, hidden in the masonry volumes. This latter feature is particularly relevant
for the question discussed previously in text relative to the visibility/invisibility of
interventions. Gavini attributed to concrete and reinforced concrete a work of ‘‘hidden
work’’ (Gavini, 1923, p. 31). Resistance to fire, durability (deemed unlimited) and
economy were also considered as relevant.
Besides these strictly technical reasons, other reasons of methodological nature
should be considered. Up until the second half of the nineteenth-century buildings
were built of masonry and their safety was entrusted to ‘‘rules of thumb’’, or — in the
case of great works — to the experience of builders. The new science of engineers,
codified between 1820 and 1830, led to the definition of a new conception of safety,
based on scientific models and quantifiable parameters. This conception was strongly
linked with those materials that, starting from the beginning of the nineteenth century,
began to be produced on an industrial scale (iron, cast iron and, later, steel) and to
which the theory of elasticity could be applied appropriately (Benvenuto, 1991).
Although some attempts were initially made to apply the theory of elasticity to
masonry, the problem of defining scientific models for masonry structures was not
actually faced in Europe at least until the end of the World War II. This is motivated in
one regard by the spreading of the new building techniques (steel and reinforced
concrete) and in another by the acquired knowledge that masonry does not follow
the laws of elasticity except for very limited loads. Poor knowledge of masonry
structures, difficulty in interpreting their behavior through the tools of the science of
engineering, and widespread mistrust in the empirical method through which ancient
buildings were designed, produced interventions that tended to replace masonry
structures with new resistant organisms, to ensure or ‘‘cage’’ masonry with rigid and
reliable members in reinforced concrete. The problem could, in this way, forcibly be
brought back into the known domain of the science of engineers.
The modern conception of safety defined in the field of engineering science
rapidly found diffusion in administrative organizations. The consequence was that
monuments tended to be subjected to a double authority: in one respect, that of
engineers and services of public works called on to guarantee their safety; in another,
that of restorers and protection organizations, called on to guarantee their overall
preservation. The definition of the exact competences of these two authorities was
argued over, often determining harsh conflicts. In Italy, the responsibility for both

preservation and safety of national monuments was initially assigned to the

Commissions for Preservation of Monuments, founded in 1874. With a law of 1882
(Decreto e Circolare del Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione no. 683 bis del 21 Luglio,
1882), it was established that restoration projects must be submitted both for the
approval of the Commissions for Preservation of Monuments, with regard to the
historical and artistic questions, and to the Genio Civile (the Italian Council of Civil
Buildings), with regard to technical questions. This law seems to be a response to the
fierce debate in progress (Paravicini, 1883), including, on one side, those who main-
tained that the interference of the Genio Civile engineers in restorations was harmful
(engineers not being prepared to understand beauty and the artistic importance of
monuments), and, on the other, those who maintained that architects did not have
sufficient competence to tackle the static problems of buildings. In the following years,
the role of the engineers of the Genio Civile in the restoration of monuments was
debated for a long time. What is surprising is that Boito himself was always a
strenuous opposer of Genio Civile, defined as ‘‘the main curse of Italian monuments.’’
(Boito, 1884, p. 33).
2.3. Doubts
Confidence in reinforced concrete for consolidation works in the first half of the
twentieth century, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, seemed to be unlimited.
However, on some occasions, doubts were raised.
The question most discussed concerned the compatibility of the strengthening
structures with historical ones. Compatibility was intended in most cases from the
aesthetic and architectural point of view, rather than structural. During the Athens
Conference, Paul Léon expressed a paradox that can be useful to understand the way
of thinking of his epoch:
It is a singular paradox that modern architecture, through the widespread use of

materials to be poured and reinforced, breaking completely with the ancient and
traditional systems of building, has so strongly helped the preservation of our
ancient monuments, to which it is, in its principles, radically foreign and which,
in the future, it is destined to replace.
— Léon, La Restauration des Monuments en France (1933, p. 58)
The contradictory nature of the relationship between reinforced concrete and restora-
tion emerges in Paquet (1933). In his speech at the Athens Conference, he raised doubts
on the technical–structural compatibility of reinforced concrete, by affirming that:
It’s easy to understand the worries that the application of such a building
system in Medieval buildings may stir; it means introducing in their extremely
elastic structures elements that are essentially rigid and likely to alter their
equilibrium.
— Paquet, Le Ciment Arme´ dans la Restauration des Monuments Anciens
(1933, p. 194)
However, he also affirmed that reinforced concrete ‘‘allows you to carry out
consolidation that does not modify . . . the structural system of buildings’’

32 C. CALDERINI
(Paquet, 1933, p. 199), and cited interventions such as insertions of frames, hooping,
tie-beams, ribbing built on the extrados of domes, plating of arches, all in reinforced
concrete.
Of particular interest is the doubt raised by Gustavo Giovannoni. In 1931, he
observed that, even if scientific and technical studies, as well as special legislative
requirements, had made anti-seismic design based on framed structures compulsory in
Italy, ‘‘serious difficulties arise when these schemes, made up of frameworks that are
all integral of elastic materials, are used again for the reinforcement or renovation of
ancient monuments whose organisms are in total contrast with them’’ (Giovannoni,
1931, p. 366).
3. THE TECHNIQUE OF THE INTERVENTIONS

3.1. General Overview

Italy and France were the countries in which reinforced concrete was used in
restoration very early and extensively. In France, the first interventions date back
to the second half of the nineteenth century (Pallot, 1997), while in Italy they date
back to the very start of the twentieth century. A combination of administrative
and ideological reasons seems responsible for this. France in the nineteenth century
was one of the main centers of the development of civil engineering and, in
particular, of the technique of reinforced concrete. Furthermore, in this country
the formation of organs of protection was timely and involved the Council of Civil
Buildings practically from the start. The principles of the stylistic restoration of
Viollet Le Duc, although widespread at the theoretical level, found very few
applications on the large scale. Indeed, as Léon (1951) pointed out, in extending
the work of protection to a large number of buildings, the state had in many cases to
limit itself to carrying out works of consolidation and mere preservation, foregoing
costly restoration work for economic reasons. Furthermore, already by the close
of the nineteenth century, many restorers embraced the theories of historical–
philological restoration and, later, of scientific restoration, the strongest theoretical
grounds for the use of modern materials in restoration (Sette, 2001). In Italy, the
ideas of historical–philological and scientific restoration and the cultural influence
of two personalities such as Boito and Giovannoni were decisive. What is more,
great importance was paid to the seismic question. As far as the author knows, and
from what is reported in Esponda Cascajares (2004), in Spain, Portugal, and
Greece, the first interventions in reinforced concrete were carried out only in the
1930s, while only after World War II in Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania. In England the use of reinforced concrete in restoration
have been very limited (Sette, 2001).
Published accounts of interventions in reinforced concrete carried out in
Europe in the first half of the twentieth century are scanty and sketchy. For
France, in addition to the text by Léon of 1951, the account by Pallot (1997) is
significant. For Spain and Italy, though referring mainly to the second half of the
twentieth century, useful references are Esponda Cascajares (2004) and Carbonara
(1981). Again for Italy, certain specific contributions are found in Alotto (1986),
Vinardi (1993, 1997), Pracchi (1996), Placentino and Torre (1997), Calderini (2000,
2003) and Pezzi (2005).

3.2. The First Experimentation of the Technique in Restoration (1900–1915)

In the history of restoration, just as in the history of the technique for new
buildings, the passage is blurred from the use of concrete as a simple binder or artificial
stone to structural reinforced concrete as understood in the modern way.
In restoration, one of the first uses of concrete was by injection or pouring,
with the aim of consolidating crumbling masonry or the ground under the founda-
tions. In the first case, the concrete served the purpose of giving back continuity and
cohesion to masonry structures. In the second, the objective was that of grouting the
ground and increasing cohesion. Some of the first uses of concrete by pouring and
injection into masonry structures were in Italy, including: 1) the consolidation of the
S. Stefano bell tower in Venice, under the direction of Crescentino Caselli and
Costanzo Antonelli between 1903 and 1904 (Vinardi, 1997), 2) the consolidation
of the pentagon tower of Vezzano Ligure, under the direction of Alfredo d’Andrade
in 1909 (Magnani Cianetti, 1981), and 3) the consolidation of the basilica of Galliano
near Como, carried out by Ambrogio Annoni in 1911 (Annoni, 1923). In the case of
foundations, one of the first examples was realized in the cathedral of Bayeux
(France) in 1855; the ground was consolidated by means of metallic cylinders, into
which liquid concrete was injected (Pallot, 1997). In Italy, injection of pressurized
concrete into the ground, with the addition of iron wedges, was adopted in 1904 for
consolidation of the bell tower of S. Stefano in Venice (Vinardi, 1997). A similar
technique was published in the 1907 Giornale del Genio Civile in which a patent is
described for foundations in gravelly or sandy ground, consisting of the injection
into the ground of a cement conglomerate reinforced with tubular metal elements
(Muggia, 1907). In these first examples of the use of concrete, a clear structural logic
is still not recognizable. The intention of these first works was for concrete, with or
without its reinforcing rods, to infiltrate into masonry and ground, and sew up, glue,
and fill hollow spaces. In any case, the structural scheme of the building was not
substantially modified.
According to Paquet (1933) the first applications of reinforced concrete in
restoration, as presently understood, were made in France by Anatole de Baudot, a
disciple of Viollet Le Duc and frequent collaborator with the French engineer Paul
Cottacin. Paquet cites as the first-ever intervention the one carried out in the castle of
Azay-Le-Rideau in 1902, where the original wooden beams, without being removed,
were hollowed out and consolidated directly on site placing reinforcing bars on the
inside and then pouring concrete. This intervention was the starting point for a series
of experiments carried out by Anatole de Baudot and his students, following which the
French Commission of Historical Monuments decided to systematically adopt rein-
forced concrete in the restoration of monuments (Paquet, 1933, p. 193). In 1906 in
France, Paul Gout placed a reinforced concrete beam between the two towers of the
cathedral of Reims, in order to relieve the underlying Gothic rose window (Pallot,
1997). A very similar intervention (it is not known whether this was emulation) was
carried out in 1908 in the cathedral of Como (Italy), where, again to relieve the central
rose window, a reinforced concrete beam was put to work hidden in the stone face of
the façade (Pracchi, 1996). These early interventions were all local interventions,
aimed at relieving limited parts of the masonry structure by the insertion of structural
elements such as beams. The choice of reinforced concrete also seems to have been
dictated from these technological reasons: it allows one to create beams of any length

34 C. CALDERINI
which, being poured, do not create technical problems for mounting and insertion in
the masonry; it allows one to carry out interventions that can be hidden inside the
masonry.
In parallel with these first experiences, reinforced concrete started to be used at
the beginning of the century also for interventions that were not explicitly of con-
solidation, but which were related to pre-existing historical structures. These were
‘‘functional’’ interventions, in which reinforced concrete was used to rebuild the
structure of a roof or floor, to create service areas, for example. The rebuilding of
roofs and floors, in particular, is one of the fields in which the material was to find
widespread use throughout twentieth century. One of the very earliest examples was
the rebuilding of the roof of the cathedral of Beauvais, in France, carried out between
1906 and 1910 (Pallot, 1997); many more followed (Paquet, 1933).
In summary, then, in the first phase of experimentation reinforced concrete was
used either for the creation of single strengthening structural elements or for the
building/rebuilding of parts of the building with a purely functional nature. Only
starting from the 1920s did new material start to be used in restoration with its own
constructive logic.
3.3. The Great Period of Restorations in Reinforced Concrete in Italy

(1920–1945)
There were numerous interventions carried out in Italy during the 1920s and
1930s. A complete cataloguing lies beyond the scope of this work; for this reason the
reader is referred to some of the works in subsequent text, under the General Overview
heading of the Technique of the Interventions section. More useful, instead, is a
typological classification of the interventions performed, which allows one to organize
the variety of experiences carried out into a general logic. The proposed classification
is the following:
Use of concrete as a binder
Use of reinforced concrete to increase the resistant section of structural elements
and to give them a resistance to traction
Use of reinforced concrete to create elements resistant to traction
Use of reinforced concrete for the building of new load bearing structures inside
masonry
3.3.1. Use of concrete as a binder As previously described, concrete is used with

or without metal reinforcements, to consolidate cracked or crumbling masonry
masses or foundation grounds. The objective is to restore the continuity of the
masses giving them back a degree of cohesion. The technique consists of injecting
or pouring concrete inside the cracks or voids or into specially prepared bore holes.
Often, reinforcement rods are inserted inside the material. Representative cases in
Italy were the consolidation of the bell tower of the Canons in Milan and the
consolidation of the Mole Antonelliana in Turin. In the first case, between 1937
and 1939, a total of 56,200 kg of concrete and 160 m of metal bars were inserted into
the masonry; in the second case, between 1934 and 1935, an enormous quantity of
concrete was injected into the ground beneath the foundations.

3.3.2. Use of reinforced concrete to increase the resistant section of

structural elements and to give them a resistance to traction Adopted
generally for the consolidation of pillars or columns, this use may be carried out in two
different ways: 1) through the external coating of the structural element with a ‘‘jacket’’
in reinforced concrete (jacket is the term used at that time), or 2) through the perforation
of the element or the creation of an internal nucleus in reinforced concrete. The
first technique was used widely, between 1930 and 1937, in consolidation of the
S. Gaudenzio basilica in Novara (as discussed later in text in the second case study)
and, between 1936 and 1942, in consolidation of the Mole Antonelliana in Turin. The
second technique was used many times by Ferdinando Forlati, particularly in the
consolidation of the columns of the Torcello basilica (Venice) and in the Capodistria
loggia, in about 1935. Furthermore, very well known is the consolidation of the columns
of the San Lorenzo basilica in Milan, immediately after the World War II.
3.3.3. Use of reinforced concrete to create elements resistant to

traction Reinforced concrete was used to build tension-resisting elements
inside the masonry structure, such as hooping or chains. Some examples are:
consolidation of the bell tower of the cathedral of Melfi with reinforced concrete
hooping in 1927; consolidation of the cupola of the Annunziata dei Catalani church in
Messina by means of reinforced concrete hooping in 1927; consolidation of the bell
tower of the S. Stefano church in Biella with internal and external reinforced concrete
hooping between 1927 and 1931; consolidation of the façade of the cathedral of
Acerenza (Potenza) by means of a reinforced concrete tie-beam in 1928; the introduc-
tion of three reinforced concrete tie-beam, at the level of the floors and the roof, in the
Ca’ D’Oro in Venice around 1935.
3.3.4. Use of reinforced concrete for the building of new load bearing
structures inside masonry This use refers to interventions in which the
objective is to partially or totally unburden the masonry structure by introducing inside
it new reinforced concrete frames. Typical are towers and bell towers, in which the
compressive stresses acting on the masonry are reduced through the introduction of
internal reinforced concrete frameworks. This is the most widespread type of interven-
tion. Among the representative cases are: the consolidation of Palazzo della Ragione in
Pomposa (Ferrara) between 1920 and 1921; the consolidation of the S. Maria di
Collemaggio church in Aquila in 1921; and the consolidation of the S. Andrea basilica
in Vercelli in 1926 (where an internal reinforced concrete framework was built to
support the facade); the consolidation of the S. Maria di Castello church in
Alessandria between 1923 and 1926; the consolidation of the Annunziata dei Catalani
church in Messina in 1926; the consolidation of the bell tower of the Canons in Milan
between 1930 and 1932 and the Bari cathedral in 1934 (where to relieve the masonry, an
internal supporting structure was built in reinforced concrete); and the already men-
tioned great restorations to the San Gaudenzio basilica in Novara and the Mole
Antonelliana in Turin.
Besides these typologies, it is also necessary to consider numerous cases of sub-
foundations and remaking of roofs. The latter, as already noted earlier, are difficult to
collocate among the interventions of consolidation, but they hold a certain impor-
tance for the structural effect that they have on historic buildings. In another regard, it
is to be considered that often the remaking of a roof means the introduction of

36 C. CALDERINI
reinforced concrete tie-beams that are justified not only for the building of the new
structure but also as consolidation of the top of the existing masonry and as hooping
for the entire building.
The brief typological review that has been presented divides the interventions in
relation to the structural function that they have to perform. However, it is also useful
to mention another possible distinction: that between interventions of ‘‘resolving’’ or
‘‘preventive’’ consolidation. Indeed, reinforced concrete was not always used to solve a
structural problem found in the building. In some cases, it was used simply to reinforce
the structure in the expectation of unforeseen future forces such as an earthquake.
Typical is the example of zones that had suffered a severe earthquake (in southern
Italy) and that were afraid of new, more violent, seismic events. But a similar attitude
is also found in the words of Giuseppe Albenga, who, referring to the consolidation of
the dome of the Mole Antonelliana in Turin, said:
It is . . . natural that in this new work of consolidation I do not move away from the
criterion . . . of not overlooking the considerable resistance that the framework of
Antonelli’s dome is capable of and I limit myself for this zone to coat the ancient
masonry with relatively slim casts of reinforced concrete, which enclose it without
forcing it, ready to come into play should the degradation of the masonry continue.
— Albenga, Relazione Tecnica, Relativa ai Lavori di Rinforzo Della Cupola
Della Mole Antonelliana (1940, p. 2)
4. TWO CASE STUDIES

4.1. The Resistance of Tradition: Restoration of the Bell Tower of the
S. Antonino Basilica in Piacenza
The story of the restoration of the bell tower of the S. Antonino basilica in
Piacenza is interesting for different reasons. In first place, it occurred at the very
beginning of the twentieth century, in an age, as we have seen, of experimentation with
the use of reinforced concrete in restoration. In second place, it represents an extreme
case of the resistance of tradition compared to modernity. Indeed, the consolidation
that will be described in the following was planned, but never carried out, due to a
series of oppositions that came from the protection authorities.
The S. Antonino basilica was built between 1004 and 1014 AD. The bell tower
has an octagonal shape. At the base, it rests on eight columns placed at the corners of
the octagon and on four corner pillars (Figure 1). Four pendentives connect the
octagonal tower to its square base. The structures are built in brick masonry, in
general not the best quality. The tower is approximately 40 m in height, and its
diameter is approximately 10 m. The Copertura, which will be mentioned many
times in this text, is the organization that has administered the basilica for centuries,
taking care of the building, its maintenance, and its functional modifications.
The question of the structural safety of the tower is very old. This is testified by a
series of historical consolidation interventions. The first intervention, which probably
dates back to the middle of the fifteenth century, was the enlargement of the section of
the four base corner pillars, which were originally multi-lobed in shape (Bertelli, 1985).
The second, performed during the sixteenth century, consisted of the plugging of the

Pendentives
Corner pillars
Columns
Figure 1. Base plan and section of the bell tower of the S. Antonino basilica in Piacenza (see appendix of
archive documents, SA5).
two lower orders of the double lancet windows. The documents report that this was
performed as a matter of urgency, following a public request by the parish priest and a
delegation of citizens to demolish and rebuild the tower (Trenchi, 1898; see appendix
of archive documents, SA1). Finally, in the middle of the nineteenth century, during a

38 C. CALDERINI
restoration campaign that involved the whole church (1853–1856), a hooping of the
central columns of the tower was carried out. The hooping was made up of iron bands
connected with vertical staves (again of iron) and was covered with a 6-cm-thick layer
of plaster (SA2).
The analysis of historic consolidation interventions leads to attributing the
structural problems of the tower to the excess compressive loads that were resting
on the masonry, in particular on the base columns and pillars. The reasons for this are
not clear. There are different hypotheses: the poor dimensioning of the masonry
sections and the foundations, because the tower had not originally been considered
in the project for the basilica but had been added later; a building defect, deriving from
the decision to rest the tower on eight central columns and four corner pillars,
transferring the loads of the octagonal tower to the square base through diagonal
masonry arches and pendentives; or the building of the internal wood mountings to
support the bells, which were very heavy. The problem of the structural safety of the
tower, leading to the consolidations designed between 1909 and 1923, arose at the end
of the nineteenth century. Initially, the interest was aesthetic rather than structural.
The restoration of 1853–1856 had been, in line with the restoration trends of those
years, of a stylistic type. The project had envisaged the reopening of the two orders of
double lancet windows walled up during the sixteenth century. This intervention was
not realized because, despite the hooping of the base columns, there were still doubts
about the structural safety of the tower. The question was brought up again in August
1893, when the municipality, in agreement with the Copertura, entrusted the engineer
Camillo Guidotti with drawing up a study of the static condition of the building. In the
same year, he wrote two reports. In the first, he stated how the reopening of the double
lancet windows was a difficult operation, ‘‘not however impossible should use be made
of suitable iron tie-rods . . .’’ (SA1). In the second, he reported the results of a series of
samplings of the building’s masonry (SA1). He noted that the plugging masonry of the
double lancet windows was not clamped to the pre-existing masonry and that, there-
fore, their function of consolidation was not being performed in full. He also reported
the evident failures in the masonry: vertical cracks that were narrow low down, wide at
mid-height, and almost non-existent on high, and cracks in the lintels of the double
lancet windows (even the plugged ones). Therefore he suggested that, before reopening
the double lancet windows, it was necessary for a technical commission to check ‘‘the
very old massive structure from the risk of falling to pieces altogether’’ and to arrange
for a project of consolidation for the building (SA1). The commission was never
appointed.
At the start of the new century, there were new alarms. In February 1903 it was
decided to insert numerous plaster gauges in the masonry in order to monitor the
advancing state of damage (SA3). The gauges, checked periodically by the technicians
of the Genio Civile, did not break until the day on which, for the first time since their
placing, the bells were rung uninterruptedly (SA4). The Genio Civile limited itself to
issuing a ban on uninterrupted ringing of the bells, and no consolidation intervention
was then envisaged.
The first consolidation project of the new century was drawn up by Guidotti
himself, who had carried out the studies since 1893. In a report of 1909 he made an
accurate analysis of the building and proposed different possible types of intervention
(SA2). The analysis of the masonry above the base columns and pillars had high-
lighted that along the large cracks the bricks had shattered and that the mortar itself

had crumbled. From the load analyses, it appeared that the compressive stress at the
column base must have been approximately 1627 kN/m2, ‘‘almost three times the
safety load accepted by the builders’’ (SA2). As pointed out by Guidotti, this assess-
ment had been made assuming a uniform distribution of the load on the twelve
columns and pillars at the base. The worry was that, in reality, the distribution was
in no way uniform. Indeed, due to the system of building, it seemed that the central
columns were more stressed than the corner pillars; this was confirmed by the fact that
the large cracks ran vertically exactly in correspondence with the eight base columns,
showing how these had had a slight depression. The proposals for consolidation made
by Guidotti were conceptually in line with what had been proposed in the past. The
objective pursued was indeed the widening of the section of the base columns and the
introduction of hooping aimed at limiting the spreading due to the normal compres-
sive stresses. He proposed four different solutions. The first, suggested by the director
of the Regional Office of Monuments, consisted of rebuilding the masonry columns

with stone columns, through an unstitch-stitch operation. Although this was the
intervention deemed ‘‘most correct, most respectful of the original organism of the
tower’’, it was also the most costly (SA2). The second solution was the plugging, with
brick masonry, of the eight minor intercolumniations at the base of the tower (only
the middle arches would remain open). The objective was not only to increasing the
section of the resistant masonry, but also to produce a better distribution of the loads
between the corner pillars and the central columns, since ‘‘the pressure of the upper
load would also mostly be distributed on the four new corner walls’’ (SA2). This
intervention was deemed by Guidotti ‘‘less expensive but much less safe’’ (SA2), but
was rejected by the administration because it would have changed the interior of the
structure too much. To meet the administration’s need to limit costs and to design an
intervention that was not too invasive, Guidotti suggested limiting the intervention to
increasing the section of the existing columns, using materials of great resistance. Thus
the third proposal was made, consisting of creating two granite pilaster strips of
approximately 0.30 m in thickness alongside each column. Alternatively, and here
the fourth and last proposal, the enlargement could have been carried out using
cast iron or iron beams (Figure 2). Guidotti’s own preference for this last proposal
is clear: ‘‘Other strengthening could be obtained through the use of cast iron or
iron, elegant, light strengthening, non suitable for the originally severe lines of the
tower, but essentially powerful’’ (SA2). However, Guidotti went along with the
opinion of the Regional Office of Monuments, and it was decided to adopt the first
solution which, despite being the most costly, was also the ‘‘most respectful toward
the monument’’ (SA2). But none of the solutions proposed by Guidotti was actually
carried out.
Guidotti having abandoned the appointment, another engineer from Piacenza,
Edoardo Righetti, was asked to study the problem once again. In a first report (SA5),
he made a new analysis of the building. His attention was particularly concentrated on
the foundations. He assessed that they were discontinuous and calculated that the
compressive stress acting on the ground was approximately equal to 800 kN/m2,
considering a uniform distribution of the loads on the eight columns and four pillars.
Considering a non-uniform distribution, ‘‘8/10 on the eight columns and 2/10 on the
four pillars’’ (SA5), the calculated compressive stress under the columns was equal to
1900 kN/m2 (SA5). Regarding consolidation interventions, he proposed a solution
based on the use of iron:

40 C. CALDERINI
Section of the column

(plaster is included).
Enlargement of the section

through granite pilaster
strips.

through iron beams.
Section of the column

(plaster is included).

through sandstone pilaster
strips.
Figure 2. Tower of S. Antonino. The solutions for the consolidation of the columns proposed by
Guidotti,1909 (SA4). Top: drawing of the two alternatives for the enlargement of the section; bottom, as
a comparison, drawing of the same solution realized with a less resistant material.
Now in as much as one tries to avoid the use of iron in works of restoration for
ancient buildings, especially if of monumental or artistic nature, due to its tendency
to rust and because it does not comply with the character of such buildings, but
since one is dealing with consolidation, as an internal structure, today that it is
widely used together with concrete, with satisfactory results from all points of view,
both in ease of use and for solidness, safety and duration, at the same time
achieving considerable cost savings, which when faced with the need for preserva-
tion and the elimination of hazards, is not a coefficient to be overlooked, it seems to
me that the ostracism to iron a priori in such conditions is not right. Since if with its
use in the internal structure one manages to easily reach stability, preserving the
shape of the building unaltered, there is no longer any reason that can confirm the
proscription. (SA5)
Righetti’s proposal consisted of placing a series of I-section iron beams connected

by means of iron hooping, sunk into a 10-cm-thick layer of concrete on the perimeter
of each column (Figure 3). All the hooping would have rested on an iron or stone
base to transfer the load to the foundations. In a second report (SA6), presented
a few months later, Righetti once again pointed out the problem of the foundations
and proposed that, before any other intervention, these should have been consoli-
dated. In particular, he suggested uniting all the foundations of the columns and
pilasters with a continuous masonry foundation, obtained by filling the empty spaces
between them and toothing the new courses of masonry with the existing ones. For the
consolidation of the columns, he again proposed the solution, already suggested by
Guidotti, of replacing the existing columns with new stone columns. Indeed, his first

Figure 3. Tower of S. Antonino. The solution for the consolidation of the columns proposed by E. Righetti,
1911 (SA5).
proposal of hooping the columns with iron and concrete was rejected by the Regional
Office of Monuments, for the following reasons: still no experience had been made ‘‘in
relation to the duration of the behaviour of iron with concrete, to be able to use it in
total safety in sheathing and as strengthening for columns’’ (SA6); the use of a
heterogeneous material would introduce a ‘‘non-homogeneous element in the internal
structure of the church’’ (Bertelli, 1985, p.137). However, this report and this project
were not to be followed up.
In 1912, a new consolidation proposal arrived directly from the Head Office of
Antiquities and Fine Arts, the state’s central organ of protection (under the Ministry
of Education). This again proposed replacing the existing columns, already suggested
by Guidotti and by Righetti. This time, though, instead of using stone reinforced
concrete was suggested. There is no direct documentation of this proposal. The
information reaches us through a letter, dated February 13, 1912, written by the
director of the Regional Office of Monuments in reply to a letter from the Head
Office, which commented:
I must frankly declare to the Ministry that I was somewhat surprised when I
read the departmental circular of 4th January containing the proposal of examin-
ing whether it is not worth remaking the pillars in reinforced concrete . . . rather
than in granitic material. I shall now explain the reason for such surprise. During
the last sitting of the Preservation Commission of Piacenza, there was a committee
member who dared to put forward such a proposal, and he obtained the effect of
simply making a pitiful exhibition of himself before the three technicians who were
part of the meeting. The writer did not miss out, supported by the other technicians,
on explaining to the proposer the unsuitability and the absurdity of the proposal
put forward, for a work of extreme difficulty as is the one in question; but the
explanations and the clarifications served no end at all, the aforesaid proposer
having declared his intention to send his proposal to the ministry. . . . I am totally
convinced that it is criminal to apply in a work of consolidation of a monumental
building, like the one in question, a new building system, which having been applied
for only twenty years, does not give us assurance of long duration and good results;

42 C. CALDERINI
even more that the system of reinforced concrete is based on the supposition that
the coefficient of expansion of iron is equal to that of concrete and in the supposi-
tion that iron closed in concrete does not suffer the modifications produced by
atmospheric agents and does not change structure due to the effect of vibrations
(SA7).
And again: Being excessively scrupulous, before sending this, I wanted to
consult the two people in Bologna most competent on the subject. I asked the
engineer Canevazzi who is a professor and director of the Scuola di Applicazione
[School of Engineering] and author of one of the most appreciated books on the
theory of reinforced concrete. When I submitted the proposal of making the new
pillars of Sant’Antonino in reinforced concrete, I was rewarded with great success
of making him laugh. Then I asked the engineer Attilio Muggia, professor of
Structural Mechanics (and thus also of reinforced concrete) of this Scuola di
Applicazione, as well as designer and builder of important and praiseworthy
buildings in reinforced concrete; he too started laughing at the proposal before

him and asked me who had had such a rash idea. (SA7)
So too, this proposal was abandoned.

In 1918, the architect from Piacenza Giulio Ulisse. Arata was entrusted with a
new project. His attention was focused on the building system of the tower and, in
particular, on the system of pendentives. He observed that this system could not be
effective: the loads could not be equally distributed between the central columns and
the corner pillars (Summer, 1989). For this reason, the consolidation solutions that
he proposed were mainly aimed at obtaining a better distribution of the loads
between the columns and the pillars at the base of the tower. Besides taking into
consideration the remaking of the eight brick columns with new stone columns, he
proposed replacing the massive wooden mounting supporting the bells with a new
iron structure, resting on the four corners of the square base of the tower. In this
way, at least a part of the loads would have been transferred to the four corner
pillars. Furthermore, Arata proposed consolidating the foundations with a robust
connection in reinforced concrete (Figure 4), placed in the spaces between the
foundations of the columns and of the pillars, ‘‘and with a double hooping that
must bind the pillars themselves and rest on the ground below previously tamped
with the system of concrete injections’’ (Arata, 1942, XLV). This project was
approved, but once again it was not implemented.
In 1922 the Genio Civile was appointed to study yet another consolidation
project for the tower. The head of the section of the Genio Civile in Piacenza,
Domenico Blesio, drew up a report in March 1923. He reported the crack pattern of
the structure, once again pointing out how the vertical cracks visible on the tower were
particularly widespread at the intersection between the octagonal body and the square
base. Excluding the possibility of a subsidence of the foundation (by the fact that the
arches built on the columns did not show any signs of failure), he attributed the
damage mainly to the poor quality of the masonry. In his opinion, however, there
was insufficient evidence to evaluate the safety of the structure:
Expressing a firm opinion about the stability or not of the tower in question does
not seem either prudent or serious to me. The evidence from which to be able to
deduce the degree of stability of the building in relation to a nearby or far off
hazard of ruin is too vague and superficial. (SA8)

Connections in reinforced
concrete.
Hooping of the foundations
of the fulcrums through a
“jacket” of reinforced con-
crete.
Concrete injections.
Figure 4. Tower of S. Antonino. Schematic illustration of the consolidation project by Giulio Ulisse. Arata,
1918 (Arata, 1942).
Pointing out the difficulties in evaluating the safety of the structure, Blesio focused his
attention on possible variations of its actual equilibrium:
. . . the doubt may be raised that an occasional cause, even of minimal size such as for
instance a slight earthquake, could disturb that equilibrium that is now maintained;
it would not even be without grounds the doubt that, to disturb the equilibrium, it
would be sufficient the vibration alone produced by the taking up once more of the
uninterrupted ringing of the bells, for some time now rung tocsin. (SA8)
To face these uncertainties, the Genio Civile designed this consolidation intervention:
inside the tower a framed structure in reinforced concrete, made up of a stairway and
four stanchions connected by a series of rings, was to be built; iron brackets connected
to the rings should have penetrated the masonry ‘‘to grip it like clamps and keep it
tightly and solidly connected to the rings themselves’’ (SA8); the stanchions and the

44 C. CALDERINI
stairs should have risen to the supporting level for the bells, where a floor in reinforced
concrete was to be built; the whole structure should have been supported by four
beams of great stiffness resting on the square masonry at the base of the tower
(Figure 5). Besides this, consolidation of the foundations was envisaged. Neither
was this project implemented. There is no certain news of the reasons why the project
was not carried out. The only reference to the project is in a letter of the director of the
Regional Office of Monuments to the parish priest of the basilica, dated February 22,
1926, in which it is written that ‘‘one shall not proceed with any preliminary act
Figure 5. Tower of S. Antonino. Schematic illustration of the consolidation project by the Genio Civile,
1923 (SA8).

without prior authorisation from this Superintendence, to which as Your Lordship

knows by law due protection and supervision falls within its competence’’ (SA9). It is
probable that, also in this case, the project was blocked by the local protection
authorities.
Despite the fierce debate and the great number of consolidation projects drawn
up in those years, the tower did not undergo any intervention until 1983 (Bertelli,
1985), when new alarms were sent out. Recently, widespread consolidation interven-
tions were carried out and the two orders of double lancet windows were finally
reopened.
4.2. The Assertion of Modernity: the S. Gaudenzio Cupola in Novara

There are two reasons for interest in the history of failures and consolidation of
the S. Gaudenzio basilica. In first place, failures and consolidation interventions went
on for more than two decades, in a succession that led to identify a relationship
between the two. In second place, the consolidation interventions were designed by
one of the most influential Italian engineers of his time, Arturo Danusso, called on
explicitly since he was an expert in reinforced concrete.
Analysis of the history of consolidation of the cupola of S. Gaudenzio cannot
ignore certain historical explanations. Firstly, S. Gaudenzio cupola was built by
Alessandro Antonelli between 1844 and 1888, thus being relatively new when it was
consolidated in the 1930s. This may in part justify the particularly invasive and
disrespectful approach employed in the restoration. Furthermore, it should be noted
that the buildings designed by Antonelli, even though being some of the best expres-
sions of masonry art in Europe, appeared undoubtedly audacious for their epoch (and
even for us). Since they were built, their structural safety has been widely discussed.
After the collapse of the Sanctuary of Boca (one of the last buildings designed by
Antonelli) in 1907, new uncertainties about the safety of Antonelli’s buildings
emerged, inducing those concerned to check and consolidate both the ‘‘Mole
Antonelliana’’ in Turin and the cupola of S. Gaudenzio in Novara.
Figure 6 shows the main parts of the structure and the terms used to describe
them. The building is 121 m high and the diameter at the base is approximately 20 m.
The structure is made of brick masonry (except for the small dome which is made of
granite), with numerous metallic bindings. The Fabbrica Lapidea, which will be
mentioned many times in the text, is the organization that has administered the
basilica since the sixteenth century, overseeing the building, maintenance and func-
tional modifications.
Antonelli’s cupola was built above the pre-existing body of the S. Gaudenzio
basilica designed by Pellegrino Tibaldi during the sixteenth century. The first alarm
for the structural safety of the building was felt between 1882 and 1883, when some
cracks were found in the structures at the base of the cupola, in particular in the large
pre-existing base pillars (Daverio, 1940). Antonelli himself took care of monitoring
and consolidating the structure, partly rebuilding the pillars and/or underpinning
them. The cracks, however, raised many doubts about the safety of the structure,
and, more in general, about Antonelli’s work. While he was consolidating the struc-
ture, numerous opinions were requested, a commission of experts was nominated in
1882 and an anonymous letter requesting the sending of a technical commission to
Novara ‘‘to witness the imminent and very serious danger’’ was sent to the Minister of

46 C. CALDERINI
Spire
1stphase of damage
Small dome
1927–1930
2ndphase of damage
1934–1937
External dome
Upper internal dome
Lower internal dome
3rdphase of damage
1937–1939
Base arches
Pendentives
1stConsolidation intervention (1930–32)
2ndConsolidation intervention (1937)
3rdConsolidation intervention (1938)
Figure 6. Section of the S. Gaudenzio basilica (from Caselli, 1877), containing the names attributed to the
main parts of the building and information on the phases of damage and the consolidation interventions.
the Interior in 1883 (Daverio, 1940, p. 130). It is worth noting that, in this period,
Antonelli continuously demanded freedom of action, because he had ‘‘the responsi-
bility for the work that was being carried out in the basilica’’ (Daverio, 1940, p.138),
while the administration claimed the very same responsibility ‘‘in as much as one is

dealing with public safety’’ (Daverio, 1940, p. 138). The consolidation works ended,
despite everything, in 1885. Then, there followed a period of calm in which doubts
about the safety of the building were no longer raised.
A new phase of alarms began as a consequence of the sudden collapse of the
Sanctuary of Boca, on August 29, 1907. Public opinion was struck by the news and
the local press fomented a sentiment of mistrust among the population towards the
building. There were similar reactions two years later, following the great earthquake
of Messina and Reggio Calabria (Daverio, 1940). The memory of the uncertainties
that emerged in the previous century about the structural safety of Antonelli’s
cupola was still alive. The technical reports written in those years were all aimed at
testifying how the ancient cracks had not worsened and how, in general, the static
conditions of the structure had not changed (Daverio, 1940). Actually, a totally new
problem was emerging: that of the failures on the small dome (Figure 6 — first phase
of damage).
The first failures on the small dome, consisting in slight cracking in the joints of
the granite masonry structure, were found at the end of the nineteenth century. They
worsened progressively until 1922, when cracks in the highest columns first appeared
(SG1). The causes of the failures were traced back to the oscillations produced at the
top of the cupola by the wind and the effect of freeze–thawing. In March 1927, having
ascertained the continual progress of the cracks, the situation was deemed alarming.
The Fabbrica Lapidea decided on the urgency of the repairs and the need to consult ‘‘a
technical specialist’’ (SG2). The technician chosen was Arturo Danusso. The motiva-
tions for the choice are very interesting: he was ‘‘a lecturer of Structural Mechanics at
the Polytechnic of Milan’’ (SG3); he was part ‘‘of the commissions that were called on
to arrange for the stability of the tower of Pisa, the Mole Antonelliana, the Basilica of
Oropa and all the other monuments whose stability has given some worries up till
now’’ (SG1); finally, he was a ‘‘specialist and professor of calculus of reinforced
concrete’’ (SG2). Danusso examined the dome for the first time on July 1927. He
attributed the damage to the oscillations produced by the wind and to the freeze-thaw
and he merely suggested ‘‘keeping the monument under close observation’’ (SG1). In
October 1930, having ascertained ‘‘the disastrous state of the spire’’ (SG1), Danusso
decided to intervene. Its first consolidation project (Figure 6 — first consolidation
intervention) consisted of: demolition and rebuilding of the spire with a new rein-
forced concrete structure; consolidation of the underlying structures with an internal
structure in reinforced concrete (Figures 7 and 8); consolidation of the eight masonry
pillars at the base of the small dome with a ‘‘jacket’’ in reinforced concrete (Figure 8).
These works were carried out from 1931 to 1932. In the final report of 1932, Danusso
illustrated the project criteria (Daverio, 1940). For the safety evaluation of the existing
structures and for the designing of the new structures he took into account gravity and
wind loads (with a uniform pressure of 1500 N/m2), both considered as static forces.
The reinforcing structures were designed in order to ‘‘withstand the weight of both the
new and old structure’’ (Daverio, 1940, p. 158). The old structure was supposed ‘‘to
have no static efficiency’’, since it was ‘‘sent honourably into retirement for what
concerns its static role’’ (Daverio, 1940, p. 158). This assumption enabled him to
design the new structure autonomously: ‘‘the calculus that directly ensues from this
conception does not in itself have any criterion of newness that is worth particular
reference. It has been carried out, as due, with total respect for the ministerial rules and
regulations for works in reinforced concrete’’ (Daverio, 1940, p. 158). Danusso’s first

48 C. CALDERINI
1st consolidation interven-

tion by Danusso (1930)
2nd consolidation interven-

tion by Danusso (1937)
Figure 7. S. Gaudenzio basilica.Scheme of the two consolidation interventions of the small dome designed
by Danusso, 1930–1937 (from Biagini, 1939).
project was accepted with resignation, faced with the urgent nature of the intervention
and the scientific rigor that the calculations seemed to guarantee. The chairman of the
Fabbrica Lapidea wrote in 1931: ‘‘The objection that comes easily to mind is the
following: but with this overload won’t the resistance and the stability of the lower
structure be compromised? One could answer negatively with a clear conscience,
because that is what the calculations made tell us’’ (SG1).

Figure 8. S. Gaudenzio basilica. Photographs of the works for the realization of the first consolidation
intervention designed by Danusso in 1931. Left: the iron reinforcement for the consolidation of the upper
part of the small dome; right, the ‘‘jacket’’ for the internal pillars at the base of the small dome (A.S.N.).
The appearance of new damage in 1934 marked the beginning of a new period of
alarms. Cracks were found in some capitals of the internal columns of the two lower
orders of the small dome. Between 1934 and 1935 these cracks widened and extended
to nearly all the capitals (Figure 6 — second phase of damage) (SG4, SG5). Following
an in situ examination by the Genio Civile (SG6), in 1935 the Fabbrica Lapidea
decided to undertake new consolidation interventions. Danusso was called in once
again. In 1936, he presented the draft of a new project. Seen as the logical continuation
of the previous project, it consisted of a cylindrical internal structure in reinforced
concrete built in correspondence of the two lower orders of columns of the small
dome. This project raised doubts of a different nature: from an aesthetic point of view,
it was feared that the new structure would alter the external aspect of the small dome,
reducing its transparency; from the static point of view, it was feared that the addition
of new structures in reinforced concrete would further increase the loads burdening
the underlying masonry structures (SG5). Danusso responded to the aesthetic doubts
by introducing openings in the cylindrical reinforced concrete structure. To the static
doubts he replied that only a ‘‘spoonful of reinforced concrete’’ would be added to the
structure (SG5). This project was approved in March 1937 (SG7) (Figure 6 — second
consolidation intervention). In its definitive version, the new reinforcing structure
consisted of pillars in reinforced concrete built behind the existing internal columns,
‘‘suitably connected with cross-beams and transversally linked by a helicoid, intended
to form the load bearing structure of the new stairway’’ (SG7) and resting on a
reinforced concrete plate that would transfer the loads to the underlying structures
(Figures 7 and 9). The project also envisaged the consolidation of a new series of

50 C. CALDERINI
Figure 9. S. Gaudenzio basilica. Schematic illustrations of the second project by Danusso for the consolida-
tion of the small dome, 1937 (SG19).
masonry pillars at the base of the small dome, which would have been wrapped in a
jacket of reinforced concrete analogously to what had been done for the eight pillars
consolidated in 1931 (Figure 10). Finally, the granite internal and external columns of
the two lower orders would be connected with radial and transversal metallic elements
(Figure 9) (SG7). The work started in the summer of 1937. In the autumn of that year,
with work in progress, there was the decisive alarm for the history of the dome.
Starting from September, small cracks opened up in the four big arches at the base
of the cupola, in correspondence with the keystones and the bolts of the tie-rods (SG5,
SG8) (Figure 6 — third damage phase). Danusso was questioned on these cracks.
He suggested completion of the work in progress and requested the installation of
instruments to monitor the structure (SG8). In October 1937, the instruments,

Figure 10. S. Gaudezio basilica. Schematic illustrations of the second project by Danusso for the consolida-
tion of the small dome: the new ‘‘jacket’’ for the internal pillars, 1936 (SG20).
extensometers, and deflectometers for measurement of the deformations were

installed. On October 29, the following notice was publicly displayed:
The reading of the measuring instruments placed on the base arches and pillars of
the Cupola of S. Gaudenzio from the morning of the 27th signal a rapid deteriora-
tion. Despite it being our duty to point out that one is dealing with very delicate
measurements that many unknown causes may invalidate, as it is none of the
instruments shows values in open contradiction with the values shown by the

52 C. CALDERINI
others and none of them advises optimism. The technicians in charge of the work,
despite noticing the total absence of macroscopic cracks usually visible in masonry
buildings even far from ruins, do not think it possible to assess with what speed the
structure is deteriorating and they cannot give any guarantee of stability even for
the immediate future. (SG9)
The announcement concluded with the invitation to the residents within a radius of
90 m of the basilica to leave their homes (SG9). Danusso then gave instructions for
an urgent intervention (SG8): the four arches at the base of Antonelli’s structure were
to be shored with a wooden structure; the four pillars supporting the previously
mentioned arches were to be hooped with metallic tie-rods supported by reinforced
concrete bolts (SG10) (Figure 11); supervisory teams were to read the instruments
constantly. The shoring work was carried out between November and December of
1937, while the hooping was concluded in the spring of 1938 (Figure 6 — third
consolidation intervention).
The uncertainty about the behavior of the structure in that period was great. At
the end of December 1937 the wood shoring seemed no longer effective, since the
wedges appeared to have slackened (Daverio, 1940, SG11). The instruments continu-
ously found new deformations. New damage was found on the arches and, for the first
time, on the pendentives connecting the dome to the base arches (SG11, SG12). New
instruments were introduced in order to measure the diametral deformations of the
springer ring of the lower internal dome (SG11). New interventions were carried out,
such as the consolidation of the pendentives and the construction of a contrast shoring
of the previously mentioned springer ring (SG13). Danusso attributed the damage that
occurred between 1937 and 1938 to: Antonelli’s ‘‘peculiar audacity’’; bad quality of
foundation ground; demolition of some parts of the structure for the introduction of a
staircase (SG10). Evidently replying to a doubt raised by someone, he wrote in 1937:
It has been asked whether the weight added to the spire in the previous restorations
might be an accomplice to the present movements. To answer it is sufficient to
think that the overall addition for the two restorations was of about three hundred
tonnes, while the load borne by the set of four arches was of about 7,600 tonnes; so
the arches underwent an increase of 4% in round figures, immensely smaller than
even the tiniest safety margin that a builder, even the very audacious Antonelli,
could have kept to. (SG14)
Although some doubts about Danusso’s work had already appeared in previous
years, it was from 1939 that doubts began to be raised publicly. In a report from the
chairman of the Fabbrica Lapidea it is said that, even though Danusso’s competence is
not disputed, ‘‘it does not seem convenient that such a weight of responsibility should
burden just one man’’ (SG15). Thereafter, a fierce polemic was begun by Arialdo
Daverio, a technician of the Fabbrica Lapidea entrusted for some time with the
reading of the monitoring instruments. Daverio’s criticism was aimed both at these
instruments, deemed unreliable, and the interventions designed by Danusso, judged as
unjustified and harmful. Daverio (1940) pointed out the following:
The measuring instruments had recorded deformations incompatible with the state
of cracking of the masonry (SG16). The deformations recorded by the instruments,
in the order of millimeters, derived mainly from temperature variations (this was

Figure 11. S. Gaudenzio basilica. Third project by Danusso for the hooping of great pillars at the base of the
structure, 1937–1938.Top: plan for the overall project (SG21); bottom left: a schematic illustration detailing
the reinforced concrete bolts (from Biagini, 1939); bottom right: an historical photograph with the iron tie-
rods introduced and, on the background, the shoring of the base arches (from Biagini, 1939).
shown by the diagrams of temperature change), but even by defects in installation of

the instruments and by blows provoked by the workmen (SG17). The significant
deformations recorded on the days with strong wind, even though not credible in
quantitative terms, testified to the sensitivity of the structure to this force .
The damage found on the small dome in the 1920s, which had led to the demolition
of the spire and to the consolidations of 1930 to 1932, had been caused by the
chemical action of the sulfur used by Antonelli to connect the metallic and stone
elements of the structure and not by the oscillations induced by the wind.
54 C. CALDERINI
The interventions carried out in 1930 to 1932 and then in 1936 to 1937, had not only
increased the weight but also the stiffness of the higher part of the structure, modifying
its dynamic behavior. The succession of damage found after 1932 was therefore a direct
consequence of the interventions of consolidation carried out (‘‘The cupola now suffers
from the orthopaedic parts that were imposed on it’’ (SG5)).
The damage found in the arches at the base of the cupola in 1937 was to be
attributed, beside the modifications undergone by the structure, to temperature
changes. This could have been demonstrated by the fact that the winter between
1937 and 1938, epoch of the great alarm, was the first in which, after more than
thirty years, the basilica was not heated artificially (Daverio 1940, 232). It might
have been hypothesized that the breakages in correspondence with the bolts that
were found in that period derived from the excess pull in the tie-rods produced by
the decrease in temperature.
In conclusion, Daverio thought that the alarm of 1937 was not justified and that
the shoring urgently carried out was ‘‘the monument to fear’’ (SG5). He believed in the
structure’s safety (his trust in the work of Antonelli was boundless) and he was
convinced that, despite the modifications undergone, it was still able to ‘‘tolerate the
new load for an indefinite number of years’’ (SG5). However, for years he asked for
the demolition of the reinforced concrete work designed by Danusso, offering as his
motivations the fear of the effect of a windstorm or earthquake and the value of
Antonelli’s architecture (SG16). His proposal was never accepted.
Following the great alarm of 1937 and the urgent measures taken, starting from
1939 the structure did not seem to show new evident signs of damage (SG18). Despite
the polemic in progress, the Fabbrica Lapidea and Municipality decided once again to
appoint Danusso so that he could design the ‘‘definitive’’ consolidation of the struc-
ture (SG18). In an article of 1939 by the Chief Engineer of the Technical Office in
Novara (Biagini, 1939) trust was once again placed in the work carried out:
Consolidating the monument, with a broader and more rational conception, was
already in the intentions of the same Antonelli, who had studied, with his art and
his intuition, suitable and adequate works. The more general vision of the problem,
that the new facts have thrown light on, and the resources of modern techniques,
certainly give to its resolution a character and a direction that we must deem the
most solicitous and appropriate. (Biagini, 1939, p. 157)
In the following years, during the war, Danusso continued with his studies of
the structure and finally, armed with a survey, he elaborated new calculations.
Unfortunately, these calculations have not survived. In 1947 Danusso designed a
last intervention of consolidation, consisting in the formation of a ring in reinforced
concrete in the springer ring of the lower internal dome. The polemic about this and
the previous interventions of consolidation went on until 1954, but no new damage
was found on the structure.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Reinforced concrete owes its success in the first half of the twentieth century to
two main technical reasons: structural effectiveness (resistance to traction and bend-
ing actions) and plasticity (intended as capacity of the material to take different

forms). However, more complex reasons led to the widespread use of this material in
restoration.
The theories of restoration of the epoch, in particular those of historical–
philological and scientific restoration, affirming the concept of conservation and
recognizability of the interventions, supplied a theoretical legitimacy for the new
material. It allowed one to perform purely technical–functional interventions. It was
clearly recognizable as modern and it stood out from the original materials of the
building, not giving cause to falsifications. It was a material ‘‘without history’’ which
allowed one to carry out neutral interventions from a stylistic point of view.
As a consequence of the division that occurred at the end of the nineteenth
century between the artistic–formal and technical–functional aspects of buildings,
structures began to have a purely functional role. They were considered as merely
technical supports for architecture and art and, for these reason, they were not judged
‘‘worthy’’ of being preserved. In the case of the tower of S. Antonino, no doubt was
placed on the replacing the existing columns with new structural elements; rather the
doubts were relative to the practical execution of the intervention, the type of material
to use and the risk of altering the internal architectonic space. In the case of the cupola
of S. Gaudenzio, the choice of demolishing and rebuilding the spire raised no objec-
tions; the discussion was limited to certain aesthetic aspects relative to the fact that the
new structure, together with the consolidation of the base of the small dome, limited
the lightness and architectonic transparency of the building’s shape. In general, lack of
attribution of value to the structure and the consequent indifference for its preserva-
tion, produced interventions that greatly altered existing structures, both in material
terms (demolitions of parts) and in functional terms (e.g., introduction of new
structural elements, creation of additional structures).
The achievement of the science of engineering led to the assertion of a modern
concept of safety, based on models and quantifiable parameters rather than on the
sharing of rules of thumb and trust in the experience of the great builders. A new
technical class of engineers was progressively entrusted by the state with the respon-
sibility for the safety of monumental buildings. Take the history of the S. Gaudenzio
basilica. In the nineteenth century, while Antonelli was still alive, great trust was
placed in the builder. All doubts about the stability of the building were overcome by
virtue of his experience and art. When new doubts were raised at the end of the 1920s,
trust went to a professor of Structural Mechanics, a declared expert on reinforced
concrete. Calling on a technician such as Arturo Danusso to intervene, the institutions
made a choice that was in some way binding: it was most likely that a lecturer in
Structural Mechanics and expert on reinforced concrete would intervene with the
tools of his science and technique. Indeed, this is what happened.
The affirmation of science of engineering led to the abandoning of the tradi-
tional art of building but, at the same time, to the abandoning of research and
experimentation with masonry structures. The loss of knowledge that resulted from
this was the premise for many of the interventions in reinforced concrete performed
in that epoch. In the case of the S. Gaudenzio basilica, Danusso’s striving to proceed
with ‘‘calculations’’ and scientific ‘‘instruments’’ is evident. It is an approach that is
methodologically shareable. But it is necessary to recognize that even today, with the
great evolution that has characterized the modeling of masonry structures in the
past forty years, we would still have great difficulty in making reliable assessments
of the structural behavior of a complex structure such as that of S. Gaudenzio.

56 C. CALDERINI
Danusso put great faith in his calculations, but in any case he tended, at least
initially in the consolidation of the small dome, to make the masonry a dead weight
supported by reinforced concrete structures. In this way, he could limit himself to
calculating only the strengthening structures, over which he felt he had full control.
The monitoring instruments, of which he continually asked responses, gave him
contrasting information with the visibly recognizable failures on the structure. He
trusted the monitoring instruments more than the traditional visual diagnosis.
Independently of whether one shares this approach or not, it is necessary to observe
that the monitoring needs models which allow one to correctly interpret the mea-
surements recorded, otherwise the information that it supplies to us has no meaning
at all. From this emerges the great lack of knowledge that is at the basis of many of
the choices made.
The difficulty in placing masonry structures inside the engineering sciences, the
lack of analytical methods for the assessment of safety and the progressive loss of the
empirical knowledge of the art of building generated many uncertainties and fears in
those who were at the time called on to guarantee the safety of historical monuments.
The tool to overcome these uncertainties and fears was technique. With reinforced
concrete, masonry structures could be caged in, forced with ‘‘orthopedic’’ interven-
tions to follow a predefined behavior, conducted forcibly into the field of engineered
structures.
REFERENCES
Albenga, G. 1940. Relazione Tecnica, Relativa ai Lavori di Rinforzo Della Cupola Della Mole
Antonelliana. Torino, Italia: Archivio Storico Municipale di Torino, senza collocazione.
Alotto, D. 1986. Antonio Giberti (1883–1963). Consolidamenti e Restauri. Politecnico di Torino
Degree Thesis. Torino, Italia.
Annoni, A. 1923. Note sul cemento armato nei restauri. Ingegneria II(3): 11.
Arata, U. 1942. Ricostruzioni e Restauri. Milano, Italia: Hoepli.
Barucci, C. 2004. Etica, statica, estetica. Modelli per l’architettura antisismica dopo il terremoto
del 1908. Parametro 251: 32–37.
Benvenuto, E. 1991. An Introduction to the History of Structural Mechanics. New York, NY:
Springer Verlag.
Bertelli, L. 1985. Sant’Antonino, il restauro. In Gotico, Neogotico, Ipergotico. Architettura e Arti
Decorative a Piacenza, 1865–1915, ed. M. Dezzi Bardeschi. Piacenza, Italia: Comune di Piacenza.
Biagini, P. 1939. Restauri alla cupola di S. Gaudenzio. Il Cemento Armato – Le Industrie del
Cemento 9 (Settembre): 152–157.
Boito, C. 1884. I restauratori. Firenze: Barbera.
Calderini, C. 2000. I monumenti della paura: cultura e tecnica del cemento armato nel restauro dei
monumenti in Italia (1900–1945). Politecnico di Torino Degree Thesis. Torino, Italia.
Calderini, C. 2003. Cultura e tecnica del cemento armato nel restauro dei monumenti in Italia
(1900–1945). Palladio 32 (Dicembre–Luglio): 92–103.
Carbonara, G., ed. 1981. Restauro e Cemento in Architettura. Roma, Italia: Aitec.
Caselli, L. 1877. La cupola della basilica di S. Gaudenzio in Novara. In L’Ingegneria Civile e le
Arti Industriali, 145–147; 161–166.
Daverio, A. 1940 [1998]. La cupola di S. Gaudenzio: l’opera del massimo architetto italiano del
secolo 19. Alessandro Antonelli. In Per San Gaudenzio, ed. G. Peagno, Ravenna, Italia: Valerio
Maioli Impianti.
Decreto e Circolare del Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione no. 633 bis del 21 Luglio 1882. Sui
restauri degli edifici monumentali.

Esponda Cascajares, M. 2004. Evolución de los criterios de intervención con hormigón armado en
la restauración de edificios históricos en Me´xico y en España. Universidad Politécnica de
Cataluña Doctoral Thesis. Cataluña, España.
Gavini, C. I. 1923. Il cemento armato nel restauro dei monumenti. Ingegneria II(2): 30–34.
Giberti, A. 1928. Conferenza sui restauri di: abbazia di S. Andrea a Vercelli, Duomo di Torino,
Campanile della chiesa parrocchiale di Brusasco. Manuscript. Comunicazione tenuta presso la
Società degli Architetti e degli Ingegneri di Milano il 7 Settembre 1928. Archivio Privato
Giberti. In Alotto, D. 1986. Antonio Giberti (1883–1963). Consolidamentie restauri.
Politecnico di Torino Doctoral Thesis. Torino, Italia.
Giovannoni, G. 1931. Sull’applicazione dei mezzi costruttivi moderni ed in particolare del
cemento armato, nel restauro dei monumenti. L’Industria Italiana del Cemento III(12):
363–367.
Giovannoni, G. 1932. La conferenza di Atene per il restauro dei monumenti. Bollettino d’Arte.
Marzo 1932: 408–420.
Giovannoni, G. 1933. La restauration des mounments en Itale. In La Conservation des

Monuments d’Art e d’Histoire, Paris: Institut de Coopération Intellectuelle, 60–66.
Léon, P. 1933. La restauration des monuments en France. In La Conservation des Monuments
d’Art e d’Histoire. Paris, France: Institut de Coopération Intellectuelle, 51–59.
Léon, P. 1951. La Vie des Monuments Français: Destruction, Restauration. Paris, France:
A. et J. Picard & C.
Lopez Otero, M. 1933. La fonction e la nature des matériaux de restauration. In La
Conservation des Monuments d’Art e d’Histoire. Paris, France: Institut de Coopération
Intellectuelle, 185–191.
Magnani Cianetti, M. 1981. Alfredo d’Andrade: l’uso del cemento nell’Attività delle prime
Soprintendenze. In Restauro e Cemento in Architettura, ed. G. Carbonara. Roma, Italia:
A.I.T.E.C.
Muggia, A. 1907. Fondazioni per agglomerato pneumatico nei terreni ghiaiosi e sabbiosi.
Giornale del Genio Civile. 73: 724–729
Pallot, E. 1997. L’utilisation du béton dans la restauration des monuments historiques.
Monumental 16: 49–55.
Paquet, P. 1933. Le ciment armé dans la restauration des monuments anciens. In La
Conservation des Monuments d’Art e d’Histoire. Paris, France: Institut de Coopération
Intellectuelle, 192–199.
Paravicini, T. V. 1883. Gli ingegneri del Genio Civile e la conservazione ed il restauro dei
monumenti architettonici. Il Politecnico XXXI: 73–77.
Pezzi, A.G. 2005. Tutela e Restauro in Abruzzo dall’Unità alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale
(1860–1940). Roma, Italia: Gangemi.
Placentino, M. P. and Torre, C. 1997. L’ uso del cemento armato nei restauri di consolidamento :
due esempi significativi nell’ Italia meridionale. Politecnico di Torino Degree Thesis. Torino,
Italia.
Pracchi, V. 1996. Il modo di restaurare. Le tecniche nel cantiere di restauro tra Otto e Novecento
e l’impiego del cemento armato. In Storia Delle Tecniche Murarie e Tutela del Costruito, ed.,
S. Della Torre, Milano, Italia: Guerini, 265–266.
Regio Decreto no. 193 del 18 Aprile 1909. Norme tecniche ed igieniche obbligatorie per le
riparazioni ricostruzioni e nuove costruzioni degli edifici pubblici e privati nei luoghi colpiti dal
terremoto del 28 dicembre 1908 e da altri precedenti elencati nel R. D. 15 Aprile 1909 e ne
designa i Comuni (Pubblicato sulla G. U. no. 95 del 22 Aprile 1909).
Sette, M. P. 2001. Il Restauro Architettonico. Quadro Storico. Torino, Italia: Utet.
Summer, L. 1989. La Basilica di Sant’Antonino a Piacenza e i consolidamento della sua torre
ottagonale. In I Materiali Metallici Negli Interventi di Restauro e Recupero Edilizio, ed. M. G.
Gimma. Roma, Italia: A.N.I.A.SPE.R.
The Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments. 1931. In La conservation des
monuments d’art e d’histoire, 1933. Paris: Institut de Coopération Intellectuelle, 402–407.

58 C. CALDERINI
Trenchi, A. 1898. Sui Restauri della Torre di Sant’Antonino: Opinioni. Piacenza, Italia:
Tipografia del Maino.
Vinardi, M. G. 1993. Alcuni consolidamenti di primo Novecento con strutture in cemento
armato in Piemonte. In Calcestruzzi antichi e moderni: cultura, storia, tecnologia, eds.
G. Biscontin and D. Mietto. Padova, Italia: Libreria Progetto.
Vinardi, M. G. 1997. Alcuni interventi di consolidamento nei primi anni del Novecento. In
Salviamo il Salvabile, ed. G. Tosti. Torino, Italia: Celid.
APPENDIX: ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS
S. Antonino Tower, Piacenza

SA1. Relazione di C. Guidotti del 1 Dicembre 1908. A.S.B., cartella 192. (In
questo documento Guidotti riportò l’insieme delle precedenti relazioni).

SA2. Relazione di C. Guidotti del 13 Marzo 1909. A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA3. Lettera di A. Germano all’Ispettore ai Monumenti del 23 Gennaio 1903.
A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA4. Lettera dell’Ufficio del Genio Civile di Piacenza alla Prefettura del 7 Luglio
1903. A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA5. Relazione sulle condizioni statiche della torre di S. Antonino con proposta di
consolidamento e restauro, di E. Righetti del 8 Aprile 1911. A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA6. Relazione sulle proposte concordate pei lavori più urgenti di consolidamento
della torre di S. Antonino in seguito alla visita fatta in luogo il 9 Giugno corrente anno, di
E. Righetti del 21 Giugno 1911. A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA7. Lettera del Soprintendente A. Germano al Ministero dell’Istruzione,
Direzione Antichità e Belle Arti, del 13 Febbraio 1912. A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA8. Relazione tecnica: Sulle condizioni statiche della torre della basilica di
S. Antonino in Piacenza, dichiarata monumento nazionale, e sui provvedimenti
relativi, dell’Ingegnere Capo del Genio Civile di Piacenza, del 20 Maggio 1923.
A.S.B., cartella 192.
SA9. Lettera del Soprintendente L. Corsini al parroco della Basilica di
Sant’Antonino del 22 Febbraio 1926. A.S.B., cartella 192.
Abbreviations: A.S.B., Archivio della Soprintendenza per i Beni Architettonici e
per il Paesaggio di Bologna.
BASILICA OF S. GAUDENZIO, NOVARA

SG1. Relazione del Presidente della Fabbrica Lapidea del 9 Ottobre 1931. A.S.N.,
Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 677.
SG2. Verbale dell’adunanza della Fabbrica Lapidea del 26 Marzo 1929: Relazione
dei lavori del 1927 e richiesta di contributo straordinario. A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di
Novara, parte III, busta 677.
SG3. Lettera della Fabbrica Lapidea al Comune di Novara del 14 Luglio 1927.
A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 677.
SG4. Relazione della Fabbrica Lapidea al Podestà di Novara del 11 Aprile 1939.
A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 676/2.
SG5. Appunti personali di Arialdo Daverio conservati presso l’Archivio di Alagna
Valsesia (NO).

SG6. Relazione del Corpo Reale del Genio Civile del 26 Luglio 1936. A.C.N.,
senza collocazione.
SG7. Verbale dell’adunanza della Fabbrica Lapidea del 31 Marzo 1937. A.S.N.,
Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 674.
SG8. Relazione non firmata del 30 Ottobre 1937. A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di
Novara, parte III, busta 676/2.
SG9. Comunicato del Comune di Novara del 29 Ottobre 1937. A.S.N., Fondo del
Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 674.
SG10. Lettera di Arturo Danusso al Podestà di Novara del 17 Ottobre 1937.
SG11. Lettera dell’Ingegnere Capo del Comune di Novara Ing. Biagini al Podestà
del 3 Gennaio 1938. A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 674.
SG12. Lettera del Comune di Novara ad Arturo Danusso del 2 Giugno 1938.
A.C.N., senza collocazione.

SG13. Lettera di Arturo Danusso al Commissario Prefettizio del 13 Agosto 1938.
A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 676.
SG14. Lettera di Arturo Danusso al Podestà di Novara del 18 Ottobre 1937.
SG15. Relazione del Presidente della Fabbrica Lapidea dell’11 Aprile 1939.
A.S.N. Fondo del Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 676/1.
SG16. Verbale dell’adunanza del Direttorio del Sindacato Fascista Ingegneri:
Cesare Rocca, della Provincia di Novara del 31 Luglio 1939. A.S.N., Fondo del
Comune di Novara, parte III, busta 676/1.
SG17. Relazione di Arialdo Daverio al Sindacato Fascista Ingegneri: Cesare
Rocca, della Provincia di Novara del 16 Maggio 1940. A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di
Novara, parte III, busta 678.
SG18. Verbale di una commissione provvisoria formata dal Podestà di Novara, da
Arturo Danusso, e da altri membri delle istituzioni del Comune, della Provincia, del
Sindacato e della Fabbrica Lapidea del 16 Maggio 1940. A.S.N., Fondo del Comune di
Novara, parte III, busta 676/1.
SG19. A.S.N., Fondo disegni e materiale iconografico, cassetta VII, n. 6.
Abbreviations: A.S.N., Archivio Storico di Novara; A.C.N., Archivio del
Comune di Novara.

Calderini2008 RC Interventions

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Calderini2008 RC Interventions

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [Laurentian University]

On: 09 September 2013, At: 02:42

International Journal of Architectural

Use of Reinforced Concrete in

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15583050701533521

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

USE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE IN PRESERVATION

KEY WORDS: reinforced concrete, restoration, strengthening techniques, retrofitting,

Received 23 January 2007; accepted 25 June 2007.

2. THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: CULTURE AND TECHNIQUE

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

The philological restoration theory, elaborated mainly by Camillo Boito, stated

2.1.1. The Conservation of a Monument is a Purely Technical Problem Camillo

The main goal of restoration is to preserve monuments: interventions of consolida-

Structural and technical interventions are fully legitimated.

2.1.2. Restoration Interventions Should be Recognizable (Falsification is not

— Camillo Boito, Questioni Pratiche di Belle Arti (1893, p. 14)

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

another reason for its success.

2.2. The Role of Technique and Engineering Science

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

Reinforced concrete owes its success to two main technical reasons:

2.2.1. Structural Effectiveness The resistance to traction and bending actions

. . . in giving compactness to crumbling walls (with injections of liquid concrete), in

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

2.2.2. Plasticity (Intended as Capacity of the Material to Take Different

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

preservation and safety of national monuments was initially assigned to the

It is a singular paradox that modern architecture, through the widespread use of

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

3. THE TECHNIQUE OF THE INTERVENTIONS

3.1. General Overview

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

3.2. The First Experimentation of the Technique in Restoration (1900–1915)

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

3.3. The Great Period of Restorations in Reinforced Concrete in Italy

3.3.1. Use of concrete as a binder As previously described, concrete is used with

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

3.3.2. Use of reinforced concrete to increase the resistant section of

3.3.3. Use of reinforced concrete to create elements resistant to

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

4. TWO CASE STUDIES

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

of the Regional Office of Monuments, consisted of rebuilding the masonry columns

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

Section of the column

Enlargement of the section

Enlargement of the section

Section of the column

Enlargement of the section

Righetti’s proposal consisted of placing a series of I-section iron beams connected

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

buildings in reinforced concrete; he too started laughing at the proposal before

So too, this proposal was abandoned.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

without prior authorisation from this Superintendence, to which as Your Lordship

4.2. The Assertion of Modernity: the S. Gaudenzio Cupola in Novara

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE 2(1): 25–59

Upper internal dome